WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011300180001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 30, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Iq
State Dept. review completed
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Secret
Weekly Summary
STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMPLETED
Secret
Cl WS 76-018
No. 0018/76
April 30, 1976
Copy N?_ 61
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every fridoy morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports' and analyzes signifi-
cant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. it
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, The Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
1 Europe
Italy; Portugal; Spain;
Romania
3 Middle East - Africa
Lebanon; Rhodesia:
Egypt-USSR;
Kenya-Uganda
5 East Asia - Pacific
China; Thailand
5 Western Hemisphere
Brazil-Angola; Argentina;
Chile
7 Vietnam: One Year Later
9 Latin American Perceptions of the US
11 Namibia: Pretoria's Control to Be Tested
15 African-Arab Cooperation
17 UNCTAD: Fourth Session to Convene
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekny
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/-4
A month of intense political maneuver-
ing is likely to end this week with the
collapse of the Moro government and a
decision by President Leone to dissolve
parliament and schedule an election.
All that remains is for parliament to
complete a debate requested by the Chris-
tian Democrats on a series of economic
proposals drawn up by the government
last week. The debate is scheduled to end
with a confidence vote. Moro may step
down in advance of the balloting,
however, since the Socialists and Social
Democrats have already said they will
vote against the government.
The Christian Democrats are still
plagued by deep internal differences that
center mainly on the question of how to
deal with the Communist Party. Christian
Democratic conservatives have urged
Moro to resign in order to make way for a
prime minister from the Christian
Democratic right to lead the party into an
election. Moro and Christian Democratic
leader Zaccagnini, who lead the party left,
want to avoid an election, even if it means
giving the Communists an indirect role in
national policy making.
The decision to hold a parliamentary
debate was a compromise between the two
sides. It seems likely to give the Christian
Democratic right the election it has
sought and to leave the party left at the
helm of the government, since Moro will
probably be asked to stay on in a
caretaker status if parliament is dissolved.
The Christian Democrats are ill
prepared to face the electorate.
Communist leader Berlinguer is still
unenthusiastic about an early election and
wary of the political polarization that the
campaign is likely to produce. Party rank
and file, however, are urging the
leadership to push for an election and to
move toward an alliance with the
Socialists. The Communist leadership is
emphasizing its continued preference for
an eventual partnership with the Christian
Democrats-the "historic com-
promise'
1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Apr 30, 76
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PO UCAL
The legislative election on April 25 did
little to chart a clear political course for
Portugal and instead injected a new note
of uncertainty into Portuguese politics.
The Socialist Party remained the
leading vote-getter, but it failed to win
sufficient seats in the assembly to enable
party leader Mario Soares to form a
government without at least some outside
support in parliament. The Socialists ob-
tained 35 percent of the vote, a drop of
more than 2 percent from their showing
in the 1975 election to the constituent
assembly.
The Popular Democratic Party came in
second with 24 percent of the vote, a drop
of 2 percentage points from its showing
last year. The party was hurt by the
revival of the conservative Social
Democratic Center, which doubled its
share of the 1975 vote-bringing it to 15.8
percent-by appealing to essentially the
same constituency as the Popular
Democrats.
The most surprising development was
the strong showing of the Communist
Party, although it dropped from third to
fourth place. The Communist Party
appeared to benefit from the lower voter
turnout this year as it advanced some two
points from its 1975 showing to 14.6 per-
cent of the vote. This reflects, however,
the Communists' ability to hold on to part
ROMANIA i I
Romanian President Ceausescu, speak-
ing on April 26, used exceptionally strong
language to charge that Moscow is
twisting Marxist-Leninist doctrine to ad-
vance Soviet hegemony in the world com-
munist movement.
The Yugoslavs immediately rebroad-
cast his speech, describing it as the "of-
ficial opening of a polemic" against ad-
vocates of limited sovereignty-a
euphemism for the "Brezhnev Doctrine."
Ceausescu told a pongress of Romanian
trade unions that certain Marx-
ist-Leninist "philosophers and
theoreticians" are denigrating national
sovereignty by interpreting "proletarian
internationalism" to mean that anyone
of the 4.5 percent of the vote received in
1975 by one of its front groups that was
not on the ballot this time.
The failure of a clear winner to emerge
will complicate efforts to form a govern-
ment following the presidential election
this summer. The Socialists will probably
get the nod, but Mario Soares so far is
continuing to insist that his party will
govern alone or not at all.
The Popular Democrats, the Social
Democrats, and the Communists have
voiced their claim to a share in the
government. With approximately two
months to go before a new government is
to be installed, there will undoubtedly be a
good deal of maneuvering among the four
major parties and the military.
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SPAIN 6---
Prime Minister Arias' speech to the na-
tion on April 28 was the most detailed
presentation of the government's reform
program yet, but it will satisfy neither the
opposition forces on the left nor the
proponents of the status quo on the right.
Responding to pressures from King
Juan Carlos and reform-minded
ministers, Arias outlined specific reform
measures and a timetable for their im-
plementation. His call for a referendum
on constitutional reforms by next October
who defends his nation's independence
violates communist theory.
The Romanian President said this argu-
ment is "absolutely erroneous" and con-
tradicts Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
Quoting Marx and Engels to support his
position, he said the Romanian party and
working class are "duty bound" to defend
the "freedom of the fatherland."
Ceausescu quoted Lenin to the effect
that those who do not aspire to freedom
are worthy only of repulsion, indignation,
and contempt. He warned the Soviets that
they themselves cannot be free if they op-
press others and that "true" proletarian
internationalism is based on the defense of
national sovereignty.
Ceausescu's strident rhetoric-which
will not be ignored by the
and a general election early in 1977,
however, sets a more leisurely pace than
reformers like Foreign Minister Areilza
had been urging.
The Prime Minister said that all reform
measures, except the election law, would
be ready for submission to parliament by
May 15. These are to include con-
stitutional provisions on monarchical
succession and the establishment of a
bicameral legislature, with one house free-
ly elected and the other retaining some of
the features of the present Cortes. The
changes in the legislative and monarchical
succession are to be the topics for the
referendum. There will also be revisions
of the penal code and of laws restricting
freedom of assembly and association to
legalize non-extremist political parties.
The government's proposal for widen-
ing suffrage would be submitted by July
15, according to Arias.
Arias said he trusted the parliament
would act on his proposals in time for the
King to call the referendum on schedule,
an indication that he is concerned over
possible rightist obstructionism in the pre-
sent parliament.
Arias warned that the government's
call for expanded political liberties does
not extend to extremists on the left or the
right who want totalitarianism. This
serves as a reaffirmation of the
government's stand against legalizing the
Communist Party.
Kremlin-suggests that Bucharest feels
itself under pressure from Moscow. His
charges and the prompt Yugoslav com-
mentary clearly reflect the apprehensions
of Bucharest and Belgrade over the
greater Soviet emphasis on ideological
conformity since the recent Soviet party
congress and over Moscow's intentions in
the Balkans in the post-Tito period.
The Soviets have been steadily criticiz-
ing the independent-minded communist
parties, specifically those in Western
Europe, for falling into the trap of
"bourgeois nationalism," and Moscow
and its loyal East European allies may use
the occasion of the East German Party
Congress opening May 18 to address the
Romanian challenge. 25X1
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president be chosen before May 2 when
the present parliament's term would have
ended had it not been extended for two
years last month. The leftists apparently
want more time to consider their strategy
and have intimated they may boycott the
scheduled session.
The top contenders to replace Fran-
jiyah-Ilyas Sarkis, the choice of the con-
servative Christians and the Syrians, and
Raymond Edde, the favorite of the
Lebanese left-have campaigned for sup-
port throughout the week. Leftist leader
Kamal Jumblatt and other anti-Syrian
deputies object to Sarkis because of his
close ties to Damascus. Edde has offended
the Syrians and faces stiff opposition
from conservative Christians who resent
his calls for secularizing the government
and his sympathetic attitude toward the
Palestinians.
