WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009500090001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A009500090001-9
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Department review completed
Secret
19 May 1972
No. 0370/72
Copy N9 51
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 Approved For Release 2007/10/23
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WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
CONTENTS (19,11ay 1972)
1 The Communist Response
2 Soviet-Egyptian Relations
5 Indochina
9 Okinawa and japan Reunited
Ceausescu Sees Honecker and Tito
Tito Now Worried About Serbs
Sweden: Conferences, Conferences
Intersputnik vs. Intelsat
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
15 Malagasy Republic: Tsiranana
Toppling
16 Turkey: Urguplu Dismissed
16 Cyprus: Cabinet Changes to Come
17 Oman - Yemen (Aden): Fireworks
18 Pakistan: Big Devaluation
18 Nigerian Diplomacy in West Africa
20 Chile: Allende Feels the Pinch
21 Cabinet Shuffle in Eruarlnr
22 Cuba: Castro in Africa
22 Uruguay: Blancos Split
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THE COMMUNIST RESPONSE
The US effort to interdict shipments to
North Vietnam is well into its second week, and
the Soviets and the Chinese are still sticking to a
decidedly low-key line in their public and private
commentary-to the intense displeasure of Hanoi.
Neither Moscow nor Peking has done much more
than recite the mildest possible bromides criti-
cizing the US actions. Soviet diplomats have
implied in private that Vietnam is not worth a
summit cancellation. Even when the Soviets
lodged a formal protest with the US over the
attacks on two Soviet ships, they said nothing
about the extent of the damage or the death of
one crew member. Nor did they make their pro-
test note public.
Moscow, faced with the delicate problem of
reassuring the North Vietnamese without calling
into question the prospects for the summit, issued
a Pravda editorial on 16 May asserting that im-
provements in Soviet-US relations are possible
and desirable-although not at the expense of
"some third countries." The editorial asserted in
standard terms that Moscow will continue giving
"all necessary assistance" to North Vietnam, but
it devoted most of its space to touting the virtues
of the Soviet "peace plan" in particular and the
value of negotiated solutions in general.
The top layer of the Soviet military hier-
archy was abroad this week, in what seems almost
a conscious effort to convey an impression of
business-as-usual. Defense Minister Grechko, ac-
companied by the heads of the air force and navy,
went ahead with a previously planned visit to
Syria and Egypt, now completed. Early this week,
the head of the Soviet Army began a visit to
France that was to last until 19 May. The Soviet
commander and the chief of staff of the Warsaw
Pact have also been out of the country.
Sino-Soviet Cooperation?
in any quantity except through China. There
have, in fact, been several recent press reports,
nearly all of them emanating from Moscow, that
the Soviets and Chinese are engaged in discussions
on this subject. There has been nothing to con-
firm these accounts, and Peking's petty harass-
ment of the Soviets over their rail shipments to
Vietnam is continuing as usual.
The logic of the situation, however, certainly
calls for some sort of Soviet appeal to the Chi-
nese, either to permit a heavier flow of goods by
rail or to allow Soviet ships to unload their
cargoes at Chinese ports for transshipment. Some
approach along these lines may have been made
before Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov left Peking
for home on 17 May. Press reports claim that he
passed a message from Premier Kosygin to the
Chinese.
The Chinese probably would not object to a
Soviet request to increase rail shipments across
China-if the request were a relatively modest
one. Thus, they might have little trouble permit-
ting an increase in rail shipments of, say, 10 to 20
percent. They would almost certainly reject out
of hand, however, any spectacular increase that
would require genuine and considerable coop-
eration with Moscow or that could be billed as
some kind of "joint action." They would also
almost certainly reject any Soviet offer that
would require Soviet personnel to transit China
with the shipments; current practice is for North
Vietnam to take title to the goods at the Sino-
Soviet border. Moreover, Peking's reluctance to
allow Soviet sailors and technicians onto Chinese
soil in any numbers makes it unlikely that the
Chinese would accede to any request that would
require either transshipment through Chinese
ports or a large-scale Soviet airlift.
With North Vietnamese ports blocked, Mos-
cow has no way to ship goods to North Vietnam
Indeed, if the Soviets present their appeal as
a "joint action" proposal, it is entirely possible
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that they would do so expecting it to be rejected
by the Chinese-as Peking has done whenever
Moscow has employed this gambit in the past.
There is some tentative evidence that Moscow
may be thinking of going this route. Soviet broad-
casts to China on 12 and 13 May hinted at an
appeal by Moscow on the aid issue. Citing the
importance of Soviet military aid to Hanoi, they
called on China for a "concrete response" to
North Vietnamese appeals for "united action"
with other socialist countries to make aid to
Vietnam more effective. The Soviets undoubtedly
see considerable potential for themselves in ex-
ploiting any Chinese foot-dragging on the issue.
For its part, Peking probably sees no reason
to make Soviet life any easier, particularly before
or during the President's trip to Moscow. The
Chinese appear to consider relations with the US
ultimately more important than those with
Hanoi, and they relish watching-from the side-
lines-Moscow's present dilemma.
SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko returned to
the USSR on 17 May after a week in Syria and
Egypt reaffirming Moscow's support for two of
its major Arab clients. Accompanied by the com-
manders of the Soviet naval and air forces,
Grechko had left Moscow on 9 May, the day after
President Nixon announced the mining of North
Vietnamese ports.
During his stay in Syria from 10-14 May,
Grechko reached agreement with Damascus on
unspecified measures "in the field of military
cooperation." In public utterances, both Grechko
and Syrian Defense Minister Talas stressed the
need for continued military cooperation and So-
viet assistance. The visit could signal the arrival of
SA-3 surface-to-air missiles in Syria. The Soviets
may also have agreed to give the Syrians addi-
tional military assistance.
Egypt. Several ships from the Soviet Mediter-
ranean squadron arrived in Alexandria on 16 May.
