WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010100060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 16, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Jecret
Secret
16 March 1973
No. 0361/73
Copy N? 43
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CONTENTS (16 March 1973)
3 France: Victory for Pompidou
4 Black September: More To
Come; Sudan
9 Philippines: Diplomatic Waves
9 Korea: Talk, Not Fight
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
15 Libya: Qadhafi's Troubles
15 Syria: Constitution Approved
16 Egypt: Helping Hand
17 Bangladesh: Mujib's Mandate
18 Ethiopia: Hard Times for Rebels
19 Malagasy Republic: Firm Hand
19 Turkey: Generals Hit a Snag
20 East Africa: Community in Danger
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20 Peru: Tough Old Soldier
21 Cuba: Raul Castro Emerges
22 Venezuela: Oil in Election
23 Chile: Looking Ahead
SPECIAL
REPORT
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Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed
to the editor of the Weekly ry, =
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ARGENTINA: A PERONIST TRIUMPH
,The Peronists swept the national elections
on 11 March in a show of strength that rivaled the
best Peron himself managed at the height of his
power. The armed forces, in a surprisingly mild
reaction, appear to have acquiesced, and Hector
Campora, the president-elect, is beginning to set
the stage for the inauguration of a "government
of national conciliation" on 25 May. i
/Surpassing the expectations of all but the
most dedicated Peronists, Campora polled ap-
proximately 49 percent of the vote; the final
count could put him over 50. The Peronists did
equally well in congressional and provincial elec-
tions across the country. Runoffs will be neces-
sary in some races, but the Peronists will come
close to having a majority in both houses of the
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national congress and will probably capture most
of the provincial governorships.
the need for a runoff in the presidential race
was avoided when the Radicals' Ricardo Balbin,
who finished a distant second with just over 20
percent of the vote, conceded victory to Cam-
pora. Semi-independent candidates like Francisco
Manrique with 14.7 percent of the vote and Oscar
Alende with about 7 percent split the anti-Peron-
ist vote that would otherwise have gone to Balbin.
Campora appears to have captured a large ma-
jority of youthful new voters with a strong anti-
government campaign.'
In the flush of victory Campora has adopted
a moderate approach, urging his followers to
remain calm and claiming that his government
will include political leaders from outside Peronist
ranks. The campaign promise that the Peronists
would work closely with the Radicals after the
elections might not be fully implemented, in view
of the strong Peronist vote and the poor showing
of the Radicals.;)
In large part, Campora's moderation seems
aimed at neutralizing his many opponents in the
armed forces. He has gone out of his way to
pacify the military, telling senior generals that he
plans no early shake-up of the military hierarchy.
He reportedly has assured General Lopez Au-
franc, President Lanusse's hand-picked successor
as army commander, that he will not oppose his
moving up to that post when Lanusse steps down.
Lopez Aufranc appears to have the strength to
overcome any power play by officers who still
harbor intentions of blocking Campora.
r
Campora owes his new found eminence en-
tirely to Juan Peron, and there is little doubt that
his approach to government will reflect this. He
has assured the nation that Peron will be present
for the inauguration on 25 May and that his
programs will be faithfully carried out. It is by no
means certain that the old dictator will choose to
remain in Argentina and assume responsibility for
Campora's success or failure. Peron is more likely
to take on the mantle of elder statesman and
perhaps return to Spain. Campora and other
Campora (top) and Vice-President Elect
Peronist leaders probably hope that Peron will
not stay on. This would inhibit any show of
independence by the newly elected leaders and
make good working relations with the military all
but impossible.,
~Peron's influence will be apparent, however,
in a tightening up on foreign investment and
increased state control over basic elements of the
economy. His hand will also be seen in a typically
Peronist mistrust of the inter-American system-
especially the Organization of American States.
Campora is also likely to follow Peron's lead in
seeking closer cooperation with Western Europe
and forging a foreign policy more "independent"
of the United States.1
{6 (Campora has announced that his government
will 'open diplomatic and trade relations with
Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In inter-
national bodies, Argentina will give greater sup-
port to so-called Third World positions, a concept
they believe was first offered to the world by
,1 Juan Peron. With the Peronists at the helm,
Argentina will also seek to re-establish a leader-
ship position in Latin America which could easily
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\The clear majority won by the governing
coalition in the legislative elections on 4 and 11
March was a personal victory for President Pom-
pidou. His coalition will have the support of 274
of the 490 delegates in the new assembly. The
coalition pitched its campaign in support of the
President, and his two interventions on TV were
the only bright spots in an otherwise dull cam-
paign.
Pompidou has thus strengthened his position
vis-a-vis the hard-core Gaullists. If he chooses, he
probably can absorb additional centrist elements
into the coalition to consolidate his hold further.
Those who compared Pompidou's coattails unfa-
vorably with De Gaulle's will be hard pressed to
explain how he held the left to fewer seats-
181-and won more for his own group than De
Gaulle did in 1967. Pompidou will have to make
social changes that will meet the demands of the
electorate if he is to retain this strong position up
through the presidential race in 1976.
The centrists, with 31 delegates, failed to
gain the pivotal role in the assembly for which
they had aimed. They did, however, gain the
status and privileges of a formal parliamentary
group. Jean Lecanuet could join the government
now or later, but he may wish to remain as leader
of an independent parliamentary group. Jean-
Jacques Servan-Schreiber, by refusing to go along
with Lecanuet in cooperating with the govern-
ment against the left in the second round, further
isolated himself. He antagonized his colleagues in
the center, and, at the same time, he cannot move
leftward so long as the Socialists are linked to the
Communists.
The failure of the left alliance to equal its
showing in 1967 may cause serious reconsidera-
tion of the value of the common accord, espe-
cially among those who have had doubts about it
all along. Socialist leader Mitterrand had hoped to
emerge as the pre-eminent leader of the left, but
his party did not do as well vis-a-vis the Com-
munists as he had expected. The election setback
and Pompidou's improved position may well
force Mitterrand to change his strategy for the
presidential race in 1976. The Soviets can be
expected to tell the French Communists in no
uncertain terms that cooperation with the Social-
ists is counterproductive. Moscow nurses a special
animosity toward Mitterrand and is surely quite
pleased with the outcome of the election.
Foreign policy is Pompidou's personal pre-
serve and is not likely to be significantly affected
by the election. On the other hand, the outcome
is certain to have repercussions in domestic pol-
icy. Pompidou's election-eve promise of social
reform indicated he recognizes the depth of the
discontent among the voters. Leftist and labor
leaders quickly indicated they would be watching
closely to make sure he makes good on these
promises. They are particularly interested in
raising the minimum wage and lowering the retire-
ment age. Although the government's victory has
eliminated the possibility of a constitutional crisis
of an assembly in opposition to the executive, the
threat was there for a time during the campaign
and worried many Frenchmen. Resolution of the 25X1
problem would be extremely complex, however,
and Pompidou will not be eager to take it up in
The centrists' poor showing illustrates the
continuing polarization of French politics. Since
the beginning of the Fifth Republic in 1958, it
has become quite clear that the center does not
constitute a viable alternative in the eyes of the
French electorate. If Lecanuet were to join the
government, the opposition center would for all
practical purposes disappear.
if 114 lip,
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Black September assassinated an alleged Is-
raeli intelligence agent in Cyprus this week, pro-
viding further evidence that they will bend every
effort to maintain their terrorist operations
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wrap the matter up quickly, the terrorists may be
tried, convicted, and possibly executed before the 25X1
month is out.l
umayri as as e the 25X1
US for additional security assistance, and steps
have been taken to protect the airline and Sudan-
ese diplomats,i In deadly earnest, the Sudanese
ambassador in 'Prague, while offering his condo-
lences at the US Embassy, produced a gun to
show that he was ready to take on the terrorists
I & )While displaying no sign of give, Numayri
has taken the initiative to blunt Arab criticism.
