WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009900050001-0
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Approved For Release 2008/07/22 CIA-RDP79-00927A009900050001-0
V
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Navy review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
1 December 1972
No. 0398/72
Copy N2 45
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LY SUMMARY, ued every Friday morning by
xrrent Intelt g e, reporrFF and analyzes slgrtif-
noon on Thursday.
teriat o ordlnatedwith or prepared
Directorate of Science and 1-echnologv.
eparalely as Spy,-ial Reports are listed in the
CONTENTS (1 December 1972)
L:Y SUMMARY contains classified information
see ic:.ns 113 and 7q4? of the t#S
ded. its transmis,ion or 'evelatton of itscon-
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
4
5
Argentina: A Crucial Duel
Yugoslavia: The Generation Gap
Japan-USSR: Siberian Oil and Gas
11 USSR: Fifty Big Ones
12 Belgium: Eysken's Finale
12 West Germany: Wage Battle
14 East Germany: Looking Westward
15 Romania: A Unified Party
16 Uganda-Libya: Brotherly Bonds
17 Pompidou's Third African Tour
18 Nepal: Looking to China
19 The Yemens: The Unity Game
20 India-Pakistan: Disappointed at Lahore
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
21 Panama: The Busjacking Caper
22 Castro Realigns His Government
23 Chile: Not Just a Junket
23 Peru: Government and Labor
24 Venezuela: Students in the Streets
SPECIAL
REPORT (Published separately)
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WWI, SECRET;
EUROPEAN SECURITY: FOR OPENERS
An aggressive Romanian delegation got the
European security conference preparatory talks in
Helsinki off to a dramatic start. Even before the
opening speeches, the Romanians managed to
provoke a debate over procedure. Moscow had
hoped such matters could have been settled in-
formally before the talks began. Extensive press
coverage of the "closed" meetings and nearly
unanimous Western and neutral support for the
Romanians have added to Soviet discomfiture.
The debate on procedure ended with a com-
promise fashioned by the Romanians and Soviets
with French assistance. The Soviets agreed to
rules that emphasize the non-bloc nature of the
talks, describe the participants as sovereign and
equal, and portray the talks as "outside the mili-
tary alliances." Thus, the Romanians made their
point, while Moscow, which managed to keep its
other allies in line, was clearly happy to get over
that hurdle.
On 29 November, the Soviet delegation
sought to recoup with their general opening state-
ment. The Soviets, after lobbying hard to speak
first, reiterated familiar Soviet positions. They
urged that the security conference itself be held
in Helsinki in late June and that it begin with a
meeting of foreign ministers and conclude with a
summit gathering. They also formally outlined
the three general topics they want considered at
the conference: principles of relations between
NATO:
1. Belgium
6.
Iceland
11.
Portugal
2. Canada
7.
Italy
12.
Turkey
3. Denmark
8.
Luxembourg
13.
UK
4. France
9.
Netherlands
14.
US
5. Greece
10.
Norway
15.
West Germany
WARSAW PACT:
1. Bulgaria
4.
Hungary
6.
Romania
2. Czechoslovakia
5.
Poland
7.
USSR
3. East Germany
NON-ALIGNED
1.
Austria
5.
Lichtenstein
9.
Sweden
2.
Cyprus
6.
Malta
10.
Switzerland
3.
Finland
7.
San Marino
11.
Vatican
4.
Ireland
8.
Spain
12.
Yugoslavia
states in Europe; development of economic and
cultural ties; and establishment of a permanent
body on security and cooperation in Europe.
The Romanian performance has raised
questions about relationships within and between
the two blocs that will recur as the talks proceed.
The French-the Western mavericks-were pleased
with the Romanian show of independence. Hav-
ing shared Moscow's preference for an informal
agreement on procedure, they were caught off-
guard, but quickly shifted when it became clear
that they would be lined up with Moscow and its
other pact allies against Romania and everyone
else.
The Western allies, meanwhile, were testing
their somewhat ad hoc procedures for coordi-
nating the positions of NATO and EC representa-
tives. The French have said that they will not join
any formal NATO caucus, but that they will
consult with their EC partners. The NATO repre-
sentatives, therefore, have held no formal
meetings, though they have held informal con-
sultations with the French in attendance. At least
to this point, the blend of EC and NATO discus-
sions is preserving a cohesive Western front. The
cohesion will be more severely tested when the
talks get down to substance.
Another procedural issue could cause some
problems. A number of NATO countries-in-
cluding West Germany, Britain, and Italy-want
the Helsinki talks to recess prior to the NATO
ministerial meetings next week and to reconvene 25X1
in mid-December. Moscow is not happy with the
idea and, at a minimum, will want any recess to
be as brief as possible.
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SECRET
Like cautious fencers probing their oppo-
nent's defenses, Juan Peron and President Lanusse
are circling warily, each seeking a clear advantage.
After two weeks of feinting and parrying, how-
ever, neither man has gained the upper hand and
their seconds are beginning to get impatient.
In fact, a stalemate may have been reached.
Peron continues to insist on the annulment of the
25 August residency deadline for candidates in
the elections next March. Lanusse has con-
sistently rejected this demand although he
softened his position somewhat last week when
Lanusse hope that divisions in the
other's camp will give them the upper
hand. Divisions are already visible in
the interparty working group organized
by Peron to put pressure on Lanusse,
indicating that stalling may be a good
tactic. Potentially serious differences
are also reported to be surfacing among
Peron's own coterie of advisers.
On the other hand, differences
have also been apparent within the
military since Peron set foot on Argen-
tine soil. These have at least temporar-
ily been smoothed over by Lanusse's
adroit handling of recent developments
and by his regular briefings of military
commanders. Nevertheless, the Pres-
ident is under pressure from the top
generals to take a firmer stand against
Peron, whom the generals blame for
the lack of progress in talks with the
political parties.
While there are many points of
disagreement between Lanusse and
Peron, the big sticking point right now
is the 25 August deadline. The two
seem to agree that a political accord,
including an agreement on candidates,
is within reach, but neither will be able
to test his strength on matters that
really count until one or the other
bends on the residency re uire-
ment.
SECRET
he said he would reconsider if the request were
made unanimously by all political groups.
Lanusse is likely to resist any temptation to lift
the residency requirement as he would risk losing
the support of the armed forces if he were to lift
this last remaining legal bar to Peron's running for
president. It may be just as difficult for Peron, as
he would risk a serious loss of face if he were to
give in on this point.
Much of this political footwork represents
no more than delaying tactics as both Peron and
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The third party conference on 6-7 December
will discuss the whole range of youth policy, but
the current atmosphere in the country suggests
that Yugoslav youth can expect more stick than
carrot.
Party complacency about youth turned into
serious concern in November 1971 when a strike
by student nationalists in Croatia touched off a
major confrontation. Tito demanded corrective
action in January and after three postpone-
ments-caused by shifts in the party line and a
purge this fall-the League of Communists is
finally ready to meet. Preparations for the con-
ference suggested that the regime was willing to
SECRET
balance incentives like more high-level party posts
for youth with increased supervision of young
people and stricter Marxist standards in educa-
tion. In the aftermath of the recent purge, how-
ever, the incentive side will probably be narrow.
It is unlikely that the party will open its doors to
any but the most sycophantic members of the
new generation.
Participation by young people in the system,
from self-managing factory units right on up to
federal bodies, has actually declined over the past
decade. The younger generation has been frus-
trated by the firm grip retained by old partisans
and functionaries. In addition, the party and Tito
himself have made serious mistakes in dealing
with youth. After the student riots in Belgrade in
1968, promises were made-including one to
reform the university system-that were generally
forgotten in the press of other problems. The
control of mass youth organizations has been left
to hacks and, in the case of the federal student
organization, to weak administrators who have
failed to control nationalist firebrands.
Bread-and-butter issues are also important
irritants, and economic regionalism is becoming
particularly virulent among the younger genera-
tion. Poor job opportunities, scanty funds for
improving the educational system, and the
widening gap between rich and poor have
undermined the regime's relations with its young.
In some cases, the situation is already explosive.
In Kosovo, the poorest area in Yugoslavia where
the average age is 24, there is already considerable
impatience with the slow improvement in the
standard of living. In Croatia, over 100,000 young
people have been forced to go abroad to find
work, and seven of these returned last summer as
members of a group of emigre guerrillas intent on
starting an armed insurrection.
element in Yugoslav society.
working youth, a more inarticulate and, he
thinks-perhaps incorrectly, a more self-sacrificing
Tito will, of course, set the tone for the
conference, and he seems genuinely concerned
that youth will prove to be a destabilizing ele-
ment after he is gone. He disapproves of young
intellectuals who have challenged his authority in
the past. He prefers to place his confidence in the 25X1
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SECRET
The North Vietnamese are offering stiff
resistance to government forces trying to advance
northward in northern Quang Tri Province. Near
the coast, heavy shelling and ground attacks early
in the week forced South Vietnamese Marine
elements to pull back from forward positions near
the Cua Viet River. Fresh government units have
since regained the lost territory and are trying to
expand their holdings. Heavy rain and flooding at
week's end are hampering the combat operations
of both sides.
