WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011300250001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 18, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
DOS review completed
Secret
CI WS 76-025
No. 0025/76
June 18, 1976
N! 66
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issue every Friday morning bythe
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes sige fi-
cant developments of the week through noon on Thursday, it
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by'the Office of Economic Recirch, the Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
SECRET
CONTENTS
1 Middle East
Lebanon
6 Europe
Italy, Spain, MBFR, Poland -
West Germany, Portugal
9 Asia
China, India-USSR
10 Western Hemisphere
Uruguay, OAS
11 Italy: Landmark National Election
14 Israel: The West Bank
16 Philippines: Marcos and the Power Structure
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
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LEBANON /-Z"'
Syrian President Asad this week still
appeared determined to bring to heel his
leftist and Palestinian adversaries in
Lebanon despite mounting pressure
against his policy from Iraq, the Arab
League, and detractors at home. After
meeting unexpectedly stiff resistance early
in the week, Syrian intervention forces
finally gained control of most of central
Lebanon and of the major access routes to
Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. Damascus
continued to play along with separate Li-
byan and Arab. League mediation efforts
while effectively stalling both initiatives to
gain time to resupply its forces and con-
solidate their positions.
The murder on June 16 of the US am-
bassador and economic counselor in
Lebanon will be viewed by Asad as in
large part an anti-Syrian act and will lead
him to review carefully his next step in
Lebanon. Any new Syrian initiatives
appear unlikely until after the Syrian
leader returns from a three-day visit to
France that began on June 17. Asad's
decision to undertake the scheduled
trip-he did cut planned stops in Eastern
Europe-was in part a gesture of con-
fidence in his domestic position.
In Lebanon
Damascus continued to funnel ad-
ditional troops into Lebanon over the past
week as the Syrians moved to reinforce
and improve their positions outside
Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon. They also ex-
tended their control over most of the
Bekaa Valley. Over 17,000 regular Syrian
troops have been committed to the
Lebanon operation since early March.
About 12,000 troops are in Lebanon, and
5,000 others are in support or reserve
25X1
roles in adjacent border areas.
Syrian units directly involved include
virtually an entire armored division, an in-
fantry brigade, two infantry battalions,
seven commando battalions, an SA-6 sur-
face-to-air missile brigade, plus combat
and service support units. Most of this
force is concentrated in the central art of
the country
After initial heavy clashes with their
adversaries, the Syrians established
blockades of Sidon, Tripoli, and lef-
tist-held territory in west Beirut. Syrian
and Syrian-controlled Saiqa Palestinian
units at Khaldah dominate the
southwestern and eastern approaches to
the capital-including the Beirut airport.
Concerned by the heavy losses suffered
by Syrian troops trying to take Sidon late
last week, Damascus has since concen-
trated on sealing off major supply routes
and establishing its control over the coun-
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tryside. Syrian troops gained ground in
the north as well as in the Bekaa Valley,
where they managed to disarm, arrest, or
co-opt many of their leftist and Palesti-
nian opponents.
The Syrians continue to proceed
cautiously in areas close to the Israeli
border. So far they have advanced no
farther south than Rashayya, where they
apparently have captured a stronghold of
the rebel Lebanese Arab Army.
The Israelis have apparently not been
unduly alarmed by Syria's action in the
south and seem to hold to their previous
25X1 assessment that Israel's security is not
threatened by the Syrian moves. Israeli
leaders are watching the situation closely
Tel Aviv for the moment is clearly
deriving satisfaction over the predicament
Tripoli:
Mar'Oyun'
Side),."BuhaYYa
BEIRUT .sa
LEBANOF &
of the beleaguered Palestinians and
probably also over Syria's withdrawal of
some of its forces along the Golan
Heights to meet its military requirements
in Lebanon and along the Iraqi border.
Major elements from two divisions,
several independent brigades, and two
SA-6 missile brigades have been
withdrawn from the Heights-leaving
Syrian troop strength there at the lowest
level since the October 1973 war.
On the diplomatic front, President
Asad has managed so far to finesse the in-
terference of other Arab states with his
actions. Arab League Secretary General
Riyad has been shuttling between Beirut
and Damascus throughout the week try-
ing to arrange the launching of a joint
Arab security force, but so far has made
little progress. Riyad has admitted that no
action has yet been taken to define even
the size of the peace-keeping force and
that it will not be deployed until a cease-
fire is established and all parties agree on
the composition of the forces.
This is tantamount to conceding that
the Arab League can do nothing without
Syrian approval,
no Libyan,
Algerian, or Sudanese peace-keeping con-
tingents have entered Lebanon.
Libyan Prime Minister Jallud's mission
has fared only slightly better than
Riyad's. Only loosely coordinating his ef-
fort with Riyad, Jallud has been trying to
arrange terms for a cease-fire that are
acceptable to the Syrians, Christians, and
the Palestinian-leftist coalition.
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The Syrians have played along with
Jallud's mission, hoping to win political
credit for seeming to be conciliatory.
They apparently have tentatively agreed
to his plan for the phased withdrawal of
Syrian forces, but may have imposed stiff
conditions on the timing of the pullback.
The Syrians have probably encouraged
the Christians-who only this week gave
their approval for the joint Arab
force-to impose similarly difficult con-
ditions. The Christians said they would
accept the force only if it merely
cooperates with, rather than replaces,
Syrian forces, does not include
Palestinians, and takes on as its principal
task the enforcement of the 1969 Cairo
agreement restricting Palestinian ac-
tivities in Lebanon.
All of these conditions are opposed
strenuously by the Palestinians, led by
Yasir Arafat's Fatah group, and
Lebanese leftists. Both groups-despair-
ing of any help from either Jallud or the
Arab League-appealed directly this
week to Egypt, Iraq, and several other
Arab states for assistance.
Iraqi-Syrian Tensions
In an attempt to exploit Damascus'
preoccupation with Lebanon, Baghdad
President Asad
25X1
since the middle of last week has amassed
sizable new forces in the proximity of the
Syrian border. The pressure on its eastern
border has caused Damascus to send a
substantial force to that area also.
Syrians have sent three armored brigades
to the border area in addition to an SA-6
brigade-a total of some 12,000 men.
Some Syrian forces probably have been
sent to the Euphrates Dam and others to
the Palmyra area in central Syria. These
are the two most likely avenues of ad-
vance should Iraqi troops be ordered into
action. 25X1
Jordan has placed its armed forces on
alert
The military moves, together with a
marked increase in the stridency of Iraqi
public statements against Syria
significantly raised the level of tension
between the two rival Baathist regimes.
