WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011100090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
DOS review completed
Secret
No. 0028/75
July 11, 1975
Copy No 64
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heWEEKLY SUMMARY, Issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current ntelllgence, reports and analyzes significant
oevFalopments of the weer through non on Thursday. It fre-
:ntly includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
ce of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
earth, the Office of Geographic and Cartottrafattic
:arch, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
sics requiring more comprehensive treatment and
ro published separately as Special Reports are listed
CONTENTS (July 11, 1975)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
1 Spain: Government Responds
2 Cyprus: Relations Worsen 25X6
3 UK: Wary Cooperation by Unions
4 Portugal: Bypassing the Parties
5 CSCE: Summit Delayed
6 USSR: Joint Mission Next Week
7 India: No Challengers
8 Persian Gulf: Different Tunes
9 Spanish Sahara: Possible Deal
10 Bahrain: Two-Year Grace
12 Japan: Miki's Diet Difficultie25X1
25X1
16 OAS: Rio Treaty Conference
16 Argentina: Wage Settlement
18 Chile: Backtracking on Rights
19 Mexico: Campaigning Abroad
20 Venezuela: Nationalization Debated
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
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SPAIN: THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS
Madrid is moving to defuse tensions in
Spain's Basque provinces. At the same time, the
Arias government is likely to face new problems
with labor following the recent nationwide labor
elections, in which opposition candidates
soundly trounced the government-supported
incumbents.
In response to a "unanimous outcry" from
the press associations, the government has
announced its decision to lift restrictions on
news reporting of disturbances in the Basque
area. Madrid also hopes to improve its image
among the Basques by declaring disaster zones
of areas of Vizcaya Province recently hit by
torrential rains, thus making them eligible for
special aid.
Prime Minister Arias and his interior min-
ister have met with parliamentary and church
leaders from the Basque area to discuss a solu-
tion to Basque unrest. The information minister
told newsmen that in his personal view the
three-month state of emergency imposed on
April 25 would not be extended unless there are
new developments before it expires. Terrorist
incidents in the Basque area have decreased in
the past several weeks.
Meanwhile, the government suffered a
serious setback in the nationwide labor elections
held last month. Nearly complete tabulations
reveal that more than 75 percent of the 360,000
incumbent shop stewards-the lowest echelon of
worker representation in the Spanish syndical
system-were voted out. Indications are that
most of the winners are members of illegal labor
organizations, including the Communist-
dominated Workers' Commissions.
The marked gains by the leftists in the
elections sets the stage for a battle over loosen-
ing the government's tight control of the
Syndical Organization. Many of the winners
favor radical changes in the system, which at
present places workers and management
together in one organization dominated by
management and government.
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Although the winners are opposed to the
government, it is by no means certain that the
majority of them are communists. In fact, the
government eliminated the most radical candi-
dates through strict eligibility rules and might
invalidate the election of known communists, as
it has in the past.
The labor elections will resume in the fall
when posts are filled at the local, provincial, and
national levels in the Syndical Organization.
Labor representatives in the Cortes also will be
chosen at that time. The results of the first
round will make it more difficult for the ap-
pointed syndical hierarchy to manipulate these
elections.
Prime Minister Arias favors limited reform
of the syndical system to meet worker discon-
tent, but he has been blocked by the conserva-
tive syndical bureaucracy, supported by
u l trarightists with ready access to Franco.
Failure to respond to demands for change at the
grass-roots level will lead to heightened tensions
between the government and labor.
The government also moved on July 4 to
quell speculation that Franco will announce his
retirement this month. The information minister
told the press that there would be no excep-
tional political announcements on July 18-the
anniversary of the outbreak of the Civil War.
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This is a date often used by Franco in the past
for important announcements. There have been
rumors that Franco would turn over some of his
power to Prince Juan Carlos or would
strengthen the Prince's position by making him
a captain general-Spain's hi hest military rank
now held only by Franco.
CYPRUS: RELATIONS WORSEN 5-1- 7
Relations between the two ethnic com-
munities on Cyprus worsened last week follow-
ing the expulsion of some 800 Greek Cypriots
from the Turkish zone. The expulsions were in
retaliation for rough treatment received by some
of the 48 Turkish Cypriots apprehended by
Greek Cypriot police while trying to make their
way to the north. The Greek Cypriots' discovery
of a large-scale resettlement of mainland Turks
in northern Cyprus has also contributed to
increasing tensions.
