WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010200030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
6 April 1973
No. 0364/73
Copy N2 43
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25X1- c,
.Y SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
ents of the week through noon on Thursday.
omic Research, the Office of Strategic
rectorate of Science and Technology.
1.4 more comprehensive treatment and there-
separately as Special Reports are listed in the
CONTENTS (6Apri11973)
2 Netherlands: The Flying Dutchmen
3 The Philippines: Jakarta Weighs In
4 Indochina
5 Peru: Velasco Is Back
6 Cambodia: Tribulations
7 Laos: Marking Time
7 Thailand: Looking at Peking
8 China: Oil Diplomacy
10 Europe: Talks in Two Cities
11 Gold
12 Yugoslavia: Ustashi Again
13 Eastern Europe: Crop Outlook Mixed
14 Bulgaria: Satellite for the '70s
15 Poland: Tightening the Reins
25X6
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
16 Israel: Eban to the Hustings
16 Turkey: The-Search Goes On
17 Bangladesh: Grim Prospects
18 Afghanistan: A Bag of Problems
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20 Dominican Republic: Road's End
21 Argentina: More Terrorism
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed
to the editor of the Weekly Summary, fl
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together a Grand Coalition with the confessional
parties. The Netherlands has been 128 days with-
out a government, its longest interregnum, and no
solution is in sight. Dutch politicians are toying
with various makeshifts that would buy time for
the parties to prepare for elections later this year.)
r I g The Labor Party's bid to form a broadly
based coalition ground to a halt last week when
the Catholic People's Party and the Anti-Revolu-
tionary Party broke off talks with formateur
Jacob Burger and opted for an opposition role.
Both parties had supported the demand of their
customary ally, the Christian Historical Union,
for an extra portfolio in the cabinet. They also
wanted to examine in detail labor's draft pro-
gram, especially projected cuts in defense spend-
ing. Labor leaders refused to make concessions on
these points, thus forcing Burger to resign his
mandate.)
Labor Party leader den Uyl is in a quandary.
He would still like to form a minority government
of the three leftist parties but few expect Queen
Juliana to give him the chance. As formateur, den
Uyl would face the problem of finding enough
qualified individuals for a cabinet without deplet-
ing the leftist parliamentary groups of their talent
and expertise. Catholic politicians are refusing
Labor's invitation to serve in a cabinet and are
unwilling to provide the de facto support in par-
liament necessary for such a coalition to survive.
In desperation, some conservative politicians
have raised the idea of forming an extra-parlia-
mentary government composed of non-political
figures. This option seems to be the only alterna-
tive because the chances of restoring the previous
center-right coalition appear slim. The strategy
might forestall the early elections that the confes-
sionals fear. This ad hoc arrangement, however,
would be no more stable than a leftist minority
government and would probably be unable to
pass any major legislation.
The problems are large and the available
solu ions transitory. It would seem the Dutch are
NETHERLANDS: THE FLYING DUTCHMEN condemned to a protracted period of govern-
mental instability that only new elections coupled
14, IThe Labor Party, the largest single party in ' with a shift in voter sentiment can resolve.
the country, has failed in its efforts to hammer
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),7 A rebellious Muslim minority in the south-
ern Philippines is hardly a new phenomenon, but
the current round of fighting has taken on
broader and more ominous dimensions. Despite a
recent lull in combat, there are indications that
the dissidence may be spreading to areas only
marginally affected before. There are also signs of
new and perhaps intensified fighting in the offing.
Although troop reinforcements have been
brought in, the situation will get worse before it
gets better. There is some evidence that the dis-
sident Muslims may be coming under the leader-
ship of younger, more militant elements not re-
sponsive to the traditional Muslim political bosses
and presumably less receptive to government
peace initiatives. Recent decisions to arm Chris-
tian "self-defense units" and other vigilante
groups and to use napalm against the insurgents
may hasten the process of radicalization in Muslim
ranks and set the stage for protracted communal
bloodshed]
/ [The flow of weapons and other forms of
e~Cternal assistance to the Muslims provides an-
other dimension to the conflict. Aside from en-
couraging further fighting, this aid is severely
straining relations between the Philippines and
Malaysia.? [Indonesia, which sees itself as a cham-
Arms Collected in Cotabato
pion of regional stability and a natural mediator
in this case, is attempting to curb foreign involve-
ment in the hope that the problem can revert to
being an internal Philippine affair)
} \Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik got
this message across to a chief culprit-Sabah Chief
} Minister Tun Mustapha-during a private meeting
I in Jakarta on 18 March.
