WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011400120001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 10, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret f"A
Weekly %7
Secret
CI WS 76-037
No. 0037/76
September 10, 1976
Copy N?.' 68
DOS review completed
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CONTENTS
September 10, 1976
f the week through noon on Thursday. It
material coordinated with or prepared
Intelligence repute and analyzes signifi
IARY, issued every Friday morning by the
:or ermic Research, the Office of Strategic
Office of GengraFhic and Cartographic
the Directorate of Science and Torhnoloq ;
1 Middle East - Africa
Lebanon; Egypt-Libya;
South Africa; USSR-US-
South Africa; Southern
Africa; Rhodesia
3 Europe
Greece-Turkey; Cyprus;
USSR
Cuba; Mexico;
Uruguay
7 Syria: Intentions in Lebanon
10 France: Giscard's Strategy
12 The Succession Problem in China
14 USSR: Climate and Grain
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
Summary
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P
LEBANON
Arab League representatives decided
on September 4 to put off an Arab sum-
mit conference on Lebanon until the third
week in October, apparently to give
president-elect Sarkis time to form a
government and for League officials in
Beirut to try to win broader support for
their peace plan.
Syria doubtless welcomed the post-
ponement, which frees the Syrians to con-
centrate on their preparations for Sarkis'
assumption of office on September 23 and
their next move after that. Judging by the
low level of military activity over the past
few weeks, the Syrians are still undecided
whether to press their military advantage
against the Palestinians and Lebanese
leftists before
president.
The Syrians are apparently confident,
meet in Syria on September 27. The an-
nouncement immediately sparked
speculation in Beirut that the three leaders
plan to form some sort of alliance, and the
subject has subsequently become the
target of leftist propaganda attacks.
Asad, meanwhile, conferred this week
with top Lebanese Christian leaders, in-
cluding the extremist Camille Shamun.
The leftists' radio in Beirut said Asad and
the Christians talked about the timing of a
possible Syrian military move as well as
the problems of rebuilding the Lebanese
army and choosing a new prime minister
and cabinet to serve under Sarkis.
The radio also contended that the
Syrians are urging that the swearing-in
ceremony be held at Shaturah, a Lebanese
town well within Syrian-controlled
territory. The Syrians may want Sarkis to
take his oath of office somewhere under
their control both to ensure his safety and
to underscore the legitimacy of their
presence in Lebanon.
Palestine Liberation Organization chief
Yasir Arafat sent three of his closest aides
to Damascus last weekend in an apparent-
however, that the transfer of power wi25X11y unsuccessful attempt to resolve his
take place on schedule. They announces problems with Asad.
on September 4 that President Asad, Jor-
dan's King Husayn, and Sarkis would
The Syrians
do not appear to
be taking Arafat's latest entreaties very
seriously. Indeed, Asad-who has come
deeply to distrust Arafat-probably sees
some advantage in encouraging these
divisions in order to undercut Arafat's
position. (An assessment of the Syrian
strategy in Lebanon appears on page 7.)
EGYPT-LIBYA
5
President Qadhafi's unruffled reaction
to Egypt's threats against him and to the
Egyptian military buildup on the border
seems to have baffled Cairo. The Egyp-
MAO'S DEATH
The death of Mao Tse-tung, announced
on September 9, will not come as a
traumatic surprise to the Chinese people;
the regime has been preparing the public
for this event for some time through wide
dissemination of photographs showing an
increasingly aged and infirm Chairman.
The political repercussions of his demise,
however, may well last for years. These
are discussed on page 12.
tians have barely mentioned his con-
ciliatory speech on September 1, and they
have toned down their own threatening
statements.
An Egyptian diplomat in Tripoli in fact
recently characterized the Qadhafi
speech-in which the Libyan tried to por-
tray himself as the reasonable party to the
dispute-as a clever move that had effec-
tively boxed Egypt into a corner. The
Egyptian reasoned that his government
could not afford to back down from its
plans to move against Qadhafi but,
because of his speech, will look like the
aggressor if it does move.
The diplomat's judgment that Egypt
has gotten itself into a no-win situation
and that Qadhafi has been able with
relative ease to put himself across as the
innocent party may be shared by other
Egyptian officials. They may now be
assessing how best to reconstruct a credi-
ble case against the Libyan leader.
Qadhafi, for his part, seems to think
that an outwardly reasonable approach is
his best course. He repeated in an inter-
view published last weekend a promise he
had made in his speech-that in the in-
terests of Arab unity he would not use Li-
byan forces even to repel an Egyptian at-
tack. He also offered to meet with Egyp-
tian President Sadat in a neutral country
to resolve their differences without
mediators. Sadat is unlikely to respond.
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Y
SOUTH AFRICA
Recent incidents in Cape Town have
dramatized the possibility that an-
tiapartheid demonstrations might even-
tually trigger serious violence in white
business or residential areas.
Police in Cape Town used tear gas on
September 2 to disperse some 3,000
colored (mulatto) high school students
holding a demonstration in the downtown
area to denounce apartheid. The clash oc-
curred when the authorities suddenly
ordered the demonstrators to disperse.
This week, smaller groups of colored
students persisted in staging
demonstrations in the downtown area but
were dispersed, apparently without
much bloodshed.
The death toll from urban rioting since
June-almost 300 blacks but only 3
whites and fewer than 10
coloreds-reflects the fact that major
violence has been confined to the black
townships. Within the last week or so,
however, relatively small-scale rioting has
spread among the colored townships in
the vicinity of Cape Town. In several in-
stances, rioters have damaged property in
adjacent white communities.
Although government leaders have
avoided any publicized meetings with
blacks since July, it was announced last
week that Prime Minister Vorster will
meet with the leaders of the tribal
homelands on October 8. Official com-
mentary has implied that Vorster will dis-
cuss the tribal leaders' recent demand for
the release or fair trial of all the urban
blacks who have been arrested since
June-more than 800 blacks are under
detention.
Vorster apparently intends to maintain
a tough stance until calm is restored in an
attempt to show that the government is
not yielding to dissidence. Vorster
probably also wants to defer dealing
directly with the blacks until after the
special caucus of his political party that is
to convene on September 10 in Pretoria.
The caucus will be attended by some 300
leaders of the ruling National Party.
