WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ELECTION TIME IN SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010800040003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010800040003-8
Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
Election Time in South Africa
ICPI/ : 'F Pages
ARCHIVAL RECORD -,.,
PLEASE RETURN TO
AC,FNC' ' AIiWI1~IVT y, BLDG. A 1
Secret
NQ 58
April 19, 1974
No. 0016/74A
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010800040003-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO10800040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010800040003-8
 Approved For Release 22006/10/12: I -RDP79-00927A010800040003-8
s
ELECT/ON TIME
IN SOUTH AFRICA
Summary Ci
Prime Minister Vorster's call for a general parliamentary election on April 24, a
full year before required, enables the ruling National Party to exploit fully the
current disarray in the opposition United Party. Vorster, whose party has been in
power since 1948 and currently holds 118 of the 166 seats in the National
Assembly, wants a fresh mandate from the all-white electorate to strengthen his
hand in dealing with basic economic and social problems.
Although the National Party is expected to renew its firm control of parlia-
ment, the election could open a critical phase in South Africa's racial relations. A
strong showing at the polls might encourage Vorster to go ahead with reforms that
would provide the non-white bulk of the population with significant material gains.
It is doubtful, however, that any politically feasible reforms will meet the already
evident pressures for social change.
Special Report - 1 -
SECRET
April 19, 1974
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO10800040003-8
 Approved
or Release 2006/10 7 CIA-RDP79-{27A010800040003-8
Background
The National Party represents the bulk of
the Afrikaners-descendants of the 17th century
Dutch settlers who now comprise some 60 per-
cent of the whites in South Africa. Their tradi-
tional dislike of the British settlers who began
arriving in the late 18th century was intensified
by the Boer War and the ensuing ascendancy of
British elements in what was from 1910 to 1960
the Union of South Africa. The National Party
came to power in 1948 by asserting the deter-
mination of Afrikaners to secure their language
and culture from alien inroads, and by stressing
the doctrine of "apartheid," or separate develop-
ment of the races.
Once in power, leaders of the National Party
sought cooperation from English-speaking whites
by emphasizing solidarity in order to maintain
white supremacy. Since becoming prime minister
in 1966, Vorster has tended to be relatively
pragmatic in implementing apartheid. Even his
Special Report
cautious adjustments to changing conditions,
however, have outraged the "verkramptes," or
ultraconservatives in his party; at the same time,
the adjustments have been criticized as too timid
by the few Afrikaner intellectuals who openly
espouse significant accommodations with other
ethnic groups.
The ideological tensions within Afrikaner-
dom surfaced during the 1970 general elections,
when a verkrampte splinter party', competed. It
failed, however, to win a single seat in parliament,
although the opposition United Party gained an
additional eight seats. Apparently, Vorster's hard-
line campaign rhetoric mollified verkrampte senti-
ments in the party's rural strongholds, but dis-
pleased some Afrikaner suburbanites and alien-
ated the few English-speakers who had joined the
party since 1948.
Since 1970, however, the United Party has
fumbled the opportunities for rebuilding its pre-
1948 coalition between moderate Afrikaners and
the bulk of the English-speaking v~hites. The only
conceivable basis for white solidarity in South
Africa is a persuasive strategy or coexistence
with the potentially overwhelmiig majority of
non-whites; the racial composition of South
Africa's population of 23.9 million is 70-percent
black, 18-percent white, 9-percent colored (mu-
latto), and 3-percent Asian. The disparate com-
ponents of the United Party haves been unable to
agree on a convincing alternative to the Nation-
alist blueprint for separate deve'opment, which
promises to maintain white supr macy by parti-
tioning the blacks among eventua, Iy independent
Bantustans.
Spokesmen for the United Party have
stressed the prohibitive costs of fully implement-
ing the Bantustan program, and such economic
arguments impress the growing numbers of
Afrikaner businessmen. Recently, however, the
quest for feasible alternatives to apartheid has
become much more divisive within the United
Party than among Nationalists. Vorster's current
election campaign is making the most of the con-
spicuous disarray in the United Party.
April 19, 1974
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A01080000003-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO10800040003-8
In the present election campaign, Vorster
has claimed credit for a full year of solid eco-
nomic. growth. He has also asserted that the Arab
oil embargo imposed on South Africa last Novem-
ber vindicates his party's long-time pursuit of
self-sufficiency in strategic materials. Indeed, al-
though South Africa relies on imports for all its
oil needs, ample coal reserves and thorough prep-
arations for an oil embargo averted serious eco-
nomic disruption during the acute phase of the
international oil shortage. Subsequently, Pre-
toria's readiness to pay the going international
prices for oil has minimized the actual impact of a
continuing Arab boycott against South Africa.
