WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010800180003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 20, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
Soviet Naval Operations in the Indian Ocean
NAVY review
completed.
Secret
N2 57
No. 0030/74A
July 26, 1974
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Soviet Naval Operations
In the Indian Ocean
Summary
During the last six years, the Soviet naval
presence in the Indian Ocean has slowly but
steadily grown, enabling Moscow to buttress its
image as a super power in the eyes of most littoral
states.
The principal objective of the Soviet naval
force is to maintain adequate military strength in
the Indian Ocean to counter-or at least appear to
counter-moves made by Western naval forces
there, particularly those of the US. The Soviets
have sent additional ships to the Indian Ocean
whenever a major US buildup has occurred there,
such as during the India-Pakistan war in 1971 and
the Middle East war in 1973.
The Soviets normally prefer to maintain a
relatively small naval force in the Indian Ocean,
sufficient to maintain the USSR's image as a
super power, but which can be strengthened if the
need arises, This policy gives them the capability
to "signal" their concern during crises and avoids
some of the political and economic costs of a
larger presence. To support their naval forces, the
Soviets have acquired varying degrees of access to
facilities along the littoral.
The Soviet naval presence in the Indian
Ocean will probably continue to grow at a slow
rate, commensurate with the navy's expanding
naval operations in other areas, unless there is a
major increase in the US military presence there.
Moscow has demonstrated that it would attempt
to match any large increase in US forces, even if it
means drawing down forces in other regions.
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July 26, 1974
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A Soviet warship first visited the Indian
Ocean area in early 1965, when the USSR sent
one destroyer to the Red Sea via the Suez Canal
for the Ethiopian Navy Day celebration at
Massawa. Similar visits to Massawa were made in
1966 and 1967.
The Soviet navy did not begin to keep ships
in the Indian Ocean on a nearly continuous basis
until March 1968, when four ships from Vladi-
vostok made a good will visit along the littoral.
Such good will cruises were the principal activity
through late 1969. Since then, the Indian Ocean
force has spent most of its time in the north-
western portion of the ocean, where the Soviets
have had the most success in acquiring use of port
facilities.
Although the number of countries visited
annually has decreased since 1969, the general
expansion of the naval force and the increased use
of a few ports on a routine basis have resulted in
an overall increase in the number of port calls.
Sixty-five percent of the 1973 port calls, how-
ever, were to Berbera, reflecting the USSR's
development and use of the Somali facility for
naval support as well as problems experienced in
gaining diplomatic clearance for routine port
visits elsewhere.
The growth in Soviet naval deployments to
the Indian Ocean since 1968 has been gradual,
but relatively steady-except for the period of the
India-Pakistan war in 1971 and the Middle East
War last fall. Soviet general purpose* naval ship-
days in the Indian Ocean increased from about
1,000 in 1968 to 5,000 in 1973, and the normal
force grew from two surface warships and an
auxiliary to five surface warships, a submarine,
and six auxiliaries.
*Excludes ballistic missile submarine, oceanographic, and
space support ship activity.
Special Report - 3 -
Soviet Objectives
The countries of the Indian Ocean area-as
distinct from those of the Middle East-have a
lower priority than the US, China, or Europe in
the USSR's diplomatic, economic, and military
initiatives. Moscow has no interests in the region
comparable to the West's vital interest in Persian
Gulf oil.
Nevertheless, the Indian Ocean has clearly
become another arena, albeit on a small scale, of
the global US-Soviet rivalry, and Moscow's long-
range strategic objectives there are to win in-
fluence at the expense of the West as well as to
limit the future role of China. Toward these goals,
the Soviets use their naval presence as one ele-
ment in a combined approach that utilizes politi-
cal, economic, and military aid activity as well.
Moscow also perceives the Indian Ocean as a
potential area of strategic weapons deployment
and has indicated concern over possible opera-
tions by US Polaris submarines there.