Baghdad gave public and private
assurances, however, that its forces would
not enter Syria without Damascus' per-
mission-which almost certainly would
not be granted. There will continue to be
some danger that miscalculation by one
side or the other may lead to a clash
between the forces opposing each other
along the border.
Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn realizes
that an Iraqi invading force would come
under immediate Syrian air attack despite
Syria's heavy involvement in Lebanon.
Baghdad may also be aware of Jordan's
commitment to assist Syria in the event of
an Iraqi attack, a factor that would
further constrain Iraqi leaders.
Baghdad, nonetheless, still shows no
sign that it is ready to return units
OC1
deployed in western Iraq to their bases.
The Iraqis may see advantages in keeping
these forces in place for some time, hop-
ing to relieve Syrian military pressure on
the leftists and Palestinians in Lebanon
and to encourage Asad's domestic op-
ponents to move against him. The Iraqis
make little effort to hide their determina-
tion to try to topple the Asad regime.
Asad's Problems
Syrian President Asad has canceled
part of his visit to Europe late this week so
that he can return more quickly to
Damascus to deal with his pressing
problems in Lebanon, with Iraq, and at
home. His first move presumably will be
to review Syrian policy toward Lebanon
following the assassination of Am-
bassador Meloy and Counselor Waring
on June 16. Asad may be tempted to use
the killings as an excuse to push harder
for a military solution to the crisis, par-
ticularly if he has become convinced that
Libyan mediators will be unable to secure
Palestinian agreement to Syria's terms for
ending their confrontation.
Iraq's military moves also demand
close attention by Asad. The Syrians ap-
parently still believe that Baghdad does
not intend to attack Syria, but surely are
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UPI
War damage in Beirut
concerned that the necessity to protect down by critics of Asad's policy in
against such a contingency has forced Lebanon. Bombs placed by unknown per-
them to move several thousand troops to sons exploded at two locations in the
eastern Syria. Similarly, although Asad capital on June 15.
shows no signs of being concerned that his25X1 At this time, Palestinian and leftist
position is being undermined by the Ira-
qis' propaganda barrage, he almost cer-
tainly is apprehensive that his domestic
critics will be encouraged by the possibili-
ty of more active Iraqi help to increase
their dissident activities.
Syrian officials have attempted to seize
on the external threat from Iraq to elicit
greater popular support for Asad and his
policies. They appear to have made little
progress, however; there continue to be
signs of dissatisfaction both among
civilians and within the armed forces. A
meeting of a Damascus area Baath Party
unit last week reportedly "broke up in
chaos" after party leaders were shouted
claims that a Syrian army unit protesting
its assignment to Lebanon mutinied on
June 14 cannot be confirmed
The
Syrian army's autonomous Defense Com-
panies, which are primarily responsible
for internal security, carried out "annual
exercises" on June 14 also, but no
evidence is available that this activity was
in response to a perceived security threat.
Soviet Reaction
The USSR has responded to continued
Syrian military activity in Lebanon by
strengthening its ties to the Palestine
Liberation Organization. It may also be
trying to put indirect pressure on the
Syrians to disengage.
Last Friday the USSR announced that
the long-awaited permanent represen-
tative of the PLO had been received in
Moscow by officials of the Soviet Afro-A-
sian Solidarity Committee. The establish-
ment of a PLO office in Moscow had been
pending for almost two years, and the
Soviet decision to permit its opening at
this time seems to be a calculated nod
toward the Palestinians.
Although the Soviets continue to avoid
direct criticism of Damascus, they are
now siding more openly with the PLO in
their media coverage of the fighting in
Lebanon. They have even repeated one
comment by Libyan leader Qadhafi
suggesting that the Palestinians are more
important than the Syrians. 25X1
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FTAI ~l /'
France has reached an agreement with
the three principal political groups in the
French Territory of the Afars and Issas
that Paris-perhaps unrealistically-
hopes will lead to the formation of
a government better able to resist
Somalia's ambitions to annex the ter-
ritory when it becomes independent.
The new arrangements, which provide
for a government of national unity, vir-
tually assure that the Issas and other
Somalia.
ethnic Somalis-who constitute a majori-
ty of the population-will dominate the
next elected government. Until now,
Afars have held sway because of French
favoritism and discriminatory laws.
Ali Aref Bourhan, the Afar president of
the local assembly, bitterly opposed the
agreement. He is almost certain to fall
from power in the next few months.
Members of Aref's party signed the agree-
ment against his wishes.
France's willingness to cut its ties to
Aref and to give in to Issa demands for a
greater role in territorial politics will
probably ease political unrest temporari-
ly. It is unlikely to ensure a peaceful tran-
sition to independence, however. Somali
President Siad will almost certainly con-
tinue trying to incorporate the territory
into a "greater Somalia." Any govern-
ment in Djibouti that is not clearly com-
mitted to that goal will be the target of a
campaign of subversion backed by
Mogadiscio.
Ethiopia views the new arrangement as
a threat to its interests. Addis Ababa
believes that France has paved the way for
Somalia to gain control of Djibouti, the
terminus of Ethiopia's principal rail link
to the sea. The Ethiopians, who have close
ties to Aref, will probably support Afar
dissidents in order to try to prevent the
Issas from turning the territory over to
ETHIOPIA J Z
The ruling military council apparently
has canceled plans to use armed peasants
against Eritrean insurgents. Some peasant
units may already have been withdrawn
from the southern Eritrean border, where
they began assembling several weeks ago.
Others will probably remain in defensive
positions as one source of pressure on the
guerrillas to begin negotiations.
Addis Ababa backed down after en-
countering a host of practical difficulties
in organizing the peasant forces and
because of strong pressure from Arab and
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Western countries to call off the cam-
paign.
Many council members reportedly have
blamed Major Mengistu and Lieutenant
Colonel Atnafu, the ruling group's two
vice chairmen, for the failure of the
peasants' march. Mengistu also has been
harshly criticized by some council
members for failing to obtain arms from
communist countries and for pushing
policies that have caused food shortages
and inflation, heightened Arab enmity,
and alienated some of Ethiopia's
traditional allies.
Last week, contact, albeit. indirect, was
apparently resumed between the govern-
ment and insurgents for the first time in
many months. Representatives of the
military wing of the Popular Liberation
Forces-one of the two major factions of
the rebel movement-reportedly met with
a group of traditional Eritrean leaders
selected by Addis Ababa to act as in-
termediaries.
oc
MAURITANIA 1?,- I0
Guerrillas of the Polisario Front-the
Algerian-backed Saharan group seeking
independence for Western Sahara-at-
tacked Nouakchott, the Mauritanian
capital, twice on June 8, adding to earlier
indications that the front is stepping up its
efforts in Mauritania to undermine Presi-
dent Moktar Ould Daddah's agreement
with the Moroccans partitioning the
former Spanish colony.
