WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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'rn+'
Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
Secret
15 February 1974
No. 0007/74
Copy M?_ 5 8
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CONTENTS (February IS, 1974)
1
SALT Resumes
2
The Energy Conference
3
EUROPE
The Middle East
5
USSR: US Technology; Mars
6
Eastern Europe -The Vatican:
Accommod ti
8
omania: Middle East Tour
Yugoslavia: Extremism Under Fire
9
Berlin: Back in the News
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
11
Laos: Obstacles to a New Coalition
12
Cambodia: Shell Shocked
13
Philippines: Muslim Backlash
14
Australia: Whitlam Scores
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
15
Israel: A Narrow Coalition
16
Jordan: Husayn Restores Order
17
Iran-Iraq: Unneighborly Neighbors
18
Arab Funds Shift
18
Cyprus: After Grivas
19
North Yemen: Out With the Old
?_0
South Africa: Seeking a New Mandate
7.1
India: Violence and Votes
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
22
American Foreign Ministers To Meet
23
Argentina: Peron and Youth
24
Colombia: Election and Beyond
25
Chile: Out in the Open
SPECIAL
REPORT (Published separately)
Afghanistan: President Daoud's
First Six Months
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SALT Resumes
r,~ ~ QG~~
The US-Soviet negotiations on strategic arms expressed readiness
limitations have entered a crucial phase. With the the systems to be
talks set to resume on February 19, both sides
have made public commitments to reach a perma-
nent agreement on offensive weapons this year. If
even a partial agreement is to be achieved by the
time of President Nixon's planned trip to Moscow
in early summer, the negotiators will be under
considerable pressure to find areas of accom-
modation at this session.
The problem facing the negotiators is both
technical and political. They must find a formula
to deal with existing strategic asymmetries in a
way that preserves the national security interests
of both sides. At the same time, the agreement
must also be so constructed as to enable both to
deal effectively with potential domestic critics.
Thus far, the two sides have taken sharply diver-
gent approaches to achieving their common objec-
tive.
The US wants to renegotiate the terms of
the existing five-year agreement, adding strategic
bombers to the inventory of weapons to be
limited and setting equal numerical limits on the
central strategic systems for both sides. Washing-
ton also wants to place limits on the throw-weight
of ICBMs, constrain qualitative improvements-
e.g., MIRVs-and begin a program of active reduc-
tions in strategic weapons.
The Soviets would like to retain the nu-
merical and throw-weight advantages they have
under the interim agreement, although they have
to include heavy bombers in
limited. They justify their
present advantages by arguing that what was
equitable for the near term is also equitable over
the longer haul, particularly if the US is unwilling
to count its own forward-based nuclear systems
and those of its allies as strategic weapons.
The negotiations have been further com-
plicated by the vigorous pace of the Soviet arms
buildup over the past year. The Soviets have
begun testing new-generation ICBMs with greater
accuracies and demonstrated MIRY capabilities.
They have tested submarine-launched ballistic
missiles to extended ranges and have continued to
add to their submarine force. These and other less
dramatic developments are consonant with the
provisions of the interim agreement, but they
have cast doubt on Soviet intentions at SALT
nevertheless.
Meanwhile, there is growing concern over
the possibility that advances in weapons tech-
nology may overtake efforts to impose political
controls over weapons development. Whether or
not the Soviets share the US concern on this
score, they have continued, at least in public, to
voice optimism about SALT's prospects. Writing
in the latest issue of the journal USA, prominent
Soviet military theoretician G. A. Trofimenko
avowed that mutually satisfactory formulas could
be found that would ensure the security of both
sides, while taking into account existing asym-
metries in the strategic relationship.
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The Energy Conference
~~ The outcome of the Washington energy con-
ference clearly highlighted France's isolated posi-
tion and suggests some shift in the power relation-
ships within the EC~
Many of the proposed objectives of interna-
tional cooperation that the conference endorsed
were in the position paper approved by the EC
Nine prior to the Washington meeting ar~d were
accepted by the French. France reserved its posi-
tions on financial measures, however, and refused
to accept the establishment of a coordinating
group of senior officials to carry out energy pro-
grams within existin bodies a move endorsed by
all other participants
-- Although ostensibly a procedural matter, the
French maintained that these points raised the
broad question of Europe's future relations with
the US. They chose to si:ick to the view that
acceptance of a coordinating group composed of
r,:onference participants amounted to another
European capitulation to tNashington's "doming-~
lion"-a charge to which many Europeans or.
occasion are sympathetic. In this instance, thE~
i=rench were unable to carry the other EC mem-
bers with them, due in part to the Europeans'
lack of confidence in their ability to cope with
the energy crisis without US cooperation.