Although South Africa's oil bill this year prob-
ably will be more than three times higher than in
1973, the steep rise in international prices for
South African gold since January portends a
healthy balance of payments for 1974.
The Prime Minister is well aware, however,
that secondary effects of the international oil
crisis will soon intensify chronic inflationary pres-
sures that are contributing to social unrest. The
rising cost of living was a root cause of the many
illegal strikes among black workers that tied up
local industry in Durban in February 1973. Al-
though the strikes were illegal, Durban municipal
authorities avoided a police crackdown on the
strikers and urged employers to raise wages. The
first wave of strikes subsided, but limited gains
for the strikers, instead of harsh punishment, have
encouraged recurrences.
Recently, Pretoria imposed legal restrictions
on four white trade union officials who were
organizing black textile workers around Durban.
Two of the individuals had helped to end a large
strike by persuading factory managers to deal
informally with leaders of a black union. Such
actions undercut a labor code that permits black
unions, but excludes black union officials from
collective bargaining.
Most white workers oppose affiliating black
workers with established white unions and are
likewise wary of any tampering with provisions of
the labor codes that reserve skilled industrial jobs
Special Report
for whites, although such rules have caused
disruptive local shortages of skilled labor. Last
year, Pretoria initiated technical training pro-
grams that could eventually upgrade thousands of
black workers. Vorster, however, has not yet
publicly recognized the eventual necessity of
drastically revising the job-reservation laws.
The Bantustan Program
The Prime Minister's commitment to a pro-
gram that will transform at least some of the
tribal homelands into independent Bantustans
within the present decade is an election issue.
Plans for partial consolidation of the eight home-
lands that now have some degree of self-govern-
ment have been pushed through parliament
despite bitter opposition from white farmers who
face resettlement. Implementing the plans, how-
ever, will be a very slow, costly process, and the
final result will not leave any of the Bantustans
with adequate resources to support the tribal
populations that are supposed to return to their
homelands.
Last November, leaders of six Bantustans
met at Umtata, capital of Transkei, South Africa's
oldest Bantustan, and asserted their determina-
tion to win a more adequate basis for independ-
ence. The "Umtata manifesto" called for early
restoration of extensive tribal lands that are not
included in the government's consolidation
schemes. Meanwhile, the Bantustan leaders de-
manded full control over their administrative
structures and freedom to negotiate directly with
foreign governments for economic aid. The
manifesto also called for an eventual federation of
all the Bantustans.
The manifesto was doubly embarrassing for
Vorster. The show of solidarity heightened fears
of ultraconservatives that the Bantustan program
is not producing its intended cast of docile
vassals. On the other hand, the substance of the
manifesto was ammunition for white liberals who
maintain that the government should either pro-
vide the Bantustans with adequate resources or
abandon its apartheid policy.
April 19, 1974
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO10800040003-8
 Approved FRelease 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-0A010800040003-8
Basotho Qwa Qwa
I Bophuthatswana
Ciskei
M Gazankulu
Kwazulu
Lebowa
Swazi*
Venda
Special Report
*Pretoria
9 Johannesburg
Newcastle.,*
April 19, 1974
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO10800040003-8
Projected,,6y
Ndebeleland K 4i '
f sue"
Homeland 5 4)
 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010800040003-8
SFI RFT
Vorster has at least temporarily disarmed his
critics on both sides by holding an informal dis-
cussion session with the leaders of all eight
Bantustans early last month. He bluntly told the
tribal leaders that he would not repeal the Native
Trust Act of 1936, which sets a final limit for all
tribal lands of only 13.7 percent of South Africa's
total territory. Nevertheless, a joint statement
issued at the session suggested that further meet-
ings could mollify the Bantustan leaders with
only minimal concessions from the government.
A week after this meeting, Transkei's leading
political party held its annual congress and
resolved to request full independence within five
years. Although Transkei has had an autonomous
administration since 1963, its chief minister,
Kaiser Matanzima, had maintained that he would
not accept independence until Pretoria ceded
extensive territories that originally belonged to
the Transkei"s Xhosa tribe. After his party
approved the independence resolution, however,
Matanzima stated that an acceptable independ-
ence settlement might include no more than a
small Indian Ocean seaport and other land parcels
that have been tentatively promised by Vorster.
