WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011200060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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No. 0045 / 75
November 7, 1975
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'ridgy morning by the
nce, reports and analyzes signifi-
torate of Science and Technology.
eo raphdc and Cartographic
earch, the Office of Strategic
coordinated with or prepared
more comprehensive treatment and there
separately as Special Reports are listed in
CONTENTS (November 7, 1975)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
1
Spanish Sahara: Marchers Move
2
Lebanon: Another Respite
2
Syria: Relaxing the Alert
3
Angola: Final Countdown
4
Bangladesh: New Leader
5
Pakistan: Political Challenges
E5
Oman: End of the Rebellion Near
7
French Territory of Afars and Issas
8
Spain: Political Maneuvering
9
Portugal: Countering the Left 25X6
10
NATO: Arms Standardization
25X6
14
Italy: Christian Democrats Still Divid
ed
15
Romania: Ceausescu on the Offensive 25X1
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
16
North Vietnam: Le Duan's Travels
17
Thailand-Cambodia: A Beginning
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
19
Argentina: Mounting Pressure on Peron
20
Guatemala-UK-Belize: Showdown Near
20
Venezuela: Nationalization
21
Chile: Tightening Security
22
Peru: Presidential Power Play
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to eekly
Summary
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l-2
SPANISH SAHARA. MARCHERS MOVE
Morocco launched its mass march into
Spanish Sahara on November 6 in the face of warn-
ings of possible dire consequences from Algeria,
which is working to block Rabat's efforts to annex
the territory. Although King Hassan, in a speech
on November 5, ordered the marchers to avoid a
confrontation with Spanish forces, he assured
them that the Moroccan army would come to
their aid against any non-Spanish forces. Some in-
cidents probably will occur involving either in-
digenous Saharans who want independence or
Spanish troops.
Rabat and Madrid reportedly concluded an
agreement this week allowing the march to
proceed under tightly controlled conditions. The
Moroccans will be permitted to cross the border
in a sector south of Tarfaya and to advance a few
miles into a no man's land from which Spanish
forces will pull back. A token delegation of some
50 Moroccans will apparently be permitted to
come to El Aaiun, after which all the Moroccans
are to return home. If the Moroccans attempt to
advance farther into the territory, Spanish troops
reportedly will use force to stop them.
Once across the border, the marchers could
easily get out of control and cause incidents that
might lead to Moroccan military intervention.
Rabat has recruited some unemployed and urban
street dwellers who are not likely to follow orders
or be especially peaceable. Some disorders have
already occurred at assembly points in southern
Morocco.
Even if Hassan is able to control his marchers,
clashes could occur with members of the Polisario
Front, a pro-independence Saharan group sup-
ported by Algeria. Armed partisans of the Front
have entered border areas in northern Spanish
Sahara from which Spanish forces have already
been withdrawn and may be in a position to
harass the marchers.
Madrid and Rabat are hoping the march will
not precipitate a military confrontation and that
negotiations toward a final settlement can be
resumed. Faced with strong Algerian opposition
to any direct transfer of the territory to Morocco
and Mauritania, however, Madrid has decided
once again to seek a UN solution to the problem.
King Hassan would accept further talks under UN
auspices, but he will continue to oppose Algerian
participation or the referendum on self-deter-
mination that Algeria demands.
Algeria has repeatedly denounced the march
as an aggressive move since Hassan announced
the project last month and can be expected to in-
sist that Spain and the UN force the Moroccans to
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withdraw. Algiers almost certainly has provided
arms to the Polisario Front to promote a sustained
insurgency effort. If Moroccan troops attempt to
occupy the territory and crush the Polisario
guerrillas, Algiers might order its forces to enter
the the Moroc-
cans.
LEBANON: ANOTHER RESPITE
Fighting was very heavy in Beirut last
weekend, but dropped off sharply later in the
week. A growing awareness among right-wing
Christians and leftist Muslims and Palestinians that
neither side could dislodge its opponents from
their new positions without heavy casualties ap-
parently prompted them to respect, at least tem-
porarily, Prime Minister Karami's latest cease-fire.
Some Phalangist forces have withdrawn from
the hotels they seized ten days ago, and some
leftist and fedayeen forces have withdrawn from
the Qantari residential area, but neither side has
given up its new vantage points completely. The
continued high tension could flare quickly into a
resumption of serious fighting.
Elements of the Syrian-controlled Saiqa
fedayeen organization and the Palestine Libera-
tion Army reportedly moved from Syria into
Lebanon this week, but are not known to have
become involved in the fighting in Beirut.
Damascus probably has allowed or encouraged
this movement to intimidate the Phalangists to
respect the cease-fire. On the political front,
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam late last week
joined with Lebanese Socialist leader jumblatt
and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman
Arafat in urging Karami to stay in office.
The most recent cease-fire was negotiated on
November 1, when Karami met with leaders of
the Phalanges Party and the main Palestinian
groups. The bargaining that led to the accord
enhanced further the already increased political
standing of Karami and Arafat. It served also,
however, to widen the split between the Prime
Minister and Interior Minister Shamun, who did
not participate and as a result lost to Karami some
of his responsibility for internal security matters.
Karami and Shamun met privately on
November 4 in an attempt to patch up their
differences over security policy. There were no
public announcements after the meeting, but the
involvement of at least a token number of army
troops in patrolling the cease-fire at midweek
suggested that Shamun may have elicited some
concessions in return for supporting-or at least
not opposing-Karami's peace initiative. Army
troops reportedly have joined representatives of
the internal security force, the private militias,
and some leftist and fedayeen groups in disman-
tling barricades and opening key roads in
the capital.
As a result of the improved security situation,
both Karami and Shamun are likely for the time
being to forget their threats to resign. Although
nothing concrete has yet come of efforts to find a
political solution to the crisis, the two leaders are
probably taking hope from the partial restoration
of political activity. The cabinet-including Presi-
dent Franjiyah-the committee for national
dialogue, and the new security committee all met
again this week.
SYRIA: RELAXING THE ALERT / U 1
Syrian military forces last week slightly re-
duced the high level of alert they have been on
for more than two weeks. Israeli military
authorities reported on October 31 that Syrian
troop activities appeared more normal than the
week previously and that some Syrian military
vehicles had been taken out of their defensive
revetments.
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Meanwhile, Syria and Saudi Arabia continued
preparations for a twice-postponed joint air and
ground exercise this week. Part of the exercise
will reportedly include an airdrop of about 120
Saudi paratroops near Dumayr, some 30 miles
northeast of Damascus. This operation will be
supported by Saudi F-5 fighters o eratin from an
airfield in northern Jordan.
