WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT BRAZIL'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
Brazil's Changing Foreign Policy
Secret
N?_ 57
August 23, 1974
No. 0034/74A
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Summary
After several years of rapid economic growth, Brazil has come to depend more
and more heavily on international trade to sustain its momentum. Thus, the quest
for markets and resource has become a major foreign policy goal. Indeed, the
urgency of the quest has led Brazil to reconsider and alter its political attitudes
toward several areas of the world. Increasing international activity is contributing to
a belief in Brasilia that sustained world prominence--a vague but deeply felt goal-is
nearly at hand.
In Latin America, Brazil seeks to minimize political instability and reduce
security threats that could hinder its development and trade activities. In the Middle
East, Brazil's growing need for oil has brought about a significant pro-Arab shift in
its political position. In sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil's long-standing but heretofore
vague interest is being focused on the nature and extent of potential markets and the
availability of resources. The quest for markets has also induced Brazil to play down
ideological differences and display an increased willingness to recognize and trade
with [he Communist nations, including China.
I or the US, certain implications are clear. Brazil will increasingly see itself as a
competitor for markets and resources. That factor along with nationalistic pride-a
feeling that Brazil has "arrived," will lead it to differ with the US more often and on
more issues.
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Brazilians come naturally by the idea that
their civilization is destined for greatness. More
than 100 million strong, the inhabitants of one of
the world's largest countries are inclined to think
in terms of superlatives. Brazilians are proud to be
the offspring of the once-vigorous Portuguese
empire, and they view their country as the logical
center of some future Luso-African community
of nations. Indeed, Brazil was the capital of
Portugal's empire when the royal family fled from
Napoleon in the early 19th century.
A sense of uniqueness pervades the Bra-
zilians. Differing linguistically and culturally from
their Spanish American neighbors, they take pride
in their political development, which has been far
more peaceful than that of Spanish America.
Independence was achieved without the costly
wars of liberation that characterized the Spanish
colonies, and the long Brazilian monarchy pro-
vided a stability that was lacking in the rest of
Latin America.
Early in this century, by a combination of
skillful diplomacy and favorable international
arbitration, Brazil in large part completed the task
of demarcating its borders. Neighboring states
suffered, however, and the process left a residue
of fear and suspicion. Brazilians, on the other
hand, gained a genuine preference for the negoti-
ated settlement of disputes.
Brazil has also benefited from a traditionally
close relationship with the US-the first nation to
recognize Brazilian independence. Brazil has
generally cultivated this relationship, recognizing
the US as its most important trading partner and
as a potential protector in the event of outside
aggression. The US has been particularly impor-
tant because Brazil has no close friends in Latin
America. In the main, history has been kind to
Brazil, giving it an essentially positive view of the
world and an optimistic sense of its own capabil-
ities.
During recent years, Brazil has been quite
successful in supporting and benefiting from @1
ties with its conservative nei hbors-Bolivia
Paranuay and a u
I razil sees such assistance
as ins rumen a in r nizing political instability
in these countries, which in return has paved the
way for substantial economic benefits for Brazil.
In Bolivia, Brasilia secured access to large gas 25X1
deposits, essential to continued growth of the Sao
Paulo - based industrial complex. In Paraguay, the
Brazilians gained the right to undertake an
ambitious hydroelectric project that will furnish
electricity to a large portion of southern Brazil. In
Brazilian Foreign Minister and counterparts
from Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay
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Uruguay, the military-dominated government has
come to depend heavily on Brasilia for aid and
advice on both economic and political matters-
while serving as a buffer against the turbulence
and uncertainties in nearby Argentina.
Brazil's good fortune was further demon-
slrated when the South American government
most distasteful to it-that of Salvador Allende-
was toppled last year. The advent of the military
junta in Santiago gratified Brasilia by eliminating
Chile as a haven for terrorist and other exiles
from a number of countries, including Brazil.
Brazil's leaders also took Allende'; fall as proof
that, on their continent at least, Marxist solutions
cannot work. Brazil welcomed the junta and
altered large amounts of assistance. Thus far,
however, aid has not reached promised levels, and
has been on terms largely favoring Brazilian ex-
ports. Nevertheless, Brasilia remains committed to
the survival of the military government in Chile
and would probably go to considerable lengths-
short of armed intervention-to prevent its col-
lapse.
As Brazil's leaders contemplate Argentina,
they see terrorism nnlitic; l ctrifp ,nrl Arnnnrnir^
over eir neig or's instability-particularly the
terrorism, which does not always respect national
boundaries. Moreover, Brazilian leaders have no
desire to see an Argentina so thoroughly frustra-
ted by domestic confusion or feeling so encircled
by pro-Brazilian regimes that it would scheme
with other Spanish-speaking nations to upset the
South American order and block Brazilian eco-
nomic and diplomatic advances.
