WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
16 November 1973
No. 0396/73
Copy N9 61
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issued every Friday inorr ng by
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aerial coordinated with or ora_oared
rate of Science and Techr:aiorv.
hensive treatment and there-
CONTENTS (j Norember 1973)
=;AST ASIA
PACT FlC
t The Middle East
I Brezhnev Weathers the Crisis
d EC Buys rime on Middle East
2 Indochina
China: A National Pastime
-tong Kona: Immigration Strain
r# ilippines: Marcos and Oil
_'SSR-China: Talks Deadlock
'riest Germany: Imnasse in Praoueg
rance: Pompidou's Gains and Losses
oslavra: Party Admits Failures
eland-UK:. Peaceful Waters
'West Eufo can Communists To Meet
Li?nmark: Fail of a Government
Ftiicpia-Somalia: Border Watch
The Yemens: Live and Let Live
India: Better Days for Mrs. G
South Africa: Bantustan Solidarity
r .: Chile: Unkept Promises
27 Ecuador: New Rules on Tuna
;PECIAL
r2 ?PC:RT (Published separately)
Comments and queries on the contents of this
pubilication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summary,)
MIDDLE. EAST
P,--R1vA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
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The Middle East
The cease-fire was looking stronger this week
and hopes for peace were picking up after the
signing by Egypt and Israel on 11 November of a
six-point stabilization accord arranged by Secre-
tary Kissinger. This turned the situation around,
reducing though not eliminating the possibility of
new hostilities and perhaps opening wider the
door to negotiations on basic issues. New hassling
between the adversaries over the interpretation of
the latest accord underscored once again that the
road to a settlement would be tortuous and re-
quire frequent maintenance and repair. Clearly,
the role of repairman would, more often than
not, devolve upon the US.
The number and magnitude of reported vio-
lations of the cease-fire dropped this week, and
the positions of the various forces remained essen-
tially unchanged. There was still a good bit of
artillery and small arms fire along the Suez Canal,
and minor skirmishing on the Syrian front.
Throughout the week the Egyptians flew occa-
sional defensive patrols, and the Israelis mounted
several reconnaissance missions; the latter drew
some fire from Egyptian surface-to-air missiles.
The substitution of UN for Israeli check-
points on the Cairo-Suez road-a prerequisite to
implementation of the prisoner exchange pushed
by Tel Aviv-was delayed for several days as a
result of differences between the UN and Israeli
interpretations of their respective roles. The com-
mander of the UN force, Siilasvuo, maintained
that his mandate required him to replace all
Israeli roadblocks and to exercise primary control
over the flow of supplies to Suez city and the
encircled Egyptian Third Army across the canal.
Israel insisted on its right to exercise "military
control" of the road and to monitor the flow of
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-46 "Ou"Os
Army and to allow daily provisioning of Suez
with food and water. The UN will provide drivers
for the resupply operation, as they did for the
restricted program Israel had permitted earlier.
The Israelis again will have the right to examine
the trucks.
The new agreement appears to clear the way
for implementation of most of the accord of 11
November, but new disputes and delays can be
expected. The checkpoint issue, for one, could
still cause trouble. Tel Aviv interprets the arrange-
ment as providing for continued Israeli control of
the Cairo-Suez road, while a UN spokesman in
Cairo has said Israel should now "leave the task of
controlling the road" to the UN force. The Is-
raelis continued to reinforce their positions along
the road throughout the week.
Moreover, virtually no progress has been
made toward implementing the commitment the
Egyptians and Israelis made on 11 November to
"settle the question of the return to the posi-
tions" of 22 October, in a way that will disengage
and separate the opposing forces. This continues
to be a central aim of Egypt's President Sadat,
although he has so far not pressed this objective,
putting priority instead on opening lines for es-
sential non-military supplies to the Third Army.
supplies. On 12 November the Israelis dismantled
a UN checkpoint at Kilometer 119 near Suez.
On Wednesday, following several meetings
between senior Egyptian and Israeli officers, the
two sides reached a new agreement on imple-
mentation of points three through six of the 11
November accord. Israel agreed to turn over the
key checkpoints at Kilometers 101 and 119 to
the UN force, and Cairo turned over a list of
Israeli war prisoners. An Israeli military spokes-
man subsequently called the list "complete,"
though it had some 100 fewer names than Tel
Aviv had indicated earlier it believed were in
Egyptian hands. The first Red Cross flight, carry-
ing home 26 wounded Israelis, left Cairo on
Thursday morning with a complementary flight
carrying Egyptian prisoners from Israel. The ex-
change is to be completed within eight Gays.
The Israelis also agreed not to impede the
movement of non-military supplies to the Third
Israeli Prime Minister Meir informed the
Knesset on 13 November that Israel is not pre-
pared to withdraw its forces from their present
positions to the "imaginary and fictitious line" of
22 October. Despite this flat refusal to withdraw,
she did note that Israel has no intention of hold-
ing the territory it occupies on the west bank of
the canal. She repeated her earlier proposal for a
mutual pullback of both Egyptian and Israeli
forces to opposite sides of the waterway.
The sensitive question of the Bab al-Mandab
Strait was ignored in the mid-week agreement, as
it was in the text of the 11 November accord.
Israeli spokesmen have, nonetheless, continued to
stress that the cease-fire is not complete without
an end to hostile acts at sea as well as on land.
Transport Minister Peres announced on 12 No-
vember that Israel would test claims that Egypt
had quietly lifted its undeclared blockade by
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No cou ac r'S
Text of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement Signed on 11 November 1973
Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the UN Security
Council.
2, Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the
question of the return to the 22 October positions in the framework of agreement on the
disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the UN.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded
civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.
4a There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East Bank.
5. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road will be replaced by UN checkpoints. At the
Suez end of the road Israeli officers can participate with the UN to supervise the non-military
nature of the cargo at the bank of the canal.
6. As soon as the UN checkpoints are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an
exchange of all prisoners of war, including wounded.
sending ships through the strait "the minute they
are ready."
Troop commitments to the UN force for the
Egyptian front grew to approximately 3,000 dur-
ing the week. By Wednesday about 2,100 of these
troops were in the Middle East. The effectiveness
of the force was still being curtailed by supply
and logistic problems. Proposals for a joint
Canadian-Polish logistic unit came to nothing
when Ottawa and Warsaw failed to agree on a
division of responsibilities. Funds needed for the
force remain the big problem, despite a second
appeal by Secretary General Waldheim.
With the agreement on 14 November, Presi-
dent Sadat appeared to have secured the minimal
requirements needed to preserve his domestic
political position. He must surely be keeping his
fingers crossed, however, especially in the light of
reports that many Egyptians are grumbling about
too many concessions to the Israelis. Sadat will
certainly start raising the pressure for an Israeli
pull-back on the west bank of the canal, though
he does not seem disposed to insist on the precise
lines that existed on 22 October. He knows there
is little chance of getting agreement on the posi-
tions then held by the two armies.
Cairo will insist on
some genuine disengagement, presumably one
that will finally free Suez city and the Third
Army from the clutch of the Israelis.
Syria's President Asad, who has been on the
sidelines since the cease-fire, faces unhappiness
both at home and abroad over his acceptance of
the cease-fire. Leaders of the Sunni Muslim sect
and the left wing of the Syrian Baath Party
oppose Asad, but reportedly have shelved-at
least for a time-any plans to move against the
President.
Jordan's King Husayn, largely out of pique
at being ignored by Arab leaders who have been
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traveling about and conferring with one another,
recently made two whirlwind tours himself. He
called on the leaders of several small Persian Gulf
states, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Most of these
states are said to have urged Husayn to press
Jordan's claim to the West Bank. In an effort to
do that and to undermine fedayeen claims to
represent the West Bank, the King publicly has
placed heavy emphasis on UN Resolution
242-which calls for Israeli withdrawal but ig-
nores the question of a Palestinian state. Husayn
revealed that he was not at present considering
resurrecting his own controversial plan for a
United Arab Kingdom, which would give Palestin-
ians a semi-autonomous area, including the West
Bank. Husayn insisted, nevertheless, chat Israel's
withdrawal from the West Bank was for him the
first order of business.
Libyan President Qadhafi, angered by
Cairo's acceptance of the cease-fire, is actively
campaigning against the six-point accord. Break-
ing his long silence early this week, Qadhafi told
interviewers that Great Power intervention to halt
the Arab-Israeli conflict was to be condemned.
Arab oil revenues will reach a record
$4.3 billion in the first quarter of 1974, even
if production is cut back 5 percent a month.
While output during the first three months of
1974 will be only two thirds of the 1973
level, revenues will be some 70 percent more
than last year.