The sea lanes to and through the Indian
Ocean are useful to the Soviets, but not essential
to their economy. Only a fraction of foreign-
bound cargos and domestic Soviet freight passes
this way. The Soviets, however, recognize the
importance to the West of Persian Gulf oil and of
the sea lanes between the Gulf and Europe or
Japan. Moscow also sees the recent increases in
the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean as tied
to the oil question. Nevertheless, the normal
composition of the Soviet force there-especially
the lack of a significant submarine contingent-
suggests that interdiction of Western commerce,
particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf,
is not a major objective.
Nor does the Soviet naval combatant pres-
ence appear to be designed for direct military
intervention in littoral states. The forces sent
there have little capability for intervention
ashore.
July 26, 1974
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Normal Levels of Soviet General Purpose Naval Forces
in the Indian Ocean, 1968-1973*
Number of ships
15 -
*Excludes ballistic missile submarine, oceanographic, and space support ship activity.
Data for 1972 and 1973 exclude harbor and mine clearing activity in Bangladesh.
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July 26, 1974
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The principal objective of the Soviet naval
force in the Indian Ocean is to provide a coun-
ter-at least in the eyes of littoral states-to the
presence of US forces. The Soviets, however, have
maintained a lower tempo of naval activity in the
Indian Ocean than in the Atlantic Ocean or
Mediterranean Sea. The vessels spend 80 percent
of their time at anchor or in port. The Soviet
naval force stationed there has been relatively
small, generally made up of older units lacking in
modern antisubmarine warfare or air defense
equipment. Moscow, however, probably has
viewed its naval presence as at least adequate to
create an image of naval equality with what has
been in the past a normally small US force.
Composition of the Soviet Force
By mid-1973, Soviet general purpose naval
units conducting routine operations in the Indian
Ocean usually were composed of five surface
warships-one! destroyer, two destroyer escorts,
two minesweepers, and an amphibious ship-as
well as a diesel submarine and six auxiliary sup-
port ships, including a merchant tanker.
Since the Middle East war of October 1973,
the number of Soviet ships has increased in re-
action to the movements of US carrier task forces
into the ocean, reaching a high point of 13 war-
ships and submarines in February 1974. A sub-
sequent decline was offset, at least partially, by
the recent arrival of seven Soviet minesweepers
from the Pacific to conduct mine-clearing opera-
tions in the Gulf of Suez, as well as the helicopter
ship Leningrad. The mine-clearing activity, how-
ever, like the recently completed harbor-clearing
operations in Bangladesh, is more in the nature of
foreign aid programs than an increase in the
Soviet naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean. The
Bangladesh operation involved at one time as
many as 13 Soviet ships and lasted from April
1972 to June 1974. After the first few months,
the force decreased in size to an average of two
minesweepers and seven auxiliaries.
In addition to the operations of general
purpose naval forces, the Soviets usually have one
hydrographic research ship and one or two space-
support vessels in the area. These ships are
Special Report - 5 -
normally not considered part of a military pres-
ence, although they do make frequent "show the
flag" port calls along the Indian Ocean littoral.
Since the Middle East war in 1973, however,
space-support ships and their shipborne heli-
copters have conducted surveillance of US carriers
in the Indian Ocean.
The Soviet warships and submarines sent to
the Indian Ocean normally come from the Pacific
Fleet, which is also the primary source for logistic
support. Units from the western fleets, however,
have normally operated in the Indian Ocean for a
few months in the course of transferring to the
Pacific. The Indian Ocean has become, in effect, a
"southern sea route" for the interfleet transfer of
naval units. About one fourth of the Soviet war-
ships and submarines that have operated there
have been units transferring to the Pacific from
the western fleets.
A modernization of the USSR's Pacific Fleet
naval forces is currently under way. Since early
1974, the Soviet force in the Indian Ocean has
included modern anticarrier and antisubmarine
units transferring to the Pacific from Soviet
western fleets. These ships have provided a more
impressive naval presence than would have been
possible a year ago. The Soviet Pacific Fleet, as a
result of the modernization, will have available
more modern ships, some of which could conduct
routine operations in the Indian Ocean.