In an effort to stave off such a development,
and protect what it has gained, Brazil now seeks
to soothe Argentine sensitivities by playing down
the rivalry question. The naming of a former
ambassador to Buenos Aires and top expert in
regional affairs as foreign minister, as well as
conciliatory statements by high-level leaders,
points in this direction.
Brazil's fear of joint action against it by
Spanish-speaking nations is not new, dating back
to the colonial period. Even though this fear
gradually waned as Brazil's power grew, it re-
mained as a vague concern that the Spanish-
speaking nations would someday join to isolate
Brazil diplomatically and economically.
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many Brazilians are uneasy
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This concern has persisted and was intensi-
fied last year by Venezuela's entrance into the
Andean Group and by the renewed possibility
that Argentina will associate with that organiza-
tion. The recent South American trip by Mexican
President Echeverria-who unabashedly seeks to
assert himself as a leader of Latin America and
the Third World-undoubtedly left Brazilian
leaders a bit uneasy. They probably suspect that
in some countries Echeverria's discussions
touched on the need to react to Brazil's growing
economic power in the hemisphere. Privately,
Brazilians were probably annoyed by Echeverria's
casual approach to protocol and his thinly veiled
criticisms of their government.
Brazil has come to realize that its recent
extraordinary growth has revived old fears among
its Spanish American neighbors of Brazilian
"imperialism" or "expansionism." Indeed, its
very success serves to foster this view. Its con-
tinuing quest for raw materials and energy
resources-currently including exploration
ventures in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia-
further contributes to this perception. Moreover,
Brazilian efforts to integrate the long-empty
hinterlands by road building and domestic coloni-
zation projects cannot fail to provoke fears of
encroachment in nations like Peru and the
Guyanas, long isolated from Brazilian population
centers.
Consequently, just as Brazil perceived a need
to mollify Argentina, so it recognizes the need to
reassure other Latin nations that it seeks no hege-
mony. Partly in an effort to do just that, the
former foreign minister recently made a South
American trip through all but one of the Andean
Group nations. In addition, Brazil plays up its
own role as an emerging nation-albeit an ad-
vanced one-by joining in Third World demands
on the industrialized states for trade concessions,
technology, and a bigger share of the profits from
multinational corporations. In so doing, Brazil
seeks to demonstrate its growing independence
from the US, at a time when the rest of Latin
America is on the same path. At the same time,
Brazil seeks to destroy the impression, voiced at
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Transamazon highway
3,100 miles from Atlantic through
jungle to ,Peruvian border
times by some Latin observers, that it acts as the
agent of the US in hemispheric affairs.
The tension that characterizes relations
among Chile, Peru, and Bolivia provides an oppor-
tunity for Brazil to practice regional diplomacy
and to work for the stability it favors. Bolivians
have long nursed a grudge against the Chileans,
who deprived them of their coastline almost a
century ago. Regaining access to the sea has been
a major goal of Bolivian foreign policy ever since.
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In Peru, which lost territory to Chile in the same
war, military leaders talk of a revenge war by the
centenary in 19/9.
Last March, when Brazil's President Geisel
was inaugurated, he brought the visiting Chilean
and Bolivian heads of state tonether to discuss
mutual problems. He undoubtedly had several
purposes in mind. For one, any kind of improve-
ment in relations between Chile and Bolivia,
which currently have no diplom.tic ties, is likely
to lessen tensions generally at, d contribute to
overall stability-
In the more serious matter of a possible
armed conflict between Peru and Chile, Brazil
genuinely hopes there will be no actual clash.
Brasilia has probably decided not. to provide arms
to Chile and is likely to take every opportunity to
act as a force for moderation, which it sees as ever
more important for an eventual peaceful settle-
ment. Brazil's conservative leaders view the Peru-
vian regime-the most leftist in South America-
with suspicion. Nonetheless, Brasilia harbors no
particular animosity toward that country, which
has little impact on it.
In the OAS, Brazil's position bears some
resemblance to that of the US. The lone Portu-
guese-speaking nation in a grouping numerically
dominated by Spanish-speaking ones, Brazil is
envied and to some extent feared and distrusted
by the Hispanic majority. Brazil preters not to
have its freedom of action circumscribed by an
organization whose other members are so unlike
it. Also, Brazil is ambivalent in its reaction to
recent Spanish American unity and assertiveness
in seeking to reduce the hemispheric influence of
the US. On the one hand, as the effort succeeds,
the area for potential Brazilian influence grows.
On the other hand, however, Brazilians must be
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concerned that they might be the Spanish Ameri-
cans' next targets.