I f neither Edde nor Sarkis is able to win
over his major opposition, the race will be
open to a host of weaker candidates. The
parliamentary session might then turn
into a prolonged debate that could upset
Tensions dropped sharply in Lebanon
after April 24, when President Franjiyah
signed the constitutional amendment that
provides for the immediate election of his
successor by the parliament. The speaker
of parliament has scheduled a vote for
May 1, despite a controversy among the
Lebanese political factions over the tim-
ing and security arrangements for the
election. The speaker acted after confer-
ring with the Syrians, who continue trying
to promote a political settlement in
Lebanon.
Ironically, the strongest protest over
holding the election so soon after the
promulgation of the constitutional
amendment came from the Muslim left-
ists who originally demanded that a new
the shaky cease-fire in Beirut.
The haphazard security arrangements
for the brief parliamentary meeting
earlier this month that passed the con-
stitutional change proved how quickly
security can collapse if left in the hands of
the rival militias and the remnants of the
Lebanese army. Similar patchwork
arrangements have apparently been made
for the May 1 session, although the 25X1
Syrians have hinted that their forces in
Beirut can guarantee the safety of the
deputies.
RHODESIA % j,. 4
Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith
announced on April 27 that he is bringing
ten blacks into his government. Four
tribal chiefs were to be sworn in the next
day as full cabinet members, and six depu-
ty ministers will soon be appointed from
among Rhodesia's black businessmen and
professionals.
Smith apparently hopes to offset the
POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR LEBANESE PRESIDENCY
The speaker of Lebanon's parliament has announced that a new
presidential election will be held Saturday, May 1. The following
reviews the possible presidential candidates.
Ilyas Sarkis, the governor of the central bank, has strong backing
from the Syrians, the Phalanges Party, and President Franjiyah and
recently received endorsement from Prime Minister Karami. Sarkis
does not have an independent power base in parliament like his
chief rivals and will probably run into considerable trouble if the
voting goes beyond a first or second ballot. Sarkis' greatest liability
is that leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt and Palestinian leaders object
to his close ties with the Syrians. His liberal attitude toward social
reform, however, might sway Jumblatt to accept his candidacy.
Raymond Edde, leader of Lebanon's third largest Christian party,
has gained favor with Jumblatt and the leftists by advocating an end
to confessionalism in government, including the Maronite Christian
hold on the presidency. Edde's maverick position has antagonized
many conservative Christians and raised doubts that he would
provide responsible leadership. The Syrians adamantly opposed him
because of his public denunciation of their efforts to bring about a
cease-fire in January. President Franjiyah, who fears that Edde
might use the presidency to discredit him, reportedly has threatened
not to resign if Edde is elected.
Edward Hunayn, a parliamentary deputy and member of Edde's
party, has been mentioned by the conservative Christians as a
fallback candidate. Hunayn has close ties with important Christian
leaders but apparently has not been involved in the rivalry and petty
feuding among them. He has generally taken a moderate course in
the dispute between Muslims and Christians and has actively worked
for reconciliation during the recent civil strife.
Pierre Edde, the younger brother of Raymond Edde and a respected
figure in his own right, has been mentioned as a possible alternative
to his brother. Although Edde has served in both the cabinet and
parliament, he is a less controversial politician than his brother and
could attract support from the same quarters without inciting the
same dislike.
Jean Aziz, also a former deputy and cabinet minister, reportedly is
on Jumblatt's list of possible compromise candidates. Aziz does not
have any significant support among conservative Christians but
apparently would be acceptable to them. He is from one of the few
mixed Christian-Muslim areas in southern Lebanon and has carefully
protected his home district from the recent civil strife.
Pierre Hilu, a deputy and former minister, is considered a
front-runner among the compromise candidates mainly because of
his close connections with Jumblatt. He is the cousin of former
president Charles Hilu which gives him automatic prominence in
Lebanese circles although apparently not enough to make him a
serious contender.
Michel al-Khouri, the son of a former president and an adviser to
President Franjiyah, has been mentioned by the Christians in their
general casting about for candidates. His close association with
Franjiyah, however, would almost certainly make him an unaccept-
able figure for the leftists.
General Hanna Said, commander in chief of the Lebanese Army, is
not a participant in the campaign but is being considered as a
possible nominee should parliament reach an impasse. He has
generally tried to play a moderating role during the crisis and has
been able to maintain the respect of many Muslims. F
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collapse last month of his constitutional
settlement negotiations with Joshua
Nkomo, one of the rival leaders of the
divided African National Council.
Nkomo had demanded immediate pari-
ty between blacks and whites in top ex-
ecutive positions and elections within a
year under a broadened franchise that
would put a black majority in the Rhode-
sian parliament. Nkomo told the
press-and Smith has not denied it-that
Smith's best franchise offer would have
postponed majority rule for at least ten
years.
Smith's token measures toward "power
sharing" are not likely to win over
Rhodesia's urban blacks, who have sup-
ported Nkomo, nor to deter foreign back-
ing for the Rhodesian guerrillas, who have
recently stepped up incursions from bases
in Mozambique.
Nevertheless, Smith's announcement,
following a closed caucus of the ruling
Rhodesian Front Party, suggests that he
has succeeded once again in asserting his
unrivalled influence over Rhodesia's
beleaguered white community. He has ap-
parently faced down the sizable faction
within his party that reportedly opposed
even such token measures. He also may
have reassured the relatively few white
moderates who hope that some accom-
modation of black aspirations might at
least stem the Qrowth of insurgency
EGYPT-USSR
Egypt's foreign trade minister underlines
the recognition by both sides that they
would lose from a break in economic
relations. Moscow is aware that an open
break would foreclose the possibility of
collecting on Egypt's outstanding
economic and military debt, the largest
with the USSR by a third-world country.
A severance of economic relations
would also hurt Egypt. The Soviets are
providing aid to expand the Huiwan steel
mill-Egypt's only integrated steel com-
plex-and the Naja Hammadi aluminum
plant. These enterprises have absorbed
more than a quarter of Moscow's $1.4
billion of development assistance.
It would be equally costly for Cairo to
terminate its trade arrangements with the
Soviets. Egypt's current exports to the
USSR consist mainly of cotton and
low-quality consumer goods. These goods
would bring much less on world markets
than the more than $500 million paid by
the Soviets on bilateral account. Ad-
ditional Western credits would be needed
to pay for the essential goods Egypt now
imports from the USSR, such as coking
coal, jet fuel, and scrap iron.
Although Cairo will probably phase out
the Soviet presence, no overt steps have
yet been taken to reduce the level or
character of the economic relationship
beyond the expulsion last week of five
Soviets from the Huiwan steel mill for an
alleged "slowdown." Most of the 1,800
Soviet technicians assigned to economic
projects in Egypt will probably remain un-
til their contracts expire or projects under
r.gypt and the USSR signed their 1976
trade protocol on April 28 despite
political differences and Egypt's cancella-
tion of the friendship treaty.
The new protocol calls for a third less
trade in 1976 ($642 million) than in 1975
and allows for an Egyptian trade surplus
of $142 million to be used to reduce
Egypt's large debt with the USSR.
Discussions also were initiated on a new
long-term trade agreement to replace the
current one that expires this year.
Egypt's request for, and the Soviets'
agreement to, a visit to Moscow by
KENYA-UGANDA ~-- I
New threats against Kenya by Ugan-
dan President Amin are certain to
heighten fears in Nairobi about Kam-
pala's military intentions.
According to a Ugandan radio broad-
cast on April 27, Amin is "seriously con-
cerned" about a report he allegedly
received from a Kenyan official that
Secretary Kissinger advised Nairobi to
withdraw from the East African Com-
munity "so the US could give Kenya full
military assistance."