Malik warned ustap a that his activities were
jeopardizing a possible regional solution and
urged restraint. Malik subsequently repeated the
substance of these remarks at a press conference
at which he stressed Indonesia's opposition to any
form of external interference in domestic Philip-
pine affairs)
Aside from attempting to rein in Mustapha,
Jakarta is urging Manila to exercise restraint in
dealing with both its Muslim population and its
Muslim neighbor, Malaysia. Manila's seven-year-
old claim to Sabah is the major factor behind
Kuala Lumpur's acquiescence in the illegal flow
of arms to the southern Philippines. Indonesia can
be expected to try to persuade President Marcos
to drop or soft-peddle this disruptive aspect of
Filipino foreign policy, and Foreign Minister
Malik will probably raise these matters when the
foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations meet in Thailand the middle of this
month.
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11 d Military action in South Vietnam this week -r
centered around the Ranger camp at Tonle Cham
in northern Tay Ninh Province. The Communists
have kept up daily harassing fire and ground
probes against the camp, making resupply ex-
tremely difficult. The government has warned
that, unless the Communists back off, Saigon may
resort to a strong military riposte.]
NORTH
'\-) VIETNAM
i Demilitarized Zone
mfr/~'
Tchepone
f;._ Both sides regard the fate of the camp as a
significant test of whether the Communists will
have unmonitored control of the Saigon River
infiltration corridor, but neither seems prepared
to carry the test to a major showdown. The
Communists appear unwilling to make the consid-
erable military investment it would take to over-
run the position; they hope that limited but
steady pressure will force the Rangers to abandon
it. The government, while threatening action to
relieve the siege, is not yet mustering the sizable
military force needed to clear the area. Both
claim they are willing to negotiate a local truce,
but neither is trying very hard to work one out.
The heightened tension and a tightened Commu-
nist squeeze on the camp could nevIrtheless push
both sides into large-scale hostilities.,,
Y'- Military action throughout the rest of the
country was generally light. Assessments from US
and South Vietnamese field observers, 60 days
after the cease-fire, conclude that local sparring is
likely to continue in nearly all areas of the coun-
try. In northern Quang Tri Province-one area
where the Communists appear reasonably satis-
fied with present battle lines-the North Viet-
namese are content to position supplies and
strengthen their air defenses, including a growing
number of SA-2 missile sites around the former
US military base at Khe Sanh. There are indica-
tions of heavy logistics activity farther south in
such areas as the A Shau Valley and the border
area of central Kontum Province.}
'yOn the political side, the talks in Paris so far
have been confined largely to propaganda ex-
changes. The Two-Party Joint Military Commis-
sion in Saigon is suffering from similar ills, further
handicapped by the disputes over the fighting at
Tonle Cham. The South Vietnamese walked out
of some commission sessions after the Viet Cong
delegates refused to permit an inspection team
from the International Commission for Control
and Supervision to arrange a temporary truce in
the fighting. As for the latter, the Polish and
Hungarian delegates still refuse to investigate any
violations that might prove embarrassing to their
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.Saigon River
dnf,tiration corridor
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PERU: VELASCO IS BACK
1 `''jRumors that President Velasco suffered
brain damage during the first of his recent opera-
tions were dispelled this week when the President
staged an impromptu news conference and then
presided over a cabinet session
P r i m e Minister Mercado's mandate for
limited presidential powers was not extended
when it expired on 31 March, and Velasco has
.formally resumed his responsibilities. Velasco's
Icomeback, however, is unlikely to end maneu-
vering by military factions concerned about who
eventually will succeed him.1
Mercado has the lukewarm support of most
of the moderate elements in the armed forces,
Velasco will
not lack support if he tries to hang on to the
presidency, but even his staunchest backers are
likely to conclude that attempting to maintain
him in power indefinitely would be counter-
productive./
i.Velasco's temporary absence may have
served as a pointed reminder of how much the
military government needs a leader who can mod-
erate its internal disputes, and Mercado is the
choice best calculated to avert divisive and poten-
tially destructive struggles. Mercado could still
find himself odd man out, however, if disagree-
ment over the succession degenerates into vio-
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CAMBODIA: TRIBULATIONS
TThe Lon Nol government is no stranger to
misfortune. For the second time in less than three
weeks, the regime confronts a new emergency.
This time the problem is economic-a severe
shortage of essential petroleum products. Regular
supply convoys along the Mekong River from
South Vietnam have been unable to reach Phnom
Penh since 20 March because the Khmer insur-
gents hold a stretch of the waterway east of the
capital. As a result, supplies of diesel fuel and
gasoline will run out early next week. Gasoline is
already being rationed.'