Price increases during 1973 have in most
cases more than doubled the revenues per
barrel reaching the Arab governments. The
October price increase alone more than com-
pensates for lost production. Arab oil rev-
enues for 1973 are expected to exceed last
year's income by 54 percent. Oil exports will
average 1 million barrels per day more than in
1972, a 7 ercent increase despite the cut-
backs.
Although the Libyan leader stopped short of
publicly denouncing Egypt's handling of the war
and its aftermath, his remarks betrayed a deep-
ening rift with Sadat and an unwillingness to
cooperate in future peace talks.
Fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat is still strug-
gling to unify factious Palestinian organizations
behind a program of participating in a future
peace conference and backing the creation of an
independent Palestinian state. Arafat and some of
his associates are convinced of the desirability of
participation, but have been unable to gain the
support of the leaders of several radical groups.
Arafat reportedly was to have led a high-
ranking delegation that included the heads of all
significant fedayeen organizations to Moscow
early this week, but fedayeen unity failed and the
trip was postponed at the last minute. Moscow is
eager that the fedayeen present a united front and
make the trip, if only to augment Soviet bargain-
ing power in any future negotiations.
Saudi Arabia's King Faysal is also trying to
foster fedayeen unity, primarily out of a desire to
see Palestinians brought under a relatively
STAT
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sow0aa.1g1L
No
moderate leadership. He reportedly has threat-
ened to cut off the critically important financial
support he provides if the fedayeen fail to attend
a peace conference.
Arab foreign ministers are scheduled to meet
in Cairo at the end of next week to prepare for a
summit meeting in Algiers this month. Several
important Arab leaders, including Sadat and
Faysal, have reservations about the usefulness of
such a meeting, but they may now feel that the
tender bud of Arab unity would be seriously
threatened should they push ahead on their
present course without at least appearing to
solicit the advice of other Arab leaders.
OAU foreign ministers will meet early next
week in Addis Ababa to try to cash in on the
action of many black African governments in
breaking relations with Israel. They want assur-
ances that oil supplies to OAU members will not
be disrupted and that the Arabs will mount an
effective oil boycott of the white regimes of
southern Africa.
Mrs. Meir's domestic political foes increased
the intensity of their criticism of her government.
this week, belaboring it both for alleged unpre-
paredness and for the conduct of the war and
what came after. Last weekend leaders of a right-
wing opposition group came out against the six-
point agreement. Among other criticisms, the
group contended the agreement in effect lifted
the siege of Egypt's Third Army.
Particularly damaging criticism came from a
leader of the group, General Sharon, who led the
Israeli breakthrough on the west bank. Sharon has
charged that his superiors failed to reinforce his
troops and enable them to exploit the advantage
they had achieved. Sharon, a popular figure, had
retired from the army earlier this year to enter
politics.
Israeli troops inspect supplies for Egyptian Third Army
These political attacks have included the
argument that the present government has no
mandate to negotiate for Israel since the govern-
ment's term of office formally ended on 28
October. Elections, postponed by the war, are
scheduled for 31 December.
In response, Deputy Prime Minister Allon
conceded that, although Israel wanted to nego-
tiate a settlement of basic issues with the Arabs,
substantive talks could not be held before the
elections. He added, however, that no opportu-
nity should be missed for beginning the talks,
even before a new Israeli government is elected.
Notwithstanding the bitter words and oppo-
sition demands that the government resign at
once, Mrs. Meir is safe enough until the elections.
Her ruling Labor Alignment has a heavy majority
in the Knesset, and there are no signs of sig-
nificant defections from its ranks. The main
opposition force has but 31 of the 120 seats, and
its leaders are clearly hoping to capitalize on the
government's present predicament.
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STAT
and Damascus, that it was important for Wash- 25X6
ington and Moscow to cooperate.
~e cabinet announced last
Sunday that the Prime Minister had proposed a
full investigation into the circumstances surround-
ing the war. Mrs. Meir pledged that an investiga-
tion would be conducted "without fear or favor."
A separate inquiry by the army was also an-
nounced.
Moscow ma' also step up its dealings with
Arab leaders other than Sadat. Syrian President
Asad, discomfited by Sadat's recent action, wants
to visit Moscow soon to seek Soviet assurances
that Damascus will be kept abreast of moves
toward a peace settlement and to request a con-
tinued flow of Soviet military equipment. Mos-
cow is showing renewed interest in the Pales-
tinians. There are even rumors that Moscow will STAT
re-establish diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv.
Meanwhile, the TASS representative in Cairo
has acknowledged to US officials that Moscow,
under Egyptian pressure, sent "a limited number"
of surface-to-surface missiles to Egypt in mid-
October. The Soviet claimed that the missiles are
under exclusive Soviet control and are manned by
Soviet crews. SCUD short-range missiles are
indeed in Egypt, but reports on who controls
them are conflicting.
l-he Soviets have reacted to the latest agree-
ment with coolness, probably reflectirg irritation
that US activity in the Middle Easi: has over-
shadowed the Soviet role. The perfunctory treat-
ment accorded the restoration of US-Egyptian
relations also suggests that Moscow is concerned
that, despite Soviet military aid, Cairc is looking
to Washington for a Middle East settlement.
To counter this, the USSR is almost cer-
tainly searching for a way to recoup. F rst Deputy
Foreign Minister Kuznetsov told US Embassy of-
ficials last week following his return from Cairo
Moscow's military resupply effort to the
Arabs declined again last week. Sea shipments are
running approximately at pre-war rates.
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Nwr
Brezhnev Weathers the Crisis
STAT
The weeks since the outbreak of hostilities
in the Middle East have handed Brezhnev and his
colleagues a series of difficult choices, requiring
them to weigh Soviet equities in the Middle East
against detente with the US. The results of the
balancing act are, of course, not yet in, but the
present reading is that Brezhnev's internal po-
litical standing is sound.
During the summer and early fall, detente,
trade initiatives, and European security talks had
come into conflict with internal security priori-
ties. Official Soviet handling of emigration, dis-
sidence, and freer movement matters was uneven,
and Soviet media treated these issues in such a
way as to suggest differences in the party and
government. Brezhnev himself was notably
defensive about the achievements of his detente
policies in his last speech before the Middle East
war.
Initial Soviet handling of the Middle East
crisis seemed designed to give Moscow maximum
credit in the socialist and developing world. This
approach, in effect, foreclosed sniping by those
Soviets who are skeptical of detente and con-
cerned about its competition with other foreign
policy objectives.
As the tension eases, Brezhnev's grasp of
power seems firmer than ever. He has apparently
been able to preserve the essence of his detente
policies while maintaining other Soviet interests
in the world and answering to political considera-
tions at home. The October Revolution celebra-
tions on 6-7 November were the occasion for
another surge in his personality cult. His unoffi-
cial party deputy, Andrey Kirilenko, paid his boss
effusive tribute in the customary holiday speech,
always a highly coordinated leadership product.
Furthermore, this year's record harvest will work
to his political advantage.
Brezhnev's very pre-eminence underlines his
ultimate responsibility for Soviet policy setbacks.
He had maintained a relatively low profile on
Soviet policy in the Middle East, but his hand was
more apparent this time around. For the Soviets,
the balance sheet in the area is mixed. Once again,
the USSR engaged in a crisis involving direct
political and military risk. Arab gratitude for this
continues to be highly dubious, as do the Soviet
Union's prospects for increasing its influence in
the area. More important for Brezhnev, however,
is the fact that Soviet-US detente has been
strained. In the past, he has derived considerable
political capital from his strong personal iden-
tification with improved Soviet-US relations, and
much will now depend on his ability to come up
with concrete new achievements in de-
tente.
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EC Buys Time on Middle East
he embarrassment-and even shzme-with
which many Western Europeans reacted to the
EC's pro-Arab declaration on the Middle East last
week is being tempered to some extent by argu-
ments that, after all, the stand was intended not
as a moral statement but as a safeguard for essen-
tial economic interests. A feeling prevails that if
the declaration "works"-that is, if it results in a
relaxation of Arab oil restrictions or in an Arab
willingness to overlook unpublicized oil sharing
with the embargoed Dutch-much of the uneasi-
ness over the community's Arab-leaning position
will be assuaged.
Much of the criticism of the Nine's Middle
East stand focused less on substance-which is,
after all, much the same as earlier EC statements
or UN resolutions-but on its timing, which
placed the community at odds with the US. Crit-
ics point to Europe's "schizophrenia" in distanc-
ing itself from the US while depending on Wash-
ington to provide a settlement that would get
Europe off the hook. This contradiction was evi-
dent in French Foreign Minister Joberl's speech
before the National Assembly this week and will
continue to be apparent in the US-European dis-
cussions about Atlantic declarations in the EC
and NATO forums.
