WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011300160001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 16, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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State Dept. review completed
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Secret
Weekly Summary
DOS review completed
Secret
Cl WS 76-016
No. 0016/76
April 16, 1976
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CONTENTS
1 Middle East - Africa
Lebanon; Angola; Israel
3 Europe
USSR-US; Italy; Cyprus;
Spain; West Germany; CIEC
5 Western Hemisphere
Argentina; Cuba
6 East Asia Pacific
China; Thailand
7 Syria: Asud's Domestic Position
9 Thailand: New Foreign Policy Direction
1 1 USSR-Somalia - Ethiopia: iF'TAI Policy
12 Nigeria: Renewed Ethnic Tension
14 Portugal: More Modern Armed Forces
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
Summary,
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1-2J' o
LEBANON
Syria intervened: openly in the Lebanese
crisis last weekend by sending Syrian
regular forces across the border into
Lebanon. Since April 9, approximately
4,000 to 6,000 Syrian army troops have
been moved into eastern Lebanon and an
tUNDOF
t - ZONE
aotg?Ii
area in Syria adjacent to the border along
the Damascus-Beirut road.
This. force consists of major elements, of
three armored and, infantry, brigades?
most of them apparently from the 3rd Ar-
mored, Division. One of Syria's four SA.-6
antiaircraft missile brigades, with about
500 men, also has been. sent to the border
area. The Syrian. forces inside Lebanon
are positioned primarily in the Al-Masna
area along the road to Beirut;: some have
moved as far west as the Baylor, Pass, ap-
proximately 15 miles from the capital.
Israeli public reaction to: the Syrian
troop movements has been. low-keyed.
The government-controlled press has
noted the entry of large numbers of
regular Syrian forces. into, Lebanon, but
has suggested that Israeli: forces will' take
action, only if Syrian troops are sent. into
the area south of the Litani: River on a
scale that would alter the security situa-
tion along Israel's northern border.
Syria's move into Lebanon was intend-
ed initially to force parliament to follow
through with its plans to amend the con-
stitution to permit the early replacement
of President Franjiyah. In addition, it was.
designed to force the leftists. to. extend: the
truce, and to prevent any attempt by the
leftist, Muslim, or Palestinian militias. to
launch a new round of heavy fighting.
Parliament on April 10 did approve the
constitutional amendment, leading
Lebanese leftist leader KamalJ-umblatt to.
announce on April I I that the left had
agreed to extend the truce until April 30
Jumblatt, however, added to his con-
ciliatory statement demands that Syrian
forces withdraw from Lebanon and that a
new president be elected within 10 days.
Jumblatt and his major Palestinian
backers appear for the moment to have
been intimidated by the Syrian show of
Page 1
force. They will. work at least indirectly,
however, to increase military pressure on
the Christians if the current round of
political negotiations stalls. (An. analysis 25X1
of thepotential domestic fal'l'out for Presi- 25X1
dent Asad from his Lebanese venture
The expected resumption of oil produc-
tion in Cabinda soon will. give a shot in the
arm to Angola's war-torn economy.
Cabindan wells accounted for half of total
exports and. government revenues before
they were shut. down in: December 1975.
Gulf Oil Company will probably initial-
ly only produce 30,000? to. 40,000 barrels
per day. Full production of 140,000 to
150,000 barrels per day will not be
reached: until at least. midyear.
Luanda has promised to. honor the con-
tract Gulf had with the Portuguese for the
first six months but will almost certainly
seek majority ownership of the Cabindan
fields soon after. Luanda may decide to 25X1
achieve this in stages, while maintaining
Gulf's role in production and sales.
ISRAEL
Palestinian nationalist candidates
scored impressively in the municipal
council elections held on April 12 in the
Israeli-occupied West Bank. Conser-
vatives were also elected to many coun-
cils, however, and they will act as a
restraining influence on supporters of the
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A'P
Residents of Bethlehem prepare to put up a banner for municipal elections in the West Bank
Palestine Liberation Organization.
Many of the victorious "nationalist"
slates appear to be made up of politically
diverse individuals ranging from members
of traditionally conservative clan factions
to radicals sympathetic to the PLO. These
men appear to have little more in com-
mon than their recent agreement to run
together and to try to attract the widest
possible spectrum of votes.
Leftist-oriented slates won majorities
on the councils of two of the West Bank's
three most populous towns-Nabulus and
Ram Allah-and in a number of smaller
towns. In Hebron a mixed group of leftist
sympathizers and conservatives gained
control. Conservatives won in one major
town-Bethlehem-and appear to have
gained majorities in several smaller com-
munities.
The strong showing by candidates sym-
pathetic to the PLO represents a protest
against the continuing Israeli occupation
and is a setback for Tel Aviv's policy of
supporting traditionalist, pro-Jordanian
council candidates.
The election results also represent a
defeat for Jordan's King Husayn, who
had privately backed pro-Hashemite can-
didates. The new nationalist councilors
will be more inclined to look to the PLO
and its allies rather than Husayn for sup-
port against the Israelis.
During the next two weeks, the new
SECRET
councils will each convene to name one of
their members, usually the highest
vote-getter, as mayor. A large number of
nationalists will probably be chosen.
Israeli occupation officials can veto these
selections and appoint mayors more to
their liking, but Defense Minister Peres,
responsible for administering the West
Bank, has said that the decisions of the
councils would be accepted unless there
was a "legal reason" for doing otherwise.
Israeli intervention in the mayoral elec-
tions could ignite a new round of an-
ti-Israeli demonstrations in the West
Bank similar to those that occurred in
February and March
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25X1
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USSR-US 21 3
Moscow is clearly concerned about the
heated debate in the US over "detente,"
despite repeated professions of confidence
in Soviet media that the US public
overwhelmingly favors improved relations
with the USSR. The Soviets are likely to
show increasing caution on important
bilateral issues until after the US election
campaign is over and the direction of US
policy is assessed.