The principal target of the guerrillas
was the presidential compound; it receiv-
ed several hits but suffered little damage.
Mauritanian security forces quickly
repulsed the main attack and reportedly
killed or captured most of the raiders in
skirmishes on June 9 and 10 some 100
kilometers (60 miles) north of the city.
The leader, who was among those killed,
was subsequently identified as the front's
secretary general, Mohamed el Ouali.
Mauritanian officials are playing up the
success of the security forces in an effort
to offset any psychological gains the
guerrillas may have won from their daring
attacks. Both publicly and privately, the
officials are denouncing Algiers, which
continues to furnish essential material
support to the front.
The guerrillas may well attack
Nouakchott again-although perhaps not
for a while. The front, whose units have
been pressed hard by the Moroccans in
southern Morocco and northern
Mauritania as well as in Western Sahara,
is trying to portray itself as a viable force
and to create pressure on Ould Daddah to
consider some accommodation. The
front's strategy is probably influenced in
part by a belief that there is significant la-
tent support for an independent Sahara
among elements of Mauritania's popula-
tion, especially Reguibat tribesmen whose
kinsmen predominate in Western Sahara
and within the Polisario Front. Large
numbers of Reguibats were arrested in
Nouakchott the day after the guerrilla at-
ITALY
/ ~, Z, ~
Exchanges between Italy's political
parties were increasingly blunt and bitter
during the final days of the election cam-
paign that closes officially today. The
Communists appear to be making a major
last-minute effort to convince wavering
voters that the party would not radically
alter Italian foreign policy.
The Christian Democrats are hammer-
ing harder than ever on their basic cam-
paign theme that Communist accession to
power would weaken Italy's Western ties
and its democratic system. In doing so,
the Christian Democrats have abandoned
their past tendency to balance these
charges by noting the Communists'
"responsible" behavior in some areas of
domestic policy.
For their part, the Communists-who
hope to draw the Christian Democrats
into some form of collaboration after the
vote-are stepping up their attacks on the
Christian Democratic Party, and no
longer tend to spare the party's left wing,
which had been receiving gentler treat-
ment because of its advocacy of a
"dialogue" with the Communists.
Communist chief Berlinguer, in an in-
terview with the country's leading
newspaper this week, implied that he sees
Italian membership in NATO as a way of
protecting his party from Soviet in-
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terference. Berlinguer said he felt "more
secure" in NATO than he would outside
the Western alliance and suggested that
his party would not be able to pursue an
independent path if Italy were aligned
with the Soviet bloc.
The Communists have previously ex-
plained their acceptance of Italian
membership in NATO by saying that they
favor the eventual dissolution of both
NATO and the Warsaw Pact but do not
want to upset the European balance of
power in the meantime by pulling Italy
out of NATO.
Berlinguer's decision to emphasize so
explicitly his differences with Moscow
appears to signal a concern on his part
that the Christian Democrats may be
making headway in their campaign to
raise fears among Italians about the con-
sequences of voting Communist.
Berlinguer's statement is likely, however,
to draw criticism from militants in his
own party. (Fuller analysis of the Italian
election campaign appears on page 11.)
SPAIN
Last week the government suffered its
first setback in pushing its reform
program through parliament. Rightist op-
position to a bill amending the penal code
led to its being sent back to committee for
redrafting.
The code must be amended to remove
penalties for political activities following
earlier passage of a bill ending the
37-year-ban on political parties. The
government is urging quick action so that
the revisions can be debated in parliament
by July 1.
The rightist attack on revisions to the
penal code was followed by a further show
of resistance in the National Council-the
ruling body of the Francoist National
Movement. The council rejected a sub-
committee report favorable to the
government's proposal to establish a
bicameral legislature-the key to the en-
tire reform program-because it con-
tained a recommendation that 40 seats set
aside for National Council members in
the proposed new senate be eliminated.
The government's referendum proposal
on royal succession was also amended to
require future monarchs to swear loyalty
to the principles of the National Move-
ment.
The council may ultimately propose
further changes in the referendum bill that
would be unacceptable to the government.
The council's opinion is not binding on the
government, but a determined stand by
these Francoist holdovers-who are also
members of parliament-could seriously
complicate the reform effort. A high
government official has said that the
government will have to resort to heavy
pressure to get its program approved by
parliament.
Rightist intrigue may also be responsi-
ble for the latest flareup of dissension in
the cabinet. The reform-minded informa-
tion minister has threatened to resign if
the government gives in to demands to
close down Spain's largest weekly
newsmagazine, Cambio 16, which has
criticized the slow pace of reform and
published stories of alleged police torture
of prisoners. Some cabinet ministers have
reportedly recommended a four-month
suspension of the magazine, ostensibly for
publishing an unflattering cartoon of King
Juan Carlos in white tie and tails dancing
on the skyscrapers of New York.
MBFR Z 6, Z
For the first time in the MBFR
negotiations, the Soviets last week pro-
vided data-albeit incomplete-on the
strength of the Warsaw Pact forces. The
Soviet action can be expected to help give
new life to the negotiations, but the
figures themselves are tailored to support
the Soviets' long-standing position that
Warsaw Pact and NATO forces are
roughly equal and that, therefore, any
force reductions should be about equal.
The Soviet figures give the overall
strength of the Warsaw Pact forces in the
NATO Guidelines Area-which includes
East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia-as 987,300 men, in-
cluding 805,000 in the ground forces. This
figure is 144,000 lower than the NATO
estimate for Warsaw Pact ground forces.
The Soviets appear to have excluded cer-
tain noncombat forces and used
definitions of forces not accepted by the
West.
The Soviets have not yet presented their
estimate of NATO strength. According to
NATO estimates, the Warsaw Pact
ground forces in the NATO Guidelines
Area outnumber Western troops by about
160,000. It is expected that the Soviet
data will show a smaller disparity between
Warsaw Pact and NATO ground forces
than do Western figures. The West con-
tends that, because Warsaw Pact forces in
the NATO Guidelines Area are larger
than NATO's, there should be an
asymmetrical reduction leading to a com-
mon ceiling of about 700,000 for the
ground forces of each side.
Allied discussions of the significance of
the Soviet move and of future Western
negotiating strategy are to take place in
Brussels this week. There is general agree-
ment that the West should concentrate
now on probing Eastern methods of count-
ing their forces. It is expected that this
approach will provide an avenue for deter-
mining whether the Soviets now intend to
begin serious bargaining, since the forces
included or excluded from the totals for
each side will determine how much of a
disparity the two sides have to deal with in
reaching an agreement.
