WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011000170001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 25, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A011000170001-3
" `' Secret
Weekly Summary
DIA review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
No. 0017/75
April 25, 1975
Copy N!
930?
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r NOW
The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and
therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed
In the contents,
25X1
CONTENTS (April25, 1975)
MIDDLE EAST
AF RICA
EUROPE
1 Vietnam: Collapse Imminent
2 The Middle East: Soviets; Egypt-Syria
4 Jordan: Husayn Spreads His Bets
5 Libya-Egypt: Feuding Again
6 Iraq: Quiet in Kurdistan
7 Italy: Barricades and Bombs
8 The Paris Energy Talks
25X6
25X6
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
13 Romanian-Soviet Tensions
14 Korea: Kim II-song in Peking
15 Cambodia: Solidifying Control
16 Laos: "Saber-Rattling"
17 Philippines: Erasing an Image
18 OAS: Old Reliable
19 Honduras: Lopez Ousted
20 Trinidad-Tobago: Taking the Initiative
21
OPEC Investment in the US
SPECIAL
REPORTS
(Published separately)
New Challenge for South Africa
France: Concern About Military Unrest
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SECRET :,,,,,,~
VIETNAM
Collapse Imminent
Despite a lull in heavy fighting at midweek
the fate of the Republic of Vietnam is sealed,
and Saigon faces imminent military collapse.
The timing is in the hands of the communists,
who now hold an overwhelming military advan-
tage over the government. While the respite has
given the government time to realign its forces
and strengthen defenses close to Saigon, senior
officials recognize the situation as hopeless, and
this mentality probably will lead to a rapid
unraveling once a major communist push begins.
Although the war is rapidly concluding, the
communists this week quashed any lingering
hopes of a genuine compromise or a quick cease-
fire, which would provide the best circum-
stances for an orderly evacuation of Americans
and those South Vietnamese most vulnerable to
communist reprisal. Hanoi and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government dismissed President
Thieu's resignation-and Saigon's call for uncon-
ditional negotiations-as a "clumsy and de-
ceptive trick" designed by the US to forestall
Saigon's inevitable collapse. They are demanding
that the entire South Vietnamese government be
replaced by persons not associated with the pre-
vious Thieu regime.
The communists are now focusing their
harshest attacks on the US, demanding a total
withdrawal of the US presence in Vietnam and
support for Saigon. In essence their message is
running along these lines:
? The American withdrawal should occur
immediately. An authoritative North Vietna-
mese commentary on April 22 said that all
Americans could be evacuated "in a very
short time, even in one day, without any
difficulty or obstacle."
? At the same time, Hanoi is extremely
sensitive to prospects of a large-scale South
Vietnamese evacuation and is condemning
US expressions of concern about communist
reprisals in the South. Hanoi appears to be
warning that the communists will interfere
with any US effort to conduct a wholesale
exodus of South Vietnamese.
The communists are not promising mean-
ingful negotiations-even in exchange for a
totally new South Vietnamese government and
full American withdrawal-but only "the rapid
settlement of the affairs of South Vietnam." At
this point, the best a new government could
probably obtain would be a negotiated sur-
render under the guise of a "political solution."
Thieu's resignation led to two days of
political confusion and bickering in Saigon, but
by week's end the formation of a government
with some chance of dealing with the commu-
nists appeared imminent. Prime Minister Can
and his entire cabinet resigned Thursday, and
negotiations are now under way between Gen-
eral "Big" Minh and President Huong to or-
ganize a new government. "Big" Minh is the
major political figure probably most acceptable
to the communists as a negotiating partner.
Assuming Minh gets his new government or-
ganized, he intends to seek and accept whatever
terms the communists offer. The South Vietna-
mese Ministry of Information already has or-
dered the removal of all anti-communist
banners, posters, and slogans in Saigon. There is
a good chance, however, that the communist
military timetable will allow little additional
time for the political process in Saigon to pro-
duce a government with which the communists
might deal.
Administration of Conquered Lands
Information is sketchy as to how the com-
munists are administering the areas of South
Vietnam that have recently come under their
control. Nevertheless, they are apparently
wasting little time in consolidating their control
and dealing with local resistance. Their new ad-
ministration appears to have a distinctive mili-
tary cast, suggesting that some areas have been
placed under a sort of martial law.
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To date, the communists have called the
administrative bodies they have set up "revolu-
tionary committees," and the mix of North
Vietnamese and South Vietnamese participation
is not known. A Western diplomat in Hanoi has
reported that roughly one North Vietnamese
civil servant in three has been sent south to
support the communist occupation effort.
The communists are making an obvious
effort to calm fears and prevent massive num-
bers of refugees from pushing south. A ten-point
manifesto broadcast on April 3 appealed to gov-
ernment civil servants to stay in their jobs and
guaranteed private businessmen that they could
continue in operation. From what little we
know about the formation of revolutionary
committees in cities like Hue and Da Nang, it
seems that at least a superficial effort in this
direction is under way.
On March 26, the Viet Cong radio broad-
cast a list of urgent tasks to be carried out in
THE MIDDLE EAST
r. z
The Soviets are meeting with a number of
Arab leaders in an effort to achieve a measure of
agreement before the reconvening of the Geneva
conference. The signs thus far suggest that fur-
ther talks will be needed.
Following the visit by Iraqi strong man
Saddam Husayn last week, Egyptian Foreign
Minister Fahmi had extensive talks in Moscow
during the weekend. Moscow and Cairo agreed
that careful and serious preparations must
precede the conference, but the communique
made no mention of timing. The Egyptians in-
dicated that the Soviets are talking privately of a
June opening. During the discussions, the So-
viets apparently made plain that they had no
interest in the Egyptian suggestion that the con-
ference be expanded to include France, the UK,
and at least one nonaligned country.
newly liberated areas, especially urban centers.
One task was to punish severely anyone "con-
cocting schemes" to oppose the new administra-
tion. The following day, a broadcast warned
that urban areas were good hiding places for
opposition elements and that "first of all"
troops should "eliminate all surreptitious acts of
resistance."
The scope and magnitude of the purges are
uncertain, but certain elements of the former
government, such as police, are particularly
vulnerable.
The communique suggests that neither the
Soviets nor the Egyptians have ruled out some
new attempt at a disengagement agreement-as
long as it is "decided on and implemented
within the framework" of Geneva. This goes
further than Cairo has in the past to affirm
Geneva as the venue for further negotiations,
but still does not completely rule out bilateral
Egyptian-Israeli talks. Recently, even some So-
viets have been speaking favorably of a renewed
attempt by Secretary Kissinger to achieve an
Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement, ap-
parently in the belief that this would give posi-
tive momentum to the conference.
The two sides seemed to agree that the
question of Palestinian representation at Geneva
should not block a reconvening of the con-
ference, but here again their comments were
ambiguous. They said that the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization should "have the same rights
as other participants," but did not specify the
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point at which the Palestinians should attend
nor did they close the door on PLO participa-
tion as part of another delegation.
Asad, who has consistently demanded that
Sadat refrain from unilateral agreements with
Israel and instead pursue an overall settlement
that satisfies all Arab territorial demands.
Although the atmosphere surrounding
Fahmi's visit appeared less strained than past
Soviet-Egyptian exchanges, the communique did
not suggest progress on such issues as debt re-
scheduling and military aid. Egyptian comments
prior to the visit indicated that Cairo had hoped
to use Moscow's interest in the Geneva con-
ference to press the Soviets on these issues. The
Soviets, however, apparently would have none
of this. Foreign Minister Gromyko, in effect,
told the Egyptians that Moscow still considered
Cairo's independent policies the major obstacle
to closer ties.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam arrived
in Moscow hard on Fahmi's heels. In addition,
Soviet chief of staff Kulikov traveled to Damas-
cus this week to discuss military issues. The
primary purpose of the talks is probably to
ensure Syrian participation at Geneva, but
Damascus' dispute with Baghdad over the
Euphrates River will probably also be dis-
cussed.
EGYPT AND SYRIA STILL AT ODDS 3.,4
Presidents Sadat and Asad appear to have
papered over some of their differences during
the two-day summit in Riyadh held under the
auspices of the new Saudi leadership. The ab-
sence of specifics in the communique issued on
April 23, however, suggests that there are still
serious disagreements between the Egyptian and
Syrian leaders.
The communique affirmed that "political
action during the coming stage demands the
establishment of the closest cooperation"
between the two countries. It noted that "any
action"-presumably meaning any negotiated
agreement with the Israelis-on any front should
be "part of" similar action on all fronts. These
assertions are obviously designed to mollify
The communique did not mention a re-
convened Geneva conference and made scant
mention of the Palestinians. This suggests that
the two presidents found little common ground
on these issues, which are basic to any formula-
tion of a joint strategy. The communique re-
ferred only in passing to ensuring the "legiti-
mate rights of the Palestinians, but avoided
standard Arab formulations on establishing a
Palestinian state and guaranteeing the presence
of the Palestine Liberation Organization at
Geneva.
Sadat has been attempting to devise a
formula that would defer PLO participation in
the conference and, even when this is agreed
upon, obscure the PLO presence by absorbing it
in a broader Arab delegation. He has apparently
had no success in pressing this position on the
Palestinians and may have run into difficulty
with Asad as well. The Syrians have hinted
broadly in the past that they might boycott the
conference unless the PLO is invited to attend
from the start.
Sadat's assertions of a determination to
coordinate more closely with Asad cost him
nothing at this point. He seems to have no hope
that another Egyptian-Israeli disengagement can
be negotiated and thus sees the Geneva confer-
ence, where closer cooperation with Syria will
be necessary, as the only negotiating avenue still
open.
The two presidents established a new vehi-
cle for future coordination, which offers some
hope of an improvement in bilateral relations.
According to the communique, they have
formed a permanent coordination committee
under the joint chairmanship of the Egyptian
vice president and the Syrian prime minister. In
the past, contacts have been the province of the 25X1
two foreign ministers, whose abrasive personali-
ties and mutual, antagonism further soured'
Egyptian-Syrian relations.
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JORDAN: HUSAYN SPREADS HIS BETS 5,(V
King Husayn, at 40 the longest ruling of
the Arab chiefs of state, arrives in Washington
next week for a discussion of Jordan's military
and economic needs. Husayn's fortunes, and
those of his country, have improved markedly
over the past year, largely as a result of his
decision to acquiesce in the Arab League's reso-
lution at Rabat last October that the Palestine
Liberation Organization should ultimately
assume control over the West Bank.
From that decision has flowed some $175
million in so-called Rabat payments from the
Arab League and a special Saudi grant of $57
million to cover "urgent and necessary require-
ments." The Palestinians have muted their
attacks on the King, and have grudgingly
acknowledged the Jordanian army's "vital role"
in the "battle for liberation" of the Palestinian
homeland.