He has offered to produce captured documents
Some 5,000 trade union workers demon- showing Fatah's connection with Black Septem-
strat6d in Khartoum last weekend in a show of ber. He also sent an "important message" this
support for President Numayri's decision to try week to Arab capitals calling on Arab leaders to
the eight Black September terrorists. Although take a united position on commando activities.]
the rally was undoubtedly encouraged by the I , Sudanese civil servant representatives walked out
government, there is little doubt that most Sudan- of a meeting of Arab workers in Cairo last week-
ese were outraged by the murder of the American end when an item was placed on the agenda
and Belgian diplomats, No date has been set for calling on Numayri to treat the eight terrorists
the trial, but given Numayri's determination to "humanely."
Substantive talks in Paris between the Thieu
government and the Viet Cong are to begin next
week. Saigon will be represented by a deputy
premier, Nguyen Luu Vien, and the Communists
by one of their Liberation Front diplomats,
Nguyen Van Hieu. The talks promise to be dif-
ficult and protracted as the negotiators struggle
over such problems as the type of elections to be
held and the structure of the Council of National
Reconciliation and Concord that is supposed to
supervise the elections.
Page 5
' )Exchanges this week gave a preview of the
sort of disputes that are likely to surface as the
sides try to outmaneuver one another. The South
Vietnamese say they believe time will tend to
favor the Communists, so the South Vietnamese
intend to push for early elections. The Viet Cong
spokesman in Paris, on the other hand, has made
it clear the Communists will not even begin to
talk about elections until Saigon has released all
the political prisoners it holds.
C,; Jne member of the Saigon delegation says
that the talks will be broad in scope and that he
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expects to be in Paris for several months. He
believes the main difficulty will be-as it has been
for months-the problem of "guarantees"; each
side wants iron-clad assurances against attack or
subversion by the other.j
North Vietnam: A New Drive at Home(
}Notwithstanding a steady stream of articles
condemning the US and Saigon for alleged viola-
tions of the Paris accords, Hanoi seems to be
concentrating on problems of domestic recon-
struction. Signs are accumulating, in fact, that the
regime is making a strenuous effort to divert the
energies of the North Vietnamese from war to
peacetime projects before they have a chance to
relax. The party politburo issued a resolution on
12 March asserting that the "building of socialism
on a large scale and at a rapid rate" was a prime
task for the immediate future, and party First
Secretary Le Duan published an article two days
later on the same theme.
One of the leadership's obvious preoccupa-
tions as it swings into this campaign is the per-
North Vietnamese repair bridge.
Page 6
formance of its officials at all levels, both inside
the party and out. Many of these key individuals,
the politburo asserted, are not doing their jobs,
and those who fail to shape up will be removed.
Campaigns like this have occurred in the
past, but the regime faces a formidable dilemma
in mobilizing the populace now that a measure of
peace has come. In the past, it has had little luck
through these campaigns of exhortation in al-
tering the haphazard approach of the populace to
organization and production. Similarly, improve-
or-be-fired campaigns have been conducted in the
party before, but party structure and effective-
ness has never been greatly affected. The lead-
ership may have more success this time, but the
odds seem to be against it~
CAMBODIA: GOVERNMENT BACKS DOWN
;Alarmed by growing popular unrest over
rising prices and charges of corruption within the
administration, the Lon Nol government over the
weekend modified its recently enacted economic
reform program. The government put price ceil-
ings back on rice, postponed scheduled increases
in utility rates, and reduced the cost of petroleum
products slightly. The government promised to
look into allegations of corruption, to control
government spending, and to review the salary
levels of all workers within three months.,
The striking teachers and students consider
the modifications a victory, but it may prove a
hollow one. The imposition of higher prices on
key commodities had been a key element in the
government's belated attempts to come to grips
with the country's deteriorating economy and
was strongly recommended by the US and the
International Monetary Fund as a way to increase
tax revenues and to reduce costly government
subsidies. Subsidy costs will now rise even higher
and, coupled with earlier wage hikes, will feed the
country's inflationary spiral and produce greater
problems later in the year.
S" The concessions do seem to have had the
desired effect of calming the situation. The
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students have indicated that they may end their
strike, in the belief the government should be
given time to implement its programs. The
teachers believe the concessions do not go far
enough and have decided to remain on strike, but
growing public sentiment may force them to
soften their position. 'j
Setbacks in the South
I ;Most of the fighting during the week oc-
curred along Route 2 between Phnom Penh and
the South Vietnam border. A series of sharp in-
surgent attacks forced the Cambodians to aban-
don several small defensive positions along the
highway, and on 12 March government troops
abandoned the town of Chambak--north of the
provincial capital of Takeo. By midweek, the
insurgents controlled most of the roadway. Gov-
ernment operations to clear Route 2 to Takeo are
making slow progress. Any attempt to clear the
road from Takeo to the border will be particu-
larly difficult because of the recent increase in
Communist activity in southern Takeo Province.
As a result of the deteriorating security situation
in this area, some 5,000 local Cambodians report-
edly have fled into South Vietnam]
The return to Vientiane late last week of the
second-ranking Communist negotiator, Phoune
Sipraseuth, sparked hope that the two commis-
sions, which have been discussing the political and
military provisions of the peace agreement, could
start making some progress. Instead, Phoune
called into question the very raison d'etre of the
commissions. The Communists now claim that
the commissions are merely technical bodies
tasked with elaborating the details of articles left
vague in the peace agreement and have no real
authority]
By trying to emasculate the two commis-
sions, the Communists are presumably setting the
stage for another round of bargaining between
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and senior
Communist negotiators similar to that which
produced the 21 February peace agreement. They
may reason that Souvanna is more likely to make
concessions behind closed doors and under the
pressure of time.]
Souvanna himself does not seem overly con-
cerned by the lack of progress. He probably
agrees with the Communists that the commissions
have little utility but appears willing to allow
them to limp along. By letting things slip and
then wrapping them up in high-level sessions at
the last minute, he can once more present the
rightists a fait accompli and neatly sidestep
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THE PHILIPPINES: DIPLOMATIC WAVES
iIAlthough the Muslims have always been un-
happy with their stake in Philippine society, Presi-
dent Marcos is inclined to attribute their current
restiveness to outside instigation. Last week he
turned the heat on Malaysia, implying that if
Kuala Lumpur would cease meddling, peace
would return to the Muslim areas in the southern
islands.:
-'YJn 6 March, Marcos had Secretary of For-
eign Affairs Romulo raise the issue at the emer-
gency meeting in Manila of diplomatic representa-
tives from the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations members-Singapore, Malaysia, Indo-
nesia, Thailand and the Philippines. In a carefully
staged presentation, Romulo revealed to the as-
sembled diplomats a press release in which Marcos
charged Malaysia with providing logistic support
and military training to the dissidents. The release
alleged that uniformed foreign mercenaries were
participating in rebel operations. Following pre-
dictable protests from the diplomats, Romulo
made a show of contacting Marcos and getting
him to withhold the release-at least for the time
being.