-1t he Jordan iar-swl
not participate in the exercise but will provide
161
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ANGOLA: FINAL COUNTDOWN
All parties in the Angolan struggle are making
strenuous efforts to advance their interests in the
few days that remain before the Portuguese
relinquish sovereignty on November 11. It now
appears likely that there will be two rival Angolan
regimes-neither recognized by Por-
tugal-claiming legitimacy and competing for in-
ternational recognition.
Spokesmen for the Soviet-backed Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola have an-
nounced their intention to form a "national un-
ity" government on November 11 to defend
Angola's "territorial integrity." They continue to
insist there is no possibility of cooperation
between their organization and its rivals, the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola and
the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola.
Leaders of the National Front and the
National Union, for their part, announced after a
meeting in Kinshasa this week that they are set-
ting up joint committees to coordinate future
military and political activities. The committees
probably represent a first step by the two groups
toward setting up their own government. Each
regime can be expected to denounce the other as
"secessionist."
The Azevedo government in Lisbon,
meanwhile, remains firm in its policy of not
transferring sovereignty to any one Angolan
movement and is still working for the establish-
ment of a government that would include all'
three. A high-level Portuguese cabinet member
was in Kampala, Uganda, this week to support a
parallel initiative by President Amin in his capacity
as chairman of the Organization of African Unity.
Amin called at the same time for an immediate
cease-fire in Angola.
All three Angolan groups have sent
delegations to the Kampala conference, but the
objectives of the National Front and the National
Union diverge widely from those of the Popular
Movement. The allied groups have made it clear
they will not agree to a cease-fire as a precondi-
tion for negotiations, but only as a possible result
of a new political agreement in which their adver-
sary yields major concessions, including the
withdrawal of its military forces from Luanda. The
Popular Movement is not about to make any such
concessions, but probably would readily accept
an unconditional cease-fire for the present.
Underlying the divergent objectives is the fact
that the Movement, which gained a dominant
military position in the territory last summer, has
been forced in recent weeks to yield substantial
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ground to the forces of its two rivals on both the
northern and southern battle fronts. This week a
combined strike force of Front and Union troops
captured the vital Benguela-Lobito rail and port
complex. In northern Angola, forces of the
National Front are threatening Luanda.
The Movement is also under heavy pressure
in the enclave of Cabinda. Heavy fighting
reportedly broke out there on November 5
between Movement troops and forces of a
Zairian-backed separatist group. Zairian army
elements may be involved in the
fighting.
BANGLADESH: NEW LEADER
Tensions among army officers who overthrew
President Mujib's regime last August culminated
this week in another change of government. The
power shift has produced new strains in the
military, probably ensuring that the new regime,
like its predecessor, will be preoccupied with its
security and give little attention to the country's
massive economic and social problems.
Brigadier General Khalid Musharraf backed
by key military units in Dacca, gained control of
the government on November 3. Two days later,
President Mushtaque resigned and was replaced
by Chief Justice Sayem, who almost certainly is in-
tended to be a figurehead. Musharraf, until this
week the number three man in the army, is the
country's new strongman. He has been elevated
to chief of staff and promoted to major general.
There are also reports that a "revolutionary coun-
cil" will be formed, which presumably will be
dominated by Musharraf and include the com-
manders who supported his move.
Musharraf's move does not appear to have
been precipitated by any policy or ideological
differences with Mushtaque. The general seems
to have acted out of personal ambition and
frustration over the growing influence of his
predecessor as chief of staff, Major General Zia
ur-Rahman, and of younger officers who led the
coup against Mujib. Musharraf, who played an
important role in support of the young officers
last August, was reportedly displeased by the sub-
sequent appointment of Zia as chief of staff. In re-
cent weeks, Musharraf had a falling out with the
coup leaders, who enjoyed direct access to
Mushtaque.
On gaining power this week, Musharraf
reportedly had Zia arrested; the former army
chief may be permitted to leave the country. The
officers who led the August coup have already
been sent into exile..
Musharraf may have difficulty holding things
together. General Zia is popular in the military,
and his supporters could cause trouble. In addi-
tion, the cabinet has resigned, and several sub-
cabinet members have been arrested. Although
the cabinet did not play an important role in the
Mushtaque government, the mass resignation of
its members suggests that Musharraf may have
difficulty lining up political support.
The ministers' resignations were in protest
over the killings on November 3 of several im-
prisoned high-level officials of former president
Mujib's regime. A partially successful general
strike was held in Dacca on November 5 to protest
the killings.
The new regime is trying to divorce itself and
the military establishment from the killings, which
were apparently the work of one or more of the
young coup leaders, and also to avoid, or at least
limit, its responsibility for allowing them to leave
the country. An official announcement on
November 4 denied any military involvement in
the deaths and stated that a special commission
had been established to investigate the crimes
and the departure from the country of the young
officers.
India, which was jolted by the overthrow of
Mujib, appears to have been caught off guard
again by Musharraf's move. New Delhi almost
certainly is concerned by the new signs of in-
stability in Dacca and is watching the situation
closely. Indian officials have indicated in recent
months that trouble in Bangladesh leading to a
massive influx of refugees into India could result
in India's military intervention in Bangla-
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PAKISTAN: POLITICAL CHALLENGES
The pace of political activity has increased in
recent weeks. Last week, Prime Minister Bhutto's
regime won an important legal victory over a ma-
jor opposition group when the Supreme Court
upheld a government decree of last February
banning the National Awami Party, Pakistan's
largest opposition party. The court supported the
government's claim that the party had sought,
through acts of terrorism and subversion, to un-
dermine Pakistan's security and territorial integri-
ty. The government's case appeared weak, but its
ability to bring considerable pressure on the
justices had led most observers to expect the
decision affirming the ban.
The ruling could cause an increase in un-
derground opposition to the government in the
North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces,
where the National Awami Party's strength is con-
centrated. The verdict also is likely to touch off a
new round of hostile propaganda between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghans have long
given strong verbal support and some material
backing to Awami activists and other dissidents in
both provinces, particularly since Mohammad
Daoud returned to power in Kabul in 1973. The
Awami party and the Afghan government ad-
vocate greater autonomy for the two Pakistani
provinces, whose inhabitants are ethnically closer
to the Afghans than to most Pakistanis.
Partly out of resentment over the
government's repression of the National Awami
Party, tribesmen in Baluchistan have in recent
months resorted increasingly to violence-mainly
raids and ambushes against army troops and
others. The incidents reportedly are somewhat
more widespread than similar dissident activity in
the province last year that was largely suppressed
by the army. Bhutto has claimed-probably ac-
curately-that although such unrest may persist,
the government is capable of preventing any
large-scale rebellion in Baluchistan. There has
long been tribal resistance to Islamabad's rule in
that province.