The Makarios government has lodged
protests with UN Security Council members,
charging that the expulsions and the coloniza-
tion were part of a Turkish effort to achieve de
facto partition and modify the island's popula-
tion ratio in order to reinforce the Turks' claim
to the two fifths of the island they now control.
Fewer than 8,000 Turkish Cypriots remain in
the south, with an equal number of Greek
Cypriots in the north.
The Turkish side wants complete separa-
tion of the two communities in a biregional
federation. The Greek side, on the other hand,
has called for a multiregional federation in
which the two communities would remain inter-
spersed in several regions. Except for hardship
cases, the Makarios government has generally
discouraged Greek Cypriots in the north from
moving south and has refused to permit Turkish
Cypriots in the Greek Cypriot zone to move
north.
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash earlier
had threatened to expel the remaining Greek
Cypriots unless all of his countrymen in the
south were allowed to move north, but he was
persuaded by the UN special envoy to Cyprus to
halt the expulsions in return for transfer to the
north of the injured Turkish Cypriots and their
families. There are indications, however, that
the Turks have now embarked on a campaign to
secure release of the rest of their kinsmen in the
south- The inhabitants of several Turkish
Cypriot villages in the Greek Cypriot zone have
already petitioned the UN for transfer to the
north.
The expulsions and the colonization, along
with the poor prospects for the talks, have
increased the frustrations of Greek Cypriots at a
time when both sides are planning large-scale
demonstrations marking the first anniversary on
July 15 of the coup against Makarios and the
Turkish invasion five days later. These demon-
strations are likely to raise feelings along the
cease-fire line to fever pitch and could lead to
outbreaks of violence before or during the
anniversary week.
The growing tensions have dimmed the
prospects for the next round of intercommunal
negotiations, set to begin in Vienna on July 24.
Denktash, who has adopted a tougher stance
than Ankara in recent months, has yet to
present proposals on the powers of the central
government or to elaborate his plan for a joint 25X1
provisional government as he has promised
earlier. He hinted last week that the talks may
have to be postponed.[
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UK: WARY COOPERATION BY UNIONS
Leaders of the Trades Union Congress and
weeak
the Confederation of British Industy this week
opted to cooperate with the government's pln
to limit wage increases voluntarily during the
coming year. By restraining wage demands the
Wilson government hopes to reduce Brtain s
annual rate of inflation from 25 perc sometime
highest in Europe-to 10 percent by so
next year. The key to the success of the govern-
ment's anti-inflation program, however, is the
assent of individual unions and their members
rather than the TUC.
The National Union of Mineworkers gave
for
the government the first glimmer of hope voluntary restraints when the miners decided
this week to "seek" rather than "demand" pay
increases of over 60 percent. The miners did not
set a deadline for the increase. statutory miners had
controls
refused to abide by the
imposed by the Heath government, and their
recalcitrance was one of the leading factors in
the Tory defeat in the election of February
1974.
Despite the miners' apparent cooperation for immediate
on wage hikes, their demand rkweek suggests
negotiations for a four-datrouble by early
that the government may face
y
next year. Chancellor of the Exchequer is
has said privately that the government
planning to stockpile coal in anticipation of a
strike.
The general council of the Trades Union
Congress-by a vote of 19 to 13-decided to
limit weekly wage increases to $13 during the
coming year. This amount is within the significant
suggested by Healey and a sig
reduction from the amount the union leaders
price
had discussed earlier. As their
ov-
operating, the TUC leaders have asked the with
h
ernment to deny pay raises 5 000, to work
annual income exceeding l
nd to h k
diligently to reduce unemployment,
down prices for six months.
Jack Jones, head of Britain's largest union,
has repeatedly
addresses National Union of Mineworkers
failure to cooperate with Prime Minister Wilson
could result in the government's defeat. The
union leaders, while not enthusiastic about any
kind of wage co troleandareal~ e that) it is ilot in
to statutory
their interests to topple the government.