Although the Soviets continue to
profess optimism that bilateral relations
will improve after the US elections, a note
of caution was sounded early this month
by Georgy Arbatov, Moscow's most in-
fluential academic expert on the US.
Writing in Pravda, Arbatov warned that
policy compromises made during the heat
of a political campaign may persist
beyond the elections and could "create
serious difficulties." He joined other com-
mentators in explicit criticism of Presi-
dent Ford and his administration.
The current campaign of harassment
against Soviet citizens and installations in
the US is one vexing irritant that has
produced concern at top levels in
Moscow. Soviet leaders have been
somewhat mollified by vigorous official
condemnations of anti-Soviet violence,
but they remain unconvinced that
Washington is sufficiently serious about
punishing culprits who "make no secret of
their involvement."
The Soviets decided to retaliate against
US officials in Moscow despite the
possibility that this might further damage
"detente." In the last few days Moscow
has reduced the level of harassment, but
Soviet officials have indicated the practice
will continue as long as the situation in the
US remains unresolved.
The generally gloomy cast of US-
Page
Soviet relations was somewhat relieved
last week with completion of a joint
draft text governing the detonation of
peaceful nuclear explosions under the
previously negotiated threshold test ban
treaty. Conclusion of these lengthy
negotiations indicates Moscow remains
committed, despite current difficulties, to
stabilizing its relations with the US, es-
pecially on matters relating to the
strategic balance.
On the other hand, the Soviets now
appear to have less hope of early agree-
ment on a new strategic arms limitations
agreement or on other key issues such as
the trade/emigration impasse. The latter
is only infrequently mentioned in the
Soviet media, while recent Soviet
statements on SALT have avoided men-
tion of a time frame or a possible summit.
21-2
Political maneuvering continues to
point to an early parliamentary election,
although all party leaders are trying to
avoid responsibility for precipitating the
contest.
The Socialists, whose abstention in
parliamentary votes permits the Moro
government to survive, reaffirmed this
week their demand for either an election
or the replacement of Moro by an
emergency government with an economic
program that would be negotiated with
the Communists. Socialist leader De
Martino has failed, however, to muster
broad support for his proposals, and the
Socialists are hesitating to topple Moro
on their own.
The Communists, who have consistent-
ly opposed an early election, are propos-
ing an emergency program that would be
supported by all the parties except the
neo-fascists. They claim this approach
would permit the present parliament to
remain in office until May 1977, when
elections would normally be held. If the
contest takes place ahead of schedule,
Communist chief Berlinguer will blame
the Christian Democrats for failing to
accept his offer to help solve the country's
problems.
At this point, the decision rests with the
Christian Democrats, who, as usual, are
divided over what to do. Party conser-
vatives, who appear to favor an election,
want Moro to pave the way by resigning
immediately. The Christian Democratic
left, led by Moro and party chief Zac-
cagnini, prefers a parliamentary debate
leading to a confidence vote on the
government's economic program. This
would force the Socialists either to aban-
don their threat or to accept responsibility
for the government's fall.
The economy, meanwhile, continues to
reflect the deteriorating political situa-
tion, with the lira plunging to record lows
this week. It has since rebounded slightly,
but the currency will remain weak as long
as political uncertainty persists. Inflation
is running at an annual rate of 30 percent,
and additional price hikes can be expected
as the costs of imports rise.
The austerity program that Moro
proposed to deal with these problems has
soured the government's relations with
Italy's powerful labor unions. In an
emergency meeting last week, the govern-
ment was unable to persuade labor to ex-
ercise restraint in the current wage talks.
CYPRUS - C , - 2 7
The search for a Cyprus settlement suf-
fered a major setback last week with the
resignation of Greek Cypriot negotiator
Clerides. This in turn precipitated Turkish
Cypriot negotiator Denktash's announce-
ment that he would no longer participate
in the talks.
The immediate cause of Clerides'
resignation was his admission that he had
secretly agreed to give Denktash advance
notice of Greek Cypriot proposals for a
settlement. A more fundamental reason
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for his forced departure was the growing
dissatisfaction of more intransigent Greek
Cypriot leaders with what they considered
to be Clerides' willingness to make con-
cessions without reciprocal gestures from
the Turkish Cypriots. Clerides' successor
will be Tassos Papadopoulos, who is ex-
derides OC_T
pected to be more responsive to the hard
liners.
Denktash contributed to Clerides'
downfall by revealing the secret agree-
ment and leaking the fact that Clerides
hadgiven him a preliminary version of the
Greek Cypriot proposals. The Turks may
have concluded that if the seemingly con-
ciliatory Clerides could be disposed of,
their own basic intransigence would not
stand out so starkly. Furthermore, any
successor to Clerides would probably, in
their view, more accurately reflect
President Makarios' basic lack of give
on the issues, thus justifying a slower
pace in the negotiations.
Following Clerides' resignation,
Denktash rejected Greek Cypriot
proposals dealing with the territorial
question and said he would appoint a
subordinate to represent Turkish Cypriots
in future negotiations.
Clerides may yet retain his position as
president of the Cypriot House of
Representatives, but his public disgrace
has made it easier for extremist leaders to
reassert themselves. The latter lost little
time sponsoring a series of anti-American
demonstrations to protest the new US
military assistance agreement with
Turkey. A large and potentially
dangerous demonstration on April 12 was
brought under control only by vigorous
police action and after both Washington
and Athens had warned the Makarios
government of its responsibility for main-
taining order.
SPAIN 2 --- 3 )
Efforts by Basque terrorists to bring
pressure on the government by inten-
sifying their campaign of violence appear
to have backfired.
The murder last week of a kidnaped in-
dustrialist by Basque Fatherland and
Liberty terrorists provoked a general out-
cry, particularly in the Basque country,
where some 15,000 turned out for the
funeral service. There are, in fact, in-
dications that the terrorists have damaged
the Robin Hood image that had won for
them at least the passive support of a
large number of Basques.
