WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009800030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09800030001-2
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
`W Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
22 September 1972
No. 0388/72
Copy N? 48
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he WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued-every Friday morning by
ueetly includes material coordinated with or preparei
developments of the week through noon on Thursday.
ice of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
by;` the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
R,n.warch, and the Directorate of Science and I echnology.
e published separately as Special Repo, is are listed in the
equiring more conipre~rensive treatment and there-
nts.
CONTENTS (22 September 1972)
i Vietnam: The Cease-Fire Option
4 Israel: More of the Same
6 Indochina
8 China: Another Quiet Anniversary
WARNING
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information
affecting the national security of the United States, within
the meaning of Title 18, sections 193 and 194, of the US
1 as amended. Its transrnis,.,ion or revelation of its con-
25X1 tents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
Money Talks
France: More Scandal
Yugoslavia vs. the Emigres
Bulgaria's Balkan Relations
Norway May Reject EC Entry
14 Uganda: Amin Rampant
Lb Arab States: Togetherness
16 Bangladesh: Signs of Discord
1.7 Moscow Woos the Arabs
WESTERN
IIEMISPHERL
1 3 Mexico: Security and Students
18 Bahamas: On to Independence
19 Uruguay: Who's in Charge Here?
70 Chile: Back to Politics
SPECIAL
REPORT (Published separately)
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TAW 'ROW
South Vietnamese Marines cheer recapture of citadel at Quang Tri..
MORE FIGHTING seems to be to enhance their position on the
ground for the contingency of either a cease-fire
The Communists stepped up the fighting in or of further prolonged fighting.
(Communist ambitions obviously have been
dealt a blow by the loss of the Quang Tri Citadel.
Even so, the Communists as yet show no signs of
giving up the fight for the rest of Quang Tri
Province or elsewhere in the north. There are
indications that they may be preparing counter-
strikes along Route 1 and nearer to Hue. And/
and October. The Communists clearly are not
capable of, and are not talking of, pulling off
something to rival their three-pronged offensive
last spring. Much as they might hope for some
dramatic new successes, their current purpose
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%while government reserves are still tied down in
the Quang Tri - Hue area, the Communists appear
determined to make inroads into the populated
coastal areas of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and
Quang Ngai.)i
''.Following up attacks they launched last
month against the Que Son Valley of Quang Nam
and Tien Phuoc District of Quang Tin, the Com-
munists struck hard this week in Quang Ngai,
overrunning a district capital and threatening sev-
eral more with the division that recently moved
to the province from the central highlands. The
situation is considered critical by South Viet-
nam's regional commander, General Truong, par-
ticularly since he may have to take forces from
the Quang Tri - Hue area to strengthen the de-
fenses to the south :'-

i The Communists also appear to be planning
for greater offensive activity in the delta, where
they have increased their forces. They are moving
in supplies and equipment, including heavier artil-
lery. They have about five regiments around Base
Area 470 in the. northern delta and the equivalent
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of at least two divisions in the western and south-
ern delta. Last week, there was a sharp increase in
shellings and attacks against government outposts
in provinces around these enemy concentrations,
notably Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa in the upper
delta and Chuong Thien and Kien Giang to the
west.)
j .(The Communists could try to use these
forces to attack major towns, although the delta
terrain makes them especially vulnerable to air
action. In any event, the presence of the enemy
units and the destruction of government outposts
have been sufficient to cause some pullback of
government administrators and troops toward the
towns, enabling the Communists to circulate
more freely in unprotected hamlets, where they
can recruit and forage for supplies. Should the
larger enemy units be withdrawn or forced out,
such setbacks to pacification might be fairly
rapidly reversed; if not, the deterioration could be
more lasting. )
I
I 'From Hanoi's point of view, the advantages
of a formal cease-fire during the period of the
actual formation of a coalition might well seem
more attractive than fighting along present lines
until the new government was established. In a
cease-fire environment, the Communists would
doubtless anticipate considerable disorganization
on the government side which they could exploit
with their own tight political and military organi-
zation. Moreover, Communist cadre during a
cease-fire presumably could more easily move
into territory, especially urban areas, now denied
them.