In his remarks to the diplomats, Romulo
implied that Marcos is under pressure from his
military leaders, who are upset at losses in the
field. There was also an implication that Marcos
might be forced to take stronger action if Kuala
Lumpur does not curb the chief minister of the
Malaysian state of Sabah, Tun Mustapha, who is
clearly providing arms and other support to the
rebels.
Malaysia shows no signs of being stampeded
into disciplining Mustapha; it is holding out for a
diplomatic quid pro quo-an agreement by Mar-
cos to drop Manila's territorial claims to Sabah.
The other members of the association, although
obviously concerned about the consequences of a
squabble between two members, are not ready to
intervene in the dispute. "l
,Marcos' allegations about Malaysian involve-
ment exaggerate the importance of foreign sup-
port to the Muslims-partly for expediency and
partly from faulty military intelligence. The Mus-
lims in the recent actions in the south have
proved to be better armed coordinated and led
than in the ast
KOREA: TALK, NOT FIGHT
Months of North-South negotiations have
produced little in terms of positive results, but
they have gone a long way toward reducing ten-
sion. The effects of more than 20 years of mili-
tant confrontation are still much in evidence
along the heavily armed Demilitarized Zone. De-
spite agreements to avoid hostilities, neither side
has lowered its guard in this area, and two South
Korean soldiers were killed in an incident on 7
March. Both sides acted quickly to defuse the
incident and keep it from adversely affecting the
more important objective of preserving the
peaceful competition. t
North Koreans on DMZ
Keeping Their Guard Up
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Without referring to the incident, Seoul and
Pyongyang announced on 9 March that they had
agreed to begin the next round of talks in Pyong-
yang on 14 March. The date had been the subject
of weeks of haggling following the last formal
meeting in December. Shortly before the shoot-
ing, Pyongyang had in fact backed out of an
agreement to meet in early March. The sudden-
ness with which the new date was set provided
reassurance to both domestic and international
observers that the year-old detente was not in
jeopardy.
The circumstances of the incident indicate
that the North Koreans deliberately fired on a
South Korean work party. It is possible that the
South Koreans were carrying out unauthorized
reconnaissance which may have provoked the
North Koreans. Neither side has exploited the
incident in propaganda. Pyongyang had made sev-
eral low-keyed statements, admitting it fired first
but alleging provocation. Seoul deliberately de-
layed its comment until the announcement of the
resumption of the talks.
The talks in Pyongyang are not likely to be
affected by the events of 7 March. There are
indeed some signs that the two sides may finally
tackle substantive issues. North Korea has long
called for economic exchanges, and Seoul, after
considerable deliberation, appears willing to ex-
plore the possibility. Both sides will use whatever
progress comes from the sessions to fuel their
respective campaigns for international acceptabil-
EUROPE: THE SOVIET ALTERNATIVE
!A West German power company delegation
goes'to Moscow next week to discuss Soviet ura-
nium enrichment services for the first core of a
1,200-megawatt nuclear reactor. The deal, if it
comes off, has a precedent. The USSR has con-
tracted to supply similar services for a French
reactor. The Germans may be serious about the
Soviet service. Their trip follows changes, disap-
pointing to the West Europeans, in the US ar-
rangements for providing enrichment services.
The West German power company plans to
ship 110 tons of uranium oxide to the USSR
between 1974 and 1976 and receive 98 tons of
reactor fuel in 1976. Although the West German
Government claims this is merely a "test case," it
already has sought the acquiescence of its Western
trading partners for the transaction. The Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)
will be represented at the talks, the first Soviet
contact with an EC officer acting in an official
capacity.
The USSR can produce more enriched ura-
nium than it needs. In recent years, the Soviets
have discussed enrichment services not only with
the French and West Germans, but with Sweden,
Italy, and Japan as well. Political factors, in-
cluding the prospect of an early IAEA-EUR-
ATOM agreement that will police utilization of
nuclear fuels, were in part behind Moscow's de-
cision to go ahead with the West German talks.
Just as important to the USSR, however, are the
profits it foresees in doing business of this nature
with the developed states, especially in Western
Eu rope.
Western countries presumably would be re-
luctant to depend heavily on the USSR for en-
richment services. The new US terms for the same
services, however, raise the unit price and require
orders eight years in advance. The Soviets clearly
are trying to take advantage of this development.
They have told the Italians that the USSR could
offer a much better bargain than "the expensive
enriched uranium available from the US."
For the longer run, the West Europeans
know they will have to examine closely their
plans to expand their own production of enriched
uranium. The EC Council on 22 May will examine
prospects for an EC enrichment facility. Such a
project, however, is still caught up in a rivalry
over different enrichment methods: France has
the gaseous diffusion system, while a potentially
less expensive centrifuge system is sponsored by
West Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The
centrifuge is still in the pilot-plant stage, but the 25X1
new US terms for enrichment services may influ-
ence its sponsors to expand the initial production
capacity.
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USSR: THE STRUGGLE OVER SAMIZDAT
The samizdat Chronicle of Current Events,
published on a bi-monthly basis since April 1968,
has repeatedly embarrassed the regime by dis-
seminating news of dissident activities and viola-
tions of the law by Soviet officials. In recent
months, the effort of Soviet authorities to sup-
press the journal has seriously disrupted its
publication schedule.
~In December 1971, the Chronicle and its
publishers came under the gun when the Central
Committee reportedly ordered the KGB to take
the steps necessary to suppress the journal. The
arrest of Petr Yakir, the reputed leader of Mos-
cow's small dissident community, was the high
point of the campaign. Scores of others have?
either been arrested or called in for interrogation:
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works in the West by publishing them first for
limited circulation in the USSR, in order to estab-
lish a Soviet copyright.
some samizdat, including at least two
5- wor s y novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, have
been published for such restricted distribution in
the past. Boris Stukalin, chairman of the State
Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants,
and the Book Trade, recently claimed that foreign
publishers who publish the works of Soviet
authors without their consent could be held
responsible under the terms of the convention.
With few exceptions, Soviet officials have had
little difficulty obtaining authors' statements
claiming that their works were published abroad
\Four issues of the Chronicle came out in
1972, but issue Number 28, due three months
ago, has failed to appear. Press reports attribute
the delay to the publishers' fear that the KGB will
carry out its threat to arrest dissidents not nec-
essarily connected with the Chronicle if Number
28 appears. In recent weeks, the KGB has in-
creased its surveillance of known dissidents and of
foreign correspondents who receive copies of the
Chronicle.
r The expressed intention of the USSR to
adhere to the Universal Copyright Convention on
27 May will give the Soviets yet another weapon
to use against dissident and non-conformist
writers. Under the terms of the convention,
Soviet writers can be held responsible for their
works being sent abroad through non-official
channels. In Soviet legal terms, such action could
be termed a violation of the state monopoly on
foreign trade, a criminal offense punishable by up
to ten years imprisonment, five years exile, and
confiscation of property. A Soviet official re-
cently commented that writers who circumvent
official procedures would not be allowed to
receive payments from their foreign publishers.?
The Soviet Government could use the con-
vention to hamper the publication of samizdat
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DENMARK: SOCIALISTS RETRENCH
L
,The popularity rating of the governing Social
Democrats has sunk to the lowest point in 20
years and has the party running scared. A recent
poll recorded a 5-percent drop last year. Years of
burgeoning welfare payments aimed at mollifying
left wingers have seriously alienated moderate and
centrist support. On 8 March, the Social Demo-
crats shifted course and unveiled an austerity pro-
gram in the hope of regaining lost ground.
