WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011000150001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
No. 0015/75
April 11, 1975
Copy
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and
25X1 refore published separately as Special Reports are listed
in the contents.
CONTENTS (April 11, 1975)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
4 The Arab Side of Confrontation
6 Rhodesia: Sithole Furloughed
7 Ethiopia: Security Concerns
8 Portugal: Road to Socialism
10 Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
11 Disarmament Conference Ends
12 Eastern Europe: VE Day
13 Yugoslav-Romanian Cooperation
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
14 Venezuela: No Bonanza; Aid
16 Ecuador: Criticism Goes Public
16 Argentina: Buying Time
18 Honduras: New Leaders Emerge
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
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Now,
H
Vietnam: Focus on Saigon
After a week's lull, the communists have
opened a new round of fighting with Saigon the
ultimate target. Hanoi now appears in position
to take whatever action is necessary to force the
war to an early conclusion. The remaining ques-
tions have to do with timing and tactics, and
whether a political solution can be arranged-on
communist terms-prior to a final South Vietna-
mese military collapse.
At midweek, parts of three North Vietna-
mese divisions supported by artillery and armor
attacked the capital of Long Khanh Province
east of the capital while part of another division
moved against the capital of Long An Province
to the southwest of Saigon. Other communist
forces that had been threatening the provincial
capital of Moc Hoa in the northern delta have
now withdrawn, apparently in keeping with
communist plans to step up the pressure closer
to Saigon.
The past week of relative inaction has given
the government some chance to consolidate its
military position. Nevertheless, in terms of capa-
bilities, the strategic balance decisively favors
the communists. The North Vietnamese now
have 18 infantry divisions in South Vietnam
supported by numerous armor, artillery, and
air-defense units. Eight of these divisions are in
Military Regions 3 and 4.
SECRET
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By comparison, the South Vietnamese at
this moment have only seven combat-ready
infantry divisions. They are, however, rebuilding
three divisions from personnel extracted from
the northern provinces and plan to form two
more by early summer.
The government's long-term prospects are
bleak, no matter how well Saigon's forces and
commanders acquit themselves in the fighting
that lies ahead. This is already beginning to
become an accepted judgment, within both
civilian and military circles in South Vietnam.
Meanwhile, in an obvious effort to encour-
age a political upheaval in Saigon, the com-
munists are again stating their willingness to
negotiate with a post-Thieu government. But
Hanoi is making it clear that it is not interested
Cake almost everyone else, the Soviets
have been surprised by the' pace of events in
I dochin , particularly in South Vietnam.
but _ Moscow,, has adjusted easily to the
ch ngin circumstances.
the soviet technique has been to use
many of thesame formulations as before,
aflowing the changed circumstances to give
those words new meaning. For example,
when calling for negotiations between the
communists acid the Saigon government be-
fore the recent military collapse, the Soviets
probably had- in mind an end result similar
to the pattern of Laos---a set-up that gave
the communists room for political as well as
military. maneuver. At this juncture, how-
ever, Moscow's call , for negotiations can:
mean little more than an interest in finding a
=means for ,an orderly, assumption of power
by the communists. Moscow may also have a
genuine, although perhaps not intense,
interest in a denouement in South Vietnam
that re leas well on the responsibility and
humaneness of its friends in Hanoi.
in a compromise but rather in a fig leaf for a
North Vietnamese take-over under military
pressure.
Pressure is building among the civilian op-
position and among some military commanders
for President Thieu either to exert vigorous lead-
ership or step aside. So far, Thieu has shown
considerable skill in keeping the opposition di-
vided. He is aided by the fact that there is no
single figure who his various political and mili-
tary critics believe would provide more effective
leadership. Thieu's new nominee for prime min-
ister, Nguyen Ba Can, hopes to have a govern-
ment formed by this weekend. Can will try to
encourage representatives from the civilian op-
position to join the cabinet. There is consider-
able reluctance, however, especially among im-
portant Buddhist and Catholic groups, to be
associated with a Thieu government.
For the moment, the Soviets emj ha
size the collapse of authority .in South-Viet
nam rather than the actions of the NSlorth
Vietnamese. Pravda commentator. ; Y=uriy
Zhukov on April 5, stated that the new
situation in South Vietnam ened u. a
1 11 clear prospect for peace, by which he pre
sumably means that an `early ,com unist
take-over is a good prospect.
The Soviets are also'still talking about
negotiations in Cambodiia, although= again
they view any such talks only as-a.deviee_to
provide an orderly transfer of power.
Moscoww
recognizes that Prince Sihanouk will prab-
ably play some role in Phnom Penh after a_=
communist victory.
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HINA
Cambodia: Continued Erosion
The erosion of Phnom Penh's outer de-
fenses reached the point at week's end where a
major Khmer communist penetration or a gen-
eral collapse of government units-or both-
appeared imminent. The most serious commu-
nist encroachments occurred along the defense
lines northwest of the city, where the insurgents
edged to within four miles of the airport. Steady
fighting had also worn holes in government de-
fenses near Route 5 north of the city. Commu-
nist gunners kept the airport under sporadic
artillery and rocket fire during the week, forcing
a partial halt to the US airlift on April 10.
Khmer air force operations have begun winding
down as the result of almost daily aircraft losses.
To the west, communist ground attacks
along Route 4 forced government units to aban-
don a number of positions, and front lines in
this sector were within several miles of the
army's main ammunition dump. On the other
side of the capital, relentless insurgent pressure
forced government troops into a relatively small
Communists
increase
pressure
.r
PHNOn~r PEN
2. ~If
enclave on the Mekong River's east bank di-
rectly opposite the city. At week's end, commu-
nist recoilless-rifle fire began hitting along
Phnom Penh's waterfront.