In an effort to counter Soviet-Egyptian
frictions, Moscow resorted to a number of dra-
matic gestures to highlight the Grechko stop in
According to the communique issued at the
end of Grechko's visit to Cairo, the USSR and
Egypt agreed to "practical steps" aimed at
implementing the military cooperation agreement
reached during Sadat's most recent visit to Mos-
cow. A Cairo radio report subsequently claimed
that a "new armaments agreement" was signed
during the visit, but gave no additional details.
There appear to be few new types of weapons
that Moscow could or would make available to
Egypt that would signficantly improve Cairo's
military position. The provision of new weapons
systems, however, would be an important politi-
cal crutch for Sadat, and would provide a signifi-
cant psychological boost for the Egyptian people.
The language of the communique, as well as other
media coverage of the visit, seems designed to
submerge recent differences between the two coun-
tries, but frictions in their military relationship
are nevertheless likely to continue.
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President Sadat has once again publicly de-
fended Egypt's relationship with the Soviet
Union. This time, he coupled the defense with a
warning to domestic critics against activities out-
side of approved channels.
Speaking on the anniversary of last year's
purge of political opponents, Sadat rationalized,
as he has before, Egypt's reliance on and gratitude
for Soviet military assistance and economic aid.
With an eye to Defense Minister Grechko's arrival
in Egypt the same day, the President described at
length the beneficial nature of this assistance. He
denied any resemblance between his country's
relationship with the USSR and the ties between
Washington and Tel Aviv, describing Israel as "an
agent of the US." Sadat admitted that differences
do arise between Cairo and Moscow, but de-
scribed them as the kind that occur "between
brothers."
During his speech, Sadat cited two petitions
he had received since assuming office that were
sent by a group of formerly prominent Egyptian
officials who called for a new form of national
leadership. Sadat described their requests as a
return to the past that would lead to the dissipa-
tion of Egypt's achievements since the revolution.
The President warned that no activity outside
Egypt's present constitutional organizations
would be tolerated and threatened punishment
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for those who try to create institutions outside of
the established order.
Egypt's ties with North Africa were also
stressed. Sadat described the support he received
during his recent tour of Algeria, Tunisia, and
Libya. His visit to Libya, however, was probably
not as harmonious as he claimed. A number of
things happened during the Egyptian leader's stay
in Libya from 8 to 10 May, such as the cancel-
lation of the departure ceremony, that suggest the
meetings with Libyan officials may have been
chilly. Frictions between the impulsive Qadhafi
and the more cautious Sadat over various policy
issues are not uncommon.
Meanwhile, Cairo has requested that the US
Interests Section reduce its size from 20 to 12
individuals. The Egyptians, dissatisfied with US
policies in the Middle East, have few other ac-
ceptable ways of registering this unhappiness.
Egypt informed the chief US representative in
Cairo that the size of the diplomatic mission
should be returned to near the level that existed
following the break in relations in 1967. An
agreement to expand the size of the US Interests
Section to the present level was reached a year
ago during a period of relative cordiality.
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The North Vietnamese main-force offensive
has made little headway since the capture of
Quang Tri almost three weeks ago. In the fighting
around An Loc, the enemy has been stymied so
far by a tenacious South Vietnamese defense
backed by allied air power. In the north, the
Communist build-up around Hue may have been
thrown off schedule to some extent by South
Vietnamese counteractions and by allied air
strikes, although the Communists probably did
not expect to be ready yet for a major battle
there. Nowhere do the Communists give any indi-
cation that they are reaching the end of their
resources. In the central highlands, their method-
ical preparations for an assault on Kontum City
seem to be nearing completion. And even in areas
that have seen little heavy fighting so far, the
North Vietnamese appear to be preparing for
combat.
Allied air strikes and one of the most intense
Communist barrages of the war have practically
leveled An Loc. Elements of the Communist 5th
and 9th divisions, supported by tanks, mounted
yet another unsuccessful ground attack on the
town last weekend. Aided by air strikes, the
South Vietnamese defenders beat off the Com-
munists.
With the South Vietnamese 21st Division still
bogged down in its none-too-aggressive attempt to
open Route 13 south of An Loc, Saigon has
formed a task force to try to do the job. During
the week, this force moved north to within a few
miles of An Loc and brought South Vietnamese
artillery within range to help defend the town.
In the region around Hue, South Vietnamese
forces have pushed out to the west of the city,
recapturing three former strong points along a
natural route of approach for the Communists.
South Vietnamese Marines also mounted a two-
day foray behind enemy lines into Quang Tri
Province. The operation gave South Vietnamese
morale a sorely needed boost, and it may have
somewhat disrupted Communist offensive prepa-
rations.
On the Communist side of the lines in the
north, a substantial build-up is continuing. South
Vietnamese forces north and west of Hue began
taking fire from Communist 130-mm. artillery on
16 May. The artillery attack caused little damage,
but the North Vietnamese may merely have been
getting the range for heavier shellings later.
In the weeks since the fall of Quang In,
knowledgeable civilians in Hue have grown more
optimistic that the city can be defended. They
have been impressed by the way General Truong,
the new commander of Military Region 1, has
taken hold, and they believe the pause in the
Communist offensive may have given the govern-
ment side enough time to consolidate its defenses.
Even the most optimistic of them, however, ex-
pects a bitter battle, with much damage to the
city.
Such a battle may break out soon at Kon-
turn City. Two Communist divisions-the 2nd and
the 320th-are arrayed around the city. The
enemy has been carrying out extensive reconnais-
sance operations. The city and its airfield were
shelled on 16 May, and sappers blew up a large
ammunition dump east of town. Resupply over-
land has been impossible for some time, and aerial
resupply has become increasingly dangerous. The
weather is bad in Kontum and getting worse.
Elsewhere in South Vietnam, the Commu-
nists are moving the division-sized Phuoc Long
Front into the delta, and they are preparing for
further action west of Saigon.
President Thieu is taking action to tighten
security and facilitate efforts to counter the
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Communist offensive, but some opposition
groups have stepped up their opposition. Follow-
ing the proclamation of martial law last week, the
government announced a series of stiff emergency
measures apparently designed in part to prepare
.the population psychologically for difficult times
ahead. Small radical student groups are hoping to
launch protests against the martial law decrees,
but police are aware of their plans and should be
able to control any disturbances.