In many sectors of the country, the Com-
munists appear to be relying heavily on terrorist
tactics to sustain their position at the grass roots
during the current period of uncertainty about a
cease-fire. This increased terrorism is carried out
by local force and sapper units, and the targets
are mostly soldiers, police, and village officials. A
Communist mili-
tary units in Tay Ninh Province have been told to
avoid significant combat with South Vietnamese
forces pending new instructions from COSVN but
to increase low-level activity, including sabotage
and terrorism. These relatively inexpensive
actions are likely to increase in the weeks ahead
as the Communists seek to rest and refit many of
their major combat units.
The Communists reportedly are holding
meetings of senior officials throughout the coun-
try to discuss cease-fire preparations and to assess
local strengths and weaknesses. A princi al aim of
the meetings, is
to explain the reasons behind the postponement
of the 31 October cease-fire date and to reassure
cadre that a settlement is in the offing. None of
the reports indicates that the Communists are
working on a firm timetable, and there are signs
that they are no longer sure how much time they
will have between an announcement of a cease-
fire and its implementation.
the enemy has worked out a three-phase, cease-
fire scenario. First, prior to the cease-fire an-
nouncement, senior cadre will be infiltrated into
hamlets and villages. Second, when the announce-
ment is made, Communist main and local forces
will attempt to seize and hold villages and
hamlets. Undercover agents already in place will
organize pro-Communist demonstrations in the
cities. During the third phase, which allegedly
may last several years, the areas under Viet Cong
control will be organized and "Liberation Front
Committees" set up.
There often is a considerable gap between
Communist intentions and capabilities
L Communist commanders reportedly
have criticized local military and political leaders
for poor performance and have called for sharp
improvement. Some reports have suggested that
the period before a cease-fire offers a good op-
portunity for local Viet Cong units to strengthen
their over-all capabilities.
Throughout these meetings, considerable at-
tention has been given to the role of Viet Cong
agents with legal documentation already living in
government-controlled areas. There is little
reliable information on their strength, but their
record does not give an impression of extensive
subversive capability.
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No progress was made this week toward a
Laos settlement at the peace talks in Vientiane.
At the latest session of the formal talks, the
senior Communist negotiator in effect rejected
the government proposal to begin serious discus-
sions on the basis of the Lao Communists' five-
point proposals. He sharply criticized the govern-
ment's interpretation of certain passages in the
Communist proposals while ignoring a number of
areas where agreement seems near. This negative
stance holds scant promise for constructive
dialogue soon and suggests that the Communists
are content to mark time pending clarification on
the nature and timing of a Vietnam cease-fire.
Hopes that the impasse could be broken by
private talks at a higher level were dampened
when Communist leader Souphanouvong declined
an invitation from Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma to meet at the royal capital in Luang
Prabang. In an official interview in Sam Neua,
Phoumi Vongvichit, the Lao Communist special
adviser to the peace talks, said that Souphanou-
vong had rejected Souvanna's invitation because
the present situation did not warrant such a
meeting. Phoumi indicated, however, that Sou-
phanouvong eventually might agree to such a
meeting if Souvanna were to adopt a more
"positive" attitude. This rebuff will be taken in
stride by Souvanna, who still seems convinced
that a settlement in Laos will closely follow
agreement on Vietnam.
Against this backdrop of stalemate, the gov-
ernment is stepping up its campaign to recapture
territory in south Laos. Irregular units in the
central panhandle have pushed east from Dong
Hene and are now trying to force a North
Vietnamese regiment from Muong Phalane, a
town on Route 9. The Communists are putting up
a strong defense of Muong Phalane to prevent a
Chavane,
Boloveaa
Plateau
government move toward the Ho Chi Minh trail
complex farther east.
To the south, another government force is
closing on Paksong, the principal town on the
Bolovens Plateau, which the Communists have
held for over a year.
Combat in the Plaine des Jarres area has
been at a low level for over a week. Enemy trucks
have been moving supplies to forward units, but 25X1
there is no evidence of a major enemy logistic
build-up in preparation for any major attack in
the Sam Thong - Long Tieng area.
SECRET
Phalanet
Sha iin9 r
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SECRET
After almost a week of talks in Tokyo and
nearly a year of discussion, Soviet officials and
Japanese business leaders recently agreed in prin-
ciple to cooperate in prospecting for oil and gas
off the coast of Sakhalin Island. The actual deci-
sion to begin development work must await the
results of exploration, which will take at least two
years.
West Siberian
Oil Fields
Offshore Oil
and Gas Field
OAKHALIN
;'2w LA NO
SECRET
According to the present arrangements, the 25X6
Japanese consortium will deliver on credit the
rigs, equipment, and materials necessary for
exploration. The Japanese Government appar-
ently will be asked to extend supplier credits and
guarantees of up to $200 million for this part of
the project, but no final decision has yet been
made. Gulf Oil Company may participate, pro-
viding technical and financial assistance.
Representatives of other US and Japanese
firms are scheduled to meet with the USSR early
next year to resume discussions on the $3-5 bil-
lion Yakutsk natural gas and pipeline project. In
late October, the USSR disclosed that Yakutsk
gas reserves were insufficient for development to
proceed and that further exploration, which
could result in a two-year delay, would be neces-
sary. Moscow, however, agreed to US participa-
tion, without which the Japanese were unwilling
to proceed. Progress on the third major Siberian
project-development of the Tyumen oil fields-is
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at a standstill. Among other things, the Soviets Japan could fall victim to political problems.
have failed to offe
T
il
r
yumen o
to the Japanese at
an attractive price, thereby delaying the financing
of a projected $1 billion pipeline.
In spite of the progress made with Japanese
businessmen, Moscow has been concerned that
Tokyo may be losing interest in rovidin finan-
cial backing for these projects.
The Soviets also are worried that Japanese
leaders will see political advantage in making
increased economic cooperation contingent upon
resolution of the Northern Territories issue-a
linkage that Moscow prefers to avoid.)
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Soviet restiveness suggests a growing concern
that plans for joint Siberian development with
NEW ZEALAND: NEW LEADER
The Labor Party has come to power with the largest parliamentary
majority of any government in 37 years-some 23 seats. Actual differ-
ences with the outgoing National Party government have been relatively
minor, and Labor is unlikely to use its comfortable margin in Parliament
as a mandate for significant departures in domestic programs.
Foreign policy was not at issue in the campaign, but the new
administration will make some changes in order to bring national policy
into line with long-standing Labor positions. The Labor Government
will probably bring home the small New Zealand training contingent in
South Vietnam, establish diplomatic relations with Peking, and work
toward eventual withdrawal of New Zealand troops stationed in Singa-
pore and Malaysia under the five-power defense arrangement with
Australia and the UK.
No significant changes in relations with the US are expected. The
new prime minister, Norman Kirk, is committed to the ANZUS treaty,
and he has made it clear that he regards the US as the guarantor of New
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USSR: FIFTY BIG ONES
The USSR is preparing to celebrate its 50th
anniversary as a federated, multi-national state.
Foreign guests reportedly have been invited to
attend ceremonies on 21-22 December that will
be on the grand scale of those for the golden
jubilee of the Bolshevik Revolution in November
1967. Brezhnev will probably use the occasion to
deliver the major speech.
According to a Soviet journalist, more than
70 foreign Communist parties and 30 governments
have been invited to take part. In addition to
their East European allies, the Soviets have
extended invitations primarily to governments
with which the Soviets have close ties such as
India, Finland, Iran, and, reportedly, Iraq and
Egypt. Turkey is the only NATO country to have
received an invitation thus far. China has not been
asked. Given the diverse interests represented and
the Soviet desire to focus on their own national
accomplishments, it is unlikely that there will be
much opportunity to transact practical business
during the holiday.
Reports that hotel space in Moscow will be
at a premium as early as 10 December suggest
that the Kremlin wants to clear its domestic
docket before the celebrations begin. The Central
Committee may meet a fews days before the
Supreme Soviet convenes for its regular winter
session on 18 December. The Supreme Soviet will
review the economy's performance during the
past year and approve the budget and plans for
1973. A Central Committee plenum should
precede this meeting to give the party hierarchy
an opportunity to pass on these matters and to
discuss pending business such as Politburo
candidate member Mzhavanadze's retirement or
the final preparations for the exchange of party
cards during 1973-74.
There has not been a party plenum since
May, although party statutes require one every six
months. Brezhnev and his colleagues have been
careful during the past eight years to keep the
party hierarchy happy by holding plenums
regularly. Consequently it is likely that they will
not limit themselves to festive speeches, but will
hold a working session before roceedinc with the
anniversary toasts. 25X1
Brezhnev at the Rostrum, July 1971.
