WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011300100001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
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NAVY review completed.
Secret
CI WS 76-010
No. 0010/76
March 5, 1976
Copy N2 74
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports "and analyzes signifi>
cant developments of the week throtsgl*? noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
CONTENTS (March S, 1976)
1 The CPSU Congress
5 Portugal: Military Mole; Settling the
9 USSR: First Naval Visit to Turkey
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
12 Lebanon: Still Squabbling
13 Israel: Rabin under Fire
14 Morocco-Algeria: Sahara Dispute
14 Rhodesia: Bleak Prospects
16 Egypt Sets Naval Priorities
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
17 Latin America: Kissinger Visit
17 Canada: New Leader for Tories
19 Argentina: Peron Persists
19 Jamaica: Gloomy Economic Picture
21 Chile: Reassessing Options
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
22 China: Mounting Attacks on Teng
23 Australia: Labor Party Scandal
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome, They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
Summary,
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Delegates vote for the resolution on the report of General Secretary Brezhnev
THE CPSU CONGRESS
Spotlight on Bre hnev
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The spotlight contin`bted to be or( General
Secretary Brezhnev as party congress speakers
discussed his report delivered on February 24. His
pre-eminence was emphasized by the speakers'
lavish praise of his leadership abilities and per-
sonal characteristics and by his own banter with
the speakers, which was reminiscent of
Khrushchev. Soviet delegates did not make any
new proposals in the domestic area. Many
criticized various economic bureaucracies in
Moscow, and some seemed to second Brezhnev's
call for reorganizing economic management.
Soviet speakers were, as expected, content to
follow Brezhnev's lead on international issues,
drawing what comments they made from the
foreign policy themes outlined by the General
Secretary last week. Brezhnev's two Politburo
colleagues with heavy responsibility for Soviet
relations with the outside world, Foreign Minister
Gromyko and Defense Minister Grechko, did not
speak at the congress.
Brezhnev's call for a continuation of his
"peace program" was endorsed routinely by sub-
sequent Soviet speakers, most often in general
terms with little discussion of US-Soviet relations.
Some, however, including Leningrad party boss
Romanov, warned of imperialist machinations
and Western attempts to fan dissent, and remind-
ed their listeners that detente entails heightened
ideological confrontation. Others, notably
Premier Kosygin, laid stress on Soviet plans to ex-
pand ties with "all countries," even as they
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SECRET
gloated over the economic troubles in the
capitalist world.
China remained the object of the most
heated abuse. Maoism appeared to have the edge
over imperialism as the Soviets' number-one
foreign policy concern.
The East Europeans
Opponents of Soviet hegemony in the Marx-
i;t world were not bashful about making their
case in Moscow. As expected, the Romanian and
Yugoslav representatives diverged sharply from
their fellow East Europeans in maintaining the
right of each party and state to develop its
political line independently and in a "creative"
manner.
Having made this point, Romanian party
leader Ceausescu, in a show of independence,
returned for a few days to Bucharest. His
reappearance in Moscow on Wednesday coin-
cided with rumors circulating in the Soviet capital
that the bloc party leaders and heads of govern-
inent attending the congress will meet in an infor-
mal summit as they did in 1971.
The West European Parties
/-3
An analysis of the speeches given by West
European delegates to the Soviet party congress
underlines the growing tendency of the major
Western parties to dissociate themselves from
Moscow's style of communist rule. More
orthodox statements by some of the smaller West
European parties failed to right the balance in
-avor of fidelity to the Soviet line.
The major West European parties stressed
their national identities and the need to form
alliances with non-communist forces. They played
down the international aspects of communism
and theSoviet leadership role.
The Italians were the most heretical. Party
leader Enrico Berlinguer emphasized that his par-
ty's autonomy was the reason it had captured the
support of an increasing number of Italian voters.
The congratulations Berlinguer offered to the
Soviets for their progress on East-West issues were
marred by his failure to express full "solidarity"
with the Soviet party, as he did at the last Soviet
congress in 1971.
He also implied that his own party's accep-
tance of certain features of Italian foreign
policy-including membership in NATO-had
contributed toward better East-West relations.
The same passage suggested that Italy's "inter-
national alliances" help protect the Italian people
from "foreign interference." By not specifically
mentioning the US in this regard, Berlinguer was
ambiguous enough for his audience to conclude
that he was talking about both the US and the
USSR.
In an apparent attempt to improve the at-
mosphere between the two parties, General
Secretary Brezhnev met with Berlinguer on Mon-
day. The two leaders issued a joint statement
recognizing the need for international coopera-
tion and mutual respect for each party's
autonomy. The full statement is not available, but
an Italian spokesman said differences of opinion
were evident in the talks.
The French Communist Party reinforced the
independent line taken at its own congress last
month by not sending party chief Georges
Marchais to Moscow. It was the first time the
leader of the party has not attended a Soviet con-
gress.
His substitute, French Politburo member
Gaston Plissonnier, did not, as Marchais did last
month, accuse the Soviets of abusing human
rights, but he called for guarantees for individual
and collective freedom and defended
"French-style socialism."
Plissonnier criticized the Soviets for being too
lenient on Giscard's foreign policy, which the
French Communists see as being more Atlanticist
than that of his Gaullist predecessors. By raising
this issue, the French party is again indicating that
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it expects Moscow to halt what it sees as in-
terference in French politics designed to bolster
the French left's opponents.
Plissonnier made clear that while the French
Communists are aiming for more independence
in their domestic activities, they are not renoun-
cing cooperation with Moscow on foreign policy
issues. He pointed out, however, that "proletarian
internationalism" no longer means that the
Soviets can expect acceptance of their interests as
the common good at the expense of the interests
of the other parties.
Spanish party leader Santiago Carrillo attend-
ed a meeting of Spanish and Italian leftists in
Rome rather than the Moscow conclave. Dolores
Ibarruri, who has been in exile in Moscow as
honorary president of the Spanish Communist
Party, delivered the Spanish address to the con-
gress. She gave only a lukewarm endorsement of
the Soviet party in contrast to her laudatory
remarks in 1971, when she praised it as the
"vanguard in the world's advance toward
socialism."
Portugal's party chief Cunhal gave a more
orthodox performance. He pledged the eternal
friendship of the Portuguese party and insisted
that Moscow's leadership is essential for the
world communist movement. Anticipating his
continued loyalty, the Soviets scheduled Cunhal
as the first West European speaker on the second
day of the congress. In 1971, Cunhal spoke on the
tenth day.