The Cambodian Army, hampered by chronic
problems of inadequate leadership and poor dis-
cipline, has been unable to regain control of the
Mekong corridor. Other factors probably contrib-
uted to the army's lackluster performance of late
along the Mekong and elsewhere. These include a
growing reluctance by many soldiers to fight, a
general war weariness brought on by hopes that
the Vietnam cease-fire would be extended to
Cambodia, and loss of respect for an increasingly
remote Lon Nola
The Mekong is not the army's only military
problem. Aggressive insurgent forces have also cut
sections of all major highways leading into Phnom
Penh. Government clearing operations along
Routes 1, 2, 4, and 5 have made little or no
headway. The effort to reopen Route 2 between
Phnom Penh and Takeo has been particularly
costly. Early in the week, elements of the army's
best division, which is made up mostly of Khmer
Krom troops, suffered heavy losses in men and
materiel. The division was forced to return to
Phnom Penh for rest and refitting.)
On the political front, Lon Nol has begun to
reshuffle his cabinet. The first to go was the
beleaguered finance minister, and the ministers of
labor and information reportedly are due to fol-
low. The most significant change was the resigna-
tion of Brigadier General Lon Non from the gov-
ernment on 3 April-which will not be formally
approved until other changes are made. Lon Non
ostensibly will concentrate on military affairs.
2A Lon Non's considerable power and trouble-
making potential flow from his unique relation-
ship with the President, who remains heavily de-
pendent on ,his younger brother. A cosmetic
change such as Lon Non's resignation will prob-
ably not be enough to relieve the political ten-
sions that have been generated by his incessant
intriguing. If he were to spend more time on
military matters, it would almost certainly further
antagonize'his many detractors within the army
establishment and would not add to military effi-
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f"
1_ rFhe Communists have submitted lengthy
counterproposals to the draft military and politi-
cal protocols offered two weeks ago by the gov-
ernment. Phoune Sipraseuth, fresh from consulta-
tions in Sam Neua, met with leading government
negotiators early this week in Vientiane. But
these talks reached an impasse over new Commu-
nist political demands and insistence that military
matters be settled before the new overnment is
formed.
Communist intransigence on this point
would ensure protracted negotiations.
The cease-fire in Laos has held up fairly well
for over a month now with an average of only ten
incidents-mostly minor-reported daily:)' n the
past two weeks, however, Communist radiobroad-
casts have become more bellicose about alleged
government encroachments into Communist terri-
territor .
Deputy Prime Minister Praphat
acterizing Peking's support of Thai insurgents as
an "unfriendly action" that forces Bangkok to
adopt a cautious attitude?
?7?1 iuiven we iree-wneeiing nature OT
I flat poli-
`}F Despite an initial burst of enthusiasm last tics, such public discussion of the China issue
year over the possibility of improved relations does not necessarily reflect government policy.
with Peking, lingering mistrust of Chinese inten- Praphat, in particular, is known to favor an early
tions combined with differences within the lead- trade agreement with Peking and may be speaking
ership over how and at what rate to proceed on his own:1'IFrustrated by what he considers
brought Bangkok's China initiative to a standstill.) Prime Minister Thanom's overly cautious handling
t Recently, discussion of the China issue, bear-
ing the mark of a government trial balloon, sur-
faced in the Thai press. This may point to a new
Bangkok effort to impart momentum to the move
toward Peking.1, Then, at a press conference on 22
March, Prapha announced that Thailand was
ready to establish trade relations with China, but
he indicated that he expected the Chinese to
make the first move.lpn 30 March, Praphat was
quoted in the press to the effect that the govern-
ment was clamping down on the activities of the
Nationalist Chinese inside Thailand in order to
demonstrate its intent to be "on friendly terms
with the Peoples Republic of China." Praphat
balanced these last remarks, however, by char-
of China policy, Praphat may feel that a new
gesture, such as the opening of official trade links,
is both necessary and appropriate to keep the
dialogue with Peking on the track,
F ; Praphat is not alone. The Foreign Ministry
has been unsuccessfully urging Thanom to reduce
the level of official representation in Taipei in
order to facilitate an improvement of relations
with Peking, and ministry officials may be fueling
the current public discussion. The public airing of
the China issue has generated a sympathetic
response from the Thai press. These public and
private pressures may edge Thanom closer to a
decision to press ahead on improving relations
with Peking.
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CHINA: OIL DIPLOMACY
t
Like other nations, China is taking more
interest in the political and economic dimensions
of oil. Chinese preparations to stake out a posi-
tion on ocean resources are having a direct bear-
ing on Sino-Japanese relations and could in the
future involve the US, the sticky Taiwan issue,
and other nearby states.?
,f aA case in point is the recent exploration by
American oil companies in the continental shelf
between China and South Korea. These opera-
tions generated a mild complaint from the Chi-
nese Foreign Ministry on 15 March. Peking crit-
icized Seoul for unilaterally sanctioning such
operations in areas where jurisdiction had not yet
been fixed and said the Chinese Government re-
served all rights in connection with the drilling.!
