WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 3, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
Secret
3 August 1973
No. 0381/73
Copy N2 44
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
CONTENTS (3August 1973)
1 Detente in Eastern Europe: Reassurances
and Warnings; Pact Meeting; Bulgaria
3 South Asia: Little Progress
4 Visiting Prime Ministers: Japan; Australia
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
S Indochina
7 China: A Quiet Army Day
7 Philippines: Marcos Progresses
8 Oil in Southeast Asia
9 Thailand-Burma: The End of Lo Hsing-han
12 EC: Talking about Defense
12 CEMA Approaches the EC
13 GATT: Ready to Begin
14 Italy: A Decisive Rumor
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
16 Greece: A Confident President
16 Cyprus: New Stresses
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
1 / Cuba: Celebration, Castro Style
18 Peru: Steady as She Goes
19 Ecuador: Political Battlefield
20 Chile: Stuck on Square One
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summary,
F- F
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
ILLEGIB
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
2 lihe Soviet leadership is trying to walk the
thin line between extolling detente's virtues and
convincing the Soviet people and Communists
everywhere of the need to remain vigilant against
ideological subversion. The task would be diffi-
cult under any circumstances, but the variety of
audiences to be dealt with makes it all the more
complicated.1
[A number of Soviet leaders have already
? taken part in the campaign. Brezhnev, party ideol-
ogist Suslov, and Defense Minister Grechko have
all spoken out since Brezhnev's return from his
trips to Bonn, Washington, and Paris. None of
them has expressed any reservations, however,
about the wisdom of the detente policy itself, nor
has there been any evidence of important institu-
tional opposition to that policy. Even the military
has taken a strong stand in support of detente]
I fBrezhnev, nevertheless, has hinted that
reservations about detente exist in the USSR and
among its allies. In his Lenin Peace Prize speech
he observed that moving from con-
on 11 July
,
frontation to peace is not easy. He offered
implicit reassurances to the doubters that the
leadership would remain vigilant, but reaffirmed
his commitment to detente and said that the
USSR must also be ready to head off any attempt
to resume the cold war.T
2
I fBrezhnev returned to the charge on 13 July,
in a speech marking the 70th anniversary of the
birth of Lenin's Bolshevik Party. Addressing com-
munists at home and abroad, Brezhnev pointed
out that the USSR's foreign policy "ensures the
further deepening of fraternal relations" with
otter socialist countries and "promotes the
strengthening of the unity of the communist
movement and of all anti-imperialist forces."
Only then did he note that implementation of the
"Soviet peace program" is likely to diminish the
danger of a new war.]
(Speaking at the same celebration, Suslov
Jreminded his audience of Lenin's bitter quarrels
wits other leftist leaders over political and organi-
zational questions. Suslov insisted that commu-
nist parties must always be highly centralized and
disciplined organizations dedicated to the goal of
a dictatorship of the proletariat. He emphasized
that membership must be restricted to politically
active people, whose actions and beliefs are in
keeping with party principles. While endorsing
detente, he pointed out that the central com-
mittee plenum last April had called for greater
vigilance against the imperialists' "hostile ideolog-
ical diversions."]
1 rMany Soviet commentators have directly
j..addressed questions that have been raised about
2 detente. They have said that it will endure, that it
represents the best interests of the USSR, the
other socialist countries, the international com-
munist movement, and the non-communist world,
anc that benefits are already flowing from it.
They have also reassured critics that the leader-
ship will not be "too trusting" vis-a-vis the
"capitalists," that Soviet military strength will be
preserved, and that trade with "capitalism" will
not open the door to "penetration" or "exploita-
tion" of the Soviet economy. In addition, the
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
SECRET ~-'
USSR will not desert its "socialist" allies and will
continue to support "national liberation" aspira-
tions.''
1 Trhese commentators have -also warned that
,a-the recent relaxation of international tension does
not mean peaceful coexistence on the ideological
front. Efforts to protect the purity of communist
beliefs and the strength of the commitment to
communism's long-term goals must be increased
as detente goes forward on a state-to-state level.
Moscow has also insisted that discipline must be
tightened in the international communist move-
ment, and that individual parties must not lose
internal discipline if they choose to cooperate
with social democrats and other leftistsl
41 Lhina, potentially the most controversial
topic, was treated only obliquely. The communi-
que warned that constant vigilance is necessary
against those who are "creating distrust and
hostility among peoples," but this was probably
aimed at both Western and Chinese opponents of
detente. On relations among Communists, the
participants adopted the Romanian formulation,
which calls for "close fraternal cooperation of
communists of all countries."]
a
The air of secrecy surrounding the central
committee plenum on 17-19 July and the sudden
revival of anti-American
r
l
d
t
k
p
opagan
a
as
wee
1 0 suggest that some elements of the party leader-
hi
il
.
h
p st
l
arbor strong reservations about detente]
U s
f The third annual meeting of the party
leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries plus Mon-
golia was held in the Crimea on 30-31 July n the ,g IThe plenum, which was devoted to foreign
absence of frequent meetings of the Warsaw . policy, failed to produce the strong endorsement
Pact's Political Consultative Committee, the of closer ties with the West expected in the wake
Crimea meetings provide an informal setting for of Brezhnev's visit to the US. Fragmentary re-
discussing policy coordination; they have become ports indicate only that the meeting reaffirmed
an institution themselves.? Sofia's close ties to Moscow, while new openings
5 IThe meeting gave Soviet party chief Brezh-'?
Y nev a chance to describe his recent visits to Bonn,
Washington, and Paris. As expected, the other
party leaders expressed firm support for Mos-
cow's detente policy and singled out Brezhnev's
personal contribution for special praise. If con-
troversy arose, the bland communique issued at
the end of the meeting did not show it]
1i The party leaders restated their goal of
ending the European Security Conference this
year, with the final session at the summit level.
