WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011200130001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 26, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
No. 0052/75
December 26, 1975
Copy N4 62
DOS review
completed
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CONTENTS (December 26,1975)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
1
Angola: Seesaw Continues
3
1(,rrorists Release OPEC Ministers
4
Lebanon: Negotiations Continue
5
Egypt: Getting Western Arms
25X1
7
USSR - Middle East: Focus on Geneva
7
USSR: Drought Slows Economic Pace
9
NATO: Arms Standardization
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
12
Cuba: First Party Congress Ends;
1
'd slov Speaks for Moscow
h
f
il
f
Pi
P
bl
M
3
ems
or
noc
e
ro
Ch
e:
ore
1.4
F c_uador: Opposition Stiffens
14
Argentina: End of the Rebellion
E
AST ASIA
PACIFIC
15
Cambodia: The Lao Pay a Call
16
South Korea: Pak Tightens His Grip
17
Philippines: Rise of Mrs. Marcos
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
Summary
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ANGOLA: SEESAW CONTINUES
Forces of the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola and the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola continued to press
the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola in the eastern
and central sectors of the country during the past
week. The Popular Movement, however,
reportedly gained some ground in the north. The
Organization of African Unity will convene in
emergency session next month, but the meeting
is not likely to bring an early end to Angola's civil
war.
Military Situation
In central Angola, a Popular Movement
counterattack, reportedly led by three Soviet T-34
tanks, was beaten back when it attempted to halt
a National Union force that had advanced from
the east to within 14 miles of Quibala. The
National Union claims to have destroyed one of
the tanks. At the same time, a separate, combined
National Union - National Front force has been
headed toward Quibala from the south.
The capture of Quibala would put the allied
forces in a position to move along a major
highway toward Dondo, the Popular Movement's
only major base before Luanda in this sector. The
hydroelectric plant that provides power to Luan-
da is located near Dondo.
In the east, a National Union force targeted
against the Popular Movement's important base
at Henrique de Carvalho advanced during the
week to the Cassai River, but its further progress
may be delayed. Retreating Popular Movement
forces have destroyed a number of bridges
behind them. Teixeira de Sousa, another National
Union objective, apparently remains in the hands
of the rival group, which thus continues to inter-
dict the Benguela Railroad.
Another National Union force has initiated a
drive south and east from Luso to clear out
Popular Movement forces that had moved into
that area earlier this month. The National Union
hopes to be able to reopen the road from Luso
through Lucusse to the Zambian border.
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Paae 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY nar 7A 79,
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In northern Angola, a 300-man Popular
Movement force reportedly advanced to within
60 miles of the National Front's base at Negage. So
far, the force apparently has not succeeded in
breaking through the Front's outer defenses
southeast of Negage. The goal of the Movement's
force is Carmona, the most important National
Front base after Ambriz. The Movement's drive
along the coast toward Ambriz remains stalled.
Political Developments
The Organization of African Unity, after
several weeks of squabbling among its 46
member-states, announced on December 19 that
a majority had agreed to hold an emergency sum-
mit on Angola on January 10-12 in Addis Ababa.
The summit will be immediately preceded by a
two-day meeting of foreign ministers, who will set
the agenda for the heads of state or government.
OAU members are deeply divided on
Angola, and the summit may well degenerate into
acrimonious debate. Supporters of the Luanda-
based Popular Movement regime-14 African
governments have recognized it-will hammer
away at South African support for the National
Union in an attempt to win new recognitions for
Luanda and, if possible, official OAU endorse-
ment of the Popular Movement as the only
legitimate Angolan nationalist group. At present,
a majority of African states are still abiding by
OAU Chairman Idi Amin's call last October for
neutrality in the Angolan conflict, a cease-fire,
and formation of a government of national unity.
Luanda's cause is likely to gain additional
momentum from the public announcement last
weekend that Nigeria has decided to give some
$20 million in nonmilitary aid to the Popular
Movement regime. The announcement capped a
visit to Lagos by the prime minister of the
Movement's "government."
Soviets Continue Anti-US Campaign
Moscow's propaganda campaign against the
US over Angola continues in high gear.
Popular Movement soldiers, in a happy mood, before going to the front lines
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The Soviet central press has been giving
heavy play to US congressional deliberations on
Angola, focusing particular attention on the fears
of legislators that the US might be drawn into
another Vietnam-like situation. Soviet media have
predictably applauded the Senate's decision to
block new US aid for the Angolan factions op-
posing the Soviet-backed Popular Movement.
Reaction in the Soviet media to President
Ford's public statements last weekend on Angola
has thus far been sparse. Radio Moscow termed
the President's remarks on Soviet policy toward
Angola "unfriendly"; it made no comment on his
references to Cuban activity.
Kremlin propagandists late last week did
stoop to a new low in their diatribe against US in-
volvement in Angola. A Pravda correspondent, in
recounting a recent trip to Angola, directly linked
a battlefield atrocity he allegedly witnessed in the
hinterlands east of Luanda to his claims that US
Vietnam war veterans were being recruited in
California "to commit new My Lai's" on Angolan
soil.
