WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Weekly Summary
State Dept.
review
completed
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE FtLTURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
Secret
Secret
1 March 1974
No. 0009/74
Copy N'?
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CONTENTS (March 1, 1974)
i China: Confucius No Say
2 Latin America: The New Dialogue
3 International Money
t ?i!srrenf #rst?:iiiraanCe recrt4 ~rnd anaiVz~~ si~nf-
t i9,~. week tt~rotagh ;eot~n on i hur5clay. It
?eriai resordinatgc# with or o~!~ared by
c~rttdc Research. 'the t~ffice of ?,tr~fen#c
C?ireE_torate of Sa;#~r~ce and T~r~no#opy,
>re cc~morehensive eatment and therefore
4 Israel: Political Frustrations
5 Ethiopia: The Times Are Changing
7 Islamic States: The Lahore Summit
8 Rhodesia: Insurgency Continues
9 EC-Arab Cooperation
10 Iraq: Truce With Kurds Expiring
11 Morocco: Restless on Throne Day
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
ugoslavia: Third Constitution
17 East Germany: A Firmer Grip
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
19 South Vietnam: Government Changes;
Economy
21 Cambodia: More Government Gains
21 Laos: The Communists' Turn
22 Thailand: The Students, Again
22 The "4th Burma Rifles Government"
~JVESTE RN
HEMISPHERE
23 Chile: At Home and Abroad
23 Argentina: Police Rebellion
25 Guatemala: Presidential Elections
2G Cuba: Raul Goes to East Europe
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SECRET
G'l~i~ra: L'oKfuc~us ,Na Say
Chou En-lai recently became the first
Chinese official to comment publicly on the anti-
Confucius campaign. Chows remarks, made dur-
ing a February 24 speech at a banquet for Zam-
bian President Kaunda, should put to rest the
frequent press speculation that the Premier is a
target of the campaign. Although there has been
no official statement on the objectives of the
drive, Peking has moved forcefully to deny for-
eign press reports that Chou is a target, that the
campaign will prompt a change in foreign policy,
or that it is a new Cultural Revolution':
Criticism of Confucius began last August but
did not become a full-fledged campaign until
early February. The announcement on February
2 that this campaign was the first order of busi-
ness was preceded by careful planning, including
specific measures to keep the campaign under
strict party control. Teng Hsiao-ping, known as a
rigid disciplinarian, was added to the Politburo
even as the propaganda was touting the virtues of
maintaining party discipline'~~In January, the
Central Committee issued a series of directives,
including one that set clear limitations on the
conduct of the campaign~~
The directive is obviously aimed at prevent-
ing t e kind of turmoil that erupted during the
Cultural Revolution. It reportedly prohibits travel
around the country to "exchange experiences," a
feature of the Cultural Revolution that resulted in
nationwide disorder as unruly youths roamed the
country at will. It also bans attacks by name on
specific individuals."
~,, The latter stricture has not been well imple-
ment d, however, and Peking has felt it necessary
to restate its position. On February 20, an author-
itative editorial in People's Daily warned that the
campaign must'stay on the "correct course" and
must not become "entangled" with "other prob-
lems." For several months, young students have
been attacking individual teachers for all manner
of real or imagined wrong-doings; petty thieves
were also being criticized~~and at least one factory
manager came under at ac rAlthough the ac-
cusers all claim that their cri icism is consistent
with the anti-Confucius drive, it is clear that
Peking is trying to put a stop to just such activity1
Ithough in some instances the campaign
has become bogged down in local issues, the prov-
inces for the most part are stir_king closely to the
official line coming from Peking. The situation is
under such controll[that some Chinese officials
have already begun to speculate when the cam-
paign will end. Chinese estimates range from three
to six months before Peking calls a halt to the
criticism of Confuciu"s~ Before that time, it is
SECRET
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SECRET
Latin America: The Ne~v Dialogue
;Latin American and Caribbean foreign minis-
ters have returned home from their meeting with
Secretary Kissinger in Mexico City last week with
.mixed feelings about what was accomplished.
i here has been insufficient time for the partici-
,r3ating governments to have reached firm con-
~lusions about the meetings, and early com-
mentaries by the area's public media have typi-
cally run the gamut from cynical negativism to
~aroud satisfaction. More measured official re-
actions will trickle in for weeks to come, but a
preliminary reading suggests that most of the 24
I__atin and Caribbean governments that attended
regard the conference as a promising starting
point fora healthy new dialogue with the US.