1 At the same time, a Communist willingness
to accept, prior to cease-fire, only the promise of
a coalition and to engage in a struggle later to see
it develop in their favor, would represent
something of a gamble. The Communists cannot
be certain that they would come out on top. Such
uncertainty, in fact, may lie behind the passage in
the Viet Cong statement that the Communists are
willing to agree with the US that a coalition
would not be dominated either by the Com-
munists or by the Saigon government but that
both sides would form a coalition "on the basis of
mutual non-elimination," a term implying no
reprisals by either side. If they saw developments
after a cease-fire going against them, they would
be certain to invoke this understanding in an
effort to protect themselves against gains by the
government side.
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enemy planning is o a con-
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`Tel Aviv intends to press on with its "war"
against the Arab fedayeen in the wake of Munich.
The Israelis followed up their 8 September air
strikes into Syria and Lebanon with a 36-hour
ground-air operation into southern Lebanon on
16-17 September. Damascus clearly sees itself as
the target for the next Israeli attack, and there are
indications that the Israelis are preparing for just
such an action. ~

/Some 200 Lebanese houses were blown up
in the operation, a minimum of 60 fedayeen were
killed, and two bridges over the Litani were de-
stroyed. Elazar indicated that the army would
have killed hundreds of fedayeen if they had not
fled. Lebanese Army units were involved and lost
17 killed as well as some 44 wounded or missing.
Figures on Lebanese civilian casualties are
incomplete, but apparently were high., The Israelis
lost three killed and had six wounded.
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munique issued on 19 September promised Soviet
help in strengthening Iraqi defense capability.).
r?,2_ ,'This sort of display suits the current inter-
ests of both countries, but neither side has any
illusion about the realities of the relationship. The
w Iraqis recently told the Turkish foreign minister,
- for example, that they are on guard against a
too-assertive Soviet influence. For its part, Mos-
cow does not want to be heavily committed in a
country that often changes governments, nor does
it want to be caught in the middle between Iran
and Iraq. '-)
The Soviets
may have floated the idea of a standard friendship
treaty and of port visits by Soviet ships in the
hope that the current threat from Israel might
make Lebanon more amenable than it has been to
such proposals in the past. Even if Lebanon re-
fuses, as seems likely, the Soviets gained some
mileage out of Lebanese press coverage that por-
trayed the Azimov-Franjiyah meeting as another
example of Soviet support for the Arab world.,
ZThe six-day visit of Iraqi President al-Bakr
also helped Moscow dramatize the rewards of
close relations with the Soviet Union. Warm com-
pliments were exchanged at state functions, eco-
nomic protocols were signed, and the com-
t,/1 ?Relations with Cairo are stalemated. The
Egyptian ambassador, who left Moscow shortly
after the expulsion of Soviet advisers, has not yet
returned. Egyptian diplomats in Moscow recently
told US Embassy officials that the Soviets are still
stalling on Sadat's call for a summit. In light of
this, the appointment of a new Egyptian charge
has raised speculation that Cairo intends to keep
relations at that level until they receive a satis-
factory response to Sadat's proposal.?
LSoviet pique over the expulsion from Egypt
was expressed by a public lecturer in Leningrad
who called Sadat a "reactionary" and a "religious
fanatic." Although these lecturers are not gener-25X1
ally official spokesmen, in this instance the com-
mentary probably was an accurate reflection of
Moscow's frustration with Egypt.
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MEXICO: SECURITY AND STUDENTS
The Echeverria government, which seems
satisfied with its progress in solving many of
Mexico's social and economic woes, is still search-
ing for an antidote to nagging security and stu-
dent problems'
When President Echeverria entered office
two years ago, his administration set about simul-
taneously attacking corruption, poverty, malad
ministration, inequitable distribution of income,
and concentration of political and economic
power. The administration feels it has made head-
way, pointing to such initiatives as "dialogues"
with dissenting elements, to increased spending
on social welfare projects, to decisions on univer-
sity policy favorable to students, and to expanded
credit for rural development.'
rVBut all is not running smoothly, as was dra-
matically illustrated by the bombings on 14-15
September of government buildings and American
companies, and by the two ambushes this summer
of army troops by guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas.