!Peking's handling of this matter suggests that
the Chinese will oppose any exploration in areas
they consider disputed. Peking has not articulated
I NORiM ~~. r
((OREA
ELLOW~ ~csoacn ,. '"~ ?J'~
of exploration
rJ o
/b KINAWA
a clear policy on off-shore territorial rights, but
some speculate the Chinese will address
the issue, per aps even laying claim to specific
areas, at the coming ECAFE conference in
Tokyo. The Chinese probably would be willing to
czparticipate in a multi-lateral gathering of inter-
Ifested riparian powers, in part because bilateral
dealings would be difficult with states like South
Korea. ,1
,?1 IThe matter of off-shore oil rights could well
become another source of friction in Peking's
relations with Japan. Tokyo plainly intends to
s r-stand firm on its exploration rights and on its
c joff-shore claims. Some believe 25X1
the Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on South
Korea was meant to obstruct joint Japanese -
South Korean development of the continental
shelf.
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crude oil sales would
offer foreign exchange to support China's in-
creasing importsa Peking almost certainly is fully
aware that its oil provides it negligible leverage ow_
with Tok o ri h
25X1
LDAI
(Over the longer 25X1
haul, however, China hopes to develop a capa-
bility, through petroleum diplomacy, to influence
Japan's dealings both with Moscow and Wash-25X1
ington. This will require fuller exploitation of
China's extensive oil resources-at best, a long-
term proposition,
Page 9
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EUROPE: TALKS IN TWO CITIES
in Helsinki, the third phase of the prepara- essential togenuine economic cooperation between
tory talks for a Conference on Security and Coop- East and West. At the very least, they insist that
eration in Europe ends this week. Some progress the way be left open to discuss them. Western
has been made in the preliminaries and the con- delegations would prefer that the concepts not be
ference itself probably will begin on schedule in brought up at all.!
June.)
fin the third "basket," human contacts, the
iA working group has now grappled with Soviets are not so much concerned about specific
topics in all four of the "baskets" into which the topics as they are about obtaining introductory
agenda has been divided. For each "basket" of4_,- language to the effect that exchanges in this area
topics, the working group has been attempting to --LI should not threaten the existence of various social
"
"
produce
mandates
that will serve as the basis
for discussion at later stages of the conference. In
the process, a number of problems have come to
light. Although there have been some positive
signs lately, many of the problems are still
resolved. y
systems. The fourth "basket," concerning the
establishment of follow-on machinery, has so far
been discussed but little. The Soviets say it is
important to them, while Western delegates re-
main opposed to any permanent post-conference
machinery
!The next phase of the preparatory talks,
beginning 25 April, will attempt to resolve some
of these disagreements, but several still may not
be settled by the time the foreign ministers of the
participating states begin the first, largely ceremo-
nial, stage of the actual conference in late June.
The working stage of the conference will prob-
ably get under way in July, take a break for the
usual European vacation, and resume in the fall!
(.,) )In Vienna, the preliminary talks on Mutual
and Balanced Force Reductions remain dead-
locked on the question of Hungarian participa-
tion, as they have been for two months. The
Warsaw Pact nations continue to insist that Hun-
gary should have observer status only or, if it is to
be a direct participant, that Italy should be also.
Since 13 March, the West has sought some ar-
rangement that would leave the status of Hungary
In the first "basket," entitled principles of
,security, it has not yet been decided how to
handle the topic on "inviolability of frontiers."
The West Germans, in particular, have wanted this
subordinated to another on "non-use of force,"
because they fear that without such a linkage,
peaceful changes such as the eventual reunifica-
tion of Germany might be precluded. Recently,
however, they have seemed willing to accept a
more tenuous connection. Moscow, concerned
about legitimizing the present boundaries in
Europe, still wants "inviolability of frontiers"
listed separately and prominently.1
(dHow prominent a role matters of military
?security will play is also unsettled. The prevailing
view on both sides is that discussion should be
limited to another topic in the first "basket,"
"confidence-building measures," but under this
rubric, the Soviets are still resisting a requirement
to notify other states prior to major military
movements. They have shown interest recently,
however, in placing "restraint" on such move-
ments if this means "self-restraint."
IIn the second "basket," the major unre-
solved question is the treatment of certain eco-
nomic concepts. The Soviets want to include as
topics both "most-favored-nation" and "non-
discrimination," on the grounds that they are
in abeyance until the actual negotiations begin,
presumably in the fall.)
61 !Differences may be narrowing somewhat,
and negotiations are now centering on each side
to make its own statement on Hungary's status.
The Soviets have also proposed a formula by
which more countries could join as direct partici-
pants. This would fulfill a Soviet objective by
leaving an avenue open for France in the
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maw GOLD ((' _I?, 4'.-~/ Co'-l)
(The Japanese are importing gold for the first time since World
War II. The government on 1 April liberalized gold import regula-
tions, and, as a result, imports this year will probably reach 130-150
metric tons, roughly double the 1972 level. all purchases so
far are being made in Western Euro e,
The liberalized measures, designed to meet industrial needs, also
permit individuals to import the equivalent of $3,000 in gold at any
one time without government approval. Japanese department stores
already are selling small gold bars. Rumors of an impending change in
the gold import laws contributed to the substantial rise in the
international gold price earlier this year, so there was little effect
when the change actually took place.