Some European representatives will be
seeking new assurances that the US will
protect their interests. The Germans in re-
cent months have been seeking to meet
with US representatives to ensure that
Washington remains firm in its opposition
to an agreement with the East specifying
the level and composition of West Euro-
pean armed forces remaining after the
reductions. A meeting of representatives
from Bonn, London, and Washington is25X1
scheduled for early July, but the Soviet
move means the allies may now raise
these matters in Brussels.
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"CIr
~~jjIJ
POCA ST GERMANY
Polish party leader Gierek's successful
visit to West Germany last week was
another step toward normalization of
relations between historic adversaries.
Gierek did, however, refuse to state, as
the Germans had urged, that the visit
symbolized a final and full reconciliation.
The two sides signed a variety of
cultural and political agreements, in-
cluding a joint declaration calling for an-
nual consultations between the foreign
ministers. The primary interest, however,
was in economic matters. An economic
cooperation agreement and 14 commer-
cial agreements-valued at $1.2
billion-were signed. Projects included
provision of certain raw materials and the
building of a coal gasification plant in
Poland.
Gierek was genuinely moved at the warm
reception he received from the German
people.
How successful the Gierek visit was will
become more apparent as the agreements
are implemented. Bonn has complained in
the past that Warsaw is more interested in
signing agreements than in bringing them
to fruition.
The Schmidt government hopes it has
finally broken the "psychological barrier"
to progress in bilateral relations.
Chancellor Schmidt also clearly hopes
PORTUGAL 9 ~ -6 2/
Army chief Eanes' presidential cam-
paign in Portugal picked up steam last
week when he gave a strong performance
in a televised debate among the four can-
didates still in the field.
Eanes, as the front-runner, was the
center of the debate, and he was a more
aggressive and articulate adversary than
the other candidates expected. Prime
Minister Azevedo, whose poorly financed
campaign has barely gotten off the
ground, will suffer the most from Eanes'
performance. Azevedo was counting on
the contrast between the two personalities
to put him on top.
Eanes still cannot be sure that he will
win a majority in the first round on June
27. A poll taken two weeks ago by a
respected weekly newspaper showed that
Eanes was favored by 33 percent of the
respondents, but nearly 40 percent were
undecided or declined to answer.
Although Azevedo and far left candidate
Otelo de Carvalho trailed far behind the
front-runner, the poll showed they both
were still slightly better known than
Eanes.
Some of Eanes' more conservative sup-
porters are concerned that his political
views are being dictated by the Socialists.
The centrist Popular Democrats-who
will tacitly support a Socialist minority
government as long as they are given the
opportunity to exercise some influence on
policy-were alarmed by Eanes' recent
assertion that a minority government
that the visit will boost I:he prospects of
his coalition government in the October
national elections. The visit, however,
would never have taken place had the op-
position Christian Democrats not
cooperated in ratifying the controversial
bilateral accord on the repatriation of
ethnic Germans. Gierek made a point O125X1
publicly thanking Christian Democratic
leader Helmut Kohl for his party's sup-
0 -76
ceases to be a minority when backed by a
popularly elected president.
The Popular Democrats and the center-
right Social Democratic Center still
prefer Eanes because of his reputation as
a strong leader. Neither party is likely to
withdraw its endorsement of Eanes.
The popularity of former security chief
Otelo de Carvalho is the most surprising
development in the campaign to date. In a
recent poll, Carvalho had more support
among those who voted for the Com-
munists in the April legislative election
than did Octavio Pato, the Communist
X" +0 1446.,
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6-001-
/&5s
CHINA ?C'3 7 4/
The health of Chairman Mao Tse-tung
has apparently deteriorated to the point
where he will no longer see foreign
visitors. I n an attempt to spread the word
abroad, a Chinese official told Western
news agencies of a central committee
decision to stop arranging audiences with
Mao because of his advanced age and
alleged workload. The President of
Madagascar left China earlier this week
without seeing the Chairman, the first
head of state to be denied such a meeting
in over a year.
Mao's health has seemed to decline
rapidly in recent months. His meetings
with foreigners were limited to about fif-
teen minutes.
Mao's condition is probably such that
he could die before the end of the year,
and Chinese leaders seem keenly aware of
this possibility. A member of the central
committee reportedly said in this connec-
tion that "anything could happen" at any
time and remarked in another context
that there would be a drastic change in the
Chinese leadership this autumn. It is
possible that he was linking a major
leadership change to the Chairman's fail-
ing health.
Political maneuvering and infighting
within the sharply divided leadership seem
likely to intensify in the coming months,
especially if-as could well be the
case-Mao himself cannot function in a
decision-making role. Both sides in the
current political campaign, which has
been idling in recent weeks, will probably
try to claim Mao's support.
In this competition, physical access to
the Chairman becomes increasingly im-
portant. Two women who appeared
regularly with Mao at his meetings with
foreigners since early 1972 have been ex-
cluded from more recent meetings. Their
place has been taken by a new interpreter
who lacks party stature and may not en-
joy the almost unlimited access to Mao
that his predecessors seemed to possess.
Access to Mao is already a sensitive issue:
the new interpreter was not mentioned in
Chinese accounts of the meetin s he took
part in with Mao.
25X1
INDIA-USSR iz-v 17
Indian Prime Minister Gardhi's state
visit to the USSR last week seems to have
been a huge public relations success, but it
remains to be seen just how much
progress was made in ironing out some of
the problems that have recently been
troubling bilateral relations.
The Soviets gave Gandhi a reception
matched only by that accorded former
President Nixon in 1972; Gandhi's warm
response about the value of India's ties
with the USSR must have been especially
gratifying to leaders still shaken by the
latest Soviet setbacks in the Middle East.
In the joint declaration issued at the
end of the visit, the language echoed re-
cent Soviet calls for the abolition of
foreign bases in the Indian Ocean, but on
the Asian collective security idea, the In-
dians did not go beyond the position they
had taken in 1973. There was no specific
reference in the communique to China or
Bangladesh, an indication of Moscow's
displeasure over India's recent gestures
toward Peking.
The communique suggests that
Moscow was at least partially responsive
to Indian suggestions for reordering
priorities in bilateral economic coopera-
tion. The Soviets, for example, apparently
agreed to export more of the kinds of
commodities India wants and to explore
avenues for cooperation in third coun-
tries.