They made a bow toward Western concerns over
freer movement in Europe by calling for "wide
and varied contacts between the public of all
countries," but they took it all back in the next
sentence, which stipulated that these contacts
must develop with strict respect for "sovereignty
and noninterference." The leaders also made a
standard reference to the "great importance" of
force reductions in Europe, but did not elaborate.7
to the West received but a passing nod. Indeed,
the regime's failure to publish the plenum
speeches of party boss Todor Zhivkov or anyone
else suggests that Zhivkov is still prodding some
of the faithful to join the era of detente.I
SECRET
3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
~~ JCVnC I =~;
5' the forced retirement of candidate polit-
buro member and former interior minister Angel
Tsanev also points to differences within the
leadership. The brand of communism advocated
by Tsanev and his followers apparently so far
exceeded the conservatism of Zhivkov that they
had to go.1
and hope for better US-Bulgarian relations made
by the deputy minister of foreign trade during his
mid-July tour of the US. The contradiction in-
dicates more than a lack of political sophistica-
tion on the part of the Bulgarians, and appears to
be another reflection of disagreement about
detente?
10 VOn top of this, anti-Americanism has, for no tiG lNevertheless, Zhivkov's recent speeches-
apparent reason, suddenly reared its head again] 'including his toast to visiting French Premier
Ibn 24 July, charges first made last April of US ? Messmer on 20 July-have reasserted Bulgaria's
peared in the Bulgarian press. The next day, all
North Korean anti-American display, comrnemo-
y rating the 20th anniversary of Pyongyang's
"victory" in the Korean conflict, appeared in the
10 Bulgarian People's Army House. These two events
11 contrast sharply with the expressions of good will
commitment to detente as defined by Moscow.
The more conservative elements in the Bulgarian
leadership, however, seem to be using Moscow's25X1
expressions of concern over those who may
misuse detente as an excuse to express their own
SOUTH ASIA: LITTLE PROGRESS
W, J\ week of hard bargaining by high-level
Indian and Pakistani negotiators in Islamabad has
resulted only in agreement to meet again in New
Delhi on 18 August. The negotiators seem to have
made a major effort to find areas in which com-
promise is possible, but with little success.
69 biscussions centered on the issues raised in
the India-Bangladesh joint declaration of 17
April. The Pakistanis stuck to their position that
all prisoners of war must be returned immediately
and that Bangladesh must not try some of them
for war crimes:?
')a rThe Indians have denied Pakistani press
charges that they raised "extraneous" questions
such as the recognition of Dacca by Pakistan and
Page 3
the admission of Bangladesh to the UN blocked
last year b a Chinese veto.IF
su si iary bi-
a era problems-the resumption of trade, for
example-could not be dealt with because
Islarnabad insisted that the major issues be settled
first 1
-?t)- Prospects for success in the next round of
talk!; appear bleak. The Pakistanis are unlikely to
charge their stand. The Indians, who have been
acting essentially as representatives of Bangladesh,
may make another effort to soften Dacca's
demands, but their chances of progress in that
direction are slim. If the negotiators fail to reach 25X1
agreement, another summit meeting between
Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi may be sought in an
attempt to break the impasse.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
Visiting Prime Ministers
(I _0
duly was a good month for Prime Minister
Kakuei Tanaka. Early in the month, Tanaka's
Liberal Democratic Party confounded the politi-
cal forecasters and held its own in the Tokyo
municipal elections. Tanaka had personally cam-
paigned for party candidates, and the party as a
whole appeared to take heart from the success. In
mid-month, the high-level meeting of the US-
Japan Joint Economic Committee in Tokyo pro-
vided an official forum for the Japanese to claim
that trade account problems had been generally
eliminated. The Japanese media liked the eco-
nomic talks and gave the Prime Minister's sched-
uled visit to Washington lots of favorable cover-
age.
Tanaka is taking back home with him a new
affirmation from President Nixon of the impor-
tance of Japan to the US. The two have met twice
in 11 months, and the joint proclamation of a
new era of relations, with stress on equal partner-
ship and cooperation, will enhance the Prime Min-
opposition parties are still boycotting the ses-
sions, and some critics are already calling it the
least productive of all postwar Diets.
Tanaka must find some way to get his re-
maining major legislation enacted without forcing
his bills through while the opposition is still out.
This sort of railroading is considered bad political
form in Japan. If he fails to get his legislation, his
detractors in his own party as well as in the
opposition will be out again in full cry?
55 JPrime Minister Whitlam's effective public
performance during his working visit to Washing-
ton this week will bolster his position back home,
already strengthened by his deft handling of the
is recent Labor Party conference'f-lis discussions
with President Nixon and other US officials have
received favorable treatment in the Australian
press. Whitlam's deportment probably also heart-
ened his more conservative countrymen, who
feared that his abrasive nature might damage US--
Australian relationslin publicly reaffirming the
importance Australia attaches to its US ties, Whit-
lam insisted that Australia under his leadership is
a friend and partner of the US-but one that has
ister's improved domestic position. The Prime r
Minister will have to move quickly and effectively
if he is to capitalize on the gains from his US trip.
His major problem is the Diet, which he was
forced to re-extend until 28 September. The
independent interests of its own.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
~ftw SECRET
is rcommunist regimes of varying stripes have
been calling attention recently to their direct ties
with the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary
Government in South Vietnam. In addition to the
publicity attending the accreditation in early June
of several Communist ambassadors who presented
their credentials somewhere in Quang Tri Prov-
ince, the subject of aid is figuring prominently in
Communist propaganda. The USSR, China, Mon-
golia, and Yugoslavia have announced that they
will be providing aid to the South Vietnamese
Communists directly, whereas in the past, foreign
assistance has been channeled through the North
Vietnamese. To drive home the point, a Mongol-
ian delegation has just presented Communist
officials in northern South Vietnam with some
2,400 tons of goods. In the sphere of political
support, Soviet leaders recently told visiting
Hanoi leaders Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, that
the Provisional Revolutionary Government
"alone" represents the genuine aspirations of the
South Vietnamese people.?
