WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010400060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 10, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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`wry
Weekly Summary
Navy review completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
Secret
10 August 1973
No. 0382/73
Copy N2 45
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CONTENTS (10August 1973)
1
Chile: New Cast, Same Roles
2
Israel: Election Warm-up
4
Europe: Labor Talks
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
5
Indochina
7
Malaysia: Leadership Gap
7
Japan: Back Home Again
8
China: Civilians in Civil Affairs
11
East Germany: Ulbricht Depar
ts
12
NATO: Getting Ready
13
European Space Policy
14
Albania: More Orthodoxy
15
Yugoslavia: Veterans Out of St
ep
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
16
Cyprus: Summer Madness
17
South-West Africa: Tribal Reb
uff
W
HEM
ESTERN
ISPHERE
18 Afghanistan: No Policies Yet
19 Burundi: Cancerous Growth
20 Argentina: All in the Family
21 Uruguay: Weakening the Left
22 Panama: Troubles for Torrijos
22 Soviet Navy Visits Cuba Again
comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summary,
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CHILE: NEW CAST, SAME ROLES
Erhe re-entry of military officers into Presi-
dent Allende's cabinet will help calm growing
lawlessness and military unrest. As was the case
last October, the military officers are likely to
find themselves in a circumscribed position
despite the strong conditions they have been de-
manding for re-entering the cabinet.
Strikes and violence, as well as growing mili-
tary resentment over conditions in general and
the activities of leftist extremists in particular, led
Allende to name the chiefs of the armed services
to his cabinet on 9 August. There has been strong
resistance to this move in his Popular Unity, and
the coalition's concurrence probably places re-
strictions on the concessions Allende can make to
the military. In most of his many crises, Allende
has been intimidated by threats of extremists in
his Socialist Party to break with the government
if he did not meet their demands; this time is not
likely to be an exception.
In any case, the military chiefs' desire to
restore order is stronger than their wish to curb
Allende's program. Their concern over political
and economic deterioration, terrorism, and the
widespread arming of civilians reached a peak this
week when new strikes broke out. Outraged
military officers seemed again on the verge of
Street fight in Santiago
trying to trigger a military coup. By acting to-
gether, the commanders hope to project at least a
facade of military unity where little in fact exists.
The Christian Democrats' warning on 8 Au-
gust that the military must demand substantial
influence through control of administration posts
at all levels indicates that opposition politicians
are skeptical that the officers' return to the
cabinet will bring real alleviation of Chile's serious
problems. The Christian Democrats are con-
tinuing to accuse Allende of accepting the guid-
ance of Cuban officials.
Allende has again managed to give himself
room to try some new maneuvers and compro-
mises. The Chilean talent for finding a way to
avoid all-out confrontation will help his efforts,
but faith in the effectiveness of this talent is
eroding. Shielded by the excesses of rightist ter-
rorists, extreme leftists who despise Allende's
moderation are flexing their muscles more openly
and more often. They are at present testing their
effEctiveness against opposition forces and the
military. If the extremists decide the time has25X1
come for armed confrontation, the Communist
Party will face a dilemma on how to use the
parry's own paramilitary forces.
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ISRAEL
I the campaign for the Eighth Knesset, to be
elected on 29 October, opened officially on 1
August, and shots of political battle are again
heard in the land. As in previous elections, the
campaign is more important as a way of forcing
policy changes on the ruling Labor Party than in
causing shifts in party loyalties, for the Israeli
Election
Warmup
voter has so far been one of the most consistent
in the world]
1 JUnder Israel's proportional representation
system, a single-party government is almost im-
possible to elect, although Labor almost turned
the trick in the last elections in 1969. By 1977,
modifications in the voting system, if approved
by the electorate, will make it easier for the
Labor Party to win a clear majority, but this year
Israelis will again vote for a party list, and most
likely another Labor-dominated coalition govern-
ment will come out of the election
9 [The primary problem for Mrs. Meir is to
keep the differing and competing factions of her
party together. The 75-year-old prime minister
postponed a bitter party struggle for succession-
between Defense Minister Dayan and Finance
Minister Sapir-by agreeing to run again despite a
personal desire to step down. Dayan is using his
wide public popularity to try to extract a more
vigorous program of Israeli settlement and eco-
nomic development in the occupied Arab ter-
ritories. He has publicly threatened that he might
not be able to run on the Labor Party list unless
7 his demands are met3Vlrs. Meir has set about the
task to keep the independent Dayan in the party
fold, and since he does not really want to bolt,
she is likely to succeed. The annexationist line
being taken by the other two main political
blocs-the right-wing Gahal and the National
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Aug 73
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Religious Party-will help to push the Labor Party
further to the right on the issue:]
to Vrs. Meir and the Labor Party will take
credit for the continuing peace, but she wants to
point the campaign debate to Israel's domestic
problems for two reasons:
? the Labor Party as the main party in
power is vulnerable to attack on a host of
social and economic issues, which she sin-
cerely wants the party to solve;
? the issue of what Israel should do in and
with the occupied Arab territories is a divisive
one and best avoided. A real battle on the
issue could in extreme circumstances-e.g., if
Dayan split with the party-bring an end to
Labor Party dominance of the government-2
The Knesset building in West Jerusalem
party
has produced an unusually consistent
,
1l s the second largest parliamentary bloc, the voting pattern over the last 25 years despite a
Gaha ists are again trying to broaden their appeal great increase in voters and widening cultural
and promote their party as an alternative to the 13 backgroundsTThis year, approximately 200,000
Laborites. They have recruited a popular ex-gen- young people will go to the polls for the first time
eral, the former chief of the Southern Command, as will 80,000 new immigrants, mostly from the
to run for the Knesset and are pushing an out- Soviet Union. No one knows how they will vote,
and-out annexationist line. Their efforts to woo but a recent poll commissioned by Israel's largest
several splinter groups back into their coalition newspaperrthe independent Ma`ariv, indicated
are likely to fail because of the scars, animosities, 1 ythat Gahal would move up from 26 to 29 seats,
and persisting political differences of past polit- while Mrs. Meir's Labor Party would drop from
ical wars 57 to 55. In answer to the question, "Will you
#2, VThe National Religious Party, the third
largest party, insists that it will maintain its
independence. The party has usually allied itself
with Labor in government coalitions in exchange
for a free hand in determining religious policies. It
is a troublesome but essential partner because of
Labor's inability to win a majority. Recently, the
party has denounced the Allon Plan and adopted
a tough annexationist line toward Jordan's West
Bank, which includes many sites of importance to
religious Jews -1
-7 IJhe generally innate conservatism of the
Israeli voter, expressed through his close ties with
Page 3
vote differently this year?", 55.4 percent ques-
tioned said "the same," 15.5 said "differently,"
14.4 percent said they had not voted before, and
another 14.7 percent declined to reply or said
they didn't know.)
