WEEKLY SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
20 April 1973
No. 0366/73
Copy N2 48
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EEK.LY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
of Current Intelligence, reports and anaiyzes signif-
developments of the week through noon on Thursday,
ntiy includes material coordinated with or prepared
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
I the Directorate of Science and Technology,
ing more comprehensive treatment and there-
itely as Special Reports are lister, in the
1 Middle East
4 Trade Talks: Initial Moves
9 China at ECAFE
10 China: An Old War Horse Returns
11 Japan: A Bigger Navy
11 Australia: Problems Down Under
12 USSR-US: Accentuating the Positive
13 Poland: Buying From the US
14 West Germany: More OstpolitikC
16 France: Defense Spending
16 Yugoslavia: Tito, Ex Cathedra
17 Norway: Negotiations with the EC
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
18 South Asia: New Proposal
i8 Turkey: New Cabinet
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20 Chile: Tough Winter Ahead
21 South of the Border
21 Uruguay: Painful Solutions Needed
22 Brazil
'3 OAS: Third General Assembly
24 Argentina: Peronists Roll On
CONTENTS (20Apri11973)
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summary,)
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The
Middle East
r ~r
The area was seething a bit more th'n usual
last week, and developments in Libya, Egypt,
Lebanon, and Israel gave little promise that ten-
sions are likely to ease soon.
In two free-swinging speeches this week that
were vintage Qadhafi, the Libyan leader tried to
breathe new life into his revolution, now three
and one half years old. He made it clear that he
was fed up with domestic opposition to his pol-
icies and characteristically threatened to resign if
a "new revolution" is not carried out.
The most extraordinary aspect of the two
speeches was Qadhafi's call for armed "popular"
committees to carry out a cultural battle against
foreign influences and the "arrogant and edu-
cated" classes. Concerned with the deepening
controversy in Libya over the proposed union
with Egypt, Qadhafi may view these "popular"
units as a sharp warning that he intends to get
tough. He told a crowd of some 6,000 laborers,
bureaucrats and students to form these commit-
Page 1
tees immediately, and some reportedly have al-
ready been created in the government and private
firms. The new groups will probably not be very
effective in the way Qadhafi would like, but they
certainly contain seeds of much future trouble.
Although the major emphasis in the speeches
was on domestic problems, Qadhafi did say that
he had no personal differences with presidents
Sadat and Asad and that he believed in their
"sincere patriotism." Qadhafi's bow to his
partners probably was intended as a bit of fence-
mending as well as an effort to underscore Libya's
commitment to both the confederation and union
with Egypt. At the same time, the Libyan leader
did not pass up the opportunity to again warn
other Arab governments against seeking separate
settlements with Israel. As he has in the past,
Qadhafi accused the other Arab governments of
working only to restore their occupied territories
and complained that Libya alone is committed to
all-out war with Israel. He also asserted that Libya 25X1
has not been party to Arab "battle plans," and
therefore, he would not shoulder the blame for
another Arab defeat.
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CYCLE OF VIOLENCE
The sabotage on 14 April of US-owned oil
facilities near Sidon, Lebanon, suggests that the
fedayeen have recovered from the shock of the
Israeli raid of 10 April. The Lebanese Revolution-
ary Guard, an obscure extremist organization,
claimed credit. It seems far more likely, however,
that the fedayeen are using the so-called guard as
a cover. Two other attempts were made against
the US-owned Trans-Arabian Pipeline, one in
southern Lebanon, one in Saudi ArabiaJ
The day before the strike against the Sidon
facility Fatah leader Arafat declared the US
"'would not have to wait long" for a "terrible
reprisal." Throughout the week, the Palestinian
press hammered hard on the theme of US collu-
sion with the Israelis. It was charged, for example,
that US Marine guards attached to the embassy
participated in the Israeli attacks. Scant coverage
was given in the Lebanese press to the US
rebuttal, moderate publishers being intimidated
by the threat of fedayeen retribution. The govern-
ment-controlled media in a number of Arab coun-
Aftermath of Terrorist Sabotage
tries joined in the effort to incite anti-US senti-
ment. The treatment was particularly virulent in
Iraq, Syria, and Algeria..]
The Lebanese Government has managed so
far to cope with fedayeen demonstrations. The
funeral for the slain fedayeen leaders drew crowds
estimated at 100,000-the largest in recent years.
Although anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment
ran high and 300-400 armed fedayeen marched in
the cortege, there were no disorders. President
Franjiyah, moving to replace Prime Minister
Salam who resigned the day of the Israeli raid, on
18 April charged Amin al-Hafiz, a moderate leftist
member of the Chamber of Deputies, with the
formation of a cabinet. Hafiz' task will be to
select a politically and religiously balanced-
Christian/Muslim-government whose first objec-
tive will be to deal with domestic repercussions
from the latest Israeli incursiorr:
- { The Israelis are threatening further action.
Following Prime Minister Meir's praise of the
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Israeli raid, Defense Minister Dayan said that
Israel still held the Lebanese Government respon-
sible for fedayeen activity against Israel ema-
nating from Lebanon. He vowed further raids if
such activity is not halted. Dayan warned that the
Israelis would not wait to retaliate, but would
strike at the fedayeen before they struck at Israel.)
/Brigadier General Shalev, the deputy chief of
Israeli military intelligence, told US officials he
thought the major impact of the Israeli raid was a
demonstration of Israel's ability to strike at the
"very nerve center" of the fedayeen movement.
Shalev described this as a "staggering blow" to
fedayeen morale and to fedayeen plans and opera-
tions. Shalev had no illusions that the Israeli raid
would put an end to terrorism, but he called it a
"significant step ' in the eventual containment of
fedayeen activities in Lebanon. Other military
officials have warned again that Israel may strike
at fedayeen bases and at government facilities of
any Arab state supporting the terrorists.
V
Al The UN Security Council meetings on the
Lebanese complaint produced some heated ex-
changes and provide another opportunity for the
Arab states to focus attention on their cause.
Lebanon came under strong Arab pressure to
insist on a harsh resolution condemning Israel.
Led by Egypt, the Arab states seemed intent on
exploiting the Israeli raid and the Council forum
to embarrass and isolate both Israel and the USJ
)9 /The Egyptians appeared to hope that the
Council meetings might lead to a full debate on
the UN role in the Middle East. To this end,
Foreign Minister Zayatt was reported to favor a
resolution calling on the Secretariat to report on
the UN's efforts to achieve peace in the Middle
East by mid-May.
6 [Prime Minister Golda Meir has again tried to
muzzle the debate on the thorny question of the
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occupied Arab territories and to paper over the
differences on their future within her Labor
Party. The main questions being asked are how
much Arab territory should be retained, does the
addition of more Arabs pose a real demographic
threat to Israel, do continued Israeli settlement
and investment in the territories block peace ef-
forts. The "minimalists" and "maximalists" have
been discussing these questions-critical in this
election year-for months. Mrs. Meir asks, "Why,
when the Arabs are not ready to make peace with
us, should we quarrel among ourselves?" aI
Prime Minister Meir
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)The issue heated up recently when Defense
Minister Dayan reiterated his belief that Jews'` 1
should retain the right in any future peace settle-
ment to settle anywhere they want to in the
occupied territories. Dayan wants what he calls a
"clear statement" on this, i.e., one reflecting his
views, in the Labor Party campaign platform.