Amin is quoted as saying he cannot act
as long as he serves as chairman of the
Organization of African Unily but that he
would "return to the barracks" when his
term expires in July.
Relations between Kenya and Uganda
have been seriously strained in the last few
months as a result of Amin's announced
territorial claims against Kenya,
Nairobi's imposition of economic restric-
tions on Kampala, and several cross-
border forays by Uganda in early April.
Although Amin has voiced measured
approval of the Secretary's policy state-
ment in Zambia this week, the Ugandan
President has been generally critical of
Kissinger's African trip. He apparently is
angry that Kampala was not included in
the itinerary; the US embassy in Kampala
was closed in 1973.
His anger was probably compounded
by the Secretary's well-publicized visits
with Kenyan President Kenyatta and
Tanzanian President Nyerere, another
neighbor with whom Amin has shay
differences.
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The criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping has
aroused widespread dissatisfaction and
bitterness in China. This was evident in
the party's higher echelons when Teng's
staunchest supporters failed to join the
rest of the leadership earlier this week at a
reception denouncing the demonstrations
in Peking of April 5.
Some lower level officials in China and
Chinese officials abroad have been willing
to speak frankly about Chinese domestic
politics with foreigners-a departure from
attitudes that have prevailed for decades.
Even more startling, a number of officials
are willing to criticize Mao Tse-tung.
From the beginning of the anti-Teng
campaign, many Chinese have pointed a
finger at Mao, calling him "selfish" and
"senile." Since Teng's fall, criticism of
Mao has increased. Chinese diplomats
have spoken candidly of Mao's
diminishing political influence, and one
even suggested that Mao ought to step
down. In January, after the initial move
against Teng, criticism of the Chairman
reportedly surfaced for the first time in
the party central committee.
There seems little doubt that Mao's
political stock has fallen and that many
Chinese blame Mao for the latest
leadership upheaval. Current criticism of
the Chairman seems greater than that
which surfaced in the early 1960s and is
different in that it is expressed openly,
rather than indirectly as was the case in
the 1960s.
Since Teng was blocked from the
premiership in early February, there has
been widespread and sometimes out-
spoken support for him and the policies he
and the late Chou En-lai represented.
Some of the discontent over his treatment
abated in March, when the attacks on
Teng seemed to have stalled, but it rose
again rapidly after the demonstrations in
Peking and Teng's subsequent dismissal.
Teng may be more popular today than
before the campaign against him began.
Many Chinese have commented that the
charges against him are false and that he
is a ca able official who was treated un-
fairly.
THAILAND
G 58
The Seni Pramot coalition is expected
to win a parliamentary vote of confidence
soon. The new government, with a com-
fortable majority of over 60 seats, should
be more stable than the Khukrit govern-
ment it replaces.
Seni Pramot A ?
The Prime Minister's Democrat Party
has a dominant position within the coali-
tion. Seni's principal problem is expected
to be Praman Adireksan, the ambitious
leader of the coalition partner, the Thai
Nation Party. Praman is both a deputy
prime minister and minister of
agriculture, and many members of the
coalition distrust him because of his
political maneuvering earlier this year and
his more recent manipulation of army of-
ficer assignments just before he stepped
down as defense minister.
Seni and his foreign minister, Phichai
Rattakun, hope to fashion a foreign
policy that will include some balance in
the Khukrit government's handling of the
negotiations for a residual US presence
and view continuation of US military aid
as important to Thailand's security. They
have indicated an interest in reopening the
negotiations on one or two facilities
currently scheduled for closure and have
made it clear that they want to tie any
possible new agreement to a guarantee of
a significant increase in US military
assistance.
BRAZIL-ANGOLA 5` 6
Brazil's decision to recognize the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola on the day the African territory
became independent appears to be paying
off in economic terms.
the return of a prospecting team from
Angola and said that the Brazilian
government had informed the Angolans
that it is interested in purchasing as much
oil as possible.
Other commercial deals may be in the
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The decision to recognize the Popular
Movement was made over the protest of
conservatives in the military. In addition
to the economic benefits, the move has
helped to dispel African resentment of
Brazil's past su port of Portuguese
colonialism.
ARGENTINA "-~ 6 1
L9 25X1
The Argentine military government is
undertaking a sweeping program to raise
farm income. It regards improvement in
agriculture as the basis for long-term
economic growth and as a source of
foreign exchange to meet the country's
huge financial obligations.
The government has reversed a number
of Peronist agricultural policies that kept
returns to farmers low and discouraged
agricultural investment. This has per-
mitted the government to siphon off
profits-through state grain- and meat-
marketing monopolies-and subsidize
food prices for urban workers.
The new measures, some already in
operation, raise farm prices and eliminate
the government marketing monopolies.
They also provide for more favorable
foreign exchange rates on the proceeds
from agricultural exports and will
gradually reduce agricultural export tax-
es. Although too late to influence the
harvest this year, the new program will
stimulate meat production and should
lead to increased planting of crops next
year, especially wheat and oilseeds.
Marketing a larger grain harvest should
be easy, but a higher beef output may be
harder to sell. Loss of the EC market
because of EC import restrictions was
chiefly responsible for the $500-million
drop in Argentine meat sales last year.
Sales are recovering, however, along with
economic recovery in the industrial
nations.
The new farm program will complicate
the problem of reducing Argentina's large
fiscal deficit. Eliminating government
marketing monopolies and reducing
agricultural export taxes will cut revenues
sharply and force the government to seek
other sources of income.
CHILE 9'- 6 7 25X1
Left-wing Chilean exiles plan to con-
vene in Mexico in mid-May to create a
unified revolutionary movement. Their
immediate objective may be to consider
ways to embarrass the Chilean govern-
ment when it plays host to the OAS
eneral Assembly meetine in early June.
Past efforts to organize an opposition
front have faltered because of the same
rivalries and quarreling that weakened
Allende's administration. Exile successes
seem limited to promoting international
censure of the junta.
The exiles probably hope to attract dis-
sidents of the Christian Democratic Par-
ty, many of whom have become dis-
illusioned with the growing atrophy of the
party and expect no early end to the
political moratorium imposed by the
military government. The exiles are ap-
parently also counting on picking up the
pieces of the extremist Movement of the
Revolutionary Left, the major target of
Chilean security forces. 25X1
Chilean exile leaders Clodomiro Almeyda (1) and Gaston Rodriguez Rojas
a ryf ex A
?+r ss
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The basic elements of Hanoi's postwar foreign policy are
beginning to take shape. A unified Vietnam will insist on an in-
fluential role for itself in Southeast Asia. It will seek help from
France, Japan, and elsewhere in its effort to avoid unnecessary
dependence on the USSR or China.
(~ 4~~
Vietnam: One Year Later
The Vietnamese communists have held
to a fairly low foreign policy profile in the
year since their victory in the south. The
other Southeast Asian nations, which had
feared that Hanoi would adopt an
aggressive posture toward the rest of the
region, have become more relaxed in re-
cent months.
Although there are several insurgencies
active in the region and Vietnam has am-
ple arms to send them, every security ser-
vice in the area is watching arms
shipments closely and, so far, not a single
report of shipments from Vietnam has
been verified.
There seem to be three principal
reasons for Hanoi's restrained foreign
policy behavior during the past year:
? It is giving first priority to putting
its own house in order.
? Its foreign policy objectives just
now are limited.
? It is working out a basically new,
long-term foreign policy.
Domestic Priorities First
Hanoi's first priority is to consolidate
its control of the south. The communists
are aware of the widespread opposition to
their take-over in the south and are deter-
mined to reindoctrinate or eliminate all
Vietnamese who have opposed them.
In the field of economic reform, party
leaders are proceeding !it a deliberate
pace. Their pragmatic approach appears
aimed at avoiding the kind of powerful
anti-regime reaction that occurred in the
north in 1956 against forced collectiviza-
tion of agriculture.