Substantial opposition has developed to
Thieu's bid to get National Assembly approval for
additional emergency decree powers. The measure
has been passed by the Lower House, but opposi-
tion blocs in both houses, led by the An Quang
Buddhists, have publicly denounced it. Some key
independents, who hold the balance of power in
the Senate, have indicated that they have mis-
givings, and they may succeed in amending or
voting down the bill.
Thieu apparently is having some success in
lining up support from politicians who are often
sympathetic to the government. Most of the
country's major nationalist political parties have
joined a new anti-Communist front, and Thieu is
encouraging their efforts. Both Thieu and the
politicians apparently view the project as a tem-
porary alliance designed to help cope with the
current military crisis.
Hanoi Has Its Problems
In their propaganda, the North Vietnamese
are making what they can out of the tepid sup-
port supplied so far by Moscow and Peking. They
continue to issue calls for more vocal support
from their two big patrons. On the home front,
there are signs in the North Vietnamese media
that morale is being stretched thin. One constant
theme in Hanoi's current output is the need for a
further tightening of security and for even
stronger dedication to the revolutionary cause.
The convening of the Hanoi party committee to
consider such problems suggests that they are
particularly serious in the capital.
CAMBODIA: MORE GOVERNMENT LOSSES
The Communists continued their month-old
campaign to secure infiltration corridors into
South Vietnam by expanding their control over
the southern border area of Cambodia. On 14
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May, government troops were forced to abandon
the town of Kirivong, some 25 miles south of
Takeo City, and the Communists also began put-
ting pressure on Tunloap, the last significant gov-
ernment border outpost on Route 2. These ac-
tions appear to have been undertaken by elements
of the North Vietnamese Phuoc Long Front-with
some support from local Khmer Communist
units.
With a landslide vote for the new constitu-
tion now on record, the government is preparing
for the country's first presidential election, to be
held on 4 June. Lon Nol's bid for the presidency
faces only one serious contender, former con-
stituent assembly president In Tam. If the elec-
tion is reasonably honest, In Tam should do very
well in his home base in Kompong Cham Province
and he might make a decent showing in Phnom
Penh, but it seems unlikely that he could beat
Lon Nol or even prevent him from getting the
majority that is necessary to prevent a runoff
election. Lon Nol already has obtained the en-
dorsement of the military establishment, which
should in turn ensure him of strong support at the
polls by the army rank-and-file.
Captured Russian-made T-59 tank on display in Saigon.
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miles 25
Lon Nol also moved this week to bring his
sometime friend and adviser, Sirik Matak, back
into the government as "special adviser" to the
president. The duties of this new position have
yet to be defined, but Matak will have the rank,
privileges, and salary provided the prime minister.
It is possible, therefore, that he will again become
Lon Nol's principal deputy-a position that he
ably filled from August 1969 to this past March,
when student protests forced him to quit the
government.
Lon Nol may be seeking to obtain the back-
ing of Matak's supporters in the forthcoming elec-
tion. He may also be paving the way for the
eventual designation of Matak as vice president.
Whatever the case, the move is sure to be unpop-
ular in some political circles-particularly among
Phnom Penh's disgruntled students. Matak's ac-
ceptance of Lon Nol's offer represents a typical
Khmer political about-face. During the two
month's that Matak spent on the sidelines, he
frequently criticized the President and repeatedly
vowed he would never again serve in any capacity
in a government headed by Lon Nol.
I n an unprecedented move, Communist
troops on 17 May forced Lao Army units to
abandon Khong Sedone, a provincial capital in
south Laos 30 miles from Pakse. Lao Army ele-
ments garrisoned at Khong Sedone withdrew to
positions about three miles south of the town
after the Communists shelled their main camp
and overran a nearby outpost. Most of the town's
2,500 inhabitants fled when the government
troops pulled out. Following the withdrawal, US
pilots observed some enemy troops in the aban-
doned camp, but the Communists were not oc-
cupying Khong Sedone the following morning.
Small North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao
units have shelled and probed Khong Sedone in
the past, but the town has never before been
under enemy control. A North Vietnamese rallier
claimed in April that the Communists did not
intend to hold the town if the government pulled
out. By attacking Khong Sedone, the Communists
probably hope to forestall rainy season forays by
the government onto the Bolovens Plateau. The
loss of the town cuts the government's principal
route north from Pakse. Government leaders in
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south Laos presumably will order troops cur-
rently in reserve at Pakse to recapture Khong
Sedone.
In north Laos, the Communists have stymied
Vang Pao's efforts to retake the territory between
Long Tieng and the Plaine des Jarres. North Viet-
namese troops have blunted the irregular advance
toward Phou Pha Sai, the high point overlooking
the southern Plaine, and on 13 May a Communist
sapper team raided Pha Dong, the staging area for
the operation, driving off the local garrison. Pha
Dong was back in government hands by 15 May,
but the Communist attacks may have helped take
the steam out of the irregular advance toward
Phou Pha Sai. A smaller government unit, which
had dug in on the ridge overlooking Tha Tam
Bleung and the new Communist road from the
Ritualized leftist protests greeted the return
of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese control on 15
May, but the reversion ceremonies were not
marred by serious disturbances. While problems
of integration still lie ahead for Japan, Okinawa is
not likely to create serious strains in US-Japan
relations or to generate major new domestic
trouble.
Opposition to the reversion agreement itself
has been partially defused. Critics in both Japan
and Okinawa had argued the agreement lacks
guarantees that US military operations on
Okinawa would be subject to the safeguards ap-
plied on the main islands. In response to domestic
pressures, Tokyo sought and received from Wash-
ington a public statement that reversion was being
implemented in accordance with Japan's policies
governing nuclear weapons.
Page 9
Plaine, has been harried back into the hills farther
north.