The addresses given by some of the smaller
West European parties-the West German,
Austrian, and Greek, for example-were also in
line with what Moscow likes to hear. The leader
of the West Berlin splinter group, for example,
launched one of the most vigorous attacks against
anti-Sovietism, while Austrian Communist chief
Muhri declared that solidarity with Moscow serv-
ed the national interests of Austria.
With the possible exception of the West Ger-
man party, however, the tone of the speeches
given by the smaller parties was not uniformly
subservient. The Austrian party leader said, for ex-
ample, that socialism meant "broad freedoms"
and advocated cooperation between communists
and socialists.
Fidel Castro talks with President Husak of Czechoslovakia at the Congress
-taS
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Among the smaller parties, the Belgians
appeared to take the most independent line,
mentioning neither Brezhnev, the Chinese, nor
proletarian internationalism and noting that it was
sometimes necessary to take a "different ap-
proach" than Moscow in developing socialism.
4-S
Fidel Castro's address to the 25th congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on
February 25 in Moscow was a careful mixture of
adulation, confidence, and ostensible humility in-
tended to defend Moscow from its ideological
antagonists and to assure the Soviets of Cuba's
loyalty. By his selection of words, Castro
demonstrated that the issues that had strained
Cuban-Soviet relations so severely nine years ago
are no longer even minor irritants. Cuban submis-
sion has been complete. The brash young Carib-
bean rebel of the mid-1960s has been replaced by
the mature, responsible, self-critical member of
the team; as a result, bilateral relations have never
been better.
Castro's new discipline and "humility" show-
ed in the brevity of his speech and in his admis-
sion that "there is very little that the Cuban com-
munists can teach and much that we must learn in
a gathering such as this." The same firebrand who
years ago had not hesitated to challenge Moscow
on virtually any ideological tenet last week extoll-
ed the Soviet communists who "have been ex-
traordinary fountains of experience and teaching
for all the revolutionaries of the world."
The faithful Castro, to prolonged applause,
continued Havana's anti-Chinese invective by
describing the "Maoists" as reactionaries,
slanderers, intriguers, or traitors, and predicted
that they would be swept aside by history. Ap-
parently willing to sweep aside his own condem-
nation of the USSR as late as 1972 for allegedly
failing to give adequate support to the Viet-
namese, he defended the Soviets from charges
that they had abandoned revolutionaries out of
expediency. Instead, he claimed, "since the
Soviet state was founded, wherever people
fought for their liberation-as in our
homeland-in Europe, Asia, Africa, or in Latin
America, the support and solidarity of Soviet
communists was never lacking." He described the
USSR as "an indestructible shield checking the
aggressive impetus of imperialism against small
and powerless nations."
The confident Castro, buoyed no doubt by
the success of his military forces in Angola, hinted
that other Angolas would take place. "Changes in
the world will not stop," he said; "the future
belongs entirely to socialism and communism
without anyone being able to export revolution,
nor impose it by means of war, nor prevent the
peoples from making it." Sensitive, as always, to
charges that he is a Soviet puppet, or that he sent
Cuban troops to Angola at Soviet behest, he af-
firmed: "Never has the Soviet Union-which has
given such decisive aid to our people-ap-
proached us to demand anything from us, to set
forth a condition, to tell us what we must do."
Castro is clearly pleased with the trend of re-
cent events, with his relations with Moscow, with
the prestige his troops in Angola have earned for
him, and with the opportunity to rub elbows with
other dignitaries visiting Moscow for the con-
gress. Some minor frictions may develop between
him and his hosts in other countries after he
leaves Moscow and begins stopping off in Eastern
Europe and elsewhere, but there is nothing on
the horizon that would seem a serious threat to
the optimism he has displayed so far on this trip.
Brezhnev did not attend the session on
March 1, at which Kosygin presented the five-year
economic plan (1976-80). His absence gave the
appearance of a snub, and a decline in Kosygin's
status since the last congress was apparent in
other ways. Kosygin gave a largely uncritical
recital of economic accomplishments of the past
five years and added no new details to the present
plan. After debate on Kosygin's report, the con-
gress met on March 4 to elect the new Central
Committee, which, in turn, elects the Politburo.
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Prime inister
President Costa Gomewatch and
alist leader Soares signs the agreement
PORTUGAL 6-,l 2-
MILITARY ROLE REDUCED
Portuguese political parties and military
leaders signed an agreement last week giving
civilian politicians a greater role in running the
government during a four-year transition to
civilian rule. The military still has the means to in-
tervene or override unsatisfactory legislation if it
desires, but the parties hope early legislative and
presidential elections will give them the political
legitimacy necessary to assert their dominance.
The pact substantially reduces the direct role
of the armed forces in Portugal's political process,
assigning most policy functions to the legislative
assembly, the president, and the cabinet. The all-
military Revolutionary Council, which has been
the major decision making body for nearly a year,
will remain the ultimate authority in military
matters, but will be reduced to serving primarily
as an advisory council to the president on political
affairs.
The council will, however, retain significant
powers and will serve as a check on the president.
With the council's authorization, the president
can declare war or invoke emergency powers.
The council also may remove the president by
declaring him physically incapacitated. The coun-
cil will also have an impact on the legislative
process through its power to require the presi-
dent to veto any bill it considers unconstitutional.
The legislature can override such a veto by a
two-thirds majority.
Most importantly, the military council retains
the right to intervene in politics virtue of its
recognized role as the "guarantor
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institutions" and protector of the constitution and
the goals of the revolution. The armed forces may
also continue to influence the political process
through the presidency because one of its
members is expected to be elected to the post.
Most political parties see little chance of electing
a civilian president and are seeking to agree on a
military candidate, like Prime Minister Azevedo
or army chief of staff Eanes.
The final agreement is a victory for the non-
Communist political parties, which last spring
had to sign a pact that certified military
dominance for at least three years. The
democratic parties wanted to force the armed
forces to admit that things have changed in the
past year, but they did not want a complete
military withdrawal from politics at this tran-
sitional stage. These parties recognize that
military backing will ensure the stability needed
to govern.
The centrist Popular Democrats were most
vocal in demanding concessions from the
military. Talks stalled for weeks over the party's
contention that presidential elections should be
held as close to legislative elections as possible in
order to prevent President Costa Gomes from
molding the next government. A date has not yet
been established for presidential elections, but
they are expected to take place in late June, about
two months after the legislative elections on April
25. The Popular Democrats settled for a two-
month hiatus in exchange for an amendment to
the pact specifying that its provisions will not
become operational until a president is elected.