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BELGIUM: EYSKENS' FINALE
Disputes within the Socialist - Social Chris-
tian coalition over Belgium's endless linguistic
problem finally forced Prime Minister Eyskens
and his cabinet to resign on 22 November.
Eyskens has agreed to head a caretaker govern-
ment, while Jozef de Saeger, the outgoing minis-
ter of public works, searches for a workable
political combination. In any case, the Belgian
position at the various international meetings
underway and projected is not likely to be
affected.
De Saeger, like Eyskens a Social Christian,
faces an arduous task, and his prospects are not
good. Prior to Eyskens' resignation, the cabinet
tried to no avail for almost a month to draft a
legislative program that both French- and Dutch-
speaking coalition leaders would accept. The
legislation involves cultural and linguistic matters
and under the recently revised constitution
requires a special, large majority in parliament to
be passed. The Socialist - Social Christian coali-
tion, even if restored, would still need the support
Jozef de Saeger
of opposition deputies for passage of any such
program.
Some observers believe that the Flemish fac-
tion of the badly divided opposition Liberal Party
might join the government to give it the extra
votes needed to pass its legislation. The predomi-
nantly French-speaking Socialists, however, are
opposed to the idea, probably because it would
mean the addition of more Flemish deputies to
the coalition. Most politicians are well aware that
new elections would be indecisive. The latest polls
indicate that there would be no significant change
in parliamentary alignment and that the coalition
parties and the Liberals would, in fact, suffer
slight losses.
De Saeger will probably take soundings
among party leaders in the hope that Eyskens'
program can be redrafted. However, de Saeger's
close identification with Flemish interests will
hinder his efforts to resolve the most contentious
issue, the division of the country into three eco-
nomic regions, Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels.
French-speaking leaders of both coalition parties
are arguing that if this program is to be imple-
mented, then the economic region envisioned for
Brussels must be broader in territory than the
linguistic borders set in the constitution. Flemish
politicians, including de Saeger himself, are ex-
tremely sensitive on this issue and will resist any
expansion of the largely French-speaking Brussels
WEST GERMANY: WAGE BATTLE
Still savoring its smashing election victory,
the Brandt-Scheel coalition faces a critical round
of wage negotiations that will profoundly affect
the course of the German economy next year.
Collective bargaining agreements with unions
representing nearly one third of the German labor
force in the private and public sector must be
ready by 1 January.
The unions include the all-important Metal-
workers Union-roughly comparable to the
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German Laborers A Vote to Strike?
United Steel Workers, United Automobile Work- regarded as one of the principal sources of infla-
ers, and International Machinists Union in the US. tionary pressures. Leaders of the government
This union is usually the West German pacesetter workers' union reportedly are demanding wage
in wage negotiations. The outcome of these nego- increases substantially higher than ten percent.
tiations is crucial to Bonn's hopes for containing
inflation. The outlook is not promising.
Now that the election is over and Brandt's
coalition has gained a significant parliamentary
majority with the help of labor's votes, the union
leadership no longer feels constrained about push-
ing for large wage increases. The leaders will point
to the more than six-percent jump in the cost of
living during the past year as justification for their
demands. The metalworkers of Lower Saxony
fired the first shot in the campaign, demanding an
11 percent average wage increase.
The negotiations with the Public Service and
Transport Workers Union, to which most govern-
ment workers belong, will also test Bonn's ability
and determination to fight inflation. Economics
and Finance Minister Schmidt has been under
strong pressure from both the opposition and the
minority members of the coalition to hold down
the rapid rise in government spending, widely
Bonn has not stated what kind of an increase
would be acceptable, but the figure would not be
much above the 5.5 percent reflected in tentative
budget proposals for next year. A larger settle-
ment would boost federal expenditures well
beyond the 10.5-percent increase proposed in the
tentative budget, or require spending cuts else-
where. Quite apart from its direct impact on the
federal government's finances, Bonn's willingness
to resist excessive wage demands would set an
example for state and local governments and for
private business.
The bargaining in the weeks ahead will be
difficult. There were strikes last year to enforce
labor's wage demands in the face of a threatening
recession and fears of widespread unemployment.
With most economic indicators suggesting a
renewed upswing in the economy in 1973, the
unions can be expected to be even more mili-
tant. 25X1
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EAST GERMANY: LOOKING WESTWARD
With ratification of the inter-German
political treaty assured by West German Chan-
cellor Brandt's re-election, East Germany is
stepping up its drive for recognition by Western
countries and for membership in international
organizations.
Pankow's immediate task is to tidy up its
agreements with Bonn. Pankow will receive a
high-level West German representative in East
Berlin, probably before Christmas. At that time
the treaty will be signed and timetables for ratifi-
cation will be discussed along with the exchange
of diplomatic representatives and the application
by both Germanies for membership in the UN.
Because of West German legislative procedures,
ratification is not expected before next April.
Simultaneous applications for full UN member-
ship by the two German states would follow.
Pankow has already requested observer
status at the UN. The request was granted by
Secretary General Waldheim on 24 November,
following East Germany's successful bid to join
UNESCO earlier in the week. Membership in a
UN specialized agency opens the way for
participation in other international organizations.
East Germany has also taken a seat-as has
Bonn-at the preparatory conference on Euro-
pean security in Helsinki.
Recognition by the Western powers remains
a highly desired goal, and Pankow is busily
Representatives of East and West Germany at Helsinki
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encouraging the Allies to hasten the normaliza-
tion procedures. Several quasi-official delega-
tions-capped this week by a parliamentary
delegation-have been sent to Paris to cultivate
the French whose interest in East Germany is
high. Recognition is expected to follow an ex-
change of views with the other Allies. Pankow is
also angling for British recognition. Deputy For-
eign Minister Moldt held informal talks with
British Foreign Office officials when he visited
London last week to sign East Germany's
accession to UNESCO. Pankow hailed the visit as
an historic event signaling favorable developments
in its relations with Britain.
The East Germans have also launched a
broad, but still low-key, campaign to spark US
interest. On 22 November, party leader Erich
Honecker sought out a US audience by granting
his first interview to a Western correspondent to
C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times. East
German media have treated the interview as a
major journalistic event, sort of an opening to a
dialogue with the US. Other East German com-
ment has alluded to trade and other advantages
that would accrue from the establishment of re-
lations with Washington. One commentator even
hinted at Pankow's willingness to settle the
potentially sticky problem of post-war US
property claims. Widespread coverage is being ac-
corded the current US visit of Deputy Foreign
Trade Minister Gerhard Beil, who is speaking with
various private businessmen.
Pankow's currying of favor among the
Nordic states is beginning to bear fruit. Finland
announced its recognition of both German states
on 24 November, and Pankow has expressed con-
fidence that the other Nordic countries will soon
follow suit. Denmark has announced that it in-
tends to recognize East Germany following signa-
ture of the inter-German treaty. The European
neutrals, principally Austria, are also considering
early recognition.
Pankow is aware that the practical rewards
of its blossoming international status, such as
broader trade and the acquisition of badly needed
Western technology, will not be immediately forth-
coming. Like other Eastern European countries,
East Germany's economic freedom of maneuver is
severely limited by its membership in CEMA and
by its exaggerated fealty to the Soviet Union.
General recognition by the West may lessen that
fealty by tempting East Germany eventually to be
bolder in pursuing its own interests.
President Ceausescu made a few personnel
changes at the party plenum on 20-21 November.
He also won strong support for Bucharest's objec-
tives at the Helsinki preparatory talks for the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe and obtained endorsement of an upward
revision of the 1973 economic plan.
The most significant change was the long-
expected removal of Manea Manescu from the
party secretariat. Except for Ceausescu, Roma-
nian leaders do not hold top-level government and
party jobs simultaneously. Manescu's tenure on
the secretariat came into question when he was
appointed chairman of the State Planning Com-
mittee last October. Replacing him was Miron
Constantinescu, a candidate member of the party
Executive Committee and probably the most
liberal of Romania's current party elite.
The plenum gave Ceausescu a strong and
open expression of support for Romania's insist-
ence that all states represented at Helsinki partici-
pate in the talks as equals. In so doing, Romania
was underscoring its deep concern that movement
toward European detente should not be allowed
to formalize the post-war division of Europe into
Eastern and Western spheres of influence.
Romania's hard-fought gains in freeing itself from
Soviet domination would then be jeopardized.
Ceausescu received plenum endorsement for his
contention that force reductions talks, held sepa-
rately on a bloc-to-bloc basis, would render mean-
ingless the projected Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
In addition to increasing the goals in the
1973 economic plan, the plenum considered and
approved next year's budget, a draft financial bill,
and a labor code. Ceausescu scheduled another
plenum for January to examine the progress made
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President Amin's move into the Arab camp
during the past year has been featured by a
dramatic increase in the influence of Libya's
Qadhafi in Kampala.
Like many of Africa's more radical coun-
tries, Libya was unhappy with Amin's overthrow
of the left-leaning Milton Obote in January 1971.