It [Efforts to enhance the status of the South
Vietnamese Communists as distinct from the
North Vietnamese were apparent before the
cease-fire agreement was signed last January, and
the trend has accelerated since then. Madame
Binh, for example, received a gala reception from
Peking on one of her trips from Paris late last year
and was similarly feted in Moscow in March and
April. For the Communist countries, beating the
drum for the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment undoubtedly serves as a cheap and con-
venient means of partially offsetting the unpalata-
ble messages they have been giving their Viet-
namese allies
It ]'Indeed, except for publicizing the aid agree-
men s and showy receptions, the Communist
countries are still treading carefully, with one eye
on Washington, when it comes to backing up the
Vietnamese Communists on specific issues. Only
Hungary echoed their recent charges concerning
US and South Vietnamese cease-fire violations,
and their line on the political impasse has fared
even worse. In an award ceremony for the "am-
bassador" from the revolutionary government in
Moscow last week, President Podgorny merely
expressed vague "solidarity" with Vietnamese
Communist positions, and added a pointed re-
minder that the USSR expects all parties to abide
by the cease-fire agreement?
/L he delegation, headed by Premier Pham
Van Dong, concluded visits to Poland and
Romania on 28 and 31 July, respectively, and
departed for Bulgaria.
14 [In Poland, the chief topic of discussion was
apparently post-war reconstruction of North Viet-
nam. There were few public references to the US
or to the ICCS, and nothing about Poland's prob-
lems on the ICCS. The joint statement issued at
the end of the visit was bland, with much mutual
praise but little substance. A Warsaw paper re-
ported that industrial cooperation would increase,
and Radio Hanoi claimed that the two sides
signed "agreements on loans, deferral of payment
on loans, and exchange of goods." The Poles
apparently did not follow the lead of Moscow and
Budapest in canceling Vietnamese obligations to
repay loans. The language also suggested that, like
the Soviets but unlike the Hungarians, the Poles
did not conclude a formal aid agreement. I
I7'[The delegation paid a brief visit to Romania
and signed several agreements there, including one
on economic and military assistance.)
i9 fGovernment and Communist negotiators in
Vientiane this week sat down to draft the actual
text of an agreement on how to implement the
Lao peace accord signed in February. Both sides
are saying that the major issues have been re-
solved and that a signing ceremony is near at
hand.?
``0f,The sudden surge toward agreement was the
resu 10f ,The
some significant Communist compro-
mises on provisions dealing with a coalition gov-
ernment. Communist envoy Phoumi Vongvichit
dropped his insistence that Pathet Lao leader
SouDhanouvong be named sole deputy prime min-
ister. The Communists also stopped demanding
the important cabinet portfolios of defense and
inte'ior. The last major obstacle was surmounted
when the Communists scaled down their demands
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
SECRET
Souvanna, however, clearly seems satisfied. He is
already preparing his rightist critics for the agree-
ment. Key members of the National Assembly
have been briefed on the terms and similar brief-
ings will probably be given to senior military
leaders. Some of the more intractable rightists
will object to any agreement, but others appear
picased that the Communists will control little
more of the government in Vientiane than they
did eleven years ago.1
2i The fighting is still close to Phnom Penh, but
little ground is changing hands. The city's key
lines of communication are open. Northwest of
the capital, government units clashed with Khmer
Communist elements within four miles of Pochen-
tong airport. To the south insurgent resistance
coupled with army command problems disrupted
government efforts to push down Route 3 and
regain a foothold along the Prek Thnaot River-
the only natural barrier in this sector. To the east,
small insurgent units skirted government defenses
on Route 2 and by midweek had begun harassing
outposts on either side of the Bassac River near
Takhmau-the capital's largest suburb. Other
on the number of Pathet Lao security troops to
be stationed in Vientiane and the royal capital of
Luang Prabangi
ZD 7i-hese concessions from the Communist side
followed by about two weeks Souvanna's decision
to accept the Communist concept of a delineation
of zones of control as well as Communist provi-
sions that could render supervision or inspection
of the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces
ineffective. In exchange for accepting less than a
lion's share of political power, the Communists
will have unfettered control of three fifths of the
country-the area important for protection of
North Vietnam's border and for Communist sup-
ply operations to South Vietnam and Cambodia.
Their share of the population is no more than a
third
'Za TLast-minute dickering over language and
minor issues could delay the signing of the new
agreement past the hoped for deadline next week.
i/
PHNONP`
PENH
Pochentong
Airfields
Takhmau
/ /
0 5
Miles
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
Jt=l.Kt I
insurgent elements late in the week cut Route 1
twelve miles southeast of Phnom Penh -1
CHINA: A QUIET A2Y evolution
ince the Cultral Revolution thrust the
armed forces into civilian politics in a major way,
Army Day on 1 August has been a major political
event in China. This year, however, it passed-as
have other recent holidays-without fanfare. i he
customary editorial did not appear, and the De-
fense Ministry reception was uneventful. Al-
though there had been much speculation in China
that the event would be used to publicize new
appointments to the military high command,
none emerged.
As part of its effort to reassert party control,
the regime has been attempting, with some suc-
cess, to disengage the army from politics, though
Peking evidently is still formulating specific guide-
lines on civil-military relations. This problem, to-
gether with an apparent desire to deflate the
tion until the Tenth Party Congress, which may
army's image, may account for the absence of an
Army Day editorial. Moreover, the Chinese could
be deferring further public discussion of the ques-
Ifavcrably anyway.l this vote of confidence fol-
PHILIPPINES: MARCOS PROGRESSES
-16 *[Philippine voters were put through their
paces on 27 July and gave the martial-law regime
of President Marcos an overwhelming mandate to
con-inue along the same lines indefinitely. Careful
preparations produced a 90-percent "yes" vote,
although there were good indications that a ma-
jority of Filipinos would probably have voted
lows the first ten months of martial law, during
which Marcos has largely neutralized potential
sources of opposition. Philippine security forces
have moved successfully against the political ap-
paratus of both the pro-Peking and pro-Moscow
communist parties. All but the most intractable
of Marcos opponents have now been released
from jail after promises of good behavior)
2.. (poradic rumors throughout martial law
h E! indicated that anti-Marcos groups were plan-
ning hostile action, but little open opposition ever
developed. The only major security problem, the
current Muslim rebellion in the south, is rooted in
historical social and economic tensions. The Mao-
ist New People's Army on Luzon, while still a
dangerous adversary, is currently content to avoid
direct confrontation with government forces.)