Gandhi said during the visit that the dif-
ficult ruble-rupee exchange problem had
been left to the experts. This may be true,
but on the eve of the visit, the two sides
tried unsuccessfully to iron out their
differences, and it appeared that only a
high-level political decision could break
the impasse.
We know of no new military aid
agreements that resulted from the visit,
but negotiations for a number of items are
in progress, and it is likely that some new
contracts will be signed. 25X1
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*)6
URUGUAY The Uruguayan armed forces high
command is moving quickly to restruc-
ture the government following President
Bordaberry's ouster last weekend.
Interim President Alberto Demichelli,
an 80-year-old former law professor, has
announced he will serve only two or three
months. Then, a newly formed "Council
of the Nation"-composed of senior
military officers, cabinet ministers, and
conservative civilian leaders-will elect a
new chief executive.
Front-runners for the post are Foreign
Minister Juan Carlos Blanco and
Economy Minister Alejandro Vegh
Villegas. Both men have done well in their
cabinet positions and have managed to
maintain good relations with top military
leaders.
The new president, like his predecessors
Bordaberry and Demichelli, will be a
figurehead. Armed forces leaders will rule
by issuing "institutional acts" and will
restructure the country's political system
in a step-by-step process over the next
eight to ten years.
During this period a new constitution
will be drafted and a plebis';ite held to
ratify it. Political parties a:id labor un-
ions-except for Marxist organiza-
tions-will gradually be allowed a
limited role in government.
The reorganization of the political
system is an ambitious undertaking, par-
ticularly for a group of military leaders
who have not worked well together in the
past. If the reorganization is to progress
smoothly, Demichelli's successor will
have to accept the fact that he is a
figurehead president. It was the
strong-willed Bordaberry's inability to
play this role-though at times he
appeared to be trying-that caused his
constant squabbling with the generals.
This in turn muddled the lines of executive
authority and hampered efforts to inject
new life into the country's long-stagnant
economy.
Whoever is selected as chief executive,
the country's conservative foreign and
domestic policies will continue in close
step with those of military governments in
neighboring countries. Relations with the
United States will remain good.
There has been almost no adverse
public reaction to Bordaberry's ouster
and the military's plans for a new political
structure. The system that is evolving runs
counter to the country's tradition of
democratic participation, but most
Uruguayans give higher priority to
economic growth and domestic tranquili-
^s '5'1 -5--3
The glamorous "informal conver-
sational" phase of the OAS general
assembly meeting in Santiago ended on
Friday on a positive note of friendship and
cooperation. Now, the permanent council
ambassadors are attempting to translate
last week's general expressions of princi-
pie into workable resolutions and
proclamations. This phase of the meeting
will last until sometime next week.
The Latins' reaction to Secretary
Kissinger, on balance, has been highly
favorable. According to the US embassy
in Santiago, the Secretary's statement on
human rights took the proper middle
ground, pleasing most of the delegates
while not offending the others. The joint
Panama-US resolution on the Panama
Canal issue appears to have forestalled
acrimonious debate over this potentially
thorny question.
Among the nettlesome issues likely to
arise during this phase of the assembly is
the US Trade Act, which many Latins
feel violates the OAS charter.
OAS reform could also be a
troublesome item. Most Latins want
some assurances of Washington's com-
mitment to cooperation in economic
development before worrying about in-
stitutional and structural changes of the
OAS. The US proposals for reform
probably will be bypassed for the time be-
ing and sent to a study group. 25X1
Despite these substantive differences,
anti-US rhetoric has been minimal, and
most delegates seem to want to avoid any
divisive fight.
Opening session of the OAS General Assembly
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The national election to be held on June 20 and 21 has
become essentially a referendum on Communist participation
in the government. The electorate's answer is not expected to be
clear-cut, but the Communists are likely to do well enough at
least to strengthen their claim to some form of indirect govern-
ment role.
Italian voters will go to the polls on
June 20 and 21 for what has become es-
sentially a referendum on the Communist
bid for a role in the government. Precise
prediction of the outcome of this crucial
election is impossible, but certain trends
can be identified and a few clues to the
likely shape of the post-election govern-
ment can be found by comparing the
public and private positions of the major
parties.
Despite scandals and the critical state
of the Italian economy, the Christian
Democrats appear to be holding their
own. There is little chance, however, that
they will recover sufficiently to regain the
political initiative and halt the Com-
munist advance.
The Communists could conceivably
lose some momentum by falling short of
the 33.4 percent they scored in regional
elections last year, but they will almost
certainly exceed the 27.2 percent the party
garnered in the 1972 parliamentary con-
test. Whatever the outcome, the Com-
munists will remain a potent force in
national politics, with dominant or sub-
stantial influence in such key sectors as
labor, education, the media, and local
governments.
It was clear long before the Com-
munists' unprecedented advance last year,
that the party had close to a veto power
over many government programs-par-
ticularly those affecting economic policy.
Even if a non-Communist government
Italy Landmark National Election
can be formed after the election, there will
be heavy pressure for some kind of ac-
commodation with the Communist Party.
Communist restraint will be a prerequisite
for political stability, and Communist in-
tervention will be necessary if organized
labor is to cooperate in an economic
recovery effort. -
Prediction Difficult
Opinion polls provide only a rough
guide to Italian elections as a result of the
limited sample and the large percentage of
respondents who declare themselves un-
decided or disinterested. Nevertheless,
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taken together the polls frequently suggest
trends. Although some polls have pro-
jected a major loss for the Christian
Democrats and a majority for the left,
most surveys tend to predict results
similar to the regional elections a year ago
in which the Christian Democrats-with
35.3 percent-held a narrow lead over the
Communists.
Most expert observers--party officials,
journalists, and Church leaders-see a
similar outcome, predicting that the Com-
munists will drop a percent or two and
that the Christian Democrats will gain
one or two percent. There is also a
widespread belief that the Socialists will
hold the 12 percent they scored last year
or improve slightly on it. Among the
smaller parties, only the fiscally conser-
vative Republicans are expected to
register any gain, with the others losing by
varying degrees.
A variety of factors supports the conclu-
sion suggested by the polls that the Com-
munists will consolidate most of the gains
they made a year ago, but that the Chris-
tian Democrats will retain their narrow
plurality. The Communists, for example,
have never lost substantial numbers of
voters they have won over. The Christian
Democrats, on the other hand, have
traditionally done better in national elec-
tions than in local contests-a factor that
could help offset any erosion in support
the party may have suffered during the
last year. Furthermore, the Christian
Democrats usually do well in the five
regions that did not hold regional
elections last year.
