WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
CI WS 76-041
No. 0041/76
October 8, 1976
DOS review completed
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TheWEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
:quently includes material coordinated with or prepared
cant developments of the week through noorf on Thursday, it
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signifi-
search, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
search, and the Directorate of Science 'and: Technology.
CONTENTS
October 8, 1976
1 Middle East
Lebanon
2 Africa
Rhodesia
3 Far East
Thailand;
4 Europe
Italy;
7 Western Hemisphere
Canada; Cuba
8 Thailand: Shaky Political System
10 Nigeria: Progress Toward Civilian Rule
12 Dispute Continuing over Western Sahara
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17 South America: Cooperation Among Military Regimes
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
Summary,
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LEBANON 1,L
The Syrians called at least a temporary
halt this week to their offensive in
Lebanon's central mountains after
pushing their Palestinian and leftist adver-
saries out of several key strongpoints by
October 1. The pause-ordered ostensibly
to permit further negotiations-seems
designed to fix the blame primarily on
Palestinian intransigence for the con-
tinuing political impasse.
At present, the Syrians appear bent
more on sowing dissension among their
opponents and eroding Yasir Arafat's
leadership position within the Palestine
Liberation Organization than on ob-
taining an acceptable political settlement.
Damascus media have called increasingly
for Arafat's removal as head of the PLO
and Fatah and have implied that he has
become the main obstacle in the way of a
Syrian-Palestinian reconciliation. The
Syrians reportedly demanded a change in
the leadership of the Palestinian move-
ment as a condition for a new cease-fire
this week.
By presenting such an unpalatable con-
dition, the Syrians appear to be
deliberately courting Arafat's rejection;
they are making it impossible for him to
salvage any Palestinian independence in
Lebanon and still reach an accommoda-
The Syrians may try to take A ay lef-
tist leader Kamal Jumblatt's headquarters
astride the major Beirut-Damascus road,
where the Palestinians and their leftist
allies are apparently well dug in. Or they
may attempt to capture the northern port
of Tripoli, where they and the Christians
have recently reinforced their positions.
Because such assaults would result in
heavy casualties, however, the Syrians ap-
parently are leaning in favor of an offen-
sive south and west from Jazzin, aimed
presumably at isolating the Palestinian
strongholds at Sidon, Tyre, and
Nabatiyah and cutting them off from the
Palestinians' main bastion in west Beirut.
According to press reports, Syrian
Deputy Defense Minister Jamil met this
week with several local Lebanese officials,
political leaders and delegations from
southern Lebanon; the Lebanese allegedly
BEIRUT
West BeirJ
requested the entry of Syrian troops and
those of the Syrian-sponsored Lebanese
"vanguard" army to restore security. The
Syrians used such local appeals earlier
this year to justify their occupation of the
Bekaa Valley.
The Egyptians are still trying to keep
themselves in the negotiating picture.
Foreign Minister Fahmi paid a visit to
Paris on short notice late last week, ap-
parently to request France to send troops
to Lebanon to buttress the Arab League
security forces already there. France con-
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tinues to condition any French role on the
agreement of all parties to the conflict.
The proposal, nevertheless, reportedly
irritated the Saudis, who appear to hold
President Sadat primarily responsible for
the collapse of their efforts to convene a
mini-summit on Lebanon. Sadat, still in a
bitter anti-Syrian mood, has turned a deaf
ear to Saudi complaints.
Soviet Initiatives
The oviet proposal of October 1 for a
resumption this month or next of the
Geneva conference on the Middle East
caps several weeks of Soviet diplomatic
activity.
The call for a return to Geneva is
similar to a Soviet proposal last April. At
that time, Moscow was concerned that
Egyptian abrogation of the Soviet-Egyp-
tian friendship treaty-together with the
visit of a US diplomatic mission to
RHODESIA 1 -i c, 17
Unity talks between tw~ of the major
Rhodesian nationalist factions apparently
have made little progress so far. The talks
between the Zitlibabwe African National
Union and the Zimbabwe African
People's Union-the two groups that
have guerrillas in the field-are now tak-
ing place in Maputo and are likely to shift
to Dar es Salaam soon.
ZAPU, which has a stronger
organizational structure inside Rhodesia
than does ZANU, is said to be insisting
that political unity must be achieved
before military forces can be united.
ZANU, which commands the loyalty of
most of the guerrillas, refuses to enter into
anything but a loose political alliance.
ZANU leaders fear that political unity
would only benefit ZAPU leader Joshua
Nkomo, whom they have long distrusted.
ZANU representatives also met last
week in Lusaka with representatives of
Lebanon-had created the impression
that the USSR was on the outside looking
in.
The Soviets now propose:
? A conference in two stages, the
first dealing with organizational and
procedural problems and the second
with substantive issues.
? Palestinian attendance "on an
equal footing from the very out-
set"-phrasing which is far more sup-
portive of the PLO's role than the
Soviet proposal in April.
? An agenda that includes discus-
sion of Israeli withdrawal from all oc-
cupied Arab territories and the es-
tablishment of a Palestinian state.
The Soviet statement makes a point of
appealing to Israel by including agenda
items that stress "appropriate inter-
national guarantees" for Israel's existence
Muzorewa had been left out of the
original unity talks by the other factions
and by the "front-line" African
presidents. Muzorewa's welcome home
last Sunday by a large and enthusiastic
crowd, after over a year of self-imposed
exile, suggests that he hopes to use his
political following to win a key role in
settlement talks.
The guerrilla leaders, as distinct from
the nationalist politicians, continue to
take a hard line in public on a settlement.
At a press conference in Maputo last
week, a guerrilla leader said that the
fighting will continue until the Smith
government is prepared to surrender un-
conditionally. Guerrilla activities in
eastern Rhodesia have continued largely
unabated in recent days.
and security as well as an end to the state
of war between Arabs and Israelis. The
Soviet proposal does not imply, as did the
one last April, that a peace settlement
would lead to the re-establishment of
diplomatic relations with Israel.