The regime gradually took control of
banking and currency, large enterprises,
foreign trade, and the vital wholesale rice
transport system. Last fall Hanoi
prescribed a mixed economy for the south
ranging from state-owned major enter-
prises to privately owned small
businesses. The bulk of rice production in
the south is still in the hands of small
private farmers. Collectivization of
agriculture has taken place only in areas
long held by the communists and in "new
economic areas" settled by urban
emigrants.
Hanoi is aware that harsh measures to
merge two disparate economic and social
systems would not only have highly dis-
ruptive effects in the south but would ex-
ceed the party's administrative capacities.
Party leaders, therefore, apparently are
prepared to tolerate major north-south
differences in economic organization for
some years.
Hanoi's objective is to free itself of
dependence on Soviet and Chinese aid,
with the help of France, Japan, and
others.
Immediate Objectives Limited
For Hanoi, the victory of the Viet-
namese communists was a turning point
in the history of Southeast Asia, and
Hanoi's foreign policy is based on its
perception of that victory and its im-
plications. The Vietnamese communist
leadership doubtless believes that, at a
minimum, the new Vietnam deserves un-
questioning respect from Laos and Cam-
bodia as the pre-eminent power in In-
dochina. Beyond Indochina, the Viet-
namese clearly feel they are entitled to
respectful cooperation from the other
nations of Southeast Asia, particularly
from Thailand.
Vietnam's main foreign policy effort in
Southeast Asia has been to press Thailand
to rid itself of US bases and to discredit
the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations as a US-backed alliance that in-
vites great power intervention in the area.
The Vietnamese clearly are thinking
ahead to a time when they may take a
leading role in the region.
Hanoi has given a high priority to
bringing Thailand to terms, since the Thai
were the most conspicuous Southeast
Asian ally of the US in the fight to pre-
vent a communist take-over in South
Vietnam.
Vietnam's outspoken attacks on the
Thai-US connection, together with the
shifting balance of forces in Southeast
Asia, undoubtedly helped to bring home
to the Thai that it was time to put their
foreign policy on a new footing. The Thai
were also motivated by their own sense of
nationalism, and by election campaign
politics, when they decided recently that
the remaining US presence must be
withdrawn. Whatever the immediate
cause for the US withdrawal, Hanoi
clearly welcomes it, and it has been
muting its tirades against Bangkok in the
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Le Duan during talks last October with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev
hope that the new Thai government will
continue to put more distance between
itself and the US.
Hanoi's strong condemnation of
ASEAN when the organization held its
summit meeting in Bali in February caus-
ed more bewilderment and resentment
than fear in the five ASEAN
capitals-Bangkok, Manila, Jakarta,
Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur. The Viet-
namese clearly regard ASEAN as a relic
of the anticommunist war effort. Their
early interest in developing relations with
Thailand and the Philippines and their re-
cent overture to Indonesia, however,
suggest that hostility toward ASEAN will
not deter Hanoi from developing better
relations with the five member states.
Independence in the Communist World
North Vietnam was dependent on
Chinese and Soviet support throughout
the war years but even so managed to play
the two communist powers off against
each other.
Now, as Vietnam seeks to end the
relative isolation of the war years, the
balance has tilted toward Moscow. The
basic relationship with Peking is one of
limited tension; Moscow now provides
substantially greater political and
material support.
Underlying the tension between China
and Vietnam is a conflict in
national-ethnic-cultural pride. China's
sense of superiority has for more than
2,000 years caused the Chinese to expect
all other peoples to come to them. As
SOV Fr-t'
Western power recedes from Southeast
Asia, Peking inevitably thinks it should
exercise the most important foreign in-
fluence in the region.
The peoples who migrated south from
China and became Vietnamese many cen-
turies ago brought with them a similar
ethnic-cultural arrogance. Today, in the
wake of their victory, the men who make
Vietnamese communist policy believe that
Vietnam should wield the most important
influence over the countries of Southeast
Asia.
Hanoi, moreover, is earning Peking's
distrust because of its good relations with
Moscow. Peking can hardly welcome the
prospect of Vietnam taking a leadership
role in Southeast Asia if Vietnam and the
USSR seem to be working closely
together there.
The conflict and distrust between Viet-
nam and China can be seen all around
Vietnam.
To the east, in the South China Sea, the
two governments assert conflicting claims
to the Paracel and Spratly islands. China
made a special point of underscoring these
conflicting claims in its propaganda on
the eve of a visit to Peking last September
by party chief Le Duan. Each government
is deeply offended by the presumption of
the other.
In Cambodia, within weeksof the fall of
Phnom Penh, clashes erupted between
communist forces of Vietnam and Cam-
bodia along disputed sections of the
border, Vietnamese forces captured some
disputed islands in the Gulf of Thailand
from the Cambodians, and the new rulers
of Cambodia asked the Vietnamese com-
munists to get out of their long-establish-
ed base areas in Cambodian territory.
During this somewhat tense period,
scores of Chinese suddenly began appear-
ing in Cambodia. The Chinese, the only
substantial foreign group there, were
presumably sent to provide practical
assistance of various kinds to the new
government, but their presence was and
remains most important as proof of
Peking's support to the Cambodians.
Today Hanoi has representation in
Phnom Penh, but there are few hints of
any sort of a cooperative relationship. The
Cambodians, with direct encouragement
from the Chinese, have taken steps to im-
prove their relations with the Thai, a
policy at odds with Hanoi's firm position
that Thailand must expel the remaining
US military presence before any improve-
ment can be made in relations with
Thailand.
In Thailand, a Chinese connection has
also helped Bangkok stand up to Hanoi.
After the fall of Saigon, Hanoi, confident
that the Thai would quickly come to
terms, demanded that the aircraft and
ships taken to Thailand in the last days of
the war be turned over to the victors.
The Thai refused with some apprehen-
sion, but after Prime Minister Khukrit
returned from Peking he was clearly
more relaxed about Vietnamese demands,
and Hanoi drew the obvious conclusion:
the Chinese had encouraged Khukrit to
stand up to Vietnamese pressures.
In Laos, too, there is an adversary
relationship between the Vietnamese and
Chinese. The Chinese have a large
presence in northern Laos, where they are
building roads connecting to China. In
general, however, the Lao-with Viet-
namese support-are holding the Chinese
at arm's length.
North Vietnamese forces did most of
the fighting on the communist side in
Laos during the last two decades, and the
North Vietnamese provided the Lao com-
munist leadership its indoctrination and
training. This history and the strength of
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Vietnamese communist units still in Laos
give Hanoi a major voice in Lao com-
munist decisions.
It was doubtless with the encourage-
ment and assistance of the Vietnamese
that the Lao invited several hundred
Soviet technicians to Laos last year. Pek-
ing presumably regards the introduction
of this Soviet presence into Laos as con-
firmation of its darker suspicions of
Hanoi's position in the Sino-Soviet com-
petition.
Prospects
With the formal completion of the un-
ification process in the next month or so,
the Vietnamese probably will adopt a
more active foreign policy. They will in-
sist on an influential voice in Southeast
Asian affairs and will work to expand
political and economic contacts with the
noncommunist world to reduce their
dependence on the USSR and China.
In their relations with Thailand and
other neighboring countries, the Viet-
namese will probably continue to subor-
dinate revolutionary rhetoric to appeals
for cooperative relations. Hanoi,
however, will continue to insist that
friendly relations cannot be achieved as
long as US military personnel and bases
are allowed to remain in these countries.
The Vietnamese almost certainly will
attempt to influence their neighbors, par-
ticularly Thailand, by keeping open the
option of increasing support to local
"revolutionary movements."
Hanoi's priority domestic goals,
however, will impose sharp restraints on
its ability to pursue expansionist policies
or to translate military prestige into effec-
tive political influence in Southeast Asia.