Prime Minister Vorster apparently has
encouraged Nlatanzima's bid for independence in
order to show South African whites, before they
go to the polls, that the Bantustan program is
working out to their advantage. It is doubtful,
however, that the remaining tribal homelands
could be brought to accept independence without
concessions by Pretoria that would provoke
serious white opposition. Transkei is the only
Bantustan that has a consolidated territorial base,
and leaders of other homelands have a greater
need than Matanzima to insist on major land
transfers before independence.
The land problem is the critical issue be-
tween Vorster and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of
Kwazulu, who is known internationally as the
most outspoken of the Bantustan leaders. The
Kwazulu homeland is fragmented into 188 pieces,
and Buthelezi has rejected a blueprint for consoli-
dation that would merely combine these bits of
land into ten segments.
Vorster has strong incentives for reaching an
accommodation with Buthelezi. The Zulus com-
prise the largest of all South Africa's tribal group-
ings and provide much of the industrial labor in
the Durban area. Buthelezi or other members of
the Kwazulu autonomous administration have
played moderating roles in some of the recent
strikes by Zulu industrial workers. Furthermore,
Buthelezi has told overseas audiences that foreign
companies should not be forced by their govern-
ments to withdraw from South Africa, provided
they upgrade their black employees.
The Bantustan program is supposed eventu-
ally to return all South African blacks except
migrant workers to their tribal homelands, where
they are expected to become farmers or to work
in new factories that are to be situated in adjacent
white areas. At present, however, roughly two
thirds of all blacks live outside the homelands,
and the black urban population is steadily in-
creasing. White industrialists recognize that urban
blacks must remain, because the homelands lack
the resources to support them and because a
settled black labor force is essential for industrial
growth. Prime Minister Vorster is clearly seeking
to make long-term provisions for black urban
dwellers, but he must work within the confines of
his party's apartheid doctrine.
The Bantustan leaders' Umtata manifesto
calls for a repeal of the pass laws that severely
restrict residence and other activities of blacks
outside the tribal homelands. Existing regulations
not only compel a large portion of black urban
workers to commute long distances to segregated
residential areas, but also restrict the access of
blacks to any facilities that might encourage them
to linger outside the black areas. Any black who
is apprehended in an area reserved for whites
without a pass showing that he is legally
employed there can be removed to his "home-
land," even though he never actually lived in a
tribal reserve.
When Vorster met with the Bantustan
leaders last month, he agreed they could partici-
pate in a special commission that is to consider
Special Report -5- April 19, 1974
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010800040003-8
 Approved F elease 200 /W01r1&PCIA-RDP79-00QWA010800040003-8
how the pass laws might be eased. Vorster has in
fact been hinting since early 1973 that some
accommodations for urban blacks were under
consideration. Last January, for example, it was
announced that restaurants for blacks would be
permitted in urban white areas where blacks are
regularly employed. Conceivably, the Prime Min-
ister might negotiate a plan with the Bantustan
leaders to extend the range of facilities for urban
blacks, as well as some softening of the more
irksome influx controls. Vorster may, in fact,
welcome petitions for such measures from
Bantustan leaders in order to convince the more
conservative Afrikaners that economically essen-
tial accommodations for urban blacks are merely
fulfilling the basic policy of separate develop-
ment.
In sharp contrast with Vorster's pragmatic
approach to social problems is his increasing use
of harsh measures to silence anyone who openly
opposes the government's policies for preserving
white supremacy. The motivation of Vorster's
recent moves is not clear. There has been no
apparent revival of the communist-oriented rev-
olutionary organizations that were thoroughly
rooted out by the highly effective security
services during the early 1960s. Vorster's present
targets are mostly individuals of all races who
advocate orderly economic or social progress for
blacks, Asians, or coloreds.
The primary device for restraining individual
dissenters is the "banning order"; the Sabota,e
Act of 1962 empowers the minister of justice to
ban any person he deems to be promoting "any
objective of communism." Vorster has stretched
the legal definition to include anyone who op-
poses any aspect of apartheid. The usual banning
order severely restricts the individual's activities
for a period of five years; the more stringent
orders have the effect of house arrest.