Soviet warships now appear to be spending
more time in the Indian Ocean-suggesting that
they have overcome some of their logistic prob-
lems. Recent tours have been for about a year,
compared with five to six months in the past.
Soviet Support Facilities
Until the facilities at the small Somali port
of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden became available
in 1973, the Soviets relied almost exclusively on
"floating bases"-collections of auxiliary ships
usually anchored in international waters-to pro-
vide support to their Indian Ocean naval forces.
The anchorages most frequently used are near the
barren island of Socotra, and in the Chagos
Archipelago, about 1,000 nautical miles south of
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Ship-days**
8,000-
Special Report
Operations of General Purpose Naval Forces
in the Indian Ocean, 1968-1973*
Auxiliaries
Submarines
Warships t
tIncludes naval-associated merchant ships.
tlncludes amphibious units and minesweepers.
*Excludes ballistic missile submarine, oceanographic. and space support ship activity.
Data for 1972 and 1973 exclude harbor and mine clearing activity in Bangladesh.
The term "ship-days ? refers to the number of days spent by each vessel in
a particular area.
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India, where the Soviets have implanted mooring
buoys. In addition, hydrographic research and
space-support ships have used anchorages in
Fortune Bank, the Seychelles, and Cargados
Carajos.
The Soviets have expanded the facilities at
Berbera, and are now using the harbor for routine
ship maintenance and crew rest. There are no
repair facilities ashore, but Soviet tenders can
render the same services in port as they previously
did at anchor.
In this regard, the Soviets in early July
signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with
Somalia, as they have done in past years with
Egypt, Iraq, and India. The contents of the treaty
have not yet been publicized, but the treaty may
have formalized the access the Soviets already
have to port facilities at Berbera. It may have also
Special Report -7-
7 -
given
given Moscow new but limited naval air privileges.
In the past, the Somalis have sought to maintain a
degree of control over Soviet military activities,
and this policy is likely to continue.
The Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, in the Persian
Gulf, where Soviet technicians have been assisting
in minor port development, is also available for
limited use by Soviet naval ships. Repair facilities
at the former British naval base at Aden have not
been used by Soviet warships, although support
ships and, occasionally, small warships stop there
for refueling and replenishment. Soviet naval
auxiliaries regularly call at Singapore as they enter
and leave the Indian Ocean. In addition to re-
ceiving fuel, since May 1972 Soviet support ships
have been serviced in the commercial drydock
facilities there.
Soviet prospects of gaining use of naval
facilities in other littoral countries are poor. The
Soviets helped build India's naval base at
Vishakhapatnam and have equipped the Indian
navy with minor warships and diesel submarines.
Nevertheless, New Delhi has not granted the
Soviets free access to Indian ports, nor is it likely
to do so in the foreseeable future. During the past
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year, Moscow has been attempting to gain use of
certain Indian airfields and ports for space-
support operations, but New Delhi has set condi-
tions upon this usage that it knows are unaccepta-
ble to the Soviets. The USSR has sent research
ships, support ships, and an occasional warship to
Sri Lanka and Mauritius to test reactions to a
Soviet naval presence. In addition, Soviet ships
may eventually call at Chittagong where Soviet
harbor clearing operations recently ended.
Routine access by Soviet ships to these facilities,
however, is riot likely to be granted.
Soviet Response in Crises
The Soviets apparently prefer to maintain in
the area a relatively small naval force-but one
adequate to maintain their image of naval
equality with the West. Such a force can be
strengthened, thus providing a "signaling"
capability during crises and avoiding the political
and economic costs of a larger, continuous pres-
ence.
Moscow has emphasized its sensitivity to
major changes in the size and capabilities of
Western naval forces in the Indian Ocean by
sending additional ships to the area whenever a
US buildup
has
occurred-such
as the
India-
Pakistan war
of
1971 and the
October
1973
Middle East war. The timing of these ships' move-
ments indicates that the Soviets were
responding primarily to moves by the US and
other Western countries rather than initiating a
unilateral buildup.