Consequently, the Azevedo cabinet will remain in
office until a new president is sworn in.
An elected government in Lisbon will have
no easier job than that of previous military-con-
trolled governments. The left is still using the
deteriorating economy and rising unemployment
to justify anti-government demonstrations and
limited strikes, which may become more frequent
if the cabinet does not complete a new wage
policy to replace the wage freeze that expired
earlier this week.
Right-wing farmers are incensed by the
agrarian reform policies of the earlier leftist
military governments and have threatened to cut
off food supplies to Lisbon this week if their
demands are not met. Similar threats by the
farmers in recent months were not carried out.
The left is warning of the danger of a right-
wing coup by such disenchanted conservatives as
the farmers or groups of Angolan refugees. Abor-
tive coups have affected the political balance in
Portugal twice during the past year, and the left
may be trying to incite the right to premature ac-
tion before elections in hopes of mounting a
countercoup.
SETTLING THE ECONOMY) 3 -3 k!
The Sixth Provisional Government under
Prime Minister Azevedo has taken a number of
steps to restore order to Portugal's chaotic
economy. To stave off a foreign payments crisis,
Lisbon has lined up substantial Western financial
assistance and enacted measures to bolster the
current account. At home, the government has
made tentative moves to stimulate private
economic activity and to invigorate the large
nationalized sector. Azevedo is giving top priority
to restoration of civil order and worker discipline.
More lasting solutions to Portugal's deep-seated
economic problems will have to await a return to
political stability following parliamentary and
presidential elections.
Recent borrowing, progress in other loan
negotiations, and new measures to improve the
balance of payments indicate that substantial gold
sales can be delayed at least until midyear.
Foreign reserves fell roughly $1 billion in 1975, to
about $1.4 billion at the end of the year.
Largely because of its swing toward less
radical policies, Lisbon has recently been more
successful in its quest for credits. The West Ger-
man central bank has agreed to lend $250 million
against gold collateral for a period of six months
to two years. Switzerland has loaned $50 million
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on similar terms. Lisbon has borrowed $85 million
from the International Monetary Fund's Oil Facili-
ty, and negotiations for loans from the Bank of
France and from the Bank for International
Settlements have been reported.
In January, a team from the European Invest-
ment Bank tentatively accepted proposals from
Lisbon for a dozen projects to be financed by the
$175 million in concessionary loans the European
Community authorized for Portugal last year.
Disbursements could begin before the end of
April. In addition, the Community agreed in prin-
ciple to expand Portugal's regular borrowing
rights by nearly $60 million and is studying several
possible food aid arrangements. Negotiations are
now in progress to expand the preferential treat-
ment of Portuguese exports to the EC and
broaden Portuguese access to EC technology.
Lisbon has obtained little help from the Com-
munist world, notwithstanding numerous official
visits and cultural exchanges, an increase in trade,
and a variety of new accords.
The Azevedo government has enacted a
number of wide-ranging measures aimed at im-
proving the balance of payments.
? To cut imports, it has boosted gas-
oline prices to the highest levels in Western
Europe and extended temporary surcharges
on non-oil imports through the first quarter.
? To promote foreign sales, it has
offered exporters insurance against ex-
change rate fluctuations and production
cost increases.
? To revive emigrant remittances, it
has authorized banks to set up special
foreign exchange accounts.
? To raise tourist receipts, it has set up
an Institute for Tourism Development.
? To attract foreign capital, it has
enacted a code of rules for foreign invest-
ment.
The government has imposed tax and wage
measures to discourage consumption so that im-
ports can be reduced and resources freed for ex-
port or domestic investment. Wage rates were
frozen through February, and on March 5 the
Council of Ministers is to consider a draft decree
that would establish a longer term wage policy.
An attempt to suspend food subsidies and to free
prices aborted because of adverse popular reac-
tion encouraged by leftist parties.
Azevedo has budgeted more than $1
billion-a 90-percent increase over 1975-for
public works, housing, and other investments.
After months of neglect, the government has
finally moved to organize the direction of
nationalized industrial and financial enterprises
and is reportedly planning to return to private
owners some 300 small- and medium-sized
businesses that were taken over by their
employees. To stabilize the agricultural situation,
the government has promised not to expropriate
land north of the Tagus River or farms under 75
acres elsewhere. Most land remains in private
hands, with nearly 40 percent of total acreage in
units of 50 acres or less.
The new measures are no cure for Portugal's
economic problems. The encouragement so far
offered to private businessmen and foreign in-
vestors, for example, may have little impact. The
guarantees and incentives are undermined by in-
adequacies in the foreign investment code and
fuzzy links between the public and private sec-
tors. Western financial assistance should,
however, permit the country to avoid a major
devaluation, large gold sales, or a domestic
economic crisis in the next few months.
Restoration of labor discipline and civil calm
appears to be the key to success at this time. Thus,
Lisbon may be justified in putting off a sharp
devaluation that would help the payments situa-
tion because it could carry heavy costs in terms of
worker discipline and the oooularity of non-com-
munist governing parties.
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FRANCE: MORE SHIPS TO DJIBOUTI
France is sending two more surface
warships-a destroyer and a destroyer escort-to
Djibouti, its naval base in the French Territory of
the Afars and Issas. Although these ship
movements appear to be part of a regular rotation
of forces, and were almost certainly scheduled
before the border incident last month between
French and Somali troops, the French govern-
ment has not discouraged reports that the
transfers may be related to current tension in the
area. Paris probably views the move as a con-
venient way to underscore its determination to
protect its interests there.
The destroyer escort, now in the Red Sea, is
scheduled to arrive in Djibouti late next week. It
will reportedly replace another destroyer escort
now in the area and will probably remain in the
Indian Ocean for at least six months. The
destroyer, according to French naval officers, will
leave France later this month and should reach
Djibouti in early April. This ship will probably
become part of France's Indian Ocean task force,
replacing two other surface vessels scheduled to
depart in March.
The French have the largest Western naval
force in the Indian Ocean. France currently has
18 ships assigned to its flotilla there, including a
helicopter carrier, two submarines, a destroyer,
three destroyer escorts, and a number of patrol
and support craft. Most of these are now in the
Djibouti area.
