WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 28, 1972
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
28 July 1972
No. 0380/72
State Dept. review completed COPY N2 51
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
25X1
cc of Current Intel] ence, reports.
and analyzes significant developments of. the'.weel
through noon ,'011 Thursday, lt. frequently includes
nateria.l cuordintted with or prepared by the Office
of Economic I es arch, the Office of Strategic Re-
arcl , and the ectat c f . ci nce and Vic,. liffl,
;y. Topics requiring .-rr re co ehensive treatment
nd therefore' published vpat tclyas Special Reports
listed in the contents
The WEEKLY S i"pi'4 ARY cozi ar classified mr,Eer-
rr~atior affecting the rxatir tr~a s cixraty ` of the U-it rl
Mates., s~rithin th , . r~eani = of kti 18, sections 793
and 194, of the US Cody, e o f trde : Its .transmis-
sion or revelation of its 'content to or r~ c+ tpt by..a
unauthorized person it prohibited , by yaw,
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
5 Indochina
10 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meet
11 Thailand: Still Thanom
17 Italy: Summer Lull
1.8 Poland: Spreading Out
19 Ceausescu Calls the Shots
20 Finland and the Germanies
25X6
25X1
21 The Red Sea: New Contention
22 Saudi Arabia - Egypt: Good Feeling
23 Kenya: Tribal Unrest in Army
23 Ghana: Debt Renegotiation
24 Pakistan: A No-Confidence Vote
25 Bhutan: New Monarch
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
26 Chile: First the Bad News
27 Uruguay: Army Flexes Its Muscle
28 Venezuela: A Giant Retires
28 Guyana: Non-aligned Exercise
29 Castro Speaks
EEK . Y SU AMA =t Y, issued every Fs
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
CONTENTS (28 July 1972)
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
SECRET
EGYPT-USSR: WITHDRAWAL SYMPTONS
1 On 24 July, President Sadat made clear that
his call for the withdrawal of Soviet forces
marked the end of a phase of expanding Soviet
military involvement in Egypt and the beginning
of an uncertain new era in relations with Moscow.
(,2 IiThe USSR, anxious to limit the damage to
its prestige and to discourage potential emulators
of Sadat's action, is portraying the withdrawal as
a joint decision taken after thorough consulta-
tion_sdTLoe Israelis see Sadat's move as a diver-
sionary tactic to damp down domestic frustra-
tions by demonstrating _Egypt's inde
' from its superpower ally.
Sadat's Explanation
J~ esident Sadat this week gave a further ver-
sion of events leading to the scaling down of the
Soviet presence in Egypt. In a lengthy foreign
policy statement to the Arab Socialist Union na-
tional congress on Monday, Sadat laid the blame
for the current state of Egyptian-Soviet relations
on Moscow's failure to honor commitments to
Egypt. He tried to soothe Soviet feelings, how-
ever, by saddling the US with the responsibility
for the Middle East impasse
Wadat said differences of view became ap-
parent during his Moscow talks in March 1971,
but he thought these were disagreements that
could be resolved between friends. According to
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
SECRET A
Sadat, the Soviets, during President Podgorny's
trip to Cairo in May 1971 to sign the treaty of
friendship, promised to bridge the differences
within a week. The Egyptian President com-
plained, however, that a year passed-his self-
proclaimed "year of decision"-and the disagree-
ments continued feeding his frustrations, culmi-
nating in his move against the Soviets.
President Sadat did not specify the exact
nature of the differences; to do so, he said, would
play into the hands of enemies. But they clearly
had to do with the provision of Soviet military
equipment and its use. The speech was replete
with references to pledges of US military, politi-
cal, and economic aid to Israel., which he said
have been implemented "automatically, enthusi-
astically, and violently," in obvious contrast to
Soviet aid to Cairo.f
U(nce Sadat asked for the Soviet withdrawal,
Soviet propaganda quickly sought to put the best
possible face on a humiliating situation. Though
probably taken a bit by surprise and obviously
miffed, the Soviets have adopted a generally con-
ciliatory tone in an effort to minimize the damage
to their prestige and to salvage what they can.
Still, there have been barbed references to "re-
actionary forces" in Egypt seeking to disrupt
Soviet-Egyptian friendship.
Page 2
Moscow has been anxious to limit the
impact of Sadat's dramatic decision in other Arab
countries. Although the Soviets probably have
been alarmed by rumors that Damascus and Bagh-
dad would expel their Russian advisers, so far
neither has moved to follow Egypt's example.
Indeed, Iraqi Foreign Minister Al-Baqi arrived in
Moscow the day after Sadat's speech for the ex-
change of documents bringing the Soviet-Iraqi
Friendship Treaty into effect. The Soviet Union
cannot, of course, be confident that its woes in
the Arab world have peaked, and attempts to
shore up the Soviet position with other Arab
governments will be forthcoming
Tel Aviv's View
1, 2_ Prime Minister Golda Meir, speaking to the
Knesset on 26 July, reiterated Israeli willingness
to negotiate on the cease-fire lines. She made it
clear, however, that a complete Israeli withdrawal
from the occupied territories, demanded by the
Egyptians, remains out of the question. The
prime minister indicated she would welcome
interim moves, such as the Egyptian proposal of
February 1971 for the reopening of the Suez
Canal, but that Israel would regard such a settle-
ment as temporary-a step toward peace. In her
speech, Mrs. Meir called for direct negotiations,
which .he Egyptians have consistently rejected.
Israel will probably attempt to minimize the im-
portance of the changes occurring in Egypt in an
5 'effort to sustain domestic viuil d foreign
support: 25X1
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jul 72
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
SECRET
JAPAN: THE ROAD TO PEKING
/1 Tokyo is moving to regularize its official
contacts with Peking. Foreign Minister Ohira on
22 July met with two Chinese officials in the
most significant Sino-Japanese move toward
Peking to date. Ohira announced no specific plans
to meet again with the head of the Chinese Trade
Office in Tokyo or the official accompanying a
visiting Shanghai ballet troupe, but he did say
that Foreign Ministry representatives might have
further direct contacts with the trade mission.