After a period of moody introspection fol-
lowing the Rabat summit, the King-prodded by
Prime Minister Rifai-moved actively to mend
fences at home and abroad. He applied some of
the Arab subsidies to improve the conditions of
the army, and, with income from phosphate
exports rising, moved forward on some long-
dormant development projects. Jordan's diplo-
matic contacts with Arab states were upgraded
across the board; even Iraqi leader Saddam
Husayn was invited to Amman, and the King
went so far as to offer to meet with Libyan
President Qadhafi. King Husayn has grown par-
ticularly cozy with Syrian President Asad,
making a surprise visit to Damascus for a long
talk with Asad early in April.
The King is nevertheless determined to
press for US delivery of a Hawk missile defense
system at an early date. He and his prime min-
ister have dropped hints that if this cannot be
managed, he will try to "borrow" Hawks from
Saudi Arabia or, if necessary, get Syria to pro-
vide Soviet SA-6s and SA-7s.
Husayn is also expecting US budget and
military support of $180 million this year. Al-
though he will remind Washington of Jordan's
long-term loyalty and his readiness to support
US policy in the area, Husayn and Rifai have
recently been spreading their bets. In the past
two months Jordan has:
? Developed a more intimate relationship
with Syria than ever before, including wide-
ranging economic and trade agreements and
active political and military consultations.
? Entertained several Soviet economic
and political delegations and lavishly wel-
comed Romanian President Ceausescu.
? Approved requests for diplomatic
representation by Yugoslavia, East Ger-
many, and North Korea.
? Rushed to congratulate Prince Siha-
nouk and promise recognition of his "gov-
ernment of national union."
Some Jordanian officials profess concern
about the extent and direction of Jordan's
widening involvement in foreign affairs, which
stirs little popular interest. They fear the coun-
try will be drawn into politically dangerous
entanglements abroad when it should be con-
centrating on internal development. Field-grade
officers are said to be worried that, if the King
accepts Soviet air defense weapons from
Damascus, Syrian and perhaps Soviet advisers
may be stationed in Jordan and the country will
automatically be drawn into any new war with
Israel.
Husayn has done his homework well, how-
ever, and Prime Minister Rifai too has paid
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attention to building domestic support for the
government. Periodic meetings have been held in
the provinces to explain development projects
and advertise beneficial government programs.
Economic development is being given new
emphasis, focusing on agriculture and mineral
exploitation as well as tourism. The King him-
self, mindful of last year's army mutiny, spent
the early part of this month in traditional visits
to army units, reknitting his personal ties with
the troops. In marked contrast to his perfunc-
tory reception at an army celebration a year
ago, Husayn this time was nearly mobbed by
soldiers eager to shake his hand and demonstrate
LIBYA-EGYPT: FEUDING AGAIN ?? 9
The gradually building tension between
Libya and Egypt flared up last week with both
sides threatening to sever diplomatic relations.
Similar acrimonious exchanges last summer
prompted the withdrawal of the Egyptian mili-
tary mission from Libya, the recall of Libya's
Mirage aircraft from Egypt, and the reinforce-
ment of border guards on both sides. This time,
over 200,000 Egyptian civilians in Libya have
become pawns in the dispute.
The Libyans, infuriated by President
Sadat's recent characterization of Qadhafi as
"insane," formally protested to the Egyptian
ambassador on April 16, warning that Sadat's
efforts to split Qadhafi from the ruling council
could lead to a break in relations. The Libyan
protest drew a quick communique from Cairo
rejecting the Libyan note and warning that with-
drawal of the Egyptian ambassador was being
contemplated. The communique also hinted
that Cairo may be considering the recall of
Egyptian civilian workers seconded to the
Libyan government.
Such a move would create serious problems
for both sides that each may want to avoid. The
Libyan economy and most of its public institu-
tions would be seriously disrupted by the with-
drawal of the Egyptians, who form the back-
bone of the country's labor and professional
force. Cairo, on the other hand, must realize
that recalling its citizens could trigger an anti-
Egyptian backlash from the traditionally hostile
Libyans, which neither Cairo nor Tripoli could
easily control. Scattered acts of violence against
Egyptians have already taken place in Libyan
border towns, according to the Egyptian press.
In such a highly charged atmosphere, prac-
tical economic and political considerations may
not serve as effective constraints. Having been
rebuffed repeatedly in his attempts to arrange a
meeting with Sadat, Qadhafi now probably feels
only the barest need for restraint. The Libyan
leader has little direct political leverage to use
against his neighbor, but he can continue harp-
ing on such sensitive issues as Sadat's close rela-
tions with the US and his "poor" handling of
Egypt's economic problems. Tripoli might also
use such assets as it may have among conserva-
tive religious factions and the armed forces
inside Egypt to foment problems for the Egyp-
tian leadership.
Sadat's recent outbursts against Qadhafi
probably stem from a concern that the Libyan
leader is willing and able to conduct subversive
operations in Egypt. When Sadat feels confident
of his position in the Arab world, he ignores
Qadhafi. At other times, such as now when he is
under attack, Sadat feels more vulnerable and
worries about other Arabs joining forces with
Libya to upset his negotiating strategy. At such
times, Sadat tends to resort to scathing attacks
designed to isolate and discredit Qadhafi fur-
ther. Sadat has thus far not considered a com-
plete break with Libya, probably because he
believes this would heighten rather than di-
minish the threat from that quarter.
Sudan's President Numayri, who has been
trying for months to resolve the Libyan-
Egyptian dispute, sent an emissary to both capi-
tals earlier this week, presumably to try to ar-
range yet another mediation effort. Intensifica-
tion of propaganda attacks from both sides over
the last few days suggests that neither Qadhafi
nor Sadat is interested at this point in Numayri's
good offices.
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IRAQ: QUIET IN KURDISTAN /0
The Iraqi army is reported to be in com-
plete control, but it is acting with restraint in
the northern areas that Kurdish forces had held
before their rebellion collapsed last month.
According military attache in
Baghdad, w no accompanied other attaches on
an extensive tour of Iraqi Kurdistan this month,
there is no substance to stories in the Western
press--apparently inspired by Kurdish sources-
of devastation and large-scale army reprisals
against the Kurdish population.
attache confirmed earlier re-
ports t at Iraqi forces had met little resistance
in the surprise drive toward the Iranian border
they launched immediately after Baghdad and
Tehran signed their reconciliation accord in
Algiers on March 6. Iraqi army officers told the
attache that their forces had succeeded in taking
key high ground all along the front by March 13
when the cease-fire requested by Iran went into
effect. The officers saw this offensive along with
Tehran's abrupt withdrawal of its support for
the Kurds in fulfillment of the terms of the
accord as key factors in breaking the back of the
rebellion.
The attache says 200,000 Iraqi troops,
both regulars and militia, are currently engaged
in re-establishing Baghdad's authority in the
area; a reduction of this force will probably
begin in about two months if all goes well. The
army's victory came so suddenly that the gov-
ernment has not had time to develop a plan to
administer the region. The authorities do seem
to be making a serious effort to provide relief
services to the population and are spending
liberally to improve roads and communications
systems. Although a few villages are completely
destroyed, most population centers sustained
only moderate damage from the many Iraqi air
The Kurds themselves are said to be passive
and very apprehensive at this point. They appear
to be baffled at the absence of reprisals and may
fear that punitive measures are still in store.
Centuries-old animosities between Arab and
Kurd remain, and incidents are likely, partic-
ularly if military rule is prolonged. The govern-
ment may encounter resistance if it attempts to
follow through with reported plans to regroup
the Kurds in large villages for purposes of secu-
rity and economy, or to resettle them in other
parts of the country.
The estimated 9,000 Kurdish fighters who
vowed last month to continue the struggl have
thus far not made their presence known.
The tripartite teams that are monitoring
the border between Iraq and Iran--made up of
Iranians, Iraqis and Algerians-are said to be
performing effectively. They told the attache
that their principal mission is to make sure that
Kurdish refugees who decide to return from Iran
are well treated and are transported back to
their villages in Iraq. Altogether, between
150,000 and 200,000 of Iraq's 2 million Kurds
fled to Iran between March 1974, when the
most recent Kurdish rebellion began, and March
31 of this year, when the flow was ended by
agreement between Iran and Iraq. Tehran would
like to see a large number of the refugees take
advantage of Baghdad's offer of amnesty to
those who return by the end of this month.
Most of the refugees fear harsh treatment if they 25X1
return home, however, and Iraqi authorities
acknowledged
the Kurds hav
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 ITALY: BARRICADES AND BOMBS 6 CP
With important nationwide regional and
local elections less than two months away, a
new outbreak of extremist violence has height-
ened political tensions in Italy. Small-scale
clashes between the Italian police and political
extremists have become commonplace in recent
years, but only occasionally have they triggered
a cycle of violence. This was the case last week,
however, when the murder of a left-wing stu-
dent in Milan, reportedly by a neo-fascist,
brought thousands of left-wing demonstrators
into the city's streets. The authorities had
trouble controlling the protesters, who threw up
barricades and firebombed neo-fascist party
offices and other right-wing "targets."
There was more trouble as a result of the
nationwide demonstrations called by the labor
unions to protest the situation in Milan.
Scattered violence continued into this week, and
could hit another high point on April 25 in
connection with the observance of the 30th
anniversary of the partisan uprising in northern
Italy.
Political violence in Italy is largely the
work of extremists outside the regular parties.
The question of how to deal with the problem,
however, has become a matter of dispute as the
parties prepare for the elections on June 15.
Christian Democratic leader Amintore Fanfani
has latched on to the law and order issue in his
effort to prevent further losses to the left by his
party. The tactic could pay off if Fanfani can
convince voters that his party-which has played
the major role in all of Italy's postwar govern-
ments-is best equipped to put an end to polit-
ical violence.
Fanfani faces an uphill fight, however.
Christian Democratic setbacks in several key
constituencies last year suggest that many voters
no longer have that much confidence in the
party. Then, the electorate in these areas seemed
to be holding the Christian Democrats respon-
sible for Italy's economic problems. Now, the
Communists and Socialists-who condemn
violence as forcefully as Fanfani-are trying to
nudge the voters toward the same conclusion
about the periodic breakdowns in public order.
Meanwhile, Fanfani continues to maintain
that recent international events should alert
Italians to the dangers of granting more
influence to the Communists. Until recently,
Fanfani has pointed mainly to the Portuguese
example, but this week he broadened his case to
include the Vietnam situation, asserting that it
proves there are "no valid accords" for the
Communists.