Then, Justice Minister Shapiro proposed that the
ban should be lifted against the purchase of Arab
lands in the territories-specifically the West
Bank-by individual Israelis or businesses.(
designs)JThe Israeli press claimed that US pres-
sures played a decisive role in forcing Mrs. Meir to
back away from the proposal. Labor Party boss
Finance Minister Sapir is also reported to have
voiced his strong opposition to Mrs. Meir. In any
event, the Israeli cabinet on 8 April announced
that the existing ban on purchases of occupied
Arab land would be maintained-only the Israeli
National Land Authority can purchase land and
then only with cabinet approval. The cabinet
communique denied that any proposals had been
submitted to the cabinet; actually Dayan,
Shapiro, and the National Religious Party each
a '! everal under-the-table land purchases have, had submitted a plan but had withdrawn them
in fa t, been concluded between Israeli purchasers when they learned that Mrs. Meir was opposed"
and Arab sellers-mostly in the Jerusalem area-)'(,, /Irs. Meir has indicated that the program of estab-
pending expected government approval. Dayan, fishing Israeli settlements in the occupied terri-
Shapiro, and ministers of the National Religious
Party support such purchases, while Foreign Min-
ister Eban, Finance Minister Sapir, and others are
opposed:~)Mrs. Meir originally took a middle-of-
the-road position, arguing that some purchases
could be permitted under tight controls. Arab
willingness to sell land to the Israelis-after 25
years of hostility-apparently stems from a con-
viction that the Israelis are going to stay in the
occupied territories. f
'
Several Arab states,
particularly Jordan,
poinfed out in Washington and at the UN that the
\
proposal to settle permanently in the occupied
territories was new proof of Israel's expansionist
TRADE TALKS: INITIAL MOVES
The EC Commission memorandum on a
community approach to the multilateral trade
negotiations coincided with President Nixon's
request for broad new trade powers from Con-
gress. The EC Council is pledged to respond to
the memorandum with a negotiating position no
later than July. Precise instructions to the Com-
mission-the body that will actually negotiate for
the EC-are not likely to be approved by the
Council, however, until the final shape of the US
trade legislation becomes clear.
tories would continue; there are now 45 settle-
ments, 15 in the Golan Heights, 18 on the West
Bank, 3 in the Gaza Strip, and 9 in Sinai.:,
Mrs. Meir may have thus temporarily
papered over intra-party differences, but they are
sure to burst out again this summer when the
Labor Party meets to draft its party platform for
the October election. The various proponents are
still publicly muttering about their specific posi-
tions, and a compromise will have to be worked
out between now and the convention to avoid a
bitter debate that could tear apart the ruling
Labor Party.
Uncertainty over the mood of Congress and
how the Administration will use the discretionary
powers it has requested has been a constant
theme in the European reaction to the President's
message. France has been the most critical, with
official and press comments harping on the
danger of US trade objectives to European farm
interests and the EC's common agricultural
policy. Other European press comment notes con-
cern that false hopes may be raised in the US,
which would force the President to implement
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retaliatory measures if substantial concessions
from the EC were not forthcoming. On the
whole, however, the proposals have been well
received.
The Commission's own proposals, which the
Council will debate next month, attempt a com-
promise between some of the member-state
desires and the intention to show movement on
matters of concern to the US. In agriculture, for
example, the international commodity stabiliza-
tion agreements the French want are put forward,
but so is restraint on export subsidies. The Com-
mission rejects the notion that industrial tariffs be
eliminated and resurrects the idea of reducing
high tariffs, of which the US has more than the
EC, proportionately more than low ones. In its
approach to safeguards against disruptive im-
ports-certain to be a major topic in the negotia-
tions-the Commission would apparently allow
particular countries (Japan is the target) to be
singled out even while it calls for non-discrimina-
tion. In any case, the Commission wants interna-
tionally supervised safeguards.
In the case of safeguards as well as the
matter of non-tariff barriers (such practices as
government procurement, technical standards,
and quota restrictions) the Commission hopes to
use the trade negotiations to extend and con-
solidate the community's jurisdiction. Some
member states will resist this, and reaching agree-
ment on an approach to the many non-tariff
barriers still not regulated by common EC policies
will be a monumental task.
The Commission may also have trouble in
getting "improvements" in the EC's program of
generalized preferences for developing countries'
exports of manufactures and semi-processed
goods. The Commission is making some headway
in its attempts to meet US objections to the
"reverse preferences" that the EC now gets from
those developing countries directly associated
with the community. The Commission recom-
mends that these countries offer similar, tariff-
free access to third parties, thus in effect elim-
inating any discrimination. Although this does
not satisfy US objections, it is at least a step in
the right direction.
All community members appear united in
insisting that the trade negotiations be ap-
proached in a spirit of reciprocity. Of the EC
members, the British appear most concerned with
avoiding any confrontation with the US. London
apparently feels its EC credentials are now good
enough to weather some of the criticism, ema-
nating mostly from the French, that it pays too
much attention to US demands. Germany's
unquestioned commitment to trade liberalization
is somewhat undercut by its equally unquestioned
support for high farm prices. France will un-
doubtedly scrutinize the Commission's sugges-
tions closely both for substance and for any signs
that the Commission is gaining more power. Paris'
loud and persistent warnings of a tough bargain-
ing line, while not to be disregarded, have had a
somewhat defensive tone. They reflect its de-
clining influence in the community since the
Kennedy Round.
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Indochina
Cambodia: In Search of Greater Unity In other areas, government forces are not
faring so well. The Khmer Communists have
IIn a first step toward revitalizing and broad- shelled Phnom Penh's southernmost suburb and
ening his government, President Lon No[ accepted kept up harassing attacks against the few re-
the resignation of First Minister Hang Thun Hak's maining Cambodian positions on Route 2 be-
cabinet on 17 April. The outgoing government, tween the capital and the isolated town of Takeo.
formed last October, will continue as a caretaker ? AThe pressure on Takeo is increasing.Some govern-
until a successor has been organized. At the same
time, Lon Nol called for the creation of a "su-
preme political council," which apparently would
be responsible for all important policy matters
and decisions. The President intends to head this
body and wants such prominent opposition fig-
ures as Republican Party leader Sirik Matak and
former Democratic Party chief In Tam to join it.)