'~ The conference outcome also made clear
that, with the EC's enlarclement, Paris cannot in
every instance call the tune. The Germans, who
are in a strong position because they hold the
presidency of the EC Council, would not go along
with the French, particularly since Britain and the
other EC members were not prepared to allo~N
Paris to frustrate the goals of the conference
~3 ~Initial press reaction in Europe stressed con-
cern over the effect that the evident disarray of
the EC Nine would have on European unity. A
representative story in the Italian press criticizE~d
t=rench intransigence and noted that, one by one,
the EC countries were aligning themselves with
the Germans. One conservative paper commented
that the European countries were torn between
their desire to preserve European solidarity and
the allure-which was simultaneously athreat-of
tt~e US invitation for cooperation. The prestigious
F rankfurtcr Allgemeerze commented that the
meeting showed that the EC is "deeply ruptured"
end that "France was prepared to allow unifica-
tion of the Nine only on its own terms, the price
of which would be a ermanent conflict between
E=urope and America.'
;,~ ~A spokesman for the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries picked up the French
theme. He accused the US of attempting "to
r~e-establish hegemony over Europe," adding that
this was precisely why France objected to the
US-initiated move:l
)~ ~--~ ~fhe immediate problems the community
now faces are difficult. The EC governments have
postponed two foreign ministers' meetings:
? One, scheduled for February I5, was to
discuss the European-US declaration of princi-
ples; the governments had also planned to an-
nounce after the meeting awide-ranging offer
of cooperation with the Arab states;
? The second, scheduled for February 1$,
The French team
Emphatic views
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The Middle East
Algiers Meeting
3 ~fhe leaders of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia,
and Algeria met in Algiers this week to discuss
~i Syrian-Israeli disengagement and to consider ac-
tion on the oil embargo against the US. The ruler
of Kuwait, who was invited but did not attend,
indicated he would support the conference's de-
cisions. The meeting was apparently promoted
jointly by the Egyptians and the Saudis
Cairo press accounts noted that the con-
'bl t' n of
ra io
h
e posse e sepa
f+3rees would discuss t
Syrian and Israeli forces, as well as "a unified
formula for a plan of Arab activity in the coming
stage." These vague formulations may, in fact,
have covered a determination to persuade Syria's
President Asad to begin disengagement negotia-
tions with Israel. Asad's reluctance to open talks
is not due to his own hesitation, however, but to
opposition within the Syrian Army and Baath
party. The other heads of state apparently hoped
that pressing Asad directly and en masse would
reinforce his own inclinations and strengthen his
hand in dealing with doubters at home
rEach of the participants has urgent reasons
for wanting movement on the Syrian front.
Egypt's President Sadat, to prove that he is not
negotiating a unilateral settlement with Israel, has
publicly pledged that he will not move further
until Syria also has a disengagement agreement.
The longer Syria delays, the greater the danger
that Sadat will be faced with discontent at home
over lack of further progress:
(~~ ~Sadat has also been urging that the oil em-
bargo against the US be lifted, and Saudi Arabia
and Algeria-for political reasons in the first case,
economic in the other-would like to oblige. For
the same reasons that hold Sadat back on further
negotiations, however, neither King Faysal nor
President Boumediene can afford to ease oil re-
strictions until those restrictions have produced
the same benefits for Syria that they appear to
have yielded for Egypt"
3 Disengagement on the Egyptian front, mean-
while, is proceeding smoothly. On February 12,
Israeli forces completed stage three of their four-
stage withdrawal from the west bank of the Suez
Canal. They now retain only the northern third of
their west bank salient and are scheduled to with-
draw from that portion by February 21. Disen-
gagement is to be completed by March 5~
'3 CAlong the Syrian front, by contrast, tension
remained high throughout the week. Beginning on
February 10, Syrian artillery shelled Israeli posi-
tions for three consecutive days. The Israeli press
claims that the three-hour Syrian barrage along
the entire front on February 11 was the heaviest
since the October war and that for the first time
it included Israeli civilian settlements. Two civil-
ians reportedly were killed.)