2 (From Marcos' standpoint, matters are well in
hand, and he is ready to begin building a more
permanent government structure to replace the ad
hoc style that has characterized his rule under
martial law. He plans to create a small legislative
advisory council of about 100 members. It will be
appointed by the President and include represent-
atives of former elective bodies and private inter-
est groups. The council will be charged with the
responsibility for appointing a successor to Mar-
cos should he die in office. Marcos apparently
believes that the lack of a clear successor has been
an important cause for misgivings about the long-
term stability of the Philippines, especially among
foreign and domestic businessmen. Resolution of
the succession problem will be the council's first
order of business.
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 Aug 73
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
ttKt
OIL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
3 1 the winding down of the Indochina conflict, 29 The most intense interest right now is in
combined with the growing world demand for oil, % South Vietnam. Thirteen companies, acting either
has stimulated new interest in the offshore areas individually or in consortiums, responded to Sai-
of Southeast Asia. Oil geologists regard these 3"gon's recent invitation to bid for offshore oil
areas as promising, but they have not yet been concessions. The four companies that were
adequately explored. This situation is changing awarded concessions-three are American-are re-
fast as a number of Western companies are step- quired to spend some $60 million on exploration
ping up their explorations and seeking new con- during the next five years to retain their conces-
cessions off Burma, Cambodia, India, Malaysia, sions,
South Vietnam, and Thailand. Even North Viet-
nam's offshore waters are drawing interest-) '.f the Italian state oil company and North
Vietnam reportedly have reached an "understand-
Gull -L
" ___
-
ing
viding for
-"brat'-' in th
1 Tonkin.
Jther areas in South Asia are getting atten-
? In Burma and India, new offshore con-
tracts are being negotiated with Western com-
panies in a startling reversal of earlier go-it-
alone policies;
? In Cambodia, the Ministry of Mining re-
cently awarded a concession to an American-
run Hong Kong firm;
? In Thailand, two US oil companies have
found traces of oil and gas offshore;
? In Malaysia, several promising discov-
eries recently prompted a government at-
tempt to replace existing concession arrange-
ments with production-sharing plans.
Conflicting territorial claims by several coun-
tries pose an obstacle to further exploration. This
is particularly true of the Gulf of Thailand, a very
promising area, parts of which are disputed by
South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Malay-
sia. In recent bidding for South Vietnamese con-
cessions, the companies avoided the gulf area and
concentrated largely on undisputed areas in the
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
1411111111K ; z t r i 1
Thai land/Burma
THE END OF LO HSING-HAN
3S the capture of a leading Southeast Asian
y opium smuggler earlier this month has thrown
some elements of the drug trafficking apparatus
36in the Thailand-Burma border area into disarray.
The capture also seems certain to put more pres-
sure on Bangkok to be more aggressive in re-
ducing narcotics trafficking in the border area.
The smuggler, Lo Hsing-han, was arrested by Thai
police on 17 July when he fled into Thailand to
escape the Burmese Army, which was attacking
his camp just inside the Burmese border. Lo's
brother, the financial mastermind of the opera-
tion, and other key officials of Lo's organization
were arrested a few weeks earlier by the Burmese.
Lo was deported to Burma on 2 August at
Rangoon's request.
35" [The collapse of Lo's empire will, for a time,
have an intimidating effect on other traffickers in
the area. It also brought to an end Lo's efforts to
3(Q ally opium traffickers and armed ethnic dissidents
against the government and the Burmese Commu-
nist Party. The arrests do not mean that the flow
of narcotics out of Burma has been stopped. Two
former Chinese Nationalist generals, who operate
a sizable smuggling apparatus from bases in north-
ern Thailand, are now in a position to become the
largest opium traffickers in the region-a develop-
ment certain to be of considerable embarrassment
to Thai officials.)
3 [The fact that the Thai were willing to col-
laborate in capturing and extraditing Lo is being
played up in the government-controlled Burmese
press as an important step forward in Thai-
Burmese relations. Bangkok could hardly have
refused help in this case, given Lo's notoriety.
Rangoon's stress on the need for greater Bur-
mese-Thai cooperation is probably motivated
partly by a desire to pressure the Thais into
stopping their support for Burmese dissident
groups and partly to shift some of the spotlight of
international criticism on the opium traffic away
Page 9
from Burma and nd.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved-For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
The UN impasse on the Middle East was
soli ified last week when the Security Council
debate concluded with a US veto. The debate--
which had been in recess since June--produced
virtually no new initiatives. The only hint of
movement, an Egyptian suggestion early in the
session that Cairo might consider separating the
return of its own territories from the Palestinian
question, was lost in a melee of accusations and
bitter rhetoric.
Secretary General Waldheim's fact-finding
trip to the area seems likely to produce little, if
anything; it does continue the illusion of diplo-
matic activity. Grateful for the US veto, the Is-
raelis are proffering full hospitality, but the
Arabs are expected to give Waldheim a cool recep-
tion. It is possible that the council will meet again
in September to hear Waldheim's report, but the
fall activities of the General Assembly should
discourage another debate.