The South African press is speculating
that the caucus will try to develop a con-
sensus on some limited modifications of
the apartheid system.
Vorster will probably also use the
caucus to report on his recent meeting
with Secretary Kissinger in Switzerland.
Vorster, however, is clearly avoiding any
move that would suggest he is bowing to
foreign criticism.
/Z-/J
USSR-US-SOUTH AFRICA
Soviet commentary on the US-South
African talks in Zurich has stressed the
role played by Secretary Kissinger and
betrays Moscow's apprehension over the
possibility that "shuttle diplomacy" may
come into play in southern Africa.
Writing in Pravda on September 7,
senior political commentator Yury
Zhukov charged that the US role in
Africa may cause "new dangerous com-
plications" in the area and that the
Secretary is trying to maintain "racists"
in power. During the Zurich talks, Soviet
media accused the US of resorting to
"illusory compromises, dubious half
measures, and political maneuvers" to
create the "semblance" of a solution.
The message to black African leaders is
to be wary in dealing with the US.
The Soviets are already concerned that
Secretary Kissinger's efforts may bear
fruit. The chief of the USA Institute's
Foreign Policy Department, G. A.
Trofimenko, remarked to a US embassy
official on September 7 that he personally
viewed the Secretary's activities in Africa
as a "carbon copy" of the US approach in
the Middle East.
The selection
of Zhukov--a well-
connected commentator who usually
deals with major East-West issues-to
write the Pravda commentary strongly
suggests that more than just African in-
terests are involved. Zhukov's comments
appear to be part of an increasing inclina-
tion on the part of the Soviets to Find fault
with the US administration in general and
the Secretary's role in particular.
25X1
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Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania (1) and Neto of Angola arrive at summit meeting
SOUTHERN AFRICA l 5- 17
The five African presidents most direct-
ly involved in southern African problems
met this week in Dar es Salaam, Tan-
zania, with black nationalist leaders from
Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa.
Much of the two-day meeting apparently
sion of the talks mentioned only that the
liberation struggle would be intensified.
The five presidents-Nyerere of Tan-
zania, Kaunda of Zambia, Khama of
Botswana, Machel of Mozambique, and
Neto of Angola-probably held off mak-
ing any final decisions until they assess the
results of Secretary Kissinger's meeting
with South African Prime Minister
Vorster last weekend.
Statements by rival Rhodesian
nationalist leaders confirm that no
progress was made either at the Dar es
Salaam gathering or at a preliminary
meeting among the Rhodesians in
Mozambique last week toward uniting
their badly fragmented movement.
The summit meeting marked a
broadening of the role of Nyerere, Kaun-
da, Machel, and Khama. They had
previously focused almost entirely on
Rhodesia, but at this meeting they ap-
parently also discussed ways to aid
nationalists aiming to overturn white con-
trol of Namibia-an area of particular
concern to Angolan President Neto-and
South Africa itself.
focused on strengthening the black 25X1
African military effort against Ian
Smith's white regime in Rhodesia.
A brief statement issued at the conclu-
6' - 7 Rhodesian insurgency intensifies
Rhodesian security forces say they have
been inflicting very heavy casualties on
the guerrillas, but the level of insurgent
activity appears not to have been affected.
According to government figures, 131
guerrillas were killed in Rhodesia during
August-the highest monthly total since
the fighting began in 1972. Press reports,
however, indicate that the insurgents last
week made one of their largest attacks
ever. Some 100 guerrillas are said to have
followed up a mortar and rocket barrage
by raiding a Rhodesian army outpost near
Mtoko in northeast Rhodesia.
In southeastern Rhodesia, the guer-
rillas, according to press reports, shot
down a helicopter.
GREECE-TURKEY ~O 31
Greece has apparently decided once
again not to interfere with the activities of
the Turkish ship Sismik I in contested
waters of the Aegean.
The latest mission of the Sismik I
began last week and is expected to run
through September 25. The Turks say the
ship will be operating in an area that en-
compasses large portions of the continen-
tal shelf claimed by Greece and in zones
where the two countries have granted
overlapping oil concessions.
The Greeks expressed concern in a
demarche to the US, but have not re-
quested any new action by the US. Athens
may also have made similar demarches to
the UN Security Council and several
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West European governments.
In a weekend speech in Thessaloniki,
Prime Minister Caramanlis hinted that
despite the sensitivity of the Turkish
ship's present area of research, Greece
would be ready to resume a dialogue with
Turkey when the ship completed its mis-
sion. His conciliatory approach-which
has included a recent public admission
that Turkey does have some rights in the
Aegean-leaves him open to domestic
criticism, and Caramanlis sought in his
speech to assure his audience that he
would defend national interests and
honor.
The Turkish government appears to be
trying to induce the Greeks to accept
bilateral negotiations on Turkish terms,
which include withdrawal of the current
Greek appeal to the International Court
of Justice. The Court has announced that
it will rule September 11 on the Greek
request for a preliminary injunction
against the Sismik's activities in disputed
waters. The Turkish ambassador in
Washington told US officials earlier this
week that a Court ruling against Turkey
would be "detrimental" to the future
course of talks.
Turkish Prime Minister Demirel seems
to be trying to undercut charges by the op-
position that his Aegean policy lacks
boldness. In his pushing and probing,
however, Demirel could eventually force
Caramanlis to react in kind and possibly
set the stage for a military confrontation.
CYPRUS
A three-party alliance supporting Presi-
dent Makarios and his handling of the
Cyprus issue scored a decisive victory
over former House of Representatives
president Glafkos Clerides' party in the
parliamentary election on September 5.
According to unofficial results, the
alliance, composed of the centrist
Democratic Front, the Communists, and
the Socialists, won 69.5 percent of the
vote and 34 of 35 seats. The Democratic
Front-which acted as Makarios' sur-
rogate-ran first in the popular vote and
won all 21 seats it contested. It will have
control of the House. The Communists
ran second in the popular vote and won all
9 seats they contested; the Socialists won
4 of 6 seats.
Greek Cypriot negotiator Tassos
Papadopoulos, who ran as an independent
and is likely to be the next House presi-
dent, won the remaining seat with the
support of the pro-Makarios parties.