The Communists, however, evidently con-
ceded Sam Thong to the irregulars who reoccu-
pied the one-time refugee center without a fight
last week. The irregulars are strengthening their
hold over the Sam Thong Valley, and one
105-mm. howitzer has been brought in to sup-
port operations to the north. In the next few
weeks, Vang Pao's forces should have little dif-
ficulty in expanding the perimeter around Sam
Thong, but the Communists can be expected to
react strongly to further government attempts to
occupy the high ground commanding the south-
ern Plaine and the routes from the Long Tieng -
Sam Thong area, where some small Communist
rear-guard units still remain.
Several dozen US military facilities on Oki-
nawa have been released for Japanese military and
Okinawan civilian use, but 88 installations, oc-
cupying some 20 percent of the island's land,
remain under US control. Agitation for the
removal of additional facilities is likely to increase
and Tokyo is already committed to seek a further
scaling down of the US military presence.
The status of the Senkaku Islands is another
potential source of friction. Washington returned
this barren chain to Japan along with the Ryu-
kyus. Actual control of the Senkakus has long
been contested by the Chinese and Japanese. The
US has taken the position that it can not com-
ment on any of the claims since such claims
predate American administration. Tokyo is anx-
ious to establish its claim to this potentially oil-
rich area and would doubtless like to see more
forthright US support.
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The NATO allies have been approaching this
spring's ministerial in an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty. They believe that NATO's next moves in
East-West diplomacy depend on the outcome of
events largely beyond their control-such as the
presidential trip to Moscow, the progress of
SALT, the Vietnam war, and the West German
debate over the Eastern treaties.
When the foreign ministers meet in Bonn on
30-31 May, some of this uncertainty may have
been dissipated. Ratification of the West German
treaties presumably would lead to early signature
of the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin,
satisfying the condition NATO has insisted on
before joining in multilateral security conference
preparations. With the protocol signed, the East
would urge even more forcefully that prepara-
tions get under way. The NATO ministers may,
therefore, feel some pressure to set a timetable
for these talks. Some allies prefer not to begin
substantive talks in Helsinki until after the Euro-
pean Community summit in October. The US
would prefer to wait until after the November
elections.
The ministers must deal with other security
conference issues on which the allies have not
established common positions. There is no con-
sensus, for example, on how the West should
broach the question of freer movement of people,
ideas, and information. The US has argued for
keeping the freer movement terminology, but
France, West Germany, and others think the term
is so blunt that the Warsaw Pact would im-
mediately reject it as an agenda item.
The allies are likewise split over the relation-
ship between a security conference and mutual
and balanced force reductions. The US has at-
tempted to keep the two issues separate. Some
allies, particularly the Italians, who would be
excluded from force reduction talks in the US
formulation, are lobbying strongly for a dis-
cussion of force reduction principles at a security
conference. This would allow countries not
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directly involved in force reductions to
play at least an indirect role.
The next allied move regarding
force reductions awaits the outcome of
the President's trip to the USSR: Mos-
cow refused to receive NATO's force
reduction "explorer mission," and in
spite of the allies' nervousness over US-
Soviet bilateral dealings, they now ex-
pect the President to act as the ex-
plorer. The Soviets may generally favor
the idea of force reductions, but will
probably prefer to do more listening
than talking at the summit.
In advance of the Bonn session,
the NATO defense ministers will meet
next week in Brussels. They reportedly
will get a stern lecture from the chair-
man of NATO's military committee
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concerning the threat to NATO defense efforts
from inflation and diminishing public support for
the necessary expenditures. The problem will also
be addressed by the Eurogroup-the European
NATO members minus France, Iceland, and Por-
tugal-when their defense ministers meet on the
eve of the larger session. The group will scrutinize
possible adjustments in the defense postures of
Denmark, Turkey, and Belgium. They will also
examine a variety of Eurogroup cooperative de-
fense projects. The West Germans hope that if the
Eurogroup can make progress in joint arms pro-
duction and procurement the French will be en-
couraged to join in.
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Romanian President Ceausescu's meeting
with East German party boss Erich Honecker last
week brought out the divisions between Bucha-
rest and Pankow. Ceausescu's talks with Yugoslav
President Tito four days later underscored the
community of interests in that quarter.
The Romanian press tried hard to create a
cordial atmosphere for Honecker's visit to Bucha-
rest (11-12 May), but this could not hide sharp
differences on a wide variety of issues, including
Moscow's role in international Communism, the
Middle East, and Vietnam.
Honecker was in Bucharest for the signing of
a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
The treaty is fairly standard, and both sides ap-
pear to have what they wanted from it. In line
with Bucharest's stance on international relations,
the first article broadens the interpretation of
socialist internationalism to include "respect for
sovereignty and independence, equality of right
and non-intervention in internal affairs." Article
nine, which defines West Berlin as a separate
political entity, is as Pankow would wish. Also in
the interest of the East Germans is the statement
on the inviolability of frontiers; the statement
refers specifically to the border between the two
German states. In spite of these accommodations,
neither side expected the other to give ground on
really contentious political issues.
There were, however, some signs of improve-
ment in the cool relations between Pankow and
Bucharest. The two sides made headway in less
sensitive areas by agreeing to cooperate in cul-
tural, economic, scientific, and technical fields.
East German media, moreover, gave the visit ban-
ner coverage in an effort to portray Pankow's
relations with Bucharest as similar to its ties with
the rest of the bloc.
On the other hand, Ceausescu's session with
Yugoslav President Tito on 16-17 May was a
warm and friendly affair. They met on the Yugo-
slav-Romanian border. The occasion was the in-
auguration of the joint Iron Gates hydro-electric
project on the Danube.
It was the sixth time the two Balkan leaders
have met since a common opposition to the So-
viet occupation of Czechoslovakia drew them to-
gether. They exchanged views on Vietnam, Mrs.