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? ?IThe Croat emigres' use of terrorism may
attract the firebrands, but their choice of target
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and method of operation have in fact inhibited
the emigres' freedom to maneuver. Australia last
(S year refused to admit the existence of terrorists
on its soil, but the new Labor government re-
cently began a drive to close down their opera-
tional bases. In addition, international revulsion
over the bombing of a Yugoslav airliner last year
has closed many doors.(
I Spain appears to remain a haven. Belgrade
has no diplomatic relations with Madrid and can
expect no direct assistance from the Spanish Gov-
ernment. The emigres who freed the convicted
murderers of the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden
and took them to Madrid on a hijacked Swedish
airliner are still being held b Spanish authorities
seven months after the event
)The extremist wing of the emigre movement
apparently believes it must regularly engage in
headline grabbing violence in order to establish its
credibility as a force to be reckoned with in the
post-Tito era. Its goal of separating Croatia from
Yugoslavia may find considerable sympathy in
Croatia, but only the lunatic fringe in the republic
would overlook the extremists' record of
atrocities during the war and since. Furthermore,
internal security in Yugoslavia, always pretty
good, has been tightened. With the warning it has
received from Canberra, Belgrade should be able
to handle any new raid with relative ease.]
The Yugoslav militia last summer suffered
13 dead and many wounded while wiping out the
19 raiders. The event provoked bitter complaints
from Belgrade that the West allowed the emigres
free r pin.
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( 6, h)
rops were good throughout Eastern Europe
last year, permitting a reduction of grain imports,
a boost in livestock production, and an improve-
ment of domestic food supplies. Prospects right
now for the winter grain harvest are not good,
however, and a poor one could result in a need to
increase grain imports by next winter.
Agricultural output in Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hun-
gary grew by an estimated 7.5 percent in 1972,
and reached record levels. This rate of growth was
in addition to gains in 1971 and was achieved
despite unfavorable harvesting conditions in most
countries. Grain production set a new high of 73
million tons, an increase of 8 percent. Output of
important non-grain crops-potatoes, sugar beets,
and fodder beets-was better than the year be-
fore. Only oilseeds dropped below 1971 levels.
The quality of grain and root crops harvested,
however, was inferior to that of 1971. The full
extent of losses due to storing wet grain and
potatoes are still unknown.
Livestock production-a priority sector-rose
more than planned in Czechoslovakia, East Ger-
many, and Poland. Output in Romania went up
substantially, but much less than planned. In
Bulgaria and Hungary, increases were no more
than one percent. Production of pork and poultry
improved in all six countries. Prospects for fur-
ther gains this year are good, except in Hungary
and Bulgaria, where the number of hogs has de-
clined.
The bumper grain harvest and improved out-
put of potatoes in the northern countries last year
permitted Eastern Europe to reduce grain imports
by 2 million tons in the current fiscal year to an
estimated 7 million tons. This cut in imports will
not reduce foreign-exchange expenditures, how-
ever, because world market prices for grain and
protein meals are much higher than a year ago.
Grain imports from the West will remain at a high
level due to reduced imports from the USSR. US
Romanian Peasants Drain Inundated Cropland
grain sales to the region in the fiscal year ending
30 June 1973 will be the highest in a decade at
over 1.5 million tons.
Current prospects for 1973 indicate a some-
what smaller harvest of winter grain-normally 50
percent of total production-than last year. Most
countries in early March were reporting that the
condition of winter wheat was no better than
average. Below-normal soil moisture reserves in
the northern countries and in Hungary have
lowered chances of the good spring growth
needed to optimize yields. March snows and sud-
den thaws in Bulgaria and Romania have caused
some flooding of grain fields and have delayed
spring field work, but the situation in the two
countries appears favorable for development of
winter grains.
A decline in grain output in the northern
three countries would boost demand for imports
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have prompted the Soviets to tighten their em-
bracel
4~ The Soviets are pushing for closer military
Moscow is working on es a is ing a
sout ern command, which would control any
Warsaw Pact operations in the Balkans. Bulgaria
would be a vital part of this command. Sofia
already gets almost all its military hardware from
the USSR, its army is organized and trained along
Soviet lines, and joint training exercises are held
annually.1
jln the political arena, the new Bulgarian
,am assador to Moscow has been given the per-
It onal rank of minister without portfolio. This is
he first time a Bulgarian envoy abroad has held
cabinet rank. The Bulgarian party has set up a
"general committee" in the Soviet Union, an ar-
rangement that portends closer coordination be-
tween the two countries. It is in fact reminiscent
of a method Stalin employed to keep a firm grip
on Sofia.1
La 4i Bulgaria's economic ties with the USSR, al-
ready close, have also been strengthened. The
1973 bilateral trade protocol calls for a 15-per-
in fiscal year 1974. Grain stocks are likely to be-ccent increase in trade over 1972, which is some-
reduced during 1973 and feedgrain will be neededL'sy what above the normal annual increase. Almost
to support high-priority livestock programs. In-
creased imports of grain would have to be largely
supplied by free world exporters, such as the US.