This sets the stage for preliminary discussions
which could lead to official negotiations and re-
place the current pattern of communication via
private visitors. d
LOhira's discussions were followed by the
formal inauguration on 24 July of a ruling Liberal
Democratic Party council to foster a party con-
sensus on normalization. Prime Minister Tanaka
presented to the council a ten-point statement of
principles for relations with Peking, including
Japan's recognition of China's "five principles of
peace" and "full understanding" of Peking's
principles for normalization. Tokyo's interest in
expediting improved relations with the mainland
Page 4
was underscored last week by an offer to have
Lanese commercial air carriers return the dance
company directly to Shanghai. If the offer is
accepted by Peking, it could be a step toward
regularized commercial flights and additional ex-
changes of personnel between the two countries.
'ffxchange between the two countries have
been increasingly warm since Tanaka assumed of-
fice on 6 July. The new government has conveyed
its determination to improve relations rapidly,
and Peking's response has been prompt and posi-
tive. Chou En-lai has welcomed the Tanaka cab-
inet, and both privately and publicly has ex-
tended an invitation for Tanaka to visit the main-
land. No date has been set for such a summit
meeting, but Tanaka would undoubtedly like to
show some specific progress toward normalization
before he calls general elections in late 1972 or
early 1973. The prime minister's meeting with
President Nixon in August and the ruling party's
desire to reach a consensus on normalization by
10 September could pave the way to
China early this fall. 25X1
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
SEUKL I
munists is not yet complete. The Communists,
with well-entrenched soldiers and heavy weapons,
13, Heavy fighting took place in and around are making the government advance difficult.
Quang Tri City during the week. The South Viet- Some enemy units have been ordered to remain
namese effort to wrest the citadel-the key to it-close to the South Vietnamese battle lines-a
control of the provincial capital-from the Com- tactic to reduce the effectiveness of allied air and
e a
C
ity wou
artillery. The loss of Quang Tri
major psychological setback to the Communist
and a major tactical victory for the government.
i1 ,.. e u.1ng
Hue Defense and Binh Dinh Offense
3 Action elsewhere in the northern provinces
remains fairly lively. Communist gunners fired
nearly 10,000 artillery and mortar rounds at
South Vietnamese positions south and west of
Hue during the week and shelled the Hue citadel
on several occasions. Some sharp ground battles
took place as Communist forces continued to
probe the string of strongpoints manned by the
South Vietnamese 1st Division along the western
approaches to the ancient imperial capital.
Government forces on 27 July pulled back from
one of these strongpoints, Fire Support Base
Bastogj
n the government counter-offensive in
coastal Binh Dinh Province, elements of the
South Vietnamese 22nd Division, supported by
rangers and territorial forces, have recaptured two
of the three enemy-held district towns in the
northern sector, and have also retaken the former
military base known as Landing Zone English. In
addition, at least company-sized units have been
in all three of the Communist-held districts. Thus
far, the Communists have offered only moderate
resistance as most enemy forces appear to have
pulled back from the coastal areas into the
mountains.
SECRET
Page 5
WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jul 72
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
~ir,VKL'l
Communist Near-Term Tactics
Reports of renewed large-scale enemy at-
tacks in the coming months are cropping up with
increasing frequency. The Communists may
actually be planning a number of smaller prepara-
tory actions prior to attempting any major new
offensive. They may, for instance, take action
soon against some of the extended lines of com-
munication linking advancing South Vietnamese
forces with their rear areas, or against areas that
Page
The Fight for Quang Tri
nave been left less protected by the use of govern-
ment forces in these operations.
Thus, the Communists may try to bring pres-
sure along Route 1 south of Quang Tri City in
order to hamper overland resupply and reinforce-
ment for the government units fighting in and
around the provincial c apital.. The enemy might
make a similar attempt in Binh Dinh Province to
close the road at the Hong Son Pass or at some
other chokepoint.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jul 12
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
i,r 1~1CJ 1
Nearer Saigon, the Communists could renew
ground action around An Loc to take advantage
of the return of some South Vietnamese to the
delta. The Communists might hope, by initiating
such limited attacks in as many areas as possible,
to stretch further the remaining government
reserves and to compound the problem of en-
forcing several fighting fronts simultaneously
/7 North Vietnamese press articles on the econ-
omy are mixing blunt exhortation with high
praise. An article in the 18 July edition of the
army newspaper, for instance, pointed with satis-
faction to the results of the early rice harvest. It
claimed that there has been a slight drop in food
and other prices since April. By contrast, another
commentary, published almost simultaneously,
cautioned production units "not to contribute to
boosting prices on the free market" and warned
transportation workers against overcharging for
their services.
Although the first article explicitly played
down the prospects of inflation, the second left
the impression that some people were profiteering
and forcing up the prices on some goods. The
article, in fact, provides a hint of the scope of
current blackmarket activities, saying that "free
and illegal markets" selling goods normally con-
trolled by the state such as raw materials, tech-
nical equipment, consumer goods, and ration
cards must be elminated entirely along with
speculation and smuggling. It did have a kind
word for government authorities in some areas
who were reportedly exceeding established quotas
in channeling grain into state coffers. It also ap-
plauded the tightening of control over food
markets recently set up to service evacuees to the
countryside from Hanoi.
Both the praise and the warnings are aimed
at bolstering popular morale and ensuring con-
tinued effort. At the same time, however, the
regime clearly is determined to alert the people to
the problems profiteering poses in hopes of
mobilizing popular sentiment against the guilty.