The Soviets want to be part of any ma-
jor negotiating activity in the Middle
East. Their latest actions also suggest they
believe the Lebanese situation is in a
critical phase-especially after the Syrian
offensive that began on September
28-and that it will further complicate
Soviet relations with both Syrians and
Palestinians.
Moscow's proposal follows a flurry of
diplomatic activity that began three weeks
ago:
? An authoritative article that
appeared in Pravda on September 8
announced a more evenhanded policy
toward Syrians and Palestinians.
? The Soviets consulted in
mid-September with PLO leaders
Arafat in Beirut and Qaddumi in
? Geneva conference representative
Vinogradov visited Syria two weeks
ago to get Damascus' support for the
Soviet initiative. The Soviets also
made diplomatic contacts with other
Arab states, including Egypt and Iraq.
The USSR's Geneva exercise has been
a sterile one in the past, and Arab-Israeli
reaction thus far indicates that the Soviets
will be no more successful this time.
? A Soviet embassy official in Cairo
remarked privately on October 4 that
Egypt was "not particularly
enthusiastic" about the Soviet
proposal.
? Syrian President Asad, in an in-
terview that appeared on the day of the
Soviet proposal, was unusually critical
of the USSR.
? Israeli officials have dismissed the
Soviet initiative as "nothing new."
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It is not yet clear whether the Thai
military's assumption of power on Oc-
tober 6 was an outright coup or a move in-
vited by a frustrated and weary prime
minister.
In an address to the nation late on Oc-
tober 6, however, Admiral Sa-ngat, leader
of the newly formed Administration
Reform Party-controlled by the
military
is explanation that the
armed forces had felt it necessary to act to
restore order and to eliminate alleged
communists in the government suggests
that the military might have taken the in-
itiative and forced Seni's hand.
At the same time, military leaders are
The Administration Reform Party has
dissolved parliament and banned political
parties, but has pledged to respect the
Thai people's "aspiration to preserve the
democratic form of government."
One of the military administrators' first
acts was to announce that all treaty com-
mitments would be respected and good
relations with all countries promoted.
Both Sa-ngat and Kamon favor close
Thai-US military relations and were
troubled by the recent US withdrawals. It
is possible that the military leaders will
play down, if not reverse, the Seni
government's emphasis on working out an
cR 5
accommodation with Vietnam.
Both Sa-ngat and Kamon have been
regarded as nonpolitical, highly
professional military officers with high
standards of personal honesty. Their
reputations will lend credence to
Sa-ngat's public statement that he and his
colleagues do not aspire to hold power for
an extended period. (An assessment of the
fragile nature of parliamentary
democracy in Thailand appears in the
feature section of this publication.)
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CHINA
The Chinese marked National Day on
October 1 with a facade of unity amid
signs of continuing dissension within the
leadership. The Peking-based members of
the Politburo avoided festive activities but
did appear at a meeting attended by 400
ITALY ~5' 2
Prime Minister Andreotti began this
week to seek parliamentary support for
key portions of the economic stabilization
program that his Christian Democratic
minority government has been working on
since August. The Communists, whose
cooperation in Parliament is essential to
Andreotti's survival, have so far shown a
willingness to work with the Prime
Minister. At the same time, they are
clearly determined to shift economic and
fiscal decision-making as much as possi-
ble to the legislature. Such a shift would
enable the Communists to exert max-
imum influence on Andreotti's program.
Andreotti has asked Parliament to con-
sider two proposals, which form the bare
minimum for any effective stabilization
representatives of the "masses."
The leaders were listed in their normal
protocol order, projecting an image of un-
ity and continuity, and the meeting itself
was billed as a symbol of unity between
the leadership and the people. Politburo
members from the provinces, who had ap-
parently remained in Peking after Mao's
funeral for a Politburo meeting, returned
to their home bases for the holiday.
In a break with past practice, Peking's
three major publications did not issue a
joint editorial for National Day. Instead,
People's Daily published an editorial of its
own that called for studying Mao's works
and made only passing reference to the
campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping. That
the other two major publications, which
usually collaborate in joint editorials, did
not lend their weight to this editorial
could indicate some dissatisfaction with
its content.
The editorial's treatment of Teng was
effort. To try to dampen inflationary
pressures, he is requesting that automatic
cost-of-living allowances be reduced for
the upper 20 to 25 percent of wage
earners, with a complete blockage of the
allowances for the highest paid workers.
Andreotti also wants to increase prices
for many public services and
government-controlled commodities;
some of the funds raised by hiking public
service charges would be used to help
finance a controversial industrial moder-
nization and development program, the
details of which Andreotti has not yet dis-
closed.
The Communists' inclination to
cooperate with Andreotti is illustrated by
the effort the Communist-dominated un-
ions apparently made to encourage Italy's
major labor federation to agree in princi-
ple this week to Andreotti's proposed
limitation on cost-of-living increases.
Ironically, the unions dominated by An-
dreotti's Christian Democrats were less
receptive because of their larger propor-
tion of highly paid workers.
much milder than some recent articles
that suggest the party's left wing is trying
to breathe new life into the criticism cam-
paign. There may also have been some
disagreement over the editorial's
characterization of Mao as pre-eminent
among communist theoreticians. This was
in contrast to a joint editorial by the three
publications, issued on September 16, that
named Mao as only one among several
communist giants.
In another possible sign of conflict
among the leadership, an article in the
current issue of Red Flag resurrects a
quotation from the disgraced former
defense minister Lin Piao. This prominent
use of a well-known Lin statement is the
latest of several indications that Lin and
the "coup" with which he was associated
remain a contentious issue and that there
is continued unhappiness over the army's
loss of prestige since Lin's fall.