Although the communists have begun call-
ing in units from the countryside to participate
in increased attacks on Phnom Penh, this did
not prevent them from attacking the govern-
ment-held provincial capitals of Prey Veng and
Kompong Speu. Defenders at Prey Veng gave
ground initially but appear to be holding. Kom-
pong Speu is more seriously threatened, with
some fighting having occurred near the center of
town.
False Hopes
Prime Minister Long Boret returned to
Phnom Penh this week amid speculation that
some sort of a breakthrough toward "negotia-
tions" had occurred. There is no evidence, how-
ever, that Sihanouk or the Khmer communists
have backed away from their outright rejection
of any "compromise or negotiations." Specula-
tion concerning negotiations was fueled by Thai
claims that a meeting had been arranged in
Bangkok between Boret and a "representative
from the opposition government." This repre-
sentative was undoubtedly Sihanouk's son,
Prince Yuvaneath, who had been in Bangkok
before with the approval of the Thai govern-
ment. Yuvaneath-who has a reputation as a
playboy and who has been staying in Macao-
clearly has no authority to speak for his father,
let alone the Khmer communists. At best, he
might be expected to relay some message from
Boret to Sihanouk. Under present conditions,
however, Boret would appear to have little to
offer the other side except surrender.
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%sr w
SYRIA-EGYPT: FRAYED RELATIONS
Cairo and Dama?cusg'are seriously at odds
again as a result of President Sadat's independ-
ent initiatives since the suspension last month of
indirect Egyptian-Israeli negotiations for a new
Sinai withdrawal agreement. The Syrians are
irked that the Egyptian leader did not coor-
dinate with them before requesting that the
Geneva peace conference be reconvened and an-
nouncing that Egypt would extend the mandate
of the UN Emergency Force and reopen the
Suez Canal. Given their already deep suspicions
of Egyptian motives, the Syrians probably re-
gard Sadat's actions as a ploy to buy Cairo more
time to pursue a separate deal with Tel Aviv.
Sadat's tendency to act alone has been a
major source of Syrian distrust of the Egyptian
President, inhibiting effective cooperation be-
tween the two countries. Syrian President Asad
and Sadat shunned each other at King Faysal's
funeral two weeks ago, and Asad deliberately
avoided Cairo on his way to and from Libya on
March 28.
The Syrians apparently were caught flat-
footed by Sadat's diplomatic initiative, which
greatly reduces their own political options.
After calling for the resumption of the Geneva
talks for so long, Damascus is hardly in a posi-
tion now to criticize Sadat for doing the same.
The Syrians are probably especially annoyed
that Sadat presumed to speak for all Arabs in
urging that European and nonaligned partic-
ipants be invited to attend the Geneva talks.
For all his misgivings about Sadat, Asad
probably still sees little alternative to trying to
work with Egypt to realize Syrian objectives.
Damascus' actions over the next few months,
therefore, are likely to be aimed, at least in part,
at curbing Sadat's independence and forcing him
to coordinate his moves more closely with Syria.
The Syrians have nevertheless refrained
from attacking Sadat publicly and are venting
on the US some of their frustration over the
lack of progress in negotiations. The controlled
press has expressed strong skepticism that the
reassessment of US policy will lead to any real
change in Washington's approach to Middle East
negotiations. In addition, the Damascus media
have recently taken the harder line that Israel
must commit itself to withdraw to 1967 borders
and to recognize the rights of the Palestinians
before the Geneva conference can be recon-
vened. One columnist, writing in the Baath
Party paper, even hinted that Syria might
boycott the Geneva talks unless Israel makes
these commitments.
A congress of Syria's Baath Party opened
on April 5 to elect a new executive group and to
ratify President Asad's position on Middle East
peace negotiations. According to press reports,
the congress is considering tough resolutions en-
dorsing Asad's recent proposal for joint Syrian-
Palestinian political and military commands, re-
jecting any new step-by-step negotiations, and
urging better Arab-Soviet relations.
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Sadat and Arafat during recent meeting
Asad and his supporters have taken pre-
cautionary measures over the past few weeks to
ensure that the congress is stacked in their favor.
A large number of Syrian Baathists known to be
ideologically aligned with the more radical Iraqi
Baath Party have been detained; some have been
charged with conspiring with Baghdad against
the Syrian government. In most cases, the
charges may well have been pressed to get critics
out of the way for the party elections that
preceded the congress. One effect of the harsh
measures has been an undercurrent of uneasiness
in Damascus and a bumper crop of coup and
countercoup rumors.
Perhaps partly to counter such rumors,
President Asad used his opening speech to the
party congress to stress that his government,
which has been in power since 1971, has pro-
vided Syria with its first extended period of
political stability. He pointed out that the pres-
ent party congress is the first to serve a full
four-year term.
The Egyptians, who have made only
oblique public references to their current dis-
pute with the Syrians, see themselves as the
aggrieved party. Sadat believes he proved his
Arab credentials when he rejected Israel's
demand for.a nonbelligerency pact and forfeited
the early return of more Egyptian territory. He
is clearly resentful that even this has not stilled
Syrian criticism of Egyptian policy.
Sadat seems to have deliberately minimized
his contacts with Asad since the 1973 war in an
effort to maintain his freedom of action in
negotiations. The subsequent deterioration in
relations, however, has increased rather than
lessened Sadat's problems with Syria, and
threatens ultimately to limit his room to
maneuver.
