WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011400280001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
CI WS 76-053
No. 0053/76
December 30, 1976
Copy N2 1461
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Fishing;
5 Europe
Germany; Spain; Portugal
6 Western Hemisphere
Cuba
CONTENTS
1 Asia
China; India; Philippines
Lebanon; Mauritius; South
Africa
may be
25X1
25X1
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CHINA 1 ., 2,
The Chinese agricultural conference
that closed on December 27 served-in
the absence of a functioning party Central
Committee-as a forum in which national
leaders addressed major political and
economic issues. The conference, which
began on December 10, brought to Peking
over 5,000 agricultural specialists and
local party leaders.
Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's
speech dealt primarily with political goals
that have apparently been set for 1977.
Foremost among these-apart from con-
tinued criticism of the four purged
leftists-is the plan to conduct a rectifi-
cation campaign of local leadership bodies.
Hua announced this campaign in 1975,
but it encountered stiff opposition from
leftist leaders and was the focus of
many local disputes this year.
The revived campaign-which will
review the qualifications of local leaders
and accordingly re-educate, reassign, or
fire them-is likely to take into account
the political affiliation of local officials
and party members. Hua's announcement
that local people's congresses will be held
next year to reconstitute local
revolutionary committees-local govern-
ment organizations-suggests that
changes will be numerous throughout
China.
The revolutionary committees have not
been systematically reorganized since
they were created at the end of the
Cultural Revolution; they include many
leftists. Hua's charge, in his conference
speech, that the leftists recruited party
members lacking proper qualifications
implies that even the lowest levels of party
organization will be affected. Changes in
local party organization will in turn serve
as an important preliminary to the
reorganization of the party Central Com-
mittee.
Other conference speakers, led by Vice
Premier Chen Yung-kuei, reaffirmed key
elements of the program for modernizing
agriculture announced in late 1975. These
include plans to expand model
agricultural areas, increase farmland
capital construction, and complete
mechanization of agriculture by 1980.
The attention given the conference
suggests that China's leaders are counting
on a successful agricultural program as a
spur to other key sectors of the economy.
Balkan Relations - -91 Chi Peng-fei, a high-ranki g men(ber
of China's National People's Congress
and a former foreign minister, last week
completed a trip to Romania and
Yugoslavia that underlined again the im-
portance Peking attaches to good
relations with the two independent-
minded Balkan countries. The trip follow-
ed by less than a month a visit by Soviet
party chief Brezhnev to both countries.
Chinese press treatment of the Roma-
nian stop was unusually detailed and
positive. Talks between Chi and the
Romanians were described as "warm and
cordial." In a banquet speech, Chi noted
China's admiration for Romania's
"revolutionary spirit of defying brute
force," a phrase he had first used in 1974
to characterize Peking's enthusiasm for
Romanian attempts to resist Soviet
domination.
A high-level Romanian delegation that
visited China at the same time was given
exceptionally warm treatment by the
Chinese, including a meeting with Chair-
man Hua Kuo-feng. Vice Foreign
Minister Yu Chan took time off from his
tasks as Peking's chief negotiator at the
Sino-Soviet border talks to accompany
the visiting Romanians on a two-day tour.
Chi's visit to Yugoslavia was handled
by the Chinese in lower key, and there
were signs of disagreement on some
issues, notably over Belgrade's apparent
endorsement of US-Soviet "detente."
Nonetheless, the disagreements were not
serious enough to prevent generally
positive press treatment of Sino-Yugoslav
relations.
In a banquet speech, Chi praised
Yugoslavia for "nonalignment" and for
its vigilance against "hegemonism," a
slap at the Soviets. As if to underscore
these points, Chinese media quoted from
a recent statement by the Yugoslav
defense minister calling for strengthened
defenses in the event of "new conditions"
in the region, implying China's approval
for what it interprets as increased
Yugoslav concern about Soviet inten-
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~ 4,- / (~o
headed by a chief minister who had once
been a protege of the Prime Minister, fell
earlier this month under pressure from
Sanjay Gandhi's followers.
The Gandhis still face problems in two
important states. In Tamil Nadu, a local
party probably remains stronger than the
Congress Party, and the Prime Minister
continues to keep the state under direct
central rule.