This third US veto, within a year. of a non-
aligned resolution may lead to some counter-
action or issues like the Korean question in the
fall General Assembly, where the nonaligned hold
a majority and there is no veto. Within the past
week, nonaligned representatives blocked Western
initiatives for UN action on terrorism and issued a
statement condemning US bombing in Cambodia.
The veto also opened a rift between the US
and the other Western members of the council.
These states accepted the nonaligned resolution as
reasonable and have let it be known that they feel
the US was too rigid. They also indicated that
they could not permit themselves to be arrayed
with the US against countries with whom they
have major commercial interests. Some of them
see in last week's events evidence of increasing US
disinterest in the UN.
I n Egypt, the veto brought new disil-
lusionment. It confirmed the Egyptian view, re-
stated by President Sadat in a speech immediately
after the conclusion of the debate, that the US
and Israel are engaged jointly in a campaign to
induce Egypt to sue for peace on Israeli terms.
Sadat interpreted the veto as evidence of full US
support for Israel, for its negotiating terms, and
for its position in the occupied territories. He
may now look to other mediators than the US
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
StUKt I =
EC: TALKING ABOUT DEFENSE
' (p Recent meetings of the Nine have high-
lighted the lingering doubts in major West Euro-
147 pean countries about the implications for Euro-
t pean security of the US-Soviet agreement on the
i j prevention of nuclear war?
recognizes the EC as a reality and has appointed
CEMA Secretary General Fadeyev to negotiate
with the Western bloc. Having several years ago
abandoned hopes that the EC would disappear of
its own accord, the USSR has been moving to-
ward recognition of the need to deal with the EC
on an official basisl As long ago as March 1972,
A/& fAn Italian official claims that the French are Brezhnev was acknowledging the "reality" of EC.
still more critical of the agreement than anyone
else. At a meeting last week in Copenhagen, they
reiterated the theme that the two superpowers are
intent on becoming world policemen, thus seri-
ously reducing the decision-making role of smaller
countries. While the German representatives at
the meeting stoutly maintained the official line
that Bonn had received all the assurances it re-
quired from the US during Defense Minister
Leber's visit to Washington, they still seemed to
harbor private misgivings. The Italians appeared
to be somewhere between the French and the
Germans in their view of the agreement.I
LfC [The Italians claim that a specific working
group has been set up to analyze the US-Soviet
agreement in detail. The German version is that
7 all that has been planned is an informal considera-
tion of the agreement prior to meetings of the EC
j. political directors and foreign ministers in early
49
September. Whatever the case, this is the second
time this year that the EC's political consultation
machinery has discussed a defense topic of major
importance. Unlike the talks held in such NATO
forums as the Eurogroup, the EC discussions in-
volve the French. If the trend toward EC consid-
eration of defense topics continues, these discus-
sions could assume a more important role in con-
certing W tern European opinion on security
questions
Last December, Brezhnev said that a way could
probably be found for the two blocs to establish
business relations if the EC would refrain from
"all attempts at discrimination." The ap-
pointment of Fadeyev was probably decided at
the CEMA council meeting in June.1
SO in addition to removing a contradiction to
their policy of detente, the Soviets probably ex-
pect some tangible benefits from a more positive
attitude toward the EC. They may anticipate that
CEMA's bargaining position will be strengthened
if bloc-to-bloc negotiations take place and that
concessions can be obtained in areas like agri-
culture. Eastern European agricultural products
have encountered difficulties in the EC market in
recent years because of the EC Common Agricul-
tural Policy.
tJ The USSR undoubtedly hopes that by using
CEMA to negotiate with the EC, the Soviets will
be better able to control the tendency of individ-
ual Eastern European states to deal bilaterally
with the West. Some Eastern European countries
may for the same reason resist formal bloc-to-bloc
relations. Some are also concerned with maintain-
ing their own relations with the EC. Romania, for
example, independently applied for the general-
ized preferences for EC grants to less-developed
countries and was accepted by the EC in June.)
horn said the Soviets told him that the ball
is now in the EC court. Although the Soviet move
CEMA APPROACHES THE EC oses problems for the community, the EC con-
siders Soviet recognition, by itself, a welcome
50 TSoviet officials in Moscow told Prime Minis- development. The Soviet proposal for direct EC-
ter Thorn of Luxembourg last week that CEMA CEMA negotiations is another matter altogether.
SECRET
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
1 1 " A '
that trade in agricultural and industrial products
siould be handled similarly as the US would like,
the EC position that there are "special problems"
was also recognized.
g;i LThe declaration suggests that participating
governments obtain negotiating authority as
repidly as possible in orde
t
ll
t
lk
r
o a
ow
a
s about
fn re-examining this position, the EC Com-S3specifics to start. This preference for speed re-
The EC has long opposed such negotiations, not
only because of a reluctance to acknowledge
CEMA as an equal, but also because of the practi-
cal problems of dealing with a regional grouping
that lacks, among other things, a convertible cur-
rency, a payments union, and a meaningful equiv-
alent of the common external tariff.?
proposal for negotiations that might rely pri-
marily upon working contacts between the EC
and the individual states of Eastern Europe, and
reserve a suitably ambiguous, token role for
CEMA. The commission will, in any case, take
time to achieve a common EC position, especially
since the community has not yet really begun to
grapple with the substance of the common com-
mercial policy it is suDDosed to annly to the East
mission may succeed in working out a counter-
GATT: READY TO BEGIN
Si in a month-long meeting at Geneva, top
trade officials of some 80 developed and develop-
ing countries succeeded in drafting a declaration
S')L'of principles to guide the coming multi-national
flects EC fears that too much may be "given
away" in the negotiating preliminaries if US trade
legislation is held up in Congress. On the other
hand, the EC agreed with the US contention that
Washington's lack of authorizing legislation does
not prevent analytical work from beginning right
alter the formal opening of the trade negotia-
tions.