Clerides' center-right Democratic Rally
made a respectable showing. It won 24.1
percent of the popular vote but failed to
gain any seats because of the winner-
take-all election system.
Makarios, who has long advocated in-
ternationalization of the Cyprus issue in
order to bring pressure on the Turks, call-
ed for Greek Cypriot unity and respect for
the electorate's verdict. Clerides vowed to
continue to work for a more conciliatory
approach to negotiations.
25X1
USSR L4'
93
The appointment last week of Nikolay
Tikhonov as Soviet first deputy premier is
an initial step to deal organizationally
with the serious illness of Premier
Kosygin. The Soviet ambassador to
Czechoslovakia told the US ambassador
on September 1 that Kosygin, 72, had suf-
fered a heart attack and was resting in a
sanitarium. Kosygin continues to be ab-
sent from leadership and state functions.
Tikhonov becomes one of two first
deputy premiers; the other is Kirill
Mazurov who has held the post since
1965. Tikhonov, 71, is General Secretary
Brezhnev's protege. He made his early
career in metallurgy and as deputy
premier has been responsible for that field
and the coal industry.
The leadership may have promoted
Tikhonov to help with the heavy workload
that Kosygin has carried. Brezhnev un-
doubtedly welcomed the opportunity to
place an ally that high in the government
to counterbalance the more independent
Mazurov. Tikhonov may also be elected
to the Politburo; Mazurov is a member,
as was former first deputy premier
Polyansky.
If Kosygin should retire or die, his
successor appears to be an open question.
Mazurov has the clearest claim to the job.
Brezhnev may have wanted to ensure that
his man, Tikhonov, served as first deputy
in such an eventuality. Mazurov, 62, is in
indifferent health, however, and was ab-
sent from public view from early June un-
til last week.
Tikhonov could replace Kosygin but
probably only after serving a period on
the Politburo. His close association with
Brezhnev would probably not sit well with
Kosygin and other collective members.
Other choices for the premiership are
possible, but do not seem prefigured by
the Mazurov-Tikhonov pairing.
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CUBA
Reduced earnings from sugar exports
We estimate Cuba's sugar production
from the 1976 harvest at six million
tons-7 percent below last year and only
slightly higher than 1974. Cane produc-
tion remained stable, but sugar content
drought that delayed planting and abnor-
mally heavy rains during the harvest.
The drop in sugar output was held to a
transportation of the cane to the mills.
one quarter in 1975.
The reduced sugar harvest, coupled
cut total export earnings this year by 11
percent to about $3 billion. With imports
increasing, we expect the total trade
with noncommunist countries will
probably rise 10 percent to $770 million,
despite a probable 10- to 15-percent
continuing dependence on massive foreign
respite caused by soaring world sugar
prices in 1974. In addition to an estimated
$1.2 billion in Soviet subsidies for sugar
and petroleum, Cuba will need $90
payments support from the 125X1.
Drawings of $550 million in Western
trade credits will cover the remaining
million in communist trade credits and
$220 million in hard currency balance-of-
MEXICO -5-7
Mexico floated the peso on August 31
to curb large speculative capital flight and
to correct distorted foreign-domestic price
relationships. The regulated float has
resulted in an immediate 39-percent
devaluation of the peso. The government
will try to stabilize it at the current level of
about 20 pesos to the dollar. Before the
float, it was 12.5 pesos to the dollar.
The peso has been under severe selling
pressure for most of this year, primarily
because Mexico's inflation rate has out-
paced the US rate. Persistent rumors that
devaluation was imminent led to an es-
timated $200-million monthly capital out-
flow.
President Echeverria, in his
state-of-the-republic speech on September
1, gave only token attention to curbing in-
flation. He stressed measures to protect
the incomes of the working class from the
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adverse effect of the devaluation.
Excessive stress on maintaining real in-
comes will increase inflationary pressures,
retarding the improvement of business
confidence and hampering new private in-
vestment in export industries. We believe
president-elect Lopez Portillo, who will
take office on December 1, will give
greater priority to controlling inflation
and to strengthening the role of private
business.
The 1977 budget, now being prepared
with a direct contribution from Lopez
Portillo, reportedly will be far more
austere than the present one. Lopez Por-
tillo is likely to place more restraint on
government spending and to increase the
productivity of government workers
through a major reorganization of the ex-
ecutive branch. These actions will tem-
porarily slow economic growth.
Initial benefits from the devaluation
will be the curtailment of capital flight
and greatly increased net receipts from
tourism and border transactions.
Tourism-Mexico's main foreign ex-
change earner and largest industry-has
slumped sharply since 1974.
Mexico's trade deficit this year will still
be more than $3.0 billion, down only
modestly from last year's $3.7 billion.
Mexico will not be able to cut imports
much without substantially reducing
economic growth, and exports cannot be
increased significantly soon because of
capacity constraints.
The outlook for the trade deficit in the
medium and long term could be much
brighter. Devaluation will increase the
competitiveness of many Mexican
products, especially in the US, its natural
market. If Lopez Portillo succeeds in
restoring business confidence and invest-
ment spending, devaluation is likely to
lead to a sharp upswing in Mexican
manufactured goods exports, which,
along with growing oil exports, will sub-
stantially reduce the trade deficit.
Uruguay- New Government Tightens Controls
Uruguay's military leaders, working
through newly appointed President
Aparicio Mendez, have freed many
political prisoners. Almost simultaneous-
ly, they have tightened their hold on the
government and deprived many
Uruguayans of their political rights.
The government recently announced
that it had freed 1,359 persons who had
been "processed for seditious offenses."
The US embassy has estimated that
previously there were about 2,000
political prisoners.
At about the same time, Mendez signed
two institutional acts that the military had
made conditions of his appointment. One
of these creates a new ministry of justice
to "harmonize relations" among the
various branches of government; gives
cabinet rank to members of the national
security council (thus, to service com-
manders); creates a secretariat of plan-
ning, coordination, and information un-
der the presidency; and provides for
military management of city governments
until a new constitution is adopted.
The other institutional act denies for 15
years the rights of both voting and
political activity to all Marxist candidates
for public office in 1966 and 1971 and to
all persons "processed" for crimes against
the state. It denies the right to political ac-
tivity for 15 years, but not the right to
vote, to the candidates for president and
vice president in 1966 and 1971, all
legislators elected in 1971 except those
holding "political posts," and board
members of the political parties. This act
also creates an "interpretive commission"
that will rule on cases involving the
prohibition of political activity.