In West Bengal, the chief minister,
although a Congress Party member, is at
odds with the Gandhis. He appears to
have survived an attempt to oust him,
presumably because the Prime Minister
concluded that blatant interference in the
state's politics would create too many
problems, including possible rioting. The
US embassy nonetheless believes the chief
minister's days in office are numbered.
government and by sympathetic courts
not inclined to honor Muslim claims to
the land.
Disunity and the absence of strong
leadership in the Muslim community have
been further impediments to an accom-
modation. The Muslim leaders who par-
ticipated in the Libyan talks are the most
radical and vocal of several groups and do
not necessarily speak for the whole
Muslim community. At the same time,
the more conservative traditional leaders,
who might accept a fairly moderate settle-
ment, are no longer accepted by the
younger and more militant Muslim ac-
tivists.
Marcos' tentative concessions ap-
parently were forced by threats from
Libyan President Qadhafi to renew his
support of the Moro National Libera-
tion Front as well as to cancel his visit
to Manila originally scheduled for next
month. The visit has now been announced
for April and is keyed to the signing of a
The installation of new governments in
the Indian states of Gujarat and Orissa
reflects the success of Prime Minister
Gandhi and her son Sanjay in gaining
control over state politics in most of the
country.
New Delhi had relatively limited con-
trol over state politics in the past. Local
politicians not only were able to modify
central government actions in their states,
but could use their local power to in-
fluence central decision-making in
general.
Last week, a state government headed
by one of the Prime Minister's followers
was formed in Gujarat, ending nine
months of direct central rule there. The
previous government-a coalition that did
not include her Congress Party-fell
because of defections induced by the
Prime Minister's party. Gandhi kept the
state under central ruUe until her
henchmen were able to organize enough
support to form a viable government.
In Orissa, a new government is to be in-
stalled next week under a chief minister
who may be closer to the Prime Minister's
son than to her. The last government,
New Delhi
I n d I a
GUJARAT\ NI~ENGALN
' r t ORISSA
Jar
PHILIPPINES /-~-
Despite a tentative agreement in princi-
ple reached in Libya last week between
President Marcos' government and the
rebel Moro National Liberation Front, a
final solution to the four-year-old Muslim
insurgency in the southern Philippines
may prove as elusive as ever.
The government has ordered a cease-
fire, but it is not clear to what extent
either side has complied. Details of the
settlement plan, moreover, remain to be
worked out at a follow-up meeting in
February. Efforts to flesh out the agree-
ment are likely to be contentious, and the
cease-fire could come unraveled in the
process.
The basic problems underlying the in-
surgency are extremely difficult to
resolve. Cultural and religious differences
created simmering unrest in the Muslim
areas long before martial law was
declared four years ago. Tensions were
significantly raised in the late 1960s and
early 1970s by growing pressure from
land-hungry Christian Filipinos for access
to land traditionally held by Muslims.
Christian incursions were abetted by the
final agreement.
LEBANON 5 2 f'
4f
The Lebanese parliament, meeting for
the first time since the cease-fire took
effect in October, voted unanimously on
December 24 to grant Prime Minister
Salim al-Huss broad emergency powers
to rule by decree for six months. In his ad-
dress to parliament before the vote,
al-Huss called for rebuilding the army and
security forces and announced that he will
establish a council for economic
reconstruction and development.
The Prime Minister is likely to use his
new authority to suspend the right of
assembly and to impose press censorship.
According to one report, the local press
association has already moved to impose
self-censorship in an effort to persuade the
Syrians to allow Lebanese newspapers
recently closed down for being critical of
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C K5
the Syrian presence in Lebanon to publish
again.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam told
the US ambassador in Damascus late last
week that Syria believed Lebanese Presi-
dent Sarkis is not pushing hard enough to
collect heavy weapons from the factions
involved in the civil war as stipulated in
the truce agreement. Pressure by the
Syrians has apparently resulted in some
movement on the problem, however. A
compromise agreement was reportedly
reached at a meeting last week of the
quadripartite committee-representatives
of Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Kuwait-charged with overseeing the
truce.
