WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009800010001-5
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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''` Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
8 September 1972
No. 0386/72
State Dept. review completed
Copy N! 47
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
he:_- ffice of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant developments of tt-e week through noon on Thursday.
It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office cif Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring snore comprehensive treatment and there-
fore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents.
The WEEKLY-- SUMMARY contains classified information
affecting the national security of the United States, within
the meaning of `title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
Code- -as am--eended. Its transmission or revelation of its con-
tents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by
law.
CONTENTS (8 September 1972)
1 Pham Van Dong Speaks
2 Israelis Likely To Hit Back
3 Brazil: The Succession Issue
4 The Soviets Re-invest: Somalia; Syria
6 Indochina
9 Japan: Defense Plan in Limbo
10 Philippines: Court Decision
10 Singapore: One-Party State
11 Iceland: Fish 'n' Ships
12 The EC Prepares a Summit
13 Norway-EC: The Nays May Have It
13 More German Treaty Talks
14 Finland: Another Government
14 East Europe: Crop Prospects Mixed
15 Poland: More Western Equipment
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
16 Canada: Elections
17 Uruguay: Tupes on the Ropes
17 Central America: And Then There Were
Three
19 Bolivia: Post Season Trades
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
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As he has in past years at the National Day
celebrations, North Vietnamese Premier Pham
Van Dong on 2 September once again delivered a
kind of "state of the country" address that set
forth the main lines of Hanoi's policy on the war
and other issues of import to the North Viet-
namese leadership. Such speeches can be taken to
represent the collective view of the politburo; in
this case, North Vietnamese media went to some
lengths to underscore the solidarity of the top
leadership with the premier. There were numer-
ous references to Le Duan and Truong Chinh in
their roles as official co-hosts at the festivities.
Dong devoted the first part of his speech to
a relatively routine, yet very defiant, repetition of
Hanoi's position on the present balance of mili-
tary power in the war, predictably claiming that
the Communist offensive had scored great vic-
tories and opened the way for the defeat of
Vietnamization. He added that, despite the US
military counter-effort against the North, Hanoi
and its southern allies remain capable of con-
tinuing and increasing their military operations.
The message is that the Vietnamese Communists
hope to press ahead on the battlefield with much
the same mix of tactics and effort that they have
mustered over the past year unless and until a
satisfactory settlement can be negotiated.
In dealing with the subject of negotiations,
Dong set forth one of the most comprehensive
statements of the North Vietnamese position
broached by any Hanoi leader since the Paris talks
resumed. Although his remarks do not indicate
any change in the core position of the North
Vietnamese concerning their basic demand for
total US military withdrawal and simultaneous
political agreement prior to a cease-fire, some of
his nuances may point to possible areas of flexi-
bity.
As Dong sets it up, there are two funda-
mental elements of the seven points that must
form the basis of any agreement. One is complete
US withdrawal, the other is termination of sup-
port for the present Saigon government. Dong
spells out the details of the North Vietnamese
demand on US military withdrawal rather
precisely, calling for a cessation of US "air, naval,
and other military activities" in both North and
South Vietnam and for the withdrawal of allied
ground forces and military personnel. His formu-
lation is suggestive of a current desire by the
Communists to keep the issues of Vietnam and
the rest of Indochina carefully separated in a
peace settlement-a position on which they have
not been wholly consistent.
On the issue of US material support for the
Saigon regime, Dong is very specific. He limits the
North Vietnamese position to a demand for the
ending of all US "military commitments" to
Saigon; he says nothing about economic or polit-
ical aid. There have been a number of fairly firm
indications in the past that it is essentially US
military aid to Saigon that Hanoi feels must be
ended or at least restrained before a settlement
can be reached.
In discussing self-determination, Dong did
not explicitly repeat the long-standing Com-
munist demand for President Thieu's resignation,
and he did not refer directly to the elections the
Communists have often described as the last stage
in the formation of a permanent government to
follow an initial government of "national con-
cord." He did repeat the Communist call for a
coalition government. This lack of specificity on
the formation and balance of a coalition is doubt-
less deliberate and intended to suggest flexibility
on the exact arrangements once agreement has
been reached on the basic outlines. This has been
more or less the direction of Hanoi's emphasis for
most of the last 12 months, especially since the
resumption of the Paris talks.