At least for the next few years, Vietnam
will need to import about $1.3 billion an-
nually in industrial machinery, raw
materials, fuels and food, and it will re-
quire foreign assistance to cover an an-
nual trade deficit of about $1 billion.
These urgent economic requirements
will oblige the Vietnamese to maintain
heavy reliance on the USSR, Eastern
Europe, and China, who for now appear
willing to foot most of the bill. Hanoi,
however, is also seeking financial
assistance from the noncommunist world
and is expanding commercial relations
with developed countries. The Vietnamese
leaders are well aware that a policy of
confrontation with their neighbors would
jeopardize their prospects for securing ad-
ditional foreign assistance.
Hanoi's long-term political and
economic interests probably will en-
courage it to hold the door open for an
eventual normalization of relations with
the US. The Vietnamese, however, are
determined to drive a hard bargain. They
will continue to make the provision of
further information on Americans miss-
ing in action, the repatriation of
American bodies, and the release of US
citizens remaining in Vietnam contingent
on US willingness to provide reconstruc-
tion assistance and to relax the US em-
bargo on trade.
The Vietnamese have long insisted that
the US must honor the "commitment" to
provide aid to "heal the wounds of war"
under the Paris Agreement of 1973, but25X1
they privately acknowledge they do not
expect US aid or a normalization of
The Latin Americans' sense of their place in the world has
been changing in recent years. Most of them, however, still
accept a strong US role in the hemisphere and would respond
positively to US initiatives for a more productive relationship.
Latin American Perceptions of the US
The search for national identity in
Latin American countries has produced
profound changes in the region over the
past 15 years, changes which have been
dictated by and at the same time fuel
nationalist sentiment. Finding their own
grievances and aspirations echoed
throughout the underdeveloped world, the
Latin Americans in the last three years
have become more conscious of the rest of
the world and have developed a new,
sharper perception of their own place in it.
Their self-image and their definition of
self-interest have altered, yet their fun-
damental view of the US remains almost
the same.
The Latin Americans believe that the
US possesses the power and wealth to
help or to hurt the rest of the hemisphere.
Their assessment of the US treatment of
Latin America over the past few years is
that Washington's interest in the area has
waned. In their view, the US has
repeatedly failed to deliver on promises
and has put new obstacles in their path to
economic development. Distrust of the
US has grown measurably.
The Latin Americans have accused the
US of preoccupation with other areas,
protectionism in commerce, punitive
legislation, threats of retaliation for dis-
agreement on international issues, and
failures to reciprocate favors. They think
the US has unilaterally changed the rules
of hemispheric relations to their detri-
ment, and they find the US unwilling to
change international arrangements that
they have come to perceive as serving only
an exclusive club of wealthy nations. They
believe the US is misjudging its own in-
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terests by turning its back on Latin
America.
Most seem to expect the divergence
between the US and Latin America to be
temporary, and it is clear that many want
a more productive relationship. For now,
however, the Latin Americans believe
their most promising course is to maintain
pressure on the US, wherever and
however they can. Pursuing this course,
they judge the impact of US actions on
the hemisphere from a highly critical
perspective,
Reactions to US Leadership
Common interests and ideology link
groups of Latin American countries on
certain issues, but it has become difficult
to predict which countries will line up for
or against the US on a particular issue.
The Latin Americans are now responsive
to a larger and more complex set of issues,
countries, and blocs than they were a
decade ago. They have come to devalue
the importance of backing the US, which
they find inconsistent in rewarding its
friends or punishing its foes.
Political ideology works to keep certain
governments allied unless some compel-
ling practicality intrudes. Strongly anti-
communist governments like those of
Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Nicaragua,
and Brazil worry about East-West an-
tagonisms and the Marxist menace, and
they tend to vote alike on such matters as
the Cuban question. In contrast, the leftist
ideologues-Peru, Guyana, and
Jamaica-tilt somewhat toward a Cuban
view of the capitalist world.
On international issues of significance
to the US, Latin American support has
steadily waned. Voting on those issues
that test the drawing power of two
sides-the "Zionism is racism" vote in
the UN is an example-divides the Latin
Americans according to no traditional
pattern.
Many issues and developments,
however, draw remarkably similar reac-
tions from all Latin American
governments. An examination of Latin
American perspectives on several recent
problems shows that Latin Americans
hold tenaciously to the view that their
area holds a special, if neglected, interest
for the US.
US Problems
Latin Americans unanimously judged
the outcome of the long struggle in In-
dochina to be a major defeat for US
policy. But almost all viewed the defeat as
an aberration. Most Latin Americans
were never able to comprehend the US ex-
penditure of human and material
resources on a large scale in that remote
area. The strongly anti-communist
minority wondered why the US drew back
from using the full weight of its military
strength.
The Indochina issue had almost no
effect on the Latin American sense of the
US security commitment in the
hemisphere.
The experience has, however, affected
the image of US strength, resolve, and
judgment in the role of leader of the
Western world. Many Latin Americans
have had an exaggerated impression of
US power, and their new appreciation for
the limits of that power probably gives
them a more realistic base for assessing
US action.
US and Cuban responses to Angola
brought more serious doubts about US
will. Another communist victory, this
time after a significant contribution from
Havana, raised sharper questions about
US reliability and judgment. The anti-
communist governments that refused a
year ago to vote with the majority on lift-
ing OAS sanctions against Cuba feel
smug about having trusted their own in-
stincts rather than voting with the US.
These same governments are nervous,
however, and feel vulnerable. They fear
that a predatory USSR and Cuba are
continuing on an aggressive path and that
the US is not resisting the communist
drive. Their bewilderment over US
"generosity" toward the Soviets leads
them to conclude that the US has been
fooled by the notion of relaxing tensions
between East and West.
Another set of countries, especially in
the Caribbean, believes Washington was
aligned on the same side as South Africa
in the Angolan civil war, and that this is
further evidence of US hostility toward
the Third World and black liberation.
Most Latin Americans are convinced
that the US would react strongly to resist
any communist threats to the Western
Hemisphere. It would be difficult to find a
politically conscious Latin American who
does not believe that the US was responsi-
ble for the overthrow of the Allende
regime in Chile. Whether they take com-
fort in it or deplore it, most continue to
believe that the US will act pater-
nalistically in its own sphereof influence.
Their confidence in US protection has
diminished, but not significantly.
Diffusion of Authority in the US
The role of the US Congress in limiting
US action in Angola helped jell the ran-
dom clues available to Latin American
observers about the real autonomy of the
branches of power in the US, and this new
appreciation worries them. Latin
Americans have been fascinated by
Watergate, the intelligence investigations,
and the foreign policy debates, though
they remain baffled by much of this.
The internal divisions in the US
translate for many Latin Americans as
national disarray. They are accustomed to
a near monopoly of executive power and
are uneasy about Congress' successful
challenges of the US presidency.
The Big Stick
US internal divisions and problems
overseas would mean little in Latin
America if the hemispheric relationship
were prospering. But there is growing opin-
ion that the US has moved into a hostile
position toward Latin American develop-
ment.
References to a new big stick policy
have multiplied in the year and a half
since the signing of the trade act-with its
"retaliatory provisions" against OPEC
members Ecuador and Venezuela. The
Latin Americans say they see threats and
intimidation in US arguments and warn-
ings at the UN and other international
forums, in US official reactions to
national voting patterns in these forums,
and in the US accordance of special con-
sideration for the other giant of the
hemisphere, Brazil.
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Increasingly, the Latin Americans
believe the "hard-line" positions they see
in US policy and disbelieve the "rhetoric"
of cooperation. Latin American bitterness
has grown as the relationship has turned
more clearly on a series of differences on
trade, investment, and military support.
Even so, the Latin Americans displayed
a willingness to work with the US to make
a new start toward a productive
relationship. They responded
enthusiastically in 1974 to the offer of a
new dialogue. The derailment of that ef-
fort badly embarrassed the foreign
ministers who had most effusively backed
it and left new wounds that have not yet
fully healed.