To help ensure their participation, the Presi-
(lent has arranged for his meddlesome younger
brother, Brigadier General Lon Non, to leave not
only the government but also the country for a
few months. Sirik Matak and In Tam have indi-
cated that they want more concessions from Lon
Nol-particularly firm assurances that he is pre-
pared to give them some real responsibility. At
mid-week, the two met with the President and
reportedly proposed that the new council consist
of themselves, Lon Nol, and former chief of state
Cheng Heng. At last report, Lon Nol was mulling
over this demand. More dickering clearly is in,
store before some sort of compromise is achieved.
ment reinforcements were airlifted into the town
early in the week, and the government com-
mander there claims he can hold the town if he
keeps getting air support'
1 (Northwest of Takeo, the Khmer Commu-
nists renewed their attacks on Tram Khnar on
Route 3, but after several days of heavy fighting,
government troops regained the village. Farther
south, Communist units on 16 April overran the
former coastal resort of Kep, which has a small
docking facility capable of handling lighters and
small fishing vessels.)
There was some upturn in the military situa-
tion east of Phnom Penh this week. Government
forces met little opposition as they cleared Route
1 near the capital and portions of the Mekong
that parallel the highway. The improved security
enabled another three POL tankers to reach
Phnom Penh from South Vietnam, and the re-
opening of Route 4 made it possible to move
some petroleum supplies to the capital from
Kompong Som. As of 15 April, the capital had
enough fuel to supply about three weeks of elec-
trical power and about a week's reserve of ra-
tioned gasoline. Another convoy due to sail for
Phnom Penh early next week may well be chal-
lenged by Khmer Communist troops.)
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btzUKt I
Hanoi Tries Reconstruction nibbling operations is a prelude to heavier fighting
in the next few weeks. All four of the country's
tl JThe North Vietnamese have made significant regional commanders are convinced that the Com-
progress in rebuilding damaged industrial instal la- /01 munists have decided that sheer military force is
tions during the past three months, but full re- ') the only way to defeat the Saigon government.
covery is still a long way off. The Communist Communist directives, however, continue to point
press is claiming that some production started up the necessity of maintaining a mix of political
shortly after equipment was brought out of stor- action and military force to erode government
age and that some plants are already fulfilling strength in the countryside and to win the sup-
planned quotas. These claims are grossly exag- port of the people.I
gerated and fail to acknowledge that the plants
are still operating under the same makeshift
schedules as they were during the bombing. 1- r7IMost of the fighting this past week occurred
Before industrial production can really be re- in the southern half of the country. Communist
oriented to peacetime output, the North Viet- pressure continued against the Tonle Cham ranger
namese will have to shift available transportation(,'? camp in northern Tay Ninh Province, although
to coping with the demands of industrial reloca- there were signs that both sides were edging closer
tions. They will also have to make wholesale to a truce agreement. The Communists used loud-
reassignments of labor from wartime duties., speakers to urge a conference with the camp
commander-a major-to arrange a truce. Saigon
has steadfastly refused to let anyone lower than
,1, ;There are clear signs that limited production corps or division commander negotiate with the
has resumed at a number of plants, but the overall ,,Communists on the battlefield, but at mid-week
level of industrial output is hard to measure. One "''there were some indications that General Minh,
rough gauge of the level of industrial recovery is the government's senior commander for that sec-
;,the status of electric power plants. The North tor, was seeking a more flexible approach for
Vietnamese press claims that the supply of elec- arranging talks with the Viet Cong. 7
y`.Vtric power is now up to about 75 percent of the
pre-bombing capacity; a more reasonable figure
would be on the order of 50 percent, since many '- jjFighting was heaviest in the delta. Com-
of the large power plants were heavily damaged il.;munist units in the vicinity of the border check-
and will require several years before they are fully point at Hong Ngu in northern Kien Phong Prov-
reconstructed. Major manufacturing facilities ince captured all the territory around the town,
will require extensive rebuilding before they reach '~ overnmen units tart her south in Chau Doc
normal production capacities. Province crossed into Cambodia in an effort to
relieve Communist pressure against Cambodian
units and to discourage additional Viet Cong units
Still Thinking War from entering the delta
~t-k Fighting in South Vietnam this week de-
clined to the lowest level since the start of the Thieu Comes on Strong
'I icease-fire. Many South Vietnamese commanders
remain convinced, however, that the current 'ae[President Thieu appears to have helped his
inactivity is a lull before a storm and that the image at home and favorably impressed his for-
Communists will launch heavier attacks country- '1 eign hosts with his two-week trip to the US and
wide within the next few weeks.) 4j1several European and Asian capitals. On his re-
;Oturn, Thieu told the South Vietnamese that Presi-
L-f(JSenior South Vietnamese commanders be- dent Nixon had assured him the US fully supports
lieve that the current Communist strategy of his government and will provide substantial
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economic aid for the post-war period. The govern-
ment is beginning a campaign throughout the
country to publicize the success of Thieu's US
visit. The President obviously believes that it is
still important to demonstrate widely that he has
firm American support. The trip has already re-
ceived favorable publicity in virtually all of Sai-
gon's newspapers.)
Thieu's success has added to the problems of
his domestic non-Communist opponents, who are
weak and divided. The two new coalitions trying
to qualify as legal political parties-the Catholic-
based Freedom Party and the six-faction Social
Democratic Alliance--reportedly are already fall-
ing out among themselves, and it is entirely pos-
sible that neither will be able to agree on a slate
of candidates for the Senate elections this sum-
mer. Within both coalitions, factions that have
been unable to have their way are threatening to
withdraw. Although these factions see the Com-
munists as a greater evil than the Thieu govern-
ment, there is no evidence that any of them are
ready to join the government.
`.The An Quang Buddhists--the country's
strongest opposition group-are having problems
with personality conflicts, competing regional
interests, and policy differences. One organization
of Buddhist legislators may be breaking up. Last
month the group expelled a prominent senator,
apparently in part because he pushed too hard for
better relations with the government.,
The Tha Viang Incident
',While government officials and Communist
negoItiators took time off for Lao new year fes-
tivities in the royal capital of Luang Prabang late
last week, North Vietnamese units launched an
attack on Tha Viang, southeast of the Plaine des
Jarres. Heavy Communist artillery and ground
attacks quickly forced the 2,000 government
troops near Tha Viang to withdraw into the
rugged hills to the south and west. Once the
government force was clear of the area, B-52s
pounded North Vietnamese positions-.
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:The attacks did not come as a great surprise
to Vientiane. Government leaders had been eye-
ing the North Vietnamese buildup in the Tha
Viang area with apprehension for several weeks,
and Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma had warned
Communist negotiators that he would request US
air strikes if major North Vietnamese assaults
occurred. In going ahead with the attack on Tha
Viang, the Communists probably reasoned that
the opportunity to firmly rebuff what they
viewed as a government encroachment was worth
the risk of US retaliation(
As could be expected, the Pathet Lao con-
demned the air strikes, warning in a radio broad-
cast of unspecified "consequences" if the strikes
were not halted. The Foreign Ministry in Hanoi
labeled the bombings as "a new military es-.