It is unlikely that the USSR will be able or willing
to export more grain to Eastern Europe next year
than the reduced level of fiscal year 1973
BULGARIA: SATELLITE FOR THE '70s
three quarters of Bulgaria's trade is with CEMA
countries; the USSR accounts for more than 50
percent by itself. Thirteen Bulgarian and 41 So-
viet economic ministries are now working under
joint production specialization agreements.]
0Si\')fhe latest moves point toward virtual inte-
gration and are about as far as the Zhivkov regime
can go without risking serious internal political
repercussions. Bulgarians take pride in their dis-
tinct cultural heritage, believing, for example,
that literacy spread to Russia from Bulgaria. In
addition, Sofia has already gone far to bend na-
tional interests on the Macedonian question to
accommodate Soviet foreign policy objectives to-
ward Yugoslavia and Greece. It is possible that
Zhivkov's poor health may have prompted Mos-
cow to push for closer cooperation rather than
[The Soviet Union now dominates Bulgarian
military, political, and economic life to an extent
not seen since the early 1950s. Sofia's subservi-
ence to Moscow contrasts sharply with the situa-
tion elsewhere in Eastern Europe, where na-
tionalist-minded leaders are using the atmosphere
of detente as an excuse to extend their independ-
ence from Moscow. Zhivkov's failing health may
face a period of tension and uncertainty should
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POLAND: TIGHTENING THE REINS
0 In an effort to tighten its control over
youth, the government last week lumped all stu-
dent organizations into a new association with
stronger ideological and political overtones than
the old groups.
1 I I [Students have always been a potential source
of opposition to the regime, and the party has
consistently tried to mobilize them into politi-
cally active groups. Just as consistently, the stu-
dents have avoided organizations that stress ideol-
ogy, preferring those that emphasize social bene-
fitsi\The need for increased discipline and Marxist
indoctrination among young people was strongly
emphasized last November at the central commit-
tee plenum. The meeting recommended that a
new student union be created.)
)Students have been grumbling ever since.
Members of the comparatively liberal and non-
ideological Polish Student Association correctly
guessed that they would be outnumbered in the
blanket union by more conservative elements
from other youth groups
j, ,q Warsaw carefully stage-managed the estab-
lishment of the new association, the Socialist
Union of Polish Students. Party chief Edward
03ierek in early February surfaced detailed plans
for its creation, and a round of mee i gs and
congresses of youth groups followed. In mid-
March, the old Polish Student Associatioh meekly
abolished itself, and the new organization was
formed immediately. Membership is open to all
students and academic personnel from Polish
higher schools, but is not mandatory.]
' I 'The regime's major chore now will be to
persuade students to join. Some intend to shun
the new group, believing they can in this manner
demonstrate their opposition both to an ideologi-
cal-political student group and to the steam-roller
tactics that brought it into existence. Pressures to
join, however, are likely to be considerable, and
many students will find it difficult to resist in-
ducements like foreign trips, book discounts, and
preferential treatment on housing and scholar-
sh i ps.
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;Labor Party regulars are grooming Foreign
Minister Eban as an alternative candidate for
prime minister in case neither Mrs. Meir nor Fi-
nance Minister Sapir run. Eban, Israel's articulate,
ambitious foreign policy spokesman, is being sent
on speaking trips about the country. Labor Party
boss Sapir and his supporters want more exposure
for Eban so that the voters can get to know him;
one party member said the move would also
"educate" Eban and stimulate his interest in
domestic matters.,
Some of his critics in the Labor Party regard
the 58-year-old Eban, who was born in South
Africa and educated in England, as not a "real"
Israeli. He does not in fact show up as a tough-
minded, hard-working, kibbutz-pioneer type.