At least 68 persons were banned during
1973, compared with only 14 in 1972. The re-
cently banned individuals are mostly young
blacks who were active in student or urban com-
munity organizations that advocate black soli-
Special Report -- 6 -
darity in pursuit of material interests, instead of
frontal attacks on apartheid institutions. The gov-
ernment's primary targets have been the South
African Students' Organization, the Black
People's Convention, and the Black Community
Program. The bannings have included moderate as
well as militant leaders, although the organiza-
tions as such have not been outlawed. Vorster
apparently intends to silence any effective black
leader who emerges outside the Bantustan struc-
tu re.
Last February, before adjourning for the
elections, the National Assembly approved two
government bills that supplement the already
extensive legal restraints against possibly subver-
sive activities or organizations. The "Riotous
Assemblies Amendment Act" empowers a magis-
trate to prohibit or break up any meeting of two
or more persons, even on private property, if he
believes the meeting to be conducive to disorder
or racial friction. The "Affected Organizations
Act" is applicable to any South African organiza-
tion that receives foreign support and "engages in
politics." It is a criminal offense for such an
organization-identifiable by three magistrates-to
receive foreign funds, or to expend any funds on
hand for any purpose except a recognized charity.
The second act appears to be aimed espe-
cially at the National Union of South African
Students, the South African Institute of Race
Relations, and the Christian Institute. These
organizations are strongholds of English-speaking
white liberals who advocate an orderly dis-
mantling of some of the bulwarks of white
supremacy. Since early 1972 all three organiza-
tions have been under investigation by a parlia-
mentary commission on internal security; its final
report is to be published soon after the elections.
The timing of the "Affected Organizations Act"
suggests that Vorster intended to focus public
attention on the generally known foreign funding
of these organizations because evidence is lacking
that they have engaged in actual subversion.
Conceivably, Vorster's crackdown on the
more articulate opponents of apartheid is
intended to mollify ultraconservatives who dis-
trust his pragmatic approach. It, is also possible
April 19, 1974
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO10800040003-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 r%p1 ,,-F, P -00927A010800040003-8
that he feels compelled to silence dissidents who
are incapable of serious subversion in order to
make sure that his cautious adjustments to
changing conditions will not encourage radical
elements to step up their activities. By sup-
pressing such a broad spectrum of opinion, how-
ever, the government appears to be alienating the
moderate leaders, both black and white, who are
needed for constructive action.
In the current election campaign, the opposi-
tion has blamed the Nationalist government for
South Africa's dangerous international isolation.
Since last November the Arab oil embargo of
South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia at the
behest of the OAU has shown the futility of
Prime Minister Vorster's persistent efforts to open
a "dialogue" with leaders of the black African
states. Malawi is the sole OAU member to main-
tain diplomatic ties with Pretoria; even Botswana,
Lesotho, and Swaziland-all economically
dependent on South Africa-have refused to ex-
change ambassadors unless Pretoria modifies its
internal racial policies.
South African whites, however, usually
applaud Vorster's assertions that his government
will never abandon apartheid in order to curry
international approval. Vorster also appears to be
drawing political advantage from the white voters'
anxiety concerning the insurgencies in neighbor-
ing white-ruled countries. The infrequent guerrilla
incursions into South-West Africa, which Pretoria
acquired as a League of Nations mandate in 1919,
are a minor problem compared with the continual
guerrilla warfare in Angola, Mozambique, and
Rhodesia.
As early as 1967 several hundred South
African police were stationed along the Rhodesia-
Zambia border in order to prevent communist-
trained South African saboteurs from returning
home through Rhodesia. Since black Rhodesian
insurgents began active terrorism in late 1972,
South Africa has reinforced its police units in
Rhodesia, and it has become apparent that these
police are supporting the white Rhodesians'
counterinsurgency operations. The South African
Special Report
public responded fatalistically to the killing of
four South African police by Rhodesian insur-
gents last month. Vorster commented that the
incident showed the need for constant vigilance,
and no opposition politician asked why South
Africans had to serve in Rhodesia.
Instead, such incidents provoke outcries for
reprisals against Zambia, where most southern
African liberation movements have bases. Vorster,
however, appears determined to avoid the sort of
open strikes against any black state that would
heighten international pressures on South Africa's
major trading partners to go along with OAU
demands for economic sanctions. Although gov-
ernment spokesmen in Pretoria met the Arab oil
embargo with warnings that South Africa's black
neighbors would be hardest hit, in practice the
diminished supply of petroleum products has
been shared equitably with Botswana, Lesotho,
and Swaziland.