Palestine Liberation Organization chairman
Yasir Arafat was in Cairo this week-for the first
time in several months-attempting to repair his
frayed relations with Egypt. In meetings with
President Sadat and a variety of other Egyptian
officials, Arafat almost certainly argued against
Egyptian participation in another round of
step-by-step negotiations and sought assurances
that Egypt would insist on a role for the PLO if
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ACI,nC 1 V '!
the Geneva talks resume. Arafat's willingness to
travel to Cairo at this time may have resulted
from an assumption that the Egyptians, in the
wake of the breakdown of the step-by-step
approach, would be more likely to accom-
modate Palestinian interests.
In fact, Sadat apparently made few conces-
sions to Arafat. According to sketchy accounts
of their meeting, the President promised only
that Egypt would continue its efforts to
"guarantee" PLO participation at Geneva. It was
also agreed that the two would work toward an
early meeting of the "confrontation forces"-
Egypt, Syria, and the PLO-to coordinate their
strategies.
Arafat may have given more than he
received. According to press reports from Cairo,
he insisted that the PLO must attend the Geneva
conference if the substance of the Palestinian
problem was to be discussed, but conceded that
the military secretariat of the 20-member Arab
League could speak on behalf of the Palestinians
if the conference were to consider only another
round of military disengagement agreements. If
confirmed, this concession marks a significant
shift in Arafat's position toward that of Sadat,
who recently suggested that the Arab League
could represent the Palestinians at Geneva.
Sadat considers this a possible way around
Israel's objections to negotiating with the PLO.
Arafat's trip to Cairo was part of a general
Palestinian effort, during the current period of
diplomatic uncertainty, to get on good terms
with all of the PLO's traditional backers. Arafat
has visited seven Arab states in the past week,
while the head of the PLO political department
has been in Eastern Europe and North Africa. A
PLO delegation reportedly will also soon travel
RHODESIA: SITHOLE FURLOUGHED
ID I)
Late last week, Rhodesian Prime Minister
Smith temporarily released imprisoned insurgent
leader Ndabaningi Sithole to attend, with other
black Rhodesian nationalists, a special meeting
of African foreign ministers that began on April
7 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The ministers are
discussing their countries' reaction to South
African Prime Minister Vorster's policy of
detente with black Africa and his resulting joint
effort with four black African leaders to
mediate a compromise settlement for Rhodesia.
Sithole, a militant leader of the Rhodesian
nationalists' African National Council, was freed
from ten years of detention last December fol-
lowing the truce-arranged by Vorster and his
African collaborators-between Smith and
Rhodesian insurgent groups. When Sithole was
re-arrested a month ago, the other leaders of the
council said they would not negotiate with
Smith unless Sithole was released. Vorster and
the black African mediators wanted to resolve
the impasse before the foreign ministers' meet-
ing in order to head off a move to censure the
black mediators for their dealings with Vorster.
Vorster is known to have urged Smith last
month to resolve the Sithole case, and the South
African foreign minister visited Salisbury the
day before Smith announced his decision. In his
public statement, Smith explained his move as a
"further indication" of his regime's "good will"
and desire to "promote detente in southern
Africa." I n fact, he may have hoped that the
presence in Dar es Salaam of Sithole, who has
called for renewed guerrilla operations in
Rhodesia would sharpen frictio g the
Africans.
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ETHIOPIA: SECURITY CONCERNS
,/3 ,c, /7,19
The government's military position in
Eritrea has improved in recent weeks and fight-
ing has dropped off sharply from the high level
that prevailed in February. Elsewhere in the
country, however, new security incidents con-
tinue to tax the overextended army and police.
Government forces now control Asmara,
the capital of Eritrea Province, and as much of
the countryside as they choose to occupy in
force at any given time. Army operations have
denied the rebels sanctuaries and food supplies
near Asmara. The government is now able to
bring basic necessities, such as food and fuel,
into the capital by military convoys, but in-
dustrial and commercial activities have not yet
recovered because of supply problems and the
exodus of foreigners in February.
The rebels continue to enjoy popular sup-
port and remain a formidable guerrilla force.
They mine roads, stage ambushes, and skirmish
with government troops on all the routes con-
necting Asmara with other important points.
The government has not disputed the rebels'
control of much of the western part of the
The government's improved military posi-
tion makes it unlikely that the ruling council
will be willing to offer meaningful concessions
to the rebels any time soon. The US consul in
Asmara reported recently that the Ethiopian
commander appeared determined to wipe out
the insurgency, not simply contain it.
Meanwhile, much smaller groups of armed
dissidents are active in several other provinces.
At least some of these groups are probably
gaining strength as a result of opposition to the
council's land reform program. In Gojjam Prov-
ince-another area of traditional opposition to
the central government-insurgents are also in
the field, some led by local notables. If the
Gojjam insurgents pick up strength-and they
may as the government begins to implement the
land reform policy-they could pose a threat to
one of Ethiopia's main north-south roads.
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7-7
PORTUGAL: THE ROAD TO SOCIALISM
Prime Minister Goncalves this week de-
fended Portugal's right to pursue an independ-
ent socialist course. At the same time, the major
political parties moved toward legitimizing the
military's control of the government.
Goncalves told a press conference that
while there had been no outside interference in
Portugal's affairs, other countries disapproved of
its course toward socialism and there was danger
of an economic boycott. A few days earlier, the
new minister for planning and economic co-
ordination had warned that such a boycott
would result in the alignment of the Portuguese
economy with "some political camp," despite
the country's desire to remain independent.