Some of the government's pronouncements
may also be aimed at girding the people for ad-
ditional burdens and economic pressures they
have yet to face. For example, the fifth-month
rice crop-which accounts for only one third of
total annual rice output-was planted some
months in advance of the offensive, and the
marketing and labor procedures needed to service
it were worked out before the current strains
began to be felt. The vital tenth-month rice crop
will thus be the first to be planted, harvested, and
marketed under the full weight of current war-
time conditions.
Although there is no evidence that the coun-
try will be facing a food shortage before then, the
labor force will be encountering additional tasks
and burdens that have not had to be contended
with since the US bombing halt of 1968. There
are few recent precedents to help the regime work
out marketing and managerial procedures under
such circumstances. The new exhortations about
the need for greater effort in the economic sphere
will be pressed with as much vigor as the regime
can muster.
19 The North Vietnamese press has begun to
praise the exploits of the country's secret police
in combatting US "psychological warfare tactics
and espionage activities." A newspaper editorial,
replayed by Radio Hanoi last weekend, acknowl-
edged a recent step-up in such allied operations,
but asserted that the "deceitful nature" of US
tactics has been exposed and that order has been
maintained because of the contributions of the
public security forces. The article applauded the
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
secret police for motivating the people and com-
mended them for alerting local cadres to the need
for "strong political order" and discipline.
Seldom has the regime made the super-secret
security apparatus the focus of so much public
attention. The new openness may simply mean
that the security forces, under the recent strains,
have become so prominent and visible to the
average North Vietnamese that their activities
warrant open coverage. The regime may feel that,
by praising the police and acknowledging their
expanded role, it can induce the people more
readily to accept the exigencies of tighter secu-
rity. While the propaganda references to US
"psychological warfare tactics and espionage
activities" may be, to some extent, simply a way
to justify a tightening of security, they may also
reflect some real concern. It is doubtful that the
regime would risk dignifying such activities with
open comment, for whatever reason, if it were
not convinced the people needed to be made
aware of the danger.1
\Pjeparations for the election of a legislature
on 3 September dominated the Cambodian politi-
cal scene for most of the week. Members of
President Lon Nol's Socio-Republican Party were
busy setting up party offices and organizing sup-
port in the countryside, where the President ran
well in the recent presidential contest. So were
the two leading opposition parties.
Some 800 members of Sirik Matak's Repub-
lican Party met in convention on 23 July and
named him party chief. The same day, the Demo-
crats met to select candidates to run in the 3
September races, quieting for the time rumors
that they would boycott the elections to protest
the government's recently announced assembly
law. This law has continued to attract wide criti-
Page 8
cism for favoring government candidates, but the
promulgation last week of another law to regulate
the elections of 17 September for the senate went
virtually unchallenged by regime opponents. The
upper house will have only 40 members compared
with the assembly's 125, and will be the weaker
of the two chambers. Special representation in
the senate for the bureaucracy and the military
has been provided under a system in which 32
members will be elected by geographic region-24
representing the general public and eight repre-
senting the bureaucracy. The other eight senators
are to be selected by a committee of the armed
forces.
Some Progress in the War
L( .Activity on the battlefield during the week
was dominated by the recapture of Kompong
Trabek, after three months of enemy occupation.
Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops, seeking
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
l7r`Jx11 1 NOOT,
to reopen Route 1 southeast of the Mekong River cabinet in a manner more favorable to their inter-
base at Neak Luong, entered the town on 23 July. ests, specificalty_to divest his cabinet of finance
By noon the following day, the last Communist minister Sisouk.
troops had withdrawn toward the north, where
the Cambodians fear they may join up with other
enemy forces for a counterattack. Friendly 2_( Souvanna insists that his "coalition" govern-
casualties in the three-week-old operation re- men was invested by the 1962 Geneva Accords,
portedly are 37 killed and 344 wounded. The and he is taking a hard line against the challenge
Cambodians estimate that 342 enemy soldiers from the rightists. He has withdrawn an earlier
were killed, but this figure is probably inflated. commitment to reshuffle the cabinet and has
After securing the town, the Cambodians and?2made it clear that under no circumstances will he
jSouth Vietnamese hope to continue south along disrupt the continuity of the government by
the highway toward the encircled provincial resigning. The burden of terminating the govern-
capital of Svay Rien and join up with the govern- ment will thus fall on the assembly, and Souvanna
ment garrison there appears confident that the Sananikones lack the
punch to win there
'/ ThThe struggle between Souvanna and the ? % ) )The new government of Giulio Andreotti,
which squeaked past its parliamentary confirma-
tion earlier this month, now looks likely to last
until fall. The Socialists would like to replace the
right-of-center Liberals in the government, but are
not agreed on how to go about it
tionwide labor contracts have to be renegotiated
this year, and there are fears of a repetition,
,perhaps on a smaller-scale, of the "hot autumn"
of 1969. On 24 July, the major Communist and
non-Communist unions joined formally in a loose
;federation to coordinate policy. Managers of both
government and private industry are concerned
about meeting any new labor demands because
Italy's economic growth rate has been exception-
ally low last year and this. I
Y:1 LTbere is little prospect of a viable alternative
to' the present government until October, after
the Socialist Party holds its congress. Christian
;Democrats have urged the Socialists to move a
little toward the center. The Socialists may be
more willing to abandon the left-leaning emphasis
of their parliamentary election campaign last
0 / spring now that it is clear they have picked up
only minimal support from the far-left Proletarian
JLabor unrest and a slow rate of economic Socialists. The Socialist campaign had been de-
growth pose hazards for the government. Doctors, , signed in part to attract a substantial faction of
e7building workers, journalists, and stone masons,)- that dying party. Instead, when the Proletarian
have already been on strike this summer, and Socialists decided to dissolve this month, only
railroad unions have announced a 24-hour walk- eight percent voted to merge with the Social-
:: ~---out for early August. Italy's key three-year na- ists.