S,L the question of whether the trade negotia-
tions can move forward only after monetary sta-
J bility is achieved also remains to be settled in
Tokyo. The US position has been that progress in
the monetary area is dependent upon progress in
the trade negotiations. Paris' extreme version of
the monetary-trade link was rejected by its EC
partners in favor of a formulation calling for
parallel progress in the two areas but would go no
further)
trad
e negotiations. The agreement on a draft 57 jThe active participation by the developing
11
5)
ma es it all but certain that a ministerial meeting countries at the preparatory committee meetings
in Tokyo, scheduled for 12-14 September, will J made it evident that the trade negotiations will
kick off the negotiations, which have come to be r.2involve a rich-poor confrontation. In the bar-
known as the Nixon Round. The draft avoids gaining over the draft declaration the
rinci
al
p
p
, decisions, however, on several differences that are a' points gained by the less-developed nations were a
certain to re-emerge not only in Tokyo but also r3watered-clown version of their demand for pref-
during the negotiations themselves. The negotia- erential treatment and a provision calling for
Geneva in November and to end in 1975.1
x' . Several controversies involving the US, EC,
and Japan remain. Language was finally found in
J- Geneva to disguise differences over the treatment
r,of agriculture, but this will remain a very prickly
issue between the US and the community. Al-
though the declaration embraces the contention
special procedures for negotiations between them
and the developed countries. A dispute between
the Africans and the Latin Americans over special
consideration for the least developed countries, a
category that includes some African countries but
no Latin American ones, will be carried into the
Tokyo meeting. The draft reflects wide support
on this point for the Africans, particularly from
the less-develnnpri rniinfrinc in Asia.
25X1
25X1
Page 13
SECRET
3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
SECRE F_
iro s S 04A
With parliament's long summ recess abou
to begin next week, Prime Minister Rumor has
invoked emergency decree laws to attack the soar-
ing inflation that he regards as Italy's number one
economic problem.
Last week he slapped a three-month freeze
on the price of food and the output of large
industrial firms. Rents for persons with low
incomes were frozen until the end of the year.
The freeze package deals primarily with the
symptoms rather than the underlying causes of
the Italian inflation. The freeze should succeed in
temporarily stemming the inflation and reducing
expectations of further price increases that lead
to inflationary hedging. The ultimate success of
the measures will depend in part on whether price
movements can be effectively monitored and
public cooperation enlisted in a country where
circumventing regulations is a fine art. The gov-
ernment is unwilling to endanger Italy's precari-
ous economic recovery and hesitates to invoke
really strong deflationary measures in support of
its anti-inflationary program. In addition, Ru-
mor's commitment to long-awaited social reforms
snakes significant cuts in government spending
unlikely.
Rumor is aided by widespread sentiment in
favor of emergency measures. He will probably
secure parliamentary approval of the decrees be-
fore the recess next week, since he has the sup-
port of his coalition partners. Labor leaders have
been cooperative so far, and the opposition has
maintained a low profile. Only the Neo-Fascists
opposed the measures in early parliamentary
voting, while the Communists and Liberals ab-
stained. Governmental cohesion will not be tested
severely until parliament returns in the fall and
has to make some very tough choices on domestic
reform issues.
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
SECRET
USSR: THE ECONOMY AT MID-YEAR
The economic report for the first six months
of t e year pictures a mild recovery from the
poor performance of 1972, although shortages of
C;q agricultural raw materials, growing out of the
poor harvest last year, continue to limit gains in
industrial output. Industrial production for civil-
ian purposes grew by about 5.7 percent, much
less than the recovery achieved in he first half of
1970 after the bad harvest in 19691
r5? rThe output of all industrial materials, except
for electric power and petroleum products, grew
at higher rates than a year ago. In the machinery
category, the growth of producer durables slipped
from the rate achieved a year ago, but consumer
durables continued to improve, boosted by
Civilian Industrial Growth
(Annual percentage rate)
1970
1971
1972
1973*
Over-all Industrial Production
7.0
6.0
5.0
5.5
Industrial Materials
7.0
5.5
5.0
5.5
Machinery
Consumer nondurables
9.0
10.0
8.0
9.0
expanding production of television sets and re- suggests that consumers can expect supplies to
frigerators7 improve in the coming months.
fiP lOther indicators of trends in consumer wel- S'S rlndustries producing goods for use in agri-
fare were mixed. Soft goods posted a modest cult? re posted a respectable, but not outstanding,
4' recovery after near stagnation last year. The out-I' performance. Increases in the output of fertilizer,
5q put of processed foods slipped; vegetable oils tractors, and agricultural machinery were in
were down 15 percent and processed meat was keeping with the modest annual goals for the Five
off by 6 percent Year Plan. Despite recent setbacks in farm
J7? The leadership's determination to maintain
or expand herds despite shortages of feed grain
4 and fodder led to a decline in meat production.
By mid-year, herds in the socialized sector (three
fourths of the total) were increased 2 percent
above the levels of mid-year 1972. Although meat
supplies were inadequate in half of the provincial
cities visited by officers from Embassy Moscow
during the first six months, the build-up of the
herds, together with further imports of grain,
output, Moscow apparently feels that the
1971-75 program to support agriculture is still
adequate
i 7 [Prospects for 1974 are brighter because of
encouraging reports from the investment sector
and the 1973 harvest. New plant completions
increased by 13 percent in the first half of 1973
compared with the first half of 1972. Crop and
livestock production should rebound, ensuring a
much larger flow of raw materials from h farms
next year. 25X1
-ECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
SECRET
GREECE: A CONFIDENT PRESIDENT
7 &George Papadopoulos-the first President of
the new republic-appears confident and in con-
trol of his government. The 78.4-percent "yes"
vote must be officially approved by the Supreme
Court within fifteen days of last Sunday. The
court is also obliged to consider formal com-
plaints contesting the validity of the vote, and
opposition politicians plan to submit a list o+
")voting irregularities. The vote claimed by the re-
gime will be validated, however, despite the offi-
cial pressure and the usual skulduggery that
clearly inflated the size of the affirmative vote.?