They generally look forward to resuming the
dialogue in Atlanta in mid-P~pril just prior to the
meeting ,there of the fourth OAS General
Assembly.
Although their comments to date about the
meeting's concrete results have been under-
standably guarded, most of the participants who
have spoken up since the rr~eeting have been en-
thusiastic about its style. They generally have
e;:hoed the satisfaction shown by Mexican For-
eign Minister Rabasa in his speech closing the
conference when he mentioned the feeling that
"here, for the first time in zi long while, we have
met on a plane of absolute equality."~
;Some of those who attended have also
spoken proudly of the fact -that the Latins them-
selves were able for the first time in such a
meeting with the US to attain and preserve a high
degree of unity on the subjects discussed. Latin
solidarity was in fact impressive, but it did show
strains when issues like Cuba, the revision of the
inter-American system, and the wording of the
final communique arose for discussion inside and
outside the formal sessions. It was only with
considerable pulling and hauling that the dele-
gates were able to agree on one Latin spokesman
to respond in the name of alt to Secretary Kis-
singer's comments on each agenda item. Some
delegates privately bridled at what they regarded
as the high-handed way that Mexico, the host
government, ran the meetings. Mexico itself ap-
peared very pleased, both with the conduct of the
conference itself and with the "Declaration of
Tlatelolco" concluding the conference:?
The two issues that produced the deepest
cleavage between some of the Latin American and
Caribbean delegates on the one hand and the US
on the other were the US suggestion that a new
"hemispheric community" be formed and the
Cuban question, which cropped up informally.
Some of the area's more nationalistic govern-
ments vehemently rejected the "community" idea
because they saw it as a possible new vehicle for
what they regard as US domination. A few dele-
gates-notably those of Jamaica, Guyana, and
Peru-sought to force the group to discuss the
exclusion of Cuba from the inter-American sys-
tem, but they received little support. Neither
problem loomed so large as to dominate the
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JCVI-tC I
conference, although Cuban and Soviet press
commentary trumpeted both issues and made it
appear that way."
>C"? Cuba has yet to react directly to the discus-
sions at Tlatelolco. Prensa Latina, the Cuban wire
service, sent considerable caustic commentary
from Mexico to Havana during the course of the
meetings. The main theme of this reportage was
perhaps best conveyed in the comment, attri-
buted to a Central American delegate, that the US
had "offered us, under new titles, the same old
State Department cliches." Tass also played up
the same alleged remark and was generally only
slightly less critical than the Cuban wire service.
International Money
~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~
,The dollar dropped further against most
mayor currencies in hectic trading during the past
week. Daily changes in value sometimes exceeded
2 percent as energy-triggered uncertainties con-
tinued to dominate currency markets. Central
banks did not intervene substantially to limit
daily fluctuations in exchange rates or to halt the
dollar's general decline. Since February 1, the
dollar has depreciated nearly 4 percent against the
mark, 2 percent against the pound, and 4 percent
against the yen. The price of gold surged to a new
high of $175 per ounce on February 26, up
nearly 50 percent so far this year; it eased slightly
on February 28 after some profit-taking.
The dollar's weakness reflects a growing
realization that the Europeans and Japanese will
be able to finance much of the rise in their oil
import bills by borrowing; thus, they will be
under less pressure than anticipated to depreciate
their currencies or draw on foreign reserves.
Rome is planning to float a new $1.5-billion
foreign loan. It also will be able to draw on a
recently negotiated $1.2-billion standby credit
from the International Monetary Fund and to
utilize new arrangements for increased short-term
currency swaps with the US. In France, some
state agencies will apparently follow the lead of
the treasury and Electricite de France in seeking
foreign capital. The treasury and the electrical
agency have already obtained loans totaling $2
billion. The Danes announced plans for a loan in
marks equivalent to $37 million, and substantial
further borrowing by the Scandinavians is likely.