USSR: FIRST NAVAL VISIT TO TURKEY
The first known visit by Soviet naval ships to a
Turkish port occurred last week. Two Moma-class
naval hydrographic research ships arrived at An-
talya in southern Turkey on February 23 and
remained until February 28, when they resumed
operations in the Mediterranean. US and other
NATO military attaches in Turkey were apparently
given no advance word of the port call.
The visit underscores the Soviet navy's policy
of showing the flag wherever possible around the
Mediterranean. Soviet sailors aboard the two
ships were not given shore leave, probably to
avoid any incidents that would mar the port call.
The visit of the Soviet ships appears to be part
of a larger exchange between the USSR and
Turkey. The port call followed by two months
Soviet Premier Kosygin's trip to Turkey. Turkish
officers-in accordance with the European securi-
ty agreement signed in Helsinki-were invited to
attend Soviet military maneuvers in the Caucasus
earlier in February.
Since late 1975 the Soviets have engaged in
low-key efforts to exploit Turkish-US frictions.
The Turks have been receptive to the Soviet over-
tures, partly because of the growing acceptability
of detente and partly because of a desire to re-
mind the it cannot take Turkey for
granted.
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LEBANON: STILL SQUABBLING
Lebanon's top political leaders have been un-
able to agree on a new cabinet to carry out the
package of political reforms announced last
month, despite two weeks of intense bargaining
and strong pressure from Syrian mediators. The
stalemate on the political front and relatively
minor but persistent security problems have con-
vinced Damascus that it cannot withdraw Syrian-
controlled Palestinian troops in Lebanon as early
as originally planned.
The extent of leftist participation in the new
cabinet appears to be the major sticking point in
the negotiations. Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt,
whose leftist coalition emerged from the recent
fighting with new popular support, has been
demanding that his more militant colleagues be
included in the cabinet. Jumblatt apparently has
received support for his position from Palestinian
leaders, who would like to see their Lebanese
allies gain a stronger voice in the government.
The Christians, for their part, are deeply
suspicious of the close ties between the
Palestinians and the Lebanese far left and are con-
cerned that Syria will eventually relax its efforts to
keep both groups under control. The Christian
position, spearheaded by interior Minister
Shamun, has been that agreements governing
Palestinian activities in Lebanon must be im-
plemented before a new government is formed.
The Syrians, increasingly frustrated by the
seemingly boundless capacity of the Lebanese
politicians to quarrel among themselves, are ap-
parently determined to break the stalemate. After
several stormy meetings in Damascus last week,
Syria's chief negotiator, Foreign Minister Khad-
dam, reportedly pushed Jumblatt into a tentative
agreement to serve on the cabinet and to scale
down his demands on behalf of other leftist
leaders. The Syrian mediator returned to Beirut
on March 4, presumably to apply similar pressure
to Christian Phalanges chief Pierre Jumayyil.
Jumayyil and Jumblatt are leaders of the two
strongest militias, and their participation in a
coalition cabinet is considered crucial to the
success of the recent peace settlement.
Damascus seems less certain of how to stop a
wave of kidnapings and other terrorist actions
that has begun to undermine confidence in the
In any event, the Syrians have decided that
they cannot risk withdrawing Palestinian troops
later this month as originally planned. Damascus
apparently now sees the continued presence of
these forces as the only way of keeping pressure
on Christian and Muslim leaders to resolve their
differences and of at least containing militant and
lawless elements.
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~ SECRET ;
ISRAEL: RABIN UNDER FIRE
Dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Rabin's
leadership of the country and the dominant Labor
Party appears to be growing in Israel. In recent
weeks, Rabin has drawn sharp criticism from both
the conservatives and the moderates for his alleg-
ed mishandling of a number of issues. Still, his
government does not appear to be in imminent
danger of falling, primarily because there is no
clearly perceived or acceptable alternative.
Rabin's leadership in economic affairs has
come under repeated attack. Two key Finance
Ministry officials recently resigned, charging that
the government was giving inadequate support to
measures to combat inflation and reduce the pre-
sent balance-of-payments deficit. Their actions
have heightened uncertainty and concern among
Israelis over the government's ability to deal with
the country's economic problems.
Rabin faces another serious leadership
problem in a political dispute stemming from an
attempt by an Israeli group to establish an illegal
Jewish settlement at Sebastia on the occupied
West Bank last December. At that time, Rabin
sought to avert violence by avoiding a final deci-
sion on the settlement and by allowing some
settlers to stay at a nearby army camp. He now
faces a dilemma because the leftist Mapam, an
important member of the ruling Labor Alignment,
is insisting that the settlers be removed from the
West Bank. Hard liners from the National
Religious Party, a member of the government
coalition, and other conservative groups are
equally determined to establish a permanent
settlement at Sebastia.
Mutual wariness and underlying tension mar
Rabin's relationship with Defense Minister Peres,
the Prime Minister's strongest potential rival. A
statement by Rabin during a background briefing
for the press when he was in Washington last
January that Israel's arms requests to the US
government were "exaggerated" was interpreted
by many in Israel as criticism of Peres. The episode
inspired renewed speculation that Peres would
resign and team up with the opposition Likud
grouping to form an alternative coalition govern-
ment.
Peres, however, characterized this specula-
tion as unfounded. He occupies a central position
in deliberations on foreign policy and security
decisions and as the leading cabinet conservative
has the power to block developments he op-
poses. For the time being, he probably sees his
political future as best served by remaining within
and not disrupting the Labor Party.
In foreign policy, the cabinet's recent deci-
sion to explore the prospects for agreements with
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on "terminating the state
of war" has also focused new heat on Rabin. In
addition to predictable criticism from right-wing
factions, a number of moderate leaders of the rul-
ing Labor Alignment, led by former foreign
minister Abba Eban, strongly criticized the
cabinet's move. These critics insisted that the next
step in peace negotiations, particularly with Jor-
dan, should be to obtain full-scale peace
agreements. So far, however, Rabin has retained
the support or at least acquiescence of almost the
entire cabinet to explore the new negotiating op-
tion.
Rabin's relations within his Labor Party-the
senior partner in the Labor Alignment-have also
become increasingly troubled. He has been per-
sistently criticized for failing to include the party
in the decision-making process. The resignation
last month of Meir Zarmi as the party's secretary
general reflected frustration within the party's
hierarchy over the failure of Rabin and other
leaders in the government to coordinate and con-
sult more fully with the party.
Despite the drop in confidence in Rabin, the
consensus in Labor Party circles remains that
there is no present alternative to his leadership.