There has been little public reaction to
the new decrees, probably because they
are confusing and open to wide interpreta-
tion. For the most part, Uruguayans have
become complacent about military rule
with civilian trappings. F_
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The Syrians remain determined to stay in Lebanon until at
least most of their objectives are met. They want a political
balance in Lebanon that keeps any one of the contending
groups, including the Christians, from exerting dominant con-
trol. Above all, their aim is to prevent Egypt or the radical Arab
states from gaining influence in Lebanon.
Syria: Intentions in Lebanon
The Syrian-Palestinian dispute has
become the priority issue in the Lebanese
crisis. Until that conflict is resolved, there
is little prospect for any serious peace
negotiations among the contending
Lebanese Muslim and Christian factions.
The Syrians do not believe the
Palestinians are serious in their recent
pledges to abide by past Lebanese-Palesti-
nian accords regulating fedayeen ac-
tivities in Lebanon. Damascus therefore is
pursuing a course aimed at sharply
limiting the Palestinians' military
capabilities, splitting the Palestinians
from their Lebanese leftist allies, and,
perhaps, securing the removal of Yasir
Arafat as head of the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
Damascus is making contingency plans
for increased Syrian military activity in
Lebanon. The Syrians presumably feel
confident they can continue to press the
Palestinians without serious constraints
being imposed on them by the other
Arabs or the Soviets. Syria also may
calculate that the Palestinians cannot
withstand a renewed Syrian offensive for
long without suffering major splits in their
ranks.
The Syrians are considering whether to
move before or after Lebanese
president-elect Sarkis has taken office on
September 23. Their apparent determina-
tion to bring the Palestinians to heel is
already posing serious problems for
Sarkis, whose candidacy was strongly
backed by Syria. Sarkis is known to
believe that Lebanese problems cannot be
attacked in earnest until the
Syrian-Palestinian quarrel is resolved.
Sarkis, moreover, has been under
pressure from moderate Muslim leaders
to secure some commitment from
Damascus for an eventual Syrian
withdrawal, and he may have to distance
himself from the Syrians to establish his
own credibility. The Syrians presumably
want him to have sufficient stature to con-
duct meaningful negotiations among the
Lebanese factions, and they may give him
a pledge of an eventual phased withdrawal
of their forces.
Syria might conclude that it can best
ease Sarkis' problems by launching ex-
panded military action against the-
Palestinians before he takes office. In any
case, the Syrians' determination to
chasten and control the Palestinians may
lead them to act quickly without reference
to Sarkis' negotiating efforts or interests.
Recent Hesitation
Until now, the Syrians have not wanted
to take any action that would fundamen-
tally change the situation in ways that
would prompt President Franjiyah or
other Christian extremists to try to pre-
vent the transfer of power to Sarkis. Syria
presumably has believed that there is at
least some possibility that the replace-
ment of the intransigent Franjiyah with
the relatively pragmatic Sarkis will make
all sides to the conflict more willing to
compromise.
Syrian President Asad apparently has
also been delaying a major new military
push out of concern that the military
balance in Lebanon might swing too far
toward the Christians. Asad does not
want the Christians to make so much
progress on the ground that they seriously
o- 7 WFFKI Y SUMMARY Sep 10, 76
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attempt to pursue their preferred strategy
of driving the fedayeen out of Lebanon.
The Syrians would be pleased to see the
Palestinians' conventional military
capabilities sharply limited and to have
fedayeen units forced into the refugee
camps and commando bases that
Damascus can control or monitor. Syria
does not favor complete destruction of the
fedayeen movement, however, and will
not back the Christians in unrestricted
warfare against the Palestinians.
Despite their distrust of the
Palestinians, Syrian leaders probably
would still be satisfied with a Palestinian
commitment to adhere to the 1969 Cairo
and 1973 Melkart accords regulating
fedayeen activities in Lebanon.[--
Seeking Balance
Syrian leaders apparently believe what
the Syrian media consistently
emphasize-that there must be "no vic-
tor, no vanquished" in Lebanon. This
conviction is based on the assessment that
Syria's ability to control events in that
country is greatest if none of the major
factions, including the Palestinians and
the Christians, is able to win a decisive
military victory.
Syria believes such a standoff provides
the greatest chance for reviving the in-
fluence of the traditional Muslim
politicians. These Lebanese leaders have
generally cooperated with Syria, but are
militarily and politically weak.
In Syria's view, the traditional Sunni
Muslim politicians must be strengthened
to prevent the further increase in power of
socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt and
leaders of the smaller and more radical
leftist and communist groups. This is fun-
damental to Damascus' aim of limiting
the influence in Lebanon of Egypt and the
radical Arab states, especially Libya and
Iraq.
Asad's original goal in Lebanon was to
prevent partition and thereby avoid an un-
stable situation likely to prompt
large-scale outside military intervention
threatening to Syria. He must now
recognize that almost complete Muslim
and Christian local autonomy-de facto
partition-is inevitable even if a unified
central government is eventually
re-established.
Military Moves
Syrian forces in recent weeks have been
attempting to strengthen their control
over large areas of eastern and northern
Lebanon, to bolster Christian forces and
enable them to secure the central moun-
tains, and gradually to constrict Palesti-
nian and leftist strongholds in Tripoli and
in the south.
Syrian commanders-seeking to avoid
Syrian casualties and international
political problems-have also sought to
create a new Lebanese security force
made up of Shia Muslims and Christians,
hoping that it can relieve Syrian forces of
most ground combat in the disputed areas
of south-central Lebanon. We consider
that this force will be of limited use for at
least several months, however, and is not
likely at any point to be able by itself to
sustain the military initiative in
Palestinian- and leftist-controlled areas of
the country.
If Syria continues to believe that the
Palestinians are not negotiating in good
faith, it is likely to take more aggressive
military action. Given Syria's reluctance
to endure heavy casualties and the inabili-
ty of the Christians to increase their
military pressure significantly, however,
Damascus probably will stop short of
all-out attacks on Palestinian and leftist
positions in the major port cities. Syrian
forces presumably would first launch
large new offensives in central Lebanon
and the Jazzin area of southern Lebanon.