Meir's recent visit to Romania, the Middle East
situation in general, President Nixon's upcoming
trip to Moscow, and President Tito's own visit to
the Soviet Union that is slated for early
President Tito, in a speech on 8 May, cau-
tioned against a revival of "great Serb chauvin-
ism." He said that Serb extremists were criticizing
other nationalities-and thereby the party's na-
tional equality policy-and were advancing "uni-
tarist" themes boosting Serb hegemony over the
Yugoslav federation. Tito warned that "many
cominformists" are joining the nationalist move-
ment and implied that Serb opposition to the
constitutional changes of last year threatened to
undermine political reforms.
In his speech, Tito specifically criticized the
Serb party's failure to come to grips with these
problems. Actually, the Serb leaders have fought
hard to contain the reaction in Serbia to the
Croatian nationalist purge but have had difficulty
making this moderate line stick. An example of
this frustration was the case of a prominent Serb
lawyer arrested last February for "nationalist agi-
tation." He was released by a Belgrade court
before the investigation of the case was com-
pleted. This is an unusual procedural step in any
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Yugoslav court and, in the eyes of the other
minorities, compromises Serbia's dedication to
the principle of national equality.
Serb chauvinism has also begun to find more
violent expression. Ali Sukrija, an Albanian serv-
ing in an important federal post, was seriously
injured three weeks ago when assaulted by three
Serbs in Belgrade. The regime has suppressed
news coverage of the case.
Now that the moderate Serbs under party
boss Marko Nikezic have Tito's firm support, they
may be able to commit their party to a more
forceful implementation of national equality and
political reforms than their conservative con-
stituency has been ready to accept so far. If they
can, it would ease tensions between the nation-
alities throughout Yugoslavia.
The question of Serb nationalism is central
to Yugoslavia's cohesion after Tito goes. Stane
Dolanc, secretary of the federal party executive
bureau, told a presidium meeting on 11 May that
an individual citizen's respect for legal authority
rests on equal application of the law throughout
the federation. If the Serbs continue selective use
of criminal and constitutional laws, there can be
no hope that the other nationalities will accept
Belgrade's role as an honest broker in settling
ethnic disputes.
SWEDEN: CONFERENCES, CONFERENCES
Leftists and others plan to sponsor separate
conferences on ecology to coincide with the UN
environmental conference in Stockholm on 5-13
June. The counter-conferences will be anti-
American in tone and could result in violence.
It all started when the Swedish Government
decided to sponsor an "Environmental Forum"
aimed at satisfying the enormous non-govern-
mental interest in such affairs. This forum, which
began as a well-intentioned exercise by the Swed-
ish UN Association, is in danger of being taken
over by radicals. It will bring together numerous
industrial, scientific, and intellectual organiza-
tions, but numbers of young radicals and others
are being excluded. This had led some 30 organi-
zations, ranging from a Swedish Maoist faction to
a group calling itself "Music Power," to organize a
"Peoples' Forum" to compete with the govern-
ment-sponsored one.
Two other leftist environmental gatherings,
the Dai Dong and the 01 Committee, have also
been timed to coincide with the UN conference.
The psuedo-religious Dai Dong calls for economic
and political change to improve the environment.
The 01 Committee derives its name from a Swa-
hili expression ote iwapo, meaning "all that exists
must be considered," and consists mainly of
young leftists from poor countries.
Also Swedish industrialists will gather in
Gothenburg the last week in May to establish
positions on various issues to come before the UN
conference. The Gothenburg meeting may be the
only one to omit charges of "ecocide" in Viet-
nam, which may even be introduced at the UN
conference.
The largest of the extraordinary conferences,
the environmental forum, is expected to attract
some 3,600 participants. Police predict that be-
tween 10,000 and 20,000 foreign youths will
converge on Stockholm during the UN confer-
ence. Anticipating violence, Swedish authorities
intend to activate some 1,850 city and 1,500
provincial police for security duty.
Arrangements for the UN conference are far
from complete. So far, China is the only Commu-
nist country to accept an invitation to attend.
The Soviet Union and other East European coun-
tries-with the exception of Yugoslavia, which
plans to attend-are holding out in deference to
East Germany, which wants full representa-
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I ntersputnik, the Soviet answer to US-
backed Intelsat, is making slow progress in re-
cruiting members and in advanced communica-
tions satellite technology. Because of a late start
and the geographic constraints on coverage im-
posed by the satellite orbit that will probably be
used, Intersputnik has little chance of becoming a
serious competitor. Instead, it seems destined to
be largely a regional system for the exchange of
television programs and civil telephone traffic and
for the possible bolstering of Warsaw Pact mili-
tary communications.
The Soviets announced their intention to
form a rival to Intelsat in 1967, but their organi-
zation did not come into formal existence until
1971. Currently, Intersputnik has only nine mem-
bers-all Communist countries-compared with 83
members in Intelsat. In contrast to Intelsat's
seven communications satellites and more than 50
earth stations, the USSR is only now testing what
may be a prototype Intersputnik satellite, and
earth station construction has yet to begin in
most member countries.
Despite this slow progress, Moscow appears
committed to the system. Second-generation
Molniya satellites are likely to reach operational
status within the next year or two, and probably
will form the basis for Intersputnik. Most of the
current members probably will have at least one
operational earth station by 1975.
Although Moscow believes that excessive US
power within Intelsat prevents formal Soviet
membership, this does not preclude a cooperative
operational relationship. In fact, the Intersputnik
Agreement specifies technical cooperation with
other communications satellite organizations.
Under a new US-Soviet "hot line" arrangement,
the Soviets will build an Intelsat-type earth sta-
tion to work with Intelsat satellites positioned
over the Atlantic Ocean. In the future, the USSR
may seek a more formal cooperative arrangement
between the two organizations.
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MALAGASY REPUBLIC: TSIRANANA TOPPLING
Ph i l i bert Tsiranana's inept and ruthless
handling of violent student protests has cast
doubt on his political survival. In a last minute
effort to preserve what remains of his fading grasp
on power and to mute opposition, Tsiranana
tapped the army chief of staff, General
Ramantsoa, to take over as head of state.