The Confederation of British Industry, for
its part, is unenthusiastic about the govern-
ment's plan, because it believes the onus for
implementation is being placed
industry. The government has said that it does
not intend to take legal action be-
cause for violation of the wage guidelines,
such sanctions generally result in labor
disputes and would negate efforts to solve the
country's economic ills. The government will
that s to set up
take legal action u against
elinescbup it plan
guidelines,
adhere to the
aid private employers who
d t
o
an insurance fun
resist strikes aimed at breaking the wage uide-
l i nes
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The 240-member armed forces general as-
sembly has issued proposals detailing the estab-
lishment of direct links between the people and
the Armed Forces Movement. The plan, clearly
a compromise between extreme left-wing, Com-
munist, and moderate views, will easily enable
the Movement to bypass political parties and
retain full military control of public assemblies.
The new governing system, as described by
the assembly's document, will include three
parallel structures: the military, the government,
and the popular assemblies. The popular as-
sembly structure is envisioned as a pyramid,
building from the local level to the municipal,
district, regional, and national levels. The re-
organization will begin with the already numer-
ous "popular organizations" formed on the local
level. The Movement assures that it will control
the process by determining which worker and
neighborhood organizations will be recognized.
Each phase of the process will be carried out
only after the next lower level has been com-
pleted and will involve the participation of
Movement delegates.
Although the document states the Move-
ment has "no intention of ignoring political
parties devoted to the construction of social-
ism," moderate parties see little hope for their
existence over the long term if the Movement's
plan is implemented. According to the docu-
ment, the Movement expects the parties gradu-
ally to merge with the popular committees "for
the correct consolidation of the political van-
guard of the revolutionary process."
The moderate parties have reacted nega-
tively, with the Socialists announcing their re-
fusal to accept any system of popular commit-
tees and calling on party militants to mobilize in
protest against this latest "threat to democ-
racy." The center-left Popular Democrats have
accused the Movement of violating the pact
signed last spring between the parties and the
military, while the center-right Social Demo-
cratic Center has complained that the parties
should have been consulted before such wide-
reaching reforms were proposed.
The Communists and their allies, on the
other hand, quickly approved the proposals.
They are probably encouraged by the similarity
between the assembly's plan and the "commit-
tees for the defense of the revolution" advo-
cated by the Communist Party. The Commu-
nists are probably also pleased that decisions
within the committees will be made by a "show
of hands," and not by secret ballot as the mod-
erates would prefer. The Communists, who have
already made progress organizing on the local
level, are planning to intensify their efforts in
order to gain a strong foothold in the new
structure while staying on the good side of the
military.
The armed forces assembly's document,
which apparently did not precipitate a power
struggle between factions, recommends tighter
government control in the form of extensive
state control of industry and a global economic
policy, while at the same time advocating decen-
tralized decision-making through the popular as-
semblies. The proposal will be presented for
final approval in the Revolutionary Council,
where moderates have shown increasing
strength.
The Revolutionary Council, however, is
having a difficult time both in making decisions
and then following through on them. The coun-
cil was perturbed by a wave of social unrest,
labor strikes, and street demonstrations last
week but was unable to take decisive action
against extreme leftists responsible for the trou-
ble, apparently out of fear that internal security
forces, sympathetic to the far left, would refuse
to carry out the orders. After ordering extre-
mists occupying the church-owned radio station
to return the facility to the control of the Cath-
olic hierarchy, the council reversed the decision
in response to left-wing street demonstrations
and called for nationalization of all radio and
television stations. Leftist workers are still oc-
cupying the offices of the Socialist newspaper
Republica-in defiance of the military govern-
ment but with the support of the security
forces. The workers announced they would be-
gin publishing their version of the newspaper
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Prospects for concluding the European
security conference this month with a meeting
of the heads of state, as the Soviets desired, have
virtually disappeared because of the partic-
ipants' failure to resolve differences on several
issues. The Finns announced that they will
require three weeks' notice to complete the
complex arrangements necessary for a summit in
Helsinki. This requirement almost eliminates the
possibility of a July date.
Given the Finnish requirements and delays
caused primarily by Malta and Turkey, it now
appears that the summit cannot be held until
August. Moreover, if agreement is not reached
soon, the meeting may have to be postponed
until after the start of the UN General Assembly
and the holding of Finnish elections in
September.