The Palestinians are said to have
agreed to gather their heavy weapons in
specified collection areas in the south. Ac-
cording to some reports, the Palestinians
would retain actual control of the
weapons, and the Arab peacekeeping
force-consisting mainly of Syrian
troops-would guard the areas where the
arms are to be stored.
On December 27, a Palestine Libera-
tion Organization official publicly
acknowledged the existence of an arms
surrender agreement. He stated, however,
that while the Palestinians' leftist allies
would store their weapons near Sidon
where they would be jointly guarded by
the leftists and soldiers of the Arab force,
the Palestinians would store theirs near
the Israeli border. This location would
preclude the presence of the Arab
peacekeeping force at the storage points
since the Israelis have repeatedly stated
they will not tolerate the presence of any
troops in the area along the border other
than regular Lebanese army forces.
The Lebanese Christians, for their part,
seem sure to balk at surrendering their
weapons while the Palestinians are allow-
ed to retain unsupervised stockpiles of
arms.
Sporadic fighting between Palestinian
and Christian forces continued in the
south during the week. New clashes also
occurred between rival pro-Syrian and
pro-Iraqi Palestinian groups in refugee
ramps near Beirut.
Prime Minister Ramgoolam
MAURITIUS /~,~ , $,
Prime Minister Prime Minister Ramgoolam's principal
opposition, the radical Mauritian Mili-
tant Movement, came within 2 votes of
gaining a majority in its first general elec-
tion test on December 20. Ramgoolam
apparently will be able to form a coalition
government with another party, but his
prospects for long tenure of office are
clearly not bright.
The Militant Movement, which was es-
tablished since the last election in 1967,
won 34 of the 70 parliamentary seats,
while Ramgoolam's Independence Party
dropped from 45 to 28. The right-
of-center Social Democratic Party took 8
seats, a loss of 7.
Ramgoolam and the Social Democrats,
who were aligned in a coalition from 1969
to 1973, apparently have agreed to team
up again to keep the Movement out of
power. Together the two parties will com-
mand a I-vote majority. Government
leaders and others with a stake in the
preservation of the political and economic
status quo are especially concerned about
the Militant Movement's Marxist orien-
tation, its appeal among restive youth and
labor unions, and its promises to
nationalize, on gaining power, large por-
tions of the industrial sector.
The Militant Movement was better
organized for the campaign than its op-
ponents and succeeded in exploiting the
general hostility against those in power
that has been building in the Indian Ocean
island country. Almost half the in-
cumbents, including a number of cabinet
ministers, were turned out. The Move-
ment also charged the government, which
ran a lackluster campaign, with failing to
deal with unemployment and other
economic problems.
The radical party apparently scored
heavily among members of its two main
constituencies-the labor unions and the
approximately 40 percent of the electorate
that is under 30. Both groups have been
attracted to the party's promises of
change and its tendency to identify with
third world issues and anti-Western senti-
ment. Movement campaigners sharply
criticized the US military installation on
the island of Diego Garcia, which was
separated from Mauritius by the UK
before independence in 1968.
Leaders of the Movement, who have
maneuvered since the election in an
attempt to come to power, clearly intend
to keep the prospective new government
under pressure, perhaps with a view to
forcing a new vote soon. They have
already denounced Ramgoolam's decision
to postpone until March the opening of
parliament-and thus any tests on no-
confidence motions the Movement will
probably introduce at the first opportuni-
SOUTH AFRICA . O - 3
Rioting and clashes between blacks that
occurred in black townships near Cape
Town over the Christmas weekend fol-
lowed patterns set. in earlier out-
breaks of violence in South Africa.
Students in two townships outside Cape
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Town had called on blacks to forgo
traditional Christmas observances in
favor of a period of mourning for those
who died in the riots in South Africa
earlier this year. Attempts by the students
to enforce their call, especially on a group
of migrant black workers from Transkei,
resulted in violent clashes that left 26 dead
and about 100 wounded, according to of-
ficial accounts. Some of the casualties
may have resulted from police action to
restore order.
Last August, student actions to enforce
a work boycott in Soweto, a large black
township near Johannesburg, resulted in
violence that spread to many other
localities. Some of the worst clashes were
between students and migrant workers,
especially Zulus. In a subsequent work
stoppage in September, the Soweto
students were better organized and able to
achieve their immediate objectives largely
without violence.