7 # pre-election trial run will occur on 1 Sep-
tember when Histadrut, Israel's giant General
Federation of Labor, holds its own elections. The
issues there are more economic than political, the
voters are only Histadrut members, not all parties
are included, and the number of voters is. much25X1
smaller. Nevertheless, political observers will be
looking carefully at the results to try to detect
voting trends.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Aug 73
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EUROPE
1'(tThe leaders of six European trade union
federations-three from Communist countries and
three from the West-met in Vienna in late July
'b and took an important step toward establishing
closer working relations. Representatives of the
major trade unions of the UK, West Germany,
Sweden, the USSR, East Germany, and Hungary
reached tentative agreement to hold a European
trade union conference next January in Geneva,
as an adjunct to the European regional conference
of the International Labor Organization. West
European trade unionists will convene in Stock-
holm this weekend to discuss prospects for the
Geneva meeting.
I'S [The Vienna agreement represents a qualified
Shelepin, who was the principal negotiator on the trolled Force Ouvriere is expected to be the most
(,Communist side. He had long pushed for a formal prominent absentee now that the nation's largest
gathering of East/West European trade unionists,r f labor organ ization3(he Communist-controlled
and at private meetings in Helsinki in 1971 had General Confederation of Labor, will attend. The
secured preliminary agreement to the meeting of 1' relatively relaxed relations among the Italian
the "group of six." No follow-up steps were taken it unions should prevent any rumpus over attend-
until early this year, however, because the Soviets ance by Italy's largest labor federation, the Com-
maladroitly sought to exploit the labor contacts munist-controlled Italian General Confederation
by trying to drum up support for their political of Labor
objectives, especially the convening of a European
security conference. Furthermore, the Soviets
hoped to avoid any link between the pan-Euro-
pean meeting and the ILO, which includes
employers. Moscow compromised on the latter
point, and the Western labor representatives want
to keep in step with their governments, which are
trying to improve relations with the Communist
countries.]
IT tThe three Western negotiators represent
federations that belong to the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions. Two of the
(p representatives, Vic Feather of the UK and Heinz
Oskar Vetter of West Germany, have been in the
forefront of those advocating improved relations
with the East. They took account of the strongly
anti-Communist stance of some confederation
members, however, by stressing that each national
affiliate is to make its own decision about at-
Labor Talks
tending the session next year in Geneva. More-
over, they publicly warned that the Geneva
meeting can succeed only if differences in polit-
ical systems are respected and the agenda is
limited to practical problems falling properly in
the trade union domain
1 f 'The Vienna conferees agreed to invite nearly
all national trade union federations-from both
Eastern and Western Europe-to attend the Ge-
tt neva meeting. Most top West European officials
the meeting
he French and Italian Communist labor
organ zations, for their part, welcome the invita-
tion to attend. They maintain limited contact
with individual non-Communist unions, partic-
ipate in the International Labor Organization, and
enjoy a degree of representation on committees
of the European Communities. Nevertheless, they
have been more isolated from the mainstream of
European labor affairs than they would like be-
cause of the international confederation's persist-
ent cold shoulder toward multilateral contacts.
Participation alongside non-Communist unions in
Geneva will represent a step forward in the
campaign by the Communists to increase their
regional impact. In addition, it might also offer an
opening for a new demarche on affiliation with
the European Trade Union Confederation, at
present composed of non-Communist unions in
14 West European countries.
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SECRET NNW
11 Fudging from its public statements six
months after the cease-fire, Hanoi seems reason-
ably satisfied with the implementation of the
agreement so far. On the positive side, the North
Vietnamese tout the "victory" achieved in the
withdrawal of US military forces, the return of
communist prisoners, and the consolidation of
the communist hold on the liberated areas of the
South. Hanoi scores the continued fighting in the
South and predictably blames it all on Saigon
with US connivance. The negative aspects, how-
ever, are treated in a low key, suggesting that
Hanoi is not attempting to build an excuse for a
return to large-scale fighting]
~$ [In contrast with the tone set by Hanoi, there
have been reports that key communists in the
South, disappointed with the gains made by their
,9 side since the cease-fire, are hopeful that Hanoi
will return to a more militant policy. Those who
entertain such thoughts will find little comfort in
Hanoi's propaganda, which may be designed to let
the rank and file know that North Vietnam is
prepared to live with the cease-fire accord for the
time being. Moreover, Hanoi calls for continued
adherence to the cease-fire by "all" parties. Hanoi
goes on to assert that the struggle will go on and
will be "protracted, hard, and difficult," but the
communists will ultimately win.'
lQ fThe propaganda makes it clear that Hanoi is
s si ve to the US position that the North to the US position that the North Viet-
namese must stop the fighting in the South and
withdraw their forces from Laos and Cambodia
before any agreement on US aid to North Viet-
nam can be reached. Hanoi claims that these
"preconditions" are a delaying tactic on the part
of the US, but its moderate language suggests that
Hanoi may eventually be willing to make conces-
sions to the US stand?
Le Duan and Pham Van Dong
?[After being out of the public eye for more
{ an two weeks, North Vietnamese party boss Le
Duan reappeared on 3 August, when TASS re-
ported that he had left Moscow for the Crimea. A
subsequent press announcement indicated that Le
Duan had met with Soviet party chief Brezhnev,
who was vacationing there. The two leaders dis-
cussed "questions of further developments of
relations" between their countries, although no
announcement has yet been ma a on a formal
economic aid agreement for 1974
Ig CNorth Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong
continued his round of visits to communist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe and concluded military
and aid agreements with Bulgaria on 6 August.