The declaration has allowed the Nine to
claim a new-found unity on a crucial foreign
policy issue, however, although there is still great
concern that tensions among and within EC mem-
ber states will eventually destroy this facade.
European oil reserves are apparently sufficient for
immediate needs, but the greater the pinch, the
greater will be community pressures for equaliz-
ing available supplies. On the other hand, domes-
tic pressures will rise in the relatively well off
states-France and Britain, for examplE-to pre-
serve their favored position vis-a-vis the Arab sup-
pliers.
These problems have been shunted aside for
the moment by the EC's wait-and-see attitude,
representing, in effect, EC agreement to let Paris
and London use their "influence" with the Arabs.
One consequence of this attitude is general con-
fusion in Brussels as to what, if anything, the
community and its institutions should do about
the energy crisis. The Europeans hope that the
political declaration will ward off an increase in
Arab demands, but they also fear that too much
overt activity on the oil front might provoke the
Arabs to further cutbacks.
Although the Arabs have generally been
pleased with the EC declaration, they seem, on
balance, still to be enjoying the apparent "reverse
colonialism" they are applying to Europe. Thus
far, they have shown little concern over mild EC
hints that economic and trading arrangements
under consideration with the Mediteranean states
might suffer if the "oil weapon" continues to be
used.
The energy situation has meanwhile con-
tributed urgency to a search for compromises in
other EC areas. Pompidou's call for summit meet-
ings was one such attempt to take advantage of
the Middle East conflict in order to assure a
showing of unity. The French are also pushing for
EC action against inflation, in large part in order
to provide cover for unpopular domestic meas-
ures. Moreover, Paris has suggested some apparent
concessions in order to move to the so-called
second stage of economic and monetary union
next year. Germany, meanwhile, has said it is
prepared to proceed with establishment of a re-
gional fund-although only at a token level-
which is a major interest of the UK, Ireland, and
Italy. None of these measures is likely to have a
significant economic impact, however, and any
momentum in these areas could end abruptly if
community solidarity on energy proves unat-
tainable.
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'7 VFhe Communists, having strengthened their
logistic network, appear ready to start their
1973-74 dry season supply effort through Laos?
rThe Communists have already built a large
supply network in South Vietnam and adjacent
areas. They have large stockpiles of military
equipment and munitions on hand. Some short-
ages of foodstuffs, especially rice, exist in parts of
South Vietnam, and the Communists will be using
the next few eeks to alleviate shortages and
build up stocks.
Saigon and the Initiative
Apparently with Thieu's bless-
in huan has now ordered infantry and air units
to take more aggressive action against the Com-
munists?
formed his subordinates on 9 November that he
had ordered:
? refitting and strengthening of all govern-
ment main and territorial forces in the region;
? surprise ground attacks against Commu-
nist positions;
? maximum use of air and artillery strikes,
especially against Communist rear-service
areas;
? an increase in the number of fighter air-
craft on strip alert and observation aircraft
over enemy-held areas 17
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f J removal of all restrictions on bombing
an shelling Communist-held areas;
? construction of tank barricades in high-
threat areas;
? a general improvement of armored
tactics?
OlThere are no reliable indications that the
Communists are readying a major attack against
Saigon. Fighting has increased in the region dur-
ing the past few weeks, partly as a result of
Communist efforts to gain better access to the
rice harvest. This kind of action is likely to con-
tinue and may occasionally become fz irly exten-
sive. If Thuan moves as forcefully as he has
intimated, he probably will touch off an equally
forceful Communist response.'
temporary and that they will soon be retaken.
The commanders rationalize the losses by saying
that none of the government's better units was
involved in the fighting, and that since the losses
came in a remote area away from major popula-
tion centers, they are essentially meaningless
anyhow]
Le Duan In Laos
IG (Le Duan was in Laos from 2-6 November,
probably to put Hanoi's stamp of approval onthe
Lao peace accord. The visit, the first ever by such
a North Vietnamese luminary to Communist-con-
trolled territory in Laos, evoked mutually com-
plimentar speeches with no evidence of any dis-
agreement(
15' [The Pathet Lao delegation chief in Vien-
tiane, Phoun Sipraseuth, commented to US offi-
cials that Hanoi had not expressed any opposition
to the Lao settlement and that the Pathet Lao
round fighting in the Quang Dui: area, now remained committed to he early formation of
mod rate, will probably increase over the next ~ 4/the coalition government The joint communique
few days as both sides reinforce their combat issued after the visit was especially flowery, de-
units. The South Vietnamese are conducting Y scribing the Lao Communists and North Vietnam-
heavy air and artillery strikes in an effort to keep, V ese as having a "model relationship rarely seen so
Communist units off balance. They are also bring- far"-perhaps a veiled reference to Hanoi's appar-
ing in armored units, apparently for a major ef- ent troubles with the Khmer Communists. The
fort to reopen Route 14 and retake the three favorable references to the Vietnam and Lao
outposts lost last week. For their pars, the Com- peace agreements may have been Hanoi's way of
munists appear to be moving in another regiment, saying "try it, you'll like it" to the Khmer?
and there is some concern that they may be
preparing to attack remote towns both in the
province and in Phuoc Long?
Ii possibly the most significant feature of the
earlier attacks in Quang Duc is the Communists'
improvecuse of armored units to support their
infantry The relative ease with which they cap-
13 tured the positions is in marked contrast with
their poor performance during the Easter offen-
sive last year. In addition, the attacks served
notice on Saigon that the Communists will not sit
idly by while government artillery an ground
probes are launched from these outposts
(i, rsome South Vietnamese commanders are
claiming that the loss of the outposts is only
CAMBODIA: A "GOVERNMENT" GOES SOUTH
(7 rsihanouk's fragile relations with the Khmer
Communists have taken another turn. On 9 No-
vember, the Prince announced that-with the
exception of the Foreign Ministry-all portfolios
of his Peking-based "Royal Government of Na-
tional Union" will be transferred to insurgents
within Cambodia. Until the ailing "prime minis-
ter" Penn Nouth is able to go to Cambodia,
Sihanouk's "defense minister," Khieu Samphan,
will serve as "acting prime minister." All that
apparently will remain of Sihanouk's Peking op-
eration will be a small "mission," which will re-
ceive foreign dignitaries and diplomats.?
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12 (Sihanouk first surfaced this idea last month,
stating that it would help remove the exile stigma
from his "government." At the time, he indicated
that the initiative had come from him, not from
the Khmer Communists, and that it had been
accompanied by his offer to step aside in favor of
a Khmer Communist leader. Sihanouk apparently
has bluffed out the Communists; at least, he is
remaining as "chief of state." But whether
Sihanouk has gained ground with the Khmer
Communists on the question of negotiations is far
from certain?
)f rOn the same day that Sihanouk made his
a nouncement, leng Sary, the Khmer Commu-
nists' watchdog over Sihanouk in Peking for the
past two years, left the Chinese capital for Cam-
bodia via Hanoi. Although Sihanouk and Sary
managed to maintain overtly correct relations,
there was considerable ill will between the two
men. Sihanouk's failure to attend any of the
farewell functions for Sary in Peking was another
sign of the tension between the Prince and the
Khmer Communist
17 rThe political distance between Sihanouk and
the Communists was increased three days later
when the Prince canceled a planned visit to the
"liberated zone" of Cambodia in 1974 as well as
several scheduled foreign trips. In making his an-
nouncement, Sihanouk reportedly emphasized
that since he was "a head of state who does not
govern," he was not needed within Cambodia.
Earlier this year, Sihanouk had mentioned plans
for a return to Cambodia, but there had been no
mention of such a trip recently. For the time
being, he evidently will stay in Canton with his
mother, Queen Kossamak
Jn Cambodia, meanwhile, Communist forces
have again cut Route 4 several miles west of
Chhnang
0 Sandan. q,'
hold
road
Pram
PHNOM PENIS
"F re _' 4n O t
Kompong s r"
Kompong Speu. Reports of impending attacks
closer to the capital have kept the high command
from committing reinforcements to help reopen
the highway. In the northwest, Communist units
are keeping pressure on government positions at
either end of the insurgent-held section of Route
5 between Sala Lek Pram and 0 Sandal. Else-
where, well-entrenched Communists are Bolding
off elements of the army's 7th Division in an area
ten miles northwest of Phnom Penhj
)_` rThe government is not completely on the
defensive. Army units at Kompong Cham con-
tinue to expand the defensive perimeter around
the city's airfield, which has been closed since
early September. In the Phnom Penh region, the
army's 1st Division registered slight gains in its
effort to regain ground along the capital's south-
ern front. To the east, over 1,300 government
troops launched a fresh drive to relieve Vihear
Suor, an isolated market town.