The Christian Democratic - oriented
Basque Nationalist Party, which probably
represents the majority of Basques, spoke
out for the first time against the terrorists.
The self-proclaimed Basque "government
in exile"-composed of the Basque
Nationalist Party and other regional
groups-also condemned the murder and
called off anti-government protest
demonstrations scheduled for Easter Sun-
day.
The government, meanwhile, struck
hard at the terrorists. In a week of intense
police activity, nearly 100 suspected
members and collaborators of the
terrorist group have been arrested, in-
cluding several who have been charged
with the murder of the kidnaped in-
dustrialist. A dozen terrorist hideouts and
large quantities of ammunition and
propaganda have also been uncovered.
The government may have further un-
dermined popular support for the
Page 4
terrorists by exercising restraint in con-
ducting its anti-terrorist campaign and
avoiding the harsh repressive methods and
arbitrary mass arrests of the Franco era.
The presence in considerable strength of
the national civil guard, however, is
resented by the Basques, who regard it as
a virtual "foreign army of occupation."
Two apparently innocent persons have
already been killed by nervous civil
guards, and more deaths could easily wipe 25X1
tage.l
25X1
WEST GERMANY
The West German cabineftas decided
to go ahead with production of the mul-
tirole combat aircraft, now clubbed the
Tornado. The cabinet's decision must be
approved by the Bundestag, but passage is
expected.
Of the two other participating coun-
tries, the UK announced its decision to
produce the aircraft in late March, but
there has been no formal announcement
from Italy. The West German decision
may speak for the Italians, however, since
Bonn is already paying the relatively
small Italian share of MRCA develop-
ment costs.
Rising costs and engine problems over
the last few years raised doubts that the
MRCA would ever reach series produc-
tion. The huge investment already made,
however, weighed heavily in the final deci-
sion to produce.
Bonn's share of the MRCA program is
$6.2 billion out of a total cost of over $13
billion. The unit cost of MRCA now is
projected by the West Germans at $10.6
million-more than double the original
estimate in 1970 of $4.6 million-but even
the new price is probably understated. We
believe it does not include spare parts,
ground support equipment, and research
and development costs; these would bring
the cost to over $19 million per airplane.
The cost of the closest comparable US
fighter, the F-I11, is about $15.6 million.
The MRCA program is about four
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years behind schedule. Although Bonn
reportedly will begin preparations for
series production in July, the air force and
navy will not receive their first fighter-
bombers until 1979.
Despite the uncertainty plaguing the
project from its beginning, a successful
debut by the MRCA could stirpulate the
growth of collaborative weapons projects
and strengthen the principle of common
procurement and standardization in
Western Europe. Co-production is viewed
as the only way for West European com-
panies to remain competitive with the US
in advanced weapons development and
sales in the 1980s.
ARGENTINA
Mounting political violence has emerg-
ed as a major headache for President
Videla's government.
Dozens of people have died in clashes
between forces of the left and the right
since the military take-over on March 24.
Urban guerrillas are attacking police and
security officials, while rightists are begin-
ning a campaign of reprisals that so far
CIEC: THIRD ROUND PREVIEW
The third round of the Conference on
International Economic Cooperation that
begins in Paris on April 21 will be the
most difficult yet.
The February and March sessions of
the four working commissions, par-
ticipated in by 19 developing and 8 in-
dustrialized states, were largely
procedural. Contentious issues were
avoided. The Energy Commission will
now examine the world-wide impact of oil
prices, something OPEC states have
resisted, while the Development Commis-
sion tackles the question of the debt
burden of developing states.
The Raw Materials Commission will
discuss a series of papers drafted by the
developing countries that reiterate the de-
mand for an integrated commodity
program, involving a common fund to
support markets for various products.
The Finance Commission will continue its
examination of investment by OPEC
states.
The approach of the UN Conference on
Trade and Development, which opens
May 5 in Nairobi, will be in the back of
everyone's mind. Both the industrialized
and developing countries want to make at
least a show of progress in Paris, before
UNCTAD.
Most EC members and Japan believe
that a modicum of success in Paris would
decrease the chances of a row in Nairobi.
They fear a collapse of the Nairobi talks
for a number of reasons, most immediate-
ly because it might interrupt the talks
between oil producers and importers in
the Paris economic cooperation con-
ference. Political and economic con-
straints, however, will limit these in-
dustrialized states' ability to make
specific concessions.
Those among the 19 developing states
in Paris that still feel there is some hope of
eventually achieving developing country
goals in Paris will want to convince the
other developing states that the Paris
forum, as well as UNCTAD, can be rele-
vant to their interests.
Others believe there is little hope left
for progress in the Paris meetings and
want to increase the concentration on
UNCTAD. In any case, even those states
that favor the economic cooperation con-
ference will want to avoid giving the
appearance that the Paris sessions are
"settling" issues that will be covered by
has taken over 20 lives.
On April 13 and 14, terrorists set off a
number of powerful bombs near the
headquarters of the First Army Corps in
Buenos Aires, killed one Argentine ex-
ecutive of a US-based firm, and fired on
the home of another, killing his two
security guards. In dealing with the
renewed violence, the junta must walk a
fine line between seeking to carry out
Videla's pledge to keep the anti-terrorist
effort within legal bounds and doing what
is necessary to suppress the violence.
The activities of the right-wing vigilante
groups are particularly troublesome for
the junta. It was widely believed that such
actions were condoned, or perhaps even
inspired, by the Peron administration.
There is in fact no indication that the new
government condones the killings of lef-
? tists by off-duty police and security of-
ficials.
Even so, the exploits of vigilante groups
could quickly dissipate the relative good
will the public has shown the military
government. The junta needs all the sup-
port it can muster at home and abroad to
proceed successfully in critical areas like
the economy.
Military advocates of harsh repression
view the continuation of left-wing violence
b
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as an argument in favor of the tough
measures they have proposed all along.