Following the Soviet lead, the Bulgarians prom-
ised to help in restoring the North Vietnamese
economy and agreed to cancel repayment of all
economic loans to Hanoi extended during the
war.)
10 [Fighting has now tapered off after some
sharp clashes early in the week as the communists
stiffened their resistance to government clearing
efforts in several parts of South VietnantThe
Viet Cong radio threatened some sort of counter-
action to the government's "nibbling" operations
into communist-held territory.
20 ,IThe heaviest fighting came in the northern
provinces, where both sides are trying to adjust
defensive positions. North Vietnamese artillery
and infantry elements in the highlands have so far
thwarted government efforts to retake two vil-
lages west of Kontum City that were lost to the
communists in early June. Northwest of Hue,
communist artillery fire forced South Vietnamese
regulars to abandon several observation outposts
overlooking a major infiltration corridor leading
to the coastal lowlands. Both sides have avoided
pushing the fi hting much beyond the present,
tolerable levels
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1) [The Khmer Communists late last week
opened up another new front between the Bassac
and Mekong rivers southeast of Phnom Penh.
Cambodian Army reinforcements were moved up
to contain the new threat, but not before the
insurgents had advanced to within three miles of
the capital and briefly surrounded several govern-
ment battalions farther south on Route 1. Gov-
ernment clearing operations made slow progress
southwest of the capital. Elsewhere, small insur-
gent units eluded government sweep operations
between three and five miles northwest of
Pochentong airport and launched sporadic ground
attacks against government positions in this area.
A sapper attack on 7 August knocked out the
telecommunications station at Kambol, ten miles
west of the capital's
X'L IThe fighting on these fronts has not dis-
rupted Phnom Penh's supply lines. Truck convoys
Page 6
CLOSE TO AGREEMENT IL11 LAOS
LGovernment negotiators in Vientiane are
predicting that an agreement will be signed on
implementation of the February peace accord
sometime next week. The few remaining
minor points at issue between the government
and the Lao Communists apparently will be
discussed privately between Prime Minister
Souvanna and senior Pathet Lao envoy
Phoumi Vongvichit. Souvanna is still under
pressure from senior Lao Army officers to
hold out for additional concessions, but he is
likely to over-ride their objections in order to
get an agreement before his self-imposed
deadline of 15 August.
are moving rice and other goods to the city over
Routes 4 and 5, and a Mekong River resupply
convoy delivered ammunition. If the next ship
convoy arrives safely on schedule early next
week, the city will have a two-week supply of fuel
and a 45-day supply of rice. The government,
meanwhile, is negotiating with Bangkok for 5,000
tons cf rice-a ten-day supply-to supplement a
similar amount purchased earlier this year from
2+i (The Lon Not government's initial efforts to
bolster the supply of military manpower have
been less than successful. When eligible draftees in
Phnom Penh failed to respond in any numbers to
a new law calling for compulsory military service,
the national police quickly resorted to press gang
methods to scoop up likely looking recruits. The
public outcry over the strong-arm tactics sparked
new political friction when Cambodian Army
Chief of Staff Fernandez blamed Prime Minister
In Tam for the police indiscretions. The general
dissatisfaction over conscription, coupled with
another resignation threat from In Tam, produced
a revised recruiting policy that seems certain to be
equally ineffective.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Aug 73
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MALAYSIA: LEADERS IP GAP
he sudden death Ila t week of Deputy Prime
Minister Tun Ismail leaves a void that will be hard
to fill. Ismail's able and impartial leadership
helped to mute racial tensions and intraparty
feuding and kept these nagging problems from
seriously intruding into the operations of govern-
ment. He was Prime Minister Razak's most
trusted lieutenant. Besides serving as backstop for
Razak as prime minister, he headed three minis-
tries and was deputy president of the United
Malay Nationalist Organization, the main com-
ponent of the ruling alliance. There is no one who
can step in to handle the broad range of his
functions.
Filling Ismail's home affairs portfolio, a key
job concerned with Malaysia's touchy communal
problems, will be particularly difficult. Few
Malay politicians have the trust of the Chinese
community that Ismail enjoyed. The Chinese will
be sensitive to any indication that Ismail's suc-
cessor represents an increase in the influence of
Malay militants who intend to take a tougher
stand with the Chinese.
The party and government vacancies created
by Ismail's death will set off a new round of
contention within the United Malay Party.
signs that the opposition parties may end their
boycott of the Diet. Their return would not mean
that they would no longer seek to block key
government legislation, but that they wish to
force Tanaka to defend his summitry diplomacy
and domestic policies in parliamentary debate.
They hope, for example, to exploit such govern-
ment moves as a recent rise in the price of rice,
which has added fuel to popular resentment over
inflation)
ZC4 tin about a month, Tanaka will make another
foreign policy foray with visits to France, the UK,
West Germany, and the Soviet Union. In the
meantime, the opposition will probably be able to
create enough difficulties to prevent him from
making headway against his problems on the25X1
home front. If so, he may be more vulnerable to
pressures in the Soviet Union for concessions on
foreign policy issues.
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Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Aug 73
Razak's distaste for contention, plus his prefer-
ence for party consensus, may incline him to
appoint only interim replacements for Ismail,
leaving final decisions to a special party congress
that had been scheduled some time aao for No-
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,;17' [As a foreign policy venture, Prime Minister
Tanaka's summit trip to Washington is judged a
success by his supporters in Japan, but its benefits
may not last long in domestic politics)
a 7 Japanese media noted with favor the procla-
mation of a "new and equal" partnership between
the two countries, though they did question the
validity of Japan's "equal" role. Not surprisingly,
the opposition parties attacked the summit as a
sign of the "increasing" Japanese subservience to
the US. They pointed to the blandness of the
communique and to its lack of specifics on how
US-Japanese problems might be resolved as proof
that Tanaka had achieved little. Popular attention
in Japan has quickly shifted back to the un-
yielding domestic issues like inflation and pol-
lution.'