Moreover, a leadership fight at this time might
require elections before their scheduled date in
late 1977, and few party leaders-certainly not
Rabin-want that. The party is still recovering
from the leadership crisis brought on by the 1973
Arab-Israeli war. Rabin probably will attempt to
defer the moment of reckoning within the party
and between the Labor Alignment and Likud until
1977.
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MOROCCO-ALGERIA: SAHARA DISPUTE
Control of Western Sahara passed to Moroc-
co and Mauritania last week in accordance with
the tripartite accord signed by Madrid, Rabat, and
Nouakchott last November. Algeria, which con-
tinues to dispute the turnover by Madrid, did not
challenge the event militarily. The Algerian-
backed Polisario Front, which is waging a guerrilla
conflict, countered politically by proclaiming the
territory an independent Saharan "state."
Algerian media have given major play to the
Polisario proclamation on February 27 of a
"Democratic Saharan Arab Republic." Polisario
leaders claim to have made their declaration
before a group of journalists and several thousand
Saharans near a town in northeastern Sahara. The
Front controls few if any towns and little other
territory, however, and its "state" is in effect a
government in exile.
The Polisario move may have been in part a
counter to Morocco's action the preceding day in
engineering a vote by Sahara's territorial assembly
endorsing the division of the territory between
Morocco and Mauritania. Both Spain and the UN
have rejected Morocco's claim that the assembly
session constitutes the "consultations" with the
Saharan people called for in the tripartite agree-
ment and in the Moroccan-supported resolution
on the issue adopted by the UN General
Assembly last December. The Spanish and UN at-
titudes may have given Algeria hope that it could
advance its case for a UN-supervised referendum
in Sahara by backing proclamation of a Polisario
"state."
Morocco initially betrayed some worry about
the possible political repercussions of the
Polisario move, but so far only two countries have
formally recognized the new "state." This week
the council of ministers of the 47-member
io as either a government or a liberation
li
P
sar
o
movement, although an informal count indicated
that 16 states favored recognition. Without taking
a formal vote, the council decided that recogni-
tion should be left up to the individual states. The
failure of the council to endorse the Polisario
Front will be a disappointment to the Algerians,
who had invested considerable political capital in
an effort to gain it the trappings of legitimacy.
Despite Moroccan nervousness about the
possibility of increased Algerian and Polisario
military activity following Spain's withdrawal from
Sahara, only a few minor incidents have been
noted. The US defense attache in Rabat believes,
however, that the Moroccans may soon begin a
new phase of military clean-up operations against
the Polisario Front. Rabat hopes to eliminate the
large number of guerrillas it believes are located
in the Zemmour mountains around Guelta in
Sahara and in the area north of Bir Moghrein in
Mauritania. The Moroccans reportedly also are
planning to clean out small pockets of guerrillas
in southern Morocco as far east as the Algerian
border.
RHODESIA: BLEAK PROSPECTS
Prospects for a settlement between
Rhodesia's black nationalists and Ian Smith's
white regime remain bleak. Despite some op-
timistic press reports from Salisbury this week, the
constitutional talks that have been going on since
December apparently are going nowhere.
Meanwhile, the nationalists' insurgency is grow-
ing.
Mozambique's President Machel announced
on March 3 that he was imposing sanctions
against the Smith regime by closing his country's
border with Rhodesia. Machel said he was acting
in response to attacks on Mozambique's territory
by Rhodesian forces.
Cross-border infiltrations by Rhodesian
guerrillas based in Mozambique and insurgent
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activity in Rhodesia have been increasing in re-
cent weeks. The insurgents still appear divided
and probably are not ready for major operations
in Rhodesia. There are indications, however, that
they have begun moving into areas of southeast
Rhodesia where they have not previously
operated. Rhodesian security forces have reacted
by pursuing guerrillas back into their sanctuaries
in Mozambique; several minor clashes between
Rhodesian and regular Mozambican forces ap-
parently occurred recently.
Although Machel may now step up his sup-
port for the Rhodesian insurgents, he will
probably avoid any direct role for his own armed
forces. His government is already plagued with
economic problems and tribal tensions, and the
loss of revenue, unemployment, and food shor-
tages in some areas that will follow the end of
economic relations with Rhodesia will be a
further blow to Mozambique's economy. Until
this week, Machel had refused to impose sanc-
tions on Rhodesia because he feared the
economic consequences for Mozambique. He
may believe the revenue loss can be made up
through increased economic aid from outside
donors, particularly Commonwealth countries,
which last year promised to support him financial-
ly if he imposed sanctions.
Machel probably hopes his action will put
enough pressure on Smith to force the latter to
reach a negotiated settlement with the
nationalists. Up to half of Rhodesia's foreign trade
had been passing through Mozambique. The
Rhodesians will try to make up as much of the loss
as they can by channeling more of their trade
through South Africa.
Smith's talks with nationalist leader Joshua
Nkomo have reached an impasse because Smith
has rejected all proposals that would lead to black
majority rule. The talks are continuing because
neither side wants to be the one to break them
off. Smith has consistently appeared to be chiefly
interested in trying to buy time and keep the
nationalists divided, in hopes of staving off a
full-scale resumption of the guerrilla war and
convincing South Africa of the need to support
him. A high-level British envoy who visited
Salisbury last week-before Machel's an-
nouncement-found no evidence that Smith was
ready to change his position.
Zambia's President Kaunda, whose prestige is
largely tied to the effort to reach a peaceful settle-
ment of the Rhodesian problem, is becoming in-
creasingly apprehensive about the Rhodesian
situation. He is especially concerned about a
possible fu ban role in su ort of the
nationalists.
At this time, any Cuban assistance
to the Rhodesian guerrillas would probably be
limited to providing arms and training.
0 Miles 500
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EGYPT SETS NAVAL PRIORITIES
Egypt's naval modernization program calls for
the acquisition of missile patrol boats, sub-
marines and fri ates
The UK
pro a y wi e t e primary source for the new
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The Egyptian navy considers missile boats its
top priority purchase, reflecting lessons learned
during the war of October 1973. At that time,
Israeli Saar-class boats equipped with Gabriel an-
tiship missiles inflicted heavy losses on the Egyp-
tians and Syrians. Cairo's current plans call for the
purchase of nine boats with British-built hulls and
French-Italian Otomat antiship missiles. These un-
its will be equipped with advanced sensors, com-
munications, and electronics equipment.