As time went on, Amin managed to gather some
legitimacy and with it acceptance by most
African governments, However, Libya, a strong
supporter of Obote, remained critical of Amin,
especially his close ties to the Israelis and the
presence in Uganda of a 50-man Israeli military
mission.
The picture began to change early this year
when Amin, probably in search of military aid
and badly needed economic assistance, started to
make overtures to Arab capitals, including
Tripoli. Amin, a Muslim, traveled widely in the
Arab world, exchanged delegations, set up em-
bassies, and pledged support for the Palestinians.
He began to castigate the Israelis, who were de-
manding payment for construction projects in
Uganda. In March, after receiving financial en-
couragement from some of his new-found Arab
friends, notably Libya, Amin broke with Tel
Aviv.
Since then, several Arab countries, including
Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, have provided
various forms of aid, some of it sizable, but
Libya's influence with Kampala seems to pre-
dominate. Libya has promised to provide both
untied financial support and project aid, to buy
Ugandan exports, to train troops, and to invest
directly in the economy. While Qadhafi has yet to
deliver on many of these undertakings, a Libyan-
Ugandan bank for foreign trade and development
has been opened, school and housing construction
projects have reached the planning stage, and
Libyan teachers reportedly have been recruited
for service in Uganda. Libya's most dramatic
gesture was the dispatch of some 400 troops and
quantities of military hardware to Uganda
following an invasion last September by Tan-
zanian-based Ugandan exiles, supporters of
Amin and Arab Friends
Obote. The move by Qadhafi strengthened
Amin's army and gained for Qadhafi Amin's
gratitude.
Qadhafi, who believes in striking the Israelis
wherever and whenever possible, doubtless sees
Amin as an ally in black Africa for the struggle.
Amin now heaps praise on the Arabs, calls for
Arab unity against Israel, and stridently con-
demns the Israelis. He has hosted delegations of
Palestinian commandos and has offered the
Palestinians the Kampala residence of the ex-
pelled Israeli ambassador for their headquarters.
Amin's new-found fervor for the Muslim
cause carries over into domestic affairs. The coun-
try's Muslim religious leaders rank among his
closest advisers. He has recruited large numbers of
Muslims into all levels of the armed forces.
Muslims reportedly are getting the nod over Chris-
tians in government training and jobs, and Amin
continues to build Muslim schools and mosques.
This sort of emphasis on Islam is likely to
add to Amin's already considerable domestic
woes. Muslims make up only about ten percent of
the population. Christians, who account for well
over half of Uganda's ten million people, are
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beginning to show their resentment. Christian ele-
ments in the army are reportedly dissatisfied with
Amin's pro-Muslim stance. The presence of
Libyan troops caused problems. Some Ugandan
troops deeply resent the Libyans, and there re-
portedly has been at least one incident of fighting
between soldiers from the two countries.
Ugandan cabinet members and military leaders
have urged a complete Libyan withdrawal.
Perhaps in an effort to mute this dissatisfac-
tion, Amin last week reportedly ordered home at
least half, or possibly all, of the Libyan troops,
but he probably has not been dissuaded from
further strengthening ties to Qadhafi and the
other Arabs. Indeed there are recent reports that
Qadhafi has been urging the erratic Amin to
throw all Christian missionaries out of Uganda
before Christmas.
The French President, as he moved across
Africa, elaborated the flexible policy of co-
operation that Paris has adopted to counter rising
nationalism in its 14 client states in Black Africa.
In Upper Volta and Togo, he emphasized French
willingness to accommodate some African de-
mands in order to preserve the special relationship
fathered by De Gaulle. Pompidou made it equally
clear, however, that France would retain final
control in key areas of the relationships.
In line with the new policy's provision for
increasing material benefits to the Africans,
Pompidou sweetened modest aid increases to
both countries by announcing the cancellation of
a pre-independence debt of $195 million owed by
the 14 former colonies. This gesture, along with a
promise of lower interest rates and longer repay-
ment periods, is presumably designed to show the
Africans how much their privileged relationship
with France can mean.
Other statements by Pompidou underscore
France's renunciation of earlier pretensions to a
monopoly on assistance to its African clients. In a
press conference in Upper Volta, Pompidou
stated flatly that France sought no such
monopoly and would collaborate with multilat-
eral aid efforts. Matching word with deed,
Pompidou's party responded to a Voltan request
for aid in a manganese project by stating that
France would limit its role to that of "catalyst,"
and would try to encourage American or Japanese
investment and World Bank involvement. This
increased willingness to encourage other donors-
especially the US-stems largely from recognition
that African development demands keep rising
and that diversification of aid sources is inevitable
in any event.
Pompidou has also faced up to the growing
African demand for revision of the network of
formal ties to Paris. In this connection, he ex-
panded earlier expressions of willingness to revise
the 12-year-old cooperation accords that govern
each state's relations with France by agreeing to
move toward changes in the French-controlled
African franc zone to which all the client states
belong. Expressing his sympathy with the growing
African desire for a larger voice in money manage-
ment, Pompidou indicated that France was pre-
pared to make more of the zone's foreign ex-
change reserves available for African economic
development. He carefully balanced this promise
by making it clear that Paris would retain ulti-
mate control and that only those states that exer-
cised fiscal responsibility-as interpreted by
Paris-would be permitted to stay in the re-
structured zone.
A discordant note was sounded in Togo,
where President Eyadema startled Pompidou with
a request for the revision of the parity rate be-
tween the African franc and the French franc-a
change that would force France to pay more for
African exports. Eyadema also asked Paris to use
its influence with its Common Market partners to
assure full convertibility of the African franc into
European currencies and the dollar. Pompidou
angrily reminded Eyadema that the African franc
could not exist without French backing. He fur-
ther stated that Paris would not consider such a
move unless all the African states jointly re-
quested the revision. Eyadema may have been
trying to see how far Paris was willing to go in its
proclaimed desire for a more flexible, restruc-
tured franc zone relationship.
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Nepalese Prime Minister K. N. Bista got the
red-carpet treatment during his recent ten-day
official visit to China. Mao himself received Bista,
and Chou En-lai met the Nepalese at the airport,
held two rounds of talks with him, and hosted a
banquet for the Nepalese party.
Peking for some time has been trying to
increase its influence among nonaligned, less-
developed states in South Asia, largely with an
eye toward New Delhi. Nevertheless, Peking was
restrained with Bista. Chou described his discus-
sions with Bista as "sincere and friendly" and as
achieving "satisfactory" results-less than effusive
formulations-and he specifically linked Chinese
aid with Nepal's support for Peking in the UN.
low-up discussions on hydroelectric projects that
Nepal wants the Chinese to build.
Since 1956, Peking has provided Nepal with
$68 million in grant aid. China finances the local
costs of its projects through the sale in Nepal of
small, Chinese-made consumer items. Some 500
Chinese workers have been employed on various
aid projects, which have included several major
roads, small factories, and a hydroelectric dam
that was formally inaugurated last week. Military
aid from China has been minimal, consisting of
small amounts of weapons parts, ammunition,
and communications equipment. Cultural ex-
changes, while on the increase, have yet to attain
the level reached before China's Cultural Revolu-
tion.
Bista came home with a new aid package as
well as with indications of Peking's interest in
even better relations with Nepal. The aid agree-
ment, signed in Peking on 18 November, includes
construction of a new road and several smaller
projects. Peking dispatched a vice minister to
Kathmandu two days later, presumably for fol-
Since assuming the throne last January,
young King Birendra has pursued his late father's
foreign policy of nonalignment, which permits
Kathmandu to look in all directions for aid. While
accepting Peking's help, Birendra does not wish to
alter Nepal's friendly relations with its giant
neighbor to the south. He recognizes that Nepal
Chinese Aid to Nepal
Previously extended assistance
New projects
MAN
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depends on India for trade and for a major
portion of its economic aid, and that the bulk of
its military assistance comes from India and
Western sources.
Indo-Nepalese relations fluctuate but have
warmed considerably over the last year once the
bitter and protracted negotiations on a trade and
transit agreement were out of the way. The future
is clouded, however, by the unfavorable reaction
the new Chinese road project will meet in New
Delhi. The project would place Chinese tech-
nicians close to the Indian border. Nevertheless,
Birendra's foremost concern is to hasten the
snail's pace of economic development in his back-
ward kingdom, and the need for an expanded
road network is crucial. He may be looking for a
counteroffer from India
Sana won the first round in the Yemen unity
negotiations. Following a summit meeting in
Tripoli this week, Sana's President Iryani and
Aden's President Ali signed an agreement that
designates Sana as the capital of the unified state,
to be called the Yemeni Republic. Iryani prob-
ably insisted on this concession in order to make
unity a more salable item to the numerous op-
ponents of unity back home, and All may have
concluded that resistance was unwise because the
summit was held in the presence of Libyan Presi-
dent Qadhafi, no friend of the Aden regime. All
may also believe that, having conceded this point,
Aden now stands to win concessions from Sana in
later negotiations.