Moscow is also continuing its war of words
with Peking over Angola. Recent Soviet commen-
taries have blasted the Chinese for "teaming up
with the most rabid forces of international reac-
tion" in Angola and for allegedly providing
"massive" military and financial assistance to
""pro-imperialist, pro-racist forces" operating
there. For its part, Peking, in a People's Daily arti-
cle last Friday, denounced the Soviets as
"outrageous meddlers" in Angola who were bent
upon undermining African unity and plundering
the continent's vast strategic resources,.
Despite Moscow's harsh rhetoric and the
absence of any visible sign of flagging in its sup-
port for the Popular Movement, there may be
some flexibility in the Soviet position. On
December 19, for example, an article in Pravda
signed by "Observer"-indicating top-level
Kremlin endorsement-spoke in positive terms of
UN and OAU deliberations on Angola and seem-
ed to imply that Moscow may now place more
value than before on African participation in a
negotiated solution of the Angolan conflict.
TERRORISTS RELEASE OPEC MINISTERS
On December 21, six terrorists probably
linked with radical Palestinian groups seized 11
ministerial-level representatives participating
in a meeting at the Vienna headquarters of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries. Three persons were killed in the incident,
and one terrorist was seriously wounded. The
next day the Austrian government provided a
plane for the terrorists and their hostages to fly
to Algiers, where all but one of the non-Arab
oil ministers were released. After several hours
of negotiations, the terrorists and the remain-
ing hostages-including Saudi Arabia's Zaki
Yamani and Iran's j a m s h i d
Amuzegar-departed for Libya. After releasing
two more oil ministers, the group returned to
Algiers and surrendered.
The terrorists have not yet been identified,
but the leader appeared to be a Venezuelan
who is affiliated with the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine and has been involved
in several terrorist incidents in Europe over the
past two years. The Popular Front, however, has
denied involvement in the Vienna attack.
The attack apparently was intended to
dramatize continuing radical Palestinian op-
position to any Arab accommodation with
Israel. A statement issued by the group at-
tacked the US, Iran, and Egyptian President Sa-
dat, while calling for renunciation of the sec-
ond Sinai disengagement agreement between
Egypt and Israel. It also denounced attempts to
involve the Palestinians in Middle East peace
negotiations.
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LEBANON: NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE
Syria appeared to be making a little progress
this week in its ongoing effort to mediate the
Lebanese dispute. Tenuous signs of movement on
the political front have so far prevented a resump-
tion of heavy fighting in Beirut. Snipers are
attempting to spark new violence in the capital,
however, and heavy clashes continue in northern
and eastern Lebanese towns.
Lebanon's Muslim Prime Minister Karami and
a personal representative of Christian President
Franjiyah visited Damascus early this week, and
last weekend Syrian army Chief of Staff Shihabi
concluded two days of talks in Beirut with all prin-
cipal Lebanese and Palestinian political leaders.
While in Beirut, Shihabi publicly credited right-
wing Phalanges Party leader Jumayyil with being
"prepared to find a solution to all aspects of the
Lebanese crisis." This statement drew attention to
the relative obstinacy of leftist leader Kamal
Jumblatt and suggests that Shihabi's visit may have
been aimed mainly at pressing Jumblatt to temper
his political demands and cooperate with Karami
in forming a new cabinet.
Jumblatt is now showing some signs that he
may settle for limited political concessions rather
than force a choice between fundamental
political changes or renewed hostilities. On
December 19 he announced that Lebanon was
"at the beginning" of a political settlement that
could take two or three months to implement. In
addition, he has refrained from blaming Lebanese
Christians for the assassination on December 20 of
the governor of Tripoli, in northern Lebanon. The
governor, a civil servant, generally shared
Jumblatt's leftist views and, like Jumblatt, was a
Druze.
The Syrians may be attempting to persuade
Jumblatt to endorse the terms of an agreement
that was reached during Jumayyil's visit to
Damascus early this month. That plan reportedly
provides for:
? Implementation of an effective
cease-fire;
C- 25
? Expansion of the cabinet to include
representatives of Jumayyil and Jumblatt;
? Agreement to minor, largely
cosmetic political changes while Franjiyah is
in office;
? Negotiations on more fundamental
reforms after a new president is elected next
August.
Lebanese Christians would probably accept
these proposals on the theory that they would
bring immediate peace and allow time to modify
or back away from the pledge to negotiate fun-
damental changes in the country's system of
government. The leftists are reluctant to give up
anything in return for mere promises of reform.
They have suffered heavy casualties in the fighting
this year, however, and may now be convinced
that Franjiyah is not likely to resign or make
significant concessions before his term expires.
According to some reports, even radical lef-
tist Ibrahim Qulaylat has mellowed
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December 20 Qulaylat's headquarters issued a
statement saying that the Lebanese crisis can be
solved only "by the political process."
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24-2 ~
EGYPT: GETTING WESTERN ARMS
Egypt is making progress in its efforts to ob-
tain Western arms and reduce its dependence on
the USSR. Most notably, Cairo reportedly has
acquired assembly rights from Paris for the
Mirage F-1 interceptor. There also are indications
Egypt will be acquiring increased quantities of
British naval equipment and tactical missiles as
well.
on foreign sources of supply.
ty, Egypt can significantly reduce its dependence
Egyptian plans for production and assembly
of arms under license are likely to be im-
plemented under the aegis of the Arab Industrial
Organization, established last. May by Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The
authority reportedly has over $1 billion in pledged
assets from the contributing oil-producing states;
Egypt is contributing its production facilities.