The new program would postpone spending
on a number of projects for at least one year. The
retrenchment would affect education, welfare,
worker participation in management, and building
projects including the Saltholm airport and the
Great Belt bridge. The program also would slow
the expansion of family welfare benefits and rent
subsidies and would give home owners some tax
advantages. The program would increase taxes on
corporate income and bond yields. It aims at
saving over the next two years more than $600
million; the budget for the current fiscal year is
approximately $8 billion. The defense budget,
already well pruned, will not be affected by the
new proposals.
Deadlocked national wage negotiations and
an unexpectedly large trade deficit probably
figured in the party's policy shift, but the big
reason is political nerves. Economics Minister Per
Haekkerup, a moderate Socialist and admirer of
the US, is the recognized architect of the new
policy. His skillful handling of the austerity
proposals thus far has prompted the press to label
him "super minister" and "prime minister in
fact." The government appears to have the sup-
port of most of the opposition parties and even
the extreme leftist Socialist Peoples Party, upon
which it normally depends for a majority in
parliament. The latter party can be expected to
extract concessions for going along with auster-
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LIBYA: QADHAFI'S TROUBLES
President Qadhafi's eagerness to press ahead
with the planned Libyan-Egyptian union is
causing the Libyan leader problems at home, and
these could get worse. Libyans in general believe
they have nothing to gain from the merger. So
far, their animosity has been vented on the al-
ready sizable Egyptian community in Libya, but
as the September deadline for merger draws
closer, some Libyans are likely to turn on
Qadhafi.i
`,The Israeli downing of a Libyan airliner last
month brought matters to a head. Many Libyans
blamed Egypt for the disaster, and some key
military officers threatened to withdraw their
support from Qadhafi unless he abandons plans
for the union. During the funeral for the airliner
victims, unruly mobs protested against the merger
and destroyed Egyptian property.;
' ~Qadhafi, who has an almost mystical attach-
ment to the union, managed to contain his own
SYRIA: CONSTITUTION APPROVED
(The new constitution was endorsed by 97.6
percent of those voting in the national referen-
dum on 12 March, according to official returns
from Damascus.' This figure was quite possibly
inflated to counteract any damage that may have
been done to the regime's image by the demon-
strations and strikes last month by opponents of
the constitution. This activity constituted the
most visible display of opposition to the Asad
regime since it took over in a bloodless coup in
November 1970:
!Opposition to the constitution came mainly
from conservative religious leaders who are
enraged that the document does not declare Syria
a Muslim state. Many rightist politicians also are
unhappy that the dominance of the socialist
Baath Party has been written into the new con-
stitution. The dissidents failed to block the refer-
endum, except in Hamah, the fourth largest city
in Syria, where press reports claim the boycott
was totally effective.'
irritation with Egypt over the tragedy and tried to The firm government repression of this op
calm his angry citizens. The members of the , position activity late last month probably did
ruling Revolutionary Command Council main- r much to discourage further expressions of dissent.
tained an official silence regarding the air disaster, President Asad, in a speech on 8 March marking
and all are continuing to promote the union. the 10th anniversary of the Baath Party take-over
N hl
t
ever
a ess, Qadhafi and his colleagues were in Syria, sharply denounced "reactionary
badly shaken by the riots-~the first since they ments" who oppose the new constitution.-
seized power in 1969.;
v~ /Qadhafi has never been able to suppress his
fear that, underneath it all, President Sadat is
seeking a negotiated settlement with Israel. In a
speech last week, the Libyan President again
criticized all Arab regimes for not joining forces
against Israel, and he implicitly accused Egypt of
abandoning the Palestinian cause. Qadhafi's
apprehensions are likely to be encouraged by in-
fluential Libyans looking for any excuse to pull
out of the merger. So far, however, these pres-
sures have not deflected Qadhafi from his pursuit
of union with Egypt or the elusive goal of general
// )The new constitution confirms the wide
powers already in the hands of President Asad. He
is empowered to appoint and dismiss vice presi-
dents, premiers, and cabinet ministers. Asad also
is secretary general of the Baath Party and presi-
dent of the National Progressive Front, which
links minority parties with the Baath. He is also
commander in chief of the Syrian armed forces.
%/ The new constitution requires that national
parliamentary elections be held within 90 days to25X1
replace the appointed 173-member People's
Council. Asad's presidential term does not expire
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EGYPT: A HELPING HAND
Cairo is assisting several Arab states in the
development of their air forces. Egyptian Air
Force personnel are currently assigned to Libya,
Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait; Egyptian MIG
squadrons are stationed in Libya and Syriai
,Egypt first put MIG-15 and -17 fighters in
Libya and Syria in 1970, and Cairo maintains a
MIG squadron in each country. These MIG units
are training Egyptian pilots as well as those of the
host country. In addition, the squadron in Syria
periodically flies defensive patrols, although the
Egyptian pilots stay away from Israeli aircraft. -I
Cairo also is assisting some Arab countries to
operate their own aircraft because of the shortage
of trained personnel in the host countries. Tripoli
has taken delivery of at least 61 of the 120
Mirages that Qadhafi bought from France. At
present, only 20 Libyan pilots are qualified to fly
them. Some 15 Egyptians have qualified to fly
the Mirages and more are probably in training.
''i JSmall Egyptian Air Force contingents ar-
rived last May in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to
train on the British-built Lightning-a jet inter-
ceptor with a ground attack capability. Kuwait
has 14 Lightnings and less than 10 qualified
Egyptian MIG-15
Saudi Lightning
pilots. Saudi Arabia has 36 pilots qualified to fly
its 39 Lightnings, but some of these pilots may
well be training on the F-5s that Saudi Arabia
recently began receiving from the US.
ie iThe Egyptians are to train on the Lightnings
in Saudi Arabia at an airfield in the northwest
corner of the country. The field apparently is
being improved by the Saudis. Jidda's willingness
to permit the Egyptians to fly the Lightnings
could be a political gesture to show support for
the Arab cause. King Faysal, however, would
hesitate to allow any Egyptian combat operations
against Israel from Saudi territory.'
'7 JEgyptian involvement in the air forces of
these Arab states probably stems from a desire to
enhance Egypt's standing in the Arab world and
to familiarize Egyptian pilots with a variety of
Western aircraft. Egyptian assistance may also
represent a form of repayment for political and
financial support that its Arab neighbors have
given Cairo over, the years.
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BANGLADESH: MUJIB'S MANDATE
iPrime Minister Mujib's ruling Awami League
is likely to read its landslide election victory as a
mandate to continue present policies. The League
captured 73 percent of the popular vote and 292
of 299 seats. i
The non - Awami Leaguers elected included
five independents and one candidate each from
two of the opposition parties. The radical, youth-
oriented National Socialist Party showed con-
siderable strength for a new party, capturing over
a million votes out of some 18 million cast and
electing one of its candidates. The pro-Moscow
wing of the National Awami Party was a distant
second in the popular vote, but failed to win a
seat. As expected, all opposition parties have
denounced the election as unfair, accusing the
Awami League of intimidating voters and stuffing
ballot boxes. These claims probably exaggerate
the actual extent of chicanery by the ruling party,
which would have won easily in any case. There
was no significant violence reported on election
day but several killings, apparently politically
motivated, have occurred since then.'
At home, the Awami League government is
likely to go on stressing famine prevention and
economic reconstruction within a socialist frame-
work;The government has already granted itself
expanded powers for moving against disruptive
and criminal elements, and Mujib may also move
to purge his regime of some of its more corrupt
officials]
t i n foreign affairs, the government will
remain friendly toward India and the USSR and
probably will refrain from excessive criticism of
the US, its leading source of economic aid. Dacca
will also continue to seek better relations with
Peking, but the Chinese are likely to remain aloof
until there has been some progress toward re-
solving the impasse over the 90,000 Pakistani war
prisoners being held by India. With the elections
out of the way, Mujib will have less reason to
worry that a shift to a more flexible policy on the
prisoners might have adverse domestic political
consequences.