With Tanaka's return to Tokyo, there are
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'36 )efore the Cultural Revolution in 1966, Pe-
king was careful to keep the People's Liberation
Army out of domestic politics. The widespread
3 confusion and disorder engendered by the Cul-
tural Revolution, however, forced China's leaders
to order the military into provincial politics.
Now, civilian cadre are making a comeback, but it
is proving a slow process
3jroday, although there is a rough parity be-
'SU tThe extent of the armed forces' "tempo- tween civilian and military representation on the
rary" intrusion into provincial politics was clearly party committees, the military still has an over-
reflected in the composition of the new party whelming number of the top slots. A total of 16
3 committees formed in late 1970 and 1971 in the top provincial figures-all PLA men-were purged
wake of the Cultural Revolution. Of China's 2910after the Lin affair; only nine of the 16 replace-
provinces and independent municipalities, only ,,, meats were civilians. Furthermore, aside from
two, Peking and Shanghai, did not have a military Shanghai, only Hunan and Honan provinces are
man in one of the top two party jobs. The com- 31 without a military man in either of the top two
mittees themselves were made up mostly of mill- positions.
Composition of Provincial Party Committees
Original total at formation,
September 1971 158
*Veteran cadre are cadre who held a party or government position
prior to the Cultural Revolution
tary men, and the few civilians who did sit on
them were generally isolated from real power)
11 [The situation proved to be embarrassing for
China's leaders, who had long prided themselves
on having a party that "ruled the gun." Beginning
with, and spurred by, the Lin Piao crisis of Sep-
tember-October 1971, Peking began to take steps
31to lessen the military's influence)
Current total,
July 1973 178
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ocunC I
%ftme
0 The military's influence has, however, been
diluted by the addition of civilians, particularly
former party cadre who were purged during the
Cultural Revolution. On the whole, the returnees
are second-level officials, who were for the most
part provincial party secretaries and vice gov-
ernors. All are experienced administrators,
3 and
y many have special expertise in rural and agricul-
tural matters-especially valuable talents given the
3f clouded agricultural outlook and the drive to
rebuild the party organization)
'315 ENith few exceptions, pre - Cultural Revolu-
tion regional and provincial party bosses have not
been rehabilitated. The decision on their return
3 presumably is now being made, and may be aired
at the Tenth Party Congress. If rehabilitated,
these old bosses would pose a greater threat to
the military's influence in local politics)? [n the immediate future, the current trend
o` w rd increased numbers of party veterans re-
turning to provincial committees and a corres-
pording decline in the percentage of military will
probably continue. The committees, however,
will still face many problems. Divisions between
younger and older cadre, the tendency to add
people without removing others, disagreement
over the liberalizing trend, and other vexed issues
will inhibit the political initiative and efficiency
Peking appears to be seeking. A clear indication25X1
of a united leadership in Peking remains the
key-as it always has been-to smooth administra-
tion of the provinces.
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EAST GERMANY: ULBRICHT DEPARTS
32 [The death of Walter Ulbricht on 1 August
hardly disturbed the smooth running of the state
he was instrumental in creating. The World Youth
Festival, an anti-imperialist propaganda gala, con-
tinued on its well-orchestrated way in East Berlin.
Page 11
preliminary talks this week between the US and
Easi; Germany on establishing formal diplomatic
The funeral was as much a show of communist
unity as a tribute to Ulbricht's memory. Even the
official obituary played down the former leader's
role in the building of East Germany -7
The 80-year-old Ulbricht had been without
pow r since Erich Honecker took over the reins as
party first secretary in May 1971. Ulbricht had
remained chief of state. He is expected to be
succeeded by Premier Willi Stoph, at one time
considered a rival of Honecker, with politburo
member Horst Sindermann succeeding to the
premiership. In any event, a shuffling of these
positions will not affect Honecker, who will keep
the real levers of power in his own hands.
3 ` sits public grief notwithstanding, the Hon-
ecker regime probably felt a sense of relief at
Ulbricht's passing. No longer will it be haunted by
his persistent advocacy of a hard line on foreign
policy issues and an equally unbending stand on
domestic problems. Moreover, the many messages
of condolence from around the world permitted
the regime to bask in its recently won inter-
national acceptance. For his part, Ulbricht in
death was deprived of witnessing the opening of25X1
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NATO: GETTING READY
qO f the allies have begun in earnest to prepare
y for the force reduction talks this fall. Last week,
they decided that the paper submitted by the US
would provide the basis for developing a common
positionl
41 he paper proposes that NATO's goal should
be t a imposition of a "common ceiling" on
NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in central
Europe. The goal would be attained by a 10
percent reduction in NATO manpower and an
accompanying reduction to bring Warsaw Pact
manpower to the lower NATO level. Reductions
during the first phase would reduce US and Soviet
forces to a level sufficient to obtain the with-
drawal of a Soviet tank army. Objectives in the
second phase would be left undefined at this
point, but would probably include a reduction of
gp indigenous European forces. ost of the allies
41have expressed general appro al of the US paper,
but nearly all are seeking revisions of specific
points
t4 D 'he British, who have been more negative
#, than the others about the force-reduction talks,
have the most problems. In London's view, the
ql all:ies would lose negotiating flexibility by using
the "common ceiling" concept, since it would
lead inescapably to a second phase in the talks.