The response of the Communists to An-
dreotti's proposed price increases, on the
other hand, demonstrates that the party's
price for continued cooperation is a larger
role for Parliament in policy formation.
Andreotti initially tried to raise certain
prices by decree, as the government is
legally empowered to do. The Com-
munists, however, are holding Andreotti
to an earlier pledge to consult Parliament,
and the issue is being considered this week
by two parliamentary committees, one of
which has a Communist chairman.
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GREECE-TURKEY
The Greek and Turkish foreign
ministers concluded their discussions in
New York on October 1 by agreeing to a
resumption of negotiations on the Aegean
continental shelf and control of Aegean
airspace. Representatives of the two
governments will meet to consider both
issues on November 2, probably in
Switzerland.
Positive public comments by both sides
suggest that the foreign ministers over-
came some earlier obstacles. After the
meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister
Caglayangil expressed satisfaction that
the Greeks no longer insist on discussing
only the legal aspects of the dispute and
are now willing to discuss other points
such as the security requirements of the
two countries.
In Athens, Greek officials said publicly
that they were satisfied with the meeting,
noting that the Turks had expressed un-
derstanding. This could mean that
Caglayangil did not press Greece to
Q
The tenth round of the Mutual and
Balanced Force Reduction talks opened
last week in Vienna.
During the round last summer, the East
finally provided data on its forces in Cen-
tral Europe, thus opening the way for
detailed discussions on force levels for the
first time since the talks began in 1973.
The chances for progress during this
round, which will conclude in December,
depend on the allied ability to respond to
the East's move by tabling updated
figures on its own forces.
The principal stumbling block facing
the Western allies is the French refusal to
include data on French forces or to have
them counted under the collective ceiling
on ground troops the West wants es-
tablished for both East and West.
Although France does not participate in
the Vienna negotiations and has disclaim-
withdraw the case it submitted to the
International Court of Justice.
Caglayangil may also have again played
down Greece's illegal militarization of its
easternmost Aegean islands.
The apparent Greek decision to engage
in more meaningful negotiations is partly
a result of Turkish pressure in the form of
the recent seismic exploration in contested
Aegean waters. Athens has realized that
its case does not have the full support of
its allies and of the international com-
munity. This was evident in the UN
Security Council's handling of the Greek
appeal in August and in the subsequent
rejection by the International Court of
Justice of the Greek appeal for a tem-
porary ban on Turkish exploration.
Despite the positive atmosphere of the
New York meeting, the approaching
Turkish election campaign and the Greek
government's care not to alienate the
Greek military by too conciliatory a
policy appear to preclude any major
breakthrough in the coming months.
Force Reduction Talks Resume
ed any obligations under an eventual
agreement, it had up until now allowed its
forces to be included in the totals.
The allies are trying to arrange a com-
promise that would prevent France from
publicly announcing its position. In
general, they fear a French announcement
would cause the Soviets to be reluctant to
proceed with the negotiations. The West
Germans also fear a French announce-
ment would cause the East to stiffen its
demand-which is directed at establishing
limits on the size of the West German
armed forces-for national rather than
collective reduction commitments. West
Germany also believes France's public
defection from the allied position would
undercut domestic support in West Ger-
many for the talks.
On September 28, Chancellor Schmidt
announced that, after the conclusion of a
SALT II agreement, he intends to ap-
proach Soviet leader Brezhnev and the
newly elected American president in an
attempt to breathe life into the
negotiations.
The allies believe that a high-level ap-
proach to the French-most likely by the
West Germans-is necessary also if a
long-term solution is to be found.
In the interim, the allies may attempt to
elicit further information on the "coun-
ting rules" the East used to arrive at force
figures. These figures are lower than
NATO estimates and challenge the
Western assertion that there is a sizable
disparity between Eastern and Western
ground forces. The allies believe they can
buttress their argument for asymmetrical
reductions by establishing that the East's
figures improperly exclude certain
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Canadian Parliament Opens with Liberal Party Popularity at New Low
Parliament reopens next week with
public opinion polls showing that Prime
Minister Trudeau's Liberal Party has
dropped to a new low in its popularity
rating. The government's policy of
bilingualism has provoked bitterness
among both English- and French-speak-
ing Canadians, and its wage-and-price
controls are widely seen as major causes
of continued high unemployment and a
sluggish economy.
Trudeau is well aware of his problems.
Last weekend, he bluntly told a provincial
party gathering that the party is "out of
touch" with the grass roots, disorganized,
and ranks as a minor party west of On-
tario. The Liberals have to be worried, he
said, about their "future as a national par-
ty.,,
CUBA--~
Prime Minister Fidel Castro
acknowleged in a speech on September 28
that the Cuban economy is having serious
problems because of the 60-percent drop
in world sugar prices since last year.
Castro said Cuba has had to reduce
hard-currency expenditures sharply and
will have to cut imports if it is to meet the
repayments schedule on its mounting debt
with the West. Imports from the West,
which totaled $1.7 billion in 1975, were
down an estimated 25 percent during
January through May and may have to be
reduced further this year.
Castro said imports from communist
countries, which amounted to $2.1 billion
or 55 percent of total purchases last year,
will be maintained.
The Cuban leader announced a series of
belt-tightening measures that will further
restrict the already austere Cuban
lifestyle. The coffee ration is to be cut-as
In the government's Speech from the
Throne on Tuesday kicking off the new
legislative year, Trudeau will undoubtedly
call for a continued fight against inflation,
but he might indicate some softening of
the government's guidelines on wages and
prices to placate both labor and business.
There are indications that he will push for
increased Canadian ownership in the
transportation field and a streamlining of
the cumbersome foreign investment
review process.