Bhutto has been confronted with another
challenge in Punjab Province, where nearly three
fifths of Pakistan's people live. A former governor
i, IAtSoN
of the province, G. M. Khar, defected from Bhut-
to's Pakistan People's Party in September, taking
with him a number of party members in the
provincial and national assemblies. These losses
did not significantly weaken the party's
dominance of either legislature, and Khar himself
was decisively defeated by a People's Party can-
didate last month in a by-election for a vacant
provincial assembly seat. Khar, however,
appeared to win considerable public sympathy
during his campaign, in part because the govern-
ment resorted to intimidation and fraud to ensure
his defeat.
Khar has begun forming alliances with other
opposition politicians and hopes to run for the
provincial assembly again soon in another
by-election. The former governor, a right-
of-center politician with many enemies, does not
appear to have enough strength to pose a major
threat to Bhutto in the near future, but over the
longer run he could become a rallying point for a
variety of anti-Bhutto groups.
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(] J
OMAN: END OF REBELLION NEAR
The Omanis are confident that the military
wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Oman will be defeated in the current
Iranian-Omani offensive. There is little doubt that
Oman has the opportunity to bring an end to the
rebellion-at least militarily.
Omani troops near the border have seized
several large arms caches, cut the rebel supply
lines from South Yemen, and deprived the
guerrillas of critical sources of water. The rebels
are now boxed in on three sides by Iranian and
Omani troops who are preparing to assault their
main supply caves. The British commander of the
Sultan's forces has left open an escape route in
hopes that some of the rebels will choose to
return to South Yemen rather than continue the
struggle.
The Front's leadership has no reason to doubt
Omani and Iranian determination to end the war.
Government forces have expanded the scope of
the war, using Omani aircraft against artillery
positions in South Yemen and fire support from
Omani and Iranian naval craft.
The rebels can still inflict heavy casualties, but
without a substantial input of men and materiel
from their backers, they will soon cease to be an
effective fighting force. Over the past 18 months
the Front's strength is estimated to have dwindled
from about 1,000 to fewer than 300 men. Defec-
tions are steadily increasing, local tribesmen are
less willing to serve in a support role, and the es-
timated 350 South Yemeni irregulars serving with
the rebels have been reluctant to fight.
The Popular Front cannot be optimistic that it
will receive the foreign support it needs. Its pleas
for help from other Arabs have produced some
Libyan arms, but not much else.
South Yemen-the Front's principal backer-
has a strong ideological commitment to the rebel
cause, but is apparently unwilling to make the
substantial and direct military intervention
necessary to salvage the rebels' military position.
'UPIG
Dhofar rebels man antiaircraft gun
Effective military action, in fact, is probably
beyond Aden's capability.
A possibly more attractive alternative for
Aden is to find a formula for accepting a Saudi
offer to provide economic aid in return for an end
to Aden's support for the rebellion. Aden would
thereby realize some gain from developments it
seems powerless to change. South Yemen for the
first time reportedly showed a cooperative
attitude toward helping resolve the Dhofar
problem when the subject came up at an Arab
League meeting in Cairo late last month.
Meanwhile, Oman, seeking to encourage such
tendencies, has said it seeks only an end to Aden's
support for the rebels-not the toppling of the
South Yemeni government.
The rebels could react to their deteriorating
military situation by simply withdrawing into the
hills or back into South Yemen, effectively ending
their military effort. This would seem an ideal
course of action from Aden's point of view. It
would absolve it from having to choose between
a risky military intervention or acceptance of the
political conditions attached to the Saudi
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FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS
Paris has apparently made up its mind to
grant independence to the French Territory of
Afars and Issas, its last foothold on the African
continent. A peaceful decolonization of the
resource-poor territory at the entrance to the Red
Sea will not be achieved easily, however, because
of competing tribal and foreign interests.
Paris decided to support independence for
the territory because of increasing pressure from
French leftists, from within the territory, and from
Arab and African countries. President Giscard
d'Estaing's administration faces serious problems
in working out a specific timetable, however,
because of opposition in France to relinquishing
sovereignty and rivalry between the territory's
major political groups. International
arrangements also have to be worked out to pre-
vent the territory from becoming a source of con-
tention between neighboring Ethiopia and
Somalia.
Officials in France's Foreign Ministry and
Department of Overseas Territories are currently
preparing contingency plans for granting in-
dependence. Objections from the Defense
Ministry and from important parliamentary con-
servatives must still be overcome before the
government can formally announce its intentions.
A recent visit to Addis Ababa by Ali Aref
Bourhan, the president of the territorial govern-
ment, marked a major step forward in the move
toward independence. Ali Aref had extensive dis-
cussions with the Ethiopians and told represen-
tatives of the Organization of African Unity that
he will soon propose a referendum on in-
dependence to the territorial assembly. The
French had never before allowed so much
latitude to Ali Aref, who has long worked closely
with them. The proposal for a referendum will
also have to be ratified by the French parliament.
Both Ethiopia and Somalia have traditional
claims to the French enclave, based on the affinity
between Ethiopian Afars and Somali Issas and
their respective kin in the territory. Ethiopia's
military government, however, has declared its
support for independence and appears to be
cooperating with All Aref, an Afar. Somalia also
gives lip service to independence, but clearly
views it as a prelude to incorporating the territory
into Somalia. The Somalis see Ali Aref's develop-
ing relationship with the Ethiopians as a threat to
Somali aspirations.
While in Addis Ababa, Ali Aref further
provoked the Somalis by publicly condemning
their failure to renounce their claim to the
territory. Mogadiscio responded with a new
denunciation of All Aref as a French puppet who
does not speak for the people of the territory.
The French government is considering
arrangements to provide international guarantees
for the territory when it becomes independent.
Paris is leaning toward seeking such guarantees
from the Red Sea countries-Saudi Arabia, the
two Yemens, and perhaps Egypt. If this fails,
France will turn to the OAU, the Arab League, or
the UN.
The absence of a recognized nationalist
spokesman who can transcend tribal loyalties in-
creases the chances of instability in the territory as
independence approaches. Neither Ali Aref nor
his opponents-some of whom are calling for im-
mediate independence-can legitimately claim a
popular mandate to lead an independent govern-
ment. The traditional animosity between Afars
and Issas is likely to intensify as each tribe seeks to
assert its righ cognized as the successor to
French rule.
CC'S
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SPAIN: POLITICAL MANEUVERING
Spain's pressing need for an active head of
state, plus the near certainty that Franco will not
recover, apparently convinced Prince Juan Carlos
to accept once again the designation of tem-
porary chief of state. He had originally resisted
this arrangement because of his experience when
he took over briefly in the summer of 1974. At that
time he served only as a figurehead, and he is
concerned that a recurrence would damage his
reputation as a leader and possibly endanger the
future of the monarchy.
The virtual certainty that Juan Carlos will
soon lead Spain has spurred intensive political
maneuvering behind the scenes. Prominent
politicians of the establishment, encouraged by
widespread speculation about changes the Prince
will make when he takes over, are vying for the
post of prime minister. Juan Carlos, however, may
decide that it would be better to retain Arias for a
period in order to assure a smooth transition.