It should be noted, however, that these
patterns are representative of ordinary
election years when the question of Com-
munist entry into the government has
been hypothetical and remote rather than
real and immediate. The dominance of the
Communist question in this campaign
suggests that the traditional patterns may
be skewed decisively by the response of
voters to the so-called "fear factor." The
Christian Democrats have waged a
vigorous campaign designed to arouse
fear among voters that the Communists
would inevitably lead Italy into an
authoritarian society linked to Moscow.
The Communists have done everything
short of announcing a break with the
Soviets to convince voters otherwise, and
the outcome will be determined by waver-
ing voters who must resolve what Com-
munist chief Berlinguer has called the
"conflict between the need for change and
the fear of novelty."
There is no question that disgust with
the Christian Democrats has deepened in
the past year or that the Communists are
seen as the major force for change, but a
key imponderable is whether these
perceptions will be outweighed by the fear
factor.
Post-Election Prospects
Whatever the outcome, the political
choices that must be made afterward will
not be as easy as the campaign rhetoric
suggests.
The Socialists
The polarization of the campaign
around the Christian Democrats and
Communists has tended to obscure the es-
sential role the Socialists will play after
the vote. It is virtually certain that neither
of the larger parties will receive enough
support to form a majority without the
Socialists.
Seeing themselves in a pivotal position,
the Socialists have kept nearly all of their
post-election options open. The Socialists
say their first preference is for the interim
emergency government proposed by the
Communists, in which all parties except
the neo-fascists would participate. The
Socialists also claim they would be willing
to form a government with just the Com-
munists if the two parties received a ma-
jority and 1e Christian Democrats re-
fused to participate. The Socialists have
left the door open to another coalition
with the Christian Democrats, but only on
condition that the latter agree to involve
the Communists formally in the formula-
tion of government programs and seek
Communist support in parliament.
Despite the Socialists' professed
preference for an emergency government
including the Communists, a majority of
Socialist leaders hope that a way can be
found to form another government with
the Christian Democrats. The Com-
munists would be relegated to an indirect
role. The Socialists believe this would give
them maximum influence, while involving
the Communists sufficiently to make
them share public responsibility for the
tough decisions the post-election govern-
ment will face.
The Communists
There is considerable evidence that
Communist chief Berlinguer is willing to
settle for less than the full government
membership he is calling for in the cam-
paign.
When asked during the campaign
whether he would accept something like
the indirect role proposed by the
Socialists, Berlinguer did not rule it out,
saying only that the Communists will not
be "stooges" for another edition of the
center-left coalition. There are in-
dications, moreover, that before propos-
ing actual Communist membership in an
emergency government Berlinguer con-
sidered proposing an indirect Communist
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role in such a government after the elec-
tion. He was apparently persuaded by
other party leaders that this would not
make for an effective campaign.
Berlinguer hopes to avoid a coalition
with just the Socialists, although both he
and Socialist chief De Martino have said
they would form such a government if no
other formula could be found. The Com-
munists reportedly fear that such a
government would provoke a hostile reac-
tion abroad and lead to unrealistic expec-
tations among the Communist rank and
file. Berlinguer may even think it would
be more difficult for the party to resist
pressure from Moscow in such cir-
cumstances.
An indirect consultative role, on the
other hand, would give Berlinguer the best
of two worlds. It would permit the Com-
munists a formal say in policy and
amount to an implicit recognition of their
potential as a governing party. At the
same time, the Communists would be in
the enviable position of being able to dis-
claim responsibility when things went
wrong.
The Christian Democrats
The unequivocal anti-communist
posture of the Christian Democrats dur-
ing the campaign makes it unlikely that
the party could agree to form a govern-
ment with the Communists immediately
after the vote. There are signs that a
debate is already under way among Chris-
tian Democrats over how far to bend on
the question of indirect Communist par-
ticipation.
Despite the overall anti-Communist
cast of the Christian Democratic plat-
form, there is language in it that clearly
signals a willingness to accept a limited
accord with the Communists on specific
government programs. Some Christian
Democratic spokesmen, such as Budget
Minister Andreotti, have begun hinting at
such an arrangement in their campaign
speeches.
The Christian Democrats do not like
the idea of negotiating openly with the
Communists and prefer to deal with them
behind the scenes in parliament.
Nevertheless, formalized consultations
with the Communists might be seen as
preferable to entering the opposition if
that is the only alternative.
In sum, there appears to be a degree of
willingness in each of the three major par-
ties to move toward a government based
on Christian Democratic - Socialist
collaboration but open to some form of
indirect participation by the Communists.
All other formulas on the table have been
categorically rejected by at least one of
the parties.
Obstacles
Agreement on the indirect participation
formula would not come easily, however.
In addition to disagreements between the
Christian Democrats and Socialists over
the role to be played by the Communists,
there are substantial differences within
each party on the advisability of such an
agreement.
The evolution toward such a com-
promise could also be cut short by a sharp
swing toward the Communists at the
polls. If the Communists score a decisive
plurality, it will be very difficult to deny
them cabinet status. Berlinguer might
have to settle for less if his plurality is not
large enough to deprive the Christian
Democrats and their traditional allies of a
parliamentary majority. A plurality for
the Communists, however, would create
unprecedented strains among the
traditional governing parties, and defec-
tions to the Communists are not to be
ruled out. Recently, for example, the So-
cial Democrats have appeared to leave
the door open to collaboration with the
Communists and Socialists in an emer-
gency government even if the Christian
Democrats refused to go along. Thus, a
Communist plurality might lead to an ex-
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Page 13
panded leftist coalition that would leave
the Christian Democrats in the opposi-
tion.
If the election fails to give any party a
marked advantage, a caretaker govern-
ment might be installed to preside until
the dust settles and until party leaders
have had time to digest the results. In that
event, efforts to form a coalition might be
postponed until the fall.
On balance, the election does not seem
likely to produce the kind of clear-cut
result that would allow a relatively com-
patible combination of parties to deal
decisively with Italy's mounting economic
and social problems. Unless the parties
can find a way to resolve the fundamental
differences that led them to hold the elec-
tion ahead of schedule, the prospect is for
continued instability and immobilism.
For that reason, the current contest may
well turn out to have been but a prelude to
another election, fought on the same
issues, in the not-too-distant future.
WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 18, 76
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The Arab inhabitants of the West Bank have become more
openly defiant of Israeli rule. Periodic anti-Israeli
demonstrations are likely to become a permanent feature of the
political landscape there. The Israeli government so far gives
little sign that it plans major policy changes to deal with the new
situation on the West Bank.