Trudeau has already gotten off to a bad
start this autumn. Federal-provincial
was the rice ration earlier in the
year-because of drought and the need to
conserve foreign exchange. Other con-
sumer items, all or part of which must be
imported from the West, will be limited
and, in some cases, eliminated.
Castro reiterated that Cuba's basic
development strategy will not change.
Because of its comparative advantage in
growing sugarcane, Cuba will not seek a
radical diversification of agricultural
production in an attempt to replace those
products now being imported from the
West. Sugar is still Cuba's most impor-
tant export-accounting for 89 percent of
total exports in 1975-and substantial ex-
pansion of nonsugar exports is several
years away.
The reduction in imports from the West
will lead to a cutback in production of
manufactured goods-particularly con-
sumer items-and force Cuba to revise
downward its five-year plan that began
this year. The cuts will complicate and
delay achievement of the plan goals,
which place considerable emphasis on
Western capital equipment.
A large reduction in supplies of
Western agricultural equipment, such as
relations are strained, and labor has called
for a nationwide work stoppage two days
after Parliament convenes. The Prime
Minister's critics say that his long-
heralded cabinet shuffle last month
removed men with the keenest political
skills-those best suited to sell the
government's programs, cool off fric-
tions between English and French
speakers, and strengthen the hands of
the moderates.
They also charge that the shuffle has
concentrated power largely in the hands
of Trudeau cronies. This goes down poor-
ly with a public that has become dis-
enchanted as much with the quality of
Trudeau's leadership as with the un-
popular programs he pursues.
sugar harvesters, would cause Cuba to fall
short of its goal of producing 8 to 8.5-
million tons of sugar by 1980, and will
seriously inhibit expansion of other
agricultural production.
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Thailand's experiment in democratic government was
plagued from its beginning by problems that have deep cultural
roots and are not easily changed.
Thailand: Shaky Political System
a near-crisis compelled some temporary
consensus.
Political parties-now suspended at
least temporarily-are basically alien to
the Thai culture. Only the Democrat Par-
ty has a semblance of permanence (it has
existed since 1946). Other parties have
made fleeting appearances, usually
created for the parliamentary contests
that briefly interrupted military rule. The
civilian elite tended to shy away from the
risks and futility of party politics, preferr-
ing the real power and influence of the
bureaucracy.
The Democrat Party comes closest to
being a political party in the Western
sense. It draws support largely from the
Bangkok area, but is developing strength
in other parts of the country, particularly
in the south, and is more of a national
party than any other. Once regarded as
the best organized and least corrupt of the
Thai parties, it has become deeply divided
along regional and generational lines,
divisions that clearly weakened the posi-
tion of former prime minister Seni
and dissipated the strength that should
have accrued from the party's large
plurality in the just-dissolved Assembly.
The Thai Nation Party, the second
largest, is more typical of Thai political
bodies; it is a coalition of conservative
businessmen, many of them retired
military officers, and civilian bureaucrats
held together by a web of personal and
business relations. The party is descended
from a powerful military clique of the
1950s that was ousted from power by
parliamentary democracy. These
weaknesses are reinforced by cultural
The return to martial law in patterns and are not susceptible to easy
Thailand-whether it proves to be tem- elimination. The instability and vacilla-
porary or drawn out-is yet another in- tion that have marked government perfor-
dication of basic weaknesses in the mance can only reduce the already
nation's three-year-old system of tenuous commitment to democratic rule
in Thailand.
There have been three elected
governments since the promulgation of
the constitution in 1974. The first one
lasted less than a month. Khukrit
Pramot's administration lasted I1
months. His brother Seni's coalition end-
ed a shaky five-month existence with his
abrupt resignation on September 23. The
coalition re-emerged two weeks later
scarcely changed and with little prospect
for improvement in its performance; it
was hampered from the beginning by the
maneuvering of rival coalition leaders and
by the internal divisions in the Prime
Minister's Democrat Party.
The multitude of parties competing for
power-19 of the 41 that ran in the last
election were represented in the
parliament-so spread the vote as to
make coalition government unavoidable.
Yet the coalitions did not represent com-
mon political purposes so much as
associations of convenience among party
leaders who saw cabinet membership as
the best way to protect and advance their
personal interests.
With coalitions divided by conflicting
personal ambitions and interests, the
development of coherent government
policies has been virtually impossible until
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SECRET
Left-wing students at Thammasat University open fire during demonstration
Field Marshal Sarit in 1957. The
overthrow of Sarit's heirs, Thanom and
Praphat, gave the old clique new life.
Political Cliques
Most of the political parties are com-
posites of such cliques, or, in the case of
many of the small ones, temporary
vehicles to further one person's ambition.
The Thai clique system is a reflection of
the patron-client phenomenon that per-
vades Thai society-a natural falling into
place of a superior-inferior relationship
with attendant obligations on each side.
Such a system can be a source of social
and political stability, as in Japan, In
Thailand, however, patron-client relations
are transitory-clients are constantly
reassessing the advantages of existing
arrangements and seeking more beneficial
patrons. In the parliamentary context,
parties were unstable, continually shifting
in relative strength as individual members
offered their allegiance to the highest
bidder.
The 1974 constitution corrected some
of the more glaring deficiencies that con-
tributed to the failure of earlier ex-
periments in representative government.
Members of the legislature could no
longer change parties without losing their
seats, a provision that contributed to
some stability in the most recent
Assembly, The legislators, however, could
and did sell their votes. In general, the
Assembly behaved more responsibly and
cautiously under the 1974 constitution. It
did not, for example, throw down the
gauntlet to the military at budget time, a
tactic that helped to bring down the
parliament in 1971.
Protest and Polarization
Fractious and vacillating government
clearly endangered the long-range
prospects for democracy in Thailand. The
Thai are a conservative people, comfor-
table with forms of paternalistic
authoritarianism and uncertain that
free-wheeling Western democracy is real-
ly compatible with their society and their
needs.