ISo far, however, Mujib has given no sign that
he will abandon his plans to try at least a few of
the prisoners or his insistence that the rest cannot
be released until Pakistan recognizes Bangladesh.
President Bhutto apparently is still afraid that
recognizing Bangladesh at this time would only
worsen his own political problems. India, which
refuses to release the prisoners without Dacca's
consent, may urge Mujib to be more forthcoming,
but probably will not try to force his
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ETHIOPIA: HARD TIMES FOR REBELS
Heavy fighting has flared again between field
units of the two main factions of the separatist
Eritrean Liberation Front.? The current fighting
may have been prompted by the arrival of arms
claimed by both sides, a frequent source of fric-
tion. The US consul general in Asmara estimates
that each faction has had at least 100 killed and
an equal number wounded during the past few
months:
The fighting comes at a time when Sudan is
reportedly preparing to oust Eritrean insurgents
from areas near the border with Ethiopia that
Numayri had agreed in principle to
stop providing aid and refuge for the insurgents
some time ago, but some Sudanese officials ap-
parently continued to allow Front troops to use
their Sudanese safehaven to stockpile arms and
ammunition,
The murder of the three diplomats in Khar-
toum early this month may have given Numayri
the pretext he needed to move against,-the Eri-
treans. In a subsequent radiobroadcast' ' I ;Numayri
disclosed that Al Fatah had operational' ties with
the largely Muslim Eritrean Liberation Front. Al
Fatah, he said, supports Eritrean field units with
clandestine radio communication facilities./!7he
expulsion of the Eritreans is being coordinated
with Ethiopian military units, which have been
moved into position to intercept the rebels as
they enter Ethiopial
The renewed fighting and the Sudanese
moves will set back Arab efforts to reconcile the
rival factions of the front~jLibya, a major source
SUDAN
4 hartoum
jEven if the Libyans withdraw their support,
the insurgents will probably continue to receive
aid from other radical Arab benefactors. This
would enable them to continue to carry out
ambushes, minings, kidnapings, and the occa-
sional clashes with government troops. The Ethio-
pian Army, for the most part, limits itself to
reacting to insurgent initiatives and often fails to
pursue the rebels. The diversion of some army
units to the Ogaden in response to what the
Ethiopians consider to be a threat from Somalia
may further diminish military effectiveness
against the Eritrean rebels
~l These developments could lead to a closer
relationship between the Eritrean insurgents and
the Arab terrorists, thereby increasing the threat
to US personnel and installations in Ethiopia7'The
insurgents have so far generally ignored US in-
terests in Eritrea, including the highly vulnerable
Kagnew communications complex in Asmara,
while pressing their struggle against The Addis
Ababa overnment.
of financial and material aid, may be goaded into
carrying out a threat to end its support unless the
factions patch things up'j Reported plans of one
faction to intensify its antigovernment activities
in Eritrea will very likely have to be postponed./
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MALAGASY REPUBLIC: A FIRM HAND
iGeneral Ramanantsoa has finally begun to
take firm steps to calm tribal conflicts on the
island. Ramanantsoa's past lack of decisiveness
had made the government appear weak as faction-
alized political groups kept putting forward insist-
ent but conflicting demands for reforms. This
played into the hands of disruptive elements seek-
ing to exacerbate the rivalry between the Cotier
tribes on the coast and the Merina of central
Madagascar.!
The government has now arrested some 40
supporters of former president Tsiranana, in-
cluding two former ministers and several former
senators, for inciting the coastal tribes to demon-
strate against the Merina-dominated government.
The most prominent persons arrested are from
Tsiranana's geographic area and ethnic group. The
Cotiers also demonstrated in favor of maintaining
close ties to France. The French had elevated the
coastals to political dominance under Tsiranana,
and they benefit economically from the French.
They, therefore, view Ramanantsoa's commit-
ment to reducing the French presence as a threat
to their own interests.'
. 1`Ramanantsoa faces a difficult problem in
holding tribal rivalries in check. Although the
current clampdown is against the Cotiers, the
Merina have done their part to fuel the trouble by
pressing for reforms the former view with suspi-
cion. Merina-dominated student and teacher
groups, for example, are pressing for rapid imple-
mentation of reforms that include imposing the
Malagasy language, which is essentially Merina, on
the educational system. The Merina-dominated
press and radio have labeled coastals as traitors
for opposing both the educational reforms and
the expulsion of French business interests.
. The two tribal groups are split on the ques-
tion of French military bases on the island. The
latest demonstrations erupted at Diego Suarez,
the headquarters of French military forces in the
Indian Ocean, where coastals demonstrated in
favor of the French. The future of Diego Suarez is
the thorniest issue in the Paris negotiations on
revising French-Malagasy cooperation agreements.
The two sides may yet find a formula to grant
Madagascar sovereignty over the base without re-
quiring expulsion of the French, although such a
solution still would not satisfy the more radical
Merinas. I
Ramanantsoa's next major test will come at
the end of the Paris negotiations, expected some-
time this month. The student, teacher, and
worker groups, whose demonstrations led to
Tsiranana's ouster, may again take to the streets if
the new accords fail to satisfy their expectations.
The deadline set by the government for comple-
tion of the negotiations, 29 March, is the anniver-
sary of the bloody 1947 rebellion inst the
French
25X1
TURKEY: GENERALS HIT A SNAG
I I lAfter four ballots on 13 March, parliament
failed to elect a new Turkish president. The im-
passe has led to further strains between the politi-
cians and the military.
:..>,,Throughout the balloting, Senate President
Tekin Ariburun, the last-minute nominee of the
Justice Party, had a wide lead over Faruk Gurler,
the military's choice, although Gurler picked up
strength on the fourth ballot. Gurler, former chief
of the general staff, went into the contest heavily
favored, but Suleyman Demirel's Justice Party
exhibited a high degree of cohesion in opposition
in the face of heavy military pressure.
j Qn the fourth ballot, Ariburun received 276
votes, Gurler 200, and Democratic Party leader
Ferruh Bozbeyli 48. Many legislators belonging to
the Republican Peoples Party-it has more than
100 members in parliament-abstained. A majority
of parliament, 318 votes, is required for election.`
I The balloting was a sharp rebuff to Gurler,
and the military. If he fails to win the presidency,
the military could implement a contingency plan,
which has reportedly been drafted, to take over
the government. Parliament tries again on 16
March, and the Turkish press speculates that
party leaders are trying to defuse the situation by
coming up with an alternative candidate accept-
able to both the parliament and the officer
corps.
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EAST AFRICA: COMMUNITY IN DANGER
The deteriorating security situation in
Uganda threatens the viability of the East African
Community, a once promising common services
organization made up of Kenya, Tanzania, and
Uganda. Some community personnel-including
Ugandans-have refused to serve in Uganda and
some joint services have ground to a halt. The
shortage of skilled manpower in Uganda could
lead to a collapse of community services there
which would have repercussions in Kenya and
Tanzania.`
For several months the organization has
been plagued by political strains among member
states, [The Tanzanian Government last week ar-
rested 48 Ugandans, most of whom were com-
munity employeesThey are charged with spying
and will be tried in open court/.
because many of the detainees were clerical per-
sonnel, some of the arrests may have been in
retaliation for the disappearance of seven Tan-
PERU: A TOUGH OLD SOLDIER
president Velasco now appears to be re-
covering satisfactorily from his two recent
operations-emergency surgery performed on
23 February for an abdominal aneurysm and
the amputation of his right leg after circula-
tory complications.