Effect of Reopening the Suez Canal
The reopening of the Suez Canal will im-
prove Soviet naval flexibility by substantially
shortening the transit time to the western Indian
Ocean from the Black and Mediterranean seas.
The reduction would not be great enough in itself
to cause a significant increase in the number of
ship-days on station in the Indian Ocean. It
would, however, reduce the logistic problem of
supporting an Indian Ocean presence.
A few warships from the Mediterranean
Squadron probably will be periodically rotated to
Special Report
Ethiopia
0
1
1
1
1
1
India
8
2
6
1
4
7
Iran
3
7
0
2
2
0
Iraq
3
8
2
11
14
16
Kenya
5
0
3
0
2
4
Kuwait
0
1
0
0
0
0
Malagasy Republic
0
1
0
0
0
0
Maldives
1
1
0
1
0
1
Mauritius
2
4
17
5
20
11
Pakistan
2
2
2
0
0
0
Seychelles
0
0
0
0
3
0
Somaliab
3
13
18
11
38
97
South Yemen (PDRY)
4
13
7
13
12
7
Sri Lanka
4
8
2
2
14
9
Sudan
0
2
0
2
0
0
Tanzania
4
2
2
0
0
0
Egypt (ARE)
3
1
0
0
0
0
Yemen
0
2
3
0
0
0
Number of Port
Calls per year
42
68
63
49
110
153
Number of
Countries
Visited each year
12
16
11
10
10
9
a. "Port calls" reflect every entry of each Soviet naval ship into a foreign
port but do not reflect the duration of the visits, which varied from one day to
twenty months. Port calls by oceanographic research and space event support
ships are included in the totals because the data available for 1968 through
1971 are not categorized by ship. Singapore is not included in the table
because it is a Pacific Ocean port. However, Soviet ships from the Indian
Ocean occasionally call there, and Soviet naval auxiliaries are overhauled in
Singapore's shipyards. In addition, ships engaged in long-term harbor clearing
operations in Bangladesh are not considered to be conducting routine port
calls and therefore are not included.
b. The large increase in visits to Somalia since 1971 reflects the USSR's
development and use of the port of Berbera for naval support. Most of the
remaining port visits in the Indian Ocean-particularly those by combatants-
were undertaken for diplomatic purposes.
the Indian Ocean when the canal opens. Typical
rotations could include two destroyers, accom-
panied by a naval auxiliary. Any ships sent there
via the Suez Canal would probably operate largely
in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa, where Soviet
naval activity has been concentrated for the past
few years. Because the Black Sea Fleet is heavily
committed to supporting operations in the
Mediterranean, however, most of the surface ships
and probably all of the submarines for routine
tours in the Indian Ocean would come from the
Soviet Pacific Fleet. With a reopened canal, aux-
iliary ships could be drawn from the Black Sea
and the Pacific on a nearly equal basis for support
of the Indian Ocean forces.
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Other important naval benefits of a re-
opened canal would be the easier transfer of
Soviet ships from the western fleets to the Pacific
Ocean Fleet and delivery of military aid to client
states in the area east of the Suez.
The most significant result of the canal's
opening, however, would be a new Soviet capa-
bility to reinforce on short notice their naval
presence from their Mediterranean and Black Sea
naval force in a crisis. On the other hand, the
USSR probably recognizes that the Suez Canal is
subject to closure in a crisis. The Soviets would
not wish to be caught with a substantial portion
of available units on the wrong end of a blocked
canal, and in considering this contingency, they
almost certainly would give priority to the
Mediterranean.
Looking to the Future
If there is no permanent increase in US naval
forces in the area, a slow but steady growth in the
.Soviet Indian Ocean force-one to two warships a
year-seems likely. Such a rate is in line with the
growth of Soviet naval operations worldwide. In
addition, from Moscow's viewpoint, such a
measured approach would be in keeping with
Soviet capabilities and would be less likely to
evoke criticism from littoral countries.