The union process now moves into a year-
long series of steps-the drafting of a constitution
by a joint committee, ratification by the legisla-
tures of the two Yemens, and a popular referen-
dum through both Yemens.
Reconciling Aden's Marxist government with
Sana's traditionalist one will be far more difficult
Sana
A unified capital
than anything thus far accomplished, and the
delicate negotiating process will offer numerous
occasions for the collapse of the whole unity
concept. Not the least of the complicating factors
is the opposition to unity in Sana. Many elements
there are still spoiling for a fight, and they fear
that unity might take away some of their backers.
These elements were recently given an excuse to
fight by an incident on the border that resulted in
the death, at the hands of Aden-backed tribes-
men, of two prominent Sana tribal leaders whose
militant followers will now be intent on revenge.
President Ali, in the meantime, will return to
Aden with points on both sides of the ledger. On
the debit side, he must list the concession to
Iryani. On the credit side, his talks in Tripoli were
preceded by a four-day visit to Moscow that re-
sulted in an economic and technical aid agree-
ment and a pledge from the Soviets to continue
to help Aden strengthen its defenses. Aden un-
doubtedly views this material and moral support
from Moscow as buttressing its position versus
Sana, whether or not the unity negotiations go
forward. The Soviet-Adeni communique made no
mention of Yemen unity, praising only Aden's
"efforts ...aimed at restoring normal relations
between the two parts of Yemen."
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India-Pakistan
DISAPPOINTED AT LAHORE
The three-hour meeting on 28 November in
Lahore between the Indian and Pakistani army
chiefs was fruitless. It probably marked the final
effort to reach an agreement on the Kashmir
border through military channels. The mutual
decision to refer the matter back to New Delhi
and Islamabad demonstrates once again that any
breakthrough in negotiations must be made by
Prime Minister Gandhi and President Bhutto.
The two generals met at Pakistan's request,
but apparently neither came with an authoriza-
tion to concede claim to the 1.7 square mile piece
of land, now in Pakistani hands, that stands in the
way of an agreement. This small strip of land is of
political rather than strategic importance; Paki-
stan fears that a concession will weaken its claim
that Kashmir is still disputed territory. The dis-
agreement is preventing the mutual withdrawal of
troops south of Kashmir.
Disappointment over the meeting is partially
offset by the prospect of an imminent exchange
of some prisoners of war and other detainees.
Wishing to appear reasonable on the eve of the
General Assembly's consideration of a resolution
favoring UN membership for Bangladesh, both
India and Pakistan engaged in a fast-flying series
of repatriation offers. The first of December is
the date set for repatriating 540 Pakistani soldiers
captured on India's western front during the
fighting last December and Pakistan's entire lot of
617 Indian prisoners. Pakistan then can claim it
no longer holds any prisoners in contrast to the
continued retention of over 90,000 Pakistani
prisoners in India. Details are still to be worked
out on the repatriation of 10,000 Bengali women
and children Bhutto is allowing to leave Pakistan,
as well as 6,000 Pakistani women and children
New Delhi has promised to release.
Despite this short-range progress, the more
important question involved the release of the
bulk of Pakistani prisoners in India, and their
release remains dependent on Islamabad's recogni-
tion of Bangladesh. During his just-concluded
11-day tour of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier
Province, Bhutto repeatedly spoke in favor of
recognition, but never committed himself to a
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Last week, US-Panamanian relations were
strained from a new direction. A labor dispute in
the Canal Zone between a US-owned bus com-
pany and its Panamanian drivers turned ugly, and
17 of the company's 52 buses were seized, driven
into Panama, and turned over to the National
Guard. The Torrijos government assured the US
Embassy that the vehicles would be returned, but
took no steps to discourage further seizures and
allowed the matter to drag on. As of 30 Novem-
ber, only seven of the buses had been returned,
the government was insisting that no reprisals be
taken against the drivers involved, and the US
company had agreed to sell out to -a Panamanian
bus cooperative.
The workers had been demanding coverage
under Panamanian social security and payment of
the Christmas bonus standard in Panama. In order
to give weight to their demands, they staged a
pre-dawn raid on a zone parking lot on 21 No-
vember, taking 12 buses. Later that day, two
more buses were seized, this time at gunpoint.
Additional buses were commandeered later in the
week.
The government clearly sympathized with
the strikers, but adopted a low-key approach,
giving relatively little publicity to the incidents.
Torrijos' measured response seemed keyed to his
differentiation between Panama's relations with
the US Government and its dealings with Canal
Zone authorities. Torrijos has tried consistently
to portray zone officials in the worst possible
light in order to demonstrate the need for a new
treaty relationship. He was enjoying their present
discomfiture, but apparently was not interested in
provoking a major diplomatic flap at this time.
The delaying tactics, however, showed govern-
ment solidarity with the workers and kept pres-
sure on the US bus company.
The Panamanian Foreign Ministry has taken
the position that services provided by the bus
company have nothing to do with the operation,
maintenance, or defense of the canal and are
therefore illegal under the 1903 treaty; the gov-
ernment favors a take-over of the bus operation
by a Panamanian firm. The US company, for its
part, had been interested in selling for some time,
but had been unable to attract a buyer. Now a
Panamanian offer has been made and, while all of
the details have not been settled, the US owner
has agreed to sell. Torrijos may insist on some
arrangement providing for immunity from prose-
cution for the drivers before the remaining buses
are returned.
The government's campaign for a Security
Council meeting in Panama moved another notch
forward this week with the release of a letter
from Foreign Minister Tack to Secretary General
Waldheim. The letter, which was circulated to all
Security Council members and later given wide
publicity in Panama, suggested 15-21 March as
the appropriate time, and stated that a formal
invitation would be presented in December. With
the government now publicly committed to the
meeting, chances are rather slim that Torrijos can
be persuaded to change his mind unless there
were a significant breakthrough in the canal nego-
tiations in the next couple of weeks.
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Havana announced a sweeping reorganiza-
tion of the top level of government late last week.
The reorganization bears none of the earmarks of
a purge and is based on a desire to bring order out
of Cuba's administrative chaos. All of the key
figures involved have held high posts for some
time, and no one seems to have suffered a serious
demotion. Although ambiguous initial announce-
ments gave the impression that Raul Castro might
have been reduced in power, it now appears that
his position as number-two man remains un-
changed. Fidel continues to head both the party
and government.
The reorganization centered on the Council
of Ministers, which was expanded from 22 to 27
cabinet positions. An executive committee was
created to simplify the management of the en-
larged body. The reorganization brought under
one roof the numerous government agencies that
had previously been operating independently and
grouped them, together with the pertinent minis-
tries, into eight administrative sectors each
headed by a vice prime minister. The eight are:
Major Ramiro Valdes, construction; Major Guil-
lermo Garcia Frias, transportation and communi-
cations; Major Pedro Miret Prieto, basic indus-
tries; Major Flavio Bravo Pardo, consumption and
services; Major Belarmino Castilla Mas, education,
culture, and sciences; Major Diocles Torralba
Gonzalez, sugar industry; Carlos Rafael Rod-
riguez, foreign relations; President Osvaldo
Dorticos, economy and administration.
Fidel Castro will exercise personal super-
vision over the security services and several other
agencies that have not been assigned to the eight
sectors. A ninth sector is expected to be formed
eventually to accommodate those agencies now
under Fidel that pertain to livestock and agricul-
ture other than sugar. There was no mention of
Raul Castro other than to describe him as first
vice prime minister. This places him above the
eight sector chiefs-or vice prime ministers-and
presumably means that he is second in command
of both the country's executive and political ap-
paratus, the Cuban Communist Party.
Administrative structures patterned after the
new Council of Ministers will be formed in the six
provinces and in some regions-the administrative
level immediately below the province. These pro-
vincial and regional councils will have executive
committees composed of delegates designated by
the respective vice prime ministers in coordina-
tion with the local party chiefs. The councils will
concern themselves primarily with coordination
and will not have the authority to alter directives
from above without approval from Havana. This
rigid centralization of authority indicates that the
Castro regime has decided to ignore a key facet of
the criticism of its administration offered in
recent years by several technical experts and for-
eign observers.
On paper, the new system is certainly an
improvement- over the old particularly in the area
of pinpointing responsibility. In practice, how-
ever, it may turn out to be merely another
bureaucratic nightmare that hinders rather than
helps Cuba's economic progress.
The small Soviet naval force that entered
Caribbean waters on 26 November will probably
arrive in Cienfuegos on 1 December. The ninth
such call to Cuba since 1969, it is the first to the
island since last spring. The force involves two
surface combatants-a Kresta-class cruiser and a
Ka n i n-class destroyer-plus an F-class diesel-
attack submarine, a tanker and an intelligence-
collection ship.
If the ships follow the earlier pattern, they
will visit several other Cuban ports and perhaps
conduct anti-submarine operations with Cuban
naval units. Previous Soviet naval visits have lasted
as long as three months, but most average 15 to
20 days. Two TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft
landed in Cuba last week. The planes then con-
ducted a reconnaissance of the mid-Atlantic on
28 November before returning to Havana's Jose
Marti Airfield. Although these aircraft have flown
to Cuba during earlier port calls, they have yet to
conduct joint operations with the visiting
ships.