The cautious and skeptical reception
given Secretary Kissinger by political
pundits during his visit to Latin America
this year indicates that the Latins intend
to keep their guard up. They seem to be
awaiting strong evidence of interest and
sympathy from the US before they take
its pledges at face value.
Solidarity and Relations with the US
The ideal of Latin American unity,
which arises from several sources, works
sometimes to nurture and sometimes to
damage relations with the US. The
traditional version of pan-American
solidarity continues to be the preferred
option for most of the governments even
though much in the recent history of the
Organization of American States testifies
to the perversion of that tradition. Despite
the recurrent use of inter-American
forums as arenas for political gang action
against the US, however, pan-
Americanism retains a durable core.
The Latin Americans feel less and less
compunction about giving offense to the
US; indeed, several governments nurture
their own sense of independence by op-
posing or challenging the US on many
issues. Yet it remains dogma that when
the chips are down on issues of survival,
they must inexorably line up with the US.
With only a few exceptions, the Latin
American governments want a cordial
and cooperative link with the US and
hope that changed attitudes in the US will
eventually make Washington more sym-
pathetically inclined toward them.
A Special Relationship
The notion of the Western Hemisphere
as a sphere of US interest is so ingrained
in Latin American thinking about the US
that it amounts to an inter-American doc-
trine with a life of its own. The concept of
South Africa's program for Namibia-the development of
separate. autonomous "homelands" for the territory's nine
tribal groups while preserving Pretoria's economic interests
there faces serious challenges from within as well as outside
Namibia.
a special relationship is very much alive
even in the current climate of skepticism
and discouragement with US policy.
Latin American attitudes toward the US
have traditionally been marked by am-
bivalence, and they remain equivocal. The
current accent is on resentment rather
than respect, and resentment will remain
in the mix of the Latin Americans'
perspectives so long as their sense of
dependence on the US prevails.
Despite their strong desire for in-
dependence and notwithstanding the value
they place on having found new political
and economic partners throughout the in-
ternational community, the Latin
Americans still consider close alignment
with "their superpower" as natural. The
current "unnatural" state of the
relationship alarms them sufficiently that
their characterization of it as a crisis is
not hyperbole to them.
Most Latin American governments are
ready and even anxious to respond
favorably to US policies that meet their
needs but preserve their pride in the in-
evitably assymetrical relationship
between the US and relativelv werless
Latin America.
17/- 9 r
Namibia: Pretoria's Control to Be Tested
Recent developments in southern
Africa augur a hard testing of South
Africa's scheme for yielding formal con-
trol of Namibia (South-West Africa)
while preserving Pretoria's important
economic and strategic interests.
South Africa's military intervention in
the recent Angolan civil war-using
northern Namibia as a staging area-has
sharply intensified black African opposi-
tion to South African control of Nami-
bia, a one-time German colony man-
dated to Pretoria by the League of
Nations in 1920.
Troops Withdrawn
The specter of an early clash between
South Africa's armed forces and Cuban
troops supporting Agostinho Neto's
regime in Angola was dispelled last month
when the last South African troops were
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Pretoria remains concerned about
Neto's declared backing for the Namibian
insurgents who are trying to extend their
guerrilla forays from southern Angola.
Last week a band of terrorists ambushed a
small South African force on patrol in
northern Namibia near the Angolan
border.
Actual support for cross-border
operations, however, will probably be
tempered by the Angolans' economic
needs as well as their fear of reprisal from
the South African forces poised along the
Namibian side of the border.
Pan-African and communist support
for Namibian insurgency is likely to build,
however, as the South Africans try to
maintain their present advantages in the
territory.
The UN Position
Namibia has long been an object of
sterile contention between South Africa
and the United Nations, which from its
earliest days has differed with Pretoria
over South Africa's obligations regarding
the territory.
In 1966, the UN General Assembly
voted to terminate the South African
mandate and to assume direct respon-
sibility for the territory. Subsequently, the
General Assembly renamed the territory
Namibia (after the Namib Desert), es-
tablished a UN Council for Namibia to
prepare the inhabitants for independence,
and repeatedly demanded that Pretoria
relinquish control to the council.
Pretoria, for its part, has acknowledged
the special international status of the
territory but rebuffed all UN assertions of
control. In practice, the South Africans
have administered the territory virtually
as a province.
South Africans regard Namibia as a
substantial economic asset as well as a
buffer shielding South Africa from poten-
tial enemies to the north. By 1966, when
Pretoria ceased publishing separate trade
statistics for Namibia, South Africa was
deriving some $250 million in foreign ex-
change earnings from the territory's
mineral, fish, and agricultural exports.
South African private investment in the
territory amounts to at least $550 million,
and South Africans own some 70 percent
of the important mining industry.
Although diamonds are the principal
product, the territory also exports signifi-
cant quantities of uranium, copper, lead,
zinc, and tin. Its uranium resources, still
being explored, are extensive.
Separate Development in Namibia
The population of Namibia-roughly
900,000-contains white and mulatto
settler groups and nine indigenous tribes
that vary widely in numbers, cultural
characteristics, and capabilities for
autonomous existence.
Since the mid-1960s, Pretoria has
systematically extended to Namibia the
policy of ethnic "separate development"
that the ruling National Party previously
adopted in South Africa proper. The
demarcation of separate geographic sec-
tors for most of the ethnic groups, as well
as the fostering of more or less
autonomous governmental units for each
group, has tended to maintain not only
the traditional cultural divisions but also
the extreme disparities in economic con-
ditions.
Although the whites make up only
about 12 percent of the population, the
area of Namibia that is reserved for them
includes much of the better grazing land
as well as most of the known mineral
deposits. On the other hand, Ovam-
boland, the area along the Angola border
allotted to the Ovambo tribe, which in-
cludes almost half of the territory's pop-
ulation, is more fertile than most of the
tribal homelands, but is inadequate for
the expanding Ovambo population.
Some of the smaller nomadic tribes
have been restricted to "homelands" that
are virtually barren. Consequently, the in-
digenous tribesmen have tended to work
in the mines, where the contract labor
system keeps them in the lowest paid jobs.
The Insurgents
Among Namibians, the most articulate
opposition to separate development has
come from the South-West African
People's Organization. This predominant-
ly Ovambo group wants Namibian in-
dependence under a unified, popularly
elected government. South African ad-
ministrators have countered SWAPO's
activities with suppressive tactics short of
outright banning, and the group's most
prominent leaders have been in exile for
years.
Largely as a result of its persistent in-
ternational lobbying, SWAPO is the only
Nambian nationalist group recognized by
the UN or the Organization of African
Unity. In 1973, its youth wing organized a
highly effective boycott of the election for
the Ovamboland Legislative Council-the
first popular election held in Namibia. To
offset the fiasco, South African ad-
ministrators held a new election in Ovam-
boland in January 1975 in which they
achieved a 55-percent turnout of eligible
voters.
The exiled SWAPO leaders have ad-
vocated violent revolt against the South
African administration and maintained a
small guerrilla force in Zambia. SWAPO
has apparently never had more than a few
hundred active guerrillas or carried out
more than small-scale raids inside
Namibia. Nor does it seem likely that the
surge of SWAPO influence in Ovam-
boland during 1973 is attributable to the
exiled leaders; their ties with the leaders of
the youth wing appear tenuous.
Little Foreign Help
Foreign backing for SWAPO, aside
from rhetoric, has been limited
Since the overthrow of the conservative
regime in Portugal in 1974, South African
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Grazing land
Base metal mining
Cu Copper
Pb Lead
Zn Zinc
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officials have been worried that the new
situation in Angola might lead to a sharp
increase in SWAPO insurgent
capabilities. Several recent developments
suggest that SWAPO insurgency is indeed
assuming new importance.