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jul 72
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
vw.e SECRET lm~
.54 'arsaw is trying to stake out a larger role for
itself in European and East-West affairs. The Poles
consider President Nixon's visit to have been a
milestone in this effort3
~, he regime last week published a speech in
which Premier Jaroszewicz summarized Poland's
foreign policy objectives. Jaroszewicz claimed
that the President's talks in Moscow and in War-
saw had confirmed the constructive change in the
"international balance of forces" brought on by
US "recognition of the irreversibility" of Euro-
pean borders, particularly the Oder-Neisse line.
Jaroszewicz said he hoped the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe would fur-
ther confirm the European status quo. He added
that Poland intended to play a role in the con-
ference to attain such an end and that it would
pursue to the fullest extent its own "national"
interestss
7roszewicz went on to say that Poland
should conduct an aggressive foreign trade cam-
paign. While paying due respect to trade with its
Warsaw Pact allies, Jaroszewicz stressed the need
for increased, trade with the capitalist world. He
added that Poland would continue to conclude
bilateral trade pacts with Common Market coun-
Page 18
tries. He expressed satisfaction with the progress
made on US-Polish economic and scientific
cooperation, but added that US restrictions still
hinder trade:'
~? Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski has also
trave ed extensively in both East and West,
expounding Polish views on European detente
and Warsaw's role in it. He has visited Austria,
Norway, Romania, Bulgaria and the USSR, and
this fall plans trips to Bonn, Stockholm, and the
UN General Assembly. In addition, he will ac-
company party chief Gierek to Paris]
5_(. arsaw also received dignitaries from
abroad. President Tito's visit in June was the
high-water mark in Poland's post-war relations
with Yugoslavia. It established Warsaw as a lead-
ing advocate of productive relations between bloc
countries and the one-time socialist outcast. The
visit of UN Secretary General Waldheim in early
July permitted Warsaw to underline its interest in
the UN and other international organizations.
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Trepczynski, for
example, will be the resident of the General
Assembly this yegi addition, the Poles re-
sgrceived President Nixon's scientific adviser, Dr.
Edward E. David, in an effort to -m7aintain the
momentum in US-Polish cooperation?t
,4 Olszowski recently told Ambassador Stoessel
that President Nixon's visit underlined Warsaw's
"independence." The visit, he said, showed that
Poland was the biggest and most important coun-
try in the socialist camp after the USSR. Poland,
he added, has a role "of its own" to play in
Europe. He admitted that some people in Poland
and other socialist countries looked askance at
the Nixon visit because of the Vietnam war and
ideological reasons. While this was important,
Olszowski stated, it was not central to the "na-
tional interest" of Poland.
;~ -)Despite their talk about "independence,"
however, the Poles realize that they must tailor
their initiatives to over-all Soviet interests. They
often reiterate their allegiance to the socialist
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
OL' Ai\L' 1
camp and Soviet leadership of it. Thus, their
diplomatic activities reflect, in addition to a sense
of Poland's growing importance, Gierek's feeling
that Moscow has confidence in his ability to
speak responsibly on issues of concern to both
Poland and the USSRj
c4 )To the surprise of no one, Nicolae Ceausescu
dominated the national conference of the
Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest last
week. Ceausescu's strength was apparent from the
moment he opened the conclave with a six-hour
speech until the final gavel. As the cacaphony of
three day's speeches subsided, the delegates
unanimously adopted the ten basic theses of his
keynote speech, leaving the regime's domestic and
foreign policies essentially unchanged.
On the domestic side, the call for a nine- to
ten-percent annual rate of economic development
and fulfillment of the current economic plan in
"less than five years" put Ceausescu's personal
imprint on the conference more than anything
else. Endorsement of these goals and of his ambi-
tious call for achieving foreign-exchange equilib-
rium by 1974 gave the lie to pre-conference
reports that Ceausescu might have to ask for less.
Ceausescu strengthened his position in the
party central committee by causing it to be
expanded by 40 members. Nineteen of the new
members are women, including Mrs. Ceausescu,
and most of the others are industrial workers. The
conference also called for the "periodic rotation
of activists in various party and state func-
tions"--just what Ceausescu has been doing-and
for the establishment of several new agencies.
Chief among the new organs is the Supreme
Council of Economic and Social Development,
with Ceausescu as chairman. Its functions are
vaguely defined, and the responsibilities of other
new agencies, such as a Finance and Bank Coun-
Ceausescu Addressing National Conference
cil, are even less clear. Plenary sessions of the
party central committee and Council of State can
be expected soon to breathe life into the new
bodies.
Ceausescu tailored his foreign policy remarks
to avoid direct offense to Moscow. He made
some, for him, warm statements about the USSR,
but tended to neutralize their content by calling
for a "new set of norms" to govern relations
among "all socialist countries" and by steadfastly
defending Romanian interests. Moreover, he con-
demned the Vienna "diktat" of 1940, by which
Romania lost Transylvania to Hungary and the
southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. No Romanian
needed to be reminded that the country had also
lost two other territories in 1940-Bessarabia and
northern Bukovina-both of which were annexed
by the USSR.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jul 72
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
'4' FD_ Isinki's pursuit of full diplomatic relations
with both Germanies has picked up momentum.
Although Bonn still seems inclined to wait for an
inter-German treaty, the Finns planned explora-
tory talks with the ever-anxious East Germans
this week or next.
The Finns first proposed recognition of the
two Germanies last September, shortly after the
conclusion of the Four-Power agreement on Ber-
lin, by offering identical treaties to both capitals.
The treaties would have stipulated that the sig-
natories must agree to recognize Finnish neutral-
ity, renounce the use of force, and pay repara-
tions for Nazi war damage to Finland. The Finns
provided Bonn an easy out by further stipulating
that Helsinki would only negotiate with both
German governments simultaneously. The West
Germans scotched things at that time by simply
declining
(3 :Helsinki tried again following West German
ratification of treaties with the USSR and Poland.