Submarines are Cairo's-second priority. Three
attack submarines and three smaller boats design-
ed for special forces operations are expected to
be purchased from the UK. Egypt is also
negotiating for four new British multipurpose
frigates with antisubmarine, air defense, and
helicopter capabilities. Cairo would also like the
British to re-equip six of Egypt's indigenously
produced patrol boats.
Cairo is already boosting its antisubmarine
capability. The first flight crews have completed
training on newly acquired Sea King antisub-
marine warfare helicopters from the UK. Because
the navy does not have an air arm, these aircraft
will be land based and attached to the air force.
Cairo also plans to procure frigates that will carry
helicopters; these helicopters too will be flown by
air force pilots. Past difficulties between the navy
and air force suggest that Cairo may have difficul-
ty obtaining the most effective use of the
helicopters.
All ship procurements appear to have been
delayed by the need for a third-country payment
guarantee. Funding for the naval craft will
probably have to come from Arab states, par-
ticularly Saudi Arabia.
The Soviets have not signed a military agree-
ment with Cairo since 1973. Major Soviet equip-
ment deliveries to Egypt were suspended in
mid-1975. The stalemate with Moscow has
accelerated Cairo's contacts with Western sources
for air, ground, and naval equipment. The transi-
tion from communist to a mix of communist and
Western military inventories will continue to im-
pair Egypt's military readiness.
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LATIN AMERICA: KISSINGER VISIT
Secretary Kissinger's trip to Brazil, Venezuela,
Peru, Colombia, and Central America was clearly
gratifying to the leaders and the people of the
countries visited. Journalists and commentators,
however, made the trip the occasion for an un-
inhibited display of their analytical and rhetorical
talents. Critics took the opportunity to rattle the
skeletons from a closetful of real or imagined US
sins against the area. Interpretations of what was
actually said and done during the trip ranged
from the very positive to the sinister. The highly
developed skepticism toward US policy of Latins
in general and Latin journalists in particular was
revealed in the broad tendency to read between
lines and to seek out the "real" meaning of what
had occurred.
Commentary weighed most heavily on two
specific topics, the Cuba-Angola question and the
US-Brazil accords. In general, however, the focus
varied from country to country according to
special interest and concern.
Brazilian commentators savored their coun-
try's enhanced status but worried about the effect
on relations with other South American nations,
which tend to be fearful of Brazil's strength. The
press also issued warnings to the US that the trade
imbalance must be corrected to remove serious
bilateral frictions and that the US is not Brazil's
only "option." Argentina, way behind in its com-
petition with Brazil, reviewed in painful detail its
internal problems and the diplomatic defeat it
was dealt by Brazil's privileged partnership with
the US. Venezuelan columnists generally
deplored the Brazil-US "axis," but the premier
business-oriented editorialist urged that "we
other countries develop as much as Brazil." The
Mexican press was clearly resentful and
sometimes vitriolic in its attack on Brazil's
preferred treatment.
Numerous observers thought the key
reason for the trip was to drum up Latin support
for US punitive actions against Cuba for its role in
Africa. This idea led in several directions, in-
cluding the observation that the US "comes to
get, not to give." Others took the stereotype of an
interventionist US and drew irony from
Washington's concern over Cuban interference
in other countries. Another common criticism
related to Latin America's hard-won solidarity,
which the US allegedly was trying to break up by
emphasizing bilateral over multilateral relations.
The anti-communist editorialists had a special
slant. They exemplified the cynicism with which
many Latins greeted US promises not to be in-
different about Cuban and communist advances.
They expressed disillusion with Washington's
leadership of the free world and with US exports
of grain and technology to the USSR. Uruguay's
leading daily commented that the US in its third
century can become a paper tiger or assume its
role as "guardian of the best values of humanity."
The media notwithstanding, the countries
visited were obviously pleased with a symbol of
direct US attention. Commentary on the trip,
while often critical, was heavily larded with ex-
hortation that the US "follow through" with
deeds. In this connection, the Costa Rican foreign
minister announced that Latin America will ask
the US for commercial treatment that would
create special tariff preferences for the region.
CANADA: NEW LEADER FOR TORIES
The leadership of the opposition Progressive
Conservative Party has been taken over by Joe
Clark, member of Parliament from Alberta.
A dark horse during most of the leadership
campaign, Clark emerged as a real contender as
the compromise candidate at the annual conven-
tion last month when two of the front-running
candidates faltered. A former journalist and
professor of political science, Clark has been in
Parliament only three years. At 36, he is the
youngest leader of a modern national party in
Canada and the first bilingual Tory leader. He was
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former Tory leader Robert Stanfield's executive
assistant from 1967 to 1970.
Clark is opposed to capital punishment, sup-
ports the idea of bilingualism, and advocates a
limited reform of the abortion laws. On the
economic front he favors wage and price con-
trols, but only pn a temporary basis; curtailment
of government spending, with welfare geared
more stringently to need; limitation of the right of
essential civil servants to strike; and decentraliza-
tion of industry.
Clark may be in good position to challenge
Trudeau in the next elections, tentatively schedul-
CI
ed for 1978. Standing to the left of past Tory
leaders, Clark can compete more effectively for
the middle-of-the-road vote. 0 several 25X1
ranking Liberals acknowledge that Clark is a most
dangerous opponent.
The first test of Clark's leadership abilities will
come shortly, as he grapples with political and
cultural divisions within the party. The Tories are
split between the rightist Diefenbaker-led
Conservatives, who have dominated the party
since the 1974 debacle, and the so-called "Red
Tories," of whom Clark is a member. The party
has been unable to establish itself securely in
Quebec.
representative of French interests after all.
Clark appears to have the political acumen to
mend the Tory wounds. Energetic and engaging,
Clark is a brilliant organizer. He has already
begun the task of reconciliation, offering
archrival Jack Horner a senior position in his
shadow cabinet. Clark also appears sympathetic
to the French cause, although this will not suffice
to enable him to make inroads in Quebec.
Clark received a cool reception after his con-
vention victory from some of his rightist op-
ponents. Defeated candidate Paul Hellyer, for ex-
ample, did not appear on stage for Clark's
swearing-in ceremony. The majority of supporters
of the Francophone candidate, Claude Wagner,
left the convention hall before Clark gave his
acceptance speech. Caught up in French resent-
ment of Wagner's loss, the editor of the influen-
tial Le Devoir suggested that the two Quebec can-
didates were not given a fair chance.