The left hopes to provoke precisely such
repression, in the belief that the eventual
result would be popular repudiation of the
CUBA 4d -4
An attack by Cuban exiles on two
Cuban fishing boats last week has evoked
a strong note of protest from Havana. It
is likely to be the major theme of Cuban
ceremonies on April 19, marking the an-
niversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion in
1961.
The incident, in which one fisherman
was killed and several reportedly were
wounded, gives the Castro regime a
nationalistic issue to exploit at a time
when much of the population remains un-
settled about the costs of the Cuban in-
tervention in Angola.
Castro, who has frequently taken ad-
vantage of the Bay of Pigs anniversary to
launch verbal attacks on the US, is not
likely to pass up this opportunity to justify
Cuban support for "anti-imperialist" ac-
tivities anywhere in the world.
He used a similar incident in May 1970
to belabor the US and divert public atten-
tion from his government's failure to meet
an important economic goal.
Much of what is said by Castro or other
speakers on April 19 will probably be in-
tended primarily for the Cuban people.
Havana's domestic radio broadcasts, for
example, have charged the US with "evi-
dent complicity" in the exile raid, but the
protest note to the US stopped well short
of such an accusation.
Its language, instead, suggests that
while Cuban officials at the policy level
may have dismissed US threats as mere
saber-rattling, they are concerned that the
threats might be interpreted by exiles as a
license to carry out paramilitary activities
against Cuba unham red b US law en-
forcement agencies.
4)-4
Rallies marking the dismissal of Teng
Hsiao-ping and the appointment of Hua
Kuo-feng as premier and first vice chair-
man of the party over the past week
seemed designed to convey an image of
popular support for the change in leader-
ship. The Chinese people have not reacted
enthusiastically to the changes, however,
and some Chinese diplomats have ex-
pressed uncertainty and concern.
Many provincial officials who had not
previously lent their public support to the
anti-Teng campaign, including some who
themselves were under attack, took part
in the rallies. These officials doubtless are
now anxious to disassociate themselves
from Teng, but their prominent role
suggests that they are not currently under
serious political pressure and that the
campaign will not spread to other political
moderates.
The military, which had earlier seemed
to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, held its
own rallies for the first time since 1971.
The sudden emergence of the military in a
political connection suggests that leading
military figures may have played an im-
portant role in piecing together the ap-
parent compromise decisions. It is likely
that political pressure against the
military, a prominent feature of Chinese
politics in recent years, will now case.
The failure, on the other hand, of
China's leading leftists to appear publicly
since the announcements suggests they are
not entirely satisfied with the outcome of
the anti-Teng campaign and points to
continued disunity in the upper echelons
of the party.
Hua Kuo-feng's ability to bring the
divided leadership together and to head a
coalition government effectively remains
a question. He does not appear to have a
power base of his own and lacks the ex-
perience and long-standing ties
throughout the hierarchy that Chou
hn-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping had.
Although Hua's political roots are in
Hunan, Mao's home province, he does
not seem to be personally close to the
Chairman. Leading leftists, who may
have hoped to win one or the other of
Hua's new jobs, may now harbor some
resentment toward him.
Hua will have to strike a balance
between pursuing relatively moderate
policies and giving sufficient weight to the
left's interests, a delicate task for which
Hua is as yet untried.
THAILAND l7
Intensive negotiations for a new
parliamentary coalition government have
dominated the Bangkok political scene
this week. According to Democrat Party
leader Seni Pramot, who is expected to
head the new government, a tentative
agreement has been reached between his
center-based party and the rightist Thai
Nation, Social Justice, and Social
Nationalist parties. It is a coalition that
would command a comfortable 74 percent
of the seats in the lower house of the
National Assembly.
The announcement of a new govern-
ment could come as early as April 16,
when the newly elected National
Assembly meets, but a number of hurdles
remained to be overcome at midweek.
There are indications, for example, that
younger members of the Democrat Party
oppose including the Thai Nation Party in
the coalition. If they, or rank-and-file
members of other parties, block formal
party ratification of the coalition, the
process of putting together a new govern-
ment could drag on for several more
weeks. (A projection of what diplomatic
course a new government might take is in-
cluded in a more general analysis of Thai
foreign policy which begins on Page 9).
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The stakes for Asad in his Lebanese venture are
high. Should he get even more bogged down in his
mediatory effort than he is now, his power position in
Syria itself could come under serious challenge.
Syrian President Asad's prestige
abroad and political strength at home
appeared two months ago to have reached
it new high as a result of his mediation in
Lebanon. Now, having used Syrian
regular forces to rein in Lebanese leftists,
Asad finds himself more vulnerable
domestically than perhaps at any time
since he came to power five and a half
years ago.
Ironically, Asad's Lebanese policy has
drawn fire from both conservative Sunni
Muslims and left-wing Baathists because
he has been forced by circumstances to
assume the role of protector of the
Lebanese Christians. More importantly,
his fairly evenhanded policy has en-
countered at least some resistance among
Syrian military officers, the mainstay of
his regime. Many of the officers strongly
sympathize with the Lebanese leftists and
also fear Israel's reaction to a larger-scale
Syrian intervention.
Should Asad succeed in getting Syrian
mediation back on track in Lebanon,
much of the present opposition to him
could quickly fade. By the same token,
should he become mired down even more,
his opposition would become correspon-
dingly greater.
The Opposition
As Syria's first non-Sunni Muslim
president, Asad has always had to con-
4 9 -SS
Syria: Asad's Domestic Position
tend with opposition from the country's Sunni commercial class, Asad has
predominantly Sunni population as well tempered some of his predecessor's doc-
as from disgruntled Baath Party trinaire economic policies and built a
ideologues and dissident members of his team of technicians and economic
own Alawite Muslim sect. To placate the planners drawn from the educated Sunni
President Asad MX
elite.