The dramatic rise in the price of gold is
attributable mainly to increased speculative de-
mand brought on by uncertainties about the fate
of major currencies. Reduced gold sales by South
Africa and renewed expectations that the EC will
raise its official price for gold sharply have also
SECRET
L rWith the Mexico meeting now over, Latin
American and Caribbean governments will begin
focusing on how best to refine their arguments
and seek further US actions in their favor at the
April meetings in Atlanta, where most of the
issues raised in Mexico will again come up. In the
interim, they will speak loudly, mostly for home
consumption, about the need for Washington to
do more for them. But privately, most will remain
guardedly hopeful that the new impetus they see
in US -Latin American relations can be nurtured
and sustai ed.
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 ISRAEL: POLITICAL FRUSTI~ATIONS
;~; ;Prime Minister Meir spent a trying week at-
tempting to broaden her minority coalition, while
seeking to forestall its early collapse. Continuing
difficulty with both tasks led President Katzir to
give her another week to form a cabinet. Last
week, he gave an informal extension of seven days
to name a cabinet after she refused to request a
formal three-week extension of her original man-
date, which expired on February 20. Mrs. Nleir
now plans to present her new cabinet to the
Knesset for a vote of confidence on March 5.
`: ~ The Prime Minister clearly wants the addi-
tiona~ time to coax the National Religious Party
and recalcitrant Labor Alignment ministers into
the cabinet. More moderate leaders of the Na-
tional Religious Party apparently are still hesi-
tating to go against the wishes of the party's
ultra-orthodox youth faction. As a result, the
party has continued to reject all overtures. Labor
leaders are now concerned that the National Re-
ligious Party may act in concert with the rightist
Fikud to block legislation in N:nesset committees)
~rying to hold her own Alignment factions
~to~jet er, Mrs. Meir addressed several personal
appeals to Defense Minister Dayan and Trans-
portation Minister Peres to remain in the govern-
ment; she reportedly even offered Dayan the post
of foreign minister. Her hopes were given a boost
when the Rafi faction, of which both are leading
members, endorsed Mrs. Meir's move tv form a
minority cabinet and urged both men to join.
~~Peres, who would like to remain in the cabi-
net and even called on Dayan to stay, will follow
Dayan's lead. The Defense Minister, for his part,
appears to be holding out for stronger support
from all Alignment factions before making his
final decision. the Alignment factions have estab-
lished a "reconciliation committee" to formulate
proposals on overcoming the intra-party crisis,
but the committee, at best, is likely only to gloss
over party differences.
=; Meanwhile, the Independent Liberal Party,
the' Alignment's junior coalition partner, is
maneuvering for more representation in the cabi-
net. Mrs. Meir has agreed to give it one more
cabinet seat in addition to that held by Minister
of -(ourism Moshe Kola
~~ ` I n contrast to the lack of movement on the
do estic political scene, a major breakthrough
was made on the Syrian disengagement issue
when Damascus presented Tel Aviv, through Sec-
retary Kissinger, with a list of the 65 Israeli POWs
it holds and said Red Cross officials could begin
visiting them on March 1. Mrs. Meir announced
that Israel was now prepared to conduct negotia-
tions with Damascus on a separation of forces
agreement
Ilsraeli political observers are playing down
'Elie possibility that Mrs. Meir's minority cabinet
would have difficulty beginning disengagement
talks, arguing that the principles held by such a
cabinet are shared by a majority of Knesset mem-
bers.