On 10 July, the Finns called in the chiefs of the
East and West German trade missions to "explore
the possibilities of diplomatic recognition in the
near future." This time, Helsinki, dropping the
previous stipulations regarding Finnish neutrality,
renunciation of force, and reparations, aimed
solely at diplomatic relations within "a month or
so. '9
4=1, IBonn's attitude toward the new Finnish ini-
tiative was in the beginning only mildly negative.
Indeed, the Finns may even have been encouraged
by Chancellor Brandt's mild reaction when Fin-
nish Foreign Minister Sorsa broached the recog-
nition issue with him at the Socialist International
meeting in Vienna in June. At the North Atlantic
Council meeting on 24 July, however, Bonn
underscored its objections to Helsinki's initiative
and found unexpectedly wide support from other
council members. The West Germans are sched-
ILuled to discuss the recognition issue at a cabinet
meeting on 9 August. Should Bonn reject the
Finnish offer, the carefully nurtured parallelism
Page 20
that seemed basic to Helsinki's neutrality would
suffer if negotiations were already under way
with Pankow`:]
(-(/ )-It does not seem too likely that Finland will
jeopardize its neutrality simply to become the
first West European nation to recognize East
Germany. Nevertheless, the issue could become a
pawn in Finland's carefully balanced "friendly"
relations with the Soviet Union. Helsinki recently
came within an ace of signing a much-needed free
trade agreement with the EC, something Moscow
has been reluctant to approve. The Soviets may
feel that such an arrangement would create an
imbalance in Finnish neutrality. While Finland's
chances for eventually signing the agreement
remain good, they might be greatly improved if
Helsinki recognized Pankow, regardless of Bonn's
respons
c`/ The minority Social Democratic government
resigned on 19 July, ostensibly to avoid signing a
free-trade agreement with the European Com-
munities. The outgoing prime minister, Rafael
Paasio, declared that "only a majority govern-
(-,ment" should take such a controversial action.
The government's decision undoubtedly pleases
the Soviets, who remain bothered about any
Finnish-EC arrangement.
rhe EC question was only one of several
thorny problems facing Finland. Others include
the financing of a large pension bill recently
passed by parliament over government objections,
recognition of the two Germanies, the hosting of
the preparatory talks for a European security
conference, and agricultural unrest. President
Kekkonen may even have prompted Paasio's res-
ignation in order to clear the way for a majority
coalition before he visits the Soviet Union on 12
August or before parliament reconvenes. Coali-
L tion talks began on 24 July, but experience in-
dicates that it could be some time before a ree-
ment can be reached.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
SECRET
1 when fresh charges were levied that Israel had
occupied islands at the waterway's southern end.
The charges appeared a few days after Yemen
(Sana) announced the capture of an alleged Israeli
spy who reportedly was running a network col-
lecting information on the lower Red Sej
Y On 19 July, the Iraqi News Agency reported
that'Sana's minister of interior had claimed that
Jsrael-with the connivance of Ethiopia-had
recently taken possession of several barren islands
within Sana's territorial waters. Though Sana has
since denied the Iraqi report, such charges from
the radical Arabs are not new. A leftist Kuwaiti
/ magazine, for example, has asserted that Israeli
and Ethiopian naval craft are carrying out joint
patrols in the area and usin the islandsac
ages.
[25X1
is determined to preserve access
to the Red Sea and the safety of its Shipping as it
passes through the Bab el Mandeb.
Israeli
concern on this score was ou i mutated by
the attack in June. 1971 on an Israeli-chartered
tanker, the Coral Sea, near the Bab el Mandeb.
75
rent
on
Representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Yemen (Sana) met in Jidda
in mid-July to discuss exploitation of the natural
resources of the Red Sea. Of greatest concern are
the potentially conflicting territorial claims by
Although Sana may not have raised the cur-~3the littoral countries and the exploitation of the
indicated an interest in some of them. Sover-
eignty over the islands has long been in doubt,
and there are no known claims to them. They are
occasionally used by Ethiopian fishermen, and on
this basis Addis Ababa could make a strong claim
to ownership
7>
vember. Whether Israel and Ethiopia are active in
the area, Sana could belaying the groundwork for
a claim to the islands.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 Jul 72
45.XI',1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
Saudi Arabia - Egypt
AN ERA OF GOOD FEELING
Nearly 40 Egyptian Air Force personnel, in- thousand were expelled during the Yemen civil
eluding seven pilots, air controllers, and tech war.
nicians, are in Saudi Arabia being trained to oper-
ate and maintain British-produced Lightning jet
fighters. The Saudi-Egyptian training arrangement
is the latest manifestation of the improved ties ,
that have been forged since Nasir's death.]
jfhe Saudis and Egyptians became antago-
'nists in the 1950s when a wave of Arab radicalism
swept over the area and the conservative Saudi
regime became pariah to the Arab socialist world.
President Nasir called for the overthrow of the /lam
Saudi-Egyptian
Saudi monarchy, and Radio Cairo heaped abuse / (
L
on the ruling family. Egypt's involvement on the ties can e expected to grow, especially in view of
side of the republicans in the Yemen civil war in the wave of satisfaction that swept over Saudi
1962 galled the Saudis, who supported the roy- Arabi_.following the Egyptian dismissal of the
alists) lfhe 1967 war drew Arabs of all stripes Soviets
together, however, and the hefty Khartoum sub-
sidies from King Faysal and Egypt's termination
of its role in Yemen prepared the ground for a
reconciliation. Relations between the two coun-
tries improved between 1967 and 1970, but it
was only after Nasir's death in September 1970
that a real rapprochement became possible./ 14
' The policies of President Sadat have been
warmly received by the Saudis. Even before
Sadat's decision last week to terminate the
services of Soviet advisers, the King was con-
vinced that the Egyptian President would be a
bulwark against Communist influence in the
Middle East.i
,''Saudi payments to Egypt, scheduled to last
until the "effects of the Israel aggression are
erased," amount to nearly $100 million annually.