Considerable progress was made in this
week's negotiations, but agreement on a summit
date is still held up by the demands of several
states. Turkey and Malta are firmly opposed to
setting a date, and Romania, West Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain also have
objections. Tentative agreement was reached on
most outstanding East-West issues. Seeking to
speed up a conclusion, the Soviets have gen-
erally compromised on most points and now
expect the other participants to reciprocate.
Despite strong divisive pressure from the Warsaw
Pact countries and disagreements behind the
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scenes, the NATO states-and the EC in par-
ticular-have maintained a united front on the
conference floor.
The participants have worked out a fragile
compromise on follow-on procedures for the
conference. The French--who had been holding
out-agreed to permit additional follow-on
meetings of senior officials and an eventual
second conference. Difficult neqotiations remain
on a number of minor points, however, and at
midweek several smaller countries were
threatening to withdraw their earlier approval.
Agreement was reached in principle last
weekend between the British, representing
NATO, and the Soviets on military-related con-
fidence-building measures. Advance notification
of military maneuvers will apply to the territory
of all European participants in the security con-
ference and to a 250-kilometer zone along
Soviet frontiers with other participants, as well
as along the Baltic and Black Sea coasts. Final
agreement was made possible when the West
Germans gave up their demand for a 275-
kilometer zone.
USSR: JOINT MISSION NEXT WEEK
Preparations for the Soviet portion of
the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project seem to be
proceeding smoothly.
The joint mission plan calls for launch
of the Soyuz spacecraft at 8:20 a.m. EDT
on July 15. About noon on the 17th, the US
Apollo spacecraft is to dock with the or-
biting Soyuz, and various crew exchanges
and joint scientific experiments will begin.
Final separation of the two spacecraft is
planned for about 11 a.m. EDT on the 19th,
and the Soyuz spacecraft is scheduled to
return to earth at about 7 a.m. EDT two
days later.
The remaining provisions of the agreement
place the threshold for notification at 25,000
troops, with amphibious and airborne troops to
be counted in any combined exercises with
regular ground forces. Notification is to be given
21 days in advance of maneuvers. All three
provisions will be voluntary, however, as the
Soviets have insisted.
The Turks' demands for a special clause
exempting them from certain provisions of mili-
tary-related confidence-building measures, and
for Turkish Cypriot representation at the
Helsinki summit, remain major obstacles to a
final agreement. Ankara wants a reduction in
the area of notification for military maneuvers
in the southern region of Turkey, as well as a
lower threshold for notification of all amphib-
ious and airborne troop maneuvers.
Western delegates believe that most of the
resistance to confidence-building measures
originates with the Turkish military. During
talks in West Germany this week, Bonn pressed
the chief of the Turkish armed forces, General
Sancar, to show more flexibility on this issue,
and several other NATO members made strong
demarches in Ankara. The Turks want to shift
discussion of these issues from Geneva to
Brussels, but the NATO allies fear that such a
move would merely prolong the negotiations.
France and Canada led several attempts
this week to break the impasse over the summit
date. They sought to establish the end of July as
a target date, while giving the participants
another week to work out their differences on
the most important issues. Maltese Premier
Mintoff's demands for the inclusion of a special
declaration on Mediterranean security in the
conference, however, prevented agreement on a
July 30 date. Since all conference decisions
must be by consensus, Malta thus has succeeded
in blocking agreement on a summit date, despite
intensive efforts by the EC to work out
promise.
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Prime Minister Gandhi continues to tighten
her control over the nation in the wake of the
proclamation of a state of emergency on June
26. The transition to a more authoritarian
regime has been surprisingly smooth, with
peaceful acquiescence in all but three of India's
22 states.
The chief potential trouble spots for the
government are the states of Tamil Nadu and
Gujarat, which are not ruled by Mrs. Gandhi's
Congress Party, and Bihar, the home state of
jailed reform leader J. P. Narayan. So far the
month-old Gujarat government has carefully
avoided antagonizing New Delhi, lest it be dis-
solved. The autonomy-minded government of
Tamil Nadu in south India is taking that risk by
making only a limited effort to enforce the
emergency regulations. Moreover, leaders of the
state's ruling party are openly critical of Mrs.