Many Sunnis also hold highly visible
and ostensibly important government
posts. Prime Minister Ayyubi, Foreign
Minister Khaddam, Minister of Defense
Talas, and armed forces chief of staff
Shihabi, for example, are all Sunnis.
In 'fact, however, the Sunnis remain
effectively cut off from real power and are
resentful of the domination of Asad's
small Alawite sect.
It is not surprising that there is concern
in the Asad government that the con-
fessional strife in Lebanon might spill
over into Syria.
Several weeks ago a regional security
chief, an Alawite with close ties to the
Asad family, was assassinated in Harrah,
apparently by members of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Since then, there have been
reports of other attacks on Alawites,
possibly also by the brotherhood. That
group serves as the cutting edge of conser-
vative Sunni opposition to the regime. We
do not know how many members the
Muslim Brotherhood has.
The government has moved quickly to
avert the kind of serious civil unrest the
brotherhood was able to touch off in
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0C',
Foreign Minister Khaddam
several Syrian cities a few years ago.
Several hundred people, including
members of locally prominent Sunni
families, have reportedly been detained
for interrogation. Sunni religious leaders
have been warned not to stir up trouble
with the Alawite community.
Asad's handling of the Lebanese
problem appears to have raised the hopes
of some of his staunchest opponents that
he will give them an opening they can ex-
ploit to bring him down. Doctrinaire
Baathists, both within the Syrian party
and in exile, for example, oppose Asad for
deviating from Baathist ideology and for
relegating the party to a secondary role in
policy making.
Asad also has enemies among the
Alawites, a result of his manipulating
rivalries among various Alawite factions
in the army and Baath party to take
power. He and his brother Rifaat are
widely believed responsible for the
assassination in 1972 of Muhammad
Umran, an influential leader of a rival
Alawite group.
External Subversion
Another potentially serious threat to
Asad conies from Iraq. The two rival
Baath regimes have long been at odds,
and the dispute between them has become
more open over the past year.
Some members of the Syrian Baath
party, and doubtless some military of-
ficers as well, would be willing to support
an Iraqi-sponsored coup attempt against
Asad. Syrian authorities reportedly
arrested several hundred pro-Iraqi
Baathists and some military officers a
year ago, allegedly for plotting against the
regime.
Baghdad also maintains ties with exiled
Syrian Baathists in Beirut, including
Salah Bitar, one of the founders of the
Baath party. The exiles in turn maintain
their own contacts inside Syria.
We know little about either the Iraqis'
or the Syrian exiles' activities inside
Syria, but we believe they could not
succeed in a coup against Asad without
the support of powerful elements of the
Syrian military.
Asad's Strength
Balanced against his opposition are the
still formidable forces Asad can count on
to protect his government. Foremost
among these are his brother Rifaat's
Defense Companies, with 20,000 men and
several hundred tanks. Asad's nephew
also commands a militia of about 10,000
men.
Asad is a skilled political operator who
would be difficult for even the most deter-
mined opponents to outmaneuver. By ob-
taining prior Baath party approval for last
week's Syrian statement on Lebanon,
Asad adeptly maneuvered the party into
publicly supporting his policies in
Lebanon and implicitly condemning the
Lebanese leftists for perpetuating the
fighting and undermining Syrian media-
tion efforts.
The continued incremental introduction
of Syrian regulars into Lebanon and the
recent Syrian naval blockade of Tripoli
also seem carefully calculated to tighten
Asad's grip on the leftists and Palestinians
in Lebanon without provoking the kind of
opposition from his senior military com-
manders that a much larger, open in-
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With communist regimes now established in the
three Indochina states, Thailand is slowly reverting to its
traditional policy of balance of power diplomacy.
Thailand: New Foreign Policy Directions
With t e with rawal of US forces from
Vietnam and the communist victories in
Indochina, the Thai have concluded that
the new power alignments emerging in
Southeast Asia make it imperative that
Thailand put its own foreign policy on a
new footing. For much of the last two
decades, Bangkok has relied almost ex-
clusively on its close relationship with the
US to protect its interests. Now, it is
returning by fits and starts to something
more like its traditionally neutral posture.
Not all members of the Thai political,
intellectual, and military elites are of like
mind on how to proceed. Many civilian
politicians, journalists, and intellectuals
believe that, given domestic opinion in the
US, Bangkok can no longer expect much
assistance from the US if Thai security is
seriously threatened. Relatively few
among the military, on the other hand,
seem to have seriously addressed the ques-
tion yet, and many seem to cling instinc-
tively to the hope that the US would come
to Thailand's aid should the need arise.
Different Perspectives
Thai Foreign Ministry officials and
military officers agree that Thai foreign
policy must be reshaped to deal with a
more powerful and assertive Vietnam.
Where they part company is over the
residual value of a continued military
relationship with the US and over the
speed with which Thailand should move
to a more evenly balanced and neutral
policy.
To the civilians who inherited political
power following the collapse of the
military regime in October 1973, the US
military presence not only served as a
symbol of a policy that had outlived its
usefulness, but also as an uncomfortable
reminder of the extremely close US work-
ing relationship with Thai military
regimes during the 1960s. It was a
relationship that effectively barred the
Foreign Ministry from all important
Thai-US security negotiations and in
general relegated it to a back seat role in
the foreign policy decision-making
process.
These bureaucratic jealousies apart, the
Foreign Ministry does appear genuinely
to believe that the continued presence of
US security installations in Thailand
severely undermines Thailand's ability to
come to terms with Laos, Cambodia, and
Vietnam. By asking all US military per-
sonnel to leave Thailand, the Khukrit
government was signaling Thailand's in-
tention to accommodate, rather than con-
front, the new communist regimes on its
borders. At the same time, the Foreign
Ministry-most notably Under Secretary
Anan Panyarachun, who until recently
was Thailand's ambassador to the
US-has been recommending that
Thailand begin hedging its bets by placing
greater emphasis on its relationship with
Peking.