Tsiranana, however, retains executive powers as
head of government, but he may not be able to
retain them long.
Tananarive university and secondary stu-
dents began the protest with a strike in late April
over the government's education policies. Stu-
dents in other cities soon joined in. Many parents
and most teachers lent support. The students
directed their major criticism against continuing
French influence on Malagasy education. They
demanded a revision of technical cooperation
agreements with France and greater stress on
Malagasy culture in the curriculum.
The students defied government threats,
pleas to return to class, and orders banning public
meetings. Tsiranana, blaming the strikes on Com-
munist agitators, refused to consider the demands
until the students ended the strike. Student anger
increased as a result of government intransigence,
the killing of students by government security
forces, and the reappointment of the minister of
culture, whose ouster the students have long
sought. Last weekend, students clashed with
security forces. Demonstrators set fire to
Tananarive city hall and to the offices of the
government's major newspaper, burned cars, and
damaged other public and private buildings.
About 30 persons were killed and hundreds
wounded. Student strike leaders were arrested
and charged with attempting to overthrow the
government; all schools in Tananarive province
were closed indefinitely.
The killings helped generate broad popular
opposition to the Tsiranana government. Last
Monday, demonstrators were joined by large
numbers of workers and civil servants in a march
on the presidential palace. The march was ac-
companied by a general strike that caused the
closing of most business firms and many govern-
ment offices in the capital.
These events prompted Tsiranana to adopt
conciliatory gestures. He ordered the release of
the imprisoned students, agreed to meet a student
delegation, and sacked the unpopular minister of
culture. Sporadic clashes continued, however, as
students directed their anger against members of
the Republican Security Force, the elite paramili-
tary force responsible for all the killings.
Conciliation came too late. Tsiranana, often
guilty of erratic behavior in the past, has been
thoroughly discredited by the killings. Most Mala-
gasy remember all too well his earlier radio speech
in which he said the killing would continue until
the protests ended. He is no longer able to rely on
the island's gendarmerie or army. Both forces
have refused to take strong action against the
students, and many members of the gendarmerie
are openly sympathetic to the protesters. Mean-
while, the Republican Security Force is on the
defensive; students are seeking out and killing
security force troopers.
Tsiranana's sharing of his authority with
General Ramantsoa is not likely to placate the
students. As of noon on 18 May, students and
workers were showing increasing signs that they
would be satisfied only with Tsiranana's ouster. If
they were to renew mass demonstrations, it ap-
pears doubtful that the army would move against
them, and this would pave the way for the mili-
tary to assume full power.
The French, who have important economic
interests and strong political influence in the re-
public, announced in Paris on 17 May that they
would not intervene. This may have removed the
final obstacle to easing Tsiranana out. The
knowledge that French forces will not be used to
save Tsiranana may increase popular pressure to
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President Sunay rejected the cabinet pro-
posed by Suat Urguplu on 13 May and turned to
Ferit Melen, who is defense minister and acting
prime minister, to form a government. This
marked the first time in Turkey's history that a
president refused to accept a government. The
move probably was dictated by the military.
Melen reportedly has been Sunay's personal
choice since Nihat Erim resigned about a month
ago under still unexplained circumstances.
The 65-year-old Melen is a political con-
servative. He split from the Republican Peoples
Party, one of Turkey's two major parties, in 1967
because he disagreed with the left-of-center orien-
tation and increasing influence of party Secretary
General Bulent Ecevit. Melen and others formed
the National Reliance Party of which he is still
vice president. He served as minister of finance
from 1962-64 after filling numerous lesser posts
in the bureaucracy. Melen has been minister of
defense since March 1971, when the military in-
tervened to end the alleged drift toward anarchy
and to promote reform, and acting prime minister
since Erim resigned.
Melen should have little difficulty in re-
taining the confidence of the top military leaders,
and he probably will be viewed by most political
leaders as an acceptable prime minister, especially
if he agrees to move toward early national elec-
tions. If Melen retains most of the members of
the second Erim cabinet, which is still serving in a
caretaker capacity, he should be able to win a
vote of confidence from parliament. So far, Melen
has refused to resign from the small but in-
fluential National Reliance Party, and this could
cause some trouble both in parliament and among
some military circles despite his professed in-
tention to form an "above-parties" government as
required by the military. 25X1
CYPRUS: CABINET CHANGES TO COME
President Makarios still declines to accept
Greek direction of Cypriot internal affairs. He
refuses to make sweeping changes in his adminis-
tration as demanded by the Greeks. Foreign
Minister Kyprianou, who is not well-regarded in
Athens, has resigned, and Makarios has promised
to reshuffle other ministers next month. He will
probably dismiss a few ministers objectionable to
Athens, but he will use the opportunity primarily
to get rid of those who have been giving him
trouble.
Whatever changes Makarios makes, he will
make sure the reshuffle does not constitute sub-
mission to Athens. In fact, Makarios appears con-
fident that the Greeks will play down their dif-
ficulties with him in order to encourage resump-
tion of the intercommunal talks. At present,
Athens is busily occupied with soothing Turkish
concern that these talks might adversely affect
the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek and Turkish
foreign ministers apparently will discuss the
Cyprus situation prior to the semi-annual discus-
sion at the UN Security Council on the renewal of
the UN peace-keeping force on Cyprus. These
developments should keep Cyprus and the
Athens-Nicosia dispute on the back burner, at
least for awhile. 7
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OMAN - YEMEN (ADEN): FIREWORKS
Oman's campaign to subdue leftist rebels
belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Oman and the Arab Gulf recently led to a
border clash with Yemen (Aden). The fighting,
which lasted about four days, involved mortar
and machine-gun attacks by popular front insur-
gents and Adeni militia on Omani positions near
Habarut in Dhofar Province. When Omani at-
tempts to arrange a cease-fire were unsuccessful,
Omani fighter aircraft, in all likelihood flown by
British pilots, strafed targets across the ill-defined
border on 6 and 7 May.