The growth of protest politics and its
attendant violence contributed to public
skepticism and reduced the tolerance level
of right-wing civilian and military groups.
In the past few years, students, workers,
and farmers, traditionally passive
elements of society, were increasingly
drawn into active politics-but their im-
pact was sporadic.
The protest movements tended to be
divided into competing cliques that ex-
pended much of their energies in in-
ternecine feuding. They were, however,
capable of coalescing temporarily around
a dramatic issue and placing considerable
pressure on the government for relatively
short periods.
The students remain the cutting edge of
protest politics. They have lost much of
the glamor they once enjoyed fer their
role in bringing down the military regime
in 1973. Since then, the more visible ac-
tivists have grown increasingly leftist and
now form the core of a nascent radical
movement.
The radicalism of a few student leaders
and the public's impatience with their ac-
tivities encouraged repressive measures by
right-wing forces. Groups such as the
NAWAPHON (New Strength Group)
and the Red Gaur, little more than bands
of armed thugs, were used successfully to
intimidate the students and other radical
activists. The extremism of both rightists
and leftists has contributed to a growing
polarization in Thai politics, which has
been reflected in the increasing violence of
recent months.
This growing tendency to violence may
abate somewhat under martial law at
least initially, since leftist activists are
likely to go into hiding to avoid
arrest-and worse-at the hands of the
military.
The King
The King has little formal political
authority, but he commands considerable
moral influence and has been an impor-
tant stabilizing factor. His intervention in
1973-when he gave protection to student
leaders and helped persuade Thanom and
Praphat to leave the country-and the
moral support he gave the new political
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structure had a critical impact on political
developments. In moving on October 6 to
take charge, the military was doubtless
convinced that the King supported the
declaration of martial law.
The King has been clearly disturbed by
the sense of instability that has permeated
civilian politics since 1973. He was ap-
palled by the growing left-wing movement
and fearful that coalition governments
beset by infighting could not cope with
the country's problems.
The special relationship he has careful-
ly cultivated with the student community
has probably been seriously damaged by
his disenchantment with the student ac-
tivists. He was outraged at reports alleg-
ing that the student demonstrators hung
the crown prince in effigy on October 6,
and his alienation from the students will
not only reduce the King's ability to act as
a calming influence but also encourage ex-
cessive reactions by the right.
The Army
The key factor in Thailand's political
future is, as always, the army. With
strong leadership, the army could be the
most disciplined and effective political
force in the country-ready to be used as
a voting bloc to influence a parliamentary
election or as the muscle for a coup.
The First Division of the First Ar-
my-the Bangkok garrison-is the
traditional coup force, and the political
proclivities of the First Army commander
are of utmost importance to the govern-
ment. The minister of defense holds
another crucial post; he can place his
allies in key military assignments when
the annual retirements and rotations take
place. The supreme military commander,
as head of all the armed forces, is also in
an influential position, as indicated by his
selection on October 6 to run the new in-
terim military council.
Until called upon to take over in the
wake of the new student violence this
week, most senior army officers seemed
disinclined to think in terms of a return to
military rule. There was growing dis-
satisfaction within the military with the
government's weak and ineffectual per-
formance, but most of the senior officers
apparently felt that the army should not
The military regime is committed to a complex plan for
reorganizing government at all levels and returning control to
civilians by 1979.
be directly responsible for the collapse of
Thailand's fragile democracy.
Their basic interests were not seriously
threatened by the conservative civilians in
power, and the military's links to the
political parties enabled them to
manipulate the political system. The out-
break of serious violence together with
Seni's manifestly weak leadership,
however, set the stage for the declaration
of martial law.
Disunity and Indecision
Thailand's parliamentary government
has always been sustained more by
negative factors than by positive ones.
The parliamentary government's under-
pinnings have been weak, and the com-
mitment to its conceptual foundation
fragile. The majority of the Thai people
had become increasingly disenchanted
with the weak performance of their
government under former prime ministers
Seni and Khukrit, and, while not pleased
at the prospect, are probably resigned to
living for a period under the martial law
Nigeria: Progress Toward Civilian Rule
Head of state General Obasanjo renew-
ed last week the commitment made a year
ago by his predecessor, General
Mohammed, to hand over the reins to
civilians in 1979. In an address on Oc-
tober 1, marking the 16th anniversary of
Nigerian independence, Obasanjo
emphasized the progress the military
regime has made during the past year
toward returning the country to civilian
rule.
Obasanjo was making his first national
day appearance as Nigeria's leader. He
moved into the top spot last February
when Mohammed, who came to power
after the ouster of General Gowon in July
1975, was killed in an abortive power grab
by disgruntled military officers.
As a southerner and the first Yoruba to
be head of state, Obasanjo was initially
uncomfortable in the leadership role
because he thought he might not be accep-
table to Mohammed's fellow Muslim
northerners. He now appears to be warm-
ing to his job, but he remains highly sen-
sitive to the northerners' feelings. He
made a point, in his speech, of paying ef-
fusive homage to Mohammed.
In fact, the northerners, who agreed to
Obasanjo's succession for the sake of
national unity, appear to have lost little or
no influence. Their chief representative on
the ruling Supreme Military Council,
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Armed Forces Chief of Staff Shehu Yar
Adua, is the regime's second ranking
member-if not its strongman.
Program for Civilian Rule
In his speech, Obasanjo reported
"significant advances" in the five-stage
program for returning the country to
civilian rule that General Mohammed
outlined last year.
One first-stage goal was reached early
this year when the military government
decreed the creation of seven additional
states and declared closed the long-stand-
ing statehood controversy. The decision
satisfied at least some of the minorities in
the original 12 states that had long press-
ed for their own states in order to have
more voice in national affairs.