SECRE7-
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JCl.ir'1C I ~~'
i "l
spreading military revolt has forced Em-
~
peror
l-laile Selassie to appoint a new government
appointees named so far are likely to be more ~~ The revolt began on February 26 when army
reform-minded than their discredited predeces- and air force enlisted men and some junior offi-
sors, and their selection represents a determined ~- cers in Asmara, Ethiopia's second largest city,
effort by the Emperor to reach some accommoda-?~~, went on strike and placed their senior officers
tion with the dissident troops, whose demands are ~ under restraint. The situation worsened on Febru-
focused mainly on economic issues. The situation, ~ ~ ary 27 when some elements close to Addis Ababa
however, will probably remain unsettled for some joined in and the dissident troops in Asmara
time. The new government will have to act placed under house arrest most of the senior
quickly if it is to restore public confidence. It is
not clear how much authority Haile Selassie will
grant the new prime minister, Endalkatchew
Makonnen, or even if the new appointees will be
acceptable to the dissidents. The new cabinet at a
minimum will have to make concessions to the
troops' economic demands
exceed the immediate economic issues. Enlisted
men and NCOs have been the most visible partici-
pants in the revolt, but many junior- and middle-
level officers are showing increased political
awareness. There is growing evidence that they
are in touch with each other and with discon-
tented civilians. These groups are now likely to
exert stronger pressure for implementation of
long-postponed reforms, and their efforts are
likely to call into question the Emperor's virtually
unlimited authority. The officers and enlisted
men, and probably most of the civilians, remain
loyal to Haile Selassie, but they would prefer that
the daily administration of the government be
placed in the hands of officials chosen more for
their competence than for their royal favor and
service to Haile Selassie.
~ ~: ~Endalkatchew is probably not the strongest
choice Haile Selassie could have made, but he is a
change for the better. Although considered a con-
servative in Ethiopian terms, he is considerably
younger and probably more politically sensitive
than former prime minister Aklilu and is more
aware of the need for significant change. Lt. Gen-
eral Abiye, the new defense minister, is a progres-
sive who has urged swifter implementation of
reform. Although loyal to Haile Selassie, he has in
the past reportedly tried to impress the Emperor
with the need to prepare Ethiopia for a less per-
sonal form of government:
officers-including the armed forces chief of
staff-who had been sent to negotiate with them..
On February 28, Fourth Division troops in Addis
Ababa for the first time proclaimed their support
for the dissidents in Asmara, but continued to
assert their loyalty to the Emperor:
,~ ~ I The military and civilian unrest of the past I`~ (The revolt so far has been almost totally free
~f. few weeks holds political implications that far ~-rof violence or bloodshed. The US consul in
SECREI~
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J C l.l~ C I
SUDAN
.*Kharloum ER(.TR.E~G
'Asmara
YEMEN
TySana
-Aden
F.T. A.I.
s,DjibouYi ~~"
AAdis Ababa
E T H I O P I A
Asmara reports that the dissidents are well disci-
plined and tha their leaders appear to be ex-
tremely capable
~~ Dissatisfaction in the military has been grow-
ing ~r some time. In addition to grievances over
low pay and benefits, morale has suffered because
of poor living conditions and extended periods of
duty against insurgents in Eritrea and along the
tense Somali border. The enlisted men are also
resentful of the privileges and much higher pay of
senior officers
~~ ~ The military revolt followed by a few days
violent demonstrations in Addis Ababa by strik-
ing students, teachers, and workers protesting the
government's inability to deal effectively with
sharply rising inflation. Haile Selassie eased the
situation by announcing strict enforcement of
price controls, a reduction in gasoline prices, and
a small increase in military salaries. These meas-
ures, however, were too little and too late to halt
the discontent, and the revolt continued to spread
in the face of the inability of Aklilu's government
to cope with the situation.
+'~ge 6 ~.NEEKLY SUMMARY Mar 1, 7~+
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ISLAMIC STATES: THE LAHORE SUMMIT
;~ The official decisions of the Islamic leaders been moving in the direction of recognition for
who met in Lahore from February 22-24 were about two years, but the efforts of Sadat and
overshadowed by other developments that others who wanted Bangladesh, the second most
emerged from the conference. Probably the most populous Muslim nation, to be represented at
important result was the enhancement of the per- Lahore apparently added enough extra pressure
sonal standing of Egyptian President Sadat. At on Pakistan to bring a favorable decisionl
least tacit acceptance of his position on the Arab-
Israeli dispute was reflected both in the relatively Z3 The official Declaration of Lahore tended to
moderate speeches of most delegates and in the _~, confirm areas of agreement and avoid possible
lack of the more radical Arab positions in the areas of conflict. The declaration included calls
joint declaration. This development may also 1.7 for:
benefit Syrian President Asad, who has been at-
tempting to overcome domestic opposition to
Damascus' participation in the Geneva peace
? Arab control of Jerusalem;
talks., ? pport for E
! Muslim su gypt, Syria, Jor-
1 ~ dan, and the Palestinians in recovering "all
,~ 'The meetings also helped bring about Paki- their occupied lands by all means";
stan's reco nition of B I d
g
h
ang a es
. Islamabad had
~- _a
Mujib and Bhutto
Recognized by the host
? confirmed the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization as the sole representative of the
Palestinians and called for the restoration of
their "full national rights."