On the left, the Communist Party, after nearly
four decades underground, is striving to unify the
opposition against Juan Carlos. The Communists
have focused particular attention on forging
bonds between the two loose coalitions of the
left-the Communist-dominated Democratic Jun-
ta and the more moderate leftist Platform of
Democratic Convergence. They have en-
countered opposition from the Spanish Socialist
Workers Party-the major socialist faction which
dominates the Platform group-who distrust the
Communists and favor giving Juan Carlos a
chance to show his colors.
The Communists apparently made significant
concessions in order to persuade the Platform
parties to sign a joint communique of "objec-
tives" for the post-Franco era. The communique,
which was issued last weekend, did not condemn
Juan Carlos out of hand as the Communists had
wanted and was vague on key Communist
demands for the immediate establishment of a
provisional government and a national referen-
dum to choose between monarchy and republic.
The joint statement concluded with the two
coalitions pledging to remain in contact and
cooperate from time to time while working to
achieve their own goals.
The Communists' immediate aim is probably
to head off any effort by the post-Franco govern-
ment to isolate them from the non-Communist
left. Juan Carlos, once he becomes king, may
legalize many of the parties now in opposition,
but it is highly unlikely that he would include the
Communists.
Rightists have indicated willingness to sup-
port a degree of liberalization, including the
legalization of some socialist and social
democratic parties. They emphasize, however,
that the change should be in the form of a gradual
and controlled evolution that would clearly ex-
clude the Communists from participating in
Spain's political life. Rightists have shown some
awareness that extremists of their own ilk will also
pose dangers to a smooth transition. Leaders of
the National Movement, Spain's only legal
political organization, have reportedly made ef-
forts to dismantle the ultra right "New Force"
Juan Carlos' chances for success and, indeed,
for survival will depend to a large extent on his
ability to respond quickly and effectively to the
pressures for change without provoking a
right-wing backlash from those who are deter-
mined to preserve the status quo. The difficulties
and dangers inherent in the Prince's task are in-
creased by Franco's continued presence. Juan
Carlos will probably be reluctant to make major
domestic changes until he has been sworn in as
king, and as long as Franco clings to life, ul-
trarightists who oppose all change will be able to
cite "Franco's personal views" to obstruct
progress. The left, meanwhile, will be expecting
Juan Carlos to act decisively and quickly. Hesitan-
cy on his part could lead to demonstrations by the
left which in turn could provoke confron-
tations-perhaps violent-with establishment and
right-wing supporters.
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PORTUGAL: COUNTERING THE LEFT
The government of anti-Communist Prime
Minister Azevedo is striving to maintain the upper
hand in the face of left-wing efforts to undermine
its authority. Rumors of plotting to overthrow his
government by both the left and the right have
placed Azevedo under an additional strain.
Azevedo traveled to southern Portugal on
November 4 to demonstrate his government's
popularity in the countryside, away from the left-
ist influences that pervade the larger urban
centers. An enthusiastic crowd of about 10,000 in
Faro cheered Azevedo's remarks on the need
for a strong and stable central governing authori-
ty. Last week, at a rally organized in Porto by
pro-government political parties, a crowd of
100,000 greeted Azevedo in the first of a planned
series of visits to the provinces. The Socialists
and the Popular Democrats are planning another
rally in support of Azevedo for Lisbon on No-
vember 9.
The cabinet shares Azevedo's concern over
the lack of governmental authority in Portugal
and is asking military leaders to do something
about it. Following a session early this week, the
cabinet requested a joint meeting with the
Revolutionary Council to discuss how they intend
to enforce the decree ordering the surrender of
all illegally held weapons. The order was issued by
President Costa Gomes on October 17, but was ig-
nored by the extreme left wing, which is said to
hold thousands of arms- stolen from military
depots. Only a handful of weapons was turned in
by the October 25 deadline.
The cabinet also announced its support of
Portugal's decolonization policy, which has been
sharply attacked by leftists who would prefer to
turn Angola over to the Soviet-backed Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola when the
colony becomes independent on November 11.
The Azevedo government is determined to avoid
handing power over to only one of the three
warring Angolan factions. If presented with no
better solution, Lisbon will probably transfer
sovereignty to the "Angolan people" and wash its
hands of a problem that appears to defy solution.
Coordination Minister Crespo is continuing
efforts to bring the three liberation movements to
the negotiating table in hopes of striking an
eleventh-hour compromise that would enable
the Portuguese to withdraw gracefully. According
to one Foreign Ministry official, the Portuguese
are already losing touch with the situation, but
harbor no illusions that a settlement would be
anything more than temporary.
The left is exploiting the Angolan situation to
aggravate the broader differences between itself
and the government in hopes of throwing the
government off balance. Charges by several new-
ly formed radical military groups that anti-Com-
munist military leaders are consorting with the
right wing in a bid to return to power have been
played up by the leftist press. Preparations for
large-scale military maneuvers and the transfer of
military aircraft and weaponry from Lisbon to out-
lying areas have been cited as proof of a plot. Air
force sources deny that they are helping the right
and justify the moves on grounds that they are in-
tended to prevent a move by the left to seize con-
trol.
The chances for a successful move by the left
appear to have receded somewhat with the
decrease of left-wing influence in the military.
The turnout at recent rallies sponsored by the far
left and radical military groups has been unim-
pressive compared to the crowds attracted by
Azevedo. Recent reductions in the size of the
armed forces are expected to diminish the
number of political militants in uniform and to
restore control of the military to career officers.
The more than 200,000 Angolan refugees who
have returned to Portugal may present a greater
threat to the government. Largely conservative in
outlook and harboring grievances against the
Lisbon government, their objectives coincide
with those of right-wing exiles known to be plot-
ting against Azevedo. The arrest of two supporters
of former president Spinola in a refugee camp in
northern Portugal on November 1 suggests that
the rightists are capitalizing on refugedissat-
isfaction to further their own plans.
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NATO: ARMS STANDARDIZATION
The well-publicized effort to shore up
NATO's conventional war capability by ensuring
the compatibility of allied arms and military
equipment may have been advanced this week by
NATO's Eurogroup, the informal caucus of most
European NATO members. Final agreement still
has not been achieved, however, on the composi-
tion and authority of a group assigned to guide
the effort. Underlying this disagreement is the
fear of many Europeans that the NATO initiative
threatens to reduce Europe to a state of total
dependence on the US. A North Atlantic Council
debate on arms standardization is scheduled for
next week.