The attack from Yemen (Aden) was prob-
ably designed to ease pressure on popular front
units nearby. Since last October, when the Sul-
tan's British-led army went on the offensive, the
insurgents, who are supported by Aden, have
been driven from many of their mountain sanc-
tuaries toward the poorly defined frontier with
Aden.
The fireworks in Dhofar have produced a
flurry of diplomatic activity. Both Yemen (Aden)
and Oman raised the matter in the Arab League
and with UN officials. Aden has seized upon the
incident to spotlight British military assistance to
the Sultanate of Oman. The incident at Habarut is
also being used by the radical regime in Aden to
support its oft-cited allegation that Saudi Arabia
and Oman are working to overthrow it. While
both governments would, for their own reasons,
like to see a less radical regime in Aden, there is 25X1
no evidence of active collusion in the border
clash. The Sultan of Oman has sought financial
aid from Saudi Arabia
to cover some of the expenses of the
campaign against the o ular front. 25X1
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PAKISTAN: BIG DEVALUATION
Islamabad last week devalued the rupee by
almost 60 percent, thereby opening the door to
substantial Western aid. The Aid-to-Pakistan Con-
sortium had made currency reform a prerequisite
for debt relief. The relief package, already tenta-
tively agreed to, will amount to $234 million
through June 1973. Western nations probably will
also provide urgently needed commodity aid, and
the International Monetary Fund probably will
grant stand-by credits.
The devaluation will have only a limited
impact on foreign trade, but it has enabled
Islamabad to get rid of a complicated bonus sys-
tem. The system, just dismantled after more than
13 years' operation, had the effect of de facto
devaluations for various categories of exports and
imports. Cotton and rice exporters, who would
normally stand to gain the most from the new
devaluation, are facing new export duties that will
lessen their advantage. Similarly, customs duties
apparently have been adjusted so that the landed
cost of most imports will not differ significantly
from the pre-devaluation figure. Finally, many
essential imports are now allowed entry only
under aid or barter agreements.
Islamabad is moving to minimize infla-
tionary pressures resulting from the devaluation.
President Bhutto has threatened sweeping arrests
of businessmen if they make unwarranted price
hikes. Government subsidies will hold down
prices of basic consumer goods such as wheat,
vegetable oil, and gasoline. To limit credit ex-
pansion, the bank rate has been increased from
five to six percent, and deposit and lending rates
will be changed.
Devaluation is the latest in a series of eco-
nomic steps announced by the Bhutto adminis-
tration. Unlike the earlier measures-land and
labor reform, selective government take-overs of
industry-the devaluation is essential to the ef-
ficient operation of the economy and is not as
closely connected with Bhutto's political plat-
form. The President still has not made his most
crucial economic decision, the choice between the
competing demands for scarce resources of mili-
tary and civilian interests.
NIGERIAN DIPLOMACY IN WEST AFRICA
General Gowon is showing a growing interest
in extending his government's influence in West
Africa. As part of the program, Lagos is drawing
on its increasing oil revenues to assist its poorer
neighbors and to promote regional economic co-
operation.
Since the end of the civil war in early 1970,
Gowon has brought Nigeria into the mainstream
of African diplomacy. In the last three months,
he has focused on West Africa. A visit to Guinea
in March strengthened bilateral relations not only
with Guinea but also with Sierra Leone, whose
president came to Conakry especially to see
Gowon. In Conakry, Gowon enhanced Nigeria's
image as a benefactor of African liberation move-
ments through well-publicized contacts with and
promises of aid to the leaders of the insurgent
group in Portuguese Guinea. Gowon also has been
demonstrating an eagerness to mediate bilateral
disputes, notably those between Guinea and
Senegal and between Guinea and Ghana.
Last month, Lagos gave a $3 million inter-
est-free loan to Dahomey, which has been re-
ceiving a variety of quasi-commercial assistance
from Nigeria since early 1971. Gowon is
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UPPER VOLTA
French-speaking state
English-speaking state
considering extending aid to hard-pressed Ghana,
whose new military leaders are admirers of his
regime.
Gowon's most striking move so far was a
recent state visit to Togo, which coincided with a
meeting of nine French-speaking heads of state of
the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organ-
ization. While in Lome, Gowon reached a recon-
ciliation with presidents Houphouet-Boigny of
Ivory Coast and Bongo of Gabon, both of whom
had recognized Biafra during the Nigerian civil
war. Gowon used the occasion to signal a serious
interest in multilateral economic arrangements by
pledging to join with Togo in an "economic en-
semble" that will be open to others. The structure
of the "ensemble" is to be negotiated in Lagos in
June, and the Nigerians claim it will be comple-
mentary to the projected West African Economic
Community that leaders of eight French-speaking
states are to discuss in Bamako in July.
Nigeria's expanding regional activities are be-
ing watched closely in Paris, which still wields
strong influence in French-speaking West Africa.
The French have long been concerned over Ni-
geria's potential as a pole of attraction to its
much smaller French-speaking neighbors. In the
past Paris has discouraged the formation of organ-
izations that include both French- and English-
speaking African states. Despite Paris' concern,
even the most conservative French-speaking
leaders have cautiously welcomed Gowon's initia-
tives, which at this point are far from a challenge
to France's basic interests in West Africa. 25X1
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Contention within President Allende's Popu-
lar Unity coalition is more apparent every day.
Socialists and smaller hard-line groups are openly
challenging the more cautious Communists and
making common cause with the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left, the miristas. The extremists
seem determined to promote violence and force a
showdown-or a series of them-that will push the
government into more drastic measures to con-
solidate power.
Communist leaders are concerned by the
obvious inroads of the extremists on the party's
influence, particularly among workers and youth.
Party strategists seem ready to adopt a more
radical stance to regain the initiative within the
coalition and to counter the growing influence of
the miristas but cannot easily gear up their stolid
organization and stodgy stalwarts. Events last
week in the strongly leftist industrial city of Con-
cepcion demonstrated the problems posed by the
extremists to the Communists and the coalition.