The wording of the declaration may have been
left intentionally vague and ambiguous in some
places. It does not deal explicitly with some im-
portant issues, notably whether there should be
negotiations with Israel.
Economic differences among the Islamic
states, aggravated by rising oil prices, were only
papered over by a vague conference commitment
to help the poorer Muslim nations. Two resolu-
tions calling for concrete action failed to pass.
One would have established an Islamic Solidarity
Fund, and the other proposed different oil prices
for rich and poor nations.
The declaration criticized the support given
Israel by some countries, "particularly the USA."
Despite this phrase, included at Syria's insistence,
anti-US sentiment was muted in Lahore, and Paki-
stani Prime Minister Bhutto in his welcoming
address spoke favorably of U5 peace efforts. In
addition to Israel, the only other nations specifi-
cally mentioned unfavorably were Rhodesia, Por-
tugal, and South Africa. The Muslims agreed to
support the Africans a ainst these coun-
tries. 25X1
SECRET
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~~~nc. i
RHODESIA: INSURGENCY CONTINUES
The African nationalist insurgency against
Prim Minister Smith's white-minority govern-
ment is now well into its second year. Although
the rebels remain confined to the large and
sparsely populated northeastern area where they
began operating in December 1972, they appear
capable of continuing their activities indefinitely:
The rebels are well supplied with Communist
arms-mostly Chinese-and continue to receive
help from their anti-Portuguese counterparts in
Mozambique, who assist them to cross into Rho-
desia from Zambia and Tanzania
~' Smith's government has been unable to halt
this infiltration even with the help of some 1,400
South African police who operate against the
guerrillas inside Rhodesia anti who als relieve
Rhodesian forces of routine border patrol.
~~ The rebels have suffered some setbacks.
hey have been unable for example, to maintain
the high level of terrorist attacks on isolated
white farms that they recorded initially; local
defense measures against such attacks have proven
quite effective. Moreover, support from rural
Africans seems to have fallen off despite resent-
ment over the government's forced resettlement
program and harsh security Iegislatiort~Since last
{~ June at least 8,000 local inhabitants have been
moved from the frontier zone, and the govern-
ment claims that some 3,000 of these have reset-
tled voluntarily in "protected villages" built by
the government
'_;~ The Rhodesian economy, on the whole, has
held up well under the added strains imposed by
the insurgency. The economy suffers from a man-
power shortage, however, and civilian morale has
been affected because of the large number of
white reservists who have been on almost contin-
ual active duty. In early February the government
announced measures intended to reduce call-ups
of white reservists without cutting back on the
counter-insurgency effort. The measures included
earlier conscription of white youths, increased
incentives for conscripts to r~e-enlist, and forma-
tion of a second black infantry battalion.
Areas of Guerrilla Activity
~~~~ Zimbabwe African National
Union
~,r Mozambique Liberation Front
,. ._
-~
55331 }74 CIA
Over the long run, other developments may
take a heavier toll on the economy and on white
morale than the insurgency. For example, white
immigration declined significantly last year, prob-
ably in part because of the guerrilla war. Al-
though the country showed a small net gain of
immigrants for 1973, the figure was substantially
lower than the 1972 total. Last month, Smith
announced a world-wide campaign to attract
white settlers.
Developments in neighboring Mozambique
could also affect Rhodesia's prospects. Rebels
there have become more active in recent weeks
and have carried out a number of attacks on the
rail line from the port of Beira to Salisbury, one
of Rhodesia's vital lifelines.
SECF~ET
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~..' ~7LVi t~ i .r.r
EC-ARAB COOPERATION
?;~' 3~~
The nine ~ countries are planning to ex-
plore wide-ranging cooperation with the Arab
states despite some concern that Washington may
view such talks with disapproval. Even those EC
states that are cooperating with the US in the
activities following the Washington Energy Con-
ference see the new effort as a way to assert an
independent role for Europe in relations with the
Arabs. They point out that:
? the European moves can complement
US policy;
? the practical effect of the Nine's efforts
will, in any case, be long term;
? the attempt is necessary to heal the rift
with France within the community.