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',..."'^ 5 I= UK t I
CHINA: A NATIONAL PASTIME
Z,q tPolitics seems to intervene every time
Chinese leaders work up to a National People's
Congress, China's rubber-stamp parliament. In
1970, a drive against ultraleftists forced postpone-
ment, and in 1971 it was shelved because of the
fall of Lin Piao. Although the Chinese were ap-
parently going to try again, a meeting this year is
threatened by what looks like the riost serious
domestic conflict since the Lin Piao affair.1
Z4 rSquabbling party leaders called ~i temporary
truce last summer to enable a party ccngress to be
held, but the contention has now returned with
even greater intensity. At the center of the con-
troversy is a serious debate over where China is
going and how it should get there, questions that
take on reater urgency as the leadership contem-
Chou En-lai and Chiang Ching
9
plates the succession problem. Signs of personal leadership. Chou En-lai seems to have his nemesis,
animosity among China's leaders, especially be- Madame Mao, on the defensive, and she could
tween urbane Premier Chou En-lai and Mao's radi-ZLwell be the targe She has not been idle, however,
cal wife, Chiang Ching, are multiplyinj7 and a play produced under her tutelage portrays
one leading figure who appears to be Chou in
unflattering terms while painting an impressive
2. [A successful challenge last summer to the Zspicture of the first ladyi.(Chinese officials are not
use of university entrance examinations set the betting on the oLtcome of these typically indirect
stage for the latest policy debates. Secondary
school students in Shanghai, a cen':er of leftist
sentiment, demanded the right to copy from each
other during tests. Some called this "cheating,"
T
assaults. They would only say to a Western corre-
spondent that a "serious debate" was in progress,
but that it was too early to predict the result7
but the debate has reportedly spread to one o
China's most prestigious universities, Tsinghua, 27 People's Daily has contributed its bit. It re-
where teachers and students are still split on the opened old wounds by suggesting that some who
issue7rOther signs of conflict have shown up in repeat the official charges against Lin Piao do so
factories, where workers have been urged to criti- merely to slander others and are in fact no better
than those they condemlll)Moreover, the long-
htist conservatism"; at
bosses for "ri
i
th
i
ii~ 0
g
r
e
c
ze
the same time the party has been demanding 7 standing controversy-whether to fill the post
strict obedience from the trade unionsJympto-
'Zg matic of the conflict mentality that grips the
nation was this warning from Tsinghai Province,
noted for its leftist propaganda. "No:hing is more
dangerous now than to act as moderates ratheF
than as revolutionaries.'?
4.S fA campaign to criticize the sage Confucius is
being pushed throughout the country. Confucius
has been attacked for a number of crimes that
have relevance now, and it seems clear that the
campaign is directed at someone it the current
head of state or abolish it-has intensified.
journal, Red lag, called on party members to
speak out against those who hold grudges, per-
haps a reference to the uncompromising Chiang
Ching. While some of this is murky indeed, ten-
sion has heightened in China and sniping at poli-
na-
cies and party leaders has become almost a
tional pastime.
25X1
25X1
25X1
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HONG KONG: IM IGRATIO~V STRAIN
, *34.
hina apparen y has acceded, at least tem- gration post at Lowu 100 yards up to the Chinese
pora ily, to a British request to limit the number border, where it was located prior to 1967, and
of Chinese entering Hong Kong. Colonial officials where immigrants could be examined before the
had become alarmed about the largest influx of entered the colon
legal immigrants into the colony in many years.
The strain on economic and social resources 25X1
prompted the colonial government to risk a set-to
with Peking in order to stem the tide. 25X1
During the first week in November, 3,000
Chinese immigrants entered, bringing the total for
1973 to well over 46,000. If the trend had con- THE PHILIPPINES: MARCOS AND OIL
tinued, 60,000 would have entered the colony
legally this year, compared with approximately 3 3rManila rumor mills were busy last week
20,000 in 1972 and only 2,000 in 1971. The cranking out stories that President Marcos plans
figures exclude the 15,000 or so illegal entrants- to convene the Interim National Assembly. Simi-
"freedom swimmers"-who come ashore each d' lar reports have circulated in the past, and some
year. Between 11 and 14 November, however,3s Manila cynics suspect the latest batch is no more
daily immigration dropped from over 600 to than a palace effort to divert attention from seri-
under 100. ous domestic problems-particularly an impend-
The increase resulted from a liberalization of
Peking's policy on exit permits. Most of the new
permits had gone to Overseas Chinese who came
back to China but were disillusioned with life
there, or to wives and dependents of Chinese
living abroad. Theoretically, those receiving per-
mits were expected to be in Hong Kong only a
short time before moving on. In fact, the majority
remained. Most of the new immigrants lacked
economic or professional skills. Peking has en-
gaged in such economic sifting operations before.
In 1956 some 56,000 Chinese entered Hong
Kong; in 1962 about 60,000 more squeezed in,
causing grave problems.
Hong Kong authorities asked the Chinese
Government to reduce the number of immigrants
entering the colony without the documentation
necessary for onward travel and publicized the
problem to bring pressure on Peking, and perhaps
on a reluctant London. The Hong Kong authori-
ties also reportedly considered moving their immi-
ing oil crisis. Marcos may well back down again,
but he is concerned about the constitutional basis
of his rule
a5 The 1973 constitution, which provides for
an interim National Assembly, has never been
fully implemented, although Marcos insists that it
has been in force since its ratification in a na-
tional referendum last January. Even though close
fidelity to constitutional niceties is not the basis
of his political power, Marcos is a cautious poli-
tician who leaves little to chancorAccording to
3 the latest stories, Marcos is thinking of calling the
assembly into session just long enough to name
him prime minister and not long enough for his
opponents to use it as a platform. This would
bridge the "constitutional gap" that will begin on
30 December when his present term as president
expires. Marcos reportedly may also ask the as-
sembly to name a deputy prime minister or to
establish a legal procedure for picking his suc-
cessor in case of his death
7
3 tf [Marcos' desire to head off potential domes-
tic opposition is probably spurred by the prospect
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SECRET
of a serious oil shortage. Manila is de-
pendent for its oil imports on major
American companies, which have suf-
fered severe cutbacks as the result of
the Middle East war. Marcos has kept
retail prices artificially low to prevert
urban discontent, and the oil com-
panies, already losing money, will be
loath to share what little they get with
Manila?
)c -Marcos has been carefully prepar-
ing the public for the worst by publi-
cizing the world-wide petroleum crisis
and emphasizing his own efforts to
make direct deals with Arab producers.
Even if the oil shortage does not
cripple Manila's economy, it may delay
industrial expansion designed to cope
growing problem of urban unemploym
cos has few friends among the lower- an
class urban dwellers who will suffer mi
though he is not directly at fault for the
blamed
with the
;nt. Mar-
ist. Even
oil crisis,
of the
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USSR-CHINA: BORPEP TALKS DEADLOCK
q 2.)
After more than thre ars at the head of
Moscow's team at the Sino-Soviet border talks in
Peking, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev has taken
up regular duties in the Foreign Ministry in Mos-
cow. No date has been set for his return to China;
indeed, he may not return at all.
Ilichev has not been in Peking since 18 July,
the longest absence by any Soviet chief negotiator
since the talks began more than four years ago.
The publicity given in Moscow for his meetings
with the Ethiopian Emperor, the North Vietnam-
ese Prime Minister, and the ambassador of
Burundi suggests that Moscow is signaling a
change in its representation at the border talks.
On 6 November, Deputy Foreign Minister
Firyubin said there is no need for a high-level
diplomat to lead the talks for the Soviets. A week
later, however, another official said that Ilichev is
still head of the Soviet delegation, but the timing
of his return to Peking is indefinite. If Moscow
does downgrade its representation at the border
talks, the Chinese, who have been sensitive on this
score in the past, are likely to react negatively.
The present impasse apparently sprang up
when Moscow failed to receive a response to a
proposal calling on both sides "not to threaten...
an attack." llichev left Peking a month after the
Soviets made the proposal, which Soviet party
chief Brezhnev later revealed in a speech on 24 t-j PLast minute objections by Czechoslovakia
September. Brezhnev claimed that the Chinese have clouded prospects for early signature of the
leaders "did not even take the trouble of answer- so-called "reconciliation" treaty between Bonn
ing this absolutely concrete proposal" and instead 1j(rand Prague and for the establishment of diplo-
chose to make propaganda about a mythical "So- matic relations. Both moves appeared just around
viet threat." the corner late last week after the Czechs agreed
4 f in principle to a West German compromise for
The proposal was one of a series Moscow has handling legal affairs of West Berlin institutions.
made over the past two years. By publicizing it, After further consideration, however, the Czechs
Brezhnev was certainly trying to strike a concilia- told the West Germans on 11 November that the
tory Soviet posture. More important, he was able
to contrast his successful efforts to conclude a
clutch of treaties with the US-particularly the
treaty to prevent nuclear war-with the total
blank on the Chinese side of the ledger.