The immediate outlook for Egypt's military is
one of reduced effectiveness because of the
changeover from Soviet arms to a mix of Com-
munist and Western equipment. The cutback in
Soviet arms deliveries to Cairo already has im-
paired Egypt's military readiness, and substantial
deliveries of many types of West European arms
are still a long way off because of Europe's more
limited production capabilities. In the longer run,
if Cairo can acquire more rights for local assembly
and production, especially for those weapon
systems it cannot purchase rapidly and in quanti-
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USSR - MIDDLE EAST: FOCUS ON GENEVA
The USSR is continuing to focus attention on
reconvening the Geneva peace conference, even
though the idea has not attracted much support.
Moscow, which has had substantial reservations
about discussing the Middle East at the UN, may
now see some chance that the Security Council
debate opening January 12 will give a new push'to
the Geneva conclave.
The Soviets demonstrated their determina-
tion to keep the Geneva conference option alive
in a note given the US on December 18. They for-
mally rejected the US proposal for a preparatory
peace conference, finding it unacceptable
because it did not call for Palestinian participa-
tion. The Soviets reiterated that a peace con-
ference in Geneva is the most effective way to
achieve a settlement and endorsed US-Soviet
consultations on reconvening the conference.
The conference was clearly uppermost in the
Soviets' mind when they received Yasir Arafat last
month. In order to overcome Israeli resistance to
sitting down at Geneva with the fedayeen,
Moscow tried unsuccessfully to persuade the
Palestine Liberation Organization to offer explicit
recognition of Israel.
In recent conversations with Western
diplomats, Y. D. Pyrlin, a ranking Soviet official
concerned with the Middle East, has frankly ad-
mitted that the language on Israel in the com-
munique issued after the Arafat visit papered over
continuing differences between Moscow and the
PLO. He said that Moscow foresees a Palestinian
state on the West Bank and in the Gaza strip, but
that most PLO leaders reject the idea of recogniz-
ing Israel within its May 1967 borders. Pyrlin add-
ed, however, that "some" PLO leaders accept the
concept of a West Bank state.
The conference was also the focus of conver-
sation for roving Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov
during his trip to Syria, Iraq, and Jordan earlier
this month. In Amman, he stressed that Jordan
should attend the conference.
Council debate would dilute Soviet influence on
the settlement process and undermine its claim to
equal status with the US as co-chairman of the
Geneva conference. In particular, the Soviets do
not want to give Peking a role in the area.
Now, there are some signs that Moscow
thinks it must get on the UN bandwagon. The
Soviets have grudgingly acknowledged that the
Syrian UN initiative has been paying political
dividends. On December 16, Moscow and its
Warsaw Pact allies formally announced that the
UN should play a more active role in the
peace-seeking process.
The Soviets, nevertheless, clearly continue to
view the UN as a secondary forum. The Soviet
note sent to the US last week may, in part, have
been meant to underscore that Washington and
Moscow are the principal custodians of the Mid-
dle East negotiations.
7 3e
USSR: DROUGHT SLOWS ECONOMIC PACE
The disastrous grain harvest, coupled with
chronic shortcomings in industrial management
and construction, has created the most serious
problems for the Soviet economy in more than a
decade. After slowing markedly in 1974, growth in
gross national product slumped to less than 2 per-
cent this year.
The outlook for 1976 is bearish. At the heart
of the 1975-76 slowdown is the severe drought
that prevailed during most of this year in the key
grain regions:
? Farm output is down more than 10
percent in 1975, the drop highlighted by the
depressed grain harvest of about 137 million
tons-80 million tons short of target; other
crops generally were mediocre.
Moscow has been cool to discussing a Middle
East settlement in forums other than the Geneva
conference. Moscow's lack of enthusiasm
probably stems from a fear that the Security
? The failure of meat output to rise in
the fourth quarter despite a sharp increase
in the number of animals slaughtered is a
harbinger of difficulties to come.
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? Industry turned in a respectable per-
formance-up 6.5 percent-with machinery
output leading the way. Military spending
continued to rise in 1975, buoyed by
procurement of hardware for strategic
weapons systems.
looking ahead to next year, the Soviets have
projected an increase in gross national product of
5.5 percent. If this goal is to be met in
agriculture, above-average weather conditions
will have to prevail. l he rebound of 11 percent
slated for farm output next year will require an
exceptionally sharp rise in crop production to
more than offset depressed livestock output. The
shortfall in feedstuffs from the 1975 crop will
mean that distress slaughtering of livestock will
have to continue into the first half of 1976.
i he Soviets are planning a 4.5-percent rise in
industrial output for 1976, the lowest planned
since World War II. This moderate goal reflects:
? hortages of agricultural raw
materi r'he fondellil5ll soft
goods industries.
? Persistent lags in completion of new
plants and the delivery of new equipment, a
coalition that will hold back production of
both light and heavy industries.
? A slowing of the growth of the in-
dustrial labor force; planners are reluctant
to draw further from the large pool of
agricultural labor for fear of aggravating
chronic difficulties in the farm sector.