Even so, there are indications that the Tories
may be ready to unite behind Clark. Several
members of Parliament who opposed Clark, later
indicated that they were ready to cooperate. A
poll at the convention showed, moreover, that
only 7 percent of the delegates felt there was an
irreconcilable split in the party. Even the out-
spoken editor of Le Devoir finally recanted and
announced that Clark might be an acceptable
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ARGENTINA: PERON PERSISTS
The Peron administration's last-ditch efforts
to win back disaffected labor and stave off a
military coup appear to be having a measure of
success.
The government's recent announcement of a
new economic package, including a three-month
price freeze and a wage hike to offset the effects
of rampaging inflation, has appeased at least some
of President Peron's labor supporters, who only a
few days ago were prepared to abandon the
beleaguered President.
As a price for continued support, labor
leaders will demand a cabinet shuffle and the dis-
missal of the small entourage of advisers around
the President who have increasingly excluded
labor from government decision-making.
Presidential press secretary Julio Gonzalez,
who has replaced Lopez Rega as the palace
eminence grise, may be labor's chief target. Peron
will probably agree to make cabinet changes
because such action has bought her time before.
The removal of Gonzalez is another matter.
The President appears incapable of func-
tioning without a close adviser. Gonzalez, as a
former protege of Lopez Rega, undoubtedly
provides her the psychological strength she needs
to hold on to the presidency. If his departure is
the price she must pay for labor's backing, she
may find that backing not worth the price.
In the meantime, efforts by several legislators
to convoke a special joint session of congress to
declare Peron unfit for office have bogged down
in legal and constitutional red tape. At midweek
Senate President Luder announced that the call
for an "eventual" joint session was still under
study.
The effect of these developments on the arm-
ed forces' preparations to take over the govern-
ment is problematical. The generals' slim hopes
that congress would spare them the necessity of
moving against Peron cannot have been
strengthened by Luder's temporizing, but some
of them, at least, will seize on the prospect of a
labor-dictated cabinet shuffle to counsel post-
onement of military intervention.
JAMAICA: GLOOMY ECONOMIC PICTURE
Jamaica has been particularly hard hit by the
world-wide recession. While export and service
revenues declined in 1975, imports were up
sharply, resulting in a record $245-million
current-account deficit. Unable to arrange com-
plete financing, Kingston had to draw on its
foreign reserves, which fell by $88 million to $63
million net at the end of the year. Unemployment
rose to about 23 percent and prices increased 18
percent. Despite a large increase in public expen-
ditures aimed at taking up the slack in the
economy, real gross national product declined by
at least 1 percent for the year.
Sagging world demand, increasing labor
problems, and the adverse effects of the new
bauxite tax caused bauxite and alumina export
earnings-normally accounting for three quarters
of exports-to fall by about 20 percent last year.
The bauxite levy, established in mid-1974, re-
quires the Jamaican producers to pay Kingston 8
percent of the final sales price of aluminum in-
gots. The regulation also requires the companies
to pay the tax based on installed capacity in 1973,
regardless of the level of production. Revere's
alumina plant has been closed since September
because of a dispute over the levy.
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Tourism, long Jamaica's second most impor-
tant source of foreign exchange, fell by more than
10 percent in 1975, causing a large number of
hotel closures. The current-account deficit would
have been much worse had not sugar earnings
doubled under the impetus of high world prices
and a good harvest.
To stem the decline in production and
employment, the government used the proceeds
of the bauxite levy, which totaled $170 million in
1975, to finance urban public works. The program
helped to bolster consumer incomes; it also near-
ly exhausted government financial resources and
was only marginally effective in reducing un-
employment. Moreover, by stimulating migration
to the cities, the program helped to intensify ur-
ban congestion.
The economic outlook this year is hardly less
bleak. Lower world sugar prices and an 8-percent
drought-induced drop in production will reduce
sugar earnings by at least 50 percent. The outlook
for recovery of bauxite and alumina sales is cloud-
ed by deteriorating labor relations, political strife,
and continued low world demand.
Earnings from tourism will fall again by 10
percent or more. Violence in Kingston at the time
of the International Monetary Fund World
Conference in January caused widespread tourist
cancellations. In fact, Pan American Airways has
requested permission to suspend air service to
Jamaica for 21 months beginning in March
because it expects continued weak demand from
American tourists.
Kingston will probably devalue the Jamaican
dollar in the next few months to stimulate ex-
ports, but little improvement in the trade and
payments situation can be expected until the US
economic recovery picks up later in the year.
Foreign payments problems will preclude im-
provement in the domestic economic situation.
Investor uncertainty will continue to deter an up-
swing in private investment. Although Kingston is
expected to maintain expenditures for public
works, unemployment will likely rise further and
income will continue to fall.
Although Prime Minister Manley intends to
continue the policy of Jamaicanization, financial
constraints will slow extension of Jamaican con-
trol over key foreign-owned economic entities
this year. In the bauxite industry, Kingston reach-
ed preliminary agreements for new operating
contracts with three of Jamaica's six international
aluminum companies in early 1975. These
agreements included the companies' acceptance
in principle of both the new bauxite tax and even-
tual purchase by the government of a 51-percent
equity. Signing of the agreements has been stalled
by labor strife and disputes over the size of com-
pany tax liabilities in the wake of the production
cutbacks. Strained government finances this year
will prevent government purchase of even a small
share in the $1-billion bauxite industry, and
Manley will almost certainly avoid expropriation
since it would have harsh effects on exports and
the availability of foreign financing. This year,
Kingston will have its hands full in merely collec-
ting the new tax.
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CHILE: REASSESSING OPTIONS
Recent reverses, internationally and
domestically, are causing the Pinochet govern-
ment to reappraise its policies.
Another strongly worded condemnation by
the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva and
US Senate action to cut off military sales and
deliveries have apparently caused Chile's ruling
generals to examine what steps can be taken to
Some presidential advisers believe that
recently announced decrees spelling out rules for
treatment of political prisoners will correct the
most la rant violations.
neighbor's weakened position.
Some junta members and government ad-
visers are urging Pinochet to set a date for the ter-
mination of military rule, but this is unlikely. At
most, Pinochet will probably press for early com-
pletion of the new constitution that is now being
drafted. This would presumably give him a chance
to hold a referendum and possibly point to it as
evidence of a popular mandate.
There are pressures from some officials for
substantial changes in the economic austerity
program, but the most likely outlook is for a few
minor modifications. The junta's basic policies
will probably remain intact, which strongly
suggests that Chileans will face more sacrifices
and hardships as winter approaches. The prospect
of continued depressed prices for copper also
dims the chances for a change in the junta's
economic fortunes.