At a meeting in Brussels set for March 4, the
foreign ministers of the EC are expected to give
final approval to the proposal, first made by
France, for cooperation with the Arabs in a vari-
ety of fields. As a first step, the West Germans-
presently holding the chairmanship of the com-
munity bodies-would inform the Arab govern-
ments of the interest of the Nine in early continu-
ation of the dialogue initiated when four Arab
leaders visited Copenhagen during the summit of
EC leaders last December. Foreign Minister Scheel
would ask the Arabs to designate one or more
representatives for future contacts in such fields
as industry, agriculture, energy, raw materials,
science and technology, financial cooperation,
and vocational training. In the next phase, the
European and Arab states could establish joint
committees to work out the principles and possi-
bilities of cooperation in detail. A conference of
Arab and European ministers, which would de-
cide how to implement the cooperative measures,
would be convened, perhaps in the autumn of
1974.
The plan for cooperation was worked out
earlier this year by a group of Middle East experts
from the foreign ministries of the EC states, and
was approved by the political directors in early
February. The cooperative venture would include
matters within the purview of the EC as well as
others-such as cultural relations-that are out-
side. For this reason, the political committee
recommended that the German foreign minister
should carry on the negotiations in both his
roles-as president of the political consultative
group and as president of the EC Council.
A number of EC members are pressing for
early action, with an eye on the rotational pattern
for the EC presidency. The West Germans are in
the chair until July, but the French will take over
for the following six months, followed by the
somewhat Francophile Irish. Paris could thus reap
inordinate political benefit from a delay of several
months in initiating the negotiations.
EC circles are nevertheless wary of Wash-
ington's reaction to EC-Arab moves. Reports are
circulating in Brussels that the US is adamantly
opposed to the prospect of an EC dialogue with
the Arabs. The West Germans have been at pains
to emphasize their determination that the EC-
Arab dialogue should neither conflict with nor
burden the US peace efforts in the Middle East.
Some Europeans believe that the US is opposed
to possible EC offers of technical help to the
comprehensive aid-for-oil agreement.
SECRET
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TUR~EY
IRAQ: TRUCE WITH KURDS EXPIRING
'~ 9J,~ a :;c, to ~,ty ~ ~
The truce that halted figftting four years ~go
between the central government and Iraqi Kurds
led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani is due to expire on
March 11. Unless it is extended, an early resump-
tion of hostilities seems likely; the two sides have
not agreed on even basic provisions of the autono-
mous status promised to the Kurds.
Iraq's two million Kurds constitute about 18
percent of its population. In March 1970, the
Baghdad government promised to grant auton-
omy within four years to areas of northeastern
Iraq where the Kurds are in a majority. Since
then, the Kurdish areas have remained generally
quiet except for occasional limited clashes be-
tween Barzani's forces and local army units.
For some time, however, and apparently
with some justification, the Kurds have been ac-
cusing the government of trying to reduce the
area in which Kurds predominate by forcing en-
tire villages to migrate north and east and re-
placing them with Arabs.
Last December, the government finally
offered a sketchy autonomy plan that the Kurds
generally view as a device to keep ultimate au-
thority in Baghdad. The Kurds want a larger
"autonomous area," greater representation in the
central government, and more of the national
budget. They are also uneasy about the future of
the Kurdish armed forces.
The most important bone of contention is
control of the Kirkuk oil fields. The Kurds claim
that: the entire Kirkuk area is within their rightful
area of jurisdiction, but the government strongly
contests this claim. If the Kurds refuse to go
along with the government's autonomy plan, as
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seems probable, Baghdad may try to impose it
anyway, hoping to enlist the support of some of
Barzani's rivals. In that event, renewed fighting on
a large scale would seem certain.