The investment data indicate a continued
concern about old problems rather than a basic
restructuring of priorities. Growth in total invest-
ment in 1976 is to be reduced to 4 percent, with
emphasis on (a) the reduction of the vast amount
of capital tied up in uncompleted investment
projects, (b) an increase in the share of producer
durables going for replacement of obsolete
equipment, and (c) the maintenance of the high
priority of investment in agriculture and its sup-
porting industries.
The serious shortfall in farm output and the
scheduled slowdown in industrial growth will put
consumer welfare programs under increasing
strain.
? Increases in consumer goods and
services will be the lowest in the Brezhnev
era. Similarly, the annual boost in wages and
salaries will be held to 3 percent to reflect
poorer prospects for supplies of consumer
goods.
? Even with consumer incomes rising
more slowly, demand for meat will continue
to grow. Although supplemented by im-
ports, domestic meat supplies will fall con-
siderably short of the 1975 level. Restricted
food supplies, taken together with the
regime's refusal to raise retail prices, could
result in severe shortages.
USSR: Selected Indicators
of
Economic Performance
1971-76
Annual Rates of Growth
1971-751 1975 1976
Plan Actual Plan
Major aggregates
Gross national product
(Western concept)
4
7
2
51/.
Industrial production
6
6'.a
6''v2
4'a
Machinery production
9
10
112
8/
tAgricultural production
-1
11
-10
11
Consumer welfare
per capita
Real income
4i
5
4
3'/.
Resources allocated to
agriculture
Deliveries of machinery 3
10
7
6
6'/s
Gross additions to Irrigated
and drained land
4.34
4.9
4.9
4.9
1 Average annual rare of growth,
1 Estimate based on civilian production.
3 0 0 1 l varies of tractors, trucks, and other agricultural machinery.
d Average annual addition.
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NATO: ARMS STANDARDIZATION
The need for greater allied efforts in the area
of arms standardization was a major topic at the
meetings of foreign and defense ministers of the
NATO countries in Brussels in mid-December.
Allied concern over steadily increasing Soviet
military might and growing economic pressures in
the NATO states have sparked new initiatives in
an area where proposals for cooperation are as
old as the Alliance itself. A compromise approach
has been worked out that satisfies both France,
which wants to emphasize the European compo-
nent of a standardization effort, and the other
allies, who do not want to lose sight of coopera-
tion within the Alliance as a whole.
France will participate in an informal ad hoc
committee, which will study initially how best to
make the member states' equipment compatible
and usable by all-in effect, an early stage of stan-
dardization. The committee will prepare an action
program for presentation to the NATO foreign
ministers when the North Atlantic Council meets
again in Oslo next May. The committee will try to
determine the areas where action is most urgently
needed-perhaps communications and ammuni-
tion, as the French have suggested.
The allies also agreed to undertake dis-
cussions on the broader questions of transatlantic
standardization, procurement, and research and
development. The French are reluctant to em-
brace this part of the NATO program, insisting
that policy guidelines on these issues must first be
developed among the Europeans. This is critical,
Paris argues, if European industrial and technical
capabilities are to be protected in transatlantic
competition.
Just recently the French agreed to participate
in a purely European effort to promote the joint
production of equipment based on common re-
quirements. An informal group of European of-
ficials will meet next month to begin studying
how much cooperation may be possible. A
proposal to create a European arms procurement
secretariat, meanwhile, was rejected by the
French on the grounds that it would be too close-
ly identified with NATO's Eurogroup.
The allies are willing to accept for now the
French-imposed limitations on NATO efforts as a
price for getting France involved in the standar-
dization effort. The Belgians and the West Ger-
mans are especially sensitive to the domestic
political problems participation poses for the
French government. Both have argued that a
relaxed allied approach offers the best prospect
for bringing the French along.
Political opposition in France to participation
in any standardization scheme is intense both on
the left and on the right. The decision to involve
France, even in such a modest fashion, reportedly
was made by President Giscard only after much
internal wrangling.
Giscard continues to maintain that an in-
dependent defense policy remains a fundamental
tenet of French foreign policy. He recognizes,
however, that greater European collaboration in
arms efforts could lead to more orders for French
arms makers, bolstering employment and the
economy in general.
France will presumably seek to establish
specific projects for inter-European cooperation
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within the new informal European group. The aim
will be to ensure an important role for French in-
dustry and to achieve a measure of European uni-
ty before engaging in NATO-wide negotiations.
At the same time, of course, Paris will continue to
seek bilateral deals with the US that would
strengthen French production capabilities in
defense and advanced technology areas.
The Europeans are willing to play along with
the French so long as some momentum toward
standardization is maintained. They realize that
without French participation there can be no
meaningful allied standardization program.
If the French prove too troublesome in the
European group, however, the allies will again be
tempted to proceed without them. The UK and
Italy, in particular, have warned that there is a
limit to how far the Europeans should go in trying
to secure French involvement.
The UK is especially anxious to see progress
toward a "two-way street" in transatlantic arms
procurement as a means of easing its balance-of-
payments problems. London is suggesting that
some decision should be reached soon to ensure
that discussions concerning European collabora-
tion and the two-way street will proceed in
parallel.