Anan and others in the Foreign
Ministry argue that Peking is the only
major power in a position to limit North
Vietnam's influence and believe that
Thailand can effectively exploit the
animosity that has long characterized
Peking-Hanoi relations. Anan came away
from the talks in Peking last July con-
vinced that the Chinese are prepared to
try to limit Hanoi's influence in Southeast
Asia. Indeed, Bangkok's improved
relationship with Peking has already paid
a diplomatic dividend in the form of a
generally improved atmosphere between
Thailand and Cambodia, a development
in which the Chinese played an important
behind-the-scenes role.
Even though military and civilian of-
ficials share the belief that relations with
China ought to be improved, few, if any,
are willing to rely on China to protect
Thai security. The military agree on the
need to move Thai foreign policy away
from its close identification with the US,
but they balk over attempts to eradicate
the security relationship entirely. In fact,
the present US withdrawal has been a
wrenching experience for the Thai
military. Thailand will soon be without a
major US military presence for the first
time since 1961.
The Thai military is concerned that
with American troops gone, US interest
in Thai security will fade, along with the
US military assistance program. The
military does not believe that China or
any other major power is a practical al-
ternative source of arms supply. Aside
from this primary consideration, senior
military leaders also maintain that a
military relationship with the US, even if
the US has ruled out further direct
military involvement in Southeast Asia,
gives Thailand important diplomatic
leverage in dealing with essentially hostile
Indochinese regimes.
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Implications of the Election
The results of the national elections on
April 4 suggest that the Khukrit
government's policy of pushing for the
withdrawal of all US military forces and
installations will, at a minimum, be re-ex-
amined. The political climate in Thailand
would probably not allow any govern-
ment, civilian or military, to seek a return
to the days of a large US military
presence, but there does seem to be grow-
ing support for preserving at least vestiges
of the US-Thai security relationship.
A Seni Pramot - led coalition govern-
ment would probably not turn Thai policy
on a US military presence completely
around-it was Seni who first called for
their removal over a year ago. He has,
however, indicated a willingness to recon-
sider the military's position before
reaching any conclusions. Mindful that
the military's estrangement from Khukrit
over the US military presence issue cost
Khukrit his seat in the parliament, Seni
may at least keep the door open for a
small US
presence if it
in Thailand's nationalistic political cli-
mate.
Such a policy would not rule out con-
tinued efforts to improve relations with
Hanoi, although Thai leaders probably
realize that any apparent backtracking by
Bangkok on the question of a US security
presence would diminish the prospects
of any early accommodation with Viet-
nam.
Whether or not the new Seni govern-
ment chooses to take a different tack on
the question of a US security presence,
the long-term direction of Thai policy
seems reasonably clear. Thailand is mov-
ing step by step to put more distance
between itself and the US, although there
is considerable disagreement at each stage
on how wide the distance should be, on the
speed of the change, and on how it should
be handled.
The Thai will probably continue to
move toward a closer relationship with
China. There is little objection to this even
from military conservatives, particularly
when Peking is offering some support to
Bangkok as it copes with pressures from
Hanoi. The Chinese already have made it
clear that a scaled down residual US
security presence in Thailand would not
stand in the way of further progress in
developing relations between Bangkok
and Peking.
Finally, any new government in
Thailand will continue to put its lines out
in as many directions as practical,
developing contacts with Europe, the
USSR, Japan, and its ASEAN neighbors,
hoping that the multiplicity of
relationships will provide the necessary
underpinning for a more balanced and
neutral position.
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As the dispute over the future status of FTAI
intensifies, Moscow is caught between protecting its
substantial stake in Somalia and trying to improve its
standing with Ethiopia.
USSR-Somalia-Ethiopia: FTAI Policy
The dispute between Somalia and
Ethiopia over the French Territory of the
Afars and Issas confronts Moscow with a
policy dilemma. Moscow for long has
been Somalia's principal military
benefactor. At the same time, it has tried
to get closer to Ethiopia, particularly
since the late Emperor Haile Selassie's
overthrow. Should war between
Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa over the
FTAI break out, the Soviets would be
faced with some difficult policy choices.
In order to preserve their signficant
strategic stake in Somalia, they would
probably have little choice but to support,
albeit reluctantly, their clients in
Mogadiscio.
In the meantime, Moscow is attemp-
ting to balance its relations with Somalia
and Ethiopia by steering a careful middle
course on the FTAI. In recent conver-
sations with US embassy officials in
Mogadiscio, Soviet Ambassador. Sam-
sonov reaffirmed Moscow's desire for a
peaceful resolution of the dispute. He said
the Soviets favor self-determination for
the territory and oppose outside in-
terference by anyone, including Somalia.
Moscow is said to have conveyed these
views privately to Mogadiscio. The
Soviets are cautioning the Somalis to
limit their activities in the territory to in-
surgency and political subversion, urging
them to avoid rash actions that almost
certainly would lead to war with Ethiopia.
The Soviets have promised to work
behind the scenes with Addis Ababa and
Paris to fashion a satisfactory political
settlement that would satisfy both Somali
and Ethiopian interests.
Such a peaceful settlement will be hard
to achieve. Earlier this month, President
Siad refused to give Paris a formal
guarantee that Somalia would respect the
sovereignty of the territory after it
becomes independent. Mogadiscio has
subsequently lambasted France for refus-
ing to allow "genuine self-determination"
in Djibouti and warned that Paris will be
responsible for any deterioration of the
situation in the territory, which is current-
ly quiet. Anti-French forces might stage
incidents to coincide with the visit to
Djibouti of an OAU fact-finding com-
mittee later this month. We expect
Somali-backed terrorist activity to in-
NORTH
YEMEN
SANA
j"
FRENCH TERRITORY ADEN
OF THE /t/
ADDIS
ABABA
crease as the decolonization process
moves ahead.