Communist chief Berlinguer has openly
criticized the Portuguese Communists. He is
reported to be "as frustrated as he ever gets"
over the implications of the Portuguese issue for
his party's chances. The Communist leader has
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also taken several other steps to underline his
party's claim to autonomy from Moscow. Never-
theless, Berlinguer has reportedly found that his
relations with Christian Democratic officials-
even those who are sympathetic to closer ties
with the Communists-have cooled.
Despite these problems, the Communist
electoral campaign still centers on Berlinguer's
call for an "historic compromise" that would
eventually bring the two parties together as gov-
ernment partners. He is stressing, however, that
this is a long-term goal as far as the national
government is concerned. The immediate
Communist aim is to score sufficient gains in the
local elections to force the Christian Democrats
into coalitions at the municipal, provincial, and
THE PARIS ENERGY TALKS
The developed and develop-m states that
participated in the Paris energy talks, which
broke down last week, have avoided extreme
positions in their comments. As they analyze
the collapse of the conference and consider the
next steps, three aspects of the Paris talks stand
out:
? The developing states and the oil pro-
ducers showed a high degree of solidarity
behind Algerian leadership.
? The industrialized states were more
united in resisting the demands of the devel-
oping !states than at any time since last year
during the special session of the UN on
development and raw materials.
? In spite of their sharp differences, the
two sides were able to avoid bitter public
recrimination, both during and after the
Paris talks. In fact, most of the participants
said they would continue to seek ways to
bring oil producers and consumers together.
As originally conceived by French Presi-
dent Giscard, the Paris talks were intended to
lay the groundwork for a later conference to
examine energy and related problems. The
Algerian-led coalition demanded that, in draw-
ing up the agenda, the industrialized states agree
to give raw materials and economic development
issues equal treatment with energy. The in-
dustrialized states maintained that the con-
ference should be restricted to a discussion of
energy issues.
The developing and oil-producing states
blamed the failure of the preparatory talks on
the industrialized states. Algeria, with leadership
ambitions in both OPEC and the Third World,
insisted that the developing states had nothing
to gain from a conference that discussed only
oil. The Algerians, who lobbied intensively, were
able to maintain unity because most developing
states are concerned with finding a way to tie
earnings from their raw materials to the price of
goods they import from developed countries.
Saudi Arabia and Iran, who are generally loath
to accept Algerian leadership, went along be-
cause it enabled them to demonstrate their sup-
port for developing countries at little immediate
expense. Both may have expected, as apparently
did the Algerians, that more than one prepara-
tory conference would be necessary before a
major conference of oil. producers and con-
sumers could convene.
While expressing some disappointment at
the breakdown of the talks, the developed states
believe that the oil-consuming nations could not
have made further concessions without capit-
ulating to the demands of the Algerian-led coali-
tion. Some of the West European participants
even maintain that Algeria intended from the
start to force the collapse of the talks. They
believe that the Algerians were more interested
in bolstering their claim to leadership of the
Third World than in negotiating. Others attrib-
ute the collapse to over-optimism by France and
to a misunderstanding of the purpose of the
talks on the part of the developing states. In any
case, a number of West European officials now
believe that the failure of the French-sponsored
meeting will strengthen the International Enerciv
Agency.
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PORTUGAL: TO THE POLLS 2 Q `2'30
Over six million Portuguese are expected to
go to the polls today to participate in an elec-
tion that has lost much of its meaning. Although
not likely to affect the composition of the gov-
ernment or significantly alter its policies, the
balloting will provide the first indication of pop-
ular attitudes toward the leftward course Portu-
gal,'s military leaders have charted.
Rumors circulating in Lisbon that the con-
stituent assembly elections might be canceled
were in large part laid to rest earlier this week
when the results of the investigation into the
coup attempt on March 11 did not clearly im-
plicate moderate party leaders. They had feared
that the report would give the Armed Forces
Movement an excuse to either cancel the elec-
tion or prevent the moderate parties from par-
ticipating.
Fears of election-rigging have been dis-
pelled to some extent by the manner in which
local election boards have been set up. The
moderate parties reportedly will have adequate
representation in nearly every precinct to guard
against election irregularities. In addition, if
Communist supporters attempt to vote early
and then obstruct their moderate opponents-a
tactic leftist extremists reportedly have been
considering--all ballots in the precinct will be
declared invalid, and another vote taken later.
Efforts have also been made to avoid fraud in
the vote counting, but some irregularities are
likely to occur.
The Portuguese election situation is unique
in a number of respects. There have been no
meaningful prior elections to serve as a guide;
public opinion polling is an undeveloped art,
and there remains an unknown proportion of
the electorate that will cast blank ballots or
abstain.
Given an election relatively free from
tampering, the moderate, non-communist
Socialist Party leader Mario Soares (foreground) during recent campaign rally in Lisbon
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parties will almost certainly receive a clear
majority. Such a result would clearly not be a
vote of confidence for the Movement, but it
would not be viewed as a decisive defeat either.
The moderate parties have already agreed to the
Movement's continued rule for the next three to
five years, and all but the Social Democratic
Center have platforms that advance many of the
same policies as those espoused by the Move-
ment.
Leftist leaders of the Movement, however,
fear that a large vote for the moderate parties
will strengthen moderates in the Movement
itself. Indeed, a resounding moderate victory
could encourage moderates within the Move-
ment to become a more effective counterweight
to the influence of the Communists upon that
body. This would probably not be immediately
evident, but it would signal a shift in the power
balance among the various factions that exist
within the Movement.
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Clerides
CYPRUS: PREPARING FOR TALKS 2-02
Glafkos Clerides' decision last week to con-
tinue as negotiator for the Greek Cypriot side
ensures that the intercommunal talks will
resume as scheduled in Vienna on April 28.
Both sides appear to be adopting more flexible
positions -than in previous sessions, but mutual
suspicions could lead to more snags.
Clerides apparently decided to stay on
after President Makarios reaffirmed his nego-
tiating mandate in the coming talks. The Greek
Cypriot negotiator appears to have been upset
by reports that Makarios had made a com-
mitment to the extremist hierarchy of the
Church of Cyprus to refuse to sign any settle-
ment negotiated by Clerides and instead to
adopt the strategy of a "long struggle" against
the Turks. Clerides had also been discouraged by
the harsh reaction to his conciliatory speech on
April 1 in which he argued for a realistic nego-
tiating strategy and suggested that the Greek
Cypriots might have to accept Turkish Cypriot
proposals for a bi-regional federation in return
for concessions in other areas.
Clerides' statement on April 19, when he
said that he was prepared to discuss the Turkish
Cypriot plan for a bi-regional federation as well
as the Greek Cypriot proposals for a multi-
regional federation, suggests that he has per-
suaded Makarios to at least consider the Turkish
Cypriot plan if, as seems likely, the Greek
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Nftwo-Nor
Cypriot scheme is rejected by the Turks. It is
doubtful, however, that Makarios would commit
himself in advance to a bi-regional federation
unless the Turkish Cypriots are willing to give
some idea of the amount of territory they are
prepared to give up and the number of Greek
Cypriot refugees that would be allowed to
return to their homes.
So far, the new government in Ankara-
with some prodding from the US-appears
willing to pull back from some of the territory it
controls on Cyprus, but it has been reluctant to
provide specific details and has emphasized that
no concessions will be made before the start of
negotiations.
The Turkish Cypriot constituent assembly
is expected to complete its work on April 25th
on a draft constitution that could provide the
legal framework for an independent Turkish
Cypriot state if a settlement appears out of
reach. Turkish Cypriot negotiator Rauf
Denktash has come under strong criticism in the
assembly. His critics charge that the original
draft, which was largely formulated in Ankara,
could lay the basis for an authoritarian regime.
They have succeeded in substantially reducing
the powers of the presidency, which Denktash is
expected to assume.
In the meantime, Greek Cypriot women
are continuing their protests against Turkey's
failure to honor UN resolutions that call for the
withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus and
the return of refugees to their homes. A peace-
ful mass demonstration was held on April 20
near Famagusta at which time a delegation of
foreign and Greek Cypriot women attempted
unsuccessfully to present a petition to the
Turkish commander and to gain entrance to
Famagusta.
ROMANIAN-SOVIET TENSIONS
33.35
is creating new strains between Bucharest and
Moscow. According to a Romanian diplomat in
Moscow, there are mounting differences over
the European security talks, closer integration
within CEMA, the Kremlin's goals at the Euro-
pean communist conference, and Soviet efforts
to expand the political coordinating role of the
Warsaw Pact. Bucharest views "coordination" as
a particular threat to its freedom of maneuver in
the international political arena.
The Soviets are allegedly pushing for the
establishment of a permanent pact committee of
foreign ministers and are calling for regular
meetings of the pact's political consultative
committee. Moscow also apparently wants to set
up a pact secretariat similar to NATO's political
committee and headed by a Soviet secretary
general. The adoption of these measures would
strengthen the pact's supranational character
under Moscow's suzerainty.
The Romanians, who bitterly oppose such
an arrangement, reportedly have been unable to
win other pact members over to their side. The
Romanian diplomat believes that over the long
run, Bucharest will be forced to compromise on
some points. Once the European security
conference is over, the Romanian predicted,
Moscow will put even greater stress on ideo-
logical orthodoxy for all pact members. He
implied that the new emphasis on conformity
would be intended in part to offset Soviet
commitments at CSCE on the freedom of
movement of peoples and ideas.
Although the diplomat's version of Soviet-
Romanian differences may be overstated, his
remarks dovetail with other signs of increased
friction between Moscow and Bucharest. For
example, Romanian diplomats in Budapest have
told US officials that they believe recent
Hungarian attacks on nationalism are in part
directed toward Bucharest, at Moscow's
Soviet pressure for closer political and
economic policy coordination in Eastern Europe
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KOREA: KIM IL-SONG IN PEKING 4-4
Kim II-song's visit to Peking should be
viewed as a serious effort to move Pyongyang's
20-year campaign to take over South Korea off
dead center-in particular to explore the possi-
bilities of a Chinese-supported diplomatic initia-
tive to secure a complete US military with-
drawal from the peninsula. It is worth noting
that the last high-level North Korean - Chinese
meeting--Chou En-lai's 1971 visit to Pyong-
yang-resulted in the unveiling of the initiative
for North-South talks.
In the psychological sphere, Kim's flam-
boyant presence was an attempt to identify his
regime and its cause with the current tide of
communist success in Indochina and to generate
at least the appearance of firm Chinese support
for unifying Korea on communist terms. Kim's
main target in this effort was the South Ko-
reans, whom he doubtless sees as peculiarly
vulnerable to such posturing at this juncture.