While attempting to reassure foreign in-
vestors, Goncalves noted that some multina-
tional companies had already left the country.
The Prime Minister stated that Portugal could
not depend upon foreign aid and that it would
have to rely on its own resources. Goncalves'
remarks were probably prompted by the recent
flurry of bilateral demarches by the NATO
countries and the increasing restiveness in West-
ern financial circles over Lisbon's radical eco-
nomic measures.
Underlining Portugal's efforts to improve
its relations with the Third World, Goncalves
stated the US would not be allowed to use its
Azores base against the Arab countries. He said
Lisbon would respect its NATO commitments,
but that the Portuguese people themselves must
ultimately decide which international treaty
commitments will be maintained.
Meanwhile, a plan to give constitutional
legitimacy to the military's domination of the
government is scheduled for approval by the
political parties this week. The plan, referred to
Recent socialist rally in Lisbon
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'"0101 N%Nopr
as a "platform of understanding," provides only
a limited role for the popularly elected legisla-
tive assembly and the cabinet for a transition
period of three to five years. Key executive,
legislative, and judicial powers are reserved for
the Armed Forces Movement's Revolutionary
Council.
The council will define the general lines of
domestic and foreign policy, pass judgment on
legislative acts of both the elected assembly and
the cabinet, and determine the constitutionality
of laws. In addition, the council will control the
selection of the prime minister and the ministers
of defense, internal administration, and eco-
nomic planning. Although the legislative
assembly theoretically will have the power to
force a change in the cabinet with a vote of no
confidence and to override a council veto with a
three-quarters majority, the assembly apparently
can be dissolved at any time by the president in
consultation with the Revolutionary Council.
While the Movement may accept some
minor changes in the wording of its platform,
the moderate parties' efforts to limit the coun-
cil's power have no prospect of success. Rather
than risk alienation, therefore, they are ex-
pected to agree to the platform, hoping to con-
tinue to exert influence within the cabinet and
the legislative assembly. The Communist Party
and its front organization, the Portuguese Dem-
ocratic Movement, quickly endorsed the plat-
form. Five far-left parties, however, have an-
nounced that they will reject it.
In a recent interview, prominent Armed
Forces Movement leader Admiral Rosa Cou-
tinho proposed the formation of a socialist
party that would more accurately express the
views of the Movement. The party's political
orientation, he said, would be somewhere be-
tween the Communists and the Socialists. Admi-
ral Coutinho strongly dislikes the Socialist Party
of Mario Soares and is reported to head a fac-
tion in the Revolutionary Council that opposes
too great a reliance on the Portuguese Commu-
SOYUZ LAUNCH 4FAILS
The Soviets failed last weekend
in their attempt to orbit two cosmo-
nauts in a Soyuz spacecraft. The cos-
monauts were to have linked up with
and boarded the Salyut 4 space station
that is currently in orbit.
While this event was not directly
related to the Apollo-Soyuz Test
Project, the failure has once again
raised some serious questions about
the overall reliability of Soviet systems
and the safety of US astronauts. The
Soviets have assured the US that the
problem was unique to an "older"
booster and will have no effect on the
"newer" booster to used or the
Test Project launch.
The Soviets' next move is not
clear, but we expect that it will largely
be determined by US reaction to the
failure. We believe they will forgo an-
other visit to Salyut 4 because of pos-
siblescheduling problems that could
impact on the Test Project launch
date. Even before this failure the
Soviets stated ; that they were pre-
paring four crews and two launch
vehicles to meet the July 15 launch
date, which indicates the extent to
which they are willing to go to ensure
the success of the joint venture.
nist Party.
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GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS
9 - '33)
Intercommunal talks are scheduled to re-
open in Vienna on April 28, but sharp differ-
ences have arisen among the Greek Cypriots
over negotiating strategy. In particular, Glafkos
Clerides' role as the negotiator for the Greek
Cypriots has been clouded in the past week,
apparently as a result of a dispute with Arch-
bishop Makarios.
Clerides has been sharply attacked by the
pro-Makarios press and political groups because
of a recent speech in which he argued that a
bizonal federation, as desired by the Turks, was
probably the solution that would provide the
Greek Cypriots with the best opportunity to
regain some of the territory lost last summer
and to achieve guarantees for the future. His
statements drew immediate fire from Makarios'
There have been conflicting reports this
week of an imminent Clerides resignation. On
April 8, Clerides told a UN official he had recon-
sidered his decision and would remain as the
Greek Cypriot negotiator, but the following day
press reports of his consultations with Greek
Cypriot officials indicated that he had not yet
made up his mind.
Clerides has used resignation threats in the
past as a tactic to get his way. He would prob-
ably hope to gain assurances of support that
would tie both Makarios and the Greek govern-
ment to the unpopular concessions he feels he
will have to make to obtain a settlement.
Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish
Cypriots, will continue as their negotiator, at
least during the first sessions. The talks are re-
portedly scheduled to last only until May 2, but
they may go on after that date in Vienna or
Nicosia at a lower level. Should Clerides carry
out his resignation threat, the talks might be
derailed, at least temporarily. ?
Relations between Athens and Ankara re-
main troubled as each side appears increasingly
ready to take risks to back up its claims to the
Aegean. On a couple of occasions, the Greeks
have fired at-but have failed to hit-Turkish
aircraft that Athens claimed were violating its
airspace in the Aegean. The Turkish aircraft
were conducting photoreconnaissance of a
Greek military buildup on the islands near the
Turkish coast. Apparently, the Turks have every
intention of continuing their aerial surveillance.