The problem of a site for next month's ses-
sion with senior West European defense, ar-
maments, and foreign office officials, and for sub-
sequent meetings if they materialize, is illustrative
of the sensitivities aroused by the
"NATO-vs-Europe" aspect of the standardization
debate. The French will probably protest London
as a choice, arguing that it is too closely identified
with the Eurogroup. Brussels, the seat of NATO, is
even more objectionable to Paris, and the other
Europeans will not countenance holding
meetings in Paris. A "neutral" city therefore is a
more likely choice. Bonn may be suggested, but
the Dutch for one are likely to want eventually to
stress links with NATO by holding sessions in
Brussels.
The French have said that their purpose at the
coming session will be merely to determine what
other Europeans have in mind. Even if initially
limited, the participation of France is seen by
many Europeans as providing a political impetus
to European integration. The French deny any
such intention and remain skeptical of arms
cooperation arrangements that have been
proposed by the EC Commission in the context of
a common industrial policy.
Nevertheless, the new arms standardization
initiatives-especially if France's European
partners can sustain the threat that Paris might
otherwise be isolated from arms
cooperation-contain the seeds for a more
rational division of labor among the Europeans.
At a minimum, they appear to have established a
forum for discussion of enhanced European
cooperation in defense matters-a burden too
"political" just now for the EC to bear.
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CUBA: FIRST PARTY CONGRESS ENDS
The first congress of the Cuban Communist
Party was held from December 17 to 22 under the
tightest security Cuba has ever experienced. The
proceedings went much as expected. Fidel and
Raul Castro were "re-elected" party first and se-
cond secretary, respectively, and the other six
members of the Political Bureau. the party's
highest policy-making body, also were recon-
firmed. Five new members were added. The ap-
pointees reflect the trend of the past five years
toward ever-closer ties with the USSR and imply
that whatever frictions existed between
pre-revolution and post-revolution communists
in the regime's leadership have been officially
resolved.
The reorganization is the culmination in the
party of the institutionalization process that has
been under way in all facets of Cuban society
since 1970. The results of the congress indicate
that Fidel is still in complete control and that
Cuban policies are now more closely aligned with
those of Moscow than ever before.
The "re-election" of Fidel and Raul was an-
nounced on December 22 by Fabio Grobart,
believed to be the only surviving member of the
group of 13 men who met near Havana in August
'1925 to form the first Cuban Communist Party.
The selection of the Polish-born, 70-year-old
Grobart-long suspected of being a Soviet
agent-to make the announcement, and the
lengthy praise he gave Fidel, were probably in-
tended to signify the total unity of views of the
Cuban Communist leadership.
The same message can be read into the eleva-
tion of Arnaldo Milian and Jose Ramon Machado
Ventura, two provincial party chiefs, to the
Political Bureau. Milian is a pre-revolutionary
communist, while Machado is a veteran of
Castro's 26th of July guerrilla movement. Also
added to the Political Bureau were Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez and Bias Roca, both high officials of
the pre-revolutionary Communist Party, and
Pedro Miret Prieto, an associate of Fidel's since
their days at Havana University. Thus, the "old"
communists, who heretofore had no representa-
tion on the Political Bureau, now have 3 of the 13
seats.
The same trend toward greater representa-
tion of the "old" communists is expected to
appear in appointments to the new party Central
Committee, which will probably also be expand-
ed. The secretariat will remain the same for the
time being, but will be reorganized at a later date.
In addition, delegates unanimously approved
new party statutes, the reorganization of Cuba's
administrative divisions, a five-year economic
plan, and a new constitution that is to be sub-
mitted to a referendum on February 15.
According to press reports, Castro in his
speech to the closing session of the congress on
December 22 responded to President Ford by
acknowledging that Cuba has supported and will
continue to give military backing to the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, and by
announcing that his government will never
"renounce its solidarity" with Puerto Rico or
Angola. He added that he does not care if the
result is a postponement of normal relations with
the US "for the next 100 years."
Suslov Speaks for Moscow 5 5 5
Senior party ideologist Mikhail Suslov head-
ed the Soviet delegation to Cuba's first com-
munist party congress. Behind the scenes, Angola
was almost certainly high on the agenda of discus-
sion topics.
Publicly, Suslov hailed Cuba as an "active and
effective participant" in the national liberation
movement. He also emphasized Havana's "great
contribution" to the "preparation and implemen-
tation of our joint policy on international affairs."
Suslov gave no indication, however, that
significantly greater economic and military
assistance would be forthcoming from Moscow to
offset Havana's expenditures in Angola.
Suslov said the Cuban revolution was proof
that the correlation of forces in the world favors
"socialism." He called repeatedly on other Latin
American states to look closely at Cuba's exam-
ple. Suslov also read a message from General
Secretary Brezhnev reaffirming the "unshakable
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militant solidarity" and "unbreakable friendship"
between the USSR and Cuba.
The Soviet ideologist did not emphasize, as
had Brezhnev when he visited Havana two years
ago, the benefits of detente or the gains to be
derived from a thaw in US-Cuban relations. Now
more than ever, the Soviets have a strong interest
in relieving the economic burden they bear
because of Cuba's isolation in the Western
Hemisphere, and hence in improving
Havana-Washington relations. They recognize,
however, that Cuba's involvement in Angola,
along with its position on Puerto Rican in-
dependence, has arrested any movement toward
rapprochement with the US. Moscow and Havana
probably made their choice last summer.
CHILE: MORE PROBLEMS FOR PINOCHET
The Christian Democratic Party is preparing
to abandon its tacit truce with the Pinochet gov-
ernment. The party's leader, former president
Eduardo Frei, is in the process of distributing a
political pamphlet attacking the government.