Last weekend's demonstration ap-
parently was less well organized. The
police swept through the townships early
to pick up student leaders and then in-
tervened in strength.
The students in the Cape Town area
clearly are emulating those in Soweto.
There may have been contact between the
two groups, although South Africa's pass
laws probably keep these to a minimum.
Further outbreaks caused by student ac-
tion seem sure to occur not only in the
Cape Town area, but also in other black
move makes more urgent an accommoda-
tion between the Soviets and the Euro-
pean Community, which will establish a
200-nautical-mile fishing zone in the
North Atlantic and North Sea effective
on January 1.
West Europeans fish both the Baltic
and Barents seas-areas included in the
Soviet zone. Fishermen on the Danish
island of Bornholm alone would lose an
annual catch worth $2.5 million if exclud-
ed from the Soviet zone, according to
Prime Minister Joergensen. Countries
fishing the Baltic already have met in
Warsaw and agreed to 1977 catch quotas;
the USSR has not ratified the agreement.
The EC foreign ministers have stated
that the Soviets may continue fishing off
EC members' coastlines until March 31.
The Soviets' catch, however, will be
limited to 40 percent of their average
catch for the last 10 years.
The EC and the USSR will have dif-
ficulty working out an agreement during
the three-month grace period. The USSR
does not recognize the EC, but Comrfiuni-
ty rules now require members to negotiate
economic agreements as a unit. The UK,
which is to assume the EC presidency on
January 1, would like to see the Soviet
catch in EC waters reduced in a few years
from the 600,000 tons of 1975 to 60,000
tons annually. This would bring the Soviet
catch into line with what EC countries
take from Soviet waters.
Japan, which takes about 10 percent of
its total catch from waters now in the
Soviet zone in the Far East, protested the
Soviet move and was subsequently
promised early bilateral negotiations. The
Soviet declaration could help convince the
Japanese public that the country must
adjust to a world in which the 200-mile
fishing zone is the norm.
So far, the Japanese government has
had a hard time selling the concept at
home. Japan's fishing industry is the
world's biggest, and the Japanese people
depend heavily on protein from the sea.
townships around South Africa's major
white population centers.
The adoption by the Soviets of a 200-
nautical-mile offshore fishing zone on
December 10 is causing concern in
Western Europe and Japan. The Soviet
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GERMANY 4 ~ 4 g
Inter-German relations have reached a
low ebb with Communist leaders in East
Berlin clearly concerned over West Ger-
man media focus on East Germany's in-
ternal problems.
On December 22, East Berlin party of-
ficials expelled a West German cor-
respondent-the second time this year
they have taken such drastic action. The
correspondent, Loethar Lowe, was a
television commentator stationed in East
Berlin. His recent coverage of the
Honecker regime's cultural
crackdown-on a program that is widely
seen in East Germany-undoubtedly was
particularly galling to leadership sen-
sitivities.
Lowe's expulsion followed a broadcast
in which he attacked an authoritative arti-
cle in the East German party daily and
was caustically critical of East German
border guards. The article in question was
one of the more strongly worded pieces on
East-West German relations for some
time. It criticized West German
Chancellor Schmidt and assailed remarks
made by Schmidt in his policy statement
to the West German parliament on
December 16. East German policy
makers were reportedly "enraged" by
Schmidt's reference in the statement to
the "border running through the middle of
Germany."
The article's criticism of Bonn's refusal
to accept the common border between the
two countries as having been recognized
in international law is a standard theme in
East German press commentary. The per-
sonal attack against Schmidt is a depar-
ture from customary practice, however, as
was the failure to mention East Ger-
many's interest in promoting a normaliza-
tion of relations between the two German
states.
Santiago Carrillo appears in Rome recently with
Dolores Ibarruri, president of the Spanish Communist Party
SPAIN y -~
The arrest last week of Spanish Com-
munist leader Santiago Carrillo, who
returned to the country clandestinely ear-
ly this year after almost 40 years in exile,
has again focused public attention on the
sensitive question of legalizing the Com-
munist Party. The government would
almost certainly like to shelve the
legalization issue until after the
parliamentary election next spring and
may be able to do so by releasing Carrillo
on bond-an action apparently under
consideration.