As long as llichev is absent or not replaced
there is little chance for progress. A former Soviet
SECRET
negotiator at the border talks remarked recently,
"there is no progress at all.... The Chinese don't
want it resolved; they need an enemy." He said
that the Chinese continue to insist that Soviet
troops must be withdrawn from the border area
prior to any genuine discussion of the problem.
For their part, Chinese officials have admitted
privately that various Soviet proposals regarding
non-aggression and non-use of force must be a
part of an over-all border settlement, but they
appear to be in no hurry to accommodate Mos-
cow on a settlement.
king.
Although the prospects for the border talks
appear as bleak as ever, neither side wishes to see
them broken off. The factors that led the two
sides to enter negotiations in 1969 are still opera-
tive in 1973. At the least, the talks provide one of
the few remaining channels of regular private
communication between Moscow and Pe-
plan was unacceptable?
*45' rThe legal compromise called for direct court-
to-court dealings on West German as well as West
Berlin matters. This was a marked retreat from
Bonn's insistence this summer that its embassies
in East Europe act as intermediaries. Foreign
Minister Scheel officially floated the scheme in
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Moscow before it was presented to Prague; the
Soviet response, while equivocal, had left Bonn
optimistic
~J f -he Czechoslovaks explained their about-
ace on the grounds that Bonn had dev ated from
the Moscow formula by requiring Prague, through
an exchange of letters, to give more than tacit
assent. Prague suggested postponing the issue
until diplomatic ties were established. Bonn re-
jected this suggestion for fear of losing le rage
on securing equal treatment for West Berlin(
q3 he Czechoslovaks want, as apparently do
the Soviets, a solution to the West Berlin legal aid
question to be as informal as possible and to
5differentiate between West Berlin and West Ger-
many in legal matters. Beyond these considera-
tions, the East Germans probably have urged Mos-
cow and Prague to move slowly so as not to
prejudice the outcome of East Germany's
incipien talks with Bonn on inter-German legal
relations
45' 1The next move is up to Bonn. The Brandt
coalition would like to establish normal relations
with Czechoslovakia quickly and push on to es-
tablish relations with Bulgaria and Hungary.
,f'There are conflicting signs of how vital Bonn
r considers equal treatment for West Germany and
41{West Berlin in legal matters. In any case, Bonn has
the option of seeking a new compromise, or wait-
ing until Brandt visits Moscow early next year to
qtake up the cudgels where it counts most.
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FRANCE: POMPIDOU'S GAINS AND LOSSES
Irresident Pompidou s ad some success of
late in reversing two unfavorable domestic devel-
opments, but he is still harassed by economic
problems and is coming under increasing fire from
members of his own coalition. His vigorous per-
formance at a press conference not too long ago
helped put rumors about his ill health to rest, if
only for a time. And he has been able to exploit
the Middle East crisis by raising questions about
the US-Soviet relationship, which has been
making the French uncomfortably aware of their
ineffectiveness in world affairs.
In a speech on 12 November, Foreign Minis-
ter Jobert repeated Pompidou's earlier criticisms
of the handling of the Middle East crisis by the
US and USSR. By strongly reiterating French
dissatisfaction, the government probably hopes to
distract domestic critics of France's role. The
ploy was at least a partial success. One of its
severest critics, center opposition leader Jean
Lecanuet, quickly praised Pompidou's European
initiative.
French politicians have a great interest in
foreign policy, but-like the average citizen-they
react more strongly to government actions affect-
ing the economy. Pompidou's call on 31 October
for EC economic and financial discussions came
when a sharp rise in the cost of living-and the
likelihood of even steeper increases in the follow-
ing months-has deepened the already acute con-
cern over inflation, now running at 10 percent
annually. French labor and business suspect the
government may hope to exploit the EC meetings
to justify new economic controls at home.
Last week, labor leaders made clear to the
government that an attempt to institute wage
controls would be met with united opposition
and a general strike. Price controls imposed early
this month have provoked a strike that has
emptied many stores of fresh fruit and vegetables
and shut down many service industries.
Members of the governing coalition-in-
cluding Gaullist leaders-have also expressed dis-
satisfaction with Pompidou's leadership. He has
never been accepted as a true Gaullist by some
members of the party,
25X1
For the first time, lead-
ing Gaullists publicly o posed Pompidou when
they failed to support his proposed constitutional
reform to reduce the presidential term from seven
to five years. Many Gaullists are highly sensitive
to Pompidou's hints that he regards Economic
and Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing as a pos-
economy.
sible successor. They have publicly indicated their
opposition to Giscard's becoming president and
are very critical of his present management of the
Pompidou
YUGOSLAV PARTY ADMITS FAILURES
S`' [Yugoslav Communists are now admitting
rthat their year-long efforts to reinvigorate the
party have met with only limited success. Last
week, Executive Bureau member Kiro Gligorov
listed the party's shortcomings for the presidium.
53 He complained that'
3-t {large segments of the rank and file are
not active either in the party or in the social
organizations to which they belong;
? the party had failed to attract workers
or youth;
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JCIrriC
? two thirds of the party organi:!ations
had failed to recruit any new members at all
in the last year;
? the purge of liberals had re Ited in a
dangerous upsurge of "dogmatists.",
51 The presidium responded by restating the
demands made in Tito's famous letter of a year
ago. The fervent campaign that resulted --rom the
,.3 letter came close to exhausting the party, how-
ever, an it is doubtful that similar fervcr can be
rekindled
rThe presidium appointed Tito's right-hand
52-
man, Stane Dolanc, to head a commission that
Ir will prepare for a party congress next May. This
517 will further strengthen Dolanc's position as the
leading contender for Tito's party post. Dolanc
now will have direct control over the election of
delegates to the congress. The new job will also
give him added leverage in shaping intra-party
policy, but this may be hard to implement given
the party bureaucrac)s current preoccupa-
ICELAND-UK: PEACEFUL WATERS
Icelandic team negotiating the future of the US-
manned NATO base. The Communist leadership,
realizing that the Progressives would reject that
idea and wanting to remain in the government at
all costs, forced the recalcitrant minister to back
down,
f f Ticeland's settlement with Britain probably
will lead to a similar agreement with West Ger-
many. The last meeting in Bonn was marred by
the refusal of the Communist fisheries minister to
discuss the use of factory ships, which make up
the bulk of the German fishing fleet. The possi-
bility that resolving the fishing disputes will lead
Bonn and London to drop their reservations
about Iceland's draft free-trade agreement with
the EC could make Reykjavik more amenable to
compromise on the types of German vessels`.
!Another by-product of the settlement may
be a slackening in anti-NATO sentiment, which
was largely generated by the fishing troubles with
Iceland's two alliance partners. This is likely to
create a favorable atmosphere for US-Icelandic
base negotiations, despite renewed efforts by the
Communists to stir things up. At the present
55 time, it appears that the government feels con-
'
SIf r he Icelandic parliament ratified the fishing
agreement with the UK on 13 November, and the
two-year accord became effective immediately.
The agreement reduces the UK's annual fish
catch, but gives Iceland only limited jurisdiction
over British vessels inside the 50-mile fishing
limit. Violations will still occur, as they cid after
.the first Cod War settlement in 1961, but there is
5 now a mechanism to settle these quietly and
without the use of forcl
' TThe Communists, one of the three coalition
parties, finally agreed to support the draft agree-
ment after four weeks of foot-dragging. It took a
determined effort on the part of Prime Minister
Johannesson, who threatened to bring down the
government and call new elections if the Commu-
nists did not approve the agreement. Even then,
one of the two Communist ministers balked and
insisted that his party be represented on the
Icelandic fishing boats
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JtL. Nt I 'WIW
WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS TO MEET
S? Cone obstacle facing West European commu- British Communists have lined up solidly behind
nists as they plan for a series of party conferences the Italians') he French Communist position is
1k is the reluctance of some to follow the Italian complex. The French are not totally opposed to
SJ lead toward greater autonomy' closer working relations among West European
communists and have recently shown more will-
, ingness to back a coordinated strategy toward
support a united stand on labor affairs and the
59
Italian Communist leader
Enrico Berlinguer
discussion into a review of Soviet policy toward
dissidents in an effort to make clear the differ-
ences between West European communists and
Moscow.l
$'Q fhe Italian and French parties have agreed
to help organize an all-European conference next
spring, but they are at odds over the purpose and
agenda of the meeting. The Italians want the
conference to tackle such questions as relations
between the East and West European parties and
measures to increase their effectiveness. The
French do not want to antagonize the Soviets and
are trying to limit the agenda to non-controversial
matters'
671? (Both parties reportedly have agreed to a
Soviet proposal to follow the all-European meet-
ing with an international Communist conference,
presumably in late 1974. The Italians have mis-
givings about such a conference, suspecting that
Moscow means to exploit the conference for anti-
China purposes. The Soviets reportedly have
assured the Italians that the world meeting will
not center on the Chinese issue but will deal with
the opportunities created by detente. Not re-
assured, the Italians are trying to organize opposi-
tion to any anti-Chinese moves or to Moscow's
using the meeting to confirm its right to dominate
the other fraternal parties.