More generally, London maintains that the allied
position should not be presented to the Soviets
early in the negotiations, as the US and some of
the others propose. London prefers a more cau-
tious approach that would allow time to sound
out the Soviets. The Canadians point out that
such an approach would postpone the start of
meaningful dialogue
i 0 ?The West Germans, still troubled by dis-
agreement within their government over the
41
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relationship between stationed and indigenous
forces, support the "common ceiling" concept,
but will be probing to determine how it would be
woven into the negotiations. A spokesman in
Bonn stressed last week that agreement on the
"common ceiling" approach must be reached dur-
ing the first phase and that a close link must be
established between the first and second phases.
yd he new Dutch government tends to regard
the force reduction exercise as a way of cutting
the Dutch defense budget. The Dutch are anxious
Ito get agreement to proceed to a second phase,
which would involve the reduction of indigenous
European forces. On the question of enforcement
of a force-reduction agreement, the Dutch believe
that verification by the US and Soviet Union
would be sufficient during the first phase but not
during the second. The Canadians have also
stressed the need for multi-national verification'
90 ~The Turks and Greeks are concerned that an
agreement along the lines of the US paper would
increase the threat to NATO's flanks. The Turks
have already suggested adding language to the
effect that reductions would be "without prej-
udice to the undiminished security of the alliance
as a whole."i
yl \JATO's Senior Political Committee began
meeting this week in an effort to settle these
matters so that an allied position can be ham-
mered out by the time the force-reduction nego-
tiations open in Vienna at the and o"cto-
EUROPEAN SPACE POLICY
lFleven Europea overnments last week gave
the go ahead to a joint US-European space pro-
gram and also made decisions on Europe's own
space research activities. West Germany, France,
and Britain will play the principal roles, with
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland in support---pro-
vided certain apparently minor obstacles are over-
come.
As their contribution to the US in the post-
Apollo space shuttle program, the Europeans will
develop the manned orbiting workshop that will
be carried aloft in the space shuttle. Both vehicles
will be re-usable. The Europeans will gain access
to the considerable American technology neces-
sary for building the workshop. The West Ger-
mans, who have been particularly insistent that
Europe should accept the US offer of post-Apollo
participation, will pay more than half of the cost
themselves. The interdependence of the space
shuttle and the manned workshop will result in
unprecedented collaboration between the US and
Europe in space activities.
The Europeans will also work together on
the French L-3S satellite launcher vehicle, which
Paris views as an appropriate vehicle for orbiting
French military reconnaissance and navigation
satellites as well as European communication
sa,,,ellites. Paris will provide most of the financing,
with West Germany the other major contributor.
Inasmuch as development and production of the
launch vehicle will be primarily a French respon-
sibility, Paris has indicated that it will have little
hesitation in using the L-3S-or its components-
for strictly French purposes. Development al-
ready is begun, and the first-stage motors have
undergone static test firings.
Agreement by the UK to develop the inertial
guidance system for the L-3S broke a deadlock on
the European space program. France in return
agreed to contribute at least minimally to the
post-Apollo program and to the development of a
maritime communications ship-to-shore satellite
desired by the British.
Finally, a European Space Agency-particu-
lar~y favored by the British-will take over the
functions of the European Space Research Organ-
ization, the European Launcher Development
Organization, and other European space activity
on 1 April 1974.
Business interest in the spin-off from space
technology accounts in large measure for the deci-
sion of the European governments to cooperate
on space programs. Concern about preventing a
brain drain is another factor, although some scien-25X1
tific groups, particularly in France, deplore the
slighting of research-related funds in favor of the
L-3S launcher.
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4( [The powerful Tirane party organization met
j, last week and branded its secretary for propa-
ganda, Fadil Pacrami, and the director of Alba-
-qj state radio and television, Todi Lubonja, as
"anti-party elements." Both men have been cen-
tral committee members for about 20 years, and
each served a stint as editor of the party daily
Zeri i Popullit.7
44 Phis blistering criticism of two central com-
mittee members is rare and could point to larger
differences at the top over the tough campaign
y'7 against Western influences, which has been going
on in Albania since spring. Both men were deni-
grated for supporting "modernistic" artistic
trends and failing later to recant2
1141# In a related show of displeasure with the
poor way its stringent ideological and cultural
guidelines are being implemented, the regime
i47shuffled the leadership of the youth and writers
organization in late July. Lesser bureaucrats in
the ro a anda apparatus have been criticized
P p g
Party Leader Hoxha
cized for encouraging imports of foreign products
with little regard for Albania's monetary and eco-
nomic capabilities. The accompanying defense of
Tirane's "self-reliance" policy was worded so
strongly as to suggest that differences exist on
these economic issues.1
and further personnel changes may well be in the [Amid this orgy of strict orthodoxy at home,
offing.1 Tirane continues its slow, pragmatic efforts to
diversify foreign commercial relations. Albanian
'F(D TMeanwhile, the campaign for orthodoxy hasiilofficials sat down with the Austrian trade minis-
spilled over into the economic field, taking its cue ter late last month to explore ways of expanding
in part from an unpublished speech by party trade. The only immediate result of the session
.' leader Hoxha in late June. Various economic appears to have been a trucking agreement, which
shortcomings-including low productivity, too increases Tirane's meager transport links with
much investment, and stagnant production-have Europe. The Swedes were in town earlier to
been directly attributed to "alien liberal in- rlude a two-year trade protocol.
fluences." Unnamed individuals have been criti-
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YUGOSLAVIA,: VETERANS OUT OF STEP
'r fOne of the problems that may demand
Tito's attention is the conflict between party and
veterans organizations in Croatia and Serbia. This
knotty problem, with its crosscurrents of nation-
alism, defiance of the party's claim to supremacy
in all spheres, and jockeying for position, ks not
new but it is getting worse]
`S'S Party officials from Belgrade cannot ride
roughshod over the veterans without running the
risk of alienating an important segment of the
population. Veterans number around a million,
and they still command substantial respect for the
contributions they made during the war. Further-
more, there is a community of interests between
the regular military and the veterans organiza-
tions, and this shared outlook gives the veterans
weight in higher councils,
~'~rIn the mid-1960s, party reforms and eco-
n mttc modernization broke the veterans' grip on
the federal bureaucracy, but their influence in
local and regional affairs is still strong. Since then
they have tried to use Tito's campaigns against
liberals and nationalists as a vehicle to reimpose
their "firm hand" philosophy. In some cases, they
over-reached themselves. In Vojvodina, for
example, Serb veterans successfully demanded
Tito (center) with Partisans, 1942
Page 15
that deposed liberals be thrown out of the party.
The parent Serb party has taken a more moderate
tack and is angry about excesses in Vojvodina.
Serb party boss Vlaskalic toured the province last
month and warned local party officials to take
firmer control before the re ional party con-
gresses convene later this year.
l41 In Croatia, the party organization has flatly
ac sed the veterans of taking an anti-party line
in their agitation for a return to old practices. The
veterans rejected the charge last month, however,
and party leaders in Belgrade are confronted with
the sensitive problem of having to choose sides.