7,f jPapadopoulos' victory statement on 30 July
included a pledge to fulfill his pre-election prom-
ises. One of his deputies, Stylianos Pattakos,
stressed to the US ambassador that the regime
intends to follow scrupulously its constitutional
obligations. Pattakos said that a constitutional
court would be set up immediately to oversee the
creation of political parties. He added that munic-
ipal and national elections would be held by the
end of 1974, although the regime has not yet
determined which election will come first.)
77 VThe make-up of the republican cabinet is in
doubt. The altered constitution will require a
major re-organization of the government appara-
tus, but Papadopoulos intends to move slowly
and carefully. Military opposition increased dan-
gerously as a result of his rush to establish a
republic, and Papadopoulos wants to avoid gener-
ating unnecessary frictions over the appointment
of a cabinet. His key military supporters tear that,
now that he has increased his powers, he will no
NAI
ox'
Greets
Few Chose "OXI "
longer have to consider their views and interests.
To allay their fears and check their disaffection,
Papadopoulos may stretch out the cabinet selec-
tion process until fall, particularly if he wishes to
weed out some of the more contentious members
of the oresent government.
CYPRUS: NEW STRESSES
7P pore than 70 bombings, along with the kid-
naping of a cabinet minister, are the latest prod-
ucts of the struggle between Archbishop Makarios
and George Grivas. One casualty occurred as a
result of the bomb attacks, which have come
from supporters of both Grivas and the govern-
akarios has blamed Grivas for the kidnap-
ing. The kidnapers, who have held Justice Minis-
ter Vakis since 27 July, have not made their
demands known, but a pro-Grivas daily has called
for the resignation of Makarios and the dispersal
of his auxiliary police force. Makarios has repeat-
edly said that he will not yield to blackmail, and
after the kidnaping vowed to wipe out Grivas'
underground bands
JO/ [The Archbishop has recently strengthened
his security forces, rounded up scores of Grivas
adherents, and restricted the pro-Grivas press. Al-
though the aged Grivas' health reportedly is fail-
ing and his supporters are heavily outnumbered
by Makarios' forces, he and they appear deter-
mined to retaliated
Tone aspect of the rivalry-and the immediate
c aus of the current incidents-is the controversy
in the Cyprus church. A few months ago, Grivas
and Athens supported an attempt by three bish-
ops to defrock Makarios unless he agreed to relin-
quish his presidential powers. The Archbishop
responded by convening a church synod that re-
buked the bishops and defrocked them instead. In
late July, Makarios enthroned the first new
bishop. The Archbishop's intention to pursue his
purge of those who have challenged him ensures
continuing problems, and probably more vio-
lence? for the troubled Greek Cypriot commu-
nity.
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
.~ Jt'_,I1t I IiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiV
CUBA: CELEBRATION, CASTRO STYLE
oO3JUnrelenting hostility toward the US was the
main theme of Fidel Castro's anniversary speech
on 26 July. Although his rejection of rapproche-
ment conflicts with the Soviet policy of detente,
his comments on domestic matters revealed pol-
icy shifts that clearly show his increased accept-
ance of Moscow's advice on the home front--even
when it entails embarrassing ideological back-
trackingI
,P2TAlthough Castro did not address the subject
of Cuban-US relations directly, in discussing
hemispheric politics he cast the two countries in
clear-cut adversary roles. He thus reaffirmed his
espousal of confrontation as the best means of
capitalizing on what he sees as a growing anti-US
trend in Latin America. He also reiterated his
long-standing rejection of Cuba's reintegration
into the Organization of American States and
called for a new regional organization, excluding
the US, that would enable the countries of Latin
America to stand together against the US. He that, because the level of "political awareness" in
ruled out any reorganization or rejuvenation of Cuba remained relatively low, material incentives
J?j the OAS, saying: "It makes no sense to revive it; would have to be added to moral stimuli. He
let us allow it to die a natural death." His remarks83vacillated on this ideological point until 1967,
were a rebuff to those Latin American loaders when he shifted to strict adherence to moral
who have been working to readmit Cuba as an incentives. Following the economic problems of
active partici ant in th OAS
e
p
J
22 While he declined to follow Moscow's policy
of detente, Castro had warm praise for Soviet
economic and military assistance and defended
the USSR against "certain leaders... of the third
world" who speak of "two imperialisms." He
characterized those who draw parallels between
the USSR and the US as servants of the "real
1970, however, material rewards gradually reap-
peared, and regime spokesmen had to perform
coivoluted verbal gymnastics to explain them in
light of official policy. Castro has now accepted
publicly the Soviet line that, although moral
incentives are superior, both must still be em-
ployed at Cuba's state of political development)
imperialism." He probably made these statements P2, [Moreover, Castro hinted that he is playing a
with an eye on the conference of so-called non- smaller role in the regime's decision-making
aligned countries, scheduled for Algeria in Sep- process---yet another trend that the Soviets have
tember. He may have decided to lead Cuba's been pushing. He put it this way: "If in the
delegation himself and was using this speech as a uncertain times of 26 July (1953) and in the first
means of getting a leg up on a leadership role at years of the revolution, men individually played
the conference. If he does go, he will undoubt- decisive roles, that role is now being played by
edl attempt to orient the proceedings against the the party. Men die; the party is immortal." A
UST lesser role for Fidel has been apparent ~ for some
time, but he has never admitted it publicly
?[Turning to the domestic scene, he ackriowl- before. He has not however, lost his grip on
edged the "idealistic mistakes we have made in power. He still is undisputed ruler and has merely
managing the economy" and called for a careful transferred to others a number of responsibilities
_ -
accounting of ex
end +?r
d
es an
p
costs mat
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
S+f In his fifth presidential independence day
message, President Velasco lashed out against op-
r ponents of his regime and declared that the mili-
86tary government will carry on "unflinchingly"
with the economic, social, and political trans-
formation of Peru. He made no mention of retire-
ment.
ooJ,
0(
1J Velasco appears to have resumed his role of
moderator between radical and moderate factions
in the military. He declared that the regime must
consolidate achievements attained so far, but that
it must also "deepen the course of the revolu-
tion." This deepening, he said, will come in the
form of action on the government's plans to buy
out the US-owned Cerro de Pasco Company and
promulgation of a long-awaited law on the owner-
ship of property7
remain in private hands and need not be subject
to "revolutionary" reforms as larger private
businesses have been.