-calation of an extremely serious character.",-
)Despite the outcry, the Lao Communists have not 25X1
broken off the talks on the formation of a coali-
tion government; these talks resumed in Vientiane
on 17 April.
saig Pi
Khov
eng
attacks
Thei
!iertg
? Government-held location
Communist-held location
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CHINA AT ECAFE
Chinese activity in the UN continues to be
morel of a problem for the Soviets than for the
US. Last week, Peking made its debut at the UN
Commission for Asia and the Far East, a forum
that the Soviets have used for years as a
propaganda platform to attack US policy toward
underdeveloped nations and to defend the in-
terests of its Asian Communist friends. This time
Peking took over the role of protector of the
smaller Asian Communist movements, gave the
US a few lumps on Vietnam, and told the Soviets
to go packing with their Asian collective security
pact.
As propaganda blasts go, the Chinese
speeches were boilerplate. Their objection to the
continued exclusion from ECAFE of some Asian
Communist movements was fairly mild, and their
criticism of Taiwan's membership in the Asian
Development Bank was pro forma. Their sharpest
remarks were directed at Moscow, and even these
did not break any new ground. As they did
initially at the UN in New York, the Chinese at 25X1
ECAFE seemed anxious to establish their
credentials and in general make a good impression
on their regional neighbors.
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Early this month a provincial radio broad-
cast hailed the accomplishments of the Cultural
Revolution as immortal. But one of the accom-
plishments of the period, the ouster of a number
of top party officials, was reversed last week
when Teng Hsiao-ping, the second highest ranking
victim in the party, reappeared at a banquet given
by Premier Chou En-lai.1
Teng's reappearance has been interpreted by
some foreign observers as a sign that the leader-
ship has reached sufficient agreement to be ready
to convene a party congress or a National People's
Congress, the government's rubberstamp legisla-
ture. Within China, however, Teng's return is
likely to cause confusion among the cadre, chiefly
because it is not in step with the current propa-
-ganda line) ince last December, the party theo-
retical journal Red Flag, which is the major leftist
propaganda vehicle, has been waging a vigorous
campaign to justify the Cultural Revolution and
praise its achievements. The campaign even de-
fends the Red Guards, the youthful activists who
helped bring down party leaders like TengThe
rehabilitation of a chief target of the Cultural
Revolution amid a propaganda campaign to de-
fend that upheaval will be taken by the cadre as a
sign that the leadership in Peking remains divided
on fundamental issues, a situation not conducive
to the settling of differences.!
Rehabilitation can take a variety of forms,
and the precise nature of Teng's status is probably
still a source of friction. Teng's reappearance`
serves to remove the stigma of his earlier disgrace,
but it does not follow that he will be allowed to
resume active duties.:Although the official Chi-
nese news agency identified the septuagenarian
Teng as a vice premier, his former government
r title,1 hree other aging luminaries, rehabilitated in
the past year, have been identified as vice-
premiers and still play no active role in govern-
ment affairs. Peking also skirted the more con-
troversial issue of whether to return Teng to an
important party post. As secretary general of the
party, a post since abolished, Teng was accused of
using his position to block implementation of
Mao's policies.I
J ;Although the final decision may have been
made last month when party officials were re-
portedly meeting outside Peking, Teng's rehabili-
tation has been under consideration for several
years. The propaganda media never attacked Teng
by name-he was the only purged leader to escape
this treatment-and there have been persi
With the current leadership unable to agree
on a number of appointments to major posts,
moderates such as Chou En-lai may want to reha-
bilitate former party leaders so they will be avail-
able for vacant high-level positions. Although
Chou has differed with some of these veteran
officials in the past, they are clearly more accept- 25X1
able to him than the more radical newcomers who
came to prominence during the Cultural Revolu-
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JAPAN: A BIGGER NAVY
he Japanese Navy, already the most power-
ful non-Communist naval force in the Far East, is
being further expanded. Under the fourth defense
plan, which runs until 1977, the Japanese will
build 54 ships for their navy. Seven destroyers
,
six destroyer escorts, five submarines, and 15
coastal minesweepers will be added. The navy also
will get 92 combat aircraft, including 40 heli-
copters
(4 Two of the new destroyers will be 5,200-ton
models. They will be the largest ships in the fleet.
Each will carry three helicopters for antisub-
marine warfare operations. Several of the de-
stroyers are scheduled to be equipped with US
Sea Sparrow and Tartar air defense missiles; they
may also be equipped with standard antiship mis-
siles from the US. The submarines will all be
conventional torpedo attack models, and later
models will be capable of increased range.-)
)The navy will buy additional P-2J patrol
aircraft which will supplement obsolescent S-2A
aircraft in antisubmarine operations. The navy
also will get more SH-3A antisubmarine heli-
:r copters and S-62B minesweeping helicopters.
Both helicopters are being built in Japan under
US license. The navy has no current plans to
acquire aircraft with an antiship strike capability.)
Japanese Naval Strength At Completion
Of 4th Defense Plan * (1972-76)
Destroyers 37
Destroyer Escorts 17
Submarines 15
Coastal Minesweepers 36
Others 62
TOTAL 167
*Some older ships will be retired during the plan.
i
/ IThe Japanese Navy is organized and
S- equipped for defense of the home islands and
-,,,,Okinawa. Its main missions are antisubmarine
warfare and mine warfare. Extensive training is
conducted for these missions in well-equipped
ships, and Japanese capabilities in both areas are
good. The navy has almost no capability for am-
phibious warfare, and the lack of adequate logisti-
cal support is a serious limitation to extended
operations beyond Japanese coastal waters. The
navy has only one tanker for at-sea replenish-
ment, and only one more is scheduled to be
AUSTRALIA: PROBLEMS DOWN UNDER
7~~)
uIn the four months the Labor governm(ent
has been in office, US-Australian relations have
encountered some rough sailing. Prime Minister
Whitlam's desire to chart a more independent
Australian policy contrasts sharply with the pro-
US attitude of the previous government. Al-
though Whitlam has repeatedly affirmed his inten-
tion to continue Australia's alliance with the US,
complications and frustrations in Washington's
dealings with Canberra may become more
common.
After an initial period of indecision, Whitlam
has now decided in favor of the continuation of
US defense and scientific installations in Aus-
tralia. He wants, however, to negotiate greater
Australian participation and control at the exist-
ing sites, and he may go slow on any new ventures
such as the proposed navigational aid station.
Complicating US-Australian relations is the
pressure from the noisy left wing of the Labor
Party. Over time, left-wing opposition could af-
fect the prime minister's ability to control his
party and the government. The recent election
of an outspoken left-wing critic of the US as
chairman of a joint parliamentary committee on
defense and foreign affairs points up Whitlam's
inclination to roll with left-wing punches. And in
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fact, Whitlam finds it neither politic nor possible
to muzzle the anti-US left-wing of his party. With-
out its support, his working majority in Parlia-
ment would be jeopardized.
Whitlam and the moderates do have one
great advantage, however, in dealing with the left.