)If his health continues to improve, Ve-
lasco could return to limited duty. He is, in
fact, so tough and stubborn that he might try
for more than a symbolic comeback. He
would, however, find himself under heavy
pressure from within the military hierarchy to
exit gracefully. He could do so on 28 July,
Peru's independence day, or on 3 October,
the fifth anniversary of the coup that brought
the military government to power.l
zanians in Uganda. They went there last De-
cember seeking employment with the East Afri-
can Community./
` j 7 Last month, for the first time since President
Ami took power two years ago, President Ken-
yatta met with President Nyerere to discuss a
common approach to the Ugandan problem.
Hitherto, the Kenyan President had steered clear
of the dispute between Tanzania and Uganda that
originated in Dar es Salaam's refusal to recognize
the Amin government and its support of an abor-
tive invasion attempt from Tanzania by anti-Amin
dissidents last fall./
7 JBoth Tanzania and Kenya remain committed
~o regional cooperation through the East African
Community. They would prefer to avoid further
trouble with the unpredictable Amin, but they
are finding it increasingly difficult to ensure the 25X1
safety of their countrymen in Uganda and may
have to pull their community officials out of
Kampala.
`Prime Minister Mercado has been given
limited temporary executive powers. This
moves Mercado a step closer to the presi-
dential chair, but he does not yet have the job
nailed down. Institutional continuity calls for
Mercado's accession, but the prime minister
has to tread a wary path between moderate
and radical military factions. He must also be
careful about Velasco and his close associates.
Mercado's task will be to ensure that no mili-
tary element objects so strongly to the pros-
pect of his taking over that it becomes willing
to risk the unity of the armed forces and the
stability of the government in an attempt to
keep him from the presidency.
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CUBA: THE EMERGENCE OF RAUL CASTRO
As Fidel Castro has over the past few
months withdrawn from the limelight, younger
brother Raul has been appearing more frequently
in political and protocol functions not related to
his position of armed forces minister. Almost all
high-level visitors to Cuba now touch base with
Raul at least once, and in the past eight months
he has been one of the regime's busiest spokes-
men on both international and domestic matters.
In addition, he has presided over the recent meet-
ings that the party has been holding at the pro-
vincial level to assess activities over the past year.
Despite all this, Fidel is doubtless still number
one, but his younger brother is significantly ex-
panding his role.
Party organizational work, which was a key
facet of the provincial meetings, has long been an
almost exclusive bailiwick of Fidel. Working
through such functionaries as Armando Hart and,
more recently, Jesus Montane Oropesa, Fidel has
carefully monitored the development of the party
ever since its formation began in 1962. The at-
tempt that year by members of the old Moscow-
oriented Communist Party that existed prior to
Castro's accession to power to seize control of
Fidel's political apparatus and relegate him to the
role of a figurehead had taught him the folly of
delegating party-building duties' ;It is unusual,
therefore, that he failed to make even a token
appearance at any of the party meetings.
In the same fashion, the loquacious Fidel has
passed up several key occasions, which, in earlier
times, he would have marked by lengthy ad-
dresses, while Raul has assumed much of the
burden of speaking for the regime. On the 13
March anniversary of a student attack on the
Presidential Palace in 1957, Fidel left the ora-
torical duties to Vice Prime Minister Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez. Fidel failed to speak on 28 January,
the anniversary of the birth of Cuban patriot Jose
Marti. His last major radio and television appear-
ance was on 3 January when, before a handful of
regime officials, he outlined the new Cuban-
Soviet economic agreement. His last speech be-
fore a mass audience was on 13 December during
the visit of Chilean President Allende.
Raul has become the prime mover of the
high-priority drive against "ideological diver-
sionism," i.e., failure to obey the regime's dictates
blindly. He also has been serving more frequently
as the featured speaker on occasions that call for
profuse homage to the USSR, a task which seems
to be increasingly unpalatable to Fidel.(
' 'These and other signs of Raul's expanding
influence and increasing responsibilities do not
indicate that the younger Castro is building a
power base from which to challenge his brother.
By and large, Raul and Fidel are complementary
rather than antagonistic personalities, and each
realizes his need for the other. The current
phenomenon can better be described as the
belated emergence of a talented organizer and
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VENEZUELA: OIL IN THE ELECTION
'Despite earlier undertakings to avoid the
subject, petroleum has developed into a major
campaign issue as the two leading parties maneu-
ver to improve their position before the presiden-
tial election in December.'.
President Caldera's Christian Democratic
Party and its major opposition, the Democratic
Action Party, have been under increasing pressure
from leftist and nationalist elements to clarify
their positions on issues directly related to
petroleum, Venezuela's major export and source
of revenue. At present, the Caldera government
and its candidate seem more susceptible to leftist
pressures, and the government gives greater
evidence of believing that a hard line toward the
US and the oil companies will be politically
profitable.;
At least, the Caldera government has been
active in exploiting oil on the international front.
In an extensive tour of Latin America last month,
President Caldera punctuated his speeches with
frequent references to Latin American solidarity
in defense of natural resources. Although Vene-
zuelan officials subsequently denied it, Caldera's
remarks were interpreted as attacks on the United
States and specifically on US oil companies?'The
Caldera government is already trying to profit
from the current seller market for oil. At the
instigation of Caracas, members of the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries will
meet in special session next week to discuss the
shortage and to coordinate policies to exploit it.
Believing that Venezuela and other oil-producing
states hold the advantage, President Caldera will
push for an international conference of oil
producing and consuming states. He has already
announced an increase in tax reference values, the
basis for estimating oil company taxes for this
year!
(Venezuela is also taking the lead in or-
ganizing the second conference of Latin American
petroleum ministers in Quito in early April.
Caldera obviously hopes to get a consensus on
petroleum policy that can be used in future nego-
tiations with the US government. j
Pti , While Caldera and his presidential candidate
hammer away at the US, Democratic Action's
candidate Carlos Andres Perez is enunciating a
more rational and flexible position on the pe-
troleum issue to US Embassy officials. Although
Democratic Action must deal with a leftist group
within its own ranks, its leaders are trying hard to
convince the US that it will be easier to deal with
than the present government.'
In a frank exchange with the US ambas-
sador, Perez said that, if elected, his immediate
objective would be an energy agreement with the
US. He believes that any agreement would have to
include "free entry" for Venezuelan oil into the
US domestic market. Oil prices would be set by
the Venezuelan Government, but would reflect
the world market. In exchange, Perez would
provide guarantees for investment by US pe-
troleum companies. In order to achieve bipartisan
national support for this policy, Perez said he
would appoint a commission of nine or ten Vene-
zuelan leaders to discuss the basic elements of a
long-term oil agreement..'
I\When asked about existing concessions,
I Perez admitted that the current reversion law,
which calls for the return to the state of all
concessions beginning in 1983, has been dis-
couraging US investors. He said that if elected he
would try to work out a new arrangement with
the US oil companies. The arrangement he en-
visages would give the Venezuelan state-owned
petroleum corporation major responsibility for
further exploitation of existing concession areas.
Perez said details such as compensation could be
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CHILE: LOOKING AHEAD
JPresident Allende and his supporters believe
,,.that the Popular Unity coalition is now in a
position to lead from strength, despite its minor-
ity status and the intense internal rivalry that
persists between the Socialists and Communists.