Siad attempted to use his recent
month-long visit to the USSR to drum up
Soviet diplomatic and military support
for a more aggressive Somali policy
toward the territory. Siad and his armed
forces chiefs met with a number of senior
Soviet military and political leaders in
Moscow. The Soviets may have agreed to
provide Mogadiscio with some additional
military equipment, but the absence of a
joint communique at the close of Siad's
visit suggests that the Somalis may have
received less than they wanted.
Somalia's ambassador to France, said
to be close to Siad, recently told US em-
bassy officials in Mogadiscio that the
FTAI issue had indeed been discussed
with Soviet officials during Siad's
Moscow visit. While shedding no light on
the substance of the discussions, the am-
bassador claimed that Somalia expects
little diplomatic or military help from the
Soviets because of Moscow's desire not to
jeopardize its present good relations with
either Ethiopia or France. The failure last
week of Soviet Deputy Defense Minister
Kulikov to visit Mogadiscio, after wind-
ing up a six-day visit to neighboring
Sudan, may have been another manifesta-
tion of Moscow's displeasure with Siad's
adventurism in the FTAI.
The Soviets have apparently been more
successful in convincing Ethiopia of their
good intentions toward the FTAI than in
restraining Somali designs on the
territory. Ethiopia's ambassador in
Moscow recently remarked that the
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Soviets seemed to share Addis Ababa's
desire for an independent FTAI and did
not appear sympathetic to Somalia's am-
bition to annex the territory.
The ambassador also appeared con-
vinced of the sincerity of Moscow's desire
for better relations with Ethiopia. He
cited a major Pravda commentary highly
favorable to Ethiopia, which appeared
while Siad was in Moscow. He interpreted
it as a signal that the Kremlin did not
want Siad's unusual month-long stay or
his saber-rattling speech at the Soviet par-
ty congress to damage Soviet-Ethiopian
relations.
Despite the USSR's close military,
economic, and strategic ties with Somalia,
the Soviets realize that Ethiopia is poten-
tially the strongest power in the Horn.
Moscow has avoided following a policy
line that would deny to the Kremlin the
possibility of making substantial inroads
in Ethiopia.
Political developments in Addis Ababa
over the past year, particularly the ruling
military council's recent sharp tilt to the
left, have only served to give the Soviets
more interest in not foreclosing options.
Moscow clearly regards the military
regime in Addis Ababa as being on a
"progressive" course and as holding
Two months after the abortive coup by minority
tribesmen, Nigeria's national leadership is virtually para-
lyzed by mutual suspicions and renewed ethnic and re-
gional tensions. There is a danger of a repetition of the
bloody upheavals of the 1960s.
Two months after the abortive coup
that resulted in the death of the head of
state, Nigeria's national leadership
appears more fragile and in greater dis-
array than at any time since 1966. Mutual
suspicions among members-based large-
ly on a resurgence of ethnic and regional
sentiment-have almost paralyzed the
ruling Supreme Military Council. The
new chief of state, Lieutenant General
Olusegun Obasanjo, is said to be concern-
ed about his personal safety.
The immediate cause of the preoccupa-
tion with security is the recent coup
attempt, but its origins lie in the bloodless
coup last July that toppled the nine-year-
old regime of Yakubu Gowon, who
ran the government by consensus. Gowon
and other minority tribesmen from cen-
tral Nigeria became arbiters between the
large and powerful ethnic groups of
northern and southern Nigeria that had
Nigeria: Renewed Ethnic Tension
vied for control of the country since in-
dependence.
The second half of the Gowon
era-after the end of the civil war in
1970-was a period of ethnic peace. It
was also a time of unfulfilled promises
and increasingly blatant corruption at all
levels of government. The country was
burdened with a bloated and expensive ar-
my-some 250,000 strong-that had little
headroom for ambitious and increasingly
restive young officers.
The group of younger, middle-grade,
mostly staff-level officers that ousted
Gowon in July 1975 promised to get
Nigeria moving again. They acted firmly
against corruption and adopted a
nationalist foreign policy. Led by Murtala
Mohammed, they gave Nigeria its most
active government since independence.
The Mohammed regime ousted almost
all military and government officials who
had extensive political experience and
sacked some 12,000 corrupt or incompe-
tent civil servants. The government eased
Nigeria's serious port congestion, created
a number of new states, and set in motion
a program aimed at returning the country
to civilian rule.
Most Nigerians applauded this ac-
tivism; they had shown growing im-
patience with the endless palaver of the
Gowon regime and with Gowon's inability
to take action on difficult problems. The
new leaders could not have acted so
forcefully without ignoring Gowon's
carefully nurtured system of consensus
and, in effect, ending the predominant
role of the minority tribesmen.
Under Mohammed, a small group of
officers-mainly from the large Hausa
and Yoruba ethnic groups-made the
decisions. The new prominence of the
Hausas awakened bitter memories among
the minority tribesmen of how they were
dominated by the Hausa aristocracy prior
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JEFIK
CAM EIROON
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to 1966, when the Hausas controlled the
northern three fourths of Nigeria.
By early 1976, coup rumors were com-
mon. At the root of the discontent was the
disgruntlement of the minorities and the
fears of junior army officers caused by the
regime's frequently stated intention to
reduce the army by 100,000 men.
The coup that came on February 13
was poorly planned and easily crushed,
but it eliminated Mohammed, the
regime's most forceful and effective
leader. The Supreme Military Council has
since backed away publicly from the ex-
plosive army-reduction issue, but it has
been unable to quell ethnic fears.
The council's actions since the coup
have, in fact, worsened ethnic tensions
within the leadership and the army as a
whole, particularly between the minorities
and the Hausas. Officers from the minori-
ty tribes are embittered by their loss of in-
fluence and angry over the executions last
month of a number of their fellow
tribesmen for alleged involvement in the
coup. They have also seen the
predominantly minority-manned brigade
of guards-formerly the chief military
security unit in the capital-virtually dis-
banded and replaced by largely Hausa
army units.