Frei's action seems certain to reinforce the
government's siege mentality and stiffen Presi-
dent Pinochet's determination to enforce his
moratorium on political activity. As a result, if
Pinochet responds characteristically by placing
further restraints on the party's activities, Chile is
likely to be subjected to still more criticism from
the US and Western Europe, where Frei is highly
regarded.
Frei's party was declared in "recess" after the
September 1973 coup, but he refrained from
openly attacking the government. Frei has decid-
ed to speak out now because of a growing fear
that the party is withering away and because of
publicity alleging CIA support for past Christian
Democratic election campaigns.
Judging from the statements of other party
spokesmen, Frei's shift was also motiviated by a
belief that things are not going well for Pinochet's
government. Christian Democratic leaders
believe that:
? The economic situation has not yet
improved substantially, and prospects for
next year are grim, particularly in light of
continued low prices for copper.
? Church-state relations have
deteriorated, reinforcing a trend toward
firmer opposition by the Catholic Church.
? Pinochet has increased his personal
power, and this is expected to cause friction
within the junta and the armed forces.
? The US and other Western countries
have demonstrably turned against Chile.
Some of this is mere wishful thinking, but the
Christian Democrats are probably correct in their
assumption that Frei has more to gain by
challenging the government now than by letting
the party continue to atrophy. Frei and his
colleagues probably hope that Pinochet's military
critics will eventually oust him and turn to the
Christian Democrats for cooperation in
reestablishing democratic government.
There are, in fact, differences within the
military over Pinochet's style and his tendency to
act without consulting other members of the jun-
ta. Opposition stems principally from the navy
At present, most evidence suggests that the
majority of the armed forces, particularly the ar-
my, is united behind the President and is willing
to endure the high political costs of restoring the
Chilean economy and putting the country on a
permanent anti-Marxist footing.
If Pinochet moves against the Christian
Democratic Party, Chile's largest, the country's in-
ternational isolation will deepen, making its
economic recovery even more doubtful. Over the
long run, it also might provoke serious discontent
mine his support.
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ECUADOR: OPPOSITION STIFFENS
President Rodriguez, in an effort to stem in-
creasing opposition to his regime, announced on
December 19 that a new constitution and new
laws on political parties and electoral procedures
were being drafted in preparation for a return to
constitutional government. The effect of his ac-
tion was weakened, however, by his failure to set
a firm date for a return to civilian rule. Persistent
economic and labor problems assure that dis-
satisfaction with his leadership will continue.
Increasing demands by labor unions are also
posing problems for Rodriguez. In the wake of a
recent successful transportation strike, com-
munications workers last week occupied several
public buildings in Quito and demanded end-of-
year bonuses and administrative reforms in the
state communications corporation.
e
communications wor ers may ave een en-
couraged by rreports that the government "caved
in" to the transportation workers. This issue poses
a "no-win" solution for Rodriguez. If he deals
decisively with the strikers, he will surely be
criticized by his opponents. If he is not firm, he
may encourage other unions to strike, putting un-
bearable strains on the economy.
Rodriguez will soon be faced with the
problem of enforcing the Agrarian Reform Law
enacted in 1973. The law establishes standards for
productivity of private lands and provides that
property not meeting these standards by January
1, 1976, will be confiscated and redistributed. As
the deadline draws near, both landowners and
campesino organizations have stepped up their
activities. The landowners are asking for an exten-
sion of the deadline, and the campesinos are
demanding that the law be enforced. The con-
troversy reportedly has prompted the minister
and the undersecretary of agriculture to state that
they are in sharp disagreement with the President
and that they will resign on December 31.
Regardless of how Rodriguez deals with the situa-
tion, his opponents are sure to criticize him and
try to exploit the situation to bring added
pressures on the government.
Unquestionably, the military recognizes that
the events of the last several weeks have eroded
Rodriguez' ability to govern effectively; however,
it is doubtful that they will be ready to move
against him soon. The military is disunited, unable
to agree on a successor, and uncertain as to what
course to follow. Until a more capable individual
or group emerges to promise more than the Presi-
dent has achieved, his continuance in office, bar-
ring his resignation, seems assured for the short
74-75-
ARGENTINA: END OF THE REBELLION
Rebellious air force officers came to terms on
December 22 with their superiors, ending the in-
surrection begun four days earlier.
No air bases remain in rebel hands, although
some individuals continue to resist. A work slow-
down called by the pro-government General
Labor Confederation to protest the rebellion was
almost immediately called off.
In the wake of the insurrection, a number of
air force officers are certain to be retired. One
brigade commander has already been replaced.
The rebels' only success, achieved early in the
uprising, was the replacement of their com-
mander in chief, who was long unpopular with his
subordinates. The underlying problem-the
status of President Per - ains unresolved.
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Khmer soldier stands guard at Thai border
CAMBODIA
The Lao Pay a Call
AF
same day, however, Khmer communist troops
and Thai border police clashed several miles
northeast of Poipet. The skirmish reportedly
started when Cambodian troops crossed the
border in pursuit of a group of Cambodian com-
munist soldiers who had crossed into Thailand
seeking food or refuge. Thai casualties were light;
Cambodian casualties are unknown.