The North Vietnamese appear to believe that
US agreement in principle to a change of govern-
ment which brings the Communists into the
central power structure in South Vietnam will be
sufficient, along with US military withdrawal, to
assure that the changes Hanoi desires will take
place. The North Vietnamese, by their handling
of specific political demands, have long hinted
that there are a variety of ways the details could
be ironed out once the principles are accepted.
Dong's treatment of the North Vietnamese nego-
tiating stand adds confirmation to this specula-
tion.
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ShC RET
ISRAELIS LIKELY TO HIT BACK
- /The fedayeen attack on the Israeli Olympic
team in Munich on 5 September, which ended in
the death of 11 Israelis, will remind Tel Aviv that
its problems with the Arabs are far from solved
and that such favorable factors as the departure
of the Russians from Egypt and the relative quiet
on the frontiers and in the occupied territories
can quickly be overshadowed by the desperate
actions of a few Palestinians. The Munich drama
followed a three-month lull in such fedayeen
activity; in early May, the same "Black Septem-
ber" organization responsible for the Munich
action attempted unsuccessfully to hijack a
Sabena jet liner. Black September is the terrorist
front of Fatah.'
The Israeli Government and public are par-
ticularly bitter over the latest outrage and will
seek to avenge the death of the Israeli athletes.
West Germany has already been the target of
Israeli press criticism, and bitterness could well he
voiced against the Meir government itself for not
having taken sufficient security precautions. The
semi-offif ial newspaper, Davar, has called ft.
"war to the end against these murderous organi
zations. their members, and dispatchers, whereve
they may be.' Davar warned the Arab govern
ments giving sanctuary to the fedayeen to "elir
inate the terrorist bases within their borders, o?
Israel will undertake the task: "The government
,/--itself expressed almost the exact sentiments in
communique issued after a cabinet meeting.
/Israel i' almost certain to strike again(;:
fedayeen- installations and concentrations in
southern Lebanon and in Syria. Fedayeen in Syria
may indeed get extra "attention" from the Is
raelis sine e they have been harassing Israeli posi
tions in the Golan Heights for several weeks and
since the Syrians have termed the Munich feda-
yeen "martyrs." Although Tel Aviv may under-
take some quick, dramatic retaliatory strikes in
the near future, the Israelis may prefer a more
carefully planned military operation in order to
deal the fedayeen a very heavy blow. Terrorist
reprisals by the radical Jewish Defense League
may also be carried out against Arab officials in
Europe and the US.
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BRAZIL: THE SUCCESSION ISSUE
'1 mnher,
however, following air strikes on suspected n rr?
positions.
d South of the Plaine, the Communist-. have
forced the irregulars operating near Khang Kho to
abandon some of their positions. North Vit tnarn-
ese Units also struck the task force near Th,t Jam
Bleung, southwest of the Plaine. That task force
managed to hold its ground and sustained only
light casualties.
A General Vanq Pao's current i ear .;~i lra
enters its fourth week, his chances for matchrng
the gains he made on the Plaine last year seem
slim. One irregular task force is completely out of
action, and the other four are largely im+?tobi-
lized Many of the irregulars are suffering lroon:
poor morale and need medical treatment. 'WWith
better weather and increased air support, mvj-
ever, the irreni tars might still he able t-
some cif their momentum'
Progress in the South
%ilihtary activity picked up this week it the
Pakse area as several government battalions b qar
to move east along Route 23. The irregular' sari
into strong North Vietnamese resistance- on the
ground and were shelled on 3 September With
the help of air strikes, they managed to react, the
junction of Routes 23 and 231, where on 5 ?;ep..
tembel they linked up with another governs ent
force gloving south.-
Little action was reported in the vicinit,/ c)f
Khonq Sedone. The present lull has permitted thw 25X1
return of civil administration to Khong Sods ;
arid commercial and agricultural activities sr ,w
signs of returning to normal
jjr,a Dons
Government-held location
9 Communist-held location
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JAPAN: DEFENSE PLAN IN LIMBO
The Japanese National Defense Council, a
civilian panel of top ministry officials chaired by
Prime Minister Tanaka, is deferring final consid-
eration of the nation's fourth five-year defense
buildup plan until after Tanaka's Peking trip. The
council probably will not return to the plan for
several months; it will then have to be approved
by the full cabinet and the Diet.)