If it became necessary in order to force
Palestinian capitulation, Syria probably
would try to destroy the two airstrips
recently constructed in Palestinian- and
leftist-controlled areas, and attempt to in-
terdict all supplies moving northward and
inland from the ports of Tyre and Sidon.
International Constraints
International political and military
considerations are not likely to restrain
Asad from taking more aggressive action
in Lebanon if he concludes that such a
policy is required to force an end to the
conflict.
The possibility that the USSR might
end its military assistance to Syria is the
most worrisome consideration Asad
thinks he faces. His behavior in recent
weeks suggests, however, that reports of
Soviet threats have been exaggerated or
that Damascus believes it can or must ig-
nore those threats.
Asad presumably believes that Soviet
statements calling for a Syrian
withdrawal from Lebanon are designed
partly to please the Palestinians and the
radical Arabs and are not threats that will
be quickly carried out. Syria probably is
prepared to accept further deterioration in
its relations with the USSR, apparently
believing that Moscow's overall interests
in the Middle East would prevent it from
taking any action that would destroy its
relations with Syria.
Pleas or demands from the other Arabs
are even less likely to inhibit Asad. He
takes satisfaction in the recent restoration
of large-scale Saudi financial assistance to
Damascus, in Egypt's inability to counter
Syria's involvement in Lebanon, and in
preliminary signs that Iraqi forces op-
posite the Syrian border may be
withdrawing. The large-scale deployment
of Iraqi troops to Syria's eastern border
did not significantly alter Asad's course.
Having demonstrated that it can pre-
vent Arab League forces in Lebanon from
damaging Syria's essential interests,
Damascus apparently considers that it
can now endure or even wring political ad-
vantage from an Arab summit on
Lebanon. Syria is privately skeptical that
anything constructive will emerge from a
summit.
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Kamal Jumblatt (1), Yasir Arafat (c), and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam during meeting earlier this year
Security and administrative problems
within Syria continue to increase as a
result of Damascus' heavy involvement
in Lebanon. So far, however, these do
not appear to pose a serious threat to
Asad.
Domestic Considerations 25X1
Asad probably concluded from Syria's
earlier involvement in ground combat in
the Sidon area that the Syrian public and
Palestinian residents of Syria will protest
actions resulting in heavy casualties, but
will tolerate even extended and large-scale
involvement if it does not result in many
casualties. Thus Syria is likely to avoid
direct attacks on Palestinian strongholds
in urban areas, but to intensify its shelling
and attempt to expand its control in all
other areas.
There have been numerous bombings in
Syria in the past two months-carried out
mostly by Palestinians and Iraqi
agents-but the incidents have not
diminished Asad's determination.
Damascus in recent weeks has imposed
tight control on entry to Syria from
Lebanon and has arrested many fedayeen
suspected of terrorist activities.
Security services have had less success
in apprehending dissident Syrian Sunni
Muslims believed responsible for several
recent political assassinations. The regime
presumably recognizes that these conser-
vative opponents are objecting primarily
to Alawite control of the army and the
security services. It is probably convinced
that their opposition would not end even if
Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon.
Asad apparently intimidated most
high-ranking military officers into endors-
ing or at least acquiescing in his policy in
Lebanon by arresting or transferring a
number of officers early this summer.
Significant opposition to Syria's in-
volvement in Lebanon presumably still
exists among powerful military and
civilian leaders, but we have no evidence
that any opposition group is plotting to
overthrow Asad. Assassination is always
a possibility, but security precautions for
Asad and other principal leaders have
been significantly strengthened in recent
weeks.
We know that Syrian leaders are dis-
turbed by the economic costs to Syria of
the continuing Lebanese crisis-inflation
is becoming worse, and approximately
one million refugees from Lebanon are
now in Syria. All evidence suggests,
however, that Damascus considers these
costs can be eliminated only by a forced
end to the conflict rather than by a Syr-
ian withdrawal that might open the way
for the fighting to continue indefinitely.
Syrian planners presumably recognize
that the bulk of the refugees, who are
Lebanese, Palestinian and Syrian, would
not be able or willing to return to
Lebanon for several months even if the
war ended.
The installation of a new Syrian
government last month was not directly
related to Asad's Lebanon policy. The
principal members of the
cabinet-including those most closely
identified with Syria's intervention in
Lebanon-retained their positions.
Focus on Lebanon
The appointment of a more able and
active prime minister apparently was
designed only to ensure that domestic and
economic problems would be adequately
treated while the President continues to
focus on Lebanon. The decision of the
Arab League foreign ministers on
September 4 to postpone the Arab sum-
mit until the third week of October is a
measure of the Arabs' inability to put
concerted pressure on Asad. The delay, in
effect, is an acknowledgement that Syria
still holds the key to a political solution,
and it leaves Asad free to pursue his
military options further if necessary.
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President Giscard has taken another step in trying to build
a viable centrist coalition able to deal with the nation's
economic and social problems.
The French cabinet changes in late
August disclosed more clearly than before
the President's strategy for reshaping the
political system-and his vulnerability if
he fails.
President Giscard:
? Reduced the Gaullists' role.
? Brought a maverick leftist into
the cabinet.
? Named more technicians, whom
he listed as members of the "presiden-
tial majority" loyal directly to himself.
? Assumed more obvious personal
responsibility for the government's-ac-
tions.
The Gaullists
Giscard's relationship to the Gaullists
has always been parasitical. His hopes for
putting a lasting mark on French polit. s
have presupposed the exploitation of
Gaullist strength to develop a power base
from which Gaullist dominance of the
non-communist political forces could be
weakened. In his two years as president,
Giscard has tried both to divide and con-
trol the Gaullists, and to isolate their less
pliable members by making them seem
merely spokesmen for an outmoded
rightist ideology.
In Giscard's first cabinet, maverick
Gaullist Jacques Chirac, who had sup-
ported Giscard, won the prime ministry.
This was the Fifth Republic's most broad-
ly based cabinet, and Giscard excluded
major Gaullist leaders who had supported
Jacques Chaban-Delmas in the first round
of the presidential race. The minor shuffle
in January 1976 further reduced the
Gaullist role.