In a basically conservative country like Australia,
the moderates can win national elections; the
leftists cannot, and they know it. This is the
factor that allowed Whitlam to gain the party
leadership in 1969 and, the prime minister hopes,
USSR-US: ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE
pbservers in Moscow have been struck by
the extent of the current campaign to publicize
the improvement in US-Soviet relations. Despite
an occasional sour note, favorable coverage of the
US is at a record high. The Soviet press has been
diligent in reporting presidential statements, and
there has been a marked drop in references to
"circles in the US opposed to detente." Differ-
ences between the two nations have been receiv-
ing low-key treatment; they are sometimes dis-
missed as being of only passing concern. The
softening of some of the more abrasive May Day
slogans on foreign policy is the latest example of
this trend.
1
will allow him to continue to have his way on
critical issues.
Whitlam himself has strong convictions,
which often are contrary to US interests. The
prime minister, who ran on the slogan "ANZUS is
not a foreign policy," has not hesitated to take
issue with the US on external issues. He has been
especially critical of American involvement in
Indochina and is publicly and privately ad-
vocating an early and total US military with-
drawal from Southeast Asia.
-7 7)
The most popular theme is the outlook for
improved economic relations. The visits of Treas-
ury Secretary Shultz and Ex-Im Bank Chairman
Kearns have received heavy play, as have the
extension of credits by the US to the USSR and
major transactions with US firms such as the
agreement last week with Occidental Petroleum.
These and other recent developments have in-
creased Soviet confidence in the summit under-
standings. As a result, the Soviet media are hold-
ing out to the ordinary citizen the prospect of
new prosperity based on an era of greater bilateral
cooperation.
Moscow's upbeat treatment was facilitated
by the end of the war in Vietnam. After the
summit last May there was some improvement in
coverage of things American. Nevertheless, the
level of criticism remained high, especially so dur-
ing the bombing of North Vietnam last Decem-
ber. Since the signing of the peace agreement,
Moscow has been much less inhibited in forecast-
ing closer ties with the US.
The timing of the accelerated campaign to
publicize the fruits of detente also suggests that
Moscow is beginning the public buildup for a
Brezhnev visit to the US. By accentuating the
successes of his US policy to date, the Soviets
may be seeking to rationalize his position domes-
tically in order to free his hand in Washing-
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POLAND
Buying from the US
Poland's purchases from C7 th
e US may well
double this year and turn Poland's long-standing
surplus in commodity trade into a deficit. Poland
already has ordered an estimated $150 million
worth of grain, soybeans, and soybean meal; pre-
sumably, it will place further orders. Poland may
also boost sharply its purchases of machinery and
equipment, which so far have accounted for a
small part of its imports from the US.
Polish purchases from the US grew 53 per-
cent last year, largely because of greatly expanded
imports of agricultural products. On the other
hand, the large increase in Polish imports from
Western Europe and Japan resulted from a
doubling of Polish purchases of capital equip-
ment. Western Europe and Japan got in on the
ground floor of the booming Polish market for
advanced technology.
Imports of capital equipment from the US
may grow rapidly over the next few years. In
addition to contracts already signed with such
firms as International Harvester, Alan Scott, and
Textron, Poland is considering a number of other
purchases. A Polish delegation, recently in the
US, expressed a strong desire to import large
amounts of equipment for the copper industry.
When the president of the US Export-Import
Bank was in Poland early this month, Prime Min-
ister Jaroszewicz told him that Poland has a new
version of the shopping list submitted last April
and will seek $200 million in credits in the US
this year.
President Nixon's decision last November
authorizing Export-Import Bank financing for
Poland should facilitate US firms' winning more
Polish contracts. The Export-Import Bank already
has authorized credits to finance part of the pur-
chase price of two meat-processing plants, a Send-
zimir metal rolling mill, and a Cyber-72 computer
system. The bank recently upgraded the country's
credit rating, which, although primarily a matter
of prestige, may increase Poland's applications for
SECRET
Foreign Minister in Trouble
>/ `Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski has been
in and out of the Warsaw dog house ever since he
got the job. Late last year he apparently tried to
introduce too many of his own initiatives into
Polish foreign relations. After a period of some
uncertainty, he seems to have resolved his prob-
lems, at least for the moment.]
N1 )When Olszowski became foreign minister in
December 1971, he was removed from his posi-
tion on the party secretariat. This shift suggested
that party chief Gierek had diminished the power
of a potential rival by removing him from daily
contact with party matters. Still Gierek was en-
trusting the Foreign Ministry to a man of intense
ambition who was sure to breathe new life into it. 7
SThough he had no prior diplomatic experi-
ence, Olszowski's initial performance won the
approval of senior officials in the ministry, and it
appeared that Gierek had made a wise choice.
Olszowski got the foreign
affairs portfolio specifically to provide dynamic
leadership to the Polish team in normalizing
relations with West Germany. He achieved that
objective with few problems and much praise in
September 1972. )
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;"By mid-December, however, Olszowski was negotiations next month looking toward a non-
running into trouble. One sign of this came during aggression treaty and diplomatic relations. If
his absence on an official visit to Mongolia when these talks are successful, a near certainty,
the Politburo took the unusual step of meeting to Lf Hungary and Bulgaria will also establish relations
discuss foreign affairs. The group decided that i with West Germany, perhaps by summer.),
there was need to improve the functioning of the
Foreign Ministry and to strengthen its political
leadership:
,Olszowski thus seems to have overstepped
his authority. Details of his actions are lacking,
but he may have moved policy a bit further and
faster than Gierek wanted. He seems to have
taken this reprimand with good grace, however,
and has tried to be the model bureaucrat since
January. He will have difficulties in keeping his
enormous ambition in check for long, even
though he recognizes he will stay in office only so
long as he continues to enjoy Gierek's confidence
or until he ives the re ime cause form re con-
cern.
More Ostpolitik
West Germany has launched a new series of
high-level exchanges with the East. The new
exchanges may help the government somewhat
with a public oversold on Ostpolitik and skeptical
about its practical worth. Bonn sees its initiatives
as the natural follow-up to recent treaties with
the major Eastern states. By working to eliminate
remaining sore spots in its eastern relations, Bonn
hopes that Pankow, the only East European
regime that feels seriously threatened by Brandt's
policies, will become more amenable to improved
ties.?
The drive began last week, when West Ger-
man and Czechoslovak negotiators announced a
compromise for handling the Munich Agreement
of 1938. In face of reported Soviet pressure,
Prague backed off from insisting that the pact was
null ab initio. The compromise clears the way for
-i
i / The first of the visits began with Brandt's
arrival in Belgrade on 16 April. During his four-
day visit, the first by a West German chancellor,
Brandt and Tito discussed broader economic
cooperation and took up the scratchy question of
more compensation for victims of Naziism.