The effort to standardize conventional ar-
maments and equipment in NATO is as old as the
Alliance itself, but has drawn new life recently
from a unique conjunction of political, strategic,
and economic conditions. The onset of strategic
parity and the modernization and improvement
of Warsaw Pact capabilities in Europe have
highlighted the need to strengthen NATO's abili-
ty to resist a conventional attack. Present
economic difficulties in the West, coupled with
the rising cost of military hardware, have also
made the idea more attractive. Finally, precarious
conditions on NATO's southern flank have un-
derscored the need to shore up the Alliance.
These unusual conditions led the US to spon-
sor a proposal in NATO that not only endorses
joint arms procurement under common
specifications but foresees eventual trans-Atlantic
competition between the US and a fully
developed European arms industry. Development
of this European industry is expected to be in-
directly fostered by provisions of the Nunn
Amendment, which allows US purchases of arms
and equipment from abroad. The European reac-
tion has been understandably enthusiastic,
because the proposal has suggested a US desire to
reduce its domination of the trans-Atlantic arms
trade and thereby provide the necessary incentive
for enhanced European economic and political
cooperation.
There is nevertheless still considerable uncer-
tainty about how the US will interpret its mandate
to buy abroad. The Europeans are worried by
repeated US demands that European-produced
equipment meet strict standards of quality and
economy-which may not be attainable at this
time.
Britain and France rely heavily on arms ex-
ports to improve their balance of payments and
maintain employment. They insist that realistic
arms purchase requirements must recognize this,
and that the cost-efficiency emphasis be qualified
accordingly. France also argues that US
superiority in high-technology areas means
that under strict standards of competition,
Europe would gradually be reduced to the
role of "sub-contractor" and left to pro-
duce only low-level conventional armaments.
This prospect of reduction to a state of
technological dependence on the US is of
great concern to Europeans already fearful
that the American policy of detente will
lead eventually to their political sub-
ordination to Washington.
These arguments have special significance
since they are being made by the French. France
has not participated in the military side of the
Alliance since 1966, but winning their coopera-
tion is important to the development of an im-
proved conventional posture in Europe. Britain
and West Germany are especially anxious to draw
France into the discussions to strengthen the case
for increased arms purchases by the US. Participa-
tion by the sizable French armaments industry is
important for the success of any standardization
program.
France agreed to participate in the NATO
arms discussions in a meeting in September.
With France's desire to maintain national discre-
tion over the commitment of French forces,
however, French spokesmen are nevertheless still
insisting that discussions of arms standardization
in NATO take place in a forum that defers heavily
to national interests. France is also refusing to par-
ticipate in Eurogroup discussions because that
body is closely tied to NATO.
Consistent
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A decision announced on November 5 by the
Eurogroup suggests that matters may be moving
to a head. The group, which has been working on
a common position since May, announced plans
to establish bodies to work out the details of the
European arrangements and the principles for a
trans-Atlantic dialogue. France has been invited
to join, with the understanding that the members
would be ready to discuss organizing the effort in
a manner that would be politically acceptable to
France. Both the British-who chair the
Eurogroup-and the Germans seem willing to
meet with France outside the Eurogroup forum
provided Paris commits itself first to address arms
standardization in a serious way. At the same
time, the Eurogroup position appears to reflect its
equally strong conviction that the best way to
bring the French along is to appear ready to
leave them behind.
The Council session next week is designed to
produce something concrete that can be
reported at the NATO ministerials in early
December. France will clearly have to make its
decision soon.
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ITALY: CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS STILL DIVIDED
Nearly five months after the Communist Par-
ty's sharp gains in regional and local elections,
Italy's Christian Democrats are still far from agree-
ment on how to prevent the Communists from
repeating their success in scattered local elections
this spring and in the 1977 parliamentary race.
The question of how to reverse the trend
toward the Communists has tended to polarize
the Christian Democrats. One group centers
around Prime Minister Moro and interim party
leader Zaccagnini. It includes most of the party's
traditional left wing as well as some centrists, like
Foreign Minister Rumor, who have gravitated
toward the left since the June elections. These
Christian Democrats share the conviction that
their party will have to shift its policies to the left
and draw the Communists into a "competitive
dialogue" in order to compete with them
successfully at the polls. The Moro-Zaccagnini
group wants to define the differences between
the Christian Democrats and Communists in
terms of tangible issues more than ideology, on
the assumption that anti-communism per se has
declining appeal for the country's discontented
voters.
The opposing group appears somewhat
stronger numerically and draws most of its sup-
port from the party center and right. The group's
leaders-including former Christian Democratic
chief Fanfani, Budget Minister Andreotti, and
Defense Minister Forlani-believe that party
policy should continue to center on the
unanimous "opposition" to the Communists ex-
pressed by the 1973 Christian Democratic con-
gress. This group fears that shifting the emphasis
to a policy of "dialogue" with the Communists
would only enhance their respectability and lead
ultimately to broader collaboration with them.
Advocates of the "dialogue" thesis now oc-
cupy the top posts in both the party and the
government. This appears to be encouraging the
centrists to try to substitute one of their
own-Defense Minister Forlani is the front-
runner-for Zaccagnini as party leader. Zac-
cagnini was never a major contender for the top
party post but agreed to take the job on a tem-
porary basis three months ago when the Christian
Democrats could not agree on a successor after
ousting Fanfani.
Until recently, most Christian Democrats
have agreed that Zaccagnini should remain at the
helm until the yet-to-be-scheduled party con-
gress. Some of Forlani's supporters, however,
seem to be urging him to advance his own can-
didacy when the Christian Democratic national
council-the party's principal deliberative
body-meets later this month. They maintain that
the party needs more than a temporary leader as
it prepares for the local elections this spring that
will involve about a quarter of the voters.
Forlani is probably reluctant to risk deepen-
ing the divisions within the party by challenging
Zaccagnini so soon. Forlani could probably com-
mand a majority in the national council if he
forced a showdown now, but he may be reluctant
to risk an internal split similar to the one that
complicated Christian Democratic preparations
for the June elections. The party's leadership and
policies would be opposed by its own left wing at
a time when the Christian Democrats' major task
is to improve their standing with an electorate that
is leaning increasingly toward the left.
Both the Socialists and Communists are
watching the Christian Democratic struggle
carefully. The Socialists are hoping that the Chris-
tian Democrats will eventually agree to an
arrangement, such as formalized consultations
with the Communists, that would limit the latter's
ability to exploit discontent with unpopular
government decisions. The provision for con-
sultations is one of the conditions the Socialists
placed on their renewed collaboration with the
Christian Democrats in the national government.
The Communists, for their part, are avoiding
actions that could increase political uncertainties
while they are attempting to consolidate their re-
cent gains. This is best seen in the Communists'
reluctance to challenge the fragile Moro govern-
ment. The Communists recently hinted, for exam-
ple, that they would abstain rather than vote
against Moro in an upcoming parliamentary vote
on the government's budget.