Government officials say they do not consider the
situation serious, maintaining that these activities
reflect nothing more than simple lawlessness.
While there is probably some truth to this claim,
there is evidence that some of the violence has a
political coloration. No particular group has
claimed responsibility for the recent bombings,
but explosions earlier in the month have been
attributed to a peasant-labor guerrilla organiza-
tion known to have an extreme leftist political
orientation.
Early in the year, after security forces com-
piled a string of successes against guerrillas and
criminals, officials claimed they had "broken the
backbone" of the terrorist movement. Yet, the
politically motivated Cabanas and his band
continue to roam the rugged mountains of
Guerrero State, and radicals are able to embarrass
the government with bombings. Officials, despite
their outward calm, are no doubt concerned that
the security problem will get worse.
Student agitation, although overshadowed in
recent days by the guerrilla violence, is another
irritant. Student unrest seems to be centered in
provincial universities, especially those in Puebla,
Nuevo Leon, and Sinaloa. While there have been
clashes between students and the authorities, vio-
lence involving rival student groups representing
ideological extremes has been on the rise lately,
with rightist groups, supported by conservatives
in the Mexican establishment, fighting leftists.
_'Echeverria is making a concerted effort to win
over student critics, yet has not moved against the
rightist gangs whose involvement in last year's
bloody student clash has never been adequately
explained. Echeverria apparently is hoping that
his social and economic reforms will, in time, rob
student militants of their causes. In the mean-
time, he will deal with student unrest firmly,
knowing that serious trouble, always a very real
possibility, could damage his progressive
image.
BAHAMAS: ON TO INDEPENDENCE
';? Prime Minister Pindling's landslide victory in
the election on 19 September promises important
shifts in Bahamian relations with the US.
j /Pindling's Progressive Liberal Party won a
strong mandate for its pledge to seek full inde-
pendence from Britain by next July, and London
has made it clear that the "will of the people"
will be granted. Formal Bahamian-UK talks on
independence will probably begin in London this
Decem ber./>
+ ;The party won 29 of the 38 contested House
of Assembly seats while the opposition Free Na-
tional Movement won only eight. A tie vote for
the remaining seat will be settled later by a run-
off election. Although independence was an
underlying but little publicized issue in the
campaign, the importance of race--the govern-
ment party campaigned as the champion of the
black population-and the Prime Minister's own
popularity were clearly demonstrated. The
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islands' downward-spiraling economic situation, aqd military support for a showdown. Several com-
problem that the opposition sought unsuccess- manders recently expressed dissatisfaction with
~F-
fully to blame on the Pindling government, does,., their political leaders and would be reluctant to
not appear to have had much weight with the become involved in the suppression of the mass
electorate.> cj ( labor movement.
LPindling made it clear during the election
campaign that, following independence, his gov-
ernment expects to set a high price for continued
US operation of the four defense-related installa-
tions in the Bahamas. These installations include
the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center
at Andros, the US Air Force Eastern Missile Test
Range facilities at Grand Bahama, the naval facili-
ties at Eleuthera, and the US Coast Guard
LORAN station at San Salvador. These installa-
tions are currently operated under agreements
with the UK that give the US full freedom in its
use of these facilities. It is anticipated that the
Pindling administration will press for renegotia-
tion of the base agreements immediately fol-
lowing independence. Pindling is clearly counting
on revenue from base rentals to help bolster the
deteriorating economy and offset the anticipated
loss of British support after independence.
URUGUAY: WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE?
Pressure from Communist labor unions has
y.. forced President Bordaberry to grant a general
wage increase that threatens current efforts to
reduce inflation, now running at about 60 per-
cent, and virtually rules out any possibility of
Uruguay's fulfilling its commitments to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund for this year.>
0 ~ Although Bordaberry publicly denounced
the unions' pressure tactics and stated that he
would not give in, he capitulated following a
24-hour transportation strike that began on 15
September. He reportedly wanted to take a
harder line with the strikers, but failed to receive
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,1 /The wage increase becomes effective on 1
October, but the amount, which will be geared to
increases in the cost of living, has not been an-
nounced. Transport workers said they would
strike again if they considered the increase insuffi-
cient.>
7