Brandt tried hard to create a good atmosphere,
but before the visit Bonn officials conceded
privately that they cannot do much for Belgrade
in economic matters
i'/ fSoviet party boss Brezhnev's precedent-set-
ting visit to Bonn in mid-May will be the high
point in the flurry of activity. The Germans will
urge Brezhnev to take a more permissive stance
on West German ties with West Berlin, and to
urge Pankow to adopt a more forthcoming pos-
ture on inter-German problems. Bonn will argue
that such steps would promote the detente Mos-
cow is interested in. The West Germans are afraid
they will not be able to satisfy Soviet expecta-
tions for increased trade or credits. Even if sub-
stantive results are few, the up-beat atmospherics
of the visit, if nurtured, could have a beneficial
effect on West German opinion_J
I~ Romanian party chief Ceausescu will be in
Vt/est Germany 26-29 June. Bonn-Bucharest rela-
tions are generally good, but West German offi-
cials expect that Ceausescu, too, will ask for more
economic benefits than they can promise. Polish
party leader Gierek may visit Bonn this fall, but
only if relations, now cool, can be warmed up.
Warsaw has been disappointed that Bonn has not
broadened its economic relations since their
non-aggression pact was signed in 1971, and Bonn
is distressed that Warsaw has not permitted more
ethnic Germans to emigrate.
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FRANCE: DEFENSE SPENDING
Michel Debre, chief theorist of French de-
fense doctrine, has departed the Defense Ministry.
He leaves the French armed forces with a 1973
budget of 34.8 billion francs-the equivalent of
about $8.5 billion if the French defense effort
were reproduced in the US. This budget is up
about 10 percent from last year, marking the
largest yearly increase since 1965. In real terms-
taking into account the effects of inflation in the
defense sector-defense outlays have actually
diminished somewhat since 1969.
The French maintain the largest military
establishment in Western Europe on smaller de-
fense budgets than either the UK or West Ger-
many, the other major defense spenders in West-
ern Europe. The limitations on French defense
spending have had their greatest impact on equip-
ment procurement. Over the past decade, capital
expenditure appropriations have been tight for
the conventional armed forces, particularly the
army. This limitation was due in large measure to
the high percentage of capital funds appropriated
for the nuclear forces-about 50 percent-until
1969.
The capital expenditures for nuclear forces
have subsequently leveled off, and additional
funds have been made available to the conven-
tional forces for purchasing not only more mili-
tary equipment but new types of equipment. The
capital outlay for nuclear systems and research
and development has been a declining percentage
of the budget for the past five years.
When he came to the Defense Ministry in
1969, Debre promised increased spending on de-
fense, particularly for the conventional armed
forces. Although he managed to get modest in-
creases in their budgets, the conventional forces
have not as well as he seemed to promise. Also,
many of the improvements that have been
achieved have come through cutbacks and con-
solidations, primarily in personnel and facilities.
The French have the fastest growing econ-
omy in Western Europe, and some European
countries have suggested that the percentage of
GNP spent by the French on defense (3.1 per-
cent) could be increased. Paris frequently has
argued that the Europeans should spend more on
their own forces. The French, nevertheless, con-
tend that they are doing their fair share in the
defense field. Before he left, Debre warned that
French defense spending, as a percentage of GNP,
had reached "a minimum below which it would
be dangerous to go." This judgment apparently
has been accepted by the French Government,
but significantly larger increases in spending prob-
ably will have to wait until the next five year
defense plan, which begins in 1975.
YUGOSLAVIA: TITO, EX CATHEDRA
I cTito will deliver a major policy address to a
huge meeting of regime leaders on 23 April. His
speech will cover constitutional changes, eco-
nomic problems, party recentralization, and for-
- eign policy. There may also be a few surprises,
and it is not impossible that the 80-year-old
leader will lighten his load by passing on some of
his presidential functions to his subordinates.]
. he meeting Tito has convened is an unprec-
edented "general assembly of the federation,"
thus stressing the importance of what he has to
say. The meeting will be attended by the full
620-member legislature, the cabinet, the party
presidium, and leaders from all Yugoslav mass
organizations. High on the agenda are certain
changes in Yugoslavia's constitution, including a
scaling-down of the collective presidency from 22
to 9 members, and a complex package of reforms
aimed at strengthening local management of polit-
ical and economic affairs. The theory of local
management is fine, but Tito is also likely to
bestow his blessing on the course of party re-
centralization.-1
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Jtl.;Kt
rs' ITito will probably press on with his effort to
make "Western influences" the scapegoat for
internal problems. As recently as late March he
was energetically condemning Western media for
suggesting the situation inside Yugoslavia was
serious and seeking better relations with Moscow.
At the meeting he may well come down hard on
emigres in the West who, he fears, plan to exploit
any instability after his passing in an attempt to
break the federation apart. Last week, Belgrade
threw down the gauntlet by announcing the
execution of three terrorists who took part in the
raid into Yugoslavia last June. Tito may thus
hope to goad the emigres into a showdown while
he is still around)
this question, which toppled two previous govern-
ments, the country can concentrate on rebuilding
its shattered political arties in preparation for
elections in September.)
iSome members of parliament may have
reservations about the agreement that was ini-
tialed on 16 April after six months of negotia-
tions. Nonetheless, the government expects no
major difficulty in obtaining Storting approval.
Debate will begin on 1 June, just a week before
the parliament recesses for the summer. The King
is expected to ratify the agreement on 1 July
[The EC issue brought down the majority
jThe assembly might produce a few surprises. coalition of Centrist Per Borten in 1971, and the
Since 1970, Tito has often said that he would like succeeding minority Labor government of Trygve
to ease his exhausting load as President of the Bratteli resigned when the referendum for full EC
Republic. In recent months, two key advisory membership failed last September. The small
groups on security and defense have been trans- Christian People's Party led by Lars Korvald was
ferred from his personal cabinet to the collective thrust into the void and formed the present mi-
S
1n71
presidency the executive body -,+ -4 i
' '
n
t o
tormulate national policy after he is gone. Tito
might make a dramatic announcement that he has
decided to give the collective presidency, thus
strengthened, more scope in the national policy
arena. J
(Such a gesture would not limit Tito's real
power, which stems from his leadership of the
party and his hold over the people, but it would
have a sobering effect on his potential successors.
They would have to demonstrate while he is still
on hand that they can run the country the way he
NORWAY: NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EC
101" Norway's "mini-coalition" has fulfilled its
.mandate by successfully negotiating a free trade
,,,!,agreement with the EC . With the resolution of
nority coalition with the Center Party and 5 of 13
Liberal Party representatives. The coalition has
only 39 of the 150 seats in parliament.)
C' ' LAlthough Labor is Norway's largest party
and the obvious successor to the present govern-
ment, it was badly split over the EC issue and
needs considerable time to recuperate. The party
will have to come up with new ideas, in addition
to its standard platform of welfare expansion, to
attract the Norwegian voters. The old four-party
bourgeois coalition-Conservative, Center, Lib-
eral, and Christian People's parties-is in no better
shape, and it probably can not be carpentered
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SOUTH ASIA: NEW PROPOSAL
:India and Bangladesh have made a proposal
to Pakistan, which shows a new flexibility in their
positions. The proposal would give something to
all parties directly concerned, but Pakistan will
have difficulty accepting it.