The appointment of Olivier Guichard
as justice minister and minister-of-state in
France: Giscard's Strategy
the new cabinet was obviously designed to
mollify the Gaullists, with whom Giscard
cannot yet afford a definitive break.
On September 3, Guichard was also
named head of a committee formed of the
senior representatives in the cabinet of
each of the four groups in the governing
coalition to oversee the majority's cam-
paign in the 1977 municipal elections.
This is a step-down from Chirac's role as
sole "coordinator" of the majority's
political activity. Although the committee
format will diffuse responsibility
somewhat, the President may be setting
up Guichard and the Gaullists to be the
scapegoats if the governing coalition does
not do well in the elections.
Guichard's appointment to the cabinet
also exploits Gaullist divisions. Guichard,
a moderate who has been considered
prime ministerial and presidential timber,
has been associated for the past two years
with the more conservative "barons," the
Gaullists' long-time major figures. Both
profit from this relationship. Guichard is
the only serious rival the barons can use
against Chirac-never completely
forgiven for deserting to Giscard.
Guichard, in turn, needs the barons' sup-
port to advance his own political am-
bitions.
Giscard, for his part, had resumed con-
tact with the barons several months ago
when he saw that Chirac was not in com-
plete control of the party.
With the barons rallying around
Guichard-magnifying earlier Gaullist
refusals completely to follow Chirac's
lead-the former prime minister will not
find it easy to become the party's
spokesman. Chirac is probably hoping,
however, that his earlier success in
revitalizing the Gaullists after their
humiliating loss to Giscard and his recent
challenge to Giscard's policies will allow
him to become the leader of the party in
the Assembly and challenge Giscard's
leadership. If only a third of the 175
Gaullist deputies challenge a government
proposal, it would face likely defeat.
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All this depends, however, on Chirac's
return to the Assembly. A by-election will
soon be held in his district, but 58 percent
of its votes went to the left in the local
election last spring.
Chirac resigned mainly over Giscard's
efforts to "presidentialize" the govern-
ment, specifically over the President's
refusal to grant him the power he wanted
to guide the government. The constitution
was on Chirac's side, but Gaullist practice
was solidly on Giscard's. Chirac would
have temporarily made the French system
more parliamentary as he strengthened
his own role as prime minister in prepara-
tion for a presidential race against
Giscard in 1981. Giscard's plans imply
maintaining the Gaullist presidential
system, but without Gaullist dominance.
Chirac wanted an early legislative elec-
tion, in which he believed the Gaullists
would have a better chance than the
would in March 1978. The President
refused because one of the keys to his pla
to tame the Gaullists is his expectation
that they will lose at least one third of
their deputies in the 490-seat Assembly in
the next election. He hopes his initiatives
over the next 18 months will enable tho
seats-and, he hopes, some now held by
leftists-to be picked up by his Indepen-
dent Republicans, the centrists,
technocrats, and co-opted leftists all run-
ning under the "presidential majority"
banner.
Giscard's introduction of "presidential
majority" technicians and a token leftist
into the new cabinet do not mean he is
succeeding in his proclaimed desire to
broaden his political support. He still has
only marginal influence among Gaullists,
and he has even greater problems on the
left.
Opinion polls show centrist and
Gaullist voters slipping leftward, but no
sign of significant shifts to the governing
coalition by leftist voters or politicians.
The President has so far failed to mold the
centrists into a dynamic grouping, and his
own Independent Republicans do not
seem to be gaining much ground.
Giscard often refers to his national
mandate, but his edge over Socialist Fran-
cois Mitterrand was razor thin in 1974
and remains fragile. His personal pop-
ularity has not increased, and his efforts
to explain his aims to the electorate do not
spark enthusiasm.
Ignoring all this, Giscard has steadily
increased the emphasis on his role as the
arbiter of government action, even going
so far in the latest cabinet shuffle as to
combine the posts of spokesman for the
government and the president.
He seems confident that his programs
will deal effectively with the nation's
economic and financial problems and
pave the way for an "advanced liberal
society"-one that can eradicate social
and economic differences in France and
remold the political system. If he can con-
vince the voters that he is moving in the
right direction his coalition will have a
better chance to win in the 1977 municipal
elections and to retain its parliamentary
majority in 1978. As a fallback, he ap-
parently expects to be able to work with a
leftist majority. Details of his policy
proposals will be announced in two to
three weeks.
Giscard apparently believes that French
political dynamics are on his side, and
that they can help him move France
toward a system in which conservative
and social democratic groups can hold
power while excluding the Communists
and extreme rightists. He hopes to bring
about the "opening to the left" by
decreasing the power and cohesiveness of
the right, by letting it be known that he
desires a dialogue with less radical leftist
leaders, and by proving his sincerity by
enacting reforms similar to those ad-
vocated by the left.
In the coming months, Giscard will
probably try:
? To intensify contacts with Socialists,
left Radicals and independent leftists.
? To prepare the way for a harmonious
working relationship if the left should win
in 1978, in part by trying to keep the
presentation of his programs and his cam-
paign issue-oriented rather than confron-
tational.
? To mold centrist and Independent
Republican policies in such a way as to
encourage the Socialists to accept these
parties as attractive alternatives to the
Communists as allies.
? To emphasize when possible those
aspects of his proposals that conform to
Gaullist traditions in order not entirely to
alienate that party.
Giscard has a long way to go, and his
course opens him to serious vulnerabilities
if he is unsuccessful. His handling of the
economy will be crucial. So far, his efforts
have irritated the left, which sees them as
too little too late, and the right, which
finds them just the reverse.
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Mao Tse-tung's most conspicuous shortcoming was his
failure to provide for a widely recognized successor. A struggle
among various rival factions now seems all but inevitable.
Chairman Mao had been an important
member of the Chinese Communist Party
since its founding in 1921, and Chairman
since the mid-1930s. He has been the most
important man in China since the Com-
munists took power in 1949 and the cen-
tral reference point in the often confused
politics of the party for much longer. Even
when his will was partly thwarted by
others in the Chinese leadership whose
policy views differed from his own, his
personality and programs could never be
ignored; even his opponents claimed to be
speaking in his name and to be carrying
out his commands.