Obasanjo announced that a draft con-
stitution-another first-stage
goal-would be made public this week for
a year of public discussion. The draft, the
work of a 49-member citizens' committee,
was completed last month ahead of
schedule.
The draft calls for an elected president
and vice president, a bicameral federal
legislature, elected governors for the 19
states, civilian control of the armed
forces, and national political parties. A
national constituent assembly is to be con-
vened in October 1977 to adopt the con-
stitution.
An ambitious plan for reorganizing the
country's local government structure by
October 1978-another goal set by
Mohammed-has also been launched.
The government characterizes the plan as
the "cornerstone" of its civilian rule
program.
Existing local government bodies are to
be dissolved and new local councils chosen
in nonpartisan elections in some states
late this year. Caretaker councils are be-
ing formed to serve until the elected coun-
cils take office in January.
Obasanjo announced the appointment
of an election commission to begin initial
preparations for state and federal elec-
tions, probably in 1979. The commission
will organize and oversee the elections,
register voters and political parties, and
delimit constituencies as prescribed by the
constitution.
According to the timetable announced
by Mohammed last year, all these steps
are to be completed in time for the
military to return to the barracks on Oc-
tober I, 1979.
Hurdles Ahead
The regime has pushed its program for
return to civilian rule aggressively, but the
steps ahead contain numerous pitfalls.
For example, reorganizing local govern-
ment without provoking a serious
backlash from traditional local leaders,
especially in the north, will be tricky.
The powerful Muslim emirs and other
traditional rulers have long opposed the
introduction of elective government in
their areas. They withheld public support
of the plan until the regime modified its
reforms to allow for many "local
peculiarities," specifying that emirs may
be nonpartisan presidents of local councils
and may continue to "aid" in tax collec-
tion. Many traditionalists also object to
the regime's proposal that women be
allowed to vote.
The campaigning for the local elections
could easily rekindle old ethnic and
regional animosities that have beset
Nigerian politics in the past. Political par-
ties remain banned for the coming local
elections, but ambitious politicians will
feel compelled to start building a follow-
ing. If the local politicking begins to
reopen old political wounds, the regime
may decide to stretch out its timetable.
Before the local councils take office, an
old controversy over the population cen-
sus may crop up again. The boundaries of
each local unit and funds provided to it
apparently will be determined by the
figures in the 1963 census, These are dis-
puted by rival ethnic groups.
Among Nigerians there is still
widespread skepticism that the present or
any successor military regime will actual-
ly give up power voluntarily. Some
high-ranking officers are widely believed
to be amassing personal fortunes, and
some observers suspect they will find ex-
cuses not to follow through on their
program-especially if it runs into
problems.
General Obasanjo 25X1
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There is no end in sight to the dispute over Western
Sahara, but none of those involved-Morocco and Mauritania
on one side and Algeria on the other-now seems anxious to
push for a showdown.
Dispute Continuing Over Western Sahara
Seven months after Spain turned over
administrative control of Western Sahara
to Morocco and Mauritania on the basis
of an agreement reached in Madrid in
November 1975, the legal status of the
former Spanish territory is still being ac-
tively contested by Algeria. The prospects
for a negotiated settlement seem remote,
and neither King Hassan nor President
Boumediene shows any disposition to
compromise.
Throughout the past summer, the
ing the insurgency indefinitely. The
danger is that Morocco may eventually
become so frustrated with a guerrilla war
of attrition, which King Hassan has
repeatedly warned he will not tolerate,
that it will resort to direct retaliation
against Algeria.
Territory Partitioned
Moroccan and Mauritanian forces oc-
cupied Western Sahara soon after the
November agreement, and the two coun-
tries formally partitioned it last April.
Morocco acquired the northern two
thirds, including the rich phosphate
reserves at Bu Craa, and Mauritania gain-
ed control of the lucrative marine
resources at Dakhla and the unexploited
iron ore at Agracha. Each country
proclaimed the extension of its sovereign-
ty over its portion of the territory.
Algeria, for its part, has been following
a two-track policy attempting both to
secure international censure of Morocco
and Mauritania and to develop the
Polisario Front into a credible military
and political force. So far, the Algerians
have had little success lining up
diplomatic support for their position or
for the Polisario "state"-Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic-created un-
der their auspices last February. Only
Algeria, eight other African states, and
North Korea have recognized the Front's
government-in-exile.
In political forums, Algeria argues that
the partition arrangement is illegal and
continues to demand a referendum on
self-determination under UN auspices.
The Algerians cite a number of
resolutions adopted by previous UN
General Assemblies that call for such a
`Dakhla Fishing industry 'o [one
Agracha
Iron Ore Deposits
quarrel between Morocco and Mauritania
on one side and Algeria on the other has
been played out in international forums
while guerrillas of the Algerian-backed
Polisario Front, who are seeking the
territory's independence, have continued
their steady harassment of Moroccan and
Mauritanian forces.
The pattern of diplomatic wrangling
and sustained guerrilla warfare is likely to
continue for some time. Neither side now
seems to want a direct military show-
down, and Algeria is capable of support-
-Bir Maghrein
Moroccan Military
Unit
Mauritania
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procedure, including one passed last
December.
Morocco and Mauritania point to
another UN resolution, also adopted by
the General Assembly last December,
that in effect recognized the Madrid ac-
cord. They insist that the resolution's re-
quirement for consultations with the
territory's inhabitants was fulfilled last
February when the Saharan assembly-a
consultative body originally created by
Spain but subservient to Rabat at the
time-endorsed the turnover agreement.
The UN, however, has not accepted the
Moroccan-Mauritanian position because
there was no UN role as called for in both
resolutions.