On the plus side for Pakistan:
? The 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war
would be sent home.
? Pakistan would not have to recognize
Bangladesh in exchange, though recognition
would still be required for any direct talks
with Dacca.
On the plus side for Bangladesh:
? Several hundred thousand Bengalis with
useful skills would go to Bangladesh. This
would give the Pakistanis no real problem.
? Some prisoners of war-195 according to
Dacca-would be tried in Bangladesh for war
crimes. Even if Pakistan decides the sacrifice
is necessary, the decision will be painful.
-i ;Prime Minister - designate Naim Talu, asked
by President Koruturk on 12 April to form a new
government, has named a coalition cabinet com-
posed of 13 members of the Justice Party, 6 from
the Republican Reliance Party, and 5 independ-
ents.jlTalu will present his proposed cabinet and
legislative program to parliament this week. A
vote of confidence will probably be taken on 25
April.;
The 54-year-old Talu, minister of commerce
since December 1971 and a senator since mid-
1972, is nominally an independent, but is close to
Sthe Justice Party in outlook. Suleyman Demirel,
Justice Party leader, clearly had a big hand in
selecting the new cabinet; the contingent from his
party is largely made up of his lieutenants. The
Talu cabinet is the most conservative as well as 25X1
the most experienced Turkish cabinet since the
military forced the resignation of Demirel as
prime minister in March 1971.
? Several hundred thousand Biharis-non-
Bengali Muslims living in Bangladesh-would
be sent to Pakistan. Islamabad has made it
clear it does not want the Biharis and deciding
to admit them might be even more difficult
than acquiescing in the trials.
On the plus side for India:
? India would get rid of the prisoners who
are becoming a source of embarrassment to
the government and who continue to hinder
the improvement of relations with Pakistan.
The latest initiative will not break the
impasse on the subcontinent, but the decoupling
of prisoner repatriation from Pakistani recogni-
tion of Bangladesh does open up new avenues in
the search for a settlement.
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percent in the last 12 months-has long since
overtaken the generous wage readjustment of last
October. The government now proposes a wage
increase that would be limited to lower income
workers. It would be financed by taxes on in-
comes in the middle and upper brackets. The
opposition, of course, rejects this plan, and many
powerful unions find it and other official labor
policies unappealing and are striking in retalia-
tion. Although the government has made propa-
ganda points thus far on the congressional
holdup, Allende probably fears that further delay
would benefit the leftist extremists. He is already
at loggerheads with them over their defiance of
his ban on illegal seizures of factories, roads, and
farms. He has even accused them of involvement
in a plot with extreme rightists, who are also bent
on promoting civil disorders-1
- ' [On the non-violent political front, Allende
has stepped back temporarily from his proposed
restructuring of the educational system, the so-
called unified national school. The changes are
designed to develop Chileans for the "new reali-
ties" of their country. In the face of strong criti-
cism Education Minister T A ; I
a
i
p
a announce imp e-
jPresident Allende's problems have not eased / mentation of the new scheme would be delayed
in the wake of his government's good showing in for a year to permit further national debate. Op-
last month's congressional elections and the im- position is strong in political parties outside the
provement in relations between the Socialists and, government, the Roman Catholic Church, and
Communists. New economic difficulties crop up many teachers' unions. Allende also faces a con-
faster than the old ones can be solved. Many of.-; stitutional fight with congress over his extensive
his own partisans distrust him; some defy him. use of the veto to thwart legislation.]
Opposition attitudes are hardening to the point
that even leftist Christian Democrats are wary of t%-6 Criticism of the school scheme is also vehe-
appearing to accommodate Allende. General Prats 4 ment among military officers, many of whom see
still defends the administration, but military of-177 it as a political threat to the military and its
ficers are among its most vehement critics, .~ independence. Particularly outspoken has been
tNone of these problems is new. One Chilean
has described Allende as taking one step back to
consolidate the two he has taken forward. This
stratagem has worked before for the President,
but he faces a difficult winter]
?In addition to acute shortages of consumer
goods, inflation has made it urgent that wages be
raised, particularly at the bottom of the pay scale
where Allende's support is greatest but leftist
agitation against him is strongest. Inflation--183
Admiral Ismael Huerta, whose distaste for the
Allende administration was heightened by a short
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,--' SECRET I.MWI
~US firms operating below the Mexican bor-
der to take advantage of low labor costs are
continuing to make substantial gains. These firms
produce various articles from US components,
selling them mainly to the US under an arrange-
ment that subjects only the value added to tariff
levies. Last year, employment in these border
industries increased about 20 percent, to 49,000
persons. Sales approximated a half billion dollars,
and net exports to the US climbed to about $170
million, a 35-percent gain.
In general, the US has benefited from the
program, although the relocation of US factories
has cost jobs in the US. For example, US firms
assembling electronic components have gained
cheaper labor, thus enabling them to be more
competitive with imports not using US materials.
US tariff exemptions are necessary to industries
producing clothing and furniture, but not to
those assembling electronic components.
The manufacture of electronic components
now accounts for 65 percent of border industry
employment, compared with 50 percent a year
earlier. The shift to electronics is making border
industry operations less vulnerable to the repeal
of tariff exemptions because the benefits of low
labor costs would outweigh losses from repeal,
unlike the situation for clothing and furniture
companies. The shift to electronics has increased
potential US balance-of-payment losses that
would result from repeal of the exemptions. The
electronics companies probably could continue
exporting to the US, but they would no longer
have an incentive to buy components in the US
because of cheaper sources elsewhere. On the
basis of 1971 data, the annual cost of repeal to
the US balance of payments has been estimated at
$70 million.
Recent currency realignments and Mexico's
low labor costs have stirred interest in border
industry operations among non-US companies. A
subsidiary of a Japanese firm, established in
Tijuana in 1971, is assembling electronic calcula-
tors from components made in its California
plant, and Sony and Mitsubishi are planning bor-
der plants to complement their US operations. In
addition, Belgian and Israeli firms have recently
shown interest in establishing border industry
operations.
Although President Echeverria periodically
expresses reservations about border industry
exemptions from regulations requiring domestic
control of firms in Mexico, he also appreciates the
contribution exemptions make to exports. He
consequently decreed last October that the
special border industry arrangement be made
available throughout Mexico. As a result of a US
request, the decree permits the firms to make
limited sales within Mexico.
URUGUAY: PAINFUL SOLUTIONS NEEDED
,S 6:xr,7ce )
(t 4e
The government's new five-year plan leads
off with an accurate analysis of the underlying
causes of Uruguay's economic woes. It fails to
come to grips, however, with the harsh remedies
needed to cut inflation and spur economic
growth.
Uruguay's economic planners apparently
recognize that a difficult and unpopular reorienta-
tion of economic policy is necessary to reverse
nearly twenty years of deterioration and hyper-
inflation. The plan rightly attributes Uruguay's
economic malaise to government policies designed
to improve the lot of urban dwellers at the
expense of agriculture, still the backbone of the
economy. For many years, artificially low farm
prices and high export taxes have reduced pro-
ducer incentives and encouraged contraband ship-
ments. Politically inspired wage increases and
burgeoning social welfare expenditures mollified
the urban majority but added fuel to the infla-
tionary fires.