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CHILE: NOT JUST A JUNKET
President Allende may use his current trip to
argue that Chile is being pushed to the wall by
foreign and domestic enemies, leaving him no
alternative but closer ties with Communist gov-
ernments. Flanked by General Prats-who, as
interior minister, became chief executive in Al-
lende's absence-Allende told a large farewell rally
in Santiago on 28 November that in his speech to
the UN General Assembly on 4 December he will
protest "unjust aggression" against Chile. The
President added that rightists responsible for the
extensive economic damages caused by the recent
protest shutdown must be punished.
These damages were particularly serious in
the already lagging agricultural sector. The new
agriculture minister has said that next year Chile
will have to import food worth at least $450
million, up $50 million from this year. A Chilean
official is in the US now seeking to buy sub-
stantial quantities of foodgrains. This effort
points up Allende's dilemma in counting so
heavily on the Soviet aid. He praises that aid
publicly as generous, but it has thus far been
minimal, cautious, and not keyed to urgent
Chilean needs.
While discussing the talks that are to begin
this month in Washington over renegotiating the
Chilean debt to the US, Foreign Minister Al-
meyda emphasized that his government wishes to
make a determined effort to break out of the
present impasse in bilateral relations. Almeyda
said that while Allende's UN speech would "ad-
dress" Chile's complaints against Kennecott and
other US corporations, it would distinguish be-
tween their actions and those of the US Govern-
ment.
Regardless of Almeyda's statements, the
tone of Allende's speech on 4 December is likely
to be less than conciliatory. Much will depend on
his estimate of Moscow's reaction to his need for
further economic aid and on whether he feels his
treatment in the US is commensurate with his
position.
PERU: DEALING WITH LABOR
The creation of a new labor confederation
by the Velasco regime could be the first in a series
of initiatives leading up to the promulgation of a
general labor law. The military government wants
to eliminate existing labor confederations, both
the Communist-dominated one and the group
controlled by the military's archenemy, APRA.
The plan is to substitute for them a new labor
group run by Sinamos, the government-controlled
apparatus designed to build an independent base
of support for the regime and ensure the "irrever-
sibility" of its programs.
This would be part of the government's
move toward its goal of a "social democracy of
full participation," a state of affairs in which
political parties and labor unions will supposedly
be obsolete. It seems inevitable that this will bring
increasing conflict with traditional parties and
groups, including those that have so far supported
the Velasco regime.
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Already, an important regime spokesman has
delivered a scathing denunciation of the Com-
munists and the Christian Democrats, both gov-
ernment supporters, while barely mentioning the
government's usual whipping boys, APRA and the
extreme left. The speech was by the head of
Sinamos, General Rodriguez Figueroa. It came in
response to a charge by the Christian Democrats
that his organization stoops to infiltration and
manipulation instead of stimulating, as it is sup-
posed to, genuine popular participation in revolu-
tionary programs. He was also responding to the
Communists' announced intention of opposing
Sinamos' attempts to undermine labor organiza-
tions. Rodriguez, whose speech was cleared at the
highest levels, pointedly declared, "The tradi-
tional political parties cannot become the politi-
cal heirs of the revolution."
The government may have been brought to
move on the labor scene by the adverse effect of a
shift in offshore currents on the fishmeal in-
dustry-a vital source of foreign exchange earn-
ings. This heightened the government's awareness
of the economic costs of labor unrest in factories
and mines. At the same time, government efforts
to recruit labor leaders apparently are beginning
to pay off. A new pro-government confederation
called the Central of Workers of the Peruvian
Revolution was created in mid-November. It
claims to be independent, but actually is govern-
ment controlled. The regime reportedly will try
to entice the individual unions to cut their ties to
other confederations and join the new group.
If this strategy is unsuccessful, a new labor
law abolishing the old confederations reportedly
will be issued early next year. The timing of the
new law's promulgation remains tentative, and
efforts at voluntary recruitment may go on well
beyond the January deadline. Debate within the
regime on the precise role of Sinamos and future
policies toward the Communists, APRA, the ex-
treme left, and the Christian Democrats may not
be over. The government may not be ready to risk
the consequences of announcing so radical a
change all at once. The simultaneous alienation of
opposition groups and current allies would be
dangerous since these elements still have consid-
erable political impact.
VENEZUELA: STUDENT DISORDER
The widespread outbreak of student violence
in the past month appears to have been stirred up
by leftist political groups.
Reasons for the outbursts vary from city to
city and change almost daily: usually the erup-
tions come over an obscure issue, police react,
students are detained and hurt, which in turn
becomes the cause for new demonstrations and
reactions. The only common theme has been a
demand, circulating during the past 60 days, for
the release of "political prisoners." This demand
has been a favorite theme of leftist political
groups and, in particular, has been used with
increasing frequency by the Marxist Movement
for Socialism, a new party that is attracting wide-
spread support among leftists and students.
Officials of the Caldera administration deny
that there are any "political prisoners" in Vene-
zuela and claim that this is a line fabricated to
accord respectability to common lawbreakers. A
hunger strike by many of those detained by the
police during the demonstrations has attracted
public attention and resulted in demands from
some small leftist parties for a congressional in-
vestigation of the situation.
Although ready to counter student violence
with equal amounts of police power, the Caldera
government is obviously sensitive to the political
risks involved in the student unrest and has at-
tempted to defuse student protests before they
get started. It has created a special unarmed
police brigade, trained to draw students into dia-
logue and presumably to talk them out of taking
to the streets. The first major use of this Special
Brigade of Order got off to a bad start when
students refused to talk and injured some brigade
members. More recently, however, the brigade
appears to have had some success in calming stu-
dents and persuading them to return to classes.
The level of student dissidence so far does
not equal that of previous years, but the latest
outbreaks demonstrate the susceptibility of this
large and volatile segment of the population to
political manipulation by extremist political
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On page 10 of the Weekly Summary Special
Report, China: A Touch of Paralysis, No.
0398/72A, the final sentences of the text should
read:
A letter now circulating officially seems designed
to show that Mao was opposed to Lin Piao and
that Mao was less than enamored with "leftists''
in general as early as 1966. This hardly seems to
conform with the facts.
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Secret
Secret
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
China: A Touch of Paralysis
Secret
N? 45
1 December 1972
No. 0398/72A
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r !^i
CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO
(Elected April 1969)
Mao Tse-tung (78) Chiang Ch'ing (56)
Chairman, Central Committee Wife of Mao; First Deputy Head,
Cultural Revolution Group
Chou En-lai (74)
Premier
K'ang Sheng (72)
e`ntral Com-
t ulster
Wth!
Chi Teng-k'uei (40)*
Vice Chairman, Honan Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
MILITARY LEADERS
Huang Yung-sheng (62)
~Lcw
ics
Li Tso-p'eng (60)
taff; Army
wry Af-
Sta?f; Po-
r, Navy;
aryAffairs CBTrrmittee
Yeh Chien-ying (72)
Vice Chairman, Military Af
fairs Committee
Ch'en Hsi-lien (60)
Commander, Shen-yang Military
Region; Chairman, Liaoning Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (59)
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal
Revolutionary Committee; Second
Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution
Group
Li Te-sheng (61)*
Commander, Anhwei Military
District; Chairman, Anhwei Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
Hsu Shih-yu (64)
Vice Minister of Defense; Commander,
Nanking Military Region; Chairman,
Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary
Committee
Yao Wen-yuan (36)
Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal
Revolutionary Committee; Member,
Cultural Revolution Group
*Alternate Members Inactive
lic Security) iaister; Chairman,
Li Hsien-nien (66)
Finance Minister
Wang Tung-hsing (age unknown)
Public Security Vice Minister; Direc-
tor, General Office, Party Central -
Committee
ess
Liu Po-ch'eng (79)
Purged or dead
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SECHt
China: A Touch of Paralysis
Despite the outward appearance of order in China, stability has not been fully
re-established since the purge a year ago of Lin Piao. The notion that Defense
Minister Lin Piao, the man chosen personally by party Tse-tung
designated successor, could turn against the great helmsman has sharply eroded
confidence in the country's leadership. The failure to reconstitute the ruling Polit-
buro and replace the military leaders who went down with Lin, together with the
general absence of leadership turnouts and authoritative policy pronouncements,
leaves a clear impression that tensions exist among the surviving leaders-an impres-
sion that is evidently shared by numerous low- and middle-level cadres in China.
Moreover, there are signs that a significant number of military men who hold power
in the provinces may also be purged-a situation that involves real risks for domestic
political order.