Recent developments in South-West Africa
suggest that Vorster would forfeit South Africa's
membership in the United Nations rather than
substantially modify the Bantustan program, or
any other policy that he considers essential for
perpetuating white supremacy. In December 1972
the UN Security Council renewed Secretary Gen-
eral Waildheim's mandate to negotiate with Pre-
toria concerning a program that would prepare
the territory for independence as a unified state.
Although Vorster would not explicitly renounce
the Bartustan program in South-West Africa, he
did promise that Pretoria would promote self-
determination, starting with repeal of restrictions
on personal movement, association, and expres-
sion.
In mid-1973, however, Pretoria set up an
autonomous administration for the Ovambos,
who comprise almost half of the territory's pop-
ulation. The new Bantustan was in effect handed
over to the traditional tribal chiefs, who pro-
hibited their opponents from competing in the
initial legislative election. Ovambos belonging to
the South-West Africa People's Organization,
which demands a modern government for the
whole country, organized a near-total boycott of
the Ovamboland election. Subsequently, South
- 7 - April 19, 1974
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010800040003-8
 Approved r Release 20RQ 1 / 2FfIA-RDP79-0 7A010800040003-8
African police have systematically suppressed the
organization and its youth league, arrested hun-
dreds of its members, and condemned several
leaders to long prison terms.
abolish or moderate apartheid. A more likely elec-
tion aftermath is such disarray among Vorster's
opponents that he will have a freer hand than ever
before.
The general election has stirred little interest
among the all-white electorate inasmuch as the
National Party is expected to renew its large
majority. Nevertheless, the results could signif-
icantly affect the quality of the parliamentary
opposition and its capabilities for promoting
needed reforms.
If the United Party loses more than a few
parliamentary seats, as appears possible, the
demoralizing impact could push its present fac-
tions into a final break. Sir de Villiers Graaff
might give up his loose party leadership, leaving
Harry Schwarz, brash leader of the liberal faction
in Transvaal Province, to force a showdown with
the conservatives who control the party caucus in
parliament. Should Schwarz gain control of the
party caucus, some conservatives may go over to
the National Party. If Schwarz is squelched, he
may leave the party and take with him many of
the reform-minded industrialists.
It appears that the Progressive Party, which
now has only one parliamentary seat, could win a
few more from the United Party. In that event,
the Progressive Party could become the rallying
point for liberals who desert the larger parties.
Although the Progressives have been mostly
English-speaking, one of the party's candidates is
a prominent Afrikaner journalist.
Even though such a grouping in parliament
would be small, it could, if it is cohesive, advocate
distinct alternatives to apartheid more effectively
than the United Party has done. The United Party
usually has sought to blur critical issues in order
to hold together the remnants of its once-winning
coalition of ideologically diverse elements.
Cohesiveness, however, has seldom been shown
by the South African whites who are seeking to
Special Report - 8 -
Some well-informed local ppliticians expect
that Vorster will seize the opportunity of an
overwhelming election victory to hake long strides
toward meeting the economic an i social needs of
South African blacks. If Vorster does go ahead
with significant reforms, these probably will be
based on some of the proposals that are being
seriously discussed among Afrikaner intellectuals
who hold to the basic tenets of separate develop-
ment.
The possible scope of post-election reforms
is suggested by a recent editorial in Die Trans-
valer, a leading Nationalist newspaper. The writer
argued that sweeping modifications in the applica-
tion of the government's apartheid policy must be
put in motion within the next five years, main-
taining that the bulk of the party's membership
can be persuaded to accept such changes. The
editorial proposed concrete objectives including
accelerated land consolidation for the tribal
homelands, adequate facilities for black urban
dwellers, increased bargaining power for black
industrial workers, and upgrading of many blacks
to skilled jobs.
As Vorster has already taken some cautious
steps toward all these objectives, the basic ques-
tion is whether his rate of change will match the
mounting pressures, especially among black in-
dustrial workers. Even if Vorster squarely
shoulders the thankless task of persuading
Afrikaner farmers and industrial workers to
accept hitherto intolerable erosions of their
manifold advantages, it does not appear likely
that the black masses will wait indefinitely for
gradualist programs to unfold. Viorster's tighten-
ing of the restraints on dissent, moreover, is
reducing the possibilities for open consideration
of alternatives ntially ex-
plosive tensions
April 19, 1974
25X1
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010800040003-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO10800040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO10800040003-8