SECRET
g
g
s
ow
s pre-em
nence
n
e
The Italian Communists, the main organizers international movemen'f)fFor example, they are
of T e West European meeting, claim to be in- ~~dragging their heels on the question of intellectual
volved in planning for the other two conferences. freedom in Western Europe. At the West Euro-
Although they do not call for a complete breaks] pean conference, the Italians want to turn this
development of a mechanism for exerting pres-
sure on the EC. The French party, however, re-
mains reluctant to stand up on issues that Mos-
cow finds more sensitive?
-1
'The French would oppose any action that
mi
ht challen
e Mo
c
'
i
i
th
with the Soviets, the Italians are asking the partic-
ipants to take positions on European issues in-
dependent of Moscow. They hope that such ac-
tion will change the public image of these parties.
In particular, they hope to enhance their own
acceptability in Italy without alienating followers
who insist on maintaining ties to Moscow?
c g The West German and Austrian communist
parti s, which are heavily dependent on the So-
viets, are resisting the Italian arguments. The
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ShUM I
Denmark
FALL OF A GO ERN MEN
(V 4
[The collapse o Socia Demo-
cratic government last week will lead
to further fragmentation of Danish po-
litical life. An election has been set for
4 December, but it is unlikely to pro-
duce a clear-cut winner. The newly
formed anti-tax party and the con-
servative splinter faction of the Social
Democratic Party are likely to profit
most.
The Social Democrats, with the
cooperation of the extreme left Social-
ist People's Party, had managed to stay
in power for two years with only a
one-vote majority in parliament. Other
parties hesitated to force new elections
during the period because of the popu-
larity of the anti-tax party, which still
gets five to ten percent of the votes in
recent polls.
The fall of Prime Minister Jorgen-
sen's government was precipitated
when Social Democratic parliamentar-
ian Erhard Jakobsen resigned from the
party on 6 November, ending the
Prime Minister's one-vote margin.
Jakobsen, long dissatisfied with the
leftist orientation of the party, has formed a new
political organization-the Democratic Center
Party--to reflect the views of conservative, mid-
dle-class Social Democrats. He has persuaded a
number of prominent party members to join him
in the new party, which expects to run a full slate
of candidates in the coming election.
Domestic questions will dominate the cam-
paign, especially taxes, inflation, and Socialist
proposals for greater government control of busi-
ness. Foreign policy, including NATO -Jes, is not
expected to be an issue. Although Denmark's
expanded role in European integration may be
debated, present policy toward the EC probably
will not change as a result of the electicn. Despite
Jorgensen's caretaker status, a government
spokesman has claimed that Denmark intends to
honor its EC obligations and play host to an EC
Prime Minister Jorgensen (leaning on table)
confers with government members
foreign ministers' meeting on 20 November and
an EC summit meeting on 14-15 December.
Recent polls indicate that the Social Demo-
crats may lose as many as 20 of their 70 seats,
with the new Democratic Center Party-assuming
it qualifies-gaining most of these. Although the
Social Democrats probably will remain the largest
party, they seem likely to fall short of a majority
in the next parliament, even with the cooperation
of the Socialist People's Party. The Danish parties
of the center-right will probably be unable to
realize a majority because of votes lost to Mogens
Glistrup's anti-tax party.
At this time, a minority government appears
the most likely possibility. It could be either a
socialist or a non-socialist minority; neither holds
much promise of providing a stable govern
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%JLL n11 I %Wfl
ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: BORDER WATCH
Both Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio are
shoring up military positions along their con-
tested border. No major clashes have occurred in
recent months, but the two antagonists clearly
continue to fear each other's intentions.
Somalia, which claims Ethiopia's Ogaden
area, has recently augmented the military forces it
sent to border areas earlier this year, and Ethiopia
is preparing to do the same?
(h fAt least the Somalis, and very likely both
srdes, are probably guilty of violating a 1964
agreement that permits police units 'to patrol
close to the border but requires army units to
remain six or more miles back. Both countries
have stepped up on-the-scene training and have
periodically placed units on alert. Ethiopia has
begun to construct bunkers near the border to
stockpile ammunition and is improving resupply
efforts to scattered units in the Ogaden. Somalia
has established several forward fuel depots
cG (None of these moves appear to have changed
the basic military relationship between the two
sides. Somalia may have some military advan-
tages-for example, in armor-but Ethiopia as of
now seems to retain the over-all edge.
f0 Minor border incidents continue, and some
o fi ials on both sides are spoiling for a fight.
Both Emperor Haile Selassie and Somali President
Siad appear anxious to avoid open warfare?
GC TSiad, however, may be preparing to take
some action on his country's territorial claims in
both Ethiopia and parts of northeast Kenya by
renewing insurgent activity such as Mogadiscio
sponsored in the early 1960s. For some time,
about 1,000 ethnic Somalis from Ethiopia and
Kenya have been receiving guerrilla training in
Somalia; some guerrill re ortedl have been
trained in North Korea
So far, Siad has re-
frained from using the guerrillas, largely because
of his concern that Ethiopia could retaliate by
exploiting chronic unrest in northern Somalia'?
/ Meanwhile, both Ethiopia and Somalia are
Inuing to press their respective cases diplo-
matically. During his visit to Moscow late last
month, Haile Selassie expressed his doubt over
Somali intentions and his concern over continued
Soviet military deliveries to Somalia. In the weeks
ahead, the Ethiopians may focus their efforts on
Arab states, urging them to make good on re-
ported promises that Arab support for Somalia-
as well as for the rebels in Eritrea-would di-
minish once Ethiopia broke relations with Israel.
Addis Ababa took that step last month
/,f Somalia, for its part, has already dispatched
s e ial missions apparently to seek reaffirmations
of Arab support. Should Mogadiscio conclude
that it can no longer count on that backina it
rnignt De more inclined to use the guerrillas.
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THE YEMENS: LIVE AND LET LIVE
he presidents of the two Yemens met in
N rt Yemen late last week for talks following up
discussions they had, at the prompting of other
Arab leaders, at the non-aligned conference in
70 Algiers. The September meeting was their first
since they signed an agreement in November 1972
looking toward a union of their two countries. It
has been abundantly clear that neither president
really wants that agreement implement':d
`q (Their latest talks may have been prompted
in part by minor border clashes between elements
of their respective armies over the past few weeks.
Both leaders seem anxious to avoid more of the
serious I hting that occurred before their accord
last year
70 (According to the US Embassy inSana, Presi-
dent Iryani went into the talks looking for an
71 agreement that neither side would sanction terror-
ist operations against the other. In an effort to
prevent provocative incidents, he refused last
month to allow anti-Adeni guerrillas based in his
country to establish camps along the border.
1? Aden-sponsored saboteurs and terrorists were
active in the north earlier this year, but there have
been few subversive incidents since the two
Yemeni leaders met in Algiers.7
72.. The communique following last week's
me ing contained the usual cliches about unity,
but nothing to suggest any real progress in im-
proving relations. Indeed, the atmospherics sur-
rounding the talks were not conducive to calming
tensions. President Ali brought with him from
Aden a full battalion of troops. Moreover, plans
for Ali to visit Sana after the talks in Taiz were
P, a
rThe talks in Taiz took place against a back-
arbp of political change in Aden. Some of Ali's
main rivals, including National Front Secretary
General Ismail whose position has been slipping
for some time, reportedly are to be removed
shortly. Ismail, particularly, has been identified
with an aggressive policy against Sana, and Presi-
dent Iryani is known to have pressed Ali during
-
Yemen (Sana) outpost on Adeni border
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INDIA: BETTER DAYS( FOR MRS. G.
r
As Prime Minister fah prrepa a sf for the
visit of Soviet party chief Brezhnev, scheduled for
26-30 November, her political stock at home ap-
pears to be rising after a sharp drop earlier this
year. To some extent, she has engineered her own
comeback, but the weather probably deserves the
major credit.