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While the plan is good at diagnosing Uru-
guay's fundamental economic problems, there is a
basic conflict between some of the cited goals and
proposed remedies. The plan, for example, calls
for maintaining high real wage levels and im-
proving the quality and quantity of costly social
welfare programs; these goals are clearly at odds
with the government's stated intention to reduce
inflationary pressures and increase investment
outlays. The government's apparent desire to con-
tinue to protect urban consumers by maintaining
discriminatory price controls on agricultural pro-
duce also conflicts with its stated goal of im-
proving incentives for agricultural producers.
The plan does call for a more realistic ex-
change rate and implies a reduced dependence on
export taxes. If implemented, these policies
should stimulate agricultural exports and the
resulting increase in foreign exchange receipts
should enable the authorities to reduce restric-
tions on imports of raw material and capital
goods necessary for industrial expansion. Equally
important, the proposed reduction in protective
barriers should force increased efficiency in the
nation's high-cost industries. The plan also en-
visages a large increase in public investment out-
lays over the next five years that will support
development in the private sector of the
economy.
An effective economic reform program
would entail a long period of politically difficult
sacrifices with the main burden falling on urban
dwellers. If the new military-backed government
backs away from the difficult and unpopular re-
forms required, it is unlikely to achieve either
stabilization or growth.
>'y The use of torture as a means of extracting
information from suspected terrorists has sur-
faced again in Brazil, following the arrests of the
wife and a son of a former cabinet minister,
Wilson Fadul. Both were interrogated about their
connections with terrorist groups, and Mrs. Fadul
later required an operation to repair damage
caused by the beatings she received at the hands
of army officers in Rio de Janeiro
ii tThe Faduls are well-connected, and friends
brought the case to the attention of the First
Army commander, the army minister, and the
retired general who is the leading candidate to
succeed President Medici. Their efforts resulted in
an investigation which indicates that the senior
officer involved, a colonel, is a close friend of the
First Army commander, on whose staff he serves,
and is also the son of a former army Chief of
Staff. Although the colonel's career will be
damaged and perhaps ended by the incident, he is
not likely to be punished any further.1
41 2. The incident points up the different
titudes taken by senior officers toward torture.
Some strongly oppose it, on grounds that it re-
flects the police mentality that some military
elements have acquired since the armed forces
took over the main responsibility for combating
terrorism. Other officers condone torture as a
necessary and effective weapon against terrorists.
Perhaps the majority avoid taking a position on
the issue; they tell their subordinates to get the
,.f-,job done and do not concern themselves about
methods unless an embarrassing incident occurs.
LThe rigid press censorship usually prevents
such incidents from causing the government seri-
ous problems. If a particular example of abuse
becomes too widely known, the government
usually either publicly denies knowledge of it or
dismisses it as a regrettable excess by an in-
dividual and not characteristic of the military as a
whole. As long as many officers believe that a
terrorist problem remains and that torture works
in fighting the terrorists, they are not likely to
drop jt entirely.
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Colombian Foreign Minister Addresses OAS
OAS: THIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
11414 Fhe Third OAS General Assembly had a
r relatively quiet 12-day meeting, but did create a
[t special committee to consider major reforms of
the inter-American system. The Cuban question
was raised indirectly, but was effectively defused
14,by a compromise resolutiori.ljhe assembly also
assed resolutions-the US abstaining-criticizing
16-)lfnultinational companies and US plans to sell
mineral stockpiles.I
if 5 )The debate during the assembly indicated
that the special committee will be split over the
issue of radical versus moderate reforms. A move-
ment to exclude the US from the OAS is unlikely,
but a permanent Latin-only sub-organization may
emerge as a vehicle for developing unified Latin
American positions for dealing with the US. One
way of accomplishing this could be through the
expansion of the Special Latin American Co-
ordinating Commission. The new special com-
mittee will probably also discuss the Cuban issue.
Regardless of its deliberations, however, several
governments that oppose the present OAS policy
on Cuba are likely to go ahead with recognition.
The committee, which includes all 23 member
states, is to report by 30 November.
j (Toward the end of the General Assembly,
the Chilean delegation tried to pass a resolution
on "ideological pluralism" that would have under-
mined the sanctions against Cuba. The final word-
ing, passed unanimously, was so watered down
that it does not have this effect.'
x-Although there were relatively few direct
attacks on the US, two resolutions critical of US
p1 policy were passed:)trhe announcement that the
US plans to sell its mineral stockpiles sparked the
passage of a resolution expressing concern over
the implications of the sales for Latin America.
The US Senate hearings on the activities of ITT in
Chile seem to have triggered a resolution con-
demning ''the interventionist activities" of
multinational enterprises.
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ARGENTINA: PERONISTS ROLL ON
In the runoff elections of 15 April the member of the Justicialista front, is an ultrana-
Peronists completed a virtual sweep of elective tionalistic "yankee baiter" who lodged charges of
offices in Argentina. The Justicialista Liberation ;'fraud against ITT in the final days of the cam-
Front-the coalition put together by Juan paign. He had been mentioned as a possible for-
Peron-captured 20 of the 22 provincial governor- eign minister in the Campora government, but his
ships and a large majority in both houses of chances appear to have been dealt a serious blow
congress.: by the election defeat.I
'The results of the runoff demonstrated the
wisdom of the Radical Party in declining to par-
ticipate in a runoff for the presidency after
Hector Campora fell only slightly short of a ma-
jority in the first round on 11 March. The Radi-
cals were badly beaten by the Peronists in all but
one of the provincial contests where the two
parties met. The Radicals failed to capture any of
the 22 provincial governorships, and will have 11
Senate seats, thanks only to the proportional rep-
resentation system. The Peronists won 43 of the
69 senate seats and have at least 142 of 243 seats
in the house of deputies.
The only bright spot in a thoroughly frus-
trating experience for the once powerful Radical
Party was the senate race in the Federal Capital
district of Buenos Aires. There a 35-year-old at-
torney, Fernando De La Rua, ran up a large
majority over Justicialista candidate Sanchez
Sorondo. Sanchez Sorondo, a non-Peronist but a
;The Peronists will undoubtedly interpret
their sweeping victory as a strong mandate for
change, and the military seems prepared to give
them considerable leeway. Terrorism may force a
closer relationship between the Peronists and the
military than would otherwise be the case, but
differences within the Peronist movement seem
likely to be the primary brake on any drastic or
revolutionary changes. Except for a somewhat
questionable allegiance to Juan Peron, the rela-
tively moderate labor leaders have little in
common with the radical youth who played a
major role in the election victory. In the early
going, such items of legislation as an amnesty for
political prisoners will probably move through
congress with relatively little difficulty. Expected
efforts of youth leaders to move the government
to the left spell almost certain trouble, however,
when the government gets around to submitting
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