More important, there is a serious lack of con-
fidence in his alleged "dove-ish" views. Sapir is far
and away the party machine's first choice to
replace Mrs. Meir; he has indicated from time to
time that he does not want the job, but since this
is a standard political posture among Israeli can-
didates it is difficult to tell whether he is serious l
Parliament cast a 14th ballot for a new
president on 4 April. While the politicians
consulted in a somewhat desultory way, the
military glowered but made no move against
parliament. At week's end, no early solution
to the three-week impasse was in sight.
jOn 2 April, Suleyman Demirel's Justice
Party suggested to other parties that there
were three ways out of the situation:
j. find a compromise candidate from
within the legislature;
? advance general elections from Octo-
ber` to June and defer the presidential
problem until after the new legislature
was seated; ,)
'Prime Minister Meir will be 75 in May, and
she has for some months insisted that she wants
to step down. Many observers think that she
might yet be persuaded by the Labor Party to
stay on for another term. This is of course pos-
sible, especially since on her recent visit to the US
she indicated that her loyalty to the party would
take precedence over her personal desires.,(
j lOther aspirants for the job include Defense
Minister Dayan and Deputy Prime Minister Allon.
The Labor Party machine hopes to keep the post
under its control and that means out of the hands
of Dayan or Allon. Should the machine decide to
field Eban, it would reflect Sapir's desire not to
take the job but to give it to an individual respon-
sive to his views. Eban's constituency has always
been outside Israel. Therefore, floating reports
that Eban may be under consideration as a serious
candidate may be a pre-election maneuver to
strengthen the bargaining position of the machine
with the hard liners who identify with Dayan's
views. Certainly, it is doubtful Eban would be
announced as the machine's choice prior to the
election, now set for October.
e I ? amend the constitution so that the
president is elected by popular vote.]
'Other civilian politicians and the military high
command have not reacted to these proposals,
each of which has its drawbacks. Meanwhile,
Justice Party member Tekin Ariburun continues
to serve as acting president.]
Dem i rel probably favors early parlia-
mentary elections, anticipating that they will
strengthen the hand of the Justice Party in
parliament and confer on him the ability to
designate the next head of state}lFor that very
reason, the generals will likely look unfavorably
on parliamentary elections in June. -
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BANGLADESH: GRIM PROSPECTS (~ ~?J
Economic recovery in Bangladesh has been
slow. Massive relief aid and the help of UN tech-
nicians have forestalled widespread famine. In
1972, almost one fifth of all foodgrains consumed
were imported, and Dacca has predicted the def-
icit will be even greater this year. Rice produc-
tion for the crop year ending 30 June 1973 is
expected to be the lowest in six years.
Except for the export-oriented jute industry,
industry in Bangladesh remains depressed because
of shortages of machinery and raw materials, the
loss of markets in Pakistan, and the overwhelming
priority of the food problem. Private investment
has been discouraged by the government's eco-
nomic policies, under which most industries and
almost all foreign trading have been nationalized.
The government itself lacks both the resources
and the expertise to carry out a vigorous invest-
ment program. Even though Dacca has announced
a ten-year moratorium on further nationalization,
limitations already imposed on the activities of
foreign and local businessmen have inhibited
private investment and discouraged economic
growth.
Indeed, in the short run, the main economic
question is one of mere survival. Bangladesh tea,
paper, and matches are not competitive on world
markets, and even jute faces an uncertain future.
The population, increasing at a minimum of 3
percent per year, is illiterate, underfed, and
underemployed. Probably the most that can be
expected of foreign aid is to avert widespread
famine rather than to generate any appreciable
economic momentum.
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Bfghanistan:
fl Bag
of Problems
'Prime Minister Shafiq's problems are increas-
ing. buring his first three months in office, Shafiq
was able to lay the groundwork for economic and
governmental reforms and to conduct foreign
policy without reference to the slow moving,
often quarrelsome lower house of parliament.
Now, however, he must go to parliament-which
has played a major part in bringing down the last
four Afghan prime ministers-for approval of,,
many of his programs.:
Shafiq's enemies fall into three main groups:
? Conservative Muslims, who believe that
Western influences have eroded his devotion
to Islam;
? and many government officials and
politicians, who are concerned that his cam-
paign against corru tion and inefficiency may
hurt their interests.!
1 JShafiq faces trouble for his failure to come
to the support of President Bhutto's opponents in
the two frontier provinces of Pakistan. Most
Afghans have long supported the closely related
peoples of these provinces, and many advocate
outright help to Bhutto's opponents there. In
response to public and parliamentary pressure,
Shafiq has recently voiced a slightly stronger
stand on the issue, and he could become even
more outspoken as unrealistic demands for action
continued
? leftists, who stand ready to take ad-
vantage of his stand on any issue including the
recent water division agreement with Iran;
jt IThe recent expulsion of foreign Christians,
including the pastor of the only protestant church
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in the country, is likely to have the most impact ({ week to prevent a quorun when the lower house
on the US and other Western countries. This is finally met, Shafiq's enemies succeeded in sending
not a major issue to Shafiq, who believes that he the agreement to parliamentary committees that
can bear adverse publicity abroad more ea$jly had not yet been formed)
than domestic criticism for not upholding Islamic
rules. The government had already expelled sev- ~I [His effort to reform the country's inefficient
eral Americans accused of trying to convert Mus- f bureaucracy will also meet resistance. Those
liras-an illegal act in Afghanistan. About a 3 threatened are seeking an ally in Prince Abdul
hundred Westerners with two charitable medical 19 Wali-probably the most important man in the
missions are likely to be ordered out of the coun- country after the King, who is Wali's cousin and
try. Even the USAID family-planning program father-in-law. Wali apparently sees Shafiq as a
may be in danger] threat to his power and his prospects for be-
)1 YLeftists may significantly delay the ratifica-
tion of the agreement with Iran on the division of
the waters of the Helmand River. Most deputies
would probably vote to ratify the agreement, the
result of years of negotiations. Alleging a sell-out
to Iran, the leftists boycotted parliament for a
coming de facto. ruler of Afghanistan when the
King dies.