During this time of uncertainty and strain, Premier Chou En-lai has played a
pivotal role, seeking to diminish the divisive forces at work while guiding China on
the road toward political recovery. It is largely through his efforts that the political,
military and economic machinery has continued to function. On the question of the
fate of the military leaders in the provinces, for example, Chou seems intent on
limiting the damage, at least until the wounds of the Lin affair have had time to
heal. His efforts at moderation are meeting resistance, however, and further clashes
within the Politburo are by no means out of the question. In such a conflict, Mao's
role obviously would be a determining factor, and the aging party chairman seems to
be keeping his options open.
In view of the magnitude of the problem,
the regime has achieved notable success in
managing the aftermath of the purge of Lin Piao.
Basic social order has been maintained. The
armed forces have remained stable while the
regime moved to re-subordinate them to civilian
party control. The trend toward moderation in
domestic policies-a trend evident since 1969 and
one that has wide popular support-has been even
more pronounced since Lin's departure. In the
conduct of foreign affairs, Peking has scored a
succession of triumphs in 1972, the fruit of a
decision several years ago to pursue a more
pragmatic and outgoing foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the events of last autumn
dramatically shattered the fragile political mosaic
Special Report
painfully constructed at the party congress in
1969, and the leadership has been extremely
cautious in picking up the pieces. The havoc is
most evident within the Politburo itself; only 16
of the original 25 members named in 1969 are
still mentioned in the official press by name, and
of these only a dozen appear to be taking part in
the affairs of state in a meaningful way. The delay
in reconstituting the Politburo is undoubtedly
associated with the question of the military's
proper place in that body.
While the regime wrestles with this problem,
the armed forces are without designated leaders.
Marshal Yeh Chien-ying has been serving as de
facto defense minister but has not been officially
appointed to this position. Similarly, no one has
been named to replace chief of staff Huang
Yung-sheng, and the vacancies at the top of the
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air force, navy, and logistics services remain un-
filled. This does not mean that the administration
of the armed forces has been neglected or that the
efficiency of the armed forces has suffered se-
verely; merely that they have been an uncom-
monly long time without formally designated
leaders.
Because Lin was officially designated Mao's
successor, Peking must also work out a new for-
mula for succession and rewrite a substantial
segment of party history. The idea of a post-Mao
"collective leadership" has persisted for at least a
year, and it seems likely that it is the composition
of this collective, rather than the principle itself,
that is still at issue. While Peking vacillates, the
leadership grows older: Mao Tse-tung will be 79
this month, and Premier Chou is 74.
Moderates Versus Extremists
The Lin affair and its sequel make it appear
that one of the central issues in Peking is civilian
versus military control. In fact, the issues at stake
are much more complex. Evidence-some of it
antedating Lin's demise-indicates that while the
institutional problem is a real one, the leadership
has long been deeply divided on a much wider
range of policy and personnel questions. The
Cultural Revolution itself, with its bitter factional
disputes and Red Guard mania, clearly added to
and intensified personal antipathies, particularly
between radical leaders who were identified with
its excesses and those of a more moderate persua-
sion. It is hard to believe that these antipathies
have now vanished or that, on any given issue,
they no longer cut across institutional lines,
including the armed forces.
The actual facts surrounding the demise of
Lin Piao in September 1971 may never be known
in detail, but, in any event, it has not ended the
rivalry between moderate and radical forces at the
center. The purge removed the leading spokesman
of radical interests in the armed forces, Lin Piao
himself. On the other hand, it also claimed as
victims high-level military officers who had been
at the opposite end of the political spectrum,
most notably the former chief of staff, Huang
Yung-sheng. Moreover, a campaign against ul-
Special Report - 4 -
traleftists-which had begun in late 1969 and
evidently was directed by Chou En-lai-has been
muted since Lin's fall, even though a number of
extreme leftist figures are still prominent and
active. For example, Chiang Ching, deputy head
of the Cultural Revolution Group, which directed
Mao's purge of the old party apparatus, should
have been an early target, but as Mao's wife she
has thus far been immune. Another prominent
leftist, Shanghai party leader Yao Wen-yuan, con-
tinues to appear frequently in Peking.
Despite the uneasy political equilibrium
within the leadership in Peking, China's policies at
home and abroad seem well defined. Rationality
and pragmatism seem to be the order of the day,
not only in foreign policy but also in such do-
mestic areas dear to Mao's heart as education.
Indeed, some of the present educational policies,
such as the broadening of the academic cur-
riculum and the special advantages given to tal-
ented students, are a virtual repudiation of con-
cepts Mao himself has advocated in the past.
From time to time, there are hints in domestic
media that the move toward moderation is being
challenged on a selective basis, but these chal-
lenges have had no visible impact on policy
implementation.
Military Under Fire
The protracted effort to repudiate Lin Piao
is almost certainly raising political temperatures
throughout the country. Since early this year,
cadres have been studying a succession of docu-
ments spelling out the alleged details of Lin's
coup plot. The key item in this series, the so-
called "571 document," contains Lin's purported
operations plan. The plan lists not only those
forces that Lin could count on for support-
primarily in the air force-but also a number of
other military units he was attempting to enlist in
the plot. The implication is strong that there are
elements within the armed forces whose loyalty is
being questioned in Peking. The most recent doc-
ument in the anti-Lin series, issued in early July,
is more ominous. It suggests that the central
authorities may be considering moves against a
wide range of military leaders and that the au-
thorities will not in the future wait for written
evidence to move against such individuals.
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ShUKE
Special Report
CHINA: Missing Provincial Military Leaders
INNER /
MONGOLIA < ',r
PEKING
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Some members of the leadership may in fact
be exploiting the Lin affair to bring down the
military leaders of the provinces. This impression
has been reinforced in recent weeks by the failure
of a number of provincial military leaders to
make public appearances and by reports that
some of them have been arrested for their alleged
support of Lin. The continuing denunciation of
Lin and the accompanying "rectification" move-
ment within the party and the army appear to
have Mao's consent. One report claims that im-
mediately after Lin's fall, Mao advocated a purge
on the scale now being pursued. Indeed, the chair-
man himself could well be a prime mover in the
reported arrests of the provincial leaders.
If a move against these leaders is under way,
even on a selected basis, it risks jeopardizing do-
mestic political order. The Cultural Revolution
dismantled the old party and government bu-
reaucracies, leaving the military as the best avail-
able unified instrument of control. Efforts have
been made to re-establish the civilian party struc-
ture and to reassert the party's leading role, but
military leaders still hold the balance of power in
the party apparatus in many places outside
Peking. Thus, a move against these military
leaders, particularly if widespread, could con-
ceivably cause a breakdown in control, since no
alternative mechanism is available to fill the void.
This consideration could help explain why Peking
is moving with such caution in this matter.
Paralysis in the Provinces
The political uncertainty generated by the
protracted anti-Lin campaign is having a notice-
able effect on life in China's provinces. With the
memory of past "rectification" campaigns vivid in
their minds, officials at the local level are showing
a marked tendency to sit tight, procrastinate, or,
if forced to go forward, to move with extreme
care.
other leaders in the province did little more than
mark time, waiting to see if he survived. Although
Han returned with no visible diminution of au-
thority, lesser officials reportedly remain reluc-
tant to commit themselves for or against him. In
other provinces where the top leaders are in
danger of removal, it is likely that a similar
ambivalence exists.
This political paralysis has apparently also
affected industrial enterprises, where at least
some factory managers have become reluctant to
assert their authorit
25X1
cadres in the countryside have been reluc-
tant to implement current agricultural policies,
presumably because they recognize that some of
these measures, such as the relatively liberal
payments system now in force, have been a target
of radical criticism in the past. The circum-
spection being exercised by officials at the lower
25X1
When province leader Han Hsien-chu, a
career army official, was called to Peking early
this year to explain his relationship to Lin Piao,
Peace at home is an elusive thing.
Special Report _ 6 -
1 December 1972
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levels is likely to continue until the leaders at the
center resolve their fundamental policy and per-
sonnel problems.
Chou and the Military
Throughout the Cultural Revolution, it was
not Lin Piao, the defense minister, but Chou
En-lai, with no official military title, who kept
the armed forces generally united and loyal
during a period of extreme stress. It was Chou
who arranged the tenuous, but nonetheless work-
able, compromise agreements on the leadership in
numerous provinces. It was Chou who flew to
Canton in April 1967 to reassure a jittery Huang
Yung-sheng, then an important regional figure,
that he was safe from Red Guard onslaughts. It
was Chou who traveled to the embattled city of
Wuhan in July 1967 to convince the rebellious
commander there to release his high level captives
and submit to central authority. In short, Chou
became closely identified with the interests of the
regional and provincial military leaders. Most of
these leaders were of moderate persuasion.
Special Report
Given this background, it is not suprising to
find that in 1972 Chou is again being linked with
efforts to protect harassed militar admini
in the provinces.
ou intervened with Mao to limit the
military purge on the grounds that a wide-ranging
attack on the military establishment would
adversely affect both stability at home and
China's image abroad.