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ROMANIA: CEAUSESCU ON THE OFFENSIVE
In speeches in Lisbon and Bucharest over the
past week, Romanian President and party chief
Ceausescu came forth with some of his most
nationalist rhetoric in recent years. Combined
with the accelerated pace of Romanian diplomatic
and interparty contacts, his remarks strongly
suggest that the Romanians are determined to
resist the Soviets on a number of issues, including
Moscow's role in the world communist move-
ment and in the CEMA summit later this month.
At home, Ceausescu used his opening ad-
dress to the 10th congress of the Romanian youth
organization this week to extol this intense and
implicitly anti-Soviet nationalism. He quoted from
a nationalist poem, "Romanians would rather fall
like lions than be chained like dogs" and urged
his cheering audience to carry on "an unremitting
struggle so that our country may find its place
among free nations, so that we may live like lions
and remain unchained forever."
While in Portugal last week, Ceausescu took
every occasion to snipe at Moscow. Stressing the
parallel between Lisbon's current situation and
that once confronted by Bucharest, he said that
Romania had solved its own special
problems-including those in the economic sec-
tor-without outside assistance. He threw down
the ideological gauntlet to Moscow when he
publicly advised all "progressive forces" in Por-
tugal-including elements of the bourgeoisie-to
work together.
The Romanians clearly anticipate hard
bargaining at the CEMA summit, particularly with
Moscow on the issue of economic integration.
Ceausescu normally goes on the offensive when
he is faced with a difficult situation. In this case,
Ceausescu in Portugal
he has expanded his contacts with both the com-
munist and the non-communist world, hoping to
attract world attention to his regime's alleged
problems with Moscow and perhaps to enlist the
quiet support of some of his East European com-
rades.
Bucharest's spate of international contacts
began in early September, when an un-
precedented number of high-level party and state
figures made visits to Peking. Ceausescu has since
received an almost steady stream of West Euro-
pean communists and leftist politicians-par-
ticularly Spanish and Italian communists, who also
oppose Moscow's efforts to dominate the Euro-
pean party conference.
Moscow is undoubtedly aware of
Ceausescu's remarks to the Portuguese as well as
his speeches at home, but the Soviet reaction to
the Romanian's offensive has so far been re-
strained. In previous campaigns of this sort, the
Soviets have generally declined to counter Roma-
nian invective openly. Instead, they have
preferred to use behind-the-scenes pressure,
such as was exerted during Party Secretary
U P!
Katushev's visit to Bucharest early last month, or
resort to aesopian language on subjects not
directly pertaining to Romania but whose mean-
ing is clear to Bucharest.
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NORTH VIETNAM: LE DUAN'S TRAVELS
North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan is ap-
proaching the end of a two-month trek in search
of economic aid commitments from his com-
munist allies. With the war over, the Vietnamese
communists are finding their allies less charitable
than in the past. In most of the communist
capitals, Le Duan has received promises of credit
on relatively easy terms, but it is clear that the
days of large-scale grant aid are over.
On the political side, the visits provided ad-
ditional evidence that Moscow now enjoys
somewhat better relations with Hanoi than does
Peking. In Moscow, Le Duan and Soviet party
chief Brezhnev were able to come up with com-
mon language on a wide range of foreign policy
concerns. In China, the two sides could not even
agree on a joint communique. The North Viet-
namese, however, realize that maintaining their
freedom of action requires a continuing balan-
cing act between the Soviets and the Chinese, and
they are not likely to move too far in the direction
of the Soviets.
Thailand, in part by playing on deep-seated
Khmer and Thai distrust of the Vietnamese.
The two sides did sign agreements on trade
for 1976 and an interest-free loan for Hanoi.
Unlike the European Communists, however, Pe-
king did not commit itself to any specific long-term
aid for Hanoi's second five-year plan (1976-80). A
North Vietnamese vice minister of trade has
remained in China, perhaps to continue dis-
cussions on long-term assistance.
The signs of friction between Hanoi and Pek-
ing during Le Duan's visit were not lost on
Moscow. When Le Duan arrived in Moscow on
October 28, he received the full red carpet treat-
ment, with Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin at
the airport to greet him. The Soviets matched
their more enthusiastic welcome with what
appears to be a generous aid package. In a joint
declaration issued on October 30, Moscow
promised to provide assistance in launching
"several major economic projects" on easy credit
terms.
[he Chinese indicated they were likely to
take a firm line with Le Duan when, in late
September, on the eve of his departure for Pek-
ing, they publicly underscored their claims to two
island groups in the South China Sea that Hanoi
also claims. In the speech making, the Chinese
lectured the Vietnamese on the dangers of
Moscow's detente policy, while Le Duan insisted
on praising Soviet as well as Chinese wartime aid
and promised to strive to bring unity back to the
world communist movement. Despite these im-
portant differences, the Chinese clearly have not
given up hope for improved relations with Viet-
nam-a fact demonstrated by the warm greeting
afforded Le Duan by Chairman Mao.
Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese left China
without hosting a reciprocal banquet for the
Chinese and, most significantly, no joint com-
munique was issued on the week-long visit. Hanoi
is not only antagonized by the island dispute, but
also by the way Peking has sought in recent
months to build up its position in Cambodia and
In a gesture Moscow will find to its liking,
Hanoi agreed to develop economic ties and
"coordinate" development plans "within the
framework of the multilateral cooperation of
socialist countries." On the surface this would
appear to foreshadow a closer North Vietnamese
relationship with the Moscow-directed
CEMA-Hanoi has attended some earlier
meetings as an observer-but the vague formula-
tion allows for considerable flexibility. In practice,
it probably means that Moscow will have some
say in deciding which East European countries are
best suited for meeting Hanoi's particular re-
quirements.
Moscow obtained a North Vietnamese en-
dorsement of some of the USSR's major policy
themes. Le Duan, for example, endorsed Soviet
detente policies more explicitly than Hanoi has
before. The Soviets must have found this especial-
ly welcome in light of Peking's efforts in
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September to persuade him of the dangers of
detente.
The joint declaration also demonstrated the
growing convergence of Soviet-Vietnamese in-
terests in Indochina. It was relatively noncommit-
tal on Phnom Penh, where Chinese influence is
predominant. This stance contrasted sharply with
pledges of aid and support for the pro-Hanoi
regime in Laos.
Despite these bows in Moscow's direction,
Hanoi is still trying to steer a middle course. For
example, Le Duan offered only the standard Viet-
namese exhortation-written into Ho Chi Minh's
last will and testament-for a restoration of unity
among the socialist countries. He also did not en-
dorse Brezhnev's pet scheme for an Asian collec-
tive security system.