The Greeks believe that the Turks are
trying to intimidate them, as well as to establish
a de facto role for the Turkish armed forces in
the Aegean.
Stepped up military activity by the Turks
in the Aegean may reflect, in part, a desire by
the Turkish General Staff to divert the attention
of junior officers from the domestic political
scene. Prime Minister - designate Demirel, who
this week presented his program to parliament,
is still unpopular with the army, which has al-
ready removed him from power once-in 1971.
In his program, Demirel called for a two-
zone federal system for Cyprus; a reappraisal of
relations with the US if the military aid cutoff is
not ended; continued "attachment" to NATO;
and an enlarged relationship with the EC.
Demirel also stated his opposition to Greek
military activity on islands near the Turkish
coast and to Athens' claim to control the air-
space over the Aegean. He noted that Ankara
would negotiate with Athens, however, to gain
equitable sharing of the continental shelf in the
Aegean.
The vote of confidence on the Demirel
program may come as early as April 11. The
opposition, led by former prime minister
Ecevit, is waging an intense campaign to defeat
him, and while Demirel still appears to have a
narrow majority, a switch of only one or two
votes could change the outcome.
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 DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ENDS
3Y N rl
The Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament concluded its spring session on
April 10 in Geneva with its usual record of no
accomplishments. The group's 30 active mem-
bers used most of the session to reiterate stan-
dard positions on disarmament topics while
calling for greater action on the part of the
committee. Little progress was made on the new
issues on which the last General Assembly asked
the committee to submit reports-nuclear-free
zones, environmental modification for hostile
purposes, and peaceful nuclear explosions.
Instead of beginning a study of all aspects
of nuclear-free zones as the General Assembly
had directed, the committee spent most of its
time arguing over procedural requirements.
Although a compromise was eventually worked
out on the size and membership of the group
that will study the nuclear-free zone question, a
consensus on the concept itself will probably
not be achieved when the group meets this
summer. The disarmament committee also
agreed to schedule informal meetings of experts
during its summer session on the two other
assigned topics. These subjects remain contro-
versial and raise serious policy questions for
most governments, but the informal meetings
will not require governments to place their
positions on the record.
Much of the debate at the committee's
meetings centered on the review of the 1968
Non-Proliferation Treaty that is scheduled for
this coming May. In their speeches, many mem-
bers focused on what they consider to be the
pressing need to implement the treaty's sections
dealing with complete disarmament measures
and methods for providing the benefits of peace-
ful nuclear development to non-nuclear states.
Although the committee has had the negotiation
of a comprehensive test ban treaty on its work
program for years, no attempts were made at
this session to proceed further.
Possibly out of frustration over the usually
inconclusive results of these meetings, the
Romanians proposed that the committee reform
its methods and establish a definite agenda and
work program at the beginning of each session.
While the proposal met with some support,
debate was inconclusive, and the committee is
likely to retain its traditional emphasis on flexi-
bility and resist attemppts to structure its pro-
ceedings.
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r w
Moscow and its allies are preparing a major
propaganda production for next month to mark
the 30th anniversary of the end of the war in
Europe. A Central Committee decision pub-
lished on February 9 spelled out the themes for
the five-day celebration, which will be high-
lighted by a solemn commemorative meeting in
the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on May 8.
In their publicity, the Soviets are asserting
that their forces played the preponderant, deci-
sive role in the defeat of the Axis powers. The
other theaters of war are being treated as subsid-
iary, almost incidental, conflicts that did not
materially affect the outcome. The war in the
Pacific, for example, is almost totally ignored.
Even where Allied contributions are conceded,
such as in the air war over Europe and the
Normandy invasion, the Soviets describe them
as too little and too late.
The Soviets have a penchant for celebrating
events at decade intervals, but there are prob-
ably other reasons for the attention given this
anniversary:
? There is a concern over political lax-
ness, particularly in the military, that has led
to a concurrent campaign to improve disci-
pline, vigilance, and combat preparedness.
? This probably is the last time that
many in the present leadership will be
around to commemorate the ten-year anni-
versary of an event which meant much to
them and to their careers.
? It is an opportunity for the Soviets to
flex their great-power muscles, to remind
their own people and the world at large of
Soviet military strength, past and present.
? It provides an occasion to reassert So-
viet legitimacy in Eastern Europe and to
celebrate Moscow's role in the establishment
of socialist regimes there.
The main focus of the celebrations will be
domestic, but the Soviets are attempting, ever
u?T row i4CE,P
more insistently, to elicit participation from
other countries involved in World War II. Al-
though most Western Allies intend to send offi-
cial delegations to the USSR, veterans groups
will meet, and an exchange of naval visits with
the US is planned, Moscow appears piqued that
the response has not been more enthusiastic.
Most East European countries are follow-
ing Moscow's lead in lauding the victorious
achievements of socialism over fascism and capi-
talism during the war. The Bulgarian party news-
paper recently added a new wrinkle by asserting
that Sofia would also celebrate "the birth of the
world socialist system." In the northern tier,
Polish party chief Gierek will reportedly deliver
a major speech at Auschwitz to an anticipated
crowd of more than 100,000 former victims of
Nazi crimes.
Moscow's handling of the anniversary is
already stirring up some political problems. One
is how to deal with the prickly question of
Stalin's role in the war. His treatment will be
read by knowledgeable Soviets as a current po-
litical barometer. So far, he has barely been
mentioned in the publicity, but as May 9
approaches and the propaganda gets more spe-
cific, it will be more difficult to ignore him.