The decision apparently has not yet been made.
The Croat situation was further muddied by the
purge in June of the Yugoslav internal security
bass, Colonel General Ivan Miskovic. He has
strong personal ties to veterans in northeast
Croatia, a stronghold of vociferous conservatives
rr he party in Belgrade undoubtedly wants to
proje t an image of unity and stability in the
run-up to the party congress and national elec-
tions early next year. Tito's heir apparent in the
party, Stane Dolanc, a latecomer to Yugoslavia's
political wars and to federal party posts, stands
midway between the old guard and the post-war
generation.7
organizations.
TDolanc and other leaders, including Tito,
wan to "renew" the party by turning over many
posts to younger people, and the factional ac-
tivities of the veterans may help to accelerate the
process. The federal party is already moving to
bring the regular military into line, and success ir25X1
this venture would free its hand to deal with the
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S 3 (General Grivas through word and deed this
past week has managed to increase the tempo of
his struggle with President Makarios. Although
strong words have dominated the current go-
l round, Grivas is threatening to increase the vio-
lence and there is little chance that additional
terrorism can be avoided.7
13 jln the war of words, the two leaders have
exchanged charges and countercharges of treason
a' to the Cypriot cause of enosis (union with
, Greece). Grivas set the stage by threatening a
fight to the end if the Archbishop does not sub-
mit to new elections and relinquish either the
presidency or the leadership of the Cyprus
church. Grivas insisted that he would stop his
lawlessness and release the kidnaped justice min-
ister if these steps were taken and other freedoms
were guaranteed. Makarios rejected the general's
demands and called on him to come out of hiding
and engage in a "democratic" confrontation.
Makarios has pledged to crush Grivas' terrorist
campaign
Sr J Further escalation of the violence by Grivas
and his supporters is not likely to force the
Archbishop to give up his position and could turn
Greek Cypriot opinion against the general, whose
real support on the island is believed to be small.
As the struggle goes on, however, the minority
Turkish Cypriots become increasingly worried
that the antagonism could eventually be directed
toward them. They and Ankara hold little love
for either man and will urge Athens to use what-
ever influence it may have to quiet the smoldering
problems in the Greek Cypriot community. The
mainland Greek Government, which has no more
than a questionable hold on Grivas and virtually
no leverage over the Archbishop, will do its
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SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: TRIBAL REBUFF
L.1 rSouth Africa's policy of separate develop-
ment for tribal homelands in South-West Africa
received a blow last week when Africans boy-
cotted the elections to the newly constituted
legislative council of Ovamboland. This clear-cut
show of disapproval-only three percent of the
(3i'registered voters went to the polls-will almost
certainly stimulate further opposition to con-
tinued South African control of the territory.1
(,'L fSouth Africa has been especially anxious to
make its version of self-government work in
Ovamboland. The Ovambo tribe, some 350,000
strong, accounts for almost half of South-West
Africa's population and provides the bulk of the
labor force in the vital mining industry. Ovambo-
land's legislative council was to have been the first
popularly elected representative body for any
non-white group in South-West Africa. Despite
the boycott, Pretoria will have the council in-
stalled and eventually go ahead with plans to
extend the same pattern to the territory's nine
other tribal homelands.
Phe election was doubly embarrassing to
Pretdria. First, the tribal chiefs who benefit from
separate development formed their own political
(1 L party and prohibited opposition groups from
holding public meetings. The chiefs were backed
up resolutely by the South African police and
S9 were thus made to look like puppets) econd, the
boycott organizers demonstrated surprising
I strength and ability. The most prominent leaders
of the boycott belong to the South-West African
Peoples Organization, which would like to unite
all non-white ethnic groups in a violent revolt
against South African rule.
(0'21 [Pretoria's grant of increased autonomy to
Ovamboland was denounced last May in an OAU
summit resolution. The African leaders called for
cancellation of UN Secretary General Waldheim's
mandate to negotiate with Pretoria on preparing
South-West Africa for independence as a single
ANGOLA
(PORT.)
Windhoek
W (SOUTH S 6A AFRICAN`Nampa Bay
(SOUTH
~ :~R CAO'ft t(8h
~owh
Ji(lJRiI<
I ]0(41,7
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
SOUTH\
AFRICA
state. The success of the boycott probably will
provoke further pressures against any renewal of
Waldheim's mandate when the issue comes before
the Security Council, probably in September. The
proof that the South-West African Peoples Or-
ganization wields broad popular influence also
could bring increased international support for
the organization's hitherto ineff guerrilla
movement. 25X1
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A~F`GHANISTAN: NO POLICIES YET
W [Afghanistan's new rulers, four weeks after
their coup, have yet to give a clear indication of
their plans. The signs of drift are many:
? President Daud has ordered lower prices
but has not said, even in general terms, how
he will deal with the alleged economic crisis
he says forced him to seize power'
(4 ?[t took ten days before the first ground
rules for the new administration emerged. The
powers of the king and parliament were
vested in Daud, and the judiciary was placed
under the Ministry of Justice.
? Plans for developing a more permanent
system or the "real democrac " Daud prom-
ised have not been announced.)
0 ? It took two weeks to name a cabinet,
whit the US ambassador describes as a "pe-
culiar hodgepodge." Daud holds the most im-
portant posts-prime minister, defense minis-
ter, and foreign minister-and several other
ministers are close to him.I
UP ?,[The junior officers who carried out the
coup and civilians sympathetic to them got
finance, interior, and a few lesser portfolios.
It is doubtful that the cabinet will be either
very effective or capable of united actiorl7
?tDaud has made no moves on foreign
policy, even toward his neighbors. He is a
long-time advocate of independence for Pak-
istan's frontier provinces, but no action has
been taken on this issue; he has a pro-Soviet
reputation, but so far has made no move
toward Moscow; he has not gone through
with the ratification of the water agreement
made with Iran a few months before the
coup)
4 5 The apparent lack of direction may stem
fro the nature of the coup that brought Daud
forward on 17 July.