In late June, a meeting of foreign
ministers of the Organization of African
Unity, after a stormy debate, passed an
Algerian-favored resolution reaffirming
the Western Saharan people's right to
self-determination and defeated a Moroc-
can-Mauritanian motion to censure
je/
Algerian aggression. The Moroccans
walked out of the session and threatened
to withdraw permanently from the OAU.
Algiers' victory proved to be short-liv-
ed. The followup OAU summit meeting in
early July shelved the pro-Algerian
resolution and passed a face-saving com-
promise-a proposal for a special summit
on Western Sahara. There is little
enthusiasm among OAU members for
such a meeting, and it may never take
place. Thus far, no member has formally
requested that a summit on Western
Sahara be convened.
Morocco views the Western Sahara
issue as a bilateral dispute with Algeria
and wants to limit further deliberations to
reducing tensions in the region. Morocco
prefers that any discussion of the problem
be confined to the Arab League, where
Morocco has considerable support, rather
than the OAU.
The Moroccans, nonetheless,
successfully exploited the OAU proposal
to blunt Algerian efforts to secure backing
at the nonaligned summit in Sri Lanka in
August. The nonaligned heads of state
merely took note of the OAU proposal in
their political declaration, expressing
hope for a peaceful solution.
At the UN
Algeria almost certainly will seek a
full-scale debate on the Western Sahara
issue at the current General Assembly ses-
sion, but the Algerians' poor showing at
the nonaligned conference suggests they
may be unable to win support for another
resolution.
Morocco's
fallback position probably will be to argue
that the dispute should be left for
deliberation in regional bodies.
With the UN in mind, Morocco and
Mauritania have begun a propaganda
campaign calling for the return of
Saharan refugees in Algeria. Morocco is
asserting that only a few refugees in
Algeria are from Western Sahara and
that these "Moroccan citizens" are being
held against their will by Algerian
authorities.
Morocco and Mauritania are sensitive
about the refugee issue because it under-
mines their argument that the Western
Saharans have been consulted. They have
pushed their case against Algeria with the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees in
the hope that Algeria will be unable to ex-
ploit this issue when the Commission
meets in committee early next month.
In the Territory
Morocco and Mauritania are firmly es-
tablished in the principal towns of
Western Sahara, but they have not been
able to eliminate Polisario guerrilla in-
filtration and harassment in outlying
areas. At least 2,000 to 3,000 guerrillas
continue to carry out sabotage and hit-
and-run attacks in southern Morocco
and Mauritania, as well as in Western
Sahara.
In early June, the Front launched a sur-
prise attack against the Mauritanian
capital of Nouakchott. The guerrillas in-
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6 119_xllovl~
flirted little damage and suffered heavy
casualties, but the raid underscored
Mauritania's vulnerability as the weakest
party to the dispute.
Since the attack on Nouakchott,
military cooperation between Morocco
and Mauritania has increased. A special
radio link between the two countries'
senior military commanders is being set
up, and a small Moroccan military liaison
group reportedly has been sent to
Nouakchott.
The continuing guerrilla harassment is
affecting the morale of both civilians and
Moroccan military personnel in Western
To counter the Polisario, Morocco has
so far relied on extensive sweep and clear
operations. These have proved largely in-
effective because of the inability of
Moroccan forces to respond quickly to
the scattered attacks mounted by small
and mobile guerrilla units.
months organizing the constitutional
referendum and national election he has
promised in order to give his regime a
stamp of legitimacy. Economic develop-
ment, Algeria's number-one priority,
already suffers from a shortage of finan-
cing; Boumediene is not likely to divert
additional resources to support a cause
that does not appear to be making much
headway.
Morocco, for now at least, is unlikely to
escalate its dispute with Algeria. To do so
would undermine the initiatives it is plan-
ning at the UN and the diplomatic sup-
port it has carefully cultivated among
other Arab and African states. The recent
routine rotation of fresh, and probably in-
experienced, Moroccan troops into
Western Sahara suggests the Moroccan
government is continuing the level of its
military effort there.
The prospects for a negotiated settle-
ment seem remote. In any eventual
political deal, Algeria would have to settle
for limited consultations with the Western
Saharan people that did not alter Moroc-
can and Mauritanian control. Morocco,
in turn, would have to accept at least a
token exercise of self-determination in the
territory and possibly a special ad-
ministration that provided a facade of
We believe King Hassan, forte pre-
sent, will keep any operations by army
commandos inside Western Sahara. He
may later be tempted, however, to use
Moroccan irregulars in cross-border
operations to seek out Polisario guerrillas
inside Algeria.
Algeria, given its own support for the
Polisario, might go no further than
responding in kind to irregular guerrilla
operations. If Moroccan regular army un-
its become involved, however, the situa-
tion could quickly deteriorate into wider
hostilities.
Prospects
Algeria does not seem to want a direct
military confrontation with Morocco, but
it almost certainly will continue to sup-
port Polisario guerrilla warfare in
Western Sahara. The Algerians believe
time works in favor of liberation
movements and hope the Moroccans
become bogged down fighting a long and
costly insurgency.
Domestic political and economic con-
siderations argue against Boumediene's
initiating hostilities with Morocco. He
probably will be preoccupied for several
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The military-controlled governments in southern South
America all feel threatened by domestic terrorism and share a
sense of isolation from the rest of the world. They are
cooperating in an increasing variety of bilateral and mul-
tilateral programs.
South America:
Cooperation Among Military Regimes
11
Circumstance and mutual interest are
drawing leaders of the southern cone
countries-Argentina, Chile, Uruguay,
and Paraguay-into closer political and
economic cooperation. The army-con-
trolled governments of these countries
share a ubiquitous fear of communist sub-
version, a growing feeling of isolation
from the rest of the world, and a concern
that they are being abandoned by the US.