Limited indications so far suggest that the So-
viets will direct as little attention to Stalin's role
as possible, but that they will treat it realisti-
cally when they do.
Even in Europe, the Soviets have problems.
There is the risk that relations with Bonn will be
worsened by Moscow's resurrection of the past.
Belgrade has already reacted angrily to
Moscow's slighting treatment of the role of
Tito's partisans in liberating Yugoslavia, and
Belgrade plans to stage a major military parade
to emphasize its independent wartime achieve-
ments. The Romanians have also chosen to
emphasize their nationalist views by playing up
two near-simultaneous but unrelated anni-
versaries from-their-own history.
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YUGOSLAV-ROMANIAN COOPERATION
Belgrade and Bucharest increasingly give
the impression of acting in concert as they re-
assert their independent roles in East European
affairs and the communist movement.
Over the last two weeks, for example, Pres-
idents Tito and Ceausescu have sharply crit-
icized Soviet plans for the celebration of the
anniversary of VE day. In addition, Ceausescu
has rebuked communist ideologues who min-
imize the role of the nation and equate na-
tionalism with anti-communism. Adding insult
to injury, the Romanian leader mocked "some
comrades" (read the Soviets) who turn to Marx,
Engels, Lenin, and "even Stalin" for solutions to
local problems that were never considered dur-
ing their lifetimes.
The two maverick leaders may well have
synchronized these reassertions of national
independence. On the same day that Ceausescu
leveled his broadside at Moscow, he met a high-
ranking Yugoslav party official. The two agreed
to expand their two parties' contacts on ideo-
logical matters, and Tito's subsequent speech
stressed many points that the Romanian media
are publishing.
"- - 38
There is also agreement on other key
issues. Belgrade and Bucharest are worried
about-and are actively collaborating against-
what they view as Soviet efforts to re-establish
the Kremlin's dominance in the international
communist movement. The Yugoslav ambassa-
dor in Bucharest said last week that the Roma-
nian and Yugoslav parties agreed that Moscow is
trying to transform the European communist
conference into a servile forum for Soviet views.
The Yugoslav added that his party definitely
would not attend under these conditions and
further noted that the Romanians would also
not accept this turn of events.
The ambassador also said that Romania is
again interested in gaining observer status at the
next nonaligned summit. He indicated he has
recommended that Belgrade support this move
and expressed confidence that obstacles that led
Tito to block a similar Romanian initiative in
1974 were no longer important. Romania thus
plans, with tacit Yugoslav approval, to approach
other nonalianed leaders with its request for an
invitation.
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VENEZUELA
NO FINANCIAL BONANZA
Si
Venezuela's oil earnings, now at peak, will
not be enough for Caracas to bankroll develop-
ing countries' commodity support schemes or
other major foreign projects. Over the next few
years, rapid growth in imports almost certainly
will put the current account in the red. The
sudden spurt in oil earnings has not altered
petroleum's role in Venezuela's economy, al-
though it has provided the funds to spur new
export industries in the next few years.
Oil export earnings will gradually drop,
from the high of $10.3 billion last year, because
of the government's oil conservation policies.
Caracas' plans call for production to be only
two million barrels a day in 1980, down from
nearly three million last year. Moreover, domes-
tic oil consumption will grow more rapidly to-
ward the end of the decade as the petrochemical
industry expands. By 1980, therefore, exports
of petroleum and petroleum products will slip
to about 1.5 million barrels a day, worth an
estimated $7 billion annually.
If Caracas holds to its industrialization
schedule, exports of petrochemicals, steel, and
aluminum will expand rapidly after 1977, reach-
ing about $3.5 billion by 1980. At this rate,
exports other than oil would essentially offset
the anticipated drop in oil exports.
With the sudden surge in foreign exchange
last year, imports jumped about 65 percent-
about 25 percent in volume-to $4.6 billion.
The value of imports will probably move up
again this year, to $6.4 billion. The rapid growth
reflects the large import requirements of exten-
sive development in heavy industry, as well as
rising imports of consumer goods, raw materials,
and intermediate products for import substitu-
tion industries.
As the government tightens restrictions on
imports to postpone sizable trade deficits, real
import growth will drop to 15 percent in 1976
and to 10 percent a year after that. A 10-per-
cent annual increase in the volume of imports
probably is needed for real economic growth
rates of 7-8 percent. Thus by 1980, imports
should total $12.5 billion.
If so, the current account surplus will end
in 1977. Considering only the current account,
foreign reserves will peak at about $9 billion in
1976. As mounting trade deficits boost the cur-
rent account deficit, foreign reserves will begin
to drop and, by 1980, will be depleted. Under
these circumstances, Venezuela will probably
back away from major foreign aid com-
mitments. Even with its present affluence,
Caracas has been conserving its funds for use in
building up its own export industries.
AID TO CENTRAL AMERICA
Sz) S12
Caracas does plan to recycle nearly half a
billion dollars, or close to 1 percent of its
1975-80 oil receipts, to Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
This aid, over the next six years, will enhance
the Venezuelan image in Central America, but
will do little to alleviate the immediate balance-
of-payments problems of these countries. In the
longer run, however, the aid could contribute
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Costa Rica
44
Fl Salvador
57
Guatemala
113
Honduras:
Nicaragua
69
Panama
370
Total
709
Projected
Trade Deficit
1975
230
177
110
128
169
NA
Aid
A"td
1975
1975-80
13
.53
21
85
27
110
21
86
14
60
23
97
Of greater potential benefit over the longer
term is a provision whereby the Central Amer-
ican countries can exchange the six-year certif-
icates for development loans running up to 25
years. These funds, however, would then be
restricted to projects approved by Venezuela-
principally those already receiving, or approved
to receive, financing from other sources. If con-
verted, the Venezuelan loans to the six countries
could equal about three fourths of probable
loans by the US and the leading international
development financing agencies combined over
the next six years.