Since mid-1974, when Portuguese
border patrols ceased apprehending
refugees from Namibia, at least 3,000
Ovambos have fled through southern
Angola to Zambia, where they now live in
refugee camps. There is no indication that
significant numbers of the refugees have
joined the SWAPO guerrillas, but a large
portion are youths who would be likely
recruits in the event that foreign backing
for a SWAPO buildup materialized.
At least some of the SWAPO guerrillas
who were based in Zambia are now in
southern Angola. South African
authorities have blamed SWAPO in-
truders for a series of small-scale terrorist
attacks in northern Namibia since last
September, including the killings of an
Ovambo chief and several whites. Most of
the attacks clearly were carried out by
well-trained guerrillas who managed to
get through the newly reinforced border
defense.
Constitutional Conference
By mid-1974, the South African
government had apparently reached a
decision to revise its strategy for
Namibia. In September of that year,
leaders of the white settlers in Namibia, at
Prime Minister Vorster's behest, called
for multiracial talks on the future of the
territory and urged each of the non-white
ethnic groups to choose truly represen-
tative spokesmen for the talks.
In May 1975, the South African foreign
minister informed the UN secretary
general that the delegates would be free to
choose any form of government for
Namibia-including independence for the
whole territory as a unified state.
The delegates were ultimately chosen
indirectly by the existing legislative or ad-
visory bodies of each ethnic group, and a
large portion are old-line tribal leaders
who usually have gone along with South
African tutelage.
a body will endorse Pretoria's apparent
goal of a loose federal system that would
maintain white control of the territory's
principal resources. Until recently most
spokesmen for the smaller tribes have ex-
pressed fears that a unified, popularly
elected government would be dominated
by the Ovambos.
Three-Year Target
When the conference convened last
September, it adopted a declaration of in-
tent that set a three-year target for devis-
ing a constitution that is to guarantee
every ethnic group considerable say in its
own affairs.
The non-white delegates have shown
more solidarity than the South Africans
anticipated-possibly as a result of work-
ing together in inter-ethnic committees
that were set up in November to consider
various social and economic measures.
Last month a brief plenary session
adopted resolutions calling for equal
educational opportunities for all ethnic
groups and equal pay for equal work.
The session also set up a drafting com-
mittee whose members appear to be a
fairly even mix of delegates who want a
loose federal system and those favoring a
unitary state.
The trend of sentiment toward a uni-
tary state may be attributable to a caucus
of delegates from the smaller indigenous
tribes and the mulatto groups. These
delegates are considering constitutional
devices that they believe would offset the
numerical superiority of the Ovambos by
fostering solidarity among, the smaller
non-white groups.
The caucus is also advocating that
various non-white political par-
ties-including SWAPO-be represented
in future sessions of the conference. Such
proposals may be pushed to a vote at the
next plenary session in June. Vorster may
then have to decide whether to accept
revisions of his scenario that would be un-
palatable to the white settlers-mostly
South African citizens-or to forfeit what
may be a last opportunity to gain non-
white support for a peaceable phasing out
of the South African administration.
SWAPO President Sam Nujoma Vorster seems to be gambling that such
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The informal alliance of Arabs and black Africans was
highlighted last week with the conference of more than 50 Arab
and African foreign ministers. Both sides see advantages in the
relationship, but there are some strains, and the Arabs cannot
count on automatic African support for their initiatives.
-Y&
African-Arab Cooperation
The conference of Arab and African
foreign ministers in Dakar, Senegal, last
week brought together for the first time
the overlapping memberships of the Arab
League and the Organization of African
Unity. The meeting was an outgrowth of
the new cooperative relationship between
black Africa and the Arab world that
crystallized during and after the Middle
East war in 1973.
Israel's diplomatic presence south of
the Sahara was all but erased at that time
as black African states severed ties with
Tel Aviv in a display of solidarity with the
Arabs.
The Afro-Arab relationship rests on a
trade-off of support on Middle East and
southern African issues at the UN and
other international gatherings and on a
common interest in restructuring the
world economic order for the benefit of
the developing countries. Cooperation
gives both groups a stronger hand in
third-world politics and gives the Third
World greater cohesion and hence greater
strength in international forums.
The relationship shows some signs of
fraying. The Africans feel they have not
received adequate economic compensa-
tion for the support they have given the
Arab cause since 1973. This sense of being
let down, coupled with often heavy-hand-
ed Arab efforts further to expand their in-
fluence on the continent, has stirred grow-
ing resentment and complaints, especially
among those African states that were the
most reluctant to sever ties with Israel.
Even in the best of circumstances, the
Afro-Arab relationship is complicated by
strong anti-Arab feeling in many parts of
black Africa. The feeling stems from
memories of Arab slave traders and the
only thinly veiled racism of many modern
Arabs.
Despite their frustration, many
Africans concede their long-term interest
lies in continued cooperation since only
the Arab oil producers can offer them the
hope of substantial aid for development
and relief from the oil price squeeze. So
far, Arab aid is estimated to have offset
less than one fourth of the increased cost
of oil imports to nonproducing OAU
members.
The foreign ministers' conference was
proposed some time ago by Arab leaders
in an effort to initiate a new dialogue with
the Africans aimed at bolstering coopera-
tion. A total of 57 foreign ministers
attended the conference. Only Guinea and
Angola were absent because of their
political differences with Senegal.
Few details of the four-day closed
meeting are yet available, but differences
apparently prevented publication of a
final communique. The conferees did
agree on a draft charter outlining a
program of action for future Afro-Arab
cooperation.
The delegates failed to arrange the
Afro-Arab summit that will be required to
ratify the charter, leaving this matter to
be worked out by the secretariats of the
Arab League and the OAU. It appears
that a summit will not convene before ear-
ly next year.
The compromise
version is said to parallel closely one
originally offered by the OAU. It calls for
mutual respect for sovereignty, for in-
stitutional links between the OAU and
Arab League, and for expanded political,
cultural, and, particularly, economic
cooperation.
Africans have unrealistic hopes that the
charter will commit the Arab side to un-
dertake more generous aid and invest-
ment programs in black Africa in return
for stronger African support for the Arab
cause in the Middle East.
Arab Aid Institutions
Apparently the Arabs made no new
financial commitments at the Dakar
meeting nor was there formal discussion
of the three aid institutions established
under Arab League auspices after the Oc-
tober 1973 war:
? A $200-million revolving fund
that provides long-term, easy credit
loans to help African countries pay
their increased oil import bills.
? A Khartoum-based bank for
African development that makes non-
concessional loans; it is capitalized at
less than half its projected level of $500
million.
25X1
25X1
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serving OAU members.
The meeting apparently avoided formal
discussion of current Middle East and
southern African political issues. The
Arab conferees did make a token response
to a request from Mozambique for special
assistance to help compensate the Machel
government for its application of
economic sanctions against Rhodesia.
Mozambique was provided a $6-million,
low-interest loan from the Arabs' revolv-
ing oil-loan fund.
Cracks in Afro-Arab solidarity have
put the Arabs on notice not to expect
automatic African support for their in-
itiatives, particularly for those involving
Israel. Arab militants did not try this time
to drum up support for excluding Israel
from the UN.
A-,
voted against or abstained last year on the
resolution that equated Zionism with
racism.
The draft charter on Afro-Arab
cooperation does contain a routine con-
demnation of Zionism along with
apartheid, imperialism, colonialism, and
"all other forms of racial and religious
discrimination."
Last
year
th
Israel i Prospects in A
i
general
,
e Arabs failed to gain
African
d
r
ce
Although the Israelis esca
ed f
proposal
en
orsement for this
either at th
p
ormal
condemnation at the Dakar confere
summit
e Kampala OAU
or the Li
nce, it
is clear that South African P
i
ference
ma nonaligned con-
Sevente
r
me
Minister Vorster's visit to Isra
l
d
.
en African countries
e
an
the
suspicions it has aroused in black Africa
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? A $25-million technical assistance
fund that still is not operational.