Bangkok has played down the incident, and
neither side wants such skirmishing to get out of
hand. Local border liaison officials have met to try
to resolve the dispute, which is complicated by
the vagueness of the border demarcation. Similar
incidents will almost certainly occur from time to
time, however, as a result of the villagers' custom
of moving freely back and forth across the border.
Moreover, Cambodian authorities are very sen-
sitive about attempted escapes from Cambodia
and infiltration by Khmer anti-communist
The Khmer communists hosted a Lao govern-
ment and party delegation headed by Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Phoun
Sipraseuth last week, and in the final com-
munique Phnom Penh for the first time supported
the Vientiane-Hanoi demand that US military
bases be removed from Thailand. Cambodian en-
dorsement of this Hanoi line points up Cam-
bodia's concern that it not fall too far out of line
with its communist neighbors, but the Khmer
communists are still maintaining their basically in-
dependent foreign policy-they did not join in
Hanoi's and Vientiane's insistence that Bangkok
return all aircraft and military equipment taken
into Thailand during the last stages of the war.
Phnom Penh thus far has not raised with Bangkok
the issue of Cambodian aircraft and equipment in
Thailand, doubtless in the interest of continuing
the effort to improve relations.
Cambodian-Thai Border Relations
Efforts by the Cambodians and the Thai to
work out their border relations are having mixed
results. Official trade began on December 11
when a train carrying a Thai salt shipment arrived
at the Cambodian border town of Poipet. On the
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SOUTH KOREA: PAK TIGHTENS HIS GRIP
South Korean President Pak Chong-hui
removed a major potential rival and further per-
sonalized his control over government ministries
by reshuffling his cabinet late last week.
Meanwhile, opposition parties, students, and
Christian dissidents remain quiescent, thanks to
rigid government enforcement of measures
designed to curtail political dissent.
The cabinet changes on December 19 were
highlighted by the removal of prime minister Kim
Chong-pil, one of the few politicians left in South
Korea with substantial independent stature and
popularity. He cited poor health as his reason for
stepping down, but the move was obviously
ordered by Pak. Although Kim was the chief
architect of the coup that put Pak in power in 1961
and has been a faithful executor of Pak's policies,
Pak apparently regarded him as a possible
challenger.
Kim was replaced by Choe Kyu-ha, who has
been Pak's special assistant for foreign affairs and
has no independent political standing. Nine other
cabinet ministers, including the foreign minister,,
were replaced. Most of the new ministers appear
to be technically proficient; more important,
none is a political figure in his own right. In addi-
tion to Choe, two other senior presidential
assistants and several loyal assemblymen were
moved into the cabinet.
Kim's removal may be followed by moves
against others who could emerge as rivals to Pak.
Chong II-kwon, for example, could be removed
as speaker of the National Assembly when Pak
reappoints a number of National Assembly
members early next year.
Pak currently has all major opposition groups
cowed. There was a notable absence of discord
between the government and the main opposi-
tion, the National Democratic Party, at the recent-
ly concluded National Assembly session. Despite
some grumbling among the party's rank and file,
the present NDP leadership is pursuing a policy of
compromise with the Pak government. Sentiment
for a tougher line against Pak seems unlikely to
grow, since Pak has made it clear that he will not
tolerate any assembly challenge to the "present
system."
The students, for their part, have been in-
timidated by an extensive police campaign to im-
plement the emergency decree announced last
May after a series of stormy anti-government
demonstrations. The decree bans criticism of the
constitution, prohibits political activity by the
students, and curbs the press. About 200 students
have been arrested under the decree; some have
received severe sentences.
All students, furthermore, have recently been
organized by the government into a tightly con-
trolled student defense corps, which now
oversees all student organizations and activities.
The police and the South Korean CIA have
saturated the campuses with informers in recent
months, and this has had a further chilling effect
on student political activities.
Christian dissidents are also under pressure.
Several prominent clergymen have been charged
with "misuse of church funds." Although some
have been let off with relatively light sentences,
the government's pressure has had a numbing
effect on dissident Christian groups. Some
younger clergymen are urging their leaders to be
more assertive-the Catholic bishops are under
particular pressure because of their unwillingness
to take a firm public stand on human rights
issues-but little seems likely to come of such ef-
forts.
An exception to the government's restrictive
policies has been its cautious handling of the Kim
Tae-chung case. A former National Democratic
Party leader and presidential candidate, Kim was
kidnaped from Japan in 1973 by the South Korean
CIA and has been tried in Seoul for alleged cam-
paign violations in the 1967 elections. Although
the government originally demanded a five-year
prison term, a one-year sentence was handed
down earlier this month-apparently out of con-
cern over potentially adverse reactions in Japan
and the US. Pak may even suspend the sentence
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during the appeal process to ensure that the case
does not complicate Seoul's relations with its two
major allies.
Over the near term at least, President Pak's
efficient enforcement of his restrictive measures
will probably enable him to maintain tight con-
trol. Some student restlessness can be expected
next spring as usual, but the government should
have little difficulty keeping it within tolerable
bounds. Other opposition groups, meanwhile,
are unlikely to risk losing what little operating
room they have left by becoming more assertive.