Heightened Brazilian activity in the Middle
East derives primarily from the need to assure
continued access to petroleum and to attract large
amounts of Arab capital. Furthermore, since its
dependence on oil imports is so great-over 75
percent of consumption-Brazil is hardly in a
strong position in dealing with the Arab coun-
tries. Nevertheless, Brazil eschews collective
negotiations by oil-consuming nations and has
opted instead for the aggressive pursuit of close
bilateral diplomatic and commercial relations.
Brasilia seeks to emphasize its ties to the Third
World and in so doing, to demonstrate to the
Arabs that it is not in league with Western indus-
trial powers and that its commitment is broadly
based and durable.
Brasilia has intensified its diplomatic efforts
in the Middle East, sending its first resident
ambassador to Libya, establishing an embassy in
Saudi Arabia, and working to develop relations
with several other states.
At the same time, Brasilia has sought to gain
stature in the eyes of Arab leaders by subtly but
perceptibly moving off its relatively pro-Israel,
though nominally "equi-distant," stance in favor
of the Arabs. Brazil now appears to favor the
removal of Israeli troops from occupied areas.
Despite its changed position, however, Brazil as
yet has made no substantial commitment to the
Arab cause. Its public attitude toward the Pales-
tinians, for example, is a bland expression of hope
that a just solution of their plight will be found.
Brazilian diplomacy has been augmented by
the commercial activities of officials representing
the Finance Ministry and Petrobras, the state oil
enterprise. The Brazilians have been aggressive
and innovative in arranging for oil supplies. For
example, Petrobras has, on occasion, bid sub-
stantially higher for oil than competitors, and has
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obtained joint exploration rights in Iran, Iraq, and
Egypt. Brazil has also sought barter deals, offering
technology, manufactures, and agricultural
commodities in exchange for fixed amounts of
petroleum. Ironically, in the process of demon-
strating its independence of the US and identi-
fying more closely with the Arab nations, Brazil
virtually acknowledges another kind of depen-
dence, this time on Middle Eastern oil and Arab
good will. The Brazilians are bound to find this
galling, and will feel a continuing pressure to seek
petroleum elsewhere while still practicing "re-
source diplomacy" in the Middle East.
Brazil has long felt that its Luso-African
heritage placed it in a unique position to serve as
a bridge between Africa and Europe, and, by
extension, between the Third World and the West.
Indeed, Brazil has always been fascinated by
Africa, ancestral home of much of its population.
Some Brazilian geopoliticians even see West
Africa as the other part of a "South Atlantic
Community" based on cultural, trade, and politi-
cal ties, and led by Brasilia.
Ironically, though, Brazil's close relationship
with Portugal ultimately made its position in
Africa awkward. Brasilia hesitated to alienate Lis-
bon, yet found close identification with that
colonial power a hindrance in its African and
Third World dealings. The change in government
in Portugual did not, as some Brazilians had
hoped, provide Brazil the opportunity to mediate
between colonies and motherland. Instead, Brazil
has become suspicious of the political direction of
the new regime. Brasilia appears to have decided
that the potential benefits to be gained from close
identification with Africa outweigh the cost of
further irritating Lisbon.
Brazil has long sought to work closely with
those African nations that produce items it also
exports-notably coffee and cacao-in order to
find ways to keep prices high. Furthermore,
Nigeria is already a supplier of oil, and other
countries of Africa could provide both oil and
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other important resources. Finally, at least some
Brazilian officials think that African nations
represent potential markets for their country's
goods and technology.
lo some extent, the increased efforts in
black Africa represent something of a victory for
the Foregn Ministry, which iii recent years has
contested for foreign affairs leadership with the
Finance Ministry. The former advocated extensive
African ties while the latter expressed reserva-
tions. Still, the revised African policy does not
preclude cordial ties with white-ruled South
Africa, as demonstrated by the recent establish-
ment of regular air service between Rio de Janeiro
and Johannesburg.
Brasilia undoubtedly hopes that the signifi-
cance of its decision to identify more strongly
with Africa, highlighted by the recent recognition
of Guinea-Bissau, and to diverge considerably
from Portugal will not be lost on its Middle East-
ern oil suppliers or, indeed, on the whole Third
World, which it has vague but genuine pretensions
of leading.
In an effort to expand trade, Brazil has
steadily lowered its ideological barriers and has
played dovvn its suspicion of Communist nations.
The result has been a wave of diplomatic and
commercial activity involving Countries through-
out the Communist world. Forrnal relations have
been established for the first time with East
Germany, while legations in Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Romania have been raised to embassy status.
Soviet and East European representatives in Brazil
reportedly have said they feel Brazil is becoming
much more receptive to them and their countries'
proposals. The diplomatic and trade initiative
even extends to China, with which Brazil has just
established diplomatic relations.