The planned expansion of US facilities on
Diego Garcia and the announced long-term in-
crease of US warships-particularly attack
cruisers-in the Indian Ocean, however, would
probably lead to a much more rapid growth in the
Soviet naval presence.
Soviet capabilities to station and support a
vastly increased naval force in the Indian Ocean,
however, are limited by a variety of factors. The
first is the distance and steaming time from the
various Soviet fleets to the Indian Ocean-even
with a reopened Suez Canal. Another important
consideration is the availability of basing
facilities.
In the near term, at least, the Soviets are
unlikely to acquire substantially better naval sup-
port facilities for their ships in the Indian Ocean
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area. Routine access to large shore facilities-such
as those in Singapore, India, Sri Lanka, or South
Yemen-for major repair and overhaul of warships
is unlikely. The limited facilities that are cur-
rently available, such as in Berbera and to a lesser
extent Umm Qasr, would require considerable
development and probably changes in the host
countries' policies to support such a buildup.
The Soviets probably also hope to increase
their capabilities for air reconnaissance in the
Indian Ocean. Prospects for access are best in
Somalia, where Soviet technicians are helping to
construct airfields at Berbera and near Moga-
discio. Even in light of the recent friendship
treaty, the Soviets are unlikely to acquire perma-
nent basing rights in Somalia, but they may be
able to operate aircraft from there on an oc-
casional basis. TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft
staging from Somalia could conduct surveillance
of most of the Indian Ocean-from the Cape of
Good Hope to the Malacca Strait. Visits by
TU-95s most likely would be on a periodic basis
as has been the case in Cuba and Guinea. Such
visits might be more frequent during times of
crisis, major Western naval movements or exer-
cises, or Soviet naval space-support activity.
Antisubmarine warfare aircraft, such as the
IL-38 operating from Somalia, could provide
surface reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare
coverage of the Arabian Sea. These aircraft, as
well as TU-16 medium bombers, were based in
Egypt until July 1972.
Other restraints on a growing Soviet naval
presence include the prior commitment of naval
forces to other areas such as the Mediterranean,
the requirement to maintain a strategic reserve in
home fleet areas, plus the economic and political
costs of operating a sizable naval force in the
Indian Ocean. Should the US make a substantial
permanent increase in its naval presence in the
Indian Ocean, the Soviets would probably not be
able to match this without reordering their pri-
orities and shifting naval forces from other
areas-much as the US itself has to do to operate
carriers in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the
USSR would probably make these adjustments
because of the broader implications of super
power rivalry.
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Concern over such a developing naval rivalry,
the planned US expansion of the naval base on
Diego Garcia, and the recent history of US carrier
task force deployments to the Indian Ocean
during crises apparently has raised concern among
some Soviet officials over the prospects for a
naval arms race there. The USSR does not want
such a major regional naval rivalry, but Moscow
clearly will respond to any increase in the US
military presence there.
Several proposals have been put forward to
linit super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. The
littoral states, supported by other developing
countries, have adopted a series of "Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace" resolutions in the UN. These
proposals call on the great powers to halt the
escalation of their military presence, to eliminate
bases and other facilities, and to keep "weapons
of mass destruction" from the area.
The Soviets, on occasion, have publicly
expressed interest in searching for a solution to
the naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean and have
referred to resolving the problem "on an equal
basis" with other great powers, namely the US,
whose ships operate in the area.
Soviet officials twice raised the question
with the US of restraining super power military
competition in the Indian Ocean and of discussing
bilateral naval limitations when expansion of
Diego Garcia was under consideration. At the
same time, however, the Soviets have been un-
responsive to US requests for clarification and to
suggestions from India and Australia that they
pursue a mutual restraint with the US. This
apparent Soviet lack of serious interest in arms
limitations is probably attributable to military
opposition within the USSR to such proposals
and concern that any limitations placed on
military operations in the Indian Ocean could set
a dangerous precedent. Soviet spokesmen have
shown a particular concern that naval limitations
agreed to in the Indian Ocean would restrict their
"freedom of the seas" and might lead to calls by
neutralist nations for similar restrictions else-
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