In material terms, Kim and the top military
officials who accompanied him to Peking almost
certainly requested a step-up in military assist-
ance from China. Chinese military aid to North
Korea, negligible through most of the 1960s, has
increased substantially since 1971 and may now
equal the Soviet contribution in dollar terms if
not in sophistication of hardware.
Probably most important among Kim's
objectives in going to Peking--it is still unclear
whether he was invited or invited himself-was
to sound out the Chinese leadership on the state
of Peking's relations with the US and to get
Peking's reading on the matter of US willingness
to stick closely to the Pak government. Kim
may reason that if Sino-US detente is not going
well, Peking would have fewer objections than
before to some minor military adventure on his
part.
Kim is probably not thinking in terms of a
major military assault-across the DMZ toward
Seoul, for example. He undoubtedly calculates
that the presence of US forces in that sector
virtually guarantees a prompt US military
response, including air attacks on the North
itself. Nor is Kim sure that such attacks would
succeed to any important extent; South Korean
strength along the DMZ must still command his
respect.
But Kim might believe that, in the wake of
Indochina, a lesser probe of South Korean and
US military intentions and capabilities-one he
could hope to control and contain-might serve
important purposes. Such probes might include
more aggressive North Korean responses to the
air and sea incidents that occur from time to
time along North-South border zones; a North
Korean attempt to shoot down low-flying US
reconnaissance aircraft presently operating
south of the DMZ; and, at higher levels of risk,
an attempt to seize and hold one or more of the
Yellow Sea islands controlled by the UN
Command but garrisoned by South Korean
forces.
Kim II-song might calculate that attacks of
this sort, if successful, would demoralize the
South Koreans and, if US responses seemed hesi-
tant, could generate new frictions between
Seoul and the US as well as new arguments in
Washington on the advisability of US forces
remaining hostage to the acts of the competing
Korean regimes.
In discussing Peking's views on US policies
in the Pacific, Kim would probably argue for the
position that, all things considered, the time
might be propitious for a major diplomatic ini-
tiative, strongly supported by Peking, to win US
troop withdrawal from South Korea; Kim's
interest would be in face-to-face talks with
Washington. At worst, in Kim's view, the initia-
tive would stir up dissension within the US
government and further shake South Korea's
faith in its ally.
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r..r
CAMBODIA: SOLIDIFYING CONTROL
47 47
Cambodia became a closed society this
week as the country's new leaders consolidated
their control behind a curtain of silence. Deputy
Prime Minister Khieu Samphan and Information
Minister Hu Nimm issued statements congratu-
lating their forces for "final victory... in the
people's war" and thanking international allies
for their support. The two leaders called for
"national unity" to build an "independent,
nonaligned, and prosperous" Cambodia but
provided no hints on conditions in Phnom Penh
or on the new regime's plans. The statements
omitted any specific call for reconciliation with,
or amnesty for, those who fought or served on
the side of the previous government, suggesting
that a purge of former government officials and
military officers is under way.
There is still no firm evidence on the fate
of senior figures captured by the communists-
including Long Boret, Sirik Matak, and Lon
Non-and most Westerners in the capital have
taken refuge in the French embassy compound.
The mood in the capital is far from hospitable,
and the 15-man Red Cross team that elected to
remain behind now wants to leave.
Sihanouk at midweek was still showing no
signs of preparing to leave Peking, and members
of his entourage, in fact, have complained
bitterly that they are not being kept informed
on developments in Cambodia. Sihanouk's vague
and somewhat testy response to questions about
his travel plans suggest that the new leadership is
deliberately delaying his return, both to prevent
the prince from stealing the "victory" show and
to allow time for the communist administrative
apparatus to become firmly established.
Khmer communist leaders leng Sary (1) and Khieu Samphan
WACOMM
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t
LAOS: "SABER-RATTLING" 51-5
Pathet Lao troops have become increas-
ingly aggressive in recent weeks, but there is no
persuasive evidence at this point that the com-
munists are planning to scuttle the year-old co-
alition in favor of a military solution.
The communist-initiated actions, concen-
trated largely in northern Laos, have been
limited and localized. The most significant fight-
ing has taken place in and around the strategic
crossroads town of Sala Phou Khoun, which lies
astride the only overland route between the
twin capitals of Vientiane and Luang Prabang.
Sala Phou Khoun was controlled by the non-
communists at the time of the cease-fire in
February 1973.
According to the northern region com-
mander, General Vang Pao, Pathet Lao forces
supported by artillery last week attacked and
Page
overran all non-communist positions along
Route 7 east of Sala Phou Khoun. They also
briefly occupied the town itself. Vang Pao has
saturated Pathet Lao troop concentrations in
the area with T-28 air strikes, but counter-
attacks by his ground forces have foundered in
the face of stiff resistance.
There are unconfirmed reports that a
North Vietnamese army "battalion" supported
the estimated two Pathet Lao battalions in-
volved in the Sala Phou Khoun actions, and that
at least two light PT-76 tanks were employed by
communist forces.
It is difficult to account for these blatant
cease-fire violations. One theory making the
rounds in Vientiane is that the communist ac-
tions are simply retaliation for recent aggressive
operations by the Royal Lao army designed to
curb Pathet Lao inroads into another area some
15 miles north-northwest of Vientiane. Non-
communist Defense Minister Sisouk na Cham-
passak takes a more somber view of the situa-
tion, one that is doubtless shared by Vang Pao
himself. Sisouk believes that the Pathet Lao
either are seeking to fulfill their long-standing
objective of controlling Sala Phou Khoun or
that they are creating a diversion there in prep-
aration for possible attacks against Vang Pao's
headquarters complex at Long Tieng, southwest
of the Plaine des Jarres.
Whatever the real motivation for the at-
tacks at Sala Phou Khoun, there is growing
speculation on the part of senior non-commu-
nist military leaders and the diplomatic corps in
Vientiane that the Pathet Lao have been em-
boldened by communist successes in Cambodia
and South Vietnam into adopting a more mili-
tant posture in Laos. While the Pathet Lao will
almost certainly continue to nibble away at non-
communist holdings in remote or contested
areas when the opportunity arises, there are no
present indications that they are preparing for a
major resumption of hostilities. Indeed, recent
public statements by Prince Souphanouvong and
other senior Pathet Lao leaders in both Vien-
tiane and Sam Neua suggest that the Lao com-
munists are reasonably satisfied with the
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coalition government's evolution over the past
year or so and that, by and large, they remain
committed to pursuing their interests in the
political arena rather than on the battlefield.
For his part, Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma has taken steps to defuse the situation
at Sala Phou Khoun. Earlier this week, he issued
urgent orders to Souphanouvong and Sisouk to
bring all military activity of their respective
sides to an immediate halt. By midweek, fight-
ing in the Sala Phou Khoun area appeared to be
tapering off, but it was not known whether the
Pathet Lao had obeyed Souvanna's instructions
to return to their original positions.
PHILIPPINES: ERASING AN IMAGE 55
President Marcos is taking advantage of US
problems in Indochina to intensify his drive for
an independent foreign policy that will erase
Manila's image as an American client state.
Despite an increase in rhetoric that seems to cast
doubt on the future of US-Philippine ties, the
fundamental bilateral arrangements are unlikely
to change radically in the foreseeable future.
Questioning the value of the mutual de-
fense treaty or the presence of US bases is not a
new tactic for Marcos. He has raised the issue
before when he felt Washington was not re-
sponding sufficiently to his diplomatic, eco-
nomic, or military needs. Talks on the future
status of US bases in the Philippines have in fact
been stalled for some time because Marcos him-
self has demurred on scheduling the high-level
negotiations needed to wind up the agreement.
Marcos apparently now wants to establish a
definite quid pro quo for the bases-either an
annual rent or a long-range military aid package.
He may assume that chances of greater US mili-
tary assistance will increase once the Vietnam
war is over.
Marcos' recent critical remarks about the
US are also part of his continuing effort to
create a more balanced foreign policy. Since
declaring martial law in 1972, Marcos has in-
creased his contacts with communist as well as
Third World states. He has established diplo-
matic relations with the East European coun-
tries and last week played host to his first com-
munist head of state, President Ceausescu of
Romania. Manila has held preliminary discus-
sions with Moscow and Peking on establishing
diplomatic relations. It also has joined its col-
leagues in the Association of Southeast Asian
nations in recognizing the new regime in Phnom
Penh and is planning to open a dialogue with
Hanoi.
Despite his public campaign to put distance
between himself and the US, Marcos privately
has often been more cooperative with US in-
terests since martial law than before. Without an
opposition party or an independent press to
point up the discrepancies, Marcos will continue
to have the luxury of speaking one way for the
record while acting a different way in private. In
the future, however, Marcos will probably be
even more assertive and independent in his rela-
tions with the US, if only to make certain that
Washington does not take Manila for granted.
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Latin American and Caribbean govern-
ments will probably make an intense effort to
formulate a joint strategy for the OAS General
Assembly that opens in Washington on May 8. A
backwater of inter-American activity over the
past year and a half, the OAS is regaining
respectability, not only as a permanent pan-
American forum but also as the one reliable
arena in which to capture US attention.
Last year, the General Assembly agenda
was backbench business, as the hemisphere's for-
eign ministers focused on Secretary Kissinger's
informal "new dialogue," which they envisioned
as a series of productive sessions with the secre-
tary. With the spotlight elsewhere, OAS com-
mittee work was desultory; most substantive
and administrative issues under study therefore
remain far from resolution.
By now, though, the perspective on inter-
American affairs for many Latins has reverted
largely to the adversary view that prevailed
before the new dialogue was attempted.
Repeated disagreements between the US and
Latin America on economic matters, suspicion
of US clandestine activity in the region, and
dismay over what many consider to be a hard
line in the current US approach to foreign
affairs have combined to convince many Latins
that the US is insensitive to their problems and
cavalier toward friendly but "unimportant" gov-
ernments in the hemisphere. Cancellation of the
Kissinger trip to the region this week may have
been the final blow to the remaining hopes that
something might come of the dialogue.
The Latin Americans believe there is
evidence that formulating joint positions with
which to confront the US can be successful.
They interpret the current effort in Washington
to "correct" the restriction on OPEC countries
in the Trade Reform Act as a response to their
united criticism in an OAS forum and tend to
see this as a model for future strategy. Even the
strident Yankee-baiting governments, such as
the Velasco regime in Peru, favor keeping the
OAS intact, although at the same time they may
support initiatives to set up new Latin-only
alliances.