For the moment, the sullen and angry
minority officers are so cowed by the
feelings against them aroused by the
assassination of Mohammed that they are
staying in the background. With a third of
the army's total manpower, they cannot
be ignored indefinitely.
The new prominence of the Hausas
holds the danger of a resurgence of the
kind of violent competition between the
major ethnic groups that led to the bloody
upheavals of the 1960s.
The new number two man in the
regime, Brigadier Shehu Yar Adua-who
was promoted two ranks and selected over
a minority officer who seemed in line for
the slot-is from a prominent Hausa
family. Some Nigerians believe he is
already calling the shots in the Supreme
Military Council.
Should Obasanjo-a popular wartime
commander and Yoruba but essentially a
Nigerian nationalist-leave voluntarily or
be removed, the council would be hard put
to find a replacement of equal stature.
Some reports suggest Yar Adua would
replace Obasanjo, which would confirm
the worst suspicions of the minority tribes
and might convince the important Yoruba
group that a Hausa attempt to take over
is under way.
In the meantime, the regime is
floundering. The military leadership ap-
parently has not yet decided on the fate of
the hundred or so persons still in custody
on charges of involvement in the coup
attempt. Some additional executions
seem likely, despite a recommendation
Portugal is substantially reducing and reorganizing
its armed forces. How far it can go in developing a small,
modern military establishment will depend in large
measure on the availability of aid from the US and
Portugal's other NA TO allies.
from important northern religious and
ethnic leaders against further bloodlet-
ting.
Portugal: More Modern Armed Forces
Although Portugal is planning to make
more reductions in its armed forces, it
wants in the process to create a modern
force capable of dealing with the country's
changed defense and security needs.
Portugal's military leaders have in-
dicated in recent statements that they
have worked out a clearer conception of
the military's new mission. Now that Por-
tugal's involvement in colonial wars is
over, the armed forces will be oriented
primarily to domestic missions. They will,
however, continue to make a small but
politically significant contribution to
NATO.
Budgetary constraints and a shortage of
foreign exchange will hamper Portugal's
efforts to modernize and reorganize.
Lisbon will almost certainly need finan-
cial and technical assistance from the US
or Western Europe to carry out its plans.
Portuguese military spokesmen already
have begun a campaign to convince the
allies of the importance of such assistance
in bringing Portugal back into full par-
ticipation in NATO, both politically and
militarily.
The Army
Army Chief of Staff General Eanes an-
nounced earlier this year that the army
would be organized into two major groups
of forces having a combined strength of
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only about 26,000. Two years ago the
army had over 200,000 men.
One of the two groups, consisting of
10,000 highly trained men, would defend
Portugal's territorial borders and protect
the country's interests abroad. The
remainder would handle domestic train-
ing and internal security matters. They
would be available for combat operations
if needed.
Lisbon plans to designate a brigade-
sized airmobile unit to replace the infan-
try division that had been committed to
NATO. Although a smaller contribution,
the designated brigade should he able to
react more quickly and more effectively to
a threat than the widely scattered divi-
sion.
The military apparently has no plans to
maintain more than a tiny elite force for
other operations outside the country. Por-
tugal will presumably rely on its NATO
allies to help counter any major external
threat.
The Navy
Portuguese naval officers reportedly see
the navy's role to be primarily coastal
defense and patrol of the sea lanes
between the mainland and Portugal's
island possessions in the Atlantic. The
navy's ability to carry out this mission is
seriously hampered by the advanced age
and poor condition of many ships in the
fleet.
Naval officers are especially interested
in replacing the fleet's obsolete
minesweepers with 12 new ones. The navy
is also interested in acquiring new British-
or US-built guided-missile frigates as
replacements for six of its seven aging
destroyer escorts. For the near term at
least, the navy plans to use its three
French-built submarines for Atlantic
patrol duty and its ten corvettes for
coastal operations.
Because of a shortage of foreign ex-
change, the Portuguese may be forced to
overhaul some of their older ships or refit
them with more modern weapons rather
than purchase new ones. Their decision
will depend largely on the response of
other NATO members to their calls for
assistance.
Army Chief of Staff General Panes (r) with President Costa Domes
Lisbon reportedly does not plan to
reduce the size of the navy below 12,000
men, but will concentrate on making the
force more efficient.
The future of the small marine corps is
uncertain. Even if it survives efforts by
some officers to disband it because of its
alleged political unreliability, it will
probably be reduced in size and impor-
tance. It could be relegated to an internal
security role in the Azores or the Madeira
Islands.
The Air Force
The Portuguese air force is making
preliminary plans to modernize its equip-
ment and set procurement priorities.
Lisbon also plans to cut the manpower
level of the air force from an estimated
12,000 men to about 9,000.
One of the most urgent needs of the air
force is modern medium-range transport
aircraft to support the army's NATO-
committed airmobile unit. The air force
reportedly would like to purchase three
US-made C-130s. It hopes to raise cash
for the purchase by selling its two Boeing
707 transports.
According to Air Force Chief General
Morais Da Silva, Portugal considers the
acquisition of fighter aircraft to be
another priority item. Morais Da Silva
has mentioned the F-4 or F-5 as a possible
replacement for Portugal's old F-86
fighters.
Morals Da Silva says that he hopes
eventually to replace Portugal's P-2E
patrol aircraft-designated for antisub-
marine warfare-with newer P-3s. Three
of the P-2E planes are committed to
NATO and are the only Portuguese force
actually carrying out a NATO mission.
These aging aircraft can no longer be
relied on, however, to carry out their
maritime patrol mission for the alliance.
Although Lisbon's leaders recognize
the need to modernize the armed forces
and are seeking to do so, Portugal's
military arsenal is years behind those of
most other NATO members and has little
prospect of catching up in the near term.
Because of internal political problems
and continuing financial restraints, Por-
tuguese military leaders will probably
have to accept only modest progress for 25X1
the next several years unless they receive
large-scale assistance from other NATO
members.
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