I JAs he has done so often, Velasco emphasized
that the Peruvian "revolution" is unique and op-
posed to all dogmatic and totalitarian attitudes.
The President went further than usual in disasso-
ciating it from commurlism, but he also de-
nounced blind anti-communism.)
Joj 11 he counter-revolutionary threat was once
again identified as an unholy alliance between
displaced oligarchs who want to return to the past
and dogmatic leftists who do not really know
what they want. Velasco sees the former as the
more dangerous, and his bitterest denunciations
were for newspapers acting as the "principal
Yspokesmen of right-wing counter-revolutionary
JOVLln an apparent concession to the moderates, extremism." Behind the regime's most virulent
the President reiterated that the state will never critics, according to Velasco, is the powerful hand
dominate the economy. He promised that "small of unnamed "imperialist foreign interests" which
:( scale" commercial and service enterprises will simultaneou ly encourage the right and finance
the ultraleftI
f ay Iln a point-by-point refutation of what he
billed as the main lines of attack against the
military government, Velasco denounced de-
mands for a return to constitutionality, declared
that social mobilization and agrarian reform will
move ahead despite "minor mistakes," and hinted
at increased government cont I over the media.
More than hints are involved the Lima daily El
1C'onnercio is once again under pressure from gov-
s'rnment-instigated labor trouble,
' %Velasco said that participatory democracy is
still the revolution's goal, but he gave no indica-
tion of when the people might start participating.
Velasco also asserted that the regime knows
where it wants to go, but he failed to mention
that most Peruvians do not aooear anxious to go
along.
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
SECRET
ECUADOR: POLITICAL BATTLEFIELD
27 [A war of words has broken out between
Ecuador's military rulers and civilian political
leaders. The battle threatens to spread, although
the regime of President Rodriguez does not yet
appear to be in real danger.
$)7 11 n June, the press began to carry anti-gov-
ernment statements by civilian politicians who
had kept a low profile since the military took
power in February 1972. The politicians were
joined by retired Rear Admiral Valdivieso, who
71
otticers is especially disquieting to the armed
P7 forces commanders, who believe such dissent
reflects on the military as a whole?
2 7 Last month, the Democratic Restoration
Front was formed. It includes several of the larger
parties, and Valdivieso has come out in support of
ao the front. Although the parties have agreed to
oppose the military government, they have not
yet been able to overcome political and person-
ality differences or to agree on a plan to replace
the current regime.
)7tresident Rodriguez has led the counter at-
tack against this wave of criticism. The govern-
ment has warned that it will not tolerate the
pq spreading of "false" or "subversive" charges, and
has reiterated its resolve to continue in power
until its loosely defined goals are met. Minister of
? Government Poveda has said that Valdivieso prob-
ably will be arrested..-
8? #T h e military government apparently is
united in meeting this challenge. There are no
signs that Proano or Valdivieso has significant
support within the armed forces, although each
probably has a small following among younger,
more liberal officers. The government's sharp
reaction to the criticism, however, indicates that
the leaders are concerned, not only about general
disenchantment with military rule, but because
the opposition may be growing confident enough
to publicize documentation on official cor-
ruption.
It is highly unlikely that Rodriguez would
step down without a fight, and there is no other
officer to replace him who commands a wide base
of support. The President, however, is likely to
find himself under increasing criticism unless he
can give at least a semblance of direction to his
administration. He may use some nationalistic
issue-territorial seas or petroleum resources-to
relieve the domestic pressure.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
was fired by Rodriguez over a year ago.
3 Aug 73
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
6E( -;HE I
, 3 'resident Allende's "dialogue" with Chris-
ban Democratic spokesmen this week only com-
plicated Chile's prolonged political imbroglio. The
' - -
iti
l
d All
l
i
d
d
'
d
oppos
on
ea
ers rejecte
en
ng tac-
e
s
e
ay
tcs in responding to their demands. They did not,
however, have a firm plan ready to use against the
1r administration, despite their expectation that the
qI talks would founder
4 3 tThe various plans under consideration by the
Christian Democrats are not new. They consist
IV chiefly of congressional action or another nation-
cwide strike that they hope would pressure Al-
lende to make concessions or create a pretext for
some sort of military take-over of the govern-
ment. Either course of action would require a
' degree of coordination, decisiveness, and strong
leadership thus far lacking in most opposition
ry~y moves against Allende. Additionally, divisions
within the armed forces still inhibit significant
military action against the government. General
Prats r in spokesman for military con
cerns.
'$ lthough Allende would like to find a for-
mul to relieve political and economic unrest, he
probably believes he has little to gain and much
to lose from making concessions. To the demand
for a military cabinet, he pointed out that his
relations with the military "are not good" and
that officers might not cooperate in the unlikely
event that his Popular Unity coalition would
accept them in the cabinet. The Christian Demo-
crats believe that Allende fears his own Socialist
13Party would leave the coalition if he were to
appear to moderate the government
Z Meanwhile, a truckers' strike like the one
that touched off a widespread economic shut-
down last October has greatly aggravated already
#' 7serious supply problems. The naval commandant
of Valparaiso has been put in charge of Chile's
major port, which is also the focal point of a bus
~f _Sowners' strike. Railroad and fuel lines have been
blown up to increase the impact of the truck
q 7 strike, and violence is once again on the rise
hr u h ut the country.
qt
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Aug 73
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400050001-3