WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010800040002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
Secret
Secret
19 April 1974
No. 0016/74
Copy N!
25X1 `
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CONTENTS April 19, 1974
erial coordinated with or prepared by
Ic Research, the Office of Strategic
;sirs requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
Wished separately as Special Reports are listed in the
_Etc .a_
25X1
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
3 South Vietnam: Fighting Picks Up
4 Laos: The Pathet Lao Hold Forth
5 Cambodia: Some Unwelcome Fireworks
6 China: Restoring the Old
7 Taiwan Stands Firm on Air Pact
9 China-USSR: More Trouble
10 Yugoslavia: Finishing Touches
11 USSR: Sakharov's Rejoinder
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
13 Nigeria: Slow Motion
14 Niger: The Military Take Over
1.4 Ethiopia: Turmoil Continues
16 UN: Resources and Development
17 International Money
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
18 Colombia To Elect a President
18 Brazil: Restless Students
19 Peron and the Terrorists
25X1
Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signi?-
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Syria-Israel
MAKING ASAD HAPPY IN MOSCOW
The Soviets rolled out the red carpet for
Syri President Asad and opened the Kremlin's
coffers a little wider in a less than subtle attempt
to cement bilateral relations at a time when Mos-
cow is having trouble elsewhere in the Arab
world.]
jAsad's five-day stay in the USSR coincided
With the arrival in Washington of the Syrian del-
egation to discuss disengagement and with strong
anti-Soviet remarks by Egyptian President Sadat.
With this backdrop, the Soviets had more reason
than ever to use the visit to reiterate that Moscow
must be a party to any negotiations leading to a
viable Middle East settlement
r rMoscow also went out of its way, apparently
some success, to keep Asad from following
Sad is path away from the USSR and toward the
US1The final communique expressed the resolve
of both sides to "rebuff" any attempts to damage
Soviet-Syrian friendship] /This was probably a
muted warning to the US, but more importantly
it implied that Syria will not follow Egypt's ex-
ample of improving relations with the US at the
USSR's expense]
he Soviets were somewhat less reticent
than before in publicly criticizing US-Egyptian
bilateral negotiations.~jBrezhnev referred to
President Asad and Soviet leaders at airport
"ersatz-plans," concocted by "the aggressor and
itsanov patrons," to substitute partial agreements for
er-all settlement. He again stressed that the
Geneva conference, where Moscow has a voice, is
the authoritative international forum where a
settlement must be worked out'!
-2. ;t he USSR has repeatedly failed to persuade
'Asad to by-pass or at least de-emphasize the
Washington bilateral negotiations in favor of
Geneva, and it seems to have had no better luck
this time] Asad's comment that "our points of
view on t e main questions coincide" suggests]
\that there were areas of disagreement, probably
including the disengagement talksThe final com-
munique fails to mention Geneva and merely
repeats the language used in the one issued fol-
lowing Gromyko's trip to Damascus last month-
that disengagement is a partial step that must be
tied to an over-all settlement, and that Moscow's
participation in all the stages and spheres of a
settlement is important.?
[Asad, who probably viewed the visit as
necessary to assuage Soviet sensitivities over being
excluded from the disengagement talks, was very
generous throughout in his praise of Soviet sup-
port for Syria. He characterized the Moscow talks
in general as having consolidated ties of friendship
and cooperation, but he was very bland and non-
committal concerning Soviet warnings against
dealing with "imperialist and reactionary" forces.?
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lIn light of Moscow's recent set-back in its
relations with Cairo, Asad may have sensed an
opportunity to obtain generous aid commitments
from the Soviets) Details are not yet available on
the economic, scientific, and cultural agreements
that Asad signed in Moscow, but it seems likely
that they are indeed favorable to the Syrians.]
I he communique did not mention any
agreement on military aid, but did say that the
two sides had "outlined steps" for the further
strengthening of the Syrian armed forces. It seems
likely that the Soviets will be generous in this area
as well. The communique reiterated an earlier
formula that Syria has the right to use all "effec-
tive means" for the liberation of its occupied
lands`abbut it did not use the Golan fighting as an
occasion for sabre rattling.)