Buoyed by their candidates' strong showing in
congressional elections on 4 March, they consider
that the coalition has proved itself a political
force that no longer needs to fear the opposition
and can carry out its socialization program with-
out major modification.'
The President's political strategy in the
months ahead reflects a pragmatic assessment of
his political backing, of the Chilean armed forces,
and of relations with the US. First of all, he will
have to deal with the radical element in his owns
Socialist Party, which he accuses of trying to
control his administration. Socialist radicals ran
well in the elections for that group to abandon
plans to leave the coalition and try to set up a
revolutionary force of all extreme leftists. Instead
these Socialists, led by Senator Carlos Altami-
rano, will attempt to use their leadership of the
coalition's largest party to overcome the ineffec-
tual reformism of Allende and the Communists.
They will probably widen their drive to organize;
"popular power" groups to step up the "class
struggle" apart from the Popular Unity and Com-
munist influence. In these circumstances, Allende
will find it difficult to engineer the recapture of
Socialist leadership by party moderates.'
He intends to steal some of the radicals'
thunder by increasing government controls, start-
INTERNATIONAL MONEY
ing with the issuance of ration cards. Allende also
plans, probably with Communist support, to in-
crease non-Marxist representation in his govern-
ment and to offer carefully drafted legislation to
further the process of socialization. He assumes
that the Christian Democrats can hardly afford to
oppose such legislation in view of their renewed
interest in proselytizing low-income groups. Al-
lende believes that steps such as these will also
open lines of communication to leftists outside
the coalition, furthering the Popular Unity goal of
dividing opposition forces.?
At present, Allende seems to feel less need
for the appearance of strong military support. He
apparently plans to retain officers in the cabinet
only until final election returns are officially
posted in May. After that, he plans to use repre-
sentatives of the armed forces in lower admin-
istrative posts only; this would keep the military
involved in his government but reduce the mili-
tary's political clout.
'EC members compromised in reaching an
agreement on a community approach to the cur-
rent monetary difficulties. Six EC members-West
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Denmark-will float jointly. The
UK, Ireland, and Italy will continue independent
floats. British participation in the joint float
foundered on London's demands for a guarantee
of unlimited financial support in the event of a
run on sterling. Although willing to make a sub-
stantial contribution, Bonn decided London's
price was too high. Paris, which originally de-
manded UK participation for fear of too rapid an
appreciation of the French franc, settled for a
small German revaluation. Reaction to the float
has generally been favorable. Norway, Sweden,
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and Austria are planning to associate with the
float, and Switzerland is still undecided."
The EC will present a new plan to the en-
larged Group of Ten in Paris on 16 March. The
community anticipates that the US and Japan will
cooperate: Washington by agreeing to intervene
to support the dollar and Tokyo by allowing the
yen to appreciate further. On Tuesday, Tokyo
announced that it would hold direct intervention
to a minimum when Japan's exchange markets
reopen on 19 March. The EC nations' own inter-
vention plans have not been spelled out, but they
clearly plan a controlled float. ;f.
Light interbank trading in Europe since
official intervention ceased early this month has
not led to much change in exchange rates.
Strengthening of the dollar earlier this week may
indicate, however, that money managers and
speculators will hold off on dollar sales, at least
temporarily, when official foreign exchange
markets reopen next week. Indeed a sharp fall in
Eurodollar rates this week points to some dollar
repayments by borrowers who earlier used them
to buy the strong European currencies
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Communist Aid to the Third World
Secret
N2 41
16 March 1973
No. 0361/73A
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COMMUNIST AID TO THE THIRD WORLD
Summary
The Communist countries continue to employ foreign aid as a major instrument for
expanding their political and commercial interests in the Third World. Nearly $2.3
billion of new economic and military aid was committed in 1972. Of this figure
Moscow contributed nearly $900 million despite its setback in Egypt. The East
European countries, finding increasing commercial reasons for providing new aid,
made their largest annual commitments last year. China extended aid to a wide range
of recipients, focusing on Africa.
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Although political considerations, at least for Moscow and Peking, are the
primary motivation for dispensing aid, economic factors are becoming more signifi-
cant. Eastern European countries are using aid credits to expand exports of machin-
ery and equipment. Moscow also finds aid recipients useful as markets and as sources
of raw materials and consumer goods. Under aid and commercial agreements with
less developed countries, the quantities of nationalized oil purchased by the USSR
and Eastern Europe have risen sharply. Soviet purchases of products like steel,
industrial equipment, and general consumer goods are also increasing. Most of these
products are from Soviet-built plants in the developing countries.
Although their experience in Egypt last year will make the Soviets more
cautious, they will certainly continue to use aid in 1973 to further their political and
economic interests in the Third World. So will the East Europeans and the Chinese.
The Middle East and South Asia will be the focal point of most of this activity this
year as last.
Communist Economic and Military Aid to Less
Developed Countries (million current U.S. dollars)
Economic
Military
$77a
U.S.S.R.
$310
Eastern
Europe `i
China
$444
U.S.S.R.
$8,475
$1,795 total $499 total
1972
1954-1972
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Soviet-constructed Rolling Mill at Helwan, Egypt
The Communist countries extended a near-
record $1.8 billion of economic aid to the Third
World in 1972, bringing the total committed since
1954 to more than $15 billion. The Soviet share
of $580 million went to five countries, while the
East European countries, chiefly Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Romania, extended about $655 mil-
lion to 12 countries. Peking, for the third consec-
utive year, committed more than half a billion
dollars in new credits, nearly 40 percent of which
went to Africa. This momentum has carried into
1973 with China allocating about $100 million in
aid to Zaire in January.
More than half of new Communist aid in
1972 went to five countries: Afghanistan, Chile,
Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Chile was the largest
recipient, receiving more than $230 million.
Seven countries-Burundi, Dahomey, Guyana, the
Malagasy Republic, Malta, Rwanda, and Togo-
accepted Communist aid for the first time; all of
it came from Peking.
Communist economic aid deliveries in 1972
totaled some $620 million, down 10 percent from
1971. Drawings against Soviet credits and grants
declined about $70 million to approximately
$310 million, largely as a result of reduced con-
struction activities in Algeria, India, and Turkey.
East European deliveries declined as well. Chinese
deliveries jumped by approximately one third to
$220 million as work on the Tan-Zam Railway
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was accelerated and large commodity shipments
were made to Chile and Pakistan.
During the past ten years, net Soviet eco-
nomic aid to the Third World has been narrowed
by the rise in repayments and the leveling off of
drawings. Drawings exceeded repayments by
$315 million in 1964; the gap had narrowed to
$75 million in 1972. If military aid repayments
are added to repayments for economic aid, then
the total repayments to the USSR have for some
time exceeded Soviet aid deliveries.
Military Aid
While economic aid commitments have re-
mained high in 1972, new extensions of military
aid dropped sharply. Communist countries com-
mitted only about $500 million in military aid
last year, down from a high of nearly $1.3 billion
a year in both 1970 and 1971. The record 1970
and 1971 figures were largely a result of com-
mitments to Egypt for its air defenses and to
India for its military buildup against Pakistan.
The new extensions in 1972 raised to nearly $10
billion the total amount committed since 1955,
85 percent of which came from the USSR. Of
this, an estimated $8.3 billion has been delivered.
Last year, about $310 million in military aid was
committed by the USSR, mainly to Egypt and
India, while China committed $75 million, largely
to Pakistan.