q j As long as Shafiq has the backing of the
King, he will be able to act fairly effectively. In
the past, the King's support has diminished as the
prime minister's problems-with parliament
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: ROAD'S END
Official spokesmen have announced the "vir-
tual extinction" of the small guerrilla band that
landed on the southwest coast nearly nine weeks
ago. As a result the government appears to be
stronger, the left weaker. The army proved itself
still ill-prepared to handle an insurgent threat.?
Any hope the invaders had of implanting a
real insurgent movement in the countryside died
with their leader-ex-colonel Francisco Caamano
Deno, who led the 1965 insurrection. If he had
been led to expect local support, it failed to
materialize. Government claims of direct Cuban
sponsorship have not been repeated and will prob-
ably not be raised at the current OAS meeting. 1
, Although the group was able to evade some
1,50 government troops for a considerable time,
its members eventually succumbed to difficulties
imposed by weather-cold, rain, and fog-rough
terrain, lack of food, and sheer weight of numbers
of the pursuing forces. Five of the guerrillas were
killed, one died of illness and exposure, and one
was captured and is being interrogated. At least
one, and possibly two, are still at large and may
be hiding in the capital. Most army units involved
in th? operation are returning to their regular
bases/
The government's response to the landing
was the immediate repression of the extreme left
and the opposition Dominican Revolutionary
Party led by Juan Bosch. While this action effec-
tively curbed potentially disruptive forces during
the incursion, it may have encouraged the diver-
gent forces on the left to plan for joint opera-
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With the effective end of the guerrilla threat,
Balaguer is again riding high, and it is doubtful
that the opposition-with or without Bosch's par-
ticipation-can develop the momentum to shake
the government.
I C,
A more serious threat may emerge from the
current dispute in the armed forces arising out of
an investigation into the recent murder of a prom-
inent Santo Domingo editor.
a'-1
ARGENTINA: MORE TERRORISM
c' ]Contrary to the belief of many Argentines
that terrorism would subside in light of the Peron-
ist victory, the level of political violence has in-
creased markedly in recent weeks. Even before
the latest and most serious incident, the assassina-
tion of the army intelligence chief in Cordoba on
4 April, the military had expressed its concern
over the deteriorating security situation.)
("r) Terrorism has indeed been increasing stead-
ily, both in terms of numbers of incidents and
their seriousness since the first of the year. Mili-
tary nerves were rubbed raw this week with the
bombing of naval headquarters in Buenos Aires,
olutionary warfare." J
(IF .The military has been shaken b the surge of
the kidnaping of a retired admiral, and finally the
assassination of the army colonel in Cordoba.
Some of the 20 kidnapings this year-possibly
including that of a US businessman on 2 April-
can be attributed to common criminals cashing in
on a good thing. The attacks on the military and
the wave of bombings, however, were obviously
politically motivated.]
`/i jThe Trotskyist-oriented People's Revolu-
tionary Army has been responsible for most of
the political violence in Argentina this year. Other
major terrorist groups profess to be pro-Peronist
and have slowed their operations to aid that
cause. The Trotskyists, however, have stepped up
their activities to put pressure on the newly
elected Peronists to live up to their pledge to free
all political prisoners. It seems likely, too, that
the Trotskyists believe that their objective of a
thorough-going revolution will be frustrated by
the populist but "bourgeois" Peronists. If the
military can be provoked into blocking Campora's
accession to power, the Trotskyists probably see
large numbers of radical Peronists turning to "rev-
The military junta has reaffirmed its
intention to turn over the reins of government to
Campora on 25 May, but if General Lopez
Aufranc begins to waver as a result of the ter-
rorism, it will give an important boost to those
officers who would like to prevent the Peronists
from taking power.
o protect their election victory, the Peron-
ists have begun to back away from their long held
position that political violence is justified by the
oppressive tactics of the military. Vice-president -
elect Solano Lima told newsmen this week that
the Peronist government will combat violence,
adding that Peronist groups have ceased opera-
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