Israel., The West Bank
Relations between the Arab inhabitants
of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and
Israel are undergoing a major transfor-
mation as the Arabs have become more
openly defiant of Israeli rule. Periodic an-
ti-Israeli demonstrations, any of which
could bring new violence, appear likely to
become a permanent feature of the West
Bank under occupation.
Despite the misgivings of Israelis over
the results of the West Bank municipal
elections in April and the unsettling effect
of the numerous Arab demonstrations,
the government does not appear inclined
to revamp its policy toward the occupied
territories.
The new West Bank leaders, for their
part, see growing support among Arab in-
habitants for their positions and do not
believe Israel will he able to hold the
territory indefinitely. They increasingly,
sense that time is on their side.
The growing ferment on the West Bank
has focused increasing attention in Israel
on the Palestinian problem. Prime
Minister Rabin recently warned that
Israel would be under great pressure next
year to show more flexibility on the
Palestinian issue and particularly on par-
ticipation by the Palestine Liberation
Organization in peace talks.
Rabin specifically cited the outcome of
the municipal elections as likely to be a
major factor contributing to such
pressure. He characterized the election
results as "the worst defeat Israel has suf-
fered in the last two years."
Perspective on the Elections
The elections brought. into office a
group of younger, better educated, and
largely politically inexperienced men. Of
the 188 elected, 148 are newcomers; 70
percent are under 50 years old, and 25
percent have some university training.
Most of the new leaders are more
nationalistic than their predecessors, and
thus more likely to challenge Israeli oc-
cupation authorities and the old pattern of
Israeli-Arab relations. They will be more
inclined to resort to militant rhetoric to
retain and expand their popular support.
They are also likely to be more willing
to consult and coordinate actions with
each other, despite Israeli restrictions on
territory-wide political activity and the in-
ternal divisions that stem from traditional
clan rivalries and jealously guarded local
prerogatives.
From the Israelis' point of view, the
new West Bank officials will be less
cooperative than the old ones, but not
necessarily impossible to deal with. The
officials do not represent a complete
break with the conservative, local clan
structure. The new mayor of Hebron, one
of the West Bank's largest towns, for in-
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 18, 76
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 Israeli troops on guard in Nabulus on the
stance, is a former Israeli government
agronomist and a successful local
businessman, as well as a member of one
of the town's most powerful clans.
There are also a number of practical
constraints that will temper the actions, if
not the rhetoric, of the new leaders. Their
local constituencies will expect them to
live up to their campaign promises to im-
prove municipal services, which they can-
not do without continued financial help
from Israel and Jordan.
Clan ties, local political rivalries, and
vested business and property interests of
the officials will also act as a brake on
tendencies to implement radical policies.
Finally, of course, the Israelis have the
military strength to impose their will.
The Israeli Reaction
The widespread and often violent an-
ti-Israeli demonstrations on the West
Bank since February have gone a long
way toward destroying the Israeli public's
perception of the occupation regime as an
enlightened government at least grudging-
ly tolerated by the territory's Arab in-
habitants. There appears to be little
willingness, however, on the part of either
the Israeli public or the Rabin govern-
ment to reconsider the basic elements of
Israel's West Bank policy.
The Israelis seem to be more than ever
convinced of the need to maintain law and
order in the troubled area. The govern-
ment believes that better riot control
techniques-involving tough, well-trained
border guard units and the use of non-
lethal ammunition-will help accomplish
this.
The Israelis will concentrate on keeping
the Arab population and local leaders
preoccupied with parochial, primarily
economic, affairs. In meetings with local
officials, the Israeli government is making
known its intention to continue with
business as usual, offering, for example,
again to provide money to the financially
strapped municipalities.
Military government officials have also
renewed their efforts to have the new
West Bank administration assume wider
civil responsibilities. Even the previous,
more conservative leaders had resisted
Israeli moves in this direction, arguing
that this would play into the hands of
Israeli efforts to undercut PLO claims to
represent all Palestinians.
The new West Bank leaders will
probably soon have to face the problem of
reconciling public pressures to stand up to
G #1'\ ti ti &
the Israelis with the necessl'ty of
cooperating with occupation authorities
to keep their towns functioning. In
general, the leftist orientation of many of
the new leaders and their desire to retain
public support will make it more difficult
for the Israelis to maintain order.
The PLO, too, may come to look upon
the new leadership with mixed emotions,
even though it reportedly helped get some
of its sympathizers elected. Although
many of the new officials have hailed the
PLO as the sole spokesman for the
Palestinians, they may eventually come to
regard themselves as the spokesmen for
the 675,000 West Bank Palestinians. The
West Bankers constitute not only the
largest single group of Palestinians, but
they already reside in the area considered
by the Arabs, including the PLO, to be the
heart of a future Palestinian state.
One hint of such a tendency was given
in a recent remark by a new West Bank
mayor who claimed that the PLO fulfills
essentially a wartime role. This suggests
that at least some West Bank leaders
probably do not see themselves turning
over power to PLO emigres in the event of
an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement.
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Since President Marcos imposed martial law in September
1972, he has so concentrated power in his own hands that a
period of serious instability would almost certainly follow
should he die or become incapacitated.
C;?'
Philippines: Marcos and the Power Structure
political authority in the Philippines is
so concentrated in the hands of President
Ferdinand Marcos that a period of serious
instability would almost certainly follow
should he die or be incapacitated. He
declared martial law in September 1972
because he had concluded that it was the
best option available to assure his reten-
tion of power. His term as president
would have expired in December, and he
was not eligible for another.
Martial Law Policies
When martial law was declared, Mar-
cos bid for public support by promising to
use his new powers to deal with the abuses
of the old society. He promised to reform
the corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy,
make the central government responsive
to local needs, restore law and order,
speed economic development, and end
government by and for the wealthy
oligarchy. The administration would be
restructured at all levels.
Few of the programs announced in the
first months of martial law have been
carried out. Despite Marcos' expanded
powers, he is as limited as were his con-
stitutional predecessors by the special in-
terests of his family and of his political
supporters.
Marcos' failure to follow through on
his promises of reform has not aroused
serious discontent. The population did not
expect him to keep his more extravagant
promises, and most concluded that mar-
tial law was an improvement, in some
respects at least, over the chaotic political
system it replaced.
Although crimes against property con-
tinue at a high rate, violent crime has been
sharply reduced. The martial law regime
also got much of the credit for the
prosperity of 1973 and 1974, traceable in
large part to good crops and high export
prices.
The Palace
During the past three and a half years,
Marcos has used martial law to eliminate
or restrict most national and local
political institutions through which rivals
might exercise power, but he has created
few new structures. Political influence
now depends largely on having a personal
relationship with Marcos or with someone
close to him.