In addition, the Saudis are recruiting large num-
bers of Egyptians-teachers, medical personnel,
and other skilled workers-to fill vacancies in the
perennially manpower-short Saudi economy. The
King has reservations about employing large num-
bers of Egyptians, however, remembering the dis-
location that occurred in 1962-63 when several
Sadat and Faysal
SECRET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jul 72
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
JL',V1\L' 1
KENYA: TRIBAL UNREST IN ARMY
Tribal animosities in the army and elsewhere
2 are likely to grow as a result of a recently con-
cluded sedition trial and President Kenyatta's
approval of a military reorganization proposal. A
Kenyan Air Force pilot, recently extradited from
Tanzania, has been convicted for his role in an
abortive coup plot in 1971. He has implicated in
the plot the former chief of the defense staff, the
former chief justice, an assistant minister, and
several army and air force officers; all are from
nated the army and are upset over the growing
influence of the aggressive Kikuyu, who now
control virtually all other instruments of power in
the country. The reorganization places a Kikuyu
directly in line to succeed the present army com-
mander,,a,Kamba, who is scheduled to retire in a
few years. 1
LKenyatta is aware of the tribal consequences
the military reorganization. The government
the minority Kamba and Luo tribes. A number of reportedly hopes to blunt tribal resentment by
lesser figures were tried and sentenced last year in 6 shifting various battalions, beginning with those
connection with the coup plot.] units in which tribal feelings are highest. The
I Lhe trial was Kenyatta's way of warning
would-be plotters, but tribal bitterness that con-
tributed to coup rumors late last May still is high,
and the trial outcome could whip up further
tension. It also may lead to the arrests of the
former defense staff chief and the former chief
justice, both of whom were implicated in last
year's plot and forced to resign.
?Meanwhile, Kenyatta has agreed to a mili-
tary reorganization proposal that abolishes the
position of chief of the defense staff. The re-
organization provides for the transfer and promo-
tion to brigadier of the army's two senior
colonels. One of these, a member of Kenyatta's
Kikuyu tribe, has been named the deputy com-
mander of the army. The other, a member of the
rival Kamba tribe, has been removed as deputy
commander of the army and given a senior staff
position in the Defense Ministry
r, , The reorganization could easily increase re-
sentment among the Kamba. They once domi-
government also plans to keep troops busy with
GHANA: DEBT NEGOTIATIONS
,)(previous debt-rescheduling exercises since
Nkrumah's ouster in 1966.)
Faced with a deteriorating economy in
Ghana, Accra's creditors may be moving toward
more generous relief than was granted in the three
k. l tepresentatives of the creditor countries
met last week in London and agreed to a 13-point
statement of principle for dealing with Ghana's
debt. They recommend that their governments be
more sympathetic to the Ghanaian point of view.
Last February, Accra justified its unilateral alter-
ation of debt servicing arrangements and cancel-
lation of some $94 million of its $300-million,
medium-term debt by asserting that it could not
pay without crippling its economic development.
The new proposal suggests that creditors lower
the interest rate on existing debt and offer a grace
period on repayment. The London statement calls
for a settlement that takes into account Ghana's
capacity to service its large debt, its need for an,_
adequate growth rate, and continued foreign aid]
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jul 72
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
'?')The shift followed an important change of
attitude by the British, Ghana's major creditor,
resulting in part from a new interest by Prime
Minister Heath in helping less-developed countries
in general and Ghana a Commonwealth member,
rticular.
?The governments have yet to decide on the
recommendations. Ghana, with the help of the
World Bank, is preparing an economic program to
bring its balance of payments under control and
to set out development objectives. The creditor
countries regard such a program as essential for a
Page 24
to consensus at that time
productive discussion of the debt problem with
Accra. The London group of creditors has tenta-
tively agreed to meet again in mid-September to
arrive at definitive positions on terms and condi-
tions for debt rescheduling. Strong French objec-
tion to several points could be a stumbling block
PAKISTAN: A NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE
(_ Concern over President Bhutto's reforms,
particularly the nationalization of industry, is
constraining investment and eroding business-
men's confidence in the economy. US bankers in
Karachi paint a pessimistic picture of the invest-
ment climate well into 1973. They report that
Pakistani businessmen are not seeking loans for
new investment or expansion in manufacturing
and that a number of them are even trying to
divest themselves of their major manufacturing
holdings. The assessment is shared by US petro-
leum officials, who also are planning no new
investments.
This general pessimism will clearly continue
to hold back economic performance. Despite a
relatively impressive showing in agriculture and
exports, industrial output-which dropped almost
six percent in the year that ended on 30 June-
will not easily recover from the loss of markets in
Bangladesh. Moreover, engineering and construc-
tion activity will remain slack because of weak
investment demand. Investor confidence was
shaken earlier this year by Bhutto's partial take-
over of several industries, and the government has
done little to allay businessmen's fears since then.
Bhutto's economic policies have been signifi-
cantly influenced by the need to avoid trouble
with the left wing of his party. In June, for
example, the government initially took repressive
measures against strikers in Karachi, but after
party leftists reacted strongly, Bhutto forced the
industrialists to agree to a settlement favorable to
labor.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
VLV1~1J 1
,q-r' 6n 24 July 1972, the
'Year of the Water Rat in
Bhutan, 16-year-old Jigme
Singhi Wangchuk was en-
throned, the fourth mem-
ber of the Wangchuk dy-
nasty to rule over Bhutan.
The new monarch succeeds
his father, 44-year-old
Jigme Dorji Wangchuk,
who died on 22 July, re-
portedly of a heart attack,
in Nairobi, where he was
undergoing treatment for a
heart ailment. Over the last
decade, he has had numer-
ous health problems and
occasionally journeyed to
Europe for medical atten-
tion. As recently as mid-
May, he was healthy
enough to participate at the
festivities in which his only
legitimate son was des-
ignated heir apparent. The
new King completed his
secondary education in England and had just
begun a governmental apprenticeship under his
father's tutelege.