It seems likely that the delegations to the
General Assembly will make a concerted effort
to work for their objectives in a cool, business-
like manner, but several contentious issues on
the agenda could provoke anti-US outbursts: the
Trade Reform Act, the effect of high oil prices,
the continuing problem of OAS sanctions
against Cuba. Members seem agreed on the need
to end the sanctions issue, but some are still
bitter over US abstention in the abortive effort
to accomplish this last November. An effort is
being made to eliminate many formal proce-
dures, especially the long-winded speechmaking
designed for home consumption, so that the
focus will remain on the real issues under dis-
cussion. The withering of the dialogue probably
has added to the general determination to
streamline the OAS and make it a more func-
tional and less rhetorical forum in which to
exert pressure on the US. There is a good
possibility that the diminished expectation of
special treatment from the US-added to the
concern throughout Latin America about the
worsened condition of inter-American rela-
tions-will make this OAS meeting more than
just another in the long series of Latin-US con-
frontations.
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HONDURAS: LOPEZ OUSTED 5
7,0
Chief of State Lopez, buffeted by a major
scandal and the determined opposition of a
group of reform-minded lieutenant colonels, was
ousted this week by the Superior Defense
Council of the armed forces. His replacement,
Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar, is likely to play
only a figurehead role and could soon become
another victim of the anti-corruption campaign
being waged by the younger officers.
Melgar may ultimately come under the
cloud of corruption that characterized the
Lopez government. He has been associated both
with Lopez and the other senior colonels of
General Lopez' regime, almost all of whom are
now out. The new chief of state will be retained
at least temporarily by the ascendant lieutenant
colonels, if only because they have not yet
agreed on a member of their own group to
replace him.
It is not clear how strong a role the lieu-
tenant colonels will play in the new administra-
tion. Although they are relatively young and
inexperienced, they have based their justifica-
tion for assuming power on the need to
eliminate corruption in government, improve
the efficiency of the armed forces, and better
the living conditions of the people.
In a lengthy communique, the officers
promise a progressive and vigorous approach to
the country's domestic problems. The officers
resent Honduras' reputation as a corrupt
"banana republic" and have resolved to improve
it. They are eager to modernize their country,
but may lack sufficient administrative ex-
perience to achieve that goal.
Thus far, the group has shown no inclina-
tion to alter the general ideological direction set
by the Lopez government. In a recent conversa-
tion with US Ambassador Sanchez, Melgar
described himself and a "majority" of ` the
lieutenant colonels' group as "right of center."
Some in the group may seem more nationalistic
than their predecessors because of their
impatience to tackle problems, but the group as
a whole can be expected to maintain Honduras'
close ties with the US.
Civilian political leaders have welcomed the
removal of Lopez and hope that the change will
eventually lead to free elections. They will prob-
ably have to wait a long time for this-the new
military leaders have declared their intention to
remain in power indefinitely.
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Trinidad-Tobago
TAKING THE INITIATIVE
Emerging from a long period of administra-
tive inertia, Prime Minister Eric Williams has
moved decisively to counteract the paralysis of
the key petroleum and sugar industries resulting
from a two-month strike. He is also using the
repercussions of the strike to further his own
political ends.
On April 9, Williams ordered military and
police personnel to begin delivering petroleum
products and sugar to the public. This move
alleviated shortages that had brought an outcry
from consumers, businessmen, the press, politi-
cal opponents, and even members of his own
People's National Movement.
Several factors probably were responsible
for the Prime Minister's long delay in dealing
directly with the problem. For one, remaining
isolated and enigmatic during a crisis is part of
his personal political style. He tends to brood
over problems and to make decisions without
Williams is also looking at the strike as a
way to improve his already strong position in
preparation for the election, which he is likely
to call for late this year. Moreover, he wants to
preserve his party's dominance even after he
eventually leaves office. He sees the United
Front of black oil workers and East Indian sugar
farmers and workers as a potential nucleus of a
political organization that in future years could
challenge the supremacy of his People's National
Movement.
Williams apparently believes that the best
way to deal with this potential political chal-
lenge is to split it up at an early stage. By letting
the strike drag on and create shortages, Williams
built up public support for using the military
and police to dilute the strike's impact. He also
used the strike to justify acquiring a degree of
government control over the Texaco subsidiary,
whose workers are on strike. The Prime Minister
announced on April 13 that the government
would take over Texaco's distributing operation
and would acquire some participation in its
350,000 barrels-per-day refinery. Williams prob-
ably will now press Texaco to settle with the oil
workers, thus isolating them from the sugar
workers and weakening the base of their sugar
union's leaders. Some press reports suggest that
the sugar workers may already be backing off
from some of their demands.
With the strike apparently on the way to
settlement, Williams can look ahead confidently
to the elections. The labor leaders are almost
certain to decide that they are in no position to
field a candidate against the Prime Minister this
year, leaving the thrust of his opposition to
come from the traditional political ranks. He has
led the nation since its independence in 1962,
and now that its economic horizons have be-
come bright, he seems to have no intention of
surrendering the reins of power.
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OPEC INVESTMENT IN THE US 64
Holdings of US assets by OPEC countries-
mostly in bank deposits and government securi-
ties-jumped $11.8 billion during 1974. At the
end of the year, US holdings totaled $14.5
billion and made up 20 percent of OPEC's for-
eign assets, compared with 13 percent a year
earlier. In addition, OPEC countries had ear-
marked substantial funds for future investment
in the American economy. At the end of the
year Kuwait held at least $1 billion in Nassau,
pending selection of suitable long-term US
investments.
(The US Treasury Department estimates
OPEC assets in the US were some $14 billion at
the end of 1974. The $500-million difference
apparently arises from conflicting reports on the
disposition of Kuwaiti funds held in a Nassau
account.)
The current account surplus of OPEC
members totaled $71 billion last year and, with
a $13 billion lag in oil payments, the producers
had an investable surplus of about $58 billion.
At least $52 billion of this was placed in foreign
official assets. Of the remainder, $2.7 billion
was used to reduce liabilities and to fund multi-
lateral aid institutions set up by producers. We
cannot specifically identify where the remaining
$3 billion went.
The share of OPEC's foreign assets held in
the US rose throughout 1974. New investment
reached its high point of 26 percent in the
second quarter, following the removal of the
Arab oil embargo. Investment in American
assets remained strong in the second half, pri-
marily because of the growing weakness of
sterling and the increasing reluctance of Euro-
banks to accept additional short-term deposits
from the OPEC states. At the end of 1974, bank
deposits and short-term government securities
accounted for just over 80 percent of OPEC
assets in the US. The percentage had declined
gradually since mid-1974, largely as a result of
falling short-term interest rates.
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Kuwait,
and Iran accounted for 85 percent of OPEC's
.US assets at the end of 1974, but the com-
position of each country's holdings differed
substantially:
? Saudi Arabia held about 50 percent in
government securities, half of which were
medium and long term.
? Venezuela kept more than 90 percent
in bank deposits, mostly time deposits.
? Nigeria placed about 95 percent in
short-term government securities.
? Kuwait held almost 45 percent in the
form of equities, real estate, loans, and cor-
porate bonds.
? Iran placed 90 percent in short-term
assets, divided about equally between gov-
ernment securities and bank deposits.
Among OPEC members, Indonesia and Vene-
zuela had the largest share of their assets in the
US, 67 percent and 41 percent respectively.
Holdings by Algeria, Ecuador, and Qatar were
negligible.
The flow of OPEC investment almost cer-
tainly will decline during most of 1975, as de-
mand for oil remains weak and the countries
continue to boost imports. OPEC's available sur-
plus for 1975 will approximate $55 billion,
compared with $58 billion in 1974. The US
should attract a substantial portion of these
funds in spite of the recent decline in US inter-
est rates relative to rates in Europe and the drop
in the value of the dollar. Barring a serious
deterioration in Arab-US relations, OPEC states
will probably invest another $10 billion in the
US in 1975, raisin their US holdin s to nearly
$25 billion.
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Weekly Summary
Special Report
France: Concern About Military Unrest
Secret
April 25, 1975
No. 0017/75A
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:4 A M, W
For the first time since the Algerian war ended almost 15 years ago, discontent
in the military has become a topic for grave concern in France. The streams of
discontent flow mainly from inadequate military salaries, a failure to define the
mission of the army in the defense of Europe, substandard living conditions, and
changing social attitudes in France.
France has been particularly sensitive to the political role of the military since
1958 when the army played a significant part in the birth of the 5th Republic. At
that time the country was faced with widespread revolt in the army over policy
toward Algeria, and de Gaulle's return to power was seen as the only alternative to
civil war. Ten years later, when student-labor disorders threatened to topple the
government, the French public noted uneasily that President de Gaulle found it
necessary to assure himself of the loyalty of the army before taking action. Most
recently, French sensitivity has been heightened by the role of the Portuguese
military, which has raised the question in French minds of whether the rumblings of
discontent in the armed forces are the early warning of an attempt by the military to
impose its own solution on France's current social and economic troubles.
During the past six months, the volume of press articles-by generals, journal-
ists, and politicians-has made it impossible for the government to ignore the
problem. President Giscard is proceeding cautiously, however, for the issue is a
potentially explosive one, and his leftist opposition may have hopes of using it to try
to embarrass, or even bring down, the government. At the same time, he is
constrained by the high cost of meaningful reforms.
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April 25, 1975
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An Army, Cut-Rate
Since the Algerian war, Paris has poured
money into its force de dissuasion-the strategic
nuclear deterrent force that allows France to
maintain its claim of military "independence."
The high cost has been offset by extremely low
salaries in the armed forces, especially for con-
scripts who are called up at the age of 18 or 19
for 12 months' service. Their salaries, though
recently raised from roughly $17 to $50 a month,
are still five times less than the French minimum
wage. Officers and noncommissioned officers also
earn far less than their civilian counterparts.
Eighty-six percent of conscript barracks
were built before World War I, and 10 percent
date from the Napoleonic wars-"without the
honor of being named national monuments."
Another important cause of malaise, particularly
among the cadres, is the feeling of being cut off
from French society. There is an increasing
tendency on the part of the public to question
the need for an expensive peacetime army, and
the prestige of a military career is at a low ebb.
Less than three candidates apply for every
vacancy at the principal military academy, com-
pared with 13 at the civil service - oriented
National School of Administration. Meanwhile,
the proportion of sons from military families who
are accepted by the academies or given direct
commissions is steadily growing-possibly an
indication that the officer corps is feeding on
itself, becoming ever more isolated from "out-
side" society.
Changing Society
The years of peace that followed France's
disentanglement from its colonial imbroglios and
the relaxation produced by detente have reduced
the importance of the armed forces in the public's
eye. Government emphasis on the strategic
nuclear force has similarly served to make the
conventional soldier seem redundant. At the same
time, the gulf between the living standards of the
soldier and his civilian friends has widened
dramatically.
The changing nature of society is also re-
flected in the new crop of conscripts, who are
better educated and more sophisticated than their
predecessors. They are also more politicized-two
years ago, they were demonstrating in their high
schools against the elimination of student defer-
ments-and they have recently been enfranchised.