The big differences between this fall and last
? plentiful summer rain that helped pro-
duce an excellent rice crop;
? predictions of a record grain harvest of
some 110 million tons in the current crop
year ;
? the arrival of the first shipments of
wheat under a 2-million-ton Soviet grain loan;
? the release of stocks by hoarders re-
sponding to a market in which supplies are
growing.
The result is a general sense of relief that the
extremely tight food situation of a few months
ago has eased significantly.
Nevertheless, widespread disenchantment
with Mrs. Gandhi's economic management
continues, along with a general conviction that
her colleagues in the administration and the lead-
ers of the Ruling Congress Party are basically
corrupt. At present, she is under mounting pres-
sure because of the high cost of living; over the
past year, wholesale prices have gone up 20 per-
cent. Recently, demonstrators in several cities
protested New Delhi's decision to almost double
the price of gasoline. The government's unpopular
move is an effort to curb consumption and the
outflow of foreign exchange in anticipation of
further price hikes in crude oil imports from the
Middle East.
So far, opposition parties have not been able
to translate any of this discontent into a serious
political challenge. Mrs. Gandhi has moved deci-
sively in recent months to control her party and
retain her pre-eminent position. Earlier this year,
More rice to thresh this year
for example, she came down hard on two conten-
tious party organizations, dissolving both when
this quarrel threatened to split the party. To keep
her personal opponents within the Ruling Con-
gress in line, she has openly raised the possibility
of a reconciliation with some leaders of the Or-
ganization Congress Party, which split with her
group in 1969.
A national election is more than two years
away, but several state elections are due early
next year. By far the most important for her is
Uttar Pradesh, Mrs. Gandhi's home state. It is
India's most heavily populated state and has been
a Congress stronghold for 40 years. A Ruling
Congress defeat there would be seen as a major
setback. Mrs. Gandhi began campaigning there
last spring, attempting to woo an electorate that
includes a sizable and restive Muslim minority.
Her job has been made somewhat easier by the
improving food situation and a lack of attractive
political alternatives.
In foreign affairs, Mrs. Gandhi's government
has been mending fences with some countries that
are of major importance to India. Relations with
the US are growing more cordial as shown by the
restrained public treatment of the recent arrival in
the Indian Ocean of a US naval task force. New
Delhi's relations with Islamabad remain cool but
the exchange of Pakistani prisoners of war con-
tinues as scheduled. The government apparently
does not intend to let Pakistani Prime Minister
Bhutto's recent calls for self-determination for
Kashmir affect the return of the prisoners
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SOUTH AFRICA: BANTUSTAN SOLIDARITY
Leaders of South Africa's autonomous ri al
homelands issued a strongly worded manifesto
last week, dramatically demonstrating that the
Bantustan program-an important feature of the
government policy of separate development for
the country's racial groups-is not producing the
intended cast of docile vassals. Although Ban-
tustan leaders lack the resources for serious resist-
ance, their act will at least stir up the chronic
doubts within the governing National Party con-
cerning the utility of the Bantustan approach, to
which South Africa's rulers are so deeply at-
tached.
Prime ministers from six of the eight autono-
mous tribal homelands met at Umtata, capital of
Transkei, for two days of confidential discussions,
their first such conference. At the end, they unan-
imously agreed that:
? a federation of all the homelands was
their long-range policy;
? sufficient land must be provided for
each Bantustan;
? they would not accept territorial consol-
idation schemes drawn up by Pretoria that did
not provide sufficient land;
they must have full control over Ban-
tustan administrative structures;
they had the right to negotiate directly
with foreign governments for economic aid;
i the pass laws, which severely restrict res-
idence and activities of Africans outside their
Bantustans, must be repealed.
Such aspirations had been expressed pre-
viously by the more outspoken Bantustan leaders,
especially Chief Buthelezi of Kwa-Zulu. The Um-
tata resolutions are typical of Buthelezi's rhetoric.
Vorster cannot simply denounce the resolutions
as subversive since they are not inconsistent with
the apartheid doctrines of the ruling National
Party. Nor can he muzzle the Bantustan leaders
without depicting the self-government offered by
the Bantustan program as a hoax.
Nevertheless, Vorster must reject the Umtata
resolutions, because genuine fulfillment would get
him in immediate trouble with his Afrikaner con-
stituents. In particular, granting sufficient land to
make the Bantustans economically practical
would be too costly. The announced consolida-
tion plans for Kwa-Zulu and other homelands
have already drawn considerable opposition from
local white farmers, even though full implementa-
tion would return only 13 percent of South
Africa's total land area to the homelands.
The Vorster government has granted self-
government to five tribal homelands during the
past year or so because their leaders were ex-
pected to be more easily manipulated than Chief
Buthelezi or Chief Matanzima of Transkei, the
first homeland tc receive self-government. Both
Buthelezi and Matanzima have refused to accept
any further evolution in the nominal political
status of their territories without more land, and
both have persuaded their legislative assemblies to
support their stand. The Umtata resolution
shatters whatever illusion Pretoria may have had
that it can play off the newly elevated Bantustan
leaders against Buthelezi and Matanzima.
STAT
25X1
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South Africa: Bantustans
Kwazulu
Lebowa
Swazi*
Transkei
Venda
Ciskei
Basotho Qwa Qwa
Bophuthatswana
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*Pretoria
Not yet self-governing
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CHILE: UNKEPT PROMISES
Although the junta was willing to let the
nniversary of its second month in power pass
with little fanfare, some of its pon:nts appar-
ently were of a different mind A 15-man squad
attacked an armory in the southern city of
Temuco. The government claims that seven of the
attackers were killed and two captured, while the
army suffered no casualties.7
caught harboring a fugitive. There is some positive
incentive to surrender, in that prompt appearance
of the wanted individual may be considered an
extenuating circumstance and used in his defense.,
The three men who head the most wanted"
ITst- ocialist Party leader Carlos Altamirano,
Movement of the Revolutionary Left chief Miguel
Enriquez, and Unitary Popular Action Movement
head Oscar Garreton-are unlikely to be swayed
by this possibility. They have already ignored the
government's call to come forward and defend
themselves against charges that they tried to pro-
mote rebellion among navy enlisted men before
the coups
t 7rn a related development, the regime re- 701 -The junta's concentration on forestalling or-
centlv decreed stiff penalties for fugitiveswho fail L. ganized violence from the left may help explain
to surrender, apparently to apply without refer- ,% the government's slowness in delivering on its
ence to the individual's guilt or innocence. TheB promises to the working class. A shortage of
new rules apply to Chileans abroad a; well as to trained administrators and a lack of effective co-
those in hiding within the country and to anyone ordination may also be to blame. At any rate,
interior minister Bonilla hears workers' complaints
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many workers earning less than the new monthly
minimum apparently are not receiving authorized
income supplements, and the officia 'October
71 price index for food was up some 82 percent over
the previous month. The US Embassy in Santiago
finds no evidence of a coordinated government
effort to give jobs to the unemployed, whose
ranks have been swelled by wholesale dismissals
from public offices?
7 I TThe technocrats who designed the govern-
ment's economic recovery program want to stick
a'to the plan despite the risk that steeply higher
Y'srices could restrict demand to the point of
inhibiting rather than stimulating production. A
struggle could develop between the technocrats
and other economic advisers who are less com-
mitted to certain features of the recovery plan.'?
US tuna boats detained by Ecuador
-)17 [Grumbling over the wage-price squeeze is as catch, and gave Ecuadorean boats preference over
yet neither very public nor very loud. Discontent '.foreign vessels. That decree's emphasis on con-
does appear to be on the rise, and workers are servation has added a new complication to the
generally suspicious of the government's eco- CIO territorial seas debate as well as to the discussions
gv nomic policies. The gap between promise and between Quito and Washingtorl'1
performance could negate the government's ef- t
forts to convince the workers that the recovery rAnother complication is the question of US
program is, in the long run, in their interest, reimbursement of fines and other charges. In
too. compliance with a 1972 amendment to the Fish-
erman's Protective Act, the US last August noti-
fied Ecuador that owners of the US fishing boats
had been compensated for fines and other charges
levied against them. If Quito fails to reimburse
the US for these payments by mid-December, aid
funds for Ecuador will be reduced by an equal
/a ffhe tuna season is fast approaching, and amount unless the provision is waived because of
Ecuador is preparing to levy stiffer penalties on national security considerations. Also at issue are
unlicensed fishing seiners operating within its military sales, which have been restricted since
claimed 200-mile coastal zone-7 1971 after US vessels were seized]
9During the last season, Ecuador seized 22 .0 3 If, as the new regulations envisage, an in-
US-owned vessels and levied fines totaling some crewing share of the tuna catch is to go to Ecua-
$1.6 million. Now it is considering a decree that If dorean fishermen, Quito will need substantial
g4 would dramatically increase both the charges for outside assistance to expand both its tuna fleet
L licenses and the fines on unlicensed boats. In and processing capability. Under these cir-
addition, the draft law would require confiscation
of tuna on board such boats. This decree would
follow one issued last September that set the basis
for eventually excluding all foreign fishermen
4G from Ecuadorean waters. It authorized the gov-
ernment to impose a ceiling on the total tuna
cumstances, Ecuador may be more willing to
compromise. In the short run, however, the pros-
pects are for further seizures of US boats and
further trouble in US-Ecuadorean rela-
tions.