Since martial law, the President's ex-
tended family and that of his wife, Imelda
Romualdez, have acquired vast economic
holdings, and both have become deeply in-
volved in political and - administrative
matters.
Imelda's appointment as governor of
metropolitan Manila in 1975 and her ven-
tures into diplomacy are the most spec-
tacular but by no means the only ex-
amples of familial government under
martial law. Other members of the two
families are scattered prominently
throughout the government and in com-
mercial enterprises, particularly those
considered politically sensitive, such as
the media.
The only political game left of any im-
portance is to gain access to and influence
with Marcos. Factions coalesce around
ambitious personalities who can convince
others they have influence. These cliques
rarely represent philosophical differences
or speak for economic or political interest
groups. A leader's power and following
dissipates at the first hint that his in-
fluence with the President may be waning.
Even the closest Marcos followers
generally interpret their loyalty to Marcos
as a short-term obligation in return for
favors. Few have any commitment to his
martial law program or see Marcos
himself as the keystone of national well
being. Marcos is aware of the fragility of
these bonds and is careful not to test them
too far.
Any successor will have to develop his
own interlocking network of obligations,
since it will be difficult for Marcos to deed
the loyalties of his supporters to a
designated successor, even his wife.
Imelda Marcos is at present the most
powerful leader of a palace clique, partly
because of her obvious access to and in-
fluence on her husband. Her prominence
is also a reflection of the decline in in-
fluence over the last six months of other
close Marcos associates.
Imelda's clique differs somewhat from
others. It has a durable core based on the
Romualdez family, but beyond this her
group is no more stable or loyal than any
of the others. It would quickly dissolve if
the President gave any sign that her
opinions no longer carry much weight.
Imelda and her relatives have tried to
guarantee her present level of influence by
persuading Marcos to designate her
publicly as his successor; thus far he has
not done so.
The Oligarchs
Before martial law, politicians and
bureaucrats were bought and sold by the
economic oligarchy, which included rural
landed families and urban commercial
clans. The two national political parties
were controlled by competing federations
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of oligarch interests with no discernible
ideological or tactical differences.
Marcos was not a member of this
oligarchy by birth, but during his long
political career he was able to acquire im-
portant economic interests, and since
martial law he has become easily the
country's wealthiest citizen.
The President has reinforced his new
political powers by extending personal
control over all important sectors of the
economy, either directly by absorbing
major businesses into the Marcos clan
portfolio or indirectly through govern-
ment regulation and supervision. Marcos'
relatives or confidants sit on the boards of
directors of all important businesses.
Marcos moved early under martial law
to reduce the power of regional warlords,
outlawing their private armies, imposing
gun control, and beginning the
long-delayed process of breaking up large
landholdings. He established tighter cen-
tral control over the constabulary and
local police to prevent alliances with the
landed oligarchs against the central
government.
Nevertheless, most oligarchs have
benefited from martial law. It has brought
new security, anti-strike decrees, and
favorable commercial and financial
regulations.
The oligarchs as important political
powers have not in fact been eliminated.
Few have surrendered their private
arsenals, and land reform has slowed after
a showy start. The important sugar plan-
tations are specifically excluded from the
reforms. The landed oligarchs will
probably be quick to revive their private
armies and reassert control over local af-
fairs if the next government appears weak
or unstable.
The Military
Marcos 'has cultivated the military
since his days as a congressman, when
most politicians treated soldiers as
second-class citizens, and he has tried to
build up the military in the public eye as
an integral part of his new administration.
Unlike other Southeast Asian armies,
the Philippine military has been a relative-
ly apolitical, highly professional corps,
which has never developed a sense of itself
as embodying the nation's interests.
Even though a number of officers have
never been comfortable with martial law,
by and large the military supports it.
Constabulary officers, in contrast to those
of the other services, have a long history
of involvement in local and provincial af-
fairs, and some have become powerful
local administrators under martial law.
This is determined largely by the personal
relationship of the local civilian ad-
ministrator with the palace.
The military has been more interested
in the economic opportunities afforded by
its new importance than in political
aggrandizement. Officers want the per-
quisites formerly monopolized by the
civilian elite-sinecures in private and
public business, elite and foreign educa-
tion for their children, kickbacks and
other easy money. The military shows lit-
tle concern for the direction of national
policies in non-military affairs.
A threatened government-wide
housecleaning last fall provoked a strong
reaction from top officers who came close
to being purged, including some who were
members of the inner circle that had
planned martial law. They quickly made
it clear to Marcos that they would
publicize Marcos' own corruption, and
the cautious Marcos backed down.
In the event of Marcos' death or in-
capacitation, however, the military would
be propelled into national politics by
default, since it is virtually the only
national institution still intact.
Implications
Marcos does not appear unduly con-
cerned about the problem of succession.
At 58 he is still a relatively young man
and is reported to be in good health. He
plans to remain in power for many more
years and doubtless assumes that he will
have time to prepare for a transition. In
Page 17
order to satisfy domestic and foreign ad-
visers, however, he claims that he has
drafted a decree on succession and placed
it with an unnamed trusted associate for
safekeeping.
Imelda and her followers have recently
increased pressure on Marcos to name her
his successor. Marcos is aware that his
wife is unpopular with many powerful
segments of the country, particularly in
the military, and he himself does not trust
her ambitions. Nevertheless, he has found
it politically convenient to foster the im-
pression that her political influence may
be growing.
The shape of a successor regime will de-
pend largely on the balance of forces at
the time of Marcos' death. Even if he
should succumb to pressure from Imelda
to name her his successor, most of her
political influence will vanish once he is
gone.
Many military officers and other
citizens would strongly oppose her acces-
sion to the presidency. They realize that
overt opposition to her is dangerous while
her husband is alive, but some have
already begun to discuss quietly how to
stop her if she survives him.
Imelda can be counted on to wage a
strong campaign to succeed her husband,
and her maneuvering will add greatly to
the political turmoil and instability that
will follow his departure. Her ac-
tions-and the reactions of others to
her-will probably shape the course of the
succession contest.
She might even be included in an initial
post-Marcos junta, but unless she is more
successful in the future than she has been
in the past in attracting supporters who
have political weight, she probably would
be eased out of power very quickly.
When Marcos leaves the political scene,
the old power groups will compete to fill
the political vacuum. There are few in-
stitutions that can be counted upon to
hold the country together while the
succession is contested, and Marcos'
successors will probably have to rely on
unstable coalitions of disparate and
potentially competitive political and
economic groups.
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