1.
,The new plan should have been put into
effect by April 1972 when the previous plan
expired, but a number of economic and political
factors prevented the National Defense Council
from considering a draft before the deadline. The
Diet has, nevertheless, approved appropriations
for the first year of the new plan after the govern-
ment agreed to withhold spending on the new
weapons systems in the plan. The freeze on the
new weapons systems will be lifted only after the
Diet passes the entire plan..)
New Japanese medium tank developed by Mitsubishi.
;?Under the draft plan, the authorized
strength of the ground forces is to increase only
slightly above the current 180,000 men. The pres-
,- dent force structure of five armies with 13 divi-
~'~sions would be maintained, but an additional
ZThe goals of the present draft are modest
and should escape drastic cuts. The plan calls for
expenditures of some $16 billion, excluding pay-
roll costs, over the next five years compared with
a budget of some $7.5 billion for the previous five
F i n urchases will climb to over $1
ore
infantry brigade will be raised for use on Oki-
nawa. The firepower and mobility of the ground
forces will be increased by providing Japanese-
made tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heli-
copters to replace obsolescent US weapons)
g p
years.
billion, over 70 percent of which will come from -( /f he draft projects new naval construction on
the US. Yearly military expenditures have been approximately the same scale as the third plan.
averaging less than one percent of Japan's gross j About 15 destroyers and destroyer escorts, along
national product and about seven percent of the with five submarines and various smaller com-
annual budget. Spending under the new defense batants, will be built. The emphasis will be on
draft is expected to average about the same per- S'improved antisubmarine and mine-sweeping capa-
centage of the country's rapidly growing GNP and bilities; procurement of antisubmarine and other
national budget. ; aircraft would be continued. The Japanese Navy
f batants 13
m
Japanese Destroyer
of F-4E Phantoms and Japanese designed FS-T2
jet fighters. These aircraft would supplement
F-104s now in the inventory and allow the
phasing out of aging F-86s. Japanese trainer and
transport aircraft also would be purchased to
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now has some 40 mayor sur ace co
submarines, and more than 200 aircraft, in addi-
tion to numerous smaller units
tt dhe plan calls for strengthening air-defense
3 and ground-attack capabilities by the acquisition
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replace obsolescent US aircraft. Air defenses
would be further strengthened by raising the
number of Hawk SAM battalions from five to
eight and the number of Nike battalions from
four to six.\
-The Japanese Defense Agency hopes to
restore some of the reductions in weapons pur-
chases in a future plan. In any event, rising equip-
ment costs, continuing budgetary restrictions, and
other political and economic factors probably will
prevent a significant increase in Japan's self
defense capabilities over the next several
PHILIPPINES: COURT DECISION
The recent Philippine Supreme Court deci-
sion jeopardizing US landholdings has, of course.
become a matter of considerable controversy, but
President Marcos is trying to prevent precipitate
Philippine action against US business. The de-
fendant in the original court case is petitioning
the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision, and
this could cause further delays, perhaps by as
much as several months.
SINGAPORE: ONE-PARTY STATE
To the surprise of no one, Prime Minister
Lee lkuan Yew's People's Action Party swept
the field in the general election on 2 Sep-
tember, winning all 65 seats in parliament-'
Prior to the election, Lee had feigned interest
in having a "constructive opposition" in par-
liament but, as election day neared, he and
other government leaders had second
thoughts, accusing their opponents of acting
as proxies for foreign powers and maligning
,The court ruled that a 1946 constitutional
amendment, which allows US interests to buy and
own land, applied only to public-domain land and
not to private land; since 1946 Americans have
acquired some 37,000 acres, over three fourths; of
which had been in private hands- The court .also,
ruled that the expiration of the amendment on
July 1974 will cancel all corporate and land
ownership rights now held by Americans. To-
gether, the two judgments place a very large cloud
over the future of a major portion of the total US
investment of $1 billion. '
.:Marc-os is urging (-,iii 25X1
lion and moderation by government and arty
leaders. Stressing the need to maintain a favorable
investment climate, he is attempting to ease the
concern o3 US business without exposing himself
to nationalist critics3FUntil the full ramifications
of the court decision are known, Marcos does not
want the legislature to pass implementing legis-
lation that might restrict his own freedom to
strike a favorable deal with the US. In particular,
Marcos wants to negotiate a new bilateral trade
relationship with the US to replace the Laurel-
Langley agreement, which expires in 1974. Fie
would doubtless like to use the court decisions as
a lever to win US concessions. 25X1
them personally;,This vitriol notwithstanding,
the four opposition parties won some 30
percent of the popular vote, indicating that
not everyone in Singapore is content under
Lee's paternalistic rule, particularly those in
the lower socio-economic strata'.While the
once-effective Barisan Sosialis was weak at the
polls, the recently reactivated Worker's Party
made a relatively strong showing.