ISerious challenge to the new King's acces-
sion is not expected, but his youth and inexperi-
ence could revive the old rivalry between the
families of his father-the Wangchuks--and his
mother the Dorjis. The late monarch's half-
brother, Namgyal Wangchuk, who served as chief
adviser and is one of the government's most capa-
ble officials, probably will assume a key role in
Page 25
running the kingdom, at least until the King
reaches his twenty-first birthday.
The Dorjis have been in eclipse since the
mid-1960s when they were involved in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to enhance their power. They
may seize the moment to try and reassert them-
selves. The mother of the new monarch has
moved her entourage back to Bhutan's capital,
and the induction of the two eldest princesses-as
well as the crown prince- into government posi-
tions earlier this year, contributed to a partial
rapprochement between the estranged royal
parents._1
,The tiny Himalayan
kingdom is almost totally
dependent on Indian eco-
nomic and military assist-
ance and is required by
treaty to be "guided" by
Indian advice in foreign af-
fairs. With Indian support,
it is cautiously entering the
international arena. It be-
came a UN member last
September and has since re-
ceived an unprecedented,
albeit modest, stream of
foreign visitors. To cope
with these new responsi-
bilities, the Bhutanese
bureaucracy has expanded
to include a full-time for-
eign minister and a proto-
col officer-the country's
first female civil serv-
ant.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
' `The cold Chilean winter is being warmed by
rhetorfc and scandal. In two major speeches this
week, President Allende blasted the US while
disclosing some hard economic realities to the
people. The momentum of his economic initia-
tives, however, has been slowed somewhat by a
growing political scandal involving criminal ac-
tivity by members of the President's own Socialist
Party.
In a radio address on Monday, Allende left
little doubt that the consumer boom of the past
18 months was over and that the time for build-
ing a new Chile had begun. Consumer goods dis-
tribution will be placed under stricter controls, a
condition that will give a boost to Santiago's
already burgeoning black market. While wages
and pensions are to be raised in October to reflect
inflationary trends, excess funds will be siphoned
off through obligatory savings plans and higher
taxes. Imported consumer goods will be severely
limited, and most new investment will go into
import-substitution industries to reduce de-
pendence on foreign sources of supply.
Agriculture will receive considerable atten-
tion. To encourage Chile's remaining small private
farmers, guarantees against expropriation were
offered to owners of up to 100 irrigated acres
who worked the land as their sole occupation.
This is only half the legal maximum size, implying
that the reform cycle is not yet over. Small busi-
nessmen were assured of a place in the economy.
Lest the workers feel that austerity might fall too
hard on them, Allende promised them free vaca-
tions and life insurance policies and spoke of
adjusting prices so that higher income groups
would pay more for their goods. While specifics
remain vague, Allende's measures do not appear
as severe as many expected.
Page 26
The following night, the President delivered
a highly partisan speech to a massive rally of
workers; in effect, it was the keynote address for
the 1973 election campaign. He told his listeners
that next year they must win in order to elimi-
nate opposition control of congress. Allende sug-
gested that a key to victory might be the registra-
tion and organization of the recently franchised
illiterates, and held up the recent Coquimbo by-
election victory as an example to follow.
Referring to congress, the President mused
that its members might now have more important
things to do than play at impeaching cabinet
ministers; he has presented a series of bills for
their approval, covering the establishment of
autonomous enterprises, worker management,
protection of rights of small farmers and business-
men, and economic activity reserved for the gov-
ernment. While saying he did not intend to
provoke problems with congress, he again held up
the threat of a plebiscite as a means of over-
coming opposition obstructionism. For the
second night in a row Allende repeated his charge
that the US is leading an economic blockade
against Chile by denying loans and credits. While
Allende believes the charge to be legitimate he has
not chosen to belabor the point.
As a backdrop, a situation potentially
embarrassing to the President is developing. The
police have arrested a number of "common crim-
inals" alleged to have perpetrated a series of
assaults on banks, private businesses, and govern-
ment installations. Some of these particular
"'common criminals" are--or were-members of
Allende's own Socialist Party, including at least
one of prominence. The Socialist Party has an-
nounced that those arrested had been expelled
from the party a few weeks prior to their
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
S1 UKt 1
incarceration, but this lame excuse, even if true, is
convincing to few. Now that the opposition press
has gotten wind of the incident, they can be
expected to make the most of it. f.
eResponding to pressure from top army of-
hcers,-President Bordaberry has fired his defense
minister and named a. civilian to replace him. The
dismissed minister, Enrique Magnani, had been
fonder strong criticism by military leaders for pro-
viding the Senate with information concerning
the death of a suspected terrorist during military
interrogation. Bordaberry had rebuffed previous
a.fforts to remove the defense minister. He ap-
parently acted only after the commanders of
Uruguay's four military regions and the chief of
the Joint Staff bypassed the commander in chief
last week and warned that they would retire en
masse if Magnani were kept on.r
? ' c he military !eaders probably were en-
in this unusual flexing of political
muscle by the prestige and public confidence they
gained with their recent successes against the
fupamaros. In addition, Magnani's performance
as defense minister had dissipated much of his
initial popularity with the military. As a general,
he had been competent and highly respected. In
the cabinet, his aggressive leadership raised
charges that he was acting more like a commander
in chief than a minister and was meddling in
internal army affairs. His replacement, Augusto
Legnani, has been Uruguay's permanent repre-
sentative to the United Nations. He is one of the
nation's most respected politicians and diplomats,
Page 27
but most officers consider him too soft to with-
stand congressional and press criticisms for very
long. 1
Although military leaders insist that they
want a tough politician as defense minister, they
want to retain control of military operations. It is
significant that the clique of senior officers who
moved against Magnani included four of the most
respected generals in the army. They have shown
they can exert sufficient pressure to get their own
way.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
SJCJKt 1
VENEZUELA: A GIANT RETIRES
/61 1omulo Betancourt, the most prominent
figure in the Democratic Action Party, has an-
nounced that he will not be a candidate for presi-
/,,Xdent in the 1973 electio _JEhe decision will un-
doubtedly cheer the governing Christian Demo-
cratic Party, whose colorless candidate, Lorenzo
Fernandez, would have looked even paler beside
Betancourt. But the greatest gains will accrue to
the various groups supporting Venezuela's other
political giant, Marcos Perez Jimenez. The former
dictator has not yet announced that he will run,
but his stock has risen markedly in recent months
and he is believed to have considerable a eal
among the large bloc of uncommitted voters
/t'J,/O 'the 64-year-old Betancourt, who has headed
the government twice, said that he was taking
himself out of the running to give other party
leaders a chance. Poor health may have been a
factor. At least four potential nominees had been
waiting for Betancourt's decision, and the party
convention, which be ins 18 August, could now
turn into a real battleThe person most likely to
emerge as the standard bearer is the party sec-
retary general, former interior minister Carlos
Andres Perezj
/' TI e withdrawal of Betancourt may reduce
the bitterness of the coming campaign. It was
Perez Jimenez who overthrew the first Demo-
cratic Action government, following which Betan-
court spent many years in hiding or in exile.