The New Rulers (President Daud second from left)
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It is by now evident that those who 25X1
seized power had no clear program and that there
are disagreements among them.?
(,r(-Tln the short run, Daud will probably be able
to exploit the inexperience and disunity of his 47 tThere have been raids into Burundi from
associates to augment his own position. In time, Tanzania. The raids have strained relations be-
Dal may be able to sort things out and set a6Y tween Burundi and Tanzania and have led to
more definite course for his government. Most(ayseveral clashes along the border involving the
Afghans would probably be content with a slow armies of the two countries. The hostilities also
pace in reform and do not expect any government resulted in a government-encouraged boycott of
to meet high standards. Nevertheless, the govern- Burundi goods by Tanzanian dock workers, which
ment's performance so far, its failure to announce was highly damaging to landlocked Burundi. To
any plans or any but the vaguest goals, and the get Tanzania to end the boycott, Micombero was
composition of the cabinet do not augur well for forced to take the blame for the border clashes.
'
its solving Afghanistan
s many problems. ~~ Another boycott could cause such havoc in Bu-
rundi that resulting internal pressures could bring
down the government., 25X1
L7 f Last month
T
nz
i
d B
,
a
an
a an
urundi signed an
BURUNDI: CANCEROUS GROWTH agreement to ease the situation. Other African
the government of President Micombero is I` leaders-particularly Zairian President Mobutu,
Who helped bring about the agreement-are begin-
s~haky as ever a year after the tribal slaughters g ning to appreciate the potential dangers Burundi's
that cost thousands of lives. The ruling Tutsi problems pose to central Africa and may be more
minority and the Hutu majority, which has suf- willing to intervene than they have been in the
fered most in tho carna a past. Dar es Salaam, however, does not have the
25X1
resources to move all of the 20,000 Hutu refugees
the rest ent a so must wrestle away from the border area, and more incidents
with i er t erences within his own Tutsi tribe) may occur that would jeopardize the agreement) 25X1
(0$ 1icombero is more conciliatory toward the
Hutus than most Tutsis, but during the past year ,1 ?\t home, Micombero must continue to deal
he has failed to take the social and economic wi h the endemic factionalism that has plagued
steps that might have helped to reconcile the two the Tutsi elite since independence. Political ri-
tribes. Repression of the Hutu population by valries between northern and southern elements
Tutsi civilians and soldiers has continued, al-s of the Tutsi oligarchy have only been slightly
though it has not re
h
d th
ac
e
e scope and severity eased by the need to unite against the Hutu
of last summer.] "threat." Micombero survives because he has been
able to balance off the two factions, which are
fairly evenly divided. Moreover, Tutsi politics
have always managed to absorb factionalism, per-
sonal rivalries, and even violent intrigues, and this
will probably be the case for some time to come.
Micombero could fall and be replaced by another
Tutsi, but the major threat to stability in Bu-
rundi, and in the area, still comes from the grow-
Page 19
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NO So4ltt4S)
The election process edged forward wiilh the third runner-up in the election that brought Peron
Justicialist Party's nomination of Juan Peron and home, has tossed his hat into the ring for the new
25X1 his wife Isabel as candidates for president and vice election, now set for 23 September. Manrique was
president. Most observers see the inclusion of nominated by the Popular Democratic Party con-
"Isabelita" on the ticket as an interim move. vention and has launched his campaign despite
In all probability, Peron has decided not to
commit himself to a deal with Radical Civic
Union leader Ricardo Balbin, whose demands
may have convinced Peron that a joint slate
would pose more problems than it was worth.
The Radicals now face the problem, when the
party convention reconvenes on 11 August, of
deciding whether to put up a separate slate.
In the only other fresh development on the
election scene, Francisco Manrique, who was
widespread doubts about his prospects for tap-
ping anti-Peronist sentiment. If the Radicals run a
candidate, the two parties would split the opposi-
tion vote.
While uncertainty over Peron's plans and
speculation about his health continued, the gov-
ernment pushed forward in several controversial
directions this week. A press leak of a US memo-
randum expressing concern over the impact of
pending economic legislation caused a public up-
roar and led to congressional demands that the
US charge be declared persona non grata. The
incident clearly demonstrated the highly charged
nationalist mood of the country. Although provi-
sional President Lastiri apparently intends to let
the matter drop, Congress has expedited action
on a series of draft economic bills, some of which
have a definite nationalist flavor.
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Discretionary powers granted to the execu- URUGUAY: WEAKENING THE LEFT
tive branch under the foreign investment law, for
instance, would allow the government wider pow- G president Bordaberry and the military,
ers in dealing with foreign investors. The law gives having at least temporarily reduced a threat from
the government enough latitude to subject US labor, are pressing ahead with plans to undermine
business interests to more stringent restrictions other strongholds of leftist influence?
than that accorded other foreign firms. The pas-
sage of these measures, combined with the up- GLf [One of their next goals is an extensive re-
surge in political assassination and kidnaping, is 4P form of the education system. Ostensibly, the
unlikely to bring any improvement in the existing reform would improve the quality of education,
investment climate or change the pessimism with 71 but its underlying objective would be to prohibit
which US business in Argentina contemplates the political proselytizing among students-and thus
future. Indeed, new investment has reached a to deny the Communists and other leftist groups
virtual standstill since the Peronists assumed one of their chief recruiting grounds 25X1
power in May.
In another move that underscored Peronist
efforts to chart a clearly independent foreign
policy, Argentina announced extension of a $200
million credit to Cuba for the purchase of trucks,
tractors, machinery, and agricultural products.
The loan, similar to one for $100 million granted
to Chile earlier this year, is in line with Argen-
tina's interest in increasing demand for its prod-
ucts abroad and boosting industrial activity and
employment. The decision is likely to place new
strains on relations with Washington because of
probable pressure to have US subsidiaries in Ar-
gentina supply goods to Cuba.
The government at least is searching for
methods to cope with the terrorist problem and
restore order. It promulgated two laws regulating
the possession of firearms and explosives and
curbing the use of paid advertisements in the
media by terrorist: groups. Still, there has been no
letup in the level of politically motivated vio-
lence, and the principal terrorist organization--- the
People's Revolutionary Army-has once again
gone on record condemning Peron for his
"capitalist tendencies." The terrorists appear to
be more active than ever, and a recent kidnap
victim-a British financier-told the press after
being freed that his captors planned to use
accumulated ransom money to purchase arms
togetner and challenge Rnrriaberry.