25X1 / Over the weekend of April 13-14, Israeli and
Syrian forces fought their sharpest battles since
ott the crest of Mount Hermon on April 13. By
early the next morning, however, Israeli forces-
using air strikes--had regained the summit. The
level of fighting generally decreased early this
week, but on April 17 and 18 Israeli aircraft again
25X1 struck at Syrian ground targets in the Mount
Hermon area.4
Israeli aircraft flew a large number of sorties
in the Golan Heights area over the weekend-
particularly on April 14, the day the Israelis
counterattacked on Mount Hermon. According to
Tel Aviv, Syrian air defense units fired surface-to-
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air missiles of all types at the Israeli planes, but
Israel reported no aircraft losses.
An Israeli force also struck into Lebanon on
Aril 12 in retaliation for the fedayeen attack on
the Israeli village of Qiryat Shemona. This force
withdrew after a few hours, but not before taking
several captives and destroying a number of
houses reportedly belonging to fedayeen sympa-
thizers. Despite the death of two Lebanese civil-
ians, the attack was not as harsh as Beirut ex-
pected. Tel Aviv presumably avoided larger scale
retaliation because of its concern over the fate of
two Israeli pilots held in Lebanon as well as the
effect more serious attacks might have on peace
negotiations.
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L--Arab battle One
Shaykh
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VAfter two days of heavy fighting in the gon and the delta. Some senior government offi-
central highlands, the Communists on April 16 cials also see the pressure as an attempt to isolate
forced government Rangers to withdraw from a Tay Ninh Province
fire support base about 25 miles southwest of
Pleiku City. The South Vietnamese have moved
two regiments from elsewhere in the highlands to )C To counter the Communists, the government 25X1
the area and are maneuvering them into position has reinforced its units northwest of Saigon, and
against the North Vietnamese forces. the outlook is for more sharp fighting in this
sector.
11-1 In Military Region 3 the government's
Ran er base at Tonle Cham on the border of Tay
Ninh and Binh Long provinces finally fell to the
Communists late last week after being under siege
for over a year. The base was the last government
outpost within a major infiltration route north-
west of Saigon, The impact of its loss has been
primarily political, however, as the South Viet-
namese announced on April 16 that they were
indefinitely suspending the Paris talks with the
Viet Cong. They cited the fall of Tonle Cham,
continuing Communist pressure against other gov-
ernment positions northwest of Saigon, and new
attacks in the central highlands as reasons for the
suspension
14 As a military retaliation for the fall of Tonle
Cham, the government directed air strikes against
.the Communist administration center at Loc Ninh
in southern South Vietnam and against other
nearby targets. Meanwhile, almost all troops of
the base's former garrison have managed to with-
draw safely to An Loc. The ease with which the
Rangers withdrew supports speculation that the
base commander, in apparent violation of orders,
abandoned the base in return for a Communist
guarantee of safe passage?
4 \Communist pressure in the area northwest of
Saigon is aimed at strengthening their position in
the border areas of Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, and
Tay Ninh provinces. A recent shifting of North
Vietnamese main force elements in Military Re-
gion 3 has put the Communists in position to
protect major infiltration corridors leading to Sai-
KONTOM
Central
lflrar,ds~
j/ ?Pleiku
vX Rangers
withdraw
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LAOS: THE PATHET LAO HOLD FORTH
the Lao Communists, wasting little time in
establishing their political and military priorities,
have struck a note of reasonableness within the
new coalition structure.)
' IPhoumi also dwelled on the Pathet Lao's
interests in a frank and highly cordial meeting
with the US ambassador, who assessed Phoumi as
an individual willing to discuss serious matters in
a non-polemical manner. Besides indicating that
the Communists want to maintain good relations
with the US, Phoumi tried to play down appre-
hensions of a Pathet Lao take-over in Laos by
stressing that the two sides should work calmly
and amicably toward reconciling their opposing
political viewpoints. Phoumi also stated again that
it was essential for all foreign soldiers to leave
Laos, and he hinted that the Pat et Lao may
request aid for refugee resettlement
IlOther Lao Communist members of the new
coalition government have also been working hard
to project an image of cooperation and cordiality.
Phoumi Vongvichit
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r.i JCIrRC I 1400,
Some Unwelcome Fireworks
The Khmer Communists dampened Buddhist
New Year celebrations in Phnom Penh this week
with their first sustained rocket attacks in over a
month. Fifteen rockets fell on the capital be-
tween April 13 and 15-most of them near the
presidential residence-killing and wounding over
30 civilians., At the same time, a flurry of Com-
munist ground attacks forced government troops
to abandon outposts along Route 5 some ten
miles north of the city and along the Bassac River
just below Phnom Penh. Skirmishing continued in.
both areas late in the week as Cambodian Army
units tried to retake the lost positions.