Betancourt and many of his political friends were
persecuted by the dictator; some were tortured
and some were killed. Ten years later Betancourt
and his followers were involved in the overthrow
of Perez Jimenez, and they successfully spear-
headed a movement to have him extradited to
face charges. Following his imprisonment and
exile, they have prevented his return to Vene-
zuela, except for a visit, and have thus far kept
him out of public office. Because of the emotions
aroused by the careers of these two strong per-
sonalities, hardly anyone in Venezuela is neutral
or indifferent to them
,,'/'The appeal of Perez Jimenez reflects the
disillusionment with parties of the center and the
growing polarization of the electorate. Brutal as
his dictatorship was, many Venezuelans, re-
member him as having provided jobs along with
law and order. The uncommitted voters may
prove more susceptible to Perez Jimenez' dema-
goguery without Betancourt in the front lines to
remind them that there were thorns among the
roses.
GUYANA: A NON-ALIGNED EXERCISE
/t The annual conference of the foreign min-
isters of non-aligned nations is to be held in
Georgetown, Guyana, from 8 to 11 August. The
conferees will have a difficult time finding issues
upon which to focus, and the idea of a larger
non-aligned role in world affairs will be further
eroded
A Che stated purpose of the conference is to
formulate a strategy for the 27th UN General
Assembly and to lay the groundwork for a non-
aligned summit provided an issue can be found
and enough interest stimulated. A preparatory
meeting in Kuala Lumpur last May set an agenda
for the foreign ministers; included are:
? the significance for non-aligned states of
moves toward detente between the super
powers;
? disarmament;
? a European Security Conference;
SECRET
Page 28 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
SECRET i%w
? colonialism and apartheid in Africa;
? conflicts in the Middle East and
Vietnam;
? the creation of "zones of peace" in vari-
ous parts of the world;
? the Law of the Sea]
[The US ambassador in Georgetown anticipates a
ate of anti-US and anti-imperialist rhetoric
during the conference, and the Cubans, especially,
are expected to be active in protesting US involve-
ment in Vietnam.]'
/O(. Zl'he Guyanese originally claimed that they
expected 500 participants from some 70 nations,
including 40 to 50 foreign ministers. So far, only
eight foreign ministers have said they will come;
most countries will be represented by lesser offi-
cials. A variety of liberation movements will be
izers are anticipating the arrival of competing
delegations from Cambodia and Vietnam, but it is
likely that, as in Lusaka in 1970, none will be
seated.)
explanation of the need for continued close ties
with the USSR. The Cuban leader also discussed
the resumption of diplomatic relations with Peru
but, despite the presence of the Viet Cong's
Madame Binh, spent little time on the subject of
Vietnam.
After some brief remarks on his recent trip
to Africa and Eastern Europe, Castro heaped con-
siderable praise on the Soviet Union, particularly
for the support it has given Cuba in the past.
Castro asserted that Cuba's continued existence in
the face of "imperialis blockade" was pri-
marily due to this support.
(o'ff'Castro's remarks reflected his awareness that
Cuba is economically and militarily dependent
upon Moscow and therefore has no real alterna-
tive to cooperation with the Soviets 5idel told
represented as well as the Organization of African / his audience that economic and political integra-
Unity and the Arab League. Conference organ- tion with Latin America could solve many of
lo,6Prime Minister Burnham believes that a suc-
astro's speech did not express any obvious
dispfasure with Soviet policies. Cuban dissatisfac-
tion was strongly implied, however, in last week's
resolution by the central committee of the Cuban
CUBA: CASTRO SPEAKS Communist Party. The resolution made Castro's
cessful conference would enhance the stature of inn/al LCastro's solution was economic integration
his nation and of himself as a leader. He-like the with the socialist bloc, an obvious reference to
probable chairman, Minister of State Ramphal- Havana's recent admission to the Soviet-led
sees a large attendance as a measure of success. It Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. He
may be that Burnham, like the non-aligned move- pointed out that this was a temporary measure
ment itself, is behind the times. He may be too until integration with the nations of Latin Amer-
late to capitalize on membership in the third ica was possiblly
25X1 world.
provided the Cuban people with an elaborate alter this relationship
Cuba's problems but that this would not be pos-
sible for many years. Castro also went to great
lengths to explain why the only other option,
resumption of ties with the US, was completely
impossible under present circumstances
v~is 'n-s"' w uic Jvv~cL IcUII I>I II i, UUL LIIC
/O/ Fidel Castro's annual 26th of July speech speech demonstrated that he did not intend to
SECRET
Page 29 WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jul 72
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
or%
Secret -7
Approved For Release 2008/05/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700030001-4
Secret