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Chinese and Local Workers on the Tan-Zam Railway
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Soviet-assisted Euphrates Hydroelectric Power
Project in Syria
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Soviet SA-6 Surface-to-air
Missile Launcher
Communist military deliveries totaled $775
million in 1972, 25 percent below the annual
average for 1970 and 1971. Moscow provided
more than $650 million in military equipment,
including the first shipments to less developed
countries of the SA-6 surface-to-air missile (SAM)
system, SU-17 (Fitter B) swing-wing fighter-
bombers, and T-62 medium tanks. Some of the
major recipients received their first SA-3 SAM
systems, OSA-class guided-missile patrol boats,
and ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft guns.
Middle East and South Asia
Middle Eastern and South Asian nations con-
tinued to be the prime beneficiaries of the Com-
munist aid; they got nearly 60 percent of the
economic and almost all of the military com-
mitments in 1972. Moscow channeled almost 85
percent of its new aid to the two areas. More than
half of all Soviet aid deliveries went to the Middle
East.
I n July 1972, President Sadat, at least in
part because of dissatisfaction with the nature of
Soviet military commitment to Egypt, ousted
most of the Soviet military personnel from his
country. An estimated 13,000 advisers, tech-
nicians, and personnel assigned to Soviet opera-
tional units in Egypt departed, leaving only a few
Special Report
hundred technicians to work with the armed
forces. Even so, Egypt still received about $150
million in new military commitments, including
an estimated $80 million of arms turned over by
departing Soviet forces. This setback produced no
perceptible impact on Soviet economic aid activ-
ities in Egypt. Work moved ahead briskly on
major projects, like the Helwan steel mill and the
Naj Hamadi aluminum plant, and discussiohs were
held on possible new aid for Egypt's new five-year
plan.
In Syria and Iraq, Communist, and especially
Soviet, influence grew as Moscow moved to offset
its losses in Egypt. Moscow provided Syria with
about $85 million for various petroleum, trans-
portation, and agricultural projects, for accel-
erated construction on existing railroad projects,
and the development of the Euphrates Valley.
The Soviets also extended more than $60 million
of new military aid to Damascus and delivered an
estimated $125 million of arms under past com-
mitments, the largest annual deliveries ever made
to Syria. In addition, Romania and China gave
Syria $93 million and $45 million respectively, in
new economic aid. Iraq signed a friendship treaty
with Moscow, obtained some $200 million of
East European economic aid, and signed an
$80-million agreement with Czechoslovakia.
Baghdad also applied for observer status with the
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Geographic Distribution of Communist Economic
Aid in 1972 (million current U.S. dollars)
1 1 I $0
Middle East Africa
$678 total $425 total
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Soviet-assisted Fanole Dam and Irrigation
Project in Somalia.
South Asia
$356 total
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$195
Latin America
$336 total
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Soviet OSA-class Guided-Missile
Patrol Boat
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)
and agreed to repay most of its aid debts in crude
oil.
A Soviet credit of $158 million to Turkey to
expand the Iskenderun steel mill raised Soviet
allocations for the project to about $420 million,
making it the costliest single Communist aid
undertaking in the Third World. Peking provided
Yemen (Aden) and Yemen (Sana) with economic
credits of about $22 million each.
Moscow continued to dominate foreign aid
activity in Afghanistan with a $121-million eco-
nomic credit that represents about 35 percent of
planned investment in Kabul's fourth five-year
development plan. Soviet aid outlays accounted
for nearly half of total investment during the first
three plans. Peking also extended $45 million of
new economic aid to Kabul.
Most European Communist countries moved
rapidly to establish diplomatic and economic ties
with Bangladesh soon after that country gained
its independence. Nearly $100 million of new aid
was made available, and about $60 million of
unused aid originally committed to East Pakistan
was reallocated. The Soviets extended about $75
million, resumed work on projects begun prior to
independence, and agreed to provide Dacca with a
squadron of MIG jet aircraft. The Soviets under-
took to clear the country's harbors of the wreck-
age of the 1971 war.
Special Report
Strains in Soviet-Indian economic relations
developed over Moscow's unwillingness to real-
locate idle industrial development credits to other
uses. The major projects are nearing completion,
and while drawings have declined, aid repayments
have risen rapidly creating a resource outflow in
favor of the USSR. Moscow did, however, agree
to provide India with an additional $100 million
of arms. China, on the other hand, committed
$65 million in new arms to Pakistan and delivered
an equal amount in 1972.
Africa is the focal point of Chinese aid activ-
ities. Peking channeled about $210 million of its
1972 commitments to seven African countries.
East European countries provided about $215
million to African nations, about $150 million of
which went to Algeria and $50 million to Zambia.
The USSR did not extend new aid to Africa for
the first time since the inception of its African aid
program in 1959. It did, however, agree to build
Somalia's largest project, the Fanole Dam on the
Giuba River, and stepped up work on Guinea's
Kindia bauxite complex.
Communist aid activities in Africa are high-
lighted by the construction of the Tan-Zam Rail-
road, which is approximately one year ahead of
schedule. Last year, an estimated $110 million of
Chinese aid funds were expended, and 16,500
Chinese technicians were employed in Tanzania
and Zambia on the project. This one undertaking
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employs about three fourths of all Chinese eco-
nomic technicians in the developing countries and
more than 40 percent of all Communist technical
personnel in the Third World.
Although Libya has not received Communist
financial aid, it has obtained substantial technical
assistance. The largest contingent of East Euro-
peans (1,150) engaged in aid projects abroad are
in Libya building various port, road, housing, and
light industrial projects and working as advisers
under individual contracts. The number of Soviets
in Libya is still small, but the two countries have
signed an agreement for the USSR to undertake
oil prospecting, extraction, and refining projects;
mineral and gas surveys; and energy resource de-
velopment. Libya has also contracted to provide
the USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania with sizable
quantities of nationalized oil. In addition, Mos-
cow has agreed to build two petroleum distilla-
tion plants and to study the feasibility of inte-
grating the Libyan and Egyptian power grids.
Communist economic relations with Latin
America expanded further in 1972 as more than
$335 million of economic aid was channeled to
the area. Chile, under Allende, turned more and
more to the Communist countries for help in
stemming the rapid deterioration of its economy.
Santiago received $230 million of aid com-
mitments, far less than it needed and sought. In
particular, there was little Communist help for
Chile's balance of payments difficulties. More-
over, while Moscow extended about $145 million
of long-term aid and a short-term revolving credit
of $50 million, it made it clear to Santiago that
the Soviet Union had neither the resources nor
the inclination to underwrite the Chilean econ-
omy. Hungary and Poland provided $78 million
in credits to Peru, and Guyana received its first
Communist aid, a $26-million Chinese credit.
Communist countries will continue to
employ foreign aid as a major instrument for
furthering their political and economic interests
East German Housing in Chile
in the less developed countries. Opportunities and
requests for economic aid will almost certainly
increase for all major Communist aid donors. So-
viet military commitments probably will rise in
1973 because of the abnormally low level of
1972, and will no doubt be concentrated once
again in the Middle East and South Asia.
Moscow probably will also concentrate new
economic aid commitments in the Middle East
and South Asia as opportunities open up for
participation in development plans of major aid
recipients. In Africa, Moscow may step up its aid
activities in areas of special Soviet interest like
Somalia and Sudan. Eastern Europe probably will
expand trade and credit ties throughout the Third
World. China will pursue its aid programs and
trade activities in most areas, but its focus will
remain on Africa.
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