WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010100040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 2, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100040001-7
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
2 March 1973
No. 0359/73
Copy N? 42
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CONTENTS (2 March 1973)
and analyzes slgnif-
1 Indochina
5 South Korea: As Programmed
5 Papua New Guinea
6 Philippines: Land Reform Stalled
7 USSR: The Big Exchange
8 USSR: Naval Shipbuilding
9 Europe: Force Reduction Talks
9 Defense Cuts in Scandinavia
11 EC: Anti-Trust Crackdown
11 Czechoslovakia: Silver Anniversary
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
14 Guinea: Mineral Ventures Flourish
15 Congo: More Turmoil
16 Middle East: Aftermath of a Crash
17 Turkey: No Hat in the Ring
17 Yemen (Sana): New Government Party
18 Sri Lanka: New Press Curbs
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
21 Cuba: Changes in the Party
22 Chile: No Solutions
23 Peru: Velasco Mending
SPECIAL
REPORT (Published separately)
Bangladesh: Elections in
a New Country
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome.
Y S$MMM?ARY, issued every Friday morning by
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SECRET
The Political Struggle Is On
With military activity now at a low level
throughout South Vietnam, both sides are fo-
cusing attention on the political struggle. The
Communists are busy organizing politically at the
grass-roots level.
The Viet
Cong are establishing administrative offices and
people's hamlet committees throughout the coun-
try, a North Vietnamese
unit occupied several hamlets a few miles north-
west of Hue for the purpose of setting up a local
"provisional revolutionary government.",''
Ngai are working through a "farmers' united
association" to try to persuade refugees to return
to their abandoned land in Communist-held areas.
The Communists are using newly constructed
houses, loans, and other material incentives as the
primary inducement for the returnees. In trying
to stress the benefits awaiting people who shift to
areas controlled by the Viet Cong, the Com-
munists are telling relatives and friends that, if
they return, they will not be discriminated against
and will be accorded the same privileges as those
who never left Communist-held hamlets and
villages.)
ffhe Communists are not forsaking their
more usual subversion techniques. The Viet Cong
in one province near Saigon have been instructed
to send agents into government-held hamlets and
villages to scout for individuals willing to work
with the Communists.' The Communists were
never very good at political organization in areas
of contested control while the war was underway,
and it is not at all clear that they will be any
better in the climate of peace, but they certainly
are trying harder now.,'
On the government side, President Thieu last
week publicly inaugurated his "Popular Front,"
designed to rally South Vietnam's disparate and
frequently bickering political and religious groups
the Viet Cong in Quang
Page 1
to his banner. Although many important groups
have agreed to throw in with his front, the An
Quang Buddhists are holding back. Some pro-
government elements see the front mainly as a
vehicle for showing popular support of the gov- 25X1
ernment rather than a means of sharing power. I
/Although the front is a visible non-Com-
munist effort, the real task of political mobiliza-
tion will be carried out by semi-clandestine "po-
litical struggle committees" being formed by the
government in every province and autonomous
city. Composed of key members of the adminis-
trative apparatus, the committees will direct local
security and intelligence efforts against the Viet
Cong and handle information and propaganda
activities among the people. They will keep a
direct government rein on the political competi-
tion with the Communists in all areas of the
country and at al I levels.
25X1
President Thieu's Democracy Party will also
be important in his over-all scheme.
the party will play a role in-
25X1
the Popular Front somewhat akin to that of the
Communist Peoples Revolutionary Party within
the Viet Cong's National Liberation Front. 0
Thieu intends the Democracy25X1
Party-mostly governmental officials-to keep the
Popular Front and struggle committees in lock
step. Success depends not only on the ability of
the Democracy Party to perform the role but also
on Thieu's ability to keep the oppositionists in
the front]
Big Minh Again
4- L Zany of Thieu's old opponents see new op-
portunities in the changing political climate.
Speaking out for the first time since the cease-
fire, Big Minh this week addressed an "open
letter" to the participants in the Paris conference,
implying that he represents a majority third force
SECRET
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in South Vietnam. Minh also played host at a
reception for a number of prominent opposition
legislators and the press, during which he took
exception to Saigon and the Viet Cong each
choosing half of the National Council for Recon-
ciliation and Concord. He and his followers, he
said, could never win a place in the council under
such a formula. Despite rumors that Minh would
take the occasion to announce a rival front to
Thieu's new organization, he did not. Minh stuck
to his usual cautious strategy-sig ling his avail-
ability while avoiding direct action
SECRET
7 IDespite their well publicized efforts to
exploit the POW issue to pressure the US and
Saigon on a host of other problems, the Com-
munists did not let the issue of returning US
prisoners impede progress for long. The Com-
munists were probably eager to see how much
they could get out of this leverage over the short
term, but then backed off when the US and
Saigon displayed little give on any issue except
the security of the truce teams.]
SECRET
Page
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SECRET
The Communists suddenly announced on 27
February that until certain "serious problems" in
the implementation of the agreement were taken
care of, they would release no more prisoners.
The statements indicated that they had in mind
the treatment of Communist delegations in South
Vietnam, Saigon's handling of the prisoners it
holds, and the pace of US minesweeping opera-
tions in North Vietnam. The next day, however,
the Communists began to modify their position,
uncoupling the prisoner release from unresolved
"serious problems." They said a new group of
prisoners would indeed be released soon, and that
issues such as security did not have to be resolved
now, but should be discussed in a "spirit of
goodwill."
Nothing in the agreement connects prisoner
releases with the issues the Communists were
raising, but the Vietnamese Communists clearly
believed that it was worth testing US reaction on
this sensitive matter.,
As the Lao cease-fire enters its second week,
the fighting is beginning to wane. The only major
violations have occurred in the south. In the
Bolovens Plateau area, the Communists took
Paksong shortly after the deadline on 22 Feb-
ruary. The Communists have also been attacking
irregular units near Thateng 1Both sides have been
guilty of initiating ground clashes and shellings
elsewhere in the country, but by midweek these
scattered actions began to taper off,'; and Com-
munist and government troops in several areas
started to work out informal cease-fire rules in
face-to-face meetings.
`` -'Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, who last
week requested US air strikes against Communist
units that retook Paksong, is now taking a more
relaxed view of the military situation. In a press
interview on 27 February, Souvanna said that-
despite the cease-fire violations-he was "con-
fident of the future." He claimed that North
Vietnam "will stop its intervention in Laos" be-
cause it will have to turn its attention to "recon-
struction." Souvanna also expressed hope that the
Paris conference would provide the basis for a real
peace. J
Creaky Peace Machinery