- fncludes some imports of products.
significantly to economic development in the
area.
Using a complex formula involving allot-
ments and price differentials, the Venezuelan
Investment Fund will make quarterly deposits in
the Venezuelan National Bank to the credit of
each Central American national bank. The first
deposits were made at the'end of March. The
banks issue six-year certificates of deposit for
the loans, which reportedly bear an interest rate
of about 8 percent a year. The deposits will
continue only until the year's purchases equal
oil shipment allotments specified by Venezuela
for each country. The allotments in 1975 for
most of the countries are considerably below
their 1974 imports from Venezuela and will be
reduced by one sixth each year from 1976 on.
A though the six-year loans apparently can
be used for any type of foreign remittances,
they will not go far toward solving the Central
Americans' balance-of-payments problems. The
projected aid will cover only about one sixth of
the total Central American oil bill in 1975, or
about 10 percent of the six countries' combined
trade deficit, which has ballooned with rising
prices of imported equipment and raw materials
and declining prices and reduced volume of their
exports.
This program will considerably increase the
funds available for Central American economic
development over the next several years, as the
countries certainly will opt to convert most of
the six-year loans before maturity. Since the
Venezuelan funds can be used to cover domestic
costs of development projects receiving other
international financing, they may prove quite
valuable to the Central American countries
despite the relatively high interest rates. Central
American sources of credit are limited, and
domestic costs of development projects fre-
quently strain national budgets. Moreover, the
countries may be able to refinance their obliga-
tions as they come due and thus defer payment
over a considerabl longer period.
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V._ JI I 9
ECUADOR: CRITICISM GOES PUBLIC
The civilian opposition has launched its
first significant press campaign to discredit Presi-
dent Rodriguez' three-year-old military govern-
ment. This anti-regime activity follows close on
the heels of an attempt by dissident officers to
overthrow Rodriguez in mid-March.
Several respected columnists, among them
former foreign minister Julio Prado, have
strongly criticized some aspects of Rodriguez'
ten-day state visit to Algeria, Romania, and
Venezuela, during which the coup was to have
taken place. Rodriguez' $600,000 budget for
the trip has been attacked as exorbitant-
apparently a veiled charge that the corruption
characteristic of previous governments has
finally made its way into the present one.
Another attack was leveled at the government's
efforts to organize a "spontaneous" demonstra-
tion of patriotism and affection to welcome
Rodriguez home-complete with the issuance of
flags to school children and civil servants, who
were given the day off for the occasion.
`Now, dear children, you will learn how to stage a
spontaneous welcome. "
Most embarrassing to the government,
however, has been pointed press criticism of
Rodriguez' promotion to major general while
out of the country. The minister of defense
took half-page advertisements in principal news-
papers defending his promotion of the President
and challenging the attackers to a public debate,
thus playing into the critics' hands by over-
reacting. Prado, among others, immediately
accepted the challenge, putting the minister of
defense and, by extension, the President in an
awkward position. Two unidentified men soon
thereafter ransacked the offices of Prado's news-
paper, and government spokesmen began a
counterattack on critics of the regime.
During most of his first year in office,
Rodriguez was viewed by many Ecuadoreans as
something of a bumbler and a buffoon. Since
that time he has provided ample evidence of his
general competence and leadership skills, but
may find his image slipping again as a result of
the media campaign and his own disproportion-
ate reaction. This in turn may increase the incip-
ient anti-Rodriguez sentiment within the armed
forces. Rodriguez' position can only suffer if the
hostility between the press and the government
does not abate. One solution, in that event,
could be the President's removal and his replace-
ment by another officer.
ARGENTINA: BUYING TIME
President Maria Estela Peron fought back
at her detractors last week and seems to have
bought some political breathing space, but she
still must face up to a number of demands from
labor and political leaders.
In an emotional speech to representatives
of the massive Peronist trade union confedera-
tion, she made a strong plea for worker support
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1WW w
and suggested that many of Argentina's prob-
lems were being caused by enemies seeking to
discredit and undermine her government. Mrs.
Peron frequently invoked her dead husband's
name, but had little to offer beyond a promise
to fulfill his programs and to consult with labor
more frequently. She did not respond specifi-
cally to the document released last week by
union leaders spelling out complaints against her
policies.
The labor leaders apparently decided not
to spoil the President's warm welcome by the
assembled delegates, and they postponed a
Two Soviet guided-missile destroyers,
which had been in Cuba since late February,
left the Caribbean on April 5. Earlier this
week, the Krivak-class ships joined a tanker
near Bermuda, and they are now in the
mid-Atlantic. The ships will probably go to
the western Mediterranean for a short time
before returning to home waters in the
Baltic.
private meeting with her at which they had
planned to express their dissatisfaction with gov-
ernment officials and worsening economic
conditions. Nevertheless, labor's determination
to press for increased power is likely to make
any easing of strains temporary.
In yet another effort to quiet her detrac-
tors, Mrs. Peron met with political leaders allied
with the Peronists. After listening to criticism of
her economic policies and of her "deteriorating
image"-an allusion to the influence of her
adviser, Lopez Rega-she promised to meet with
the politicians monthly, but she stoutly insisted
that no one told her what to do.