In the countryside, the Communists are still
blockading Kampot's outlet to the sea and are
shelling the southwestern coastal city sporad-
ically. Ground pressure has slackened, however,
and government reinforcements are having little
trouble working their way overland from the
coast. The Communists have kept Kampot under
siege for over a month, and they may soon begin
to experience shortages of ammunition and other
supplies. Moreover, many insurgent units pres-
ently at Kampot saw action on other fronts ear-
lier in the dry season and may be tiring/
Some Welcome Attention
Prince Sihanouk, who recently has been
taking a back seat to his touring "defense minis-
ter," Khieu Samphan, began his annual visit to
Pyongyang late last week. In his major address in
North Korea, Sihanouk acknowledged Samphan's
growing political prominence by describing him as
the "authentic representative of our people."
Although Sihanouk was pessimistic about the
prospects for a Khmer Communist military vic-
tory this dry season, he again ruled out any nego-
tiations with the Lon No[ government or with any
third force. He did not mention the possibility of
direct talks with Washington-a theme he revived
last month during his visit to Laos.
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/The rehabilitation of veteran civilians who
were ousted during the Cultural Revolution has
long been a sensitive political issue in China. The
struggle between those who favor bringing back
former leaders and those who oppose the idea has
been complicated by the related question of re-
placing military men in top party and government
posts with civilians. It appears to be easier for
feuding central leaders to agree on removing sol-
diers than on who should replace them, but the
recent appointment of a new provincial leader
demonstrates that progress is being made]
\On April 15, a Peking broadcast describing
the opening of the Spring Canton Trade Fair
identified Chao Tzu-yang as the new party and
government leader in Kwangtung Province. Chao
headed the Kwangtung party committee prior to
the Cultural Revolution, but was gusted after
attacks by leftist Red Guards in 1967,
!His tortuous return to power has been typi-
cal of others who have been rehabilitated. Chao's
initial post - Cultural Revolution provincial ap-
pointment was in Inner Mongolia. He then reap-
peared in Kwangtung in April 1972, but was not
named a secretary until January 1973. When the
late-December rotation of military region com-
manders vacated the top Kwangtung party and
government posts, there were several candidates
for the positions, including politburo member
Hsu Shih-yu, the new Canton Military Region
commander. Chao was elevated over two other
Kwangtung secretaries who outranked himi
hao is the first appointee to a top provin-
cial arty post previously held by one of the
rotated regional commanders. The displacement
of provincial military men has increased markedly
in the last few months, and many soldiers are now
targets of critical wall posters. It seems clear that
civilians will fill most of the slots vacated by
military men.
The rehabilitation controversy continues to
be hird-fought at both the central and provincial
levels. Last December, Teng Hsiao-ping, the sec-
ond highest ranking victim of the Cultural Revo-
lution, was restored to the Politburo. Teng's ele-
vation apparently took place in the face of strong
opposition, as did his return to public view in
April 1973. Several other high-ranking cadres who
were purged or demoted during the Cultural Rev-
olution have also returned to official favor, but
reports suggest that others who were candidates
for rehabilitation, such as former Central South
Bureau leader Tao Chu, have been successfully
blocked.)
The rehabilitation question is clearly part of
the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign, and the
issue appears to have been addressed by both
sides. Depending on the context in which they are
presented, media articles criticizing Confucius for
wishing to "restore the old" can be read as thinly
veiled attacks on either: pre - Cultural Revolution
civilian officials, such as Teng or Chao, and those
who wish to rehabilitate them; or those who wish
to bring back people brought down in the later
stages of the Cultural Revolution, most of whom
were leftists. The trend in favor of the rehabili-
tated veterans is a favorable sign for Premier
Chou, who has led the effort to bring them back.
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TAIWAN STANDS FIRM ON AIR PACT
' !'. ITaipei last week underscored its tough stand
on the impending China-Japan civil air agreement
and put muscle into its threat to close Taiwan's
airspace to Japanese planes by putting the Na-
tionalist Air Force on alert.