After the Trip
With only a stop in Poland remaining, Le
Duan has been treated for the most part as a
visiting chief of state. This should help the
68-year-old party leader move a little further from
under the shadow of the near legendary figure of
the late Ho Chi Minh. Le Duan will return home
to enormous reconstruction and development
tasks that are no less challenging than the long
war to bring all of Vietnam under communist
THAILAND-CAMBODIA: A BEGINNING
Thai government leaders are pleased with
Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister leng Sary's
visit to Bangkok last week. Agreement was reach-
ed on establishing diplomatic relations and
cooperating in trade matters.
Some Thai officials, led by Foreign Minister
Chatchai, are citing the success of the talks as
proof that accommodation with communist
neighbors is a workable policy. Before Chatchai
can make any progress with the Lao and the Viet-
namese, however, he will have to come to grips
with the issue of military equipment taken to
Thailand during the last phase of the Communist
take-overs. Both communist countries insist that
the equipment be returned before substantial
progress can be made in improving relations with
the Thai. The Cambodians, on the other hand,
provided evidence of their independence of their
Indochinese colleagues by not bringing up this
controversial issue in Bangkok.
The agreement with Thailand marks Cam-
bodia's first significant step toward developing
relations with a non-communist country. The
Cambodians, nevertheless, are somewhat
cautious. The joint communique's vague formula-
tion on the timing of the ambassadorial ex-
changes-at a convenient date "depending on
prevailing conditions"-confirms that the Cam-
bodians are not yet ready to permit Thai
diplomats in Phnom Penh. The Cambodians
refused Thai aid offers but will receive urgently
needed Thai rice and petroleum products
through a barter trade agreement to be worked
out later after the establishment of border liaison
offices.
The liaison offices may also handle refugee
matters. The communique did not refer to the
large number of Cambodian refugees in Thailand,
but leng Sary implied that Phnom Penh was not
insisting on their return when he told reporters
that Cambodian policy is to take back all refugees
"as requested."
In light of the improving Chinese-Thai
relations and Peking's desire to counter Viet-
namese influence in Indochina, the Chinese
almost certainly encouraged Phnom Penh to
begin developing relations with Thailand.
Chatchai, in fact, attributed the relatively
cooperative attitude of leng Sary in part to
Chinese influence, claiming the Cambodians met
Chinese diplomats after each negotiating session
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TIMOR: GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS
Talks between Indonesia and Portugal last
weekend in Rome resulted in little more than
another pledge by Lisbon to do what it can to
secure a cease-fire between the local forces now
struggling for control of Portuguese Timor. Lisbon
can probably do very little. Jakarta concluded
weeks ago that a Portuguese request for Indone-
sian "assistance" in restoring law and order to the
colony would not be forthcoming, and that the
Portuguese have neither the inclination nor abili-
ty to reassert their own authority in the colony.
The continuing diplomatic dialogue with Por-
tugal, however, is important to the Indonesians, if
only to demonstrate to world opinion that Jakarta
would prefer a non-military solution. Indonesia
has had increasing difficulty in maintaining a low
profile on Timor as its limited military interven-
tion there has expanded. Recently, Portugal com-
pounded Jakarta's image problem by announcing
that it had asked Jakarta to withdraw its forces
from the Timor border area and nearby waters.
The Australian government last week also added
to Jakarta's problems by publicly criticizing for
the first time Indonesia's military intervention in
Timor.
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/ 4) 4~ - !/ 2-
ARGENTINA: MOUNTING PRESSURE ON PERON
Pressures against President Peron continue to
mount. Despite her stated determination to stay
and fight, she is almost certain to be forced from
office within the near future.
According to the latest press reports, the
government has acceded to labor's demands for a
wage hike. The size of the increase has not been
officially announced, but labor sources indicate it
may be as much as 40 percent. Economy Minister
Antonio Cafiero last week had tried to reach an
accord with business and labor to coordinate ef-
forts to retard inflationary pressures.
Official efforts to bring critics of President
Peron into line have not only failed but it now
appears that the judiciary is cooperating with the
legislature to force her from office on charges of
corruption.
A judge has ordered the arrest on charges of
corruption of Rodolfo Roballos, who briefly serv-
ed as social welfare minister following the
removal of Lopez Rega. The action stems from an
investigation under way in the lower house of
Congress to examine financial misdealings of
Peron's administration. Historically, both the
legislature and the judiciary have been generally
subservient to the President, but it is becoming
increasingly clear that most government figures
who are not wholly dependent on Peron see her
departure from office as a necessity and the onl
possible way to prevent a military take-over.
The leading political opposition leader,
Ricardo Balbin, who has long cooperated with the
government, now charges that President Peron
does not understand the deepening economic
and social problems of the country and cannot be
allowed to continue ruling it.
The President has blamed "journalistic
terrorism and defamatory rumors" for her
troubles. Minister of Interior Angel Robledo is
also trying to stem growing public criticism of the
administration by warning journalists to avoid
"sourceless reports, assumptions, speculation,
false information, and other forms of under-
mining institutions and confusing public
opinion." Although Robledo's directive is inter-
preted as a threat to press freedom, he may be
attempting to prevent outside forces from adding
to the government's difficulties at a critical time.
Meanwhile, feuding within conservative
Peronist circles continues to grow over what to do
about the President. Although most reformist-
oriented and youth groups long ago sided with
leftist terrorist opposition to her or dropped out
of politics, strains within the "orthodox" sec-
tor-which includes the bulk of organized
labor-have continued to deepen. The two fac-
tions have focused on the issue of political con-
trol-whether to follow orders from Peron or not.
The most powerful figure arguing against follow-
ing Peron's orders is the governor of Buenos Aires
Province, Victorio Calabro, who occupies a
uniquely powerful position as the only labor
leader who holds an elected high political post.
During the past month, he has repeatedly criti-
cized the administration, and recently he re-
peated his criticisms in answer to a Peronist
disciplinary tribunal's demand that he retract
them. The tribunal has responded by expelling
him from the movement, an action that will un-
doubtedly gain Calabro a larger following.
The latest reversal for President Peron is the
apparent defection of Lorenzo Miguel, the
political head of the Peronist labor movement.
Miguel has sided with the President in her
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GUATEMALA-UK-BELIZE: SHOWDOWN NEAR
Guatemala and the UK are nearing a show-
down on Belize, the end result of which could be
an outbreak of hostilities before the year is out.
This week, the UN's Fourth Committee is likely to
pass a British-sponsored draft resolution on
Belize, which the Guatemalans consider
humiliating. Angered and feeling frustrated,
Guatemala has threatened military action if, as
seems likely, the General Assembly then approves
the resolution. The General Assembly will
probably act on the resolution by early
December.
The draft resolution calls for resuming
negotiations on Guatemala's claim to Belize, but
Guatemalan leaders contend it establishes ground
rules that prejudge the outcome against
Guatemala. The draft specifies that negotiations
must be based on the "inalienable right of Beli-
zeans to self-determination and independence"
and on the "inviolability and territorial integrity
of Belize." Guatemalan leaders have told the
British that such language firmly closes the door
to meaningful negotiations and could lead to a
collision course.