Brazil and Bolivia are beginning to par-
ticipate in the relationship but have reser-
vations for one reason or another. A
close-knit alliance of these countries could
have important implications for the US.
The southern cone regimes purport to
be "democratic," but are clearly
authoritarian. The men in power do not
get their support from political groups,
but from the military.
Most of the military leaders are con-
vinced they can exert a modernizing in-
fluence on government through increased
efficiency and rationality. Most believe
they are better qualified to govern than
civilian politicians.
The views of these military leaders
seem to be coalescing into a still-unform-
ulated philosophy of military admin-
istration in which an abhorrence of
disorder, distrust of the old politics, and
dedication to social and economic
progress are the driving forces.
Fear of Subversion
The military leaders believe the
primary national concern should be
security. The principal enemies are leftist
terrorism and international communism.
Preserving the nation, in their view, must
take precedence over personal well-being
and individual freedom.
The preoccupation with security may
seem excessive, but for the countries that
have participated in a struggle against
terrorists, the fight is real. It is true, for
instance, that political violence in Argen-
tina took more lives last year than the
total killed in Northern Ireland during the
past five years. All of the southern cone
countries, to one extent or another, feel
threatened by terrorist violence.
Isolation
Most of the countries suffer from a
poor image in the world press and in inter-
national forums. The military
governments are variously described as
"totalitarian" and "fascist." One
Brazilian government official lamented to
US embassy officers that the Israelis are
praised for staging a raid into Africa
against terrorists, but similar
counterterrorist activities in Brazil are
called excessive and cruel in the world
press.
Leaders in the southern cone also
believe that investigations by unofficial
and official bodies such as Amnesty Inter-
national and the UN Commission on
Human Rights are overzealous and mis-
guided. The leaders think they should
have the right to eliminate terrorists
without foreign interference.
Chilean leaders in particular are weary
of "international interference," and
profess to see the recent murder in
Washington of former ambassador
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Letelier as part of a plot to discredit the
nation. All of these countries believe they
are the victims of an international cam-
paign led by the communists.
Close Cooperation
The original impetus for cooperation
among the southern cone countries
probably came from Chile. Following the
coup in 1973, the Chilean regime was anx-
ious to acquire friends and military equip-
ment for protection against a perceived
threat from Peru.
The Chileans first approached Brazil
and came away with the belief that Brazil
at least would lend a hand indirectly if
Chile were invaded. Chile then ap-
proached Bolivia and proposed a renewal
of discussions on an outlet to the sea.
Dipl"omatic relations between the two
countries were re-established in February
1975.
The military coup in Argentina last
March brought Buenos Aires into step
with its neighbors. The Argentines in-
creasingly began talking of "new
realities" in hemisphere affairs and
cooperation among all of the southern
cone countries including Brazil.
After a period of concentration on the
internal security situation and the
economy, the Argentine government
finally felt secure enough early last
summer to implement some new foreign
policy initiatives. In June, the Foreign
Ministry sent carefully selected am-
bassadors to Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and
Paraguay. High Argentine officials also
began visiting around the continent to dis-
cuss topics of mutual interest.
Current Status of Cooperation
Diplomatic activity in the southern
cone has continued. Argentina and Brazil
reportedly have had discussions on
creating a "South Atlantic Treaty
Organization." This naval alliance is en-
visaged as a defense of the South Atlantic
against the Soviet-Cuban presence in
southern Africa. The Brazilians, so far,
have dismissed talk of an alliance as non-
sense, but rumors persist.
Argentina and Paraguay agreed this
month to increase trade by eliminating
customs barriers. They also said they
would stimulate complementary joint in-
dustrial projects. Argentine President
Videla met with Uruguayan President
Mendez and agreed to increase coopera-
tion between the two governments. Videla
is scheduled to visit Chile and Bolivia at
the end of this month.
Chilean diplomacy continues to be
directed against Peru, but improved
relations between the two countries have
diminished the urgency of the Chilean ef-
fort. Chile is continuing to talk with
Bolivia about an outlet to the sea. Chilean
willingness to discuss the problem and
Peruvian intransigence have improved
relations between Chile and Bolivia.
Chile is working to increase trade
relations with Paraguay and Uruguay. It
is already involved in a "joint integration
commission" with Argentina and also
hopes to increase trade with that country.
Chile has concluded that the Andean Pact25X1
restricts development and that there is a
better market for Chilean products in the
southern cone.
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay also
have been discussing trade and coopera-
tion. Brazil and Paraguay already are in-
volved in the construction of the Itaipu
hydroelectric project on the Parana River.
Paraguay and Uruguay have just launch-
ed a joint commission; its first task is to
eliminate customs restrictions between
the two countries.
Many intangibles will affect the extent
of southern cone cooperation. There are
many reasons why these countries would
be drawn together in some sort of an
alliance, but there are also old an-
tagonisms.
The great imponderable is Brazil-the
only country in the area with true global
aspirations. Until now, Brazil has been
lukewarm toward an extensive alliance
with neighboring countries. Whether or
not Brazil can be enticed into joining the
group may be one key factor in the extent
and direction of southern cone coopera-
tion. A lasting improvement in relations
between Argentina and Brazil would be a
difficult achievement under any con-
ditions, but the leaders of both nations
may now be prepared to try to accomplish
just that.
Continued perception of mutual in-
terest among all of these countries is the
most important element in the future of
their relationship. A prolongation of
terrorist activities in the southern cone
will drive these countries into further
cooperation.
Continued US criticism for human
rights violations will heighten the sense of
abandonment already prevailing in the
area and intensify the feeling of isolation
and frustration. This could foster closer
cooperation and increasing protests
against US interference in internal affairs.
Chilean and Uruguayan leaders have
already suggested publicly that their con-
tinued swallowing of criticism from the25X1
US on human rights issues is not worth
the limited assistance they now get from
Washington.
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