[A few days before the alert, Foreign Minister
Shen publicly repeated Taiwan's demand that the
present civil air agreement between Taipei and
Tokyo be maintained. He warned that Taiwan
would give up air links to Japan and refuse per-
mission for Japanese aircraft to enter the Taipei
Flight Information Region and Air Defense Zone
if the Japanese unilaterally altered the existing
agreement in order to secure a civil air pact with
Peking
jPremier Chiang Ching kuo is hoping that by
Cooperating on the air issue with the right-wing
Seirankai group of Japan's ruling Liberal Demo-
cratic Party, he can help damage politically Prime
Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohiral
Chiang long ago wrote off both men as too pro-
Peking and would prefer a more conservative cabi-
net in Tokyol[Chiang's estimate of the situation
~,-within the party clearly overstates the strength of
Seirank i as well as his own influence on events in
Tokyo.
25X1
rA by-product of Chiang's course of action
has been an increase in anti-Japanese feeling on
Taiwan. This atmosphere, which stems from the
Nationalists' sense of grievance against Japanese
"perfidy," makes eventual compromise more
difficult.
? IDespite his adamant public stand, which has
aroused misgivings among his advisers, Chiang has
not completely closed the door to negotiation,
nor has he specified the exact conditions that
would trigger a rupture in air service. The points
at issue in retaining air links with Japan have been
reduced to two: the presence of Nationalist air-
line personnel in Japan and the conditions for
maintaining necessary ground and business serv-
ices there for Taiwan's airline; and Japanese
handling of the name of Taiwan's airline. On the
face of it both points would appear open to
discussion.?
lln the present turbulent atmosphere, how-
ever, Taipei may lose sight of the long-run neces-
sity of maintaining good political and economic
relations with Japan. It might precipitate a rup-
ture that will embitter Nationalist-Japanese rela-
tions in general, and make future working ar-
rangements more difficult
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UK-FRANCE: CONCORDE TROUBLES
/ The British Government is seriously consid-
ering canceling its participation in the Concorde
supersonic airliner. Britain's secretary of state for
industry, Anthony Benn, presented a strong eco-
nomic case to Parliament last month for ending
the program, despite the fact he personally favors
continuing development of the aircraft. Recent
press reports indicate that several government
officials have made private comments suggesting
that the new Labor government has embarked on
a course that could bring the project to an end.]
final decision, however, may not be made
for several months. Cancellation of the project
will be difficult because the Labor government is
under great pressure from the British aerospace
industry, trade unions, and civic groups to cony
tinue development of the Concorde. London also
faces the possibility of having to pay huge cancel-
lation costs to its French partner should Paris
decide to continue the project alone. The issue of
cancellation costs could be the most influential
factor in the UK's final decision.
' ~ccording to estimates by Benn, it would
cost the UK an additional $944 million to finish
and put into service its share-eight aircraft-of
the 16 Concordes now under construction. This
amount would be in addition to the $956 million
that the British have already spent on develop-
ment-money they acknowledge is beyond re-
covery.1j
;Only a few Concordes are still under sales
contracts. British Airways has ordered five and
Air France has agreed to purchase four. When the
Concorde was still in the early stages of develop-
ment, major world airlines had options to buy 74
of the planes. China and Iran also signed letters of
intent to purchase three and two Concordes, re-
spectively, but there is no evidence that they
intend to exercise these options.
a` 41 In his calculations, Benn has argued that the
British and French would continue to suffer
losses even if more Concordes are sold. This is
because the aircraft would have to be sold at a
competitive international price, which is well be-
low its production cost. Benn estimates that this
loss in revenue, plus the cost to manufacturers of
maintaining the spares and support facilities that
the airlines would demand, would result in a loss
of about $33 million per aircraft.
France has been pressing the British in re-
cent months to agree to the addition of a fuel
tank to the Concorde to increase its 3,500 -
nautical mile range by 200-250 nautical miles.
The French apparently believe this modest in-
crease would make the aircraft more attractive to
the airlines because it would give the Concorde
the capability to carry about 100 passengers plus
baggage non-stop from many West European
cities to the eastern US. The Concorde currently
has only a marginal capability to make this run.
An earlier plan to increase the Concorde's range
and payload, which would have required rede-
signing the wings as well as major engine modi-
fication, was dropped because of the high costs
involved and the additional delay to a project that
was already six years behind schedule.