Further Brazilian moves to improve ties with
the Communist world are to be expected. The
Geisel government's commitment to what it calls
"responsible pragmatism," basically the pursuit of
economic and political advantage wherever bene-
ficial and regardless of ideological differences,
makes this particularly likely.
Factors other than economic considerations
facilitate and encourage the rapprochement with
the Communist nations. Success in virtually elimi-
nating domestic terrorist movements-sometimes
inspired and supported from abroad-has built up
Brazil's confidence in its ability to protect itself
from untoward communist influence. In addition,
Brasilia probably feels that the current trend
toward East-West detente makes such a threat less
likely than before. Moreover, the new initiative,
although implemented for very practical reasons,
also serves once again to demonstrate Brazil's
independence in foreign affairs and its desire to
emerge as a nation with truly global interests.
Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira vir-
tually put the US on notice recently that it can
expect Brazil to differ more and more on a va-
riety of issues. He was quoted as saying, "Brazil
will not necessarily be for or against on the basis
of prejudgment. Each episode, each situation, will
be examined from the standpoint of national in-
terest." Indeed, Brazil has already diverged from
US views in a number of areas, such as its refusal
to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
its extreme position on the Law of the Seas.
It is logical to expect this trend to continue
and to grow. Brazil, just emerging on the inter-
national stage, will feel an even greater need to
demonstrate that its independence in world
affairs is complete and unqualified. Moreover,
Brazil's Third World leadership bid-along with its
own desire for special treatment-will lead it to
push further for preferential access to markets in
the developed nations, especially the US. Thus,
there exists the potential for further disputes such
as a current one over Brazilian shoe imports.
Finally, it is possible that Brazil will at least
explore prospects for cartel-like arrangements
with other producers of coffee, cocoa, and iron
ore.
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Brazil's leaders are unlikely, however, to
allow differences to cause a serious breach with
Washington. They value their country's tradition
of cooperation with the US, as exemplified by
Brazilian participation on the Italian front in
World War II and its active role in the peace-
keeping contingent in the Dominican Republic in
1965. Moreover, the very economic concerns that
impel current foreign policy point to the need to
retain access to markets in the US, which
sin le l a m e s t
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Weekly Summary
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CONTENTS (August 23, 1974)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
6 Arab States - Israel: Groping Their Way
8 Egypt-Libya: Meeting Produces Little
8 Arabian Peninsula: Radicals Shift
10 Portuguese Africa: Ups and Downs
11 Vietnam: Communist Pressure Continues
12 Japan: Tanaka's Political Outlook
13 Korea-Japan: Assassination Aftermath
14 Malaysia: No Election Surprises
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
15 Mexico: Major Oil Find
16 Panama-Cuba: Diplomatic Relations
17 Nicaragua: Once and Future President
18 Alternatives to Non-Proliferation
19 France: Defense Policy Review
20 Northern Ireland: New Security Force
Proposed
21 UK: More Nationalization
SPECIAL
REPORT (Published separately)
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be di?ected to
the editor of the Weekly Summary, Harry Clauss,
Code 143, Extension 7562.
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MALAYSIA: NO. ELECTION SURPRISES
the Razak government is expecfed to sweep
the national elections on August 24. Razak's
National Front, a new nine-party confederation
that mirrors Malaysia's racial diversity, will
probably take the lion's share of the 154 seats in
the lower house of the federal parliament. The
Front's member parties held 118 of the 144 seats
in the outgoing parliament, and they are likely to
do better in the enlarged body.
The projected election outcome will further
Prime Minister Razak's aim of achieving a
"national consensus," a solid coalition govern-
ment that embraces all of Malaysia's major races
and has a minimum of political opposition. At the
same time, the United Malays National Organiza-
tion, the main government party, predominates in
the multiracial National Front, and Malay
political pre-eminence has been enhanced by a
redrawing of electoral boundaries.
Under the constitution, the government was
not required to go to the polls until 1976, but
Razak decided to act now, believing government
popularity is at a peak. Economic prosperity cur-
rently is at an all-time high, but there may be a
downturn later in this year or the next because of
Malaysia's dependence on exports. The govern-
ment also believes that its position has been
strengthened by recent successes against Com-
munist insurgents in the east Malaysian state of
Sarawak, and that these achievements will out-
weigh any public concern over the expansion of
Communist activities in peninsular Malaysia.
Moreover, the opposition parties are weak, and
efforts to establish a united opposition front have
foundered.
The campaign has been a quiet one, and the
government hopes that limiting the campaign to
three weeks, plus strictures on the discussion of
racially sensitive subjects, will prevent a recur-
rence of the communal rioting that followed the
last elections in 1969. Communist terrorists have
staged several incidents in remote areas, but they
are not capable significantly with
the voting.
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