J rThe February 11 attacks, according to the
US Embassy in Tel Aviv, violated a tacit Syrian-
Israeli understanding that the Israelis would re-
frain from retaliatory air strikes so long as the
Syrians limited their attacks to military targets`7'
Despite this alleged violation, the Israelis are, for
the present, inclined to avoid heavy retaliation
that could upset current diplomatic efforts to
launch Israeli-Syrian negotiations. According to
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, Tel Aviv feels that
the Syrian attacks reflect Damascus' political
frustrations rather than a desire for renewed
hostilities)
3 rlsraeli forces did step up their shelling of
southern Lebanon early this week in retaliation
for two recent cross-border attacks by the feda-
yeen. One Israeli soldier and one civilian were
k i Iled in the attacks. Lebanese Government
spokesmen have been unusually candid in
acknowledging that fedayeen initiatives have
Cv prompted the Israeli shellings, but the Lebanese
Army has only a limited ability to control feda-
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(~co ~cxx ~c ~,S
Moscow's interest in Western, e cially US, ~
technology has flourished over the past five years
or so. In pursuing trade deals, cooperation agree-
ments, and bilateral technological contacts, the
USSR has been more aggressive than at any time
since the 1920s. Soviet leaders recognize that
rapid economic growth can be achieved once
again only by accelerating technological progress.
The USSR has been relatively inefficient in devel-
oping and applying new technology, however,
forcing Moscow to turn increasingly to the West
for assistance.
The revival of Soviet interest in US products
and technology is partly political, but it is also in
line with the traditional policy of acquiring the
most advanced technology available. In some
areas, such as oil field equipment for Arctic ex-
ploration, US firms are the only source in the
eyes of the Soviets. US companies also are the
preferred sources of automotive equipment, com-
puter hardware and software, and civilian aircraft
technology. If contracts cannot be reached with
US companies, however, the Soviets recognize
that other countries often can provide technology
that is as good or almost so. The USSR has, for
example, bought computer hardware and some
kinds of automotive equipment and machine
tools from Western Europe and Japan.
Soviets have included the acquisition of technical
data, contacts with Western firms and scientists,
and formal arrangements for joint research and
exchange of scientific and technical information.
None of these has lived up to Soviet expectations,
however. Western equipment frequently is not as
productive under Soviet conditions, and attempts
to exploit foreign technical data or to copy for-
eign machinery have had mixed success.
Because machinery imports-especially
"turn-key" plants-are expensive, the Soviet lead-
ership is trying to hold down the cost of acquiring
foreign technology in this manner. The most
prominent innovation is a push for cooperative
economic ventures that provide for the export to
the USSR of equipment and technology on long-
term credits, which are repaid by deliveries of the
goods produced by the venture.
As an alternative means of acquiring technol-
ogy, the USSR is also pressing strongly for in-
creased cooperative research with private firms.
More than 20 such agreements have already been
concluded with US firms. Most ho-d out the
promise of tangible technological gains for the
USSR, while Western companies hope to enhance
their sales prospects in the USSR.
The onset of detente has lowered some of
the traditional obstacles to Soviet acquisition of
US technology. The extension of medium- and
long-term credits by the US after May 1972 re-
sulted in a large increase in Soviet imports of US
equipment and technology. Relaxation of US ex-
port controls has also contributed to the rise in
imports, although controls continue to limit ac-
cess to very specialized and sophisticated tech-
nology.
The major means of acquiring technology
from abroad is the outright purchase of machin-
ery and equipment. Other channels used by the
There is little prospect that transferring tech-
nology from the US to the USSR will have a
substantial influence on Soviet economic devel-
opment. Although machinery imports and the
acquisition of technical data from the West will
continue, they are likely to be too small in scale
to have a substantial impact on Soviet economic
and technical development. The sum total of
technology acquired from the industrial west will
be more impressive, but the influence of such
transfers depends above all on how rapidly they
can be assimilated and duplicated. Ultimately, the
USSR must depend on its own applied research
and development sector to close the technological
gap with the West and to boost its own economic
growth. 25X1
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improved relations with Eastern Europe. In each
instance, the Vatican's actions also appear in-
tended to signal amore pragmatic approach to
church-state relations in the communist-governed
countries
2-~ With apparent approval from Moscow, the
East European regimes with large Roman Catholic
populations are responding in kind. The Soviets
probably feel that in an era of detente, with
East-West contacts increasing, it is well to neutral-
ize apotential source of internal discord"?