Barzani's Kurdish force, which numbers
about 30,000 men with an estimated 50,000
tribesmen in reserve, is reported to have been
re-equipped recently with new weapons, largely
with Iran's help. The Kurds lack armor, heavy
artillery, and air support, but they are capable of
defending their mountainous homeland, where
heavy equipment would be of little use. They are
also capable of guerrilla forays that could prove
costly to local army units, as well as to the oil
fields in the north. Government forces have better
equipment, but would have to keep one eye on
the Iranian border, where recent clashes have in-
creased tensions.
MOROCCO: RESTLESS ON THRONE DAY
An atmosphere of uneasiness~prevai~s with/
the approach of March 3, the 13th anniversary of
King Hassan's accession to the throne. A year ago
on the same date, short-lived disorders broke out
in central Morocco.
The government is concerned over the
security situation and has taken a number of
precautionary measures. Security patrols in Rabat
and Casablanca have been increased, and numer-
ous road blocks have been set up throughout the
country. The local rumor mill and the announce-
ment that a small group of Moroccan dissidents
was recently captured after crossing the border
from Algeria have also made the public nervous.
The government believes the current subver-
sion is backed by Libya. Tripoli has made no
attempt to hide its hostility to King Hassan since
President Qadhafi prematurely gave public sup-
port to a coup attempt against Hassan in 1971.
Military officers, from whose ranks came the
leaders of two abortive coup attempts within the
past three years, remain the chief threat to the
King. Following the last attempt in 1972, Hassan
assumed direct control of the armed forces, exe-
cuted those officers who were implicated, isolated
potential challengers in the military, and dis-
persed most of the units upon which a military
contender might rely.
While these actions have tightened Hassan's
control of the military, many officers are in-
creasingly restive because of their direct subor-
dination to the King and Morocco's lack of mod-
ern military equipment. There is no firm evi-
dence, however, of organized opposition within
the armed forces.
Hassan has sought to prevent another chal-
lenge from the military in part by balancing it
against the security services. His growing reliance
on Colonel Ahmed Dlimi, his chief intelligence
adviser, may be weighting the scales too far the
other way, however. Although there have been no
signs that Dlimi is becoming disaffected, he may
soon be in a position powerful enough to engineer
or facilitate a coup.
Hassan continues to demonstrate consider-
able skill in political manipulation as well as a
willingness to deal summarily with dissident activ-
ity. The concentration of effective power in the
palace has increased rather than diminished over
the past three years; opposition political parties
are as weak and divided as ever. Moreover, the
throne has some popular support as a symbol of
legitimacy, and the King's narrow escapes from
the two coup attempts are seen by many as proof
of divine favor. Nevertheless, the King remains
vulnerable to a coup generated by his own refusal
to change his method of governing or to eliminate
official corruption.
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EASTERN EUROPE: FORE:IG~I TRADE BOOM
tip d ~'~")
Eastern Europe s f~reign trade boomed in
197, and most of the countries plan even larger
growth this year. While Eastern Europe as a whole
accumulated a record hard??currency deficit with
the West, its trade with tlhe Soviet Union was
again in surplus.
Total trade grew some 17 percent last year-
double the average annual rate for 1960-72-and a
20-percent increase is planned for 1974. With the
exception of Hungary, all the countries ran hard-
currency deficits. Total debt to the developed
West-almost $5 billion at 'the end of 1972-grew
substantially. Poland and Czechoslovakia amassed
record hard-currency deficits of $1 billion and
$300 million, respectively. East European imports
were paced by large purchases of high-priced agri?~
cultural products and raw materials-corn, soy~~
beans, and cattle hides. V1lestern machinery and
equipment also remained in high demand, witrl
purchases by Romania and Poland leading the
way.
Eastern Europe's large surplus with th~~
Soviet Union last year reflected the USSR's con-
tinued heavy purchase of consumer goods. Soviet
deliveries of fuels and other raw materials were on
schedule. Planned deliveries of these commodities
through 1975 should be sufficient to forestall
major energy problems in f=astern Europe.
Poland and Romania, the countries with the
fastest growing trade withl the West, do not plan
to cut back on their purchasing this year. Czecho-
slovakia also is likely 'to buy more Western
machinery. East Germany will probably reduce its
trade with the West, while machinery imports by
Hungary and Bulgaria will rise moderately. This
pattern will probably coni:inue through 1975.