Peronist legislators, meanwhile, delivered a
strongly worded secret document to party vice
president Raul Lastiri protesting the govern-
ment's lack of coherent direction and the domi-
nant role played by certain key officials.
The expulsion of 13 prominent left-wing
Peronists from party ranks on April 4 was
undoubtedly intended to appease some of the
President's critics on the right. It is unlikely,
however, that she can win back their much-
needed support unless she gets rid of Lopez
Rega and makes some major concessions to
labor's demands for a larger voice in govern-
ment.
Aside from a four-day swing into the
Gulf of Mexico, the destroyers-making the
13th such visit to Cuba-spent most of their
time in port at Havana and Cienfuegos. A
diesel attack submarine that was seen with
the ships when they were en route to Cuba
has not been observed since and may now
be operating in the Mediterranean.
SECRET
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 HONDURAS: NEW LEADERS EMERGE
0 -73
The reformist field-grade officers who
forced Chief of State Lopez to relinquish com-
mand of the armed forces on March 31 are
moving to assume control of the government.
No particular leaders have emerged from among
the lieutenant colonels and majors, however,
and the country's immediate future remains in
doubt.
The officers probably prefer to remain
temporarily behind Lopez and his one-time pro-
tege, Colonel Melgar, the new chief of the armed
forces. They presumably fear that an abrupt
government change could result in a power vac-
uum, jeopardizing their own unity and the
prevailing civil order. Their determination to
wipe out corruption may force them to remove
Lopez from even his figurehead position, how-
ever, in the wake of a scandal involving a
$1.25-million bribe paid by United Brands Fruit
Company to an "unidentified Honduran offi-
cial." All indications are that Lopez knew of the
bribe and in all probability was the recipient of
the money.
The younger officers have already removed
all but two of the country's colonels from com-
mand positions
Althou woo a colonels have been
C-
offered cabinet posts, most have been retired or
assigned abroad.
If the new collective leadership consoli-
dates its power as expected, it will probably not
change the country's ideological orientation.
Indeed, the field-grade officers seem more so-
cially aware than their seniors and would prob-
ably accelerate existing reform programs. They
share the old guard's skepticism of civilian rule
and want to take a more active role in the
nation's development. They believe that a
modernized military, with effective leadership,
is best suited to resolve the country's problems.
Having lost control of the military, Lopez
apparently realizes that he cannot buck the tide
now turning against him and that he soon may
have to step down as chief executive. There are
signs, however, that some embittered officers
will resist the changes. They will probably label
the reformers "leftists" in an attempt to attract
support from conservatives at home and possi-
bly in neighboring countries.
The Central Americans have recently
demonstrated a renewed determination to im-
prove regional relations and are anxiously
awaiting the outcome of developments in Hon-
duras. The Salvadorans are particularly inter-
ested in any leadership change in Tegucigalpa.
The younger Honduran officers apparently feel
that a settlement of the Salvadoran border feud
is not only possible but is long overdue, despite
lingering resentment and suspicion. Nearly all
were active in the military during their country's
five-day war with El Salvador in 1969.
Hondurans in general seem confused by
these changes. Politicians are likely to call for
elections, although they probably do not expect
a return to constitutionalism in the near future.
The parties have not been severely repressed
but, fearing government reprisals, the political
leaders have restricted themselves to organiza-
tional affairs and limited propagandizing. Lopez'
popularity among the peasant groups that
supported his return to power in 1972 has de- 25X1
clined in recent months, and other sectors are
reserving judgment until they see how events
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NOW N..r,
-7 y -77
Indonesia's armed forces are continuing
their contingency preparations for a possible
move against the Portuguese colony of Timor,
but during the past several weeks most activity
has been in the diplomatic arena. Recent discus-
sions between Indonesian, Australian, and
Portuguese officials have been aimed at trying to
head off any precipitate Indonesian action over
Timor.
The highest level talks were held last week
in Australia between President Suharto and
Prime Minister Whitlam. The Suharto trip was
billed as an informal visit to Australia returning
Whitlam's trip to Indonesia last fall. The timing
of the talks and the interest surrounding them,
however, were undoubtedly stimulated by Can-
berra's fear that Jakarta was preparing for an
imminent move against Timor.
hand of those in Whitlam's party who have long
opposed the Suharto regime and object to giving
it military assistance.
Suharto would prefer to acquire Timor
peacefully with all the constitutional niceties
preserved, but he would not let this stand in the
way of military action if he believes that is the
only way to assure Indonesian control. The con-
tinuing round of inter-government discussions
about Timor may have convinced him that he
need not make an early decision on pre-emptive
action, as advocated by his military advisers. At
the same time, the discussions have doubtless
brought home to Indonesian leaders that Lisbon
will not simply relinquish the colony to Jakarta.
The course of political events in Lisbon itself
has increased concern in Jakarta about Portu-
gal's ability to carry through on any long-term
promises regarding Timor. Undoubtedly with
this in mind, Indonesian officials overseas are
presently lobbying hard to promote Jakarta's
interests in Timor, trying to head off recrimina-
tions in world forums should Jakarta decide to
move militarily.
Whitlam is concerned about the conse-
quences that an Indonesian military move would
have on the political scene in Australia as well as
on bilateral relations. The Australian left has
already publicly taken up the cause of the Ti-
morese, and several leftist politicians recently
made a much-publicized trip there. Indonesian
aggression against Timor would strengthen the
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