An increasing number resent having to donate 12
months to the state-especially when that time is
often wasted on menial and nonmilitary duties.
Finally, the military is confronted with the funda-
mental problem of enforcing rigid discipline in an
increasingly permissive society.
Military Protests
During the final round of the presidential
election last May, a series of demands in the form
of an open letter was sent to the two candidates,
Giscard and Socialist leader Mitterrand. Originally
signed by 100 conscripts and NCOs, the letter
became known as the "Call of the 100." It was
later signed-sometimes in a diluted form-by
some 2,500 to 4,000 soldiers, including many
stationed in West Germany.
The letter called for specific measures to
ameliorate compulsory military service:
? free choice of date and place of induc-
tion between the ages of 18 and 25;
? right to form trade unions;
? pay equal to the minimum wage;
? free transportation.
A series of other demands was aimed at loosening
the bonds of military protocol; eliminating mili-
tary security, tribunals, and sanctions; and
terminating conscript service outside of France.
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April 25, 1975
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Sites of Conscript Demonstrations
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April 25, 1975
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This, document may well represent the most
serious challenge to French military institutions
since the early years of the 5th Republic. The
"Call of the 100" has become the manifesto of
the draftee demonstrations that have taken place
since last September in several French and West
German cities.
The 200 draftees who broke out of their
barracks last September 10 to march down the
streets of Draguignan in southern France set a
precedent for revolt against the previous system
of protesting through proper military channels.
Driven by what the French media has dubbed le
phenomene ras le bol-military slang for "fed up
to the back teeth"--they chanted slogans against
army conditions and raised their fists in the salute
of the extreme leftists. Among them were 30
blacks from France's overseas departments who
also protested against racial discrimination in the
barracks. The demonstration was orderly and
ended without incident, but the chain reaction it
set off is still rocking the French military estab-
lishment.
The Draguignan protest was quickly fol-
lowed by incidents of insubordination in a bat-
talion stationed in nearby Nice, and by a joint
letter to the defense minister from 200 draftees
and noncommissioned officers in Paris requesting
a variety of reforms in line with the "Call of the
100."
On January 13, some 100 draftees assigned
to units in Karlsruhe, West Germany, demon-
strated against the living and working conditions
in Germany. They also questioned the need for
stationing French troops in Germany-the first
time a political factor raised by the "Call of the
100" had been used in a demonstration. Two
weeks later, another garrison in West Germany
was affected when some 80 draftees in Tuebingen
protested disciplinary actions taken against fellow
conscripts.
In mid-February, about 150 draftees demon-
strated in the streets of Verdun, demanding a
civilian inquiry into the accidental death of a
conscript. A day later, some 100 draftees met in
Special Report
Nancy for a clandestine press conference with the
leader of the Young Communists.
The demonstrations so far have all been
orderly. They have not attacked the concept of
compulsory military service, but have con-
centrated on demands for more pay, better living
conditions, and fewer restrictions.
The military. leadership has blamed leftist
agitation for the unrest in the barracks. This
charge was emphasized by Prime Minister Chirac
during his trip to Moscow last month, when he
accused the French Communist Party of under-
mining national defenses. In fact, there is no
evidence to support the contention that the party
is behind the military malaise. The Communists
and the Socialists have not taken a firm stand on
defense issues. Extreme leftist splinter groups,
however, have been active among the military.
The anti-militarist image formerly associated
with the left in France has become an embarrass-
ment for the Socialist Party. In a confidential
note last January, Socialist chief Mitterrand
warned his party members not to associate
themselves with purely anti-militarist demonstra-
tions "which could only rebound to hurt the
left." One of the reasons for the Socialist change
of heart is reflected in polls showing that over 50
percent of the military officers and NCOs voted
for Mitterrand in the last presidential election.
Nevertheless, Socialist action has been limited to
issuing a 20-point program aimed at improving
material conditions and morale in the barracks.
The Communist propaganda efforts that are
aimed at the armed forces appear to be primarily
defensive-to ensure that the army will not inter-
fere should a leftist government come to power.
But the Communists are also worried about being
"passed on the left" by extremists active among
the armed forces. The French Communists'
propaganda tries to counter the appeal of more
radical leftist groups by building strict discipline
among the party's military members and by
emphasizing the necessity for wide-ranging
reforms. Many Communist draftees signed the
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"Call of the 100" but they have steered clear of
radical "soldiers' committees" and have not been
conspicuous in the demonstrations. As the new
secretary of state for defense, General Bigeard,
recently remarked, "Communist soldiers are
always well behaved and disciplined. If one day
there were a Communist defense ministry, there
would be no more street marches."
There is some evidence that the Young Com-
munists are stepping up their activities in an ef-
fort to avoid being left in the dust of radical left
splinter groups. The draftee demonstration and
news conference in Nancy in mid-February was
"sponsored" by the leader of the Young Commu-
nists. Defense Minister Bourges, who has seized
every opportunity to blame the Communists for
the military troubles, immediately denounced the
party as the instigator of the demonstration.
Special Report - 6 -
The Socialist "National Convention of
Reserve Cadres for the New Army" and the Com-
munist "Federation of Officers and NCOs of the
Republican Reserve" compete to enroll members
of the officer corps. To date, their influence has
been small and has been confined largely to lower
ranking reserve NCOs. Senior NCOs and officers,
who consider themselves members of professional
cadres and identify with the French bourgeoisie,
so far have not been as susceptible as the draftees
to the proletarian solidarity approach of the left.
link the
formation of soldiers' committees to the presence
of soldiers belonging to the Trotskyite Commu-
nist Revolutionary League (formerly the Commu-
nist Revolutionary Front), the Marxist Revolu-
tionary Alliance, the Anti-militarist Committee,
and other leftist splinter groups. Security crack-
downs and the splitting up of groups of known
sympathizers had severely curtailed the activities
of these organizations until the "Call of the
100 which embodied many of the demands
made by the soldiers' committees-gave the move-
ment new impetus.
France's most respected newspaper, Le
Monde, conducted a survey among soldiers in late
January. The newspaper concluded that the
Trotskyite Revolutionary League was heavily
involved in focusing the attention of draftees on
''legitimate grievances," thereby drawing the
draftees into soldiers' committees. Soldiers inter-
viewed pointed out that even though one of the
three leaders of the initial demonstration at
Draguignan was connected with the Trotskyites,
he had not hidden this fact. The soldiers
emphasized, however, that even though some of
the demonstrations may have been "encouraged"
by Trotskyites it would be a grave mistake to
assume that draftees' grievances were contrived.
Government Response Sluggish
In early December a report on army morale
prepared by the army's then chief of staff, Alain
de Boissieu, was leaked to the press. His report
was apparently initiated as a result of the
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JCl..rrZC I
incident at Draguignan. De Boissieu urged that
conditions in the military be improved and sug-
gested a revision of missions to adapt the French
army to its financial means. According to Le
Monde, the memorandum conceded that morale
had become a serious problem and even intimated
that, should French society suffer another
upheaval like that of May 1968, the army might
not escape involvement. The words "May 1968,"
and the specter of army involvement in a student-
labor confrontation with the government, evoked
a strong negative emotional response from the
French public.
The Council of Defense met on December
18 and announced that the basic statute
governing officers and NCOs would be studied
and revised. The new laws would provide for
quicker promotion and would encourage younger
cadres. The results of the study, incorporating
suggestions made by all ranks of officers, were
submitted to the defense minister in early April
and will be hammered into a new statute to go
before the Council of Defense. The report calls
for the division of all officer grades into three
groups junior officers up to captains, com-
mandants up to lieutenant colonels, and colonels
and above-within which promotion would be
automatic. An age limit would be established for
promotion into these major "groups." Military
purists in France are already decrying the new
proposals as a minor revolution that will create a
whole category of short-term officers, changing
the army from a way of life to a vocation.
In early January, the military trial of one
black and two white leaders of the demonstration
at Draguignan once again focused public attention
on conscript grievances. Thousands of leftist
civilians demonstrated in Paris and Marseilles in
support of the defendants, and the Socialist and
Communist parties declared their solidarity with
the draftees. The black draftee was acquitted-
"proving there is no racial prejudice in the army,"
as one French news magazine drily remarked-and
the other two received token sentences. The
verdicts were lenient enough to deter strong reac-
tions, but on the whole the army suffered from
the exposure given to anti-militarist propaganda.
Special Report
April 25, 1975
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St=(;Kt I
At the end of January, Giscard replaced
Defense Minister Soufflet, who had not been
effective and, moreover, was identified in the
public mind with the government's inadequate
response to military discontent. Yvon Bourges, a
dynamic civil servant and staunch Gaullist. be-
came the new minister. Giscard also filled the
vacant secretary of state for defense slot by
appointing a colorful and controversial paratroop
general, Marcel Bigeard.
Bigeard will be a key figure in the govern-
ment's attempt to cope with the military. He may
well be the best man for shaking the army out of
its torpor. Bigeard rose through the ranks and
survived the bloodiest fighting of the French
colonial wars to become one of France's most
decorated soldiers. Though worshipped by the
men in his command, he is regarded with some
suspicion by the high command because of his
unorthodox methods and his well-publicized
irreverence for other generals.
The first indication that Bourges and Bigeard
were coming to grips with the military problem
came on March 4 when the cabinet announced
several new measures aimed at improving morale
in the armed forces. Among these, conscripts
were to be allotted one free trip home per month,
and their pay was tripled to 210 francs (about
$50)-still one of the lowest salaries in NATO.
Bourges has also opted to retain the Permanent
Military Service Council set up by Soufflet
shortly before his resignation. The council-com-
posed of military, parliamentary, and private
members-is empowered to investigate and report
on all aspects of military service. Bigeard has
called for a more flexible code of discipline, but
no action has yet been taken.
Giscard has promised further reforms and
has emphasized the necessity for reintegrating the
military into the mainstream of French life. In his
March "fireside chat" to the nation, he also
stressed the importance of the conventional
forces. Drawing attention to the explosive nature
of world crises today, he called for a more mobile
and flexible army capable of defending French
interests anywhere in the world at a moment's
notice.
Special Report
Meaningful Reforms Expensive
In the current economic climate it will be
very difficult to expand the military budget.
Prime Minister Chirac supports the Defense Minis-
try's appeal for more funds,
Barring a real increase in funds for the de-
fense budget, further increases in personnel ex-
penditures will have to come at the expense of
weapons development and procurement, or
through reduced combat preparedness standards.
Already, the completion of a third group of
IRBM silos has reportedly been canceled for
budgetary reasons, and the air force has been
forced to reduce both flying time and the number
of bases for its strategic bomber force.