7, (Meanwhile, the government has reaffirmed
its determination not to cave in under demands
and protests from outlawed labor leaders. The
Communist-dominated National Convention of
Workers called off a strike last week after it
became clear the walkout would not succeed. The
government attacked labor leaders by labeling
them "anti-national" and involved with the
Tupamaros.l
7S [Efforts to organize political opposition to
the government are still feeble. A "Democratic
Front," formed by elements of the Colorado
Party and the once pro-government factions of
the Blanco Party, hopes to wear down the govern-
merit through a low-key, long-term campaign. As
yet, it is no more than an irritant to the Borda-
berry regime. A similar alliance under negotiation
between the leftist Frente Amplio coalition and
the largest Blanco faction is being delayed by the
reluctance of rank-and-file Blancos. Unless the 25X1
government blunders badly, there is little pros-
...._1 1__I .. ...
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PANAMA: TROUBLES FOR TORRIJOS
77, JA sharp collision between communist and
conservative forces in a remote provincial capital
has mushroomed into a significant political test
for Torrijos and his government. The incident
demonstrates how politically unsure of itself the
government is-even after five years in power--
and points up some of the contradictions within
the administration7
'73 Chiriqui Province is conservative, independ-
ent, and relatively wealthy, and it has long been a
potential trouble spot for Torrijos. In late June, a
few students at a high school in the provincial
capital began clamoring for the ouster of the
principal for refusing to permit them to attend a
leftist-backed youth festival. The students, who
were members of the communist-dominated Pana-
manian Students Federation, apparently had the
tacit support of the provincial governor, a com-
munist placed in the post by Torrijos. The leftists'
demands were vigorously countered by conserva-
tive students and their parents-including many
wealthy businessmen and ranchers-who de-
manded that the principal remain and the gover-
nor be fired instead. Clashes between the oppos-
ing student factions and the possibility that all
businesses would close down finally convinced
Torrijos to send his right-hand man, Lt. Colonel
Noriega, to try to solve the problem. Apparently
in response to Noriega's advice, Torrijos ousted
the principal as well as the governor and his
cabinet and named a friend of Noriega to govern
the troublesome province.]
74 rtrong man Torrijos, apparently surprised by
the way the dispute developed, blames both the
left and the right and says he intends to take steps
to show that he will not permit any group to
frustrate his plans for the country. Moves against
2the left could include the arrest of Communist
Party leaders, the removal of communists from
positions in the government and schools, and a
7T crackdown on the student federation.F_
Page 22
73.11 is likely to be more difficult for him to
move against the right, since he is already con-
cerned about the business community's lack of
confidence in his regime. His domestic difficulties
seem to be mounting, and the administration
seems unable to solve pressing problems. Torrijos'
own reluctance to make decisions also hampers
his regime's effectiveness
SOVIET NAVY V SITS CUBA AGAIN
it)
The Soviet naval detdchment that arrived
at Aavana on 4 August is the tenth such group
to visit Cuba since 1969.
An E-II - class cruise missile submarine
with the group is the first nuclear-powered
submarine of any class to tie up at Havana. In
the past, diesel-powered F-class submarines
have visited Havana and nuclear submarines
have confined themselves to the more remote
bases of Antilla and Cienfuegos. In addition
to the E-11, two guided-missile ships-a cruiser
and a destroyer-are in Havana. According to
the Soviet and Cuban press, all the ships will
call at other Cuban ports after 9 August.
Cuba may also receive additional Osa-
class guided-missile patrol boats soon. Two
Soviet merchant tugs, each towing an Osa, left
the Baltic on 5 August and are believed head-
ing for Havana. The first delivery of Osas to
Cuba took place in January 1972, when two
of them were towed across the Atlantic and
turned over to Castro's navy.
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Since the dollar rallied in early August, it has
stabilized about 3 percent above the July lows.
The main source of dollar strength stems from
rapidly rising US and Eurodollar interest rates.
The interest rate picture is inducing money
managers and speculators to switch back into
dollars from marks and other currencies as well as
from gold. The price of gold has dropped sharply
from its high of $127 an ounce on 6 July 1973.
On 9 August alone, it fell $3.75 to close at
$110.00.
Central bank intervention has again become
a major factor in international money markets. In
the past week:
? The US and German central banks in-
tervened to support the dollar;
? Substantial intervention was required,
mainly by the Bundesbank, to maintain the
European joint float;
? The Italians and the British intervened
heavily in the market to support the falling
lira and pound.
The major central banks spent the equivalent
of about $2.5 billion in these interventions. The
Changes in the Dollar Value of Foreign Currencies Since 19 March
Mark
French Franc
Sterling
Yen
(in percent)
9 August 2 August
6 July
+19.0
+21.0
+23.1
+25.1
+ 9.5
+10.9
+12.5
+19.9
+ 0.8
+ 2.3
+ 1.9
+ 3.9
- 0.1
+ 0.3
- 0.2
1.1
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Bank -of Italy paid out the equivalent of about $1
billion; the Bundesbank about $800 million; and
the Bank of England approximately $500 million.
The greater part of the intervention was carried
out without public announcement, since the cen-
tral banks did not want to create the impression
that they were the only source of strength for
weak currencies.
Resumed intervention to support the dollar
reflected official concern at the growing insta-
bility in the exchange markets. The intervention
was designed to minimize the short term fluctua-
tions and slow the rise of the German mark and
the slide of the dollar, the lira, and pound. No
country was willing to undertake the multi-billion
dollar effort needed to defend the existing ex-
change rates against powerful market forces.
Intervention this time around did help to
blunt currency fluctuations. Nevertheless, the
mark continued to appreciate, and the Bundes-
bank, under considerable pressure from other
governments, had to relax its tight money policy25X1
It was not until the German inter-bank interest
rate dropped sharply on 30 July that pressure on
the dollar and the joint float eased.
10 Aug 73
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