When simultaneous scheduling of three marches-
by the opposition, the coalition, and the
miristas-appeared certain to set off violence,
President Allende ordered them all canceled. The
more radical coalition factions and the miristas
disregarded the order. Two days of violence en-
sued when the police tried to stop them. The
radicals, in turn, blamed the fracas, and the death
it caused, on the ineptness of the ranking provin-
cial official, a Communist, and his party.
There are similar splits in the countryside,
where Socialists are joining miristas in land sei-
zures in efforts to push the government into a
more drastic agrarian program. Their efforts have
led to stepped-up rural violence. Violence had
already been triggered by some peasants' dissatis-
faction over the meager immediate benefits of
agrarian reform and landowners' use of force to
salvage what they can. The Communists see the
illegal seizures as helping the opposition and
raising sympathy for landowners among the mili-
tary.
In the political arena, the hard-line Socialist
leaders headed by Secretary General Carlos
Altamirano are again trying to force a plebiscite.
They plan to submit a constitutional amendment
to congress providing for more sweeping national-
izations of businesses, expropriations of even
smaller farms, worker participation in all enter-
prises, and confiscation of all ITT interests. The
Socialists have challenged the opposition majority
in congress to reject the amendment so that the
government can call a plebiscite on the amend-
ment.
President Allende, the police, and the judi-
ciary are caught in the middle. Allende is showing
concern over opposition claims that the touted
integrity of the Chilean judiciary is threatened by
his government and that the police are not
ordered to curb the illegal activities of leftist
extremists. The President wants to decide his own
timing and issue for a plebiscite that he knows
could be critical. He is weary of end runs and
constant and competing pressures from his sup-
posed supporters.
There are further indications that he sees the
incorporation of more military officers into his
government as strengthening both it and his own
position. The commandant of the Valparaiso
Naval Zone has been named to head the pro-
vincial government-the second such appoint-
ment-and there is a report that an air force
general will be given the task of putting the hard-
up national airline back on its feet. Allende's own
bill to nationalize ITT's majority holdings in the
Chilean telephone company provides for the
military forces to name officers to appraise the
value of the holdings. 25X1
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CABINET SHUFFLE IN ECUADOR
On 11 May, President Rodriguez dismissed seriously impair his ability to govern effec-
from his cabinet the two members who had been tively. 25X1
and most independent of the rest of the adminis-
tration. Rumors had been circulating for several
weeks that Rodriguez wanted to get rid of Gov-
ernment Minister Valdivieso and Production Min-
ister Proano. The President had hesitated because
of Proano's support among younger officers and
because of the navy's backing of Valdivieso, a
navy captain. After assuring himself of the sup-
port of important army commands, the President
removed the men from the cabinet and returned
them to active military service. A civilian, Felipe
Orellana has replaced Proano, and Defense Min-
ister Aulestia will take over the government
portfolio temporarily.
Other shifts are expected as Rodriguez at-
tempts to assert more forceful control over his
administration. Two other activist ministers,
Rodriguez of public works and Jarrin of natural
resources, would be likely candidates, but they
have been less vocal than Proano and therefore
may be kept on, at least for a while, to mollify
reformists within the armed forces. The fact that
Valdivieso and Proano were not retired indicates
that Rodriguez did not believe himself to be in
full control.
Strains do persist within the armed forces,
especially over the pace and direction of reforms.
The navy, the most reformist of the services,
believes that the army officers who hold key
positions are motivated only by a desire for
power and have no clear direction in mind. Navy
leaders believe that the replacement of naval of-
ficers holding government positions is a calculated
policy to place the army in complete control.
Rodriguez can remain president as long as he
retains the support of the leaders of key troop
commands. Even with this backing, continued
dissatisfaction within the armed torces v.ouia
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CUBA: CASTRO LEAVES AFRICA
Fidel Castro has completed the African
portion of his extensive foreign tour after a ten-
day stay in Algeria. Although Castro was warmly
received on his arrival in Algiers, it appears that
his statements about his political philosophy
made a negative impression on his Algerian hosts.
Some of them have come to regard the Cuban
case as an excellent example of what happens to a
country's revolution if its leaders are unable to
establish true independence.
Algerian Foreign Ministry officials who ac-
companied Castro throughout his tour of their
country reportedly commented that the Cuban
leader has sold out to the USSR and that he
should be considered as just another Marxist-
Leninist. They admitted that Cuba's revolu-
tionary doctrine does in some ways have a pecul-
iarly Cuban stamp, but said that Castroism cannot
be considered as a pattern for other developing
nations.
Castro evidently also made a number of mis-
takes in his public contacts. During a visit to a
southern oasis, the Cuban leader timed some date
pickers and said they were too slow. Moreover,
Castro criticized the quality of the crates in which
the dates were being packed. Algerian officials
remarked that Castro's criticism was laughable in
view of his inept handling of the Cuban economy.
Relations between Algeria and Cuba had
been somewhat more cordial since Foreign Min-
ister Bouteflika spent ten days in Cuba last year.
It appears, however, that Castro did not impress
the Algerians as a third-world leader. It is likely
that they were glad to see him move on when he
left for Bulgaria on 17 May for the first stop on
the European leg of his long tour.
President Bordaberry has gained a 45-day
extension of his internal state-of-war measures,
thanks to the support of two opposition Blanco
factions. Having failed to obtain passage of a
national security law, Bordaberry appealed to
Congress last week to grant him emergency
powers for an additional 90 days beyond the 15
May termination date for the state of war. Al-
though Blanco leader Wilson Ferreira wanted to
give the administration only a 15-day extension,
conservative Blancos voted to give the President
more time to negotiate a compromise on the
security law.
This is the first time that Blanco legislators
have split on a major issue since Bordaberry took
office. The Blancos who sided with the adminis-
tration, however, did not support Ferreira for
president in the last election, but backed the
more conservative Mario Aguerrondo. These dis-
sident factions may lend occasional support to
Bordaberry in the future, but it is unlikely that
they will agree to consistent coo eration with the
administration. 25X1
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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09500090001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09500090001-9
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09500090001-9