Gandhi's actions. She could dismiss the state
government and impose rule from New Delhi,
but only at the expense of fanning latent feel-
ings of separatism that have long existed in
Tamil Nadu.
This month, as schools reopen, students
may try to demonstrate against the suppression
of civil liberties. Mrs. Gandhi will not hesitate,
however, to use the sizable and effective secu-
rity forces at her disposal to crush any protest.
Tight press censorship will continue to limit
public knowledge of events that could embarrass
the government.
Parliament has been convoked for the week
of July 21 to approve the emergency proclama-
tion; the constitution requires such action
within 60 days. The Congress Party's large
majority ensures easy passage. Government of-
ficials claim the proceedings will be valid,
despite the fact that opposition leaders are now
in jail. Mrs. Gandhi has been anxious to
emphasize that she is operating entirely within
constitutional limits.
The Supreme Court is scheduled to take up
next week Mrs. Gandhi's appeal against her re-
cent conviction of illegal campaign practices in
1971. Although the court is unlikely to render a
full written decision before late summer, an oral
judgment could be issued earlier.
Some segments of society are showing
approval for Mrs. Gandhi's authoritarian moves.
Her apparent determination to press for greater
national productivity, for austerity among the
middle and upper classes, and for a crackdown
on racketeers, smugglers, and hoarders has been
well received by much of the public as well as
the military.
This week the Prime Minister also secured
promises of cooperation from industrialists and
labor union leaders. Some businessmen maintain
that Mrs. Gandhi wants tangible economic
improvements to justify her emergency actions
and that she may not hold national elections
until there is enough economic improvement to
compensate for the curbs on political freedom.
The majority of the population will focus
on Mrs. Gandhi's sweeping promises to improve
economic conditions for the poor-many of
these promises being reminiscent of campaign
pledges made five years ago.
One way the Prime Minister could
demonstrate that she now means business would
be to start implementing long-sought economic
measures, such as land reform, that would hurt
some prosperous supporters of the Congress
Party. Another would be to strengthen central
government control over the economic affairs of
the states. Since independence, legal and
political considerations have allowed the states
to pursue agricultural and financial policies that
give priority to local rather than national goals.
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PERSIAN GULF: DIFFERENT TUNES
Iran's Shah is unlikely to realize soon his
ambition to be the architect of a comprehensive
Persian Gulf security pact. Sharp differences
have developed between Tehran and Baghdad
over the scope of the proposed arrangements,
and Saudi Arabia's rulers are clearly wary of any
formal multilateral scheme.
The Shah has long been promoting an area
defense accord that would be directed against
both externally mounted threats to regional
peace and subversive efforts against local
regimes. He had apparently come to believe that
Baghdad, following the rapprochement between
Iran and Iraq last March, was thinking along the
same lines. Last month, however, the Iraqis
began making it known that their idea of
regional security cooperation was limited to an
agreement to ensure freedom of navigation in
the gulf and the narrow Strait of Hormuz.
Persian Gulf security was one of the topics
discussed during the visit to Tehran last week by
Saudi Crown Prince Fahd. A Saudi official who
accompanied Fahd described the talks on the
subject as "useful." According to the final com-
munique, the two sides agreed that the gulf
should remain a "peaceful, secure, and stable
region, free from foreign interference and for-
eign bases."
Although Fahd thus agreed with the
Iranians that foreign activity in the Persian Gulf
should he opposed-a Position spelled out
previously in Saudi Policy statements-he ap-
parently displayed little enthusi
r_ - .
asm
agreement on security arrangementsishould be
worked out in bilateral contacts before any such
conference is held; othe
i
rw
se thell
smaer states
might be forced to accept Positions with which
they do not agree. In fact, the Saudis almost
certainly oppose the Shah's concept, fearing
that such an accord would mean a stronger
Iranian role on the Arab side of the gulf.
The disparity of views among these three
key countries would seem to rule out any
serious discussion of a regional security pact
whstatesen thmeeetfoireign ministers of the Persian Gulf
informally in Saudi Arabia this week
during the Islamic foreign ministers' conference.
The Iranians themselves may now feel con-
strained to back off from the project, at least
for the present. The Shah's foreign minister, in a
statement to the press while Fahd was still in
Tehran, denied that a regional defense accord is
under discu