An example of how a provincial luminary
can be buffeted about is provided by the case of
Liu Hsing-yuan, a career military officer who ran
Kwangtung Province until March of this year. At
that time, reports began to circulate that Liu, a
close associate of purged chief of staff Huang
Yung-sheng, was being transferred to the top
party post in Szechwan Province in southwest
China. His transfer to Szechwan would serve two
objectives: it would separate him from his south
China power base, thus carrying out the logical
extension of Huang's purge; at the same time, it
would preserve his prestige, because his assign-
ment would be an even more responsible post.
Similar stratagems were used by Premier Chou
during the Cultural Revolution on the behalf of
embattled provincial chiefs, and it is easy to see
his hand at work in Liu's case. This assumption is
supported by the appearance of Chou in Canton
in April at the public installation of Liu's suc-
cessor in Kwangtung. Liu himself disappeared
from the scene, and rumors were about that he
was under house arrest in Peking. In Canton, the
capital of Kwangtung, the stories of Liu's arrest
apparently created unrest; according to one
report, someone tried to assassinate his replace-
ment.
After remaining in the shadows for seven
months, Liu Hsing-yuan showed up again last
week in Szechwan. He was identified only as a
"leading member" of the Szechwan hierarchy,
but the fact that he gave the major speech for the
occasion will be a signal to many that he is or will
be the province chief. This sequence of events
suggests that Liu's transfer may have been
opposed by those seeking to reduce the influence
of moderate elements within the military estab-
lishment. The length of his absence from view
could mean that Chou, if in fact he pushed for
1 December 1972
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An Accusatory Finger?
Chou En-lai and Chiang Ching at a National Day musical performance on 1 October this year.
Liu's transfer, had some difficulty getting his way
even though he finally prevailed.
Chou, in any event, can be expected to have
a realistic view of the dangers inherent in trying
to reduce the army's political role too abruptly.
He is apt to urge caution at every step along this
path. The moderates among the provinical mili-
tary figures would appear to have nowhere else to
turn if they are to make their voices heard in
Peking.
The Militant Madame
Many of the fires that Chou has been called
upon to put out in the last six years were lit by
Mao's wife, Chiang Ching. On at least one oc-
casion, she herself was burned. In July 1967, at
the height of the Wuhan confrontation, Chiang
Ching urged that her militant Red Guard groups
be armed in order to defend themselves against
the repressive actions of the conservative military
Special Report 8
leaders in the provinces. Chaos ensued, and by
September 1967 Madame Mao was obliged to
back down and disavow her slogan, "arm the
masses."
Since 1969, most of the extremist policies
associated with the madame and other Cultural
Revolution leaders have been discarded, but
Chiang Ching continues to be accorded a high
place among the party elite, preceded only by
Mao and Chou. While there are reports that her
activities have been restricted to the cultural
sphere, some officials probably see her current
exalted political status as a sign that she has the
potential to stir things up again. Indeed, there is
some reason to believe that Chiang Ching may
have tried to pull a political cloud over the for-
tunes of Liu Hsing-yuan.
On the basis of what is known about their
behavior in the Cultural Revolution, Chou and
Chiang Ching probably differ sharply today not
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SLUKt
Photos taken from a Canton television broadcast monitored in Hong Kong.
only on the question of the fate of military
province chiefs but also on a number of other
important personnel and policy matters. Since the
Cultural Revolution ground to an end, the two
have been able to mask these differences from
public view, but on several recent occasions for-
eign visitors to China have detected what they
believed to be considerable impatience and an-
noyance on the premier's part at Chiang Ching's
behavior. The fact that Chou and Madame Mao
are poles apart temperamentally as well as politi-
cally does not mean that they are in permanent
and implacable opposition on every issue; nor
does Chiang Ching appear to be in a position to
challenge Chou directly. Chou, for his part, is in
no position to put the madame down completely
as long as she retains Mao's patronage.
As has been the case at times in the past,
Mao's role in China's recent internal affairs is
Special Report
obscure. In some respects, he has removed himself
from the public stage. He has not presided over a
major public gathering since the funeral of the
late foreign minister Chen I in January 1972 and
has not appeared on the rostrum at Tien An Men
Square in Peking since May 1971. The chairman's
periodic meetings with foreign visitors in his
private residence indicate that his mental and
physical condition are probably not the reason
for his reduced public activity.
The pattern of Mao's recent activities, in
fact, is reminiscent of earlier periods in which he
engaged in intense behind-the-scenes maneu-
vering, either to shore up his own position or to
plot the next move against real or fancied op-
ponents. It could be, for example, that Mao is
personally directing the anti-Lin campaign,
viewing it as an opportunity to settle scores with
a number of provincial military leaders, primarily
those whose opposition to the Red Guard
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movement led to a closing out of the Cultural
Revolution before it had accomplished all of
Mao's objectives.
On the other hand, the chairman must rec-
ognize that his close personal identification with
Lin renders him vulnerable in important ways.
The 571 document contains unusually harsh
words about Mao's leadership. It accuses him of
imposing ill-conceived and unpopular domestic
programs and characterizes him as a "cruel
tyrant." This attack on the chairman is attributed
to Lin, and it has been circulated with Mao's
explicit approval. Still, the effect has been to give
wide publicity to a list of grievances against Mao
with which many officials can identify. Indeed,
there are signs that the regime-and perhaps Mao
himself-are taking steps to disassociate the chair-
man from the Cultural Revolution experience. A
letter now circulating officially seems designed to
show that Mao was opposed to Lin Piao and that
Piao was less than enamored with "leftists" in
general as early as 1966. This hardly seems to
conform with the facts.
The 571 Document on Mao's Leadership,16 January 1972
(Mao) is the greatest dictator and tyrant in the history of China.
The days of B-52 (this reference is clearly to Mao) are numbered. B-52 has consistently
adopted the tactics of "divide and rule"; he is very cunning and treacherous and very rarely leaves
his residence.
Nobody has ever been able to work with him from beginning to end. Today you are his guest
of honor, but tomorrow you will be his prisoner.
He is a suspicious and cruel maniac.
His several secretaries and some people who were close to him were either killed or locked up
and struggled against.
The struggle in the party has come to typify his personal likes and grudges.
The leadership of the ruling group has fallen into corrupt, decadent, ignorant, and inefficient
hands.
The troops are under pressure, and dissatisfaction is widespread among cadres of the middle
and upper ranks.
Initially the Red Guards were hoodwinked into serving as cannon fodder, but now they are
being suppressed, criticized, and repudiated. The sending of intellectual youth to the mountains or
the countryside is just another form of labor reform.
Cadres sent to the countryside are just swelling the ranks of the unemployed.
The living standard of workers and peasants is falling; the freezing of the wages of the
workers, particularly young workers, has increased dissatisfaction.
The socialist system in China is now being threatened in a serious manner.
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SECKL I
At the same time, there has been a marked
de-emphasis in Mao's role as the party's theo-
retical guide. Propaganda organs in China are
reverting to more orthodox ways of justifying
policy; namely, invoking the authority of the
"party line" rather than citing passages from
chairman Mao's works. Mao himself has given
personal approval to a general playing down of his
"cult," however, and speculation within-and out-
side-China that Mao is losing his grip and is
about to step down is at best premature.
The Coming Months
At this juncture, these domestic headaches
seem containable. Provincial military leaders are
not being faced, either collectively or individ-
ually, with the massive public attacks and orches-
trated violence that were a leitmotif of the
Cultural Revolution. Premier Chou's concern for
the loyalty of the armed forces to the political
system is surely as great as his concern for the
cohesion of the military establishment. On both
Chairman Mao at the Funeral of the Late Foreign Minister Chen I, 10 January 1972
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scores, he is likely to attempt to limit the damage
rather than place himself at the head of a group
determined to end the pressures against the mili-
tary, especially if such a stance would involve
open defiance of Mao.
Mao's motives in the present situation are
less predictable. He was stung by the army's
equivocal role in the Cultural Revolution, and
vindictiveness on his part could be a major factor
in the current drive to unseat the provincial mili-
tary. Mao presumably is aware of the disruptive
influence of his wife, but he seems unwilling to
put a stop to all her activities. On the other hand,
the chairman's willingness to support relatively
conservative and pragmatic policies at home as
well as abroad seems to indicate that he is not
preparing for another major political offensive at
this time. Mao seems intent on establishing a
better balance between competing leftist and con-
servative forces-and hence enhancing his own
maneuverability-by whittling away at the pre-
dominantly conservative military leaders in the
provinces through a process of linking them, how-
ever tenuously, to Lin Piao.
Mao may not be content for long merely to
whittle away. His seeming lack of activity and the
surface calm in China may again only be the
reassuring backdrop an old magician artfully
develops before he unveils his next startling trick.
A hint as to what it will be may have been
provided in appointments recently made in
Peking. While most of the new appointees are
conservatives who were under attack during the
Cultural Revolution, there are two notable excep-
tions. The elevation of these two leftist veterans
of the Cultural Revolution points to the possi-
bility of yet another leftward swin of
nolit-
ical pendulum.
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