The Africans have been trying for two
years to gain a voice in the administration
of these institutions and a far larger finan-
cial commitment for them. The Arabs
have liberalized their terms for oil loans
and increased the capitalization of the
other two institutions to present levels.
They are unlikely to accept African
suggestions that a large part of Arab mul-
tilateral aid be administered by the
African Development Bank in Abidjan, a
predominantly black African institution
Delegates arrive for the opening of the Dakar conference
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have had a negative impact on some of
Tel Aviv's former friends there.)
over the past two years have expressed
Although several African governments
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25X1
25X1
varying degrees of interest in renewing
diplomatic relations with Israel, few have
pursued the idea seriously, and none has
been willing to take the lead. Tel Aviv
now has diplomatic relations with only
four black African states-Lesotho,
Swaziland, Malawi, and Mauritius. Israel
has diplomatic interest sections in third
county embassies in several others
The next phase in the dialogue between the developing and
the industrial states opens on May 5 in Nairobi. The at-
mosphere generated there will have an effect on other
North-South economic discussions, including the Conference
on International Economic Cooperation in Paris.
g-5 - k ef
UNCTAD: Fourth Session to Convene
The atmosphere generated at the 4th
UN Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment in Nairobi from May 5 to 28 will be
more important than any specific
decisions the conference may reach.
Many of the developing states have ex-
plicitly linked the acceptance of their
demands to the future of negotiations in
other forums. Despite this linkage, the
developing states are not likely to break
off the talks at the Paris Conference on
International Economic Cooperation un-
der any but the most negative cir-
cumstances. The developing countries'
spirit of accommodation at Paris, in the
UN, and at the GATT multilateral trade
negotiations will be affected, however, by
the outcome of the Nairobi conference.
Some observ r
that Nairobi will degenerate into a
propaganda attack against the in-
dustrialized states. On balance, however,
the session will probably maintain the
generally conciliatory tone set at last fall's
UN special session. Their limited
bargaining strength, and the concern of
many developing states that an un-
successful conference could threaten their
future unity, will probably lead the
developing states grudgingly to accept
even limited progress at UNCTAD.
Unresolved issues would then be taken up
in other, more limited forums, even
though the developing states prefer the
North-South dialogue in UN bodies where
they have the advantage of numbers.
Preparations by Developing States
For most developing countries,
UNCTAD represents the near-term
culmination of their efforts to achieve
economic independence that began
with decolonization and were in-
stitutionalized in the first UNCTAD con-
ference in 1964. Most of these states
believe the industrialized countries began
to take their demands seriously only after
effects of the OPEC oil embargo were felt
in 1974.
The developing countries are divided by
regional, political, economic, and racial
factors, but all of them largely share a
conviction that low levels of development
are due to past exploitation and can be
overcome only by persistent opposition to
efforts of the industrialized states to
perpetuate discriminatory trade and
financial structures. This view, codified in
a series of demands for a "new inter-
national economic order," found expres-
sion most recently in the documents of the
Group of 77 ministerial meeting in
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Manila last January. The Group of 77 is
composed of the 110 developing states
that are members of the UN.
Most developing states recognize that
their unity in economic negotiations
remains their major bargaining strength;
they will go to considerable lengths to
maintain that unity. Weaknesses in the
facade, however, are evident in private
caucuses such as the Manila meeting.
The most contentious issue for the
developing countries in Manila was about
commodities-specifically over the
proposal to create an "integrated
program." This program, developed by
the UNCTAD secretariat, remains the
cornerstone of developing country policy
for the Nairobi meetings and will be the
main bone of contention with the in-
dustrialized states.
The program addresses the assertion
that developing states cannot plan their
development because revenues from their
exports of raw materials are uncertain.
The integrated program calls for a $3-
billion common fund-primarily to come
from industrialized states-to help sup-
port prices for 18 different raw materials
through the use of buffer stocks. The
program also calls for an expansion of ex-
isting mechanisms that provide compen-
sation to developing states whose earnings
from exports of raw materials decline.
The splits at Manila were largely along
regional lines-primarily between
Africans and Latin Americans. Argument
focused on differences over which
products should be covered by the in-
tegrated program and over the preferred
access some developing states now enjoy
in developed country markets. The Latin
Americans believed the list of com-
modities covered items only of interest to
African states; they also opposed a
proposal to cancel existing commodity
agreements because this would call into
question a separate commodity pact for
coffee. .
African states opposed a call for univer-
sal nondiscrimination in trade because
they do not want to give up the preferen-
tial treatment granted them by the Euro-
pean Community under the Lome agree-
ment. The Latin Americans argued with
some justification that such treatment
creates special-interest blocs among the
developing states.
Another point of contention among the
developing states will be important in the
discussions in Nairobi-the issue of debt
burdens. Some developing states, primari-
ly African and Asian, have been support-
ing a call for an international conference
to consider a debt moratorium or a broad
rescheduling of repayments. These states
are opposed by the Latin Americans who
fear their own relatively favorable credit
standing would be jeopardized in such a
move. The Group of 77 did agree to call
for special measures to aid the poorest
developing states, which face especially
heavy debt burdens.
The developing states are likely at
Nairobi to press for restructuring
UNCTAD to increase its influence in the
UN system. The developing states would
like to see UNCTAD become the primary
forum for economic talks between in-
dustrialized and developing states. The
developing states recognize, however, that
trying to make UNCTAD a specialized
agency of the UN-rather than letting it
remain an organ of the General
Assembly-could diminish rather than in-
crease the conference's value to them.
Industrialized States
The industrialized states have, in large
part, been reacting to policies advocated
by the developing countries rather than
presenting their own program and have
had less success in forging even the
appearance of a common policy. Most of
these states recognize the need for some
compromise in order to maintain the
dialogue but are unwilling to agree to
potentially expensive, open-ended
agreements.
Japan, as well as the members of the
EC, who have yet to agree on a common
policy among themselves, have been look-
ing for US initiatives at Nairobi. At the
same time, they are concerned that the
US may again appear to be leading the in-
dustrialized countries, as it did during the
special session of the UN General
Assembly last September. At that session
both the Europeans and the Japanese
resented the appearance of being
followers rather than fully consulted
partners.
Most EC members might go along with
US proposals they believe the developing
states would consider favorably. The EC
Nine are anxious that the Community
itself earn credit among the developing
states, and the Nine might agree to some
concessions only to show that they too can
be "generous." The EC meets on May 3
and 4 to complete preparations for
UNCTAD. If no common policy is ar-
rived at, as seems likely, most EC mem-
bers will present their own views. This
would not ony undermine the EC's negoti-
ating position but also weaken the stand
of the industralized nations as a whole.
The Japanese are mainly concerned
that they not appear unsympathetic to the
demands of the developing states.
Conflicts within the government,
however, will make it impossible for
Tokyo to do anything but line up with the
more conservative developed countries.
Any Japanese concessions will be aimed
at improving Tokyo's relations with ma-
jor suppliers of raw materials, but will
avoid getting the Japanese involved in
broad commodity agreements.
Almost all of the industrialized coun-
tries-but not the Dutch and Scan-
dinavians-will resist the full range of
developing country demands at Nairobi.
On raw materials, most of the in-
dustrialized states may well agree to an
overall statement to permit a study of
buffer stocks for a number of com-
modities, but will not accept the proposed
common fund. The industrialized states
are united in opposition to a debt
moratorium, but most of them would sup-
port a conference on general debt
problems.
The industrialized states will also op-
pose a legally binding code for the
transfer of technology and a restructuring
of UNCTAD. They will reject the conten-
tions of the developing countries that in-
sufficient attention has been paid to their
problems in the GATT multilateral trade
negotiations.
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