Some British experts believe that no amount
of modification or extra refinement will ever turn
the Concorde into a commercially acceptable air-
craft. They are of the opinion that the plane's
payload and range are too limited to be attractive
to the world's airlines. The advantages of the
Concorde have been almost offset by the wide-
bodied jets, which carry up to five times as many
passengers. Although the Concorde can fly twice
as fast as any wide-bodied jet, its flight time is
nowhere near twice as fast on routes where it is
necessary to stop and refuel. Concorde flights on
long routes could in fact be slower than those of
the larger, long-range subsonic jets because the
Concorde would require two refueling
stops
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N%Wwe Z)tLKt I 'wage,
N 11 rPeking may bring charges of espionage
against the Soviet helicopter crew that was cap-
tured in northwestern China last month The
Chinese ambassador in Moscow told his colleagues
a trial was "possible," and Vice Foreign Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua labeled the crew "spies." Such a
trial would heat up the Sino-Soviet polemic. Chi-
nese exploitation of the incident has thus far been
measured, and Moscow's reaction has been mainly
low key.7
! There have been hints that the Soviets
pressed Peking to release the crew. Soviet heli-
copters apparently overflew Sinkiang in early
April, and some Soviet diplomats reportedly
dropped hints of trouble along the frontier. A
strong anti-Soviet stand is politically important in
China at this juncture, however, and there is no
sign the Chinese plan to give up the crew soon.
Rallies in Sinkiang, where the helicopter lande-I
have linked the incident with the anti-ConfuciL,
anti-Lin campaign. Peking also has tied the heli-
copter to an alleged Soviet espionage case last
January, in order to develop a pattern of Soviet
misbehavior regarding China
hould a trial be held, it is likely that the
Chin se will give heavy publicity to this addi-
tional "indication" of Soviet meddling in Chinese
affairs. There were a number of indications that
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Peking contemplated linking important indi-
viduals in China with Soviet espionage even be-
fore the helicopter incident. It is uncertain, how-
ever, whether Peking would jail or repatriate the
crew following a trial.
I-The Soviets are privately spreading the line
that there will be a trial of the helicopter crew.
They were the first to publicize the helicopter
incident in an apparent effort to pre-empt a
massive Chinese publicity campaign. Now they
seem resigned to the prospect of a trial, but intent
on limiting the damage such a trial might have on
the Western-primarily US-appreciation of Sino-
Soviet relations.
.Moscow would probably be restrained in its
25X1 treatment of any trial unless Peking forces its
hand by staging massive public demonstrations.
This would be in line with current efforts to
Sino-Soviet affairs in a low key.
Tito's program to re-establish the Commu-
nist Party as the country's most powerful unify-
ing force will take a giant step toward completion
at the tenth party congress next month. The
party's authority to make national policy and to
exercise closer institutional control over the rank-
and-file will be sharply increased}
The last touches are now being applied to
the report that will guide party policy for the
next four years, and proposed changes in the
party statutes are also under final scrutiny. Much
of this was probably accomplished last week
when party secretary Stane Dolanc, who is chair-
man of the congress' preparatory commission,
and Edvard Kardelj, the country's top ideologist,
held several days of discussions with Tito. Kardelj
subsequently indicated that substantial thanes in
the central party machinery are in the works
One of the key changes would abolish the
largely advisory Permanent Conference and re-
establish a full-fledged central committee-which
was dissolved in 1969-as the main repository of
party authority between congresses. In the ab-
sence of a central committee, Tito has sometimes
found the presidium, the party's top policy-
making body, to be insufficiently responsive to
changing policy needs. Re-establishment of the
central committee, which will probably have
around 165 members selected from regional
parties and the military, appears mainly intended
to bolster the party's control, stability, and
confidencej.
ii There also is a proposal to enlarge the nine-
man executive bureau, which has strongly sup-
ported Tito's plans to recentralize the party. With
increased staffing, the bureau will be in an even
better position to oversee and direct the activities
of the party rank-and-file. In addition, the new
party statutes enhance prospects for increased
party control by abandoning the efforts, initiated
in 1969, to create autonomous parties in Yugo-
slavia's constituent republics. Regional party
congresses-now almost over-have already re-
organized local party units to dovetail more
closely with the functional subdivisions of the
central party apparatus..
!i