In the next plan period-1976-80-the East
Europeans face serious raw-material supply
1971 1972 1973" 1974`*
*Preliminary; based on 1973 plan fulfillment documents
,,h5 ft~ t ,u **Based on 1974 plans and supplemental information
problems. Soviet deliveries probably will level off
in volume but cost substantially more. East Euro-
pean investments in the exploitation of Soviet
resources will not begin to pay off until late in
the 1970s. The East European countries are
likely; therefore, to have to plan on reduced rates
of economic growth during the 1976-80
period.
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USSR: GROMYKO'S TRAVELS
,,L ~ Less than two weeks after his visit to Cuba
~nd he US, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
was on the road again, trying to keep up the
momentum of detente in Europe even though the
Middl East situation was still very much on his
mind.
~ During his visit to France from February ~/ ~ One reason for Gromyko's trip to Rome
~~-1 Gromyko did not make much headway 'frn~ FPhr~~ar? isz_~~-~..,.,.~.._ .___~_~ ...
. ,_.__._...., ,..w,. ~~~?~ uN~,caicu ni J
Soviet-French relations over the past few months,
but he at least kept them from getting worse.~:~
Paris has been troubled by what it regards as a
Soviet failure to consult adequately during the
Middle East war, while Moscow has serious reser-
vations about the interest the French are showing
in West European defense cooperation. The So-
viets have also been disturbed by France's unwill-
ingness to participate in MBFR, and may feel that
this attitu~,ie is spreading to other West European
countries./
l- I Many of these problems can only be resolved
at the summit, if at all. Some progress may be
made during President Pompidou's trip to the
USSR, which has been under consideration for
some time. During Gromyko's stay in Paris, it was
25X1 25X1
announced that tree trip will take place in early
March, probably next week. Looking further
ahead, the Soviets, who are presumably aware of
Pompidou's declining health, will have to consider
the policy they will take toward France after his
departure from the political scene'
one Italians-was to see the Pope. The Vatican has
recently been displaying a more pragmatic ap-
proach toward church-state relations in commu-
nist countries. With Moscow's approval, the East
European regimes with large Roman Catholic
populations have been responding in kind, The
Soviets probably believe that in an era of detente,
with East-West contacts increasing, it is useful to
neutralize a potential source of internal discord in
Eastern Europe:
While in Rome, Gromyko touched on the
Middle East situation, expressing Moscow's irrita-
tion at being pushed from center stage in the
negotiations. To reassert the Soviet role, the For-
eign Minister embarked on his own tour of Arab
capitals-going to Damascus on February 27 and
~uiiU~~~H!1~4n'~ ~ ~ ~~I~IIIPV 'q~ ~~ ~m
.,,awiwmnn~nll~,~iN11~ .,,~~;n maim unmu~~nnnun?i i ,~(V' ~~ ~np116 ',a1
~~iH~liliH~~~,;.
Gromyko and Jobert
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YUGOSLAVIA: THIRD CONSTITUTION
'~~ ?'Yugoslavia promulgated its third post-war
constitution on February 21 with great pomp and
circumstance but without President Tito, who
'was reportedly ill with a "cold." Many of his
countrymen will see his absence as another sign
that they may soon have to get along without
him
-~ ~~ jThe constitution is important to Tito be-
ca se it attempts to codify his approach to ruling
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Yugoslavia, and thus to ensure that his political
and administrative concepts will continue to dom-
inate national life. It also seeks to guarantee the
survival of Yugoslavia's unique socialist system
after his death. Under preparation for four years,
the long and complicated document sets out in
detail the future goals of workers' self-manage-
ment and strengthens the party as the leading
political force in the country.
(~ff The composition of the collective presi-
~IdncJ, the highest level of state power, has been
altered. It will now contain 9 instead of 23 mem-
bers. President Tito will preside over this body
during his lifetime but, upon his death, the posi-
tion of chief of state will rotate among the mem-
bers on an annual basis"l
j The Yugoslavs now face the demanding task
/of i~plementing the constitution in stages. If Tito
remains physically and mentally active, it would
greatly facilitate the process and provide for a
smoother transition into the post-Tito era]~His
absence from the promulgating ceremony, how-