Y~; The 81-year-old Mindszenty, all but offi-
f h US E
t
d
h
d
t
e m-
epar
ure rom
r_ially retire
since
is
bassy in Budapest in late 1971, has continued to
be a symbol of resistance to the Hungarian Com-
munist regime rAlthough his removal opens the
gary, any real amelioration in the church's plight
v~~ill come slowly~rln conjunction with Mind-
REACH RE=D P~ NET ?~ `kzenty's dismissal, the Vatican was able to fill an
~~ , ; t~,~ 1j archbishopric that has been vacant for two years
wo of four S let 'space probes launched and to appoint a temporary administrator for
surface on February 10 but 1=ailed to orbit Mars as
planned due to a malfunction. Mars 5 went into
orbit around the planet two days later.
last simmer have arrived in the vicinity of Mars. Esztergom, the archbishopric that includes Buda-
According to a Tass announcement, Mars 4 passed pest. A permanent successor to both of Mind-
within about 1,200 nautical miles of the planet's`LSrszent~'s positions will probably not be selected
The other space probes-Mars 6 and 7-are
still en route to the planet. They should arrive in
early March and are expected to release small
instrument packages in an effort to obtain data
and pictures from the planet's surface. The So-
viets landed a capsule from Mars 3 on the planet
in December 1971,
Eastern Europe -The Vatican
GESTURES TOWARD ACCOMMODATION
In the long run, Wyszynski
may not be a le to prevent an accord but, for the
'~ ~ ~T'he enforced retiremeint of Jozsef Cardinal ~~" time being, Casaroli and his official hosts could
Mindszenty as primate of Hungary and Arch ?on-y agree to discuss the specific issue of diplo-
?,_~, bishop of Esztergom, together with the visit of ~ matic relations in Rome at some future date.
Vatican "foreign minister" Casaroli to Poland last They did, however, com liment each other on
,,-week, demonstrate the \/atican's interest in their devotion to detente.
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until the Cardinal dies
_j ~ ~he removal of Mindszenty on February 5
followed by one day Casaroli's arrival in Warsaw.
The coincidence of the two events may have been
intended to remind Poland's primate, the con-
servative Cardinal Wyszynski, that he also may
eventually have to show more flexibility toward
the state in order to permit formal Vatican-Polish
ties
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V L. V I lL t
ROMANIA: MIDDLE EAST TOUR
1~~'~President Ceausescu's current swing through
four Arab capitals marks a high point in his drive
to justify Romania's neutraliist Middle East policy
and to head off Arab plans to boycott Romanian
exports. Ceausescu will also use the tour to nur-
ture the impression at home and abroad that
Romanian diplomacy is facilitating the Arab-
Israeli peace negotiations~rCeausescu's delegation
~~pent February 12-13 in Tripoli, will be in Beirut
until February 17, and wil'! visit Damascus and
Baghdad before returning to Bucharest on Feb-
ruary 21.~
excluded from playing a role in the Middle East.
Bucharest will also find ways to drive home this
message in Moscow and Belgrade, which bitterly
YUGOSLAVIA: EXTREMISM UNDER FIRE
~,~ ~ugoslav party leaders are stepping up prep-
rati ns for republic and federal party congresses
~ this spring to include a drive against extremists.
i nese errorts to achieve ideological "purification"
~fhe Romanian press buildup for the tripe have increasingly shifted away from attacks
n
o
suggests that Ceausescu will offer limited political ~ liberals and nationalists, however, to focus on the
and economic concessions, .but will not bow to threat posed by "neo-Stalinists.'
Arab demands that Romania break diplomatic
relations with Israel. The Syrian and Iraqi visits ~~ The most striking example of this shift oc-
could prove especially trying as the Romanians ~ca~rred during a meeting last week of the Croat
will face Arab leaders who have been particularly 'y~~party central committee, during which veteran
~.~Gociferous advocates of a boycott of Romanian ~ party leader Vladimir Bakaric leveled a blast at
goods. A preliminary recommendation for eco- ~ lwhat he called a "centralist faction." He charged
nomic sanctions against Ronnania already awaits ~ that this faction is vigorously pressing for large-
action by the Arab League. The Romanian Presi-y lscale personnel changes, for a radical restructuring
dent's personal efforts to avert a boycott will of the party along Soviet lines, and for the total
probably feature attractive offers of Romanian ~~7domination of society by the party. He also
oil-extraction equipment and technology as well charged that the group is undermining Yugo-
as selective political support: for Arab goals n sl