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warned that a lengthy delay would only increase
the difficulty of reaching an agreement. The
Soviet Union, incidently, has deplored Iceland's
action. ?
hile the governments involved move
to restart negotiations over the 50-mile
fishing limit instituted on 1 September,
Icelandic Coast Guard vessels and British
J trawlers confront each other daily in the
North Atlantic. The first incident came on 5
September when an Icelandic vessel cut
across the stern of a trawler, severing the
lines to its net. r
/Iceland activated its entire coast
guard-six small ships and several aircraft-
on 31 August. Despite indications by Prime
Minister Johannesson that the Coast Guard
will not attempt to arrest violators but
merely catalog violations, more incidents
are likely to occur. A British frigate, dis-
patched by London after the first incident,
is expected to arrive on station, just outside 3
the 50-mile limit, on 8 September. ) W
0
he British and West Germans, who
have identical fishing treaties with Iceland, are
trying to arrive at a common negotiating position,
but one Foreign Office official in London
thought it might take another week. He thought
that talks between the UK, West Germany, and
Iceland could not begin before the end of the
month. He said his government was interested in
getting some sort of interim arrangements with
Reykjavik; he indicated that the UK might settle
for slightly less than the catch limit awarded by
the International Court of Justice last month.)
`~ Z I n Reykjavik, Fisheries Minister Ludvik
Josefsson, a Communist, predicted that the dif-
ficulties for the foreign fishermen will become
insurmountable as winter approaches. They will
either give up and go home or seek shelter in
Icelandic ports, where their ships will be subject
to impoundment. Josefsson did not comment on
the chances for resumption of negotiations, but
r I /When asked about the base issue, Josefsson
asserted that the Keflavik air station was not
essential to Iceland's economy and that jobs
could be found elsewhere for Icelanders working
there. He was less assured when asked if he
thought the US would retaliate by stopping
purchases of Icelandic fish if the base were closed.
He said he doubted that Washington would react
in such a manner. Unless a solution can be found
oon, tholfishing dispute will have an adverse
effect on subsequent base negotiations. If forced
to compromise on fishing, the government is apt
to be much tougher over the base issue to save
face-and possibly their jobs.
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'Summitry as a tool for promoting European
integration will be tested when the EC foreign
and finance ministers meet in Rome next week to
finish preparations for the scheduled October
session..
The French want the meetings to show
promise of "solid achievements" at the summit,
and they underline this desire by threatening to
withdraw-at least temporarily-Pompidou's
invitation to hold the summit in Paris. France's
partners seem determined to reveal no public con-
cern that the summit might be postponed and
seem content to let Paris bear the onus for calling
it off. ?
The Hague summit in 1969, which set the
stage for the enlargement negotiations and the
ambitious scheme for EC economic and monetary
union, was notable for generating a new solidarity
in the community.Ithe prospects for the October
summit are not so bright. The preliminaries have
revealed confusion about how far it is possible to
advance now and new suspicions about French
intentions,;[he European press has not been shy
of bitterly riticizing Paris' "bilateral diplomacy"
or of recommending alliances against France to
preserve community institutions.,
'The French sought to "clarify" their expec-
tations in a series of meetings with the Italians,
Germans, and British in July and August.tThese
encounters were not entirely successful; there is
virtually no acceptance of the French desire to
raise the price of gold in intra-EC bank settle-
ments, and there is resistance to locating a polit-
ical secretariat in Paris. Bonn was nevertheless
worried about Italian receptivity to French
inducements-most of which directly or indirectly
involved the Germans' paying for French prom-
ises)