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ARGENTIN G PERob AS STATESMAN
ua eron is s trying to establish himself
as a leading spokesman for Latin America. He has
decided to speak at the UN in early December
and, according to the Argentine press, expects to
meet with President Nixon. Foreign Minister
Vignes is strongly advocating such a meeting as a
follow-up to Vignes' talks at the UN last month
with Secretary Kissinger. The Foreign Minister
considers that these talks set the stage for re-
ducing strains between the two countries.
The recent appointment of a new and well-
qualified ambassador to Washington suggests that
Peron does wish to improve relations. Neverthe-
less, while Buenos Aires has made a serious effort
to minimize differences with the US, there are
several potentially troublesome issues, like the
pending foreign investment laws and pressure on
US subsidiaries in Argentina to sell to Cuba. It is
unlikely that Peron regards these questions as
major obstacles to a meeting with the President.
Peron also is moving to forge closer ties with
other Latin leaders. He has invited Bolivian Presi-
dent Banzer and Panamanian strong man Torrijos
to make state visits to Buenos Aires this month,
and he reportedly wants to go to Paraguay at the
end of November to sign a new energy treaty with
President Stroessner. The overtures to Bolivia and
Paraguay appear calculated to reduce the influ-
ence of Argentina's arch-rival, Brazil. Peron prob-
ably views the meeting with Torrijos as an oppor-
tunity to associate himself with the Panamanian
leader's outspoken nationalism.
This flurry of diplomatic activity does not
signal any major changes in Argentina's foreign
policy. It is reminiscent of Peron's efforts during
the late 1940s to become the major spokesman
for "third-bloc" nations and to forge an economic
union with Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile. Peron's
current moves are probably designed to present
him as elder statesman and hemisphere leader as
well as to divert public attention from pressing
domestic problems.
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Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
Romania: The Ceausescu Style
Secret
N2 61
16 November 1973
No. 0396/73A
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,. r - ~~ I? u n n n n n I.
tioioa,+E .scu Ceausescu
*Gere
Pane -
Popescu
Bodnaras Bodnaras -
Manescu, M.- Manescu, M...
Maurer Maurer
Niculescu-Mizil - Niculescu-Mizil
Radulescu Radulescu -~?
Trot in Trofin
Verdes
Berghianu
Ceausescu, E.
Cioara
Ciobanu
Danaleche
Dragon
Draganescu
Fazekas
Lupu -
R au to
Stoica
Vilcu
Voitec
*Babalau
*Bane
*Blajovici
*Dalea
*Darrila
"Dobrescu
*Filipas
" I l i escu
*lonita -
"Stenescu
*Telescu
*Uglar
"Winter
lonita, Minister
of Defense
- Paton
Vice Premier
- Patilinet, Minister of
Forestry and Economy
Babalau, Minister
of Electric Power
Manescu, M.
Vice Premier
Maurer
Premier
N icu l escu-M i z i l
Vice Premier
Radulescu
Vice Premier
Trofin
Vice Premier
Verdet
First Deputy Premier
Berghianu
Minister of Tech-
nical Supply
Peterfi
Vice President
"Candidate Members
COUNCIL
OF STATE
COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS
Ceausescu
President
Constantinescu
Vice President
Bodnaras
Vice President
Popescu, Chairman,
Council of Social
Education
Dragon
Secretary General
Draganescu
Vice Premier
Fazekas
Vice Premier
Lupu
Minister of Labor
Stoica
Vilcu
Vice President
Statescu
Secretary
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[Despite the cult that surrounds him, Ceau-
sescu does have a claim to genuine pcpular sup-
port. His open denunciations of tie Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia electrified the Roma-
nians, and for the first time in the postwar period
pulled them together behind the regime in a
common struggle against Moscow. Ceausescu thus
achieved something that no other postwar Roma-
nian communist leader had been able to do. More-
over, there is a general awareness of and pride in
his ability to read the Soviets. The people admire
his ability to probe pressure points, to test Mos-
cow, Washington, and Peking-and thus to exploit
the rivalry to further Romanian nationa interests.
The Economy
Under Ceausescu's guidance, Romania has
achieved one of the highest rates of economic
growth in the world. Gross National Product has
grown at an average annual rate of nire percent
since 1970. Rapid industrialization, however, has
been achieved mainly by massive imports of West-
ern machinery and equipment, mostly purchased
on credit. As a result, Romania's hard-currency
indebtedness-and the burden of servicing that
debt-has become an immense headache. Roma-
nia is caught in a vicious circle-to repay the
hard-currency debt, Ceausescu presses for greater
economic self-sufficiency, but in order to sustain
Special Report
Ceausescu and wife join folk dancers
in celebrating his 55th birthday
rapid growth and increase efficiency, Romania
needs greater access to Western technology and
credits.
Although Ceausescu has long been fully in
charge of economic, as well as political, affairs, he
took steps last May which have resulted in his
accepting to a degree uncommon in communist
states personal responsibility for curing the na-
tion's economic ills. He thus made himself more
vulnerable to criticism in the event that the
economy deteriorates.
Behind Ceausescu's economic policies is the
recurrent question of decentralization versus
centralization of economic management. Ceau-
sescu seeks rapid industrialization, economic self-
sufficiency, and closer trading links with the West
as a means of underscoring his political independ-
ence of Moscow. He has chosen to stick with a
centralized economy. Ceausescu has seen eco-
nomic reform carried out elsewhere in East
Europe, and some reports say he has concluded
such experimentation is alien to his style. In this
respect, his brand of communism is more ortho-
dox than that of the Soviets. The inherent prob-
lems, weaknesses, and contradictions are obvious.
Ceausescu urges greater efficiency, but is unwill-
ing to take the necessary steps to achieve his goals
by allowing greater individual responsibility.
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Even with his insistence on a rigid Soviet-
styled system, Ceausescu has been able to strike a
reasonably independent economic position be-
tween East and West. He has been able gradually
to reduce the share of his country's trade with
CEMA and the USSR. As a result, he has reduced
Romanian vulnerability to economic sanctions
designed to force him to conform to Moscow's
policies. Mindful of Khrushchev's schemes of the
early 1960s, Ceausescu also is particularly wary of
being drawn into any supranational economic or
political plans or bodies that would infringe on
his nation's independence.
Under Ceausescu's leadership, Bucharest has
also sought new ways to promote hard-currency
exports. Romania was the first Warsaw Pact coun-
try to allow Western equity participation-up to
ercent-in. selected industries.
Despite success in some areas, the economy
will be a major problem for Ceausescu. Interest
on debt service payments already amounts to 40
percent of Romania's exports to the West. The
Romanians are being asked to tighten already
tight belts in the name of greater efficiency and
higher production. While Ceausescu keeps a firm
grip on the situation, he is not yet willing to
decentralize and allow market forces to come into
play in order to produce the results he seeks. But
his hands may be tied. The successes he has been
able to achieve in other fields rest to a great
extent on his insistence on an orthodox com-
munist economy. Ceausescu is aware that the
slightest hint that the party is losing control over
economic matters could produce an adverse So-
viet response.
Ceausescu's relative youth, his powerful
drive, and his single-minded pursuit of goals have
enabled Romania to make significant strides in
removing itself from Soviet domination. Although
Ceausescu has not resisted having himself put
forward as a national hero, he has not become
drunk with power and he is not corrupt. He has
dealt magnanimously with his political oppo-
nents.
His extensive foreign travels and his harping
on greater economic efficiency have produced
some criticism within the upper reaches of the
hierarchy. The muttering is muted and does not
constitute any serious threat to his rule. To the
average Romanian, Ceausescu's accomplishments
and achievements are well known, and they far
outweigh his shortcomings. He has given the
country international prestige and importance it
had never before enjoyed.
Ceausescu has proved capable of guiding
Romania in a multipolar world. He has traded on
real and potential Soviet, Chinese, and American
rivalries to expand his nation's independence. He
also has seized upon the climate of detente to
draw attention to his claim that Romania is an
independent state. Ceausescu will doubtless con-
tinue to press his nation's independence from the 25X1
Soviet Union whenever possible, but in doing this
he will be careful to stay within the limits of
Soviet tolerance.
Special Report
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Special Report - 12- 16 November 1973
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