PHILIPPINES: RISE OF MRS. MARCOS
President Marcos' recent decision to appoint
his wife Imelda governor of the newly created
Metropolitan Manila region bears witness to her
growth as a political figure. Increased centraliza-
tion of power since martial law was declared three
years ago has given Mrs. Marcos opportunities to
attract her own political coterie and to expand
her personal influence into many new areas of
government policy. Mrs. Marcos clearly hopes to
exploit her enhanced power to build a political
base that would enable her to take over in the
event of her husband's death.
Mrs. Marcos is ambitious and ruthless. Born a
poor cousin of landed aristocracy, she has thirst
for wealth, power, and public acclaim; her ego
makes her easy prey for flatterers. Although she
has had little formal education, she is cunning and
determined.
Mrs. Marcos has a loose political organization
made up of media people and businessmen, plus
some politicians and a few military men. Most
moves on her behalf are orchestrated by her
brother Benjamin Romualdez, sometime gover-
nor of Leyte Province, home of Imelda's family.
Many of her foreign and domestic policy advisers
are former associates of the now moribund
pro-Soviet Communist Party of the Philippines.
Much of her power is based on her husband's
authority and the belief among both foreigners
and Filipinos that she is able to influence his
decisions. The Marcos marriage is essentially a
business and political partnership, but the
closeness of even this relationship is a
much-debated subject. In most policy areas, they
have generally similar views, although her public
positions are often more extreme. He probably
occasionally finds her statements useful as trial
balloons, but there is no evidence that she coor-
dinates everything in advance.
President Marcos' announced intention to
bring a new balance to Philippine international
relations and reduce Manila's close identification
with US interests gave Mrs. Marcos new oppor-
tunities in foreign policy, and she has been quick
to take advantage of them. She has cultivated the
image of a roving ambassador whose specialty is
cementing new relationships with Third World
and communist countries.
Manila's opening of relations with China is a
good example of how Mrs. Marcos operates.
Much of the groundwork for improving relations
with China had already been laid through regular
government-to-government negotiations when
she seized on the idea of making a visit. The
Chinese, for reasons of their own, treated her
royally. After her return to Manila she began
pressing hard for early establishment of formal
relations and for a presidential state visit to Pek-
ing. Marcos himself had already decided to es-
tablish ties with Peking, but his wife probably was
responsible for speeding up the timetable.
She has also made a trail-blazing visit to Cuba
and would like to make one to Moscow, but has
yet to wangle an invitation from the Soviets. Her
trips to the Middle East have been publicized as
negotiation efforts to assure oil supplies and to
relieve Arab concerns about discrimination
against the Philippine Muslim minority. As with
the China trip, however, whatever tangible results
have come from the visits were usually negotiated
in advance by the responsible government agen-
cies, leaving only the signing and publicity for
her.
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Imelda Marcos addressing UN last fall
0(,\
Mrs. Marcos' desire to become governor of
Metro-Manila evidently stemmed from her belief
that she needs to demonstrate her administrative
talents. Her husband acceded to the idea, but
Manila's middle and lower classes have never lik-
ed the Marcos clan-voting against President
Marcos in national elections and even registering
a sizable negative vote in the latest controlled
referendum on martial law. The new position will
give Mrs. Marcos an opportunity to attack some
of the city's obvious physical problems, such as
flood control, slum clearance, and road
maintenance, but she has a short attention span,
and it is quite likely that she will not have the ad-
ministrative follow-through to accomplish much.
If she can find good administrators as subor-
dinates, she may be able to make some progress,
but most of her present advisers could not per-
form such a role.
Her debut as governor was not inspiring.
After only one week on the job, she left town for
a visit to the US, saying publicly that her new
domestic duties would not interfere with her
foreign policy interests. Part of Mrs. Marcos'
problem in being taken seriously as a successor to
her husband is her freewheeling life style, featur-
ing world junkets and jetset friends.
If something should happen to President
Marcos, there is little doubt that his wife would
make a bid to replace him. In the political confu-
sion she might even succeed, but her ability to
rule would require support from the military, and
she is not well regarded by the officer corps. The
military's loyalty to Marcos is personal, based on
his long record of political support to the armed
forces during a period when most Filipino
politicians treated the military with contempt.
This loyalty does not extend to Mrs. Marcos.
The longer Marcos stays in office, the more
likely are the chances that his wife could put
together a powerful political machine of her own.
But even without more significant support,
Imelda can almost certainly be expected to
become one of many candidates to succeed her
husband-adding to political turmoil and in-
stability that would follow Marcos' depar-
ture-without much chance of emerging the vic-
Her enthusiasm for Third World and com-
munist contacts fits well with her growing an-
ti-American bias. Mrs. Marcos resents what she
believes are slights she has suffered from US of-
ficials both in Washington and Manila. Over the
long run this could cause friction in US-Philippine
relations. Thus far her husband still values the US
relationship, and Mrs. Marcos' activities have
been confined to anti-American statements.
Many Filipinos believe that Marcos has left a
political will naming Mrs. Marcos his successor.
She does not yet have the stature, however, to
make a serious bid for the presidency. Imelda
regards Defense Secretary Ponce Enrile, a long-
time Marcos confidant with strong friendships
among the military, as the principal threat to her
ambitions. Since the early days of martial law,
Enrile has been widely considered the most ob-
vious successor to Marcos, and there is a
long-standing deep personal antagonism
between Mrs. Marcos and him.
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