Some leaders, especially in the military,
doubtless feel that with no room to negotiate, an
invasion is the only way to salvage some scrap of
territory from the claim. At the same time, they
see a military move as offsetting what is shaping
up to be a humiliating diplomatic defeat in the
UN. Others in the leadership, concerned about
the disastrous consequences a military defeat-a
very real prospect for the logistically handicapped
army-would have on political and social stability
in the country, are probably pressing for restraint.
They will continue to seek a peaceful solution
through negotiations, hoping that they can ex-
tract some public offer from the British that will
salvage some of Guatemala's goals.
Guatemalan anger could probably be cooled
by a UK offer to consider ways to meet
Guatemala's economic and security concerns,
such as increased access to Amatique Bay and
Belizean ports or a pledge that an independent
Belize will not be used as a base for Cuban in-
fluence. The militants, however, may not be
satisfied with anything less than some Belizean
territory. They can point out that an earlier
Guatemalan proposal, calling for a territorial con-
cession, was roundly rejected by Belize last
summer, and a similar approach is not likely to get
anywhere in the future.
The British want to settle the recurring
problem of Belizean independence once and for
all and seem determined to press forward even at
the risk of provoking a Guatemalan military
adventure. The British tried last week to calm the
Guatemalans by telling them that the UK was
open to talks after the UN vote and might then
show some flexibility, but this gesture may not be
enough to overcome the frustration presently
building in Guate 7 Ia.
VENEZUELA: NATIONALIZATION
Foreign petroleum companies have accepted
Venezuelan offers of compensation, clearing an
important hurdle for the transfer of the billion-
dollar private industry to state control. Marketing
and technical assistance agreements with each of
the 19 foreign firms must now be worked out.
Venezuelan officials are optimistic that all
agreements can be completed in time for the for-
mal transfer of company assets on January 1, 1976.
According to Article 12 of the nationalization
law, the agreement for each company must be set
forth in a written document-an acta-prepared
by the attorney general and signed by him and
the concessionaires. The acta is then immediately
submitted to congress for "consideration and ap-
proval" within 30 days. The government's
legislative majority in both chambers ensures final
acceptance of the agreements. The opposition
leftist parties, however, particularly the Social
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Christians and the Marxist Movement Toward
Socialism, have already begun to ask some
pointed questions about the nationalization
process. They are focusing their attacks on how
much the companies will be paid for their
marketing and technological services, whether
the compensation figure includes deductions as
required by law for drainage and marginal fields,
and the apparent "monopolization" by
transnational companies of international
marketing and technological assistance to the
petroleum industry.
Opposition efforts to generate public sup-
port are hampered by the complexity of the
issues, disarray and division within the major op-
position parties, and President Perez' proven
ability to manipulate public opinion.
1/ 9:_ ~ z 1
CHILE: TIGHTENING SECURITY
Recent events in Santiago suggest that the
Pinochet government is undertaking a new round
of anti-subversive activity. Since September,
security forces have uncovered at least ten caches
of weapons, explosives, and medical supplies in
the Santiago area and have made a number of
arrests in at least ten cities.
also uncovered imid-October w at appears to
have been a major headquarters of the
Revolutionary Left in a Santiago suburb. During a
lengthy gunbattle, several extremists were killed
and five captured. Andres Pascal Allende, a
nephew of former president Allende and the
leader of the extremist group, reportedly es-
caped.
The government now claims that it has
shattered an active plot by the Communist Party
to assassinate President Pinochet and establish a
Marxist-Leninist government by force.
Authorities claim to have arrested Communist
ringleaders in nine cities and are holding them in-
communicado while they search for more.
Although the Communist Party has not been
regarded as a direct threat to the regime in Chile,
government officials for some time have
reportedly been considering a campaign to
destroy its infrastructure, which, unlike Allende's
own party, survived his overthrow virtually intact.
The government's charges about communist in-
tentions suggest an effort to justify such a cam-
paign. There is evidence that one party leader has
been working actively with the Revolutionary Left
Movement in defiance of the party's policy of
nonviolence; this would give the government
added justification for moving against the party at
this time.
A concerted move against the Communist
Party would indicate the government's intention
to eliminate the left rather than continue efforts
to neutralize it and halt its growth. In light of
Chile's current problems involving foreign con-
demnation of alleged human rights abuses,
however, such a move would be at the cost of
al criticism.
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PERU: PRESIDENTIAL POWER PLAY
In the past two weeks President Morales Ber-
mudez has moved decisively to consolidate his
position and reduce radical influence in his ad-
ministration. His actions, which included the
forced resignations of three senior army generals
and the detention of two former cabinet minis-
ters, should strengthen his position in the longer
term. In the near term, however, he may have to
deal with disruptive actions by leftist civilian
groups and a few officers loyal to one of the
ousted generals.
Since taking power from former President
Velasco last August 29, Morales Bermudez has
been under strong pressure from more conser-
vative officers to rid the government of radicals,
most of whom were closely associated with the
former president. Morales Bermudez, uncertain
of his support at first, urged caution. More
recently, however, the President decided to act
because of evidence that Velasco's contacts with
civilians and military officers had increased.
Moreover, a situation had arisen in which,
because of military seniority rules, some
troublesome officers would have to be promoted
or cashiered.
In the case of General Graham, head of the
presidential advisory committee, allegations that
he was involved in questionable financial dealings
afforded additional plausible grounds for his
removal. The ouster of General Rodriguez, com-
mander of the important Lima military region, on
the other hand, appears more obviously political,
and leftist civilian supporters of the now-retired
general are demanding a more explicit justifica-
tion for the President's action.
A third army general, who in the past has
been associated with more conservative policies,
was also removed last week, reportedly for failing
to declare himself fully in support of the
President's other actions. The officer may have
been ousted, however, to demonstrate to the
radicals that Morales Bermudez still intends to
follow an even-handed approach. This approach
is also apparent in the fact that Army Chief of Staff
Fernandez Maldonado, one of the more vocal an-
ti-American cabinet ministers under Velasco, is
00
now in line to become prime minister next
February when the incumbent retires.
The net effect of these personnel changes
will be to strengthen Morales Bermudez' position
in the army command structure and in the cabinet
and to give him more flexibility in instituting ad-
ditional changes. Army opposition to the moves
probably will be minimal because none of the
ousted generals enjoyed widespread personal
support. Leftist civilian groups, however, pose
more of a potential problem. They are under no
constraints to curb their opposition in the in-
terests of maintaining armed forces unity.
A number of radical officers remain in high
government posts, but their prospects are uncer-
tain as it is becoming increasingly apparent that
Morales Bermudez intends to clear the regime of
leftist elements.
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