As the dominating force in Chinese
politics, a founder of the party, the for-
mulator of the "Chinese way" to com-
munism, and the man who led the Chinese
revolution to triumph, Mao will be
irreplaceable. There is no one on the
Chinese scene today who even remotely
commands the authority that has been ac-
corded to him or who can easily assume
the charismatic role of leader of the
Chinese people he exercised for years.
In the upper echelons of the party,
however, the Chairman's death may come
as something of a relief to a considerable
number of second-level leaders. Mao's
autocratic actions, suspiciousness, and
sometimes erratic policy shifts were
almost certainly resented by some of his
associates and subordinates, particularly
in the past decade. Some of these in-
dividuals are now likely to believe that
more orderly and rational approaches to
policy problems can be taken without fear
of reprisals.
The Succession Problem in China
Although Mao's place in the
three-thousand-year-old history of the
Chinese state is likely to loom large, one
conspicuous failure in his long domination
of the political scene is already glaringly
evident and is likely to have serious im-
plications for the future. The Chairman
did not succeed in providing for a widely
acknowledged and recognized successor.
Two designated successors, Liu Sliao-chi
and Lin Piao, fell by the wayside in 1966
and 1971 respectively.
A third, Teng Hsiao-ping, who
appeared in a position to inherit much of
Mao's authority if not the formal title of
party chairman, was removed from all his
high positions in early April.
At the same time, the young Wang
Hung-wen, who by virtue of his position
in the hierarchy seemed to have a shot at
succession to the formal title of party
chairman-but probably without much of
the authority that normally would accrue
to that post-was passed over for promo-
tion last April. Finally, Chou En-lai, who
by virtue of his experience and the respect
accorded him by most Chinese was
perhaps the most logical of all possible
successors to Mao, died last January.
A Collegial Group
For several years the Chinese have talk-
ed about post-Mao arrangements in terms
of a collegial group that would in effect
share the Chairman's authority among
themselves. Such an arrangement is en-
tirely possible, at least in the short run,
since it seems clear that no single in-
dividual has the stature to replace Mao in
his full leadership capacity.
It is possible, in fact, that the post of
party chairman may now be retired as a
post that could only be held by the
irreplaceable leader who has just died.
The Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan
followed a similar procedure at the death
of Chiang Kai-shek last year. In this case,
Peking would probably revive the post of
party secretary general, which has been
dormant since the start of the cultural
revolution, in order to provide a manager
for party affairs.
If the post of chairman is to be filled,
however, the most likely candidate for the
job is Premier Hua Kuo-feng, who is now
Premier Hua Kuo-feng, party
first vice chairman
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"first" party vice chairman, a new post
created in early April at the time of the
fall of Teng Hsiao-ping. Hua is, however,
a compromise figure who lacks a strong
power base and who has operated at the
center of power for only a few years.
In his hands the post of chairman would
be less important than it was when Mao
occupied the position. Moreover, there
are almost certainly a number of senior
leaders of the party who would prefer that
additional power and prestige does not ac-
crue to Hua. There have been occasional
covert attacks on Hua in the media since
January, and his deputy in Hunan
Province, which he ran before coming to
Peking, has been under heavy political
pressure for several months.
Decision May Be Postponed
It is possible, therefore, that Hua's
elevation to the chairmanship could be
contested, and in fact any decision to fill
the post might be put off for some time. It
is also possible that if Hua were elevated
to the chairmanship, he could be balanced
by a reconstitution of the post of secretary
general. In this case a leading candidate
Chang Chun-chiao, apparent de facto
party secretary general
for that job would be the leftist political
boss of Shanghai, Chang Chun-chiao,
who probably performs the functions of
secretary general on a de facto basis at
present. There is certain to be opposition
to this appointment from the party's right
wing, however.
If the post of chairman were abolished,
that of the current party vice chairman
would also have to be abolished. In addi-
tion to Hua, the other vice chairmen are
Wang Hung-wen, whose youth makes him
suspect to many older party members and
whose alignment with the left wing of the
party is a major disability in the eyes of
the rightists, and Defense Minister Yeh
Chien-ying, a long-time associate of the
late Chou En-lai who has been identified
with the party's right wing and who came
under criticism earlier this year for his
vehement support of Teng Hsiao-ping.
The balance these two men provide
could be an argument for preserving the
system of chairman and vice chairman. If,
however, that system is scrapped, Hua
Kuo-feng would be an obvious candidate
for the secretary general's post. Since
Chang Chun-chiao also has claims on this
job, a clash between the two could easily
develop.
Potential Friction
Insofar as the principle of collegiality is
followed by the Chinese, the three current
vice chairmen, plus Chang Chun-chiao
and Peking Military Region Commander
Chen Hsi-lien would almost certainly
form the core of the collective. These five
men are the most powerful in China to-
day. They are not likely to work easily
together, however. The left-right split
between Yeh, on the one hand, and Wang
and Chang, on the other, is already
pronounced, and as already noted, there is
potential for serious friction between
Chang and Hua.
Chen, even more than Defense Minister
Yeh, is likely to represent military in-
terests in the collective. Many important
military figures have resented the leftist
leaders since the days of the cultural
revolution, and to the degree that Chen
speaks for these military men, he could
come into conflict with Chang and Wang.
Chen, however, appears to be an am-
bitious man whose personal interests
could lead him into temporary and ex-
pedient alliances with any civilian faction.
Latent factionalism among the ruling
group is likely to come to the fore rather
quickly, in fact. Mao's death occurs at a
tense and rather fluid moment in Chinese
politics. Repercussions from the Teng
purge are still echoing throughout the
country-in the provinces and in Peking.
The fissure between the party's right and
left wings is perhaps wider than at any
time since the late stages of the cultural
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revolution, and the issue of relations
between the military and civilian
members of the party is still not fully
resolved.
Since the attacks on Teng began, the
army has begun to re-emerge as an impor-
tant factor in political affairs; this tenden-
cy is likely to become more pronounced in
the wake of Mao's death.
This confused situation makes a
struggle among the various factions in the
leadership all but inevitable, and this
struggle is likely to make itself manifest
sooner rather than later.
An Unpropitious Time
Mao has died at an unpropitious mo-
ment for the party's left wing, however.