Alternatively, Paris may choose to reduce
the size of its forces in order to arrest the rising
imbalance between personnel costs and force de-
velopment and readiness. The US embassy reports
that Paris is already asking itself if it can continue
to afford a half-million-man defense force. US
officials indicate that increasing personnel costs,
coupled with the absence of a shooting war, could
compel Giscard's government to reduce the armed
forces to 300,000 or 400,000 men.
The most likely political solution in the
short term is a program of conventional "re-
forms" designed to make the existing system
more palatable. In the long term, however, France
will have to come to grips with the basic question
of whether to increase defense spending or accept
a reduced role as a world power.
Meanwhile, the demonstrations will con-
tinue, and the military, especially the lower ranks,
will remain a fertile field for leftist exploitation.
Unless the promised "further reforms" come
quickly, the conscripts could become more dis-
orderly. Officers and senior NCOs, however,
remain firmly committed to the existing system,
and there does not appear to be any imminent
danger of the French military pushing for a voice
in French politics or participating to any signif-
icant degree in a major civil disturbance.
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Special Report
New Challenger for South Africa
Secret
April 25, 1975
No. 0017/75B
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JCI.I it I
Since the coup in Portugal a year ago led Lisbon to decide to give up its African
colonies, the South African government has faced new problems and opportunities
in its dealings with black Africans. In an address to the South African Senate six
months ago, Prime Minister Vorster said the black African states and South Africa
had come to a crossroads between constructive cooperation and violent conflict. He
promised financial and technical aid to any African country that would agree to
co-exist on a basis of mutual nonintervention in domestic affairs. Vorster said his
government was anxious to maintain South Africa's economic ties with Mozambique
after it became independent, to participate in efforts to resolve the Rhodesian
problem, and to prepare the people of Namibia (South-West Africa) for self-determi-
nation.
Three days after Vorster's speech, Zambian President Kaunda welcomed this
"voice of reason." Kaunda said the time might be ripe for constructive cooperation
since South Africa's ties with Portuguese colonialism had been dissolved. Kaunda
placed priority on resolving th.e Rhodesian problem, and proposed South Africa start
the process by withdrawing its military support for the Smith regime. Zambia, he
said, would welcome progress toward self-determination in Namibia, provided it led
to the independence of the territory as a unified state. In recognition of the
entrenched white-controlled system in South Africa, Kaunda's comments about
change there were less specific.
A Quandary in Rhodesia
Lisbon, Pretoria, and Salisbury had long
shared a common interest in keeping the bulk of
southern Africa under white rule. To the black
Africans, this was an "unholy alliance," but it had
always been more apparent than real. Solid col-
laboration had been inhibited by mutual distrust
as well as by different approaches to their com-
mon racial problem. Portuguese and Rhodesian
officials feared South African predominance in
any joint venture, while Rhodesians and South
Africans shared a basic contempt for. Portuguese
counterinsurgency capabilities.
A month after the Portuguese coup, Rho-
desian Prime Minister Smith visited Vorster to
discuss the effect of an early grant of independ-
ence to Mozambique. Their joint press conference
after the talks made it appear that they saw eye
to eye and that both would welcome an
independent black government in Mozambique,
provided it was stable and maintained construc-
tive relations with Rhodesia and South Africa.
Smith and Vorster drew different inferences
from such a take-over. Vorster recognized, as
Smith did not, that a black government in
Mozambique would nullify South Africa's
strategic interest in maintaining white control of
Rhodesia. Smith's break with Britain in 1965 had
posed diplomatic problems for Pretoria; the
South Africans, for example, never officially
recognized the breakaway regime: They did
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5bUKE I
provide discreet economic, financial, and military
support to Smith because a white-ruled Rhodesia
was regarded as a buffer against black insurgents
who might operate against South Africa from
Zambia or Tanzania. A black government in
Mozambique would, however, permit such in-
surgents to outflank Rhodesia.
Both Smith and Vorster understand that a
hostile government in Mozambique may block
Rhodesian or South African trade that now flows
through Mozambican ports. Vorster perceives that
Rhodesia is much more vulnerable to these
dangers than South Africa. Loss of access to
Mozambique's seaports would be a crippling blow
for the Smith regime, but merely a temporary
setback to the South Africans. The bulk of Rho-
desia's overseas trade flows through Beira and
Lourenco Marques, and rerouting through South
African ports would be prohibitively expensive.
Lourenco Marques, however, handles only one
fourth of South Africa's overseas trade, mostly
from the Transvaal mining and industrial area. A
new South African port is scheduled to open in
1976 that will further reduce the present impor-
tance of Lourenco Marques to South Africa.
Black Insurgency
Mozambican support for insurgency, a
remote contingency for Pretoria, is a present
danger for Salisbury. The Rhodesian guerrillas
who have been active in northeastern Rhodesia
since late 1972 infiltrated through Mozambique
from bases in Zambia and Tanzania. The Front
for the Liberation of Mozambique has held out
hopes to the Rhodesian insurgents that, after
Mozambique becomes independent, they may
extend their infiltration routes along Rhodesia's
entire eastern border with Mozambique. Smith's
security forces, dependent on a limited pool of
white reservists, could not expand sufficiently to
cope with a major increase in guerrilla operations.
Last June, the prospect of early independ-
ence for Mozambique apparently encouraged the
leaders of the African National Council, the
largest black political organization in Rhodesia, to
reject Smith's proposals for a constitutional
settlement. Smith had offered to broaden the
Special Report
franchise gradually for Rhodesian blacks, who
outnumber whites 20 to 1, but in a way that
would have kept them from gaining a majority in
Parliament for at least 40 years.
Smith countered with an election in which
his party won all 50 of the parliamentary seats
allocated to whites. Black candidates who sup-
ported the council's rejection of the Smith
proposals won 7 of the 8 seats allocated to the
some 7,000 blacks who are allowed to vote.
Zambian President Kaunda is a man with a
strong preference for peaceful rather than violent
change, and a Rhodesian settlement has become
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for him a matter of increasing urgency. Zambia Implications for Pretoria
has not been able to offset the economic cost of
its boycott of the Smith regime since Salisbury's
break with Britain'. Even the Tan-Zam railroad,
when it is completed next year, will not fully
compensate for the stoppage of Zambian ship-
ments over Rhodesian rail lines to Indian Ocean
ports in Mozambique; port congestion in Tan-
zania will still delay Zambian shipments.
The mutual interest of South Africa and
Zambia in a Rhodesian settlement brought
Vorster and Kaunda together last October to seek
a way to end guerrilla warfare and reopen settle-
ment negotiations. From then on, the mediation
effort has grown to involve Tanzanian President
Nyerere, President Khama of Botswana, and
Samora Machel, head of the Front for the Libera-
tion of Mozambique.
Since November, Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama,
and Machel have met repeatedly with the rival
Rhodesian nationalist groups, while Vorster has
kept in close touch with Kaunda and Smith. The
combination of sustained pressures-Vorster on
Smith, and the four black mediators on the Rho-
desian nationalists-has brought progress toward a
negotiated settlement:
? In December three Rhodesian insurgent
groups merged with the non-insurgent African
National Council.
? A few days later Smith and the leaders
of the enlarged council agreed to a truce.
? In early February, Smith began meeting
with the council leaders to try to arrange for
the constitutional conference that was called
for in the truce agreement.
In order to force both sides to observe the
cease-fire, the black African mediators have scaled
down their support for the Rhodesian insurgents,
and Vorster has cut back his support for Smith's
counterinsurgency teams. The black mediators
told Rhodesian insurgent leaders, who wanted to
retain control of their individual guerrilla forces,
that all future aid would go to a newly unified
command structure.
Special Report
While V o rster has pushed-and pushed
hard-for Smith to come to terms with Rhodesia's
blacks on early majority rule, he has no intention
of allowing majority rule in South Africa. Most
South Africans, including Vorster, concede that
racial discrimination exists in their country, but
they have also convinced themselves that
apartheid, when perfected, will eliminate the
most galling aspects of discrimination.
In the South African view, the Rhodesian
situation is quite different from theirs; when the
white Rhodesians rejected the South African
course-apartheid-many years ago, they made a
multiracial society inevitable. The South Africans
believe that Salisbury must, as a result, either
move toward majority rule at a pace that satisfies
Rhodesian blacks or face a dangerous insurgency
supported more actively than before by neighbor-
ing black African governments.
The Smith government, in an effort to make
sure that South Africa does not desert white
Rhodesia, has maintained contacts with right
wingers in Vorster's Nationalist Party who share
Salisbury's views. Nevertheless, the efforts of the
right wingers to bring Vorster to view the cause of
Rhodesian whites as identical with that of South
African whites have been unsuccessful.
A Challenge on Namibia
The loosening of Portugal's grip on the reins
in Angola has serious implications for Pretoria's
ability to deal with any unrest that might develop
in Namibia (South-West Africa).
Dissident Ovambo tribesmen, who inhabit
northern Namibia adjacent to the Angolan
border, found that Portuguese security forces in
Angola, after the coup in Lisbon, were no longer
apprehending refugees and handing them over to
South African police. By mid-1974, an Ovambo
exodus to Angola was under way, and a large
number of the refugees moved on to Zambia,
where some 3,000 now live in refugee camps.
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Special Report
April 25, 1975
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Some of the Namibian refugees in Zambia
are said to have joined the insurgent South-West
African People's Organization, which has main-
tained a headquarters in Zambia since its para-
military structure in Namibia was destroyed by
Pretoria in 1966. The membership of the organ-
ization is limited almost exclusively to the
Ovambo tribe, the largest of 11 non-white groups
in Namibia. Although militarily ineffectual, the
group challenges Pretoria's control of the ter-
ritory, advocating independence for Namibia as a
unified state. It is the only Namibian political
group to have gained support from the Organiza-
tion of African Unity and several UN bodies.
In August 1973, agents of the South-West
Africa People's Organization initiated an effective
boycott of Ovamboland's first popular election to
select a legislative council. Only 3 percent of the
eligible voters turned out. Despite this warning,
the South African government continued to back
the territory's traditional tribal leaders and to
suppress the dissident organization. Last Septem-
ber, however, the branch of South Africa's ruling
National Party in the territory announced that it
would eventually hold multiracial talks on the
future of the territory and called on all non-white
ethnic groups to choose spokesmen for the talks.
Keeping a Promise
Subsequently, Pretoria announced that a
new election would be held in January 1975 for
the Ovamboland legislative council, and that the
People's Organization would be permitted to par-
ticipate. The new election seems to be intended as
a first step toward selecting genuinely representa-
tive Ovambo spokesmen for multiracial talks.
Vorster apparently had decided to move toward
eventual self-determination for the whole of
Namibia, as he promised UN Secretary General
Waldheim in early 1973.