The 62-year-old Carrillo, who is still of-
ficially banned from entering Spain, made
his arrest inevitable earlier this month
when he defied the government by holding
a press conference in Madrid. At the time
of his arrest on December 22, he appeared
to be leaving a meeting of the party Cen-
tral Committee. Seven other party of-
ficials were detained with him.
The arrests triggered scores of protests
from both communist and democratic
parties in other countries. At home, they
sparked three days of leftist street
demonstrations and threats of further civil
unrest until Carrillo is released.
The Court of Public Order, a political
tribunal, has charged Carrillo and the
others with belonging to "an illegal
association," a charge that will require
the court to render a definitive ruling on
the party's legal status. Political insiders
now say that the detainees will be given a
"provisional" release in the next few days
and that the trial could be delayed in-
definitely.
Meanwhile, five top-ranking police of-
ficials have been reassigned, apparently
because of government dissatisfaction
with its control over the public security
forces. The chiefs of the paramilitary civil
guard and the armed police-a special ur-
ban security force-as well as the civilian
chief of security were sacked on
December 23. Two more dismissals of
high-ranking officers followed on
December 27. The government also has
formed a commission to review the
organization of the security forces and the
military services, with the apparent aim of
eventually establishing a single unified
command structure.
The transferred police officers evidently
have been replaced by men more willing
to work with the government; there have
been hints that King Juan Carlos was per-
sonally involved in the shifts.
PORTUGAL
Prime Minister Mario Soares' minority
Socialist government passed its toughest
test to date this week by gaining
parliamentary approval of both its new
economic plan and its relatively aus-
tere 1977 budget.
The Socialist Party's own parliamen-
tary strength carried the day as the third
and fourth largest parties-the conser-
vative Social Democratic Center and the
Communists-abstained in the two votes
on December 29.
Soares had warned the opposition at
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the end of the parliamentary debate that
unless both bills were passed, his govern-
ment would be forced to resign. A
negative vote not only would mean a
defeat for Portugal's fledgling democracy,
he said, but would also harm delicate
negotiations presently under way to ob-
tain badly needed international credits.
Although the Socialists appeared to win
handily in the assembly balloting, the out-
come had remained in doubt for several
weeks as opposition leaders, particularly
the second-ranking Social Democrats,
harshly attacked the economic measures.
On December 28, Social Democratic
Center Secretary General Basilio Horta
assured US embassy officials privately
that his party was prepared to support the
government should its votes be neces-
sary.
With the parliamentary vote behind it,
the government can now go forward with
its efforts to stabilize Portugal's faltering
economy. The economic plan focuses on
increasing national production, which has
declined considerably since the April 1974
coup, and reducing dependence both on
imports and foreign financing. Specific
targets are a 5-percent increase in gross
national product next year, the creation of
125,000 new jobs, and a halving of the
present high inflation rate.
Persistent drought probably will hold
down Cuban sugar production this year
despite improved efficiency by processors.
Production will total about 6 million tons,
roughly equal to last year's level.
For the third consecutive year, there
was below-normal rainfall in the impor-
tant cane-growing regions in eastern
Cuba. Milling yields could improve,
however, because of reduced cane burning
and a planned increase in mechanical
harvesting of the crop from 33 percent of
total volume harvested in 1976 to 42 per-
cent next year.
Stagnation of sugar output in 1977,
together with prospective low world
market sugary prices at least through
midyear, may force Cuba to curtail im-
ports further from noncommunist coun-
tries, already down by a third this year.
Cuban hard-currency earnings in 1977 are
unlikely to exceed this year's estimated
$800 million, an amount equal to only
about two thirds of 1976 imports from
noncommunist countries.
Cuba is reluctant to expand its hard-
currency debt substantially beyond the
current estimated $1.3 billion because
debt service obligations, estimated at $400
million in 1977, are already burdensome.
Imports from the USSR and other
communist countries will probably be in-
creased slightly again next year. Cuba will
not feel a new financial constraint on im-
ports from the communist countries
because they will continue to pay 19 to 30
cents a pound for Cuban sugar compared
with the likely free market price of 7 to 9
Dor 4; \A/f=FVI V CI IAAMADV rlo- 'fl 7F.
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