This group-a minority in the party and
among the leadership-has not yet
managed to achieve a solid and largely
unassailable position, as it clearly hoped
to do before the Chairman's death.
Mao had his differences with the leftists
in recent years, but they were at most
times able to play on his obsessive concern
for the development of an equalitarian
China, and their enemies were inhibited
by fear that Mao could intervene on their
behalf in unexpected fashion. This inhibi-
tion has now been removed.
One likely victim of these changed cir-
cumstances is Mao's wife, the termagant
Chiang Ching. She is widely disliked, and
without the Chairman's potential protec-
tion she may well fall by the wayside
rather quickly. The left as a whole is in
fact now in a somewhat unenviable posi-
tion. It is likely to be on the defense in
whatever struggle develops in the wake of
Mao's death. Nevertheless, leftist leaders,
although a minority, speak for a signifi-
cant portion of the Chinese party, and the
struggle, if it develops, is not likely to be
resolved quickly.
This fact, plus the obvious difficulty the
Chinese will have in adjusting to a China
without Mao, is likely to inhibit the
development of new policy initiatives and
to slow the implementation of policies
already adopted, both in the domestic and
foreign policy spheres. If the military
gains an increased voice in policy making,
however, it is possible that Peking may
become more receptive to the idea of
moderating somewhat its unyielding op-
position to the USSR.
The evidence suggests a return to the harsher climate of the
early 1960s in the USSR's grain-growing regions. This could
mean a staggering shortfall in the country's annual grain re-
quirements between now and 1980.
USSR: Climate and Grain
The severe Soviet drought of 1975 con-
trasted sharply with the unusually
favorable conditions of 1969-1974,
suggesting a return to the climate-that
is, weather averaged for a year or
more-of the early 1960s, when good and
bad years alternated.
While good weather has returned to the
USSR in 1976, there is evidence to
suggest that a return to harsher average
conditions is under way. The general
climatic conditions in the Northern
Hemisphere since 1974 show definite
similarities to those of the early 1960s.
The well-publicized drought of 1972
was different from those of the early
1960s and 1975 because its effects were
felt mainly in the winter grain areas of
European Russia rather than in the steppe
regions of the New Lands.
Assuming the same climate as in
1962-1965, annual Soviet grain output
would average no more than 200-million
tons in 1976-1980. An output of this size
falls a staggering 25 to 30 million tons
short of estimated annual requirements. If
the USSR chooses to cover the deficit by
imports, these purchases would match
those following the disastrous grain
harvests of 1972 and 1975. Alternatively,
Moscow could cut the already modest
livestock program.
Environmental Limitations
Grain growing in the USSR faces
severe environmental limitations. Because
three fourths of the sown area is
climatically comparable to the prairie
provinces of Canada and the northern
great plains in the US, the farmland of the
USSR is less productive on the average
than that of the US. As in analogous
areas in North America, the Soviet
Union's agricultural land is relatively
lacking in adequate amounts of heat,
moisture, and nutrients.
More than 30 percent of the USSR is
too cold for agriculture, and an additional
40 percent is so cold that only hardy, early
maturing crops can be grown. Even where
warmth permits a wide range of grain
crops-south of about 50 degrees
latitude-low precipitation and high
temperatures limit moisture so that, with
few exceptions, grain can be grown only
by irrigation.
Because of these unfavorable natural
conditions, Soviet grain growing areas are
particularly susceptible to longer term
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USSR: Spring Wheat Yields and Crop Season Precipitation
On this chart, the relatively higher level of growing season precipitation in the period
1969-74 is generally associated with higher spring wheat yields; the more normal pattern
of precipitation of 1960-65 is related to lower yields.
fluctuations in hemispheric conditions.
Climatic fluctuations in the USSR, as
well as in other regions, are related to the
size of the circumpolar vortex, a dome of
cold air covering the polar regions.
As the Northern Hemisphere cools in
winter, the vortex expands, cooling the
middle latitudes and moving the
hemispheric weather patterns southward.
In summer, it contracts, allowing warmer
air to move north from the subtropics.
As important as the size of the vortex,
is its pattern of waves that extend out
from it and move with the wind patterns
of the hemisphere. The size, shape, and
number of these waves depend on the size
of the vortex, the temperature difference
between the pole and the equator, and the
topography over which the air flows.
During the late 1960s, the cooling of the
Northern Hemisphere moved the wetter
northern climates in the Soviet Union
southward. At the same time, the changed
wind pattern associated with this cooling
brought increasing amounts of air from
the North Atlantic rather than from
Siberia.
This shift increased moisture, cooled
summers, and prevented the bitter cold of
the Siberian winter from penetrating into
the grain belt. The net effect was to trove
the moist northern climate southward
about 190 kilometers (120 miles), pushing
back the desert and nearly doubling rain-
fall in Kazakhstan. The cooling of the
Northern Hemisphere and the subsequent
shift of the desert zone south of the Soviet
grain belt apparently is also related to the
Sahelian drought and failures of the In-
dian monsoon during this period.
Effect of Climate Change
The climate changes of the 1960s
modified the normally harsh conditions
and had a major effect on Soviet grain
output. Between the early 1960s and 1974,
total grain output increased at an average
of 6.8 million tons annually. We estimate
that about half of the increase since 1963
was caused by the more favorable climate.
The other half is apparently due to a
greater use of fertilizer and improved
varieties of grain. The improvement was
greatest in the southern fringes of the
grain belt east of the Urals, where spring
grain output is concentrated.
In the mid-1970s, the climate appears
to have reversed itself. The southward
shift of the desert, which had so benefited
Soviet agriculture, ended. In late summer
1974 the hot dry winds, which were com-
mon in the early 1960s, reappeared in the
eastern steppe regions of the grain belt.
The dry weather lasted for more than a
year, spreading over most of the grain belt
by the summer of 1975.
Unlike previous droughts, which were
concentrated in the New Lands area east
of the Urals, the 1975 drought also hit the
grain heartland in the European part of
the country. In other parts of the world,
the drought in the Sahel ended, and the
monsoons returned to India. All three
events seem linked to an apparent warm-
ing of the Northern Hemisphere during
the early 1970s.
Pane 15 WFFKI Y SIIMMARY Sen 10. 76
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