Vorster's concept of self-determination does
not, however, anticipate the independence of
Namibia as a unified state, despite successive UN
resolutions to this effect. Vorster's preparations
for self-determination still resemble, in fact, the
National Party's blueprint for the separate devel-
opment of the- major tribal groups within South
Africa itself. He has implied that Namibia might
Special Report -5-
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become independent as a federation of separate
homelands for each ethnic group. Under such a
scheme, the white residents would have direct
control of the southern part of Namibia, where
the territory's most valuable mineral resources are
situated, and possibly retain indirect control of
the whole federation.
Because the Ovarrmbos make up roughly half
of the territory's non-white population, the
smaller tribes, who already fear Ovambo domina-
tion, might be induced to support the whites
against the Ovambos. In the event that the
Ovambos choose to stay out of a federation, the
90,000 white residents of the territory would be
the largest of the remaining ethnic groups. Fur-
thermore, an independent Ovambo state may be
regarded in Pretoria as a useful buffer between
the federation and a possibly unfriendly, inde-
pendent Angola.
Zambian President Kaunda, who clearly
shares Vorster's desire for political solutions in-
stead of violent conflict, has long feared South
African military reprisals for Zambian support of
guerrilla strikes into Rhodesia or Namibia.
Kaunda is, for example, convinced of Pretoria's
complicity in laying the land mines that have
occasionally exploded in Zambian territory
adjacent to Namibia and Rhodesia.
It is unlikely that Kaunda or the other
Africans who have been involved in the
Rhodesian mediation efforts would explicitly
disavow the UN call for independence of Namibia
as a unified state or the OAU policy of supporting
the liberation struggle of the South-West African
People's Organization. Vorster might at least
succeed, however, in dissuading the black leaders
from stepping up support for Namibian insur-
gents. He might argue that the Rhodesian truce is
a valid precedent for Namibia, because it was
accepted by both sides before agreement on con-
stitutional terms was reached.
Divide and Conquer
Vorster's senate speech last October suggests
that he will attempt to turn any discussions from
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political issues to the mutual advantages of eco-
nomic cooperation, highlighting the economic
and technical aid that South Africa is prepared to
extend to black Africa.
Vorster probably has no illusion that the UN
will come around to approving his version of
self-determination by May 30, 1975, the latest
deadline set by the Security Council for South
Africa to relinquish control of Namibia. More
likely, Vorster has decided to gamble that lifting
some of the hitherto tight restraints on political
expression in Namibia will foster tribalism instead
of nationalism. If a program leading to autonomy
or independence for each ethnic group actually
mollifies Namibians who resent white rule,
Vorster can well withstand international criticism.
IF such is Vorster's game, he may have been
encouraged by the outcome of the second
popular election in Ovamboland last January. Al-
though the South-West African People's Organiza-
tion again called for a boycott, 55 percent of the
120,000 eligible voters went to the polls, an
impressive gain over the 3 percent of the first
election. Although opposition candidates were
allowed to run, the traditional tribal leaders who
are responsive to Pretoria were re-elected.
Although the election results may indicate
the organization's support inside Namibia is
waning, Namibian guerrilla bands based abroad
have gained recruits from the recent exodus of
Ovambo tribesmen and may step up their incur-
sions into Ovamboland.
Special Report
A Test in Mozambique
Since the coup in Portugal, South Africa has
officially maintained that Pretoria will neither
interfere with black governments that emerge in
the two territories nor tolerate foreign meddling
in South African affairs. The "non-interference"
doctrine was put to the test last September after
Lisbon came to terms with the Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique and gave it the
dominant place in a transitional government.
When disgruntled whites in Lourenco Marques
attempted to seize power, the South African for-
eign minister promptly declared Pretoria's
readiness to cooperate with the transitional gov-
ernment and warned South Africans not to join
mercenary bands that were said to be preparing to
support the white dissidents.
A large portion of Mozambique's revenue is
derived from port and rail earnings on South
African trade and from the remittances of some
100,000 Mozambicans who work in South
African mines. South Africans also anticipate that
completion of the huge Cabora Bassa hydro-
electric project will strengthen their economic
leverage over an independent but impoverished
Mozambique. South Africa is the only possible
big consumer of power from the dam, but over
the short term it could also do without.
Thus far, the Mozambique nationalist leaders
seem willing to cooperate with Pretoria, but they
are likely to stop short of diplomatic ties.
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Vorster Seeks New Dialogues
Vorster apparently hopes he can parlay his
quiet collaboration with the four black leaders on
Rhodesia into an open and continuing associa-
tion. He also wants his work on a Rhodesian
settlement to smooth the way toward a general
normalization of relations between South Africa
and the black African states. Although Pretoria
has sought for a decade to establish diplomatic
relations with OAU members, only Malawi has an
embassy in Pretoria. Vorster's earlier attempts to
initiate dialogues with black African leaders were
rebuffed by an OAU summit resolution in 1971
that condemned any diplomatic contact unless
Pretoria modified its racial policies.
Since Vorster assumed a mediator role in
Rhodesia, however, he has pursued new dialogues,
approaching several West African leaders. In
September 1974, Vorster visited Ivory Coast to
meet with President Houphouet-Boigny and
Sengalese President Senghor. Last February, he
made another quick trip to Liberia and met with
President Tolbert.
Although both trips were secret, the South
African press made reference to the meetings with
Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor two months
afterward; Vorster and Tolbert publicized their
meeting within a week.
Vorster Explains
According to Tolbert, Vorster asked for the
visit in order to give his views on the problems
that stood in the way of black African leaders
who might accept his offer of a dialogue. During
their talks:
? Vorster promised that the South African
police in Rhodesia would be withdrawn as
soon as guerrilla terrorism ceased, noting that
he favored a compromise settlement.
? Vorster accepted Tolbert's stipulations
that the whole of Namibia should be inde-
pendent and that Pretoria should set forth a
definite program and target date for inde-
pendence.
Special Report -7-
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? In response to Tolbert's statement that
racial problems within South Africa must be
resolved on a basis of equality, Vorster said
that the policy of separate development was
designed to provide independence for blacks
in their own homelands and that he was
striving for a gradual removal of admitted
racial injustices.
Back in South Africa, Vorster has been tell-
ing audiences that he is indeed seeking to normal-
ize relations with the other African states, but
that he has no intention of abandoning apartheid.
Vorster's Apparent Strategy
Vorster apparently assumes that black
African leaders are grasping at straws to justify
profitable dealings with South Africa, a view that
may be the thread binding his current activities
together:
? The withdrawal of South African police
from Rhodesia would fulfill Vorster's most
immediate promise to Tolbert and thereby
might sustain expectations from some
Africans that Vorster intends to follow
through with more difficult reforms in
Namibia and South Africa proper.
? An eventual grant of independence to
Namibia as a federation of autonomous home-
lands would, at least superficially, reconcile
Vorster's promises to his white constituents
and to Tolbert.
? Vorster's periodic meetings with South
Africa's black Bantustan leaders can be used
to turn aside the challenge from the OAU to
maintain a dialogue with South African
blacks, yet the concessions he has made to
them thus far have been so minor that white
South Africans have not become appre-
hensive.
? The opening of a government-sponsored
theater in Cape Town to mixed audiences in
February was prompted by Vorster as part of
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his reported plans to desegregate some public
facilities without dismantling the basic struc-
ture of apartheid.
The aftermath of Vorster's meeting with the
Liberian President may make him revise his
strategy. Although Vorster's explanations of his
policies convinced Tolbert that he should consult
with other OAU members in order to determine
their views, the OAU foreign ministers criticized
the meeting when they met in Addis Ababa last
February. Some also criticized Kaunda, Nyerere,
and Khama for working with Vorster to bring
about a Rhodesian settlement outside the frame-
work of the OAU.
The debate at Addis Ababa led to a resolu-
tion calling for an extraordinary foreign ministers'
meeting in April in Dar es Salaam to discuss a
coordinated reaction toward Vorster's detente
policy. This meeting, held last week, concluded
with a declaration that approves negotiations with
South Africa designed to bring about majority
rule in Rhodesia and independence for Namibia.
The latest declaration went on, however, to
call upon member states to help southern African
nationalists prepare for intensified guerrilla war-
fare if their goals cannot be attained through
negotiations. It also calls for a tightening of the
boycott against South Africa until it ends
apartheid.
The declaration is a significant gain for the
black African leaders who have cooperated with
Vorster in pushing the Rhodesian nationalists and
Prime Minister Smith toward a negotiated con-
stitutional settlement. Nevertheless, Nyerere had
to formulate the new boycott measures in order
to counteract calls for a repudiation of efforts to
mediate the Rhodesian conflict.
A Rhodesian settlement that provides for a
peaceful transfer of power to the black majority
might pave the way for constructive relations
between South Africa and a few moderate black
African states. Vorster's dramatic turnabout-
from militarily backing a white supremacist
regime in Rhodesia to helping arrange its
demise-will make it psychologically easier for
black African leaders to meet him openly and
discuss sensitive issues. It is unlikely, however,
that Vorster's contributions toward a Rhodesian
settlement will yield international tolerance for
his concept of separate development in Namibia
or in South Africa proper.
The OAU would probably condemn a
member state if it tried to open diplomatic rela-
tions with Pretoria in return for economic assist-
ance. Nevertheless, an end of UN sanctions
against Rhodesia would open the way for
economic integration throughout southern Africa.
Vorster went ahead with his initial meetings
with the three West African presidents before he
was sure a Rhodesian settlement could be con-
cluded. His domestic political situation hardly
required diplomatic triumphs, and his party has a
comfortable majority in parliament. Possibly,
Vorster hoped that his meetings with the leaders
of other OAU states would reduce pressures on
the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, and
Botswana while they were involved with him
concerning the Rhodesian problem. Possibly, also,
Vorster assumed that a satisfactory Rhodesian
settlement would be in sight by the time his
meetings surfaced in the press. Such a favorable
outcome still seemed likely in early February
when Vorster visited Liberia.
Recent events in Rhodesia, however, show
that Smith will not easily go along with Vorster's
plans, and the Rhodesian situation remains at an
impasse. Vorster apparently had hoped the
meager concessions that Smith had made to
Rhodesian nationalists at his behest would soften
the OAU boycott of South Africa. The declara-
tion issued by the African foreign ministers at Dar
es Salaam proved otherwise.
Of all the players in the Rhodesian game,
Vorster seems to have the highest stakes on the
table. He has depicted a Rhodesian settlement as
the first step toward a solution of Pretoria's
Namibia problem and toward full acceptance of
South Africa by the black states of Africa. Unless
settlement negotiations are salvaged soon, Vor-
ster's further goals may fade from sight.
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