The most urgent problem facing the regime is
to correct some of the causes of foreign criticism
of human rights practices, since this has slowed
the flow of funds needed for economic recovery.
Too often in the past the government has
declared its intention to move toward less
repressive rule only to have its guidelines ignored
by security forces. If Pinochet has now decided
that stricter restraints and compliance with ex-
isting regulations must be enforced, there may be
a gradual improvement of internal security
procedures.
An overriding factor in the minds of Presi-
dent Pinochet and his junta colleagues in con-
sidering a modification of present policies is the
impact that US action on military aid will have on
relations with Peru, which is militarily stronger.
The termination of all US assistance to the Chilean
armed forces would deepen the generals' fears
that Peru is ready to take advantage of its
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CHINA: MOUNT N ATTACKS ON TENG
The attacks on Teng Hsiao-ping continue to
escalate and, after a slow start in the provinces,
have gathered momentum throughout the coun-
try. The campaign has thus far stopped short of its
final step-a call for and subsequent announce-
ment of his ouster. This would suggest that Teng's
removal is at least as divisive an issue as was his
return from political disgrace nearly three years
ago. Nevertheless, more moderate elements in
the leadership have not been able to slow the at-
tacks on him, mute public criticism of him, or
mount a public defense of Teng and his policies.
Teng is the only member of the Politburo's
elite Standing Committee who has not appeared
in public since Chou En-Tai's funeral in
mid-January. No one in the leadership has
appeared regularly, but the party's left wing,
which is leading the attack on Teng, has
monopolized the public limelight. Those leaders
who are most likely to support Teng and his
policies have made few or no public appearances.
Chinese officials have made conflicting
statements as to whether Teng still holds his im-
portant party, government, and military positions.
A Chinese official responded on March 3 with a
"no comment" when asked to confirm rumors
that Teng had resigned. Even if Teng retains his
titles, there is no evidence that he has exercized
Students at Tsinghua University in Peking read wall posters
141- le~5
any authority since January 24, well before the
current round of attacks on him began. If the
moderates fail to defend Teng publicly in the
face of the strong leftist attack, he probably
ultimately will have to give up his highest-
ranking positions as party vice chairman and
member of the Politburo Standing Committee.
Should his opposition fall short of purging him,
it is probable that at best Teng could hang on as
an ordinary member of the Politburo. Teng's
position as PLA chief of staff is also in doubt.
The criticism of Teng became more pointed
when People's Daily ran an article on February 29
attacking an individual "'capitalist roader" and
citing one of Teng's well-known statements, thus
leaving no doubt who the target is. This formula-
tion has been picked up by several provincial
radios. Wall posters attacking Teng by name have
appeared in factories and schools in Peking and
are on public display in the streets in some
provinces. Posters on the streets of Peking do not
use Teng's name, and one observer who visited
several other cities saw no sign of poster activity,
indicating that the poster attack is not yet univer-
sal. One Chinese official noted that Kwangtung
Province is following Peking's instructions on the
criticism campaign "but very slowly." The head of
that province is an associate of Teng's and
reportedly is maintaining a neutral stance.
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The media attacks on Teng have become in-
creasingly harsh, criticizing his behavior before,
during, and since the Cultural Revolution. An ar-
ticle in the current issue of Red Flag, the party
theoretical journal, accuses Teng of refusing to
watch performances of the "model" plays
produced under the guidance of Mao's wife,
Chiang Ching. The article was written by Chu Lan,
a pseudonym for someone who is either Chiang
Ching or a spokesman for her. This indicates that
Chiang Ching, who was in relative eclipse last
year, is once again on the political offensive and
an active member of the group working to oust
Teng.
A particularly hard-hitting article in People's
Daily on March 3, implying that Teng has never in
fact been a communist, read as though it were
calling for his ouster-until the final paragraph. It
ended on a strangely mild note, saying he should
get "another hard slap and see how he will
behave in the future." This leaves open the
possibility that both sides could claim victory
through some form of recantation on Teng's part.
As an indication of how controversial a public
call for Teng's ouster is at the moment, the article
quoted a statement from the Cultural
Revolution-"No matter how high a position he is
in...we should overthrow him"-but pointedly
substituted "criticize" for the word "overthrow."
The political left clearly intends to have Teng
ousted, but backstage conflict within the
leadership has thus far prevented the left from
publicly stating its intention.
AUSTRALIA: LABOR PARTY SCANDAL
Former prime minister Whitlam's efforts to
get foreign contributions for the Labor Party cam-
paign in last December's elections may cost him
his leadership of the party.
The Australian press has charged that
Whitlam and the party secretary met with two
Iraqi diplomats just before the elections to discuss
a $500,000 contribution in return for Labor's tak-
ing a pro-Arab position on foreign policy
questions. Whitlam admits meeting the Iraqis but
denies that he discussed money. Labor Party of-
ficials admit, however, that the
newspaper stories are essentially correct.
Whitlam was reconfirmed as party leader in
late January, in spite of efforts to make him a
scapegoat for Labor's disastrous defeat in the
December elections. Many who backed Whitlam
in his leadership fight in January now believe he is
guilty of wrongdoing in the contributions
episode.
Most leftists relish the opportunity to dump
the former prime minister. A few, from the party's
fractious Victoria state organization that normally
opposes Whitlam, are backing him only because
they invited the Iraqis to Australia. The leftists'
standing in party councils was strengthened by
the defeat of any middle-of-the-roaders in the
December elections.
Facing the prospect that Whitlam may be
sacked by the Labor Party's executive council on
March 5, some Laborites have become concerned
over the lack of a replacement of adequate
stature. One rumored successor is Kim Beazley, a
respected middle-of-the-roader who has taken
positions in recent weeks to the liking of the lef-
tists. His accession to office would probably give
new impetus to a leftward drift in the party at least
initially. Another possibility, William Hayden, is
seen by some of his colleagues as not sufficiently
self-confident for the demanding leadership posi-
tion, and his chances have been hurt by Whitlam's
endorsement. Thomas Uren, a third possibility, is
probably too closely identified with the party's
left wing to be accepted by the entire
membership. The charges about the con-
tributions have added to strains within Labor
ranks caused by the party's election rout, and any
new leader would face increased difficulties in
holding Labor's parliamentary group together.
The scandals that cropped up during the
Labor government's three-year tenure con-
tributed to its defeat in December. Whitlam's
removal for malfeasance would further reduce
the party's chances of making a comeback in
coming state elections.
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