WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009500060002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 28, 1972
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
D
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Italian Election Maze
Secret
N2 50
28 April 1972
No. 0367/72A
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The
ITALIAN
ELECTION
MAZE
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Manifesto Party A pro-Chinese faction of Italy's Communist Party, it is
presenting its own slate of candidates for the first time. It is named after II
Manifesto, a publication the dissidents have been issuing for the past three
years.
Communist Party of Italy The largest Communist Party in a non-
Communist state, it supports the policy of the Soviet Union in foreign affairs
and reform of the state in domestic affairs.
Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity Formed in 1964 by left-wing
Socialists who did not approve of the Socialist Party's participation in the
center-left coalition.
Socialist Party The largest element in the country's socialist movement,
which has been split, reunited, and split again over the degree of cooperation
with the Communists.
Social Democratic Party Right-wing Socialists who do not approve of a
unified program with the Communists.
Republican Party A small, left-center party whose traditions go back to
the 19th century struggle to unite Italy as a republic. Its foreign policy
positions ordinarily are pro-US.
Christian Democratic Party The descendant of the Catholic Popular
Party of the early 1920s, it has been the core of all postwar governments. It
represents a wide range of views, which sometimes makes it difficult to reach
agreement on specific issues.
Liberal Party Strongly pro-NATO, it is distinguished from the right
wing of the Christian Democrats mainly by its anti-clericalism.
Italian Social Movement Imbued with the traditions of fascism, and a
certain nostalgia for the Mussolini era.
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The
ITALIAN
ELECTION
MAZE
A new season of Italian politics opened on 28 February when President Leone
dissolved parliament and set elections for 7-8 May. The atmosphere this time around is
markedly different than when the nation last went to the polls in 1968. Then, the outgoing
government defended its record. Today, the four parties of the center-left coalition are
blaming each other for the inadequacies and general malfunction of recent Italian adminis-
tration.
In 1968, the economy was flourishing: today, it is floundering after the poorest year
since World War II. The electorate's mood has changed from optimistic support to deep
disenchantment over the lack of progress the tired center-left formula has made toward
solving political and social problems.
The parties of the extreme right and extreme left have been thriving on these problems.
The neo-fascists, who were not taken seriously in 1968, now have developed a knack for
rallying the protest vote. The Communists are troubled by this trend and also are worried
about the prospect of losses to their own left. The Communists' militant Manifesto group,
for example, is running on a separate ticket for the first time. Labor unrest, the turbulence
in Italian society itself, and the jumble of political currents within the center-left coalition
have all combined to create an atmosphere of political uncertainty.
Italy's voters always have been more stable than the governments they elected. The
percentage of votes won or lost by an individual party from one national election to the
next has exceeded four percent only once in twenty years. The politicians are uncertain how
long this can go on. A record number of first-time voters-one in ten-may disrupt the
pattern this year, but there are so many parties and political movements that it is difficult
for any one party to gain a dramatic advantage. This year, 6,888 candidates representing 23
parties will compete for the 630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
Special Report
- 3 - 28 April 1972
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The Making of a Parliamentarian
To complement the complexities of a political system that has a superabundance
of parties and overlapping factions, Italy has devised an equally intricate electoral
process.
Chamber of Deputies
The candidate must be
25 and the voter 21. The
country is divided into 32 dis-
tricts or electoral colleges. The
number of deputies elected
from each electoral college is
in proportion to the popula-
tion of the district. Individual
parties submit a list of candi-
dates for each district which
may include as many names as
there are prospective seats.
The candidate need not reside
in the district and may run in
as many as three districts. If a
candidate wins in more than
one district, he must choose
the district he will represent.
The next person on his party
list in the other district is then
declared the winner there.
Each voter is allowed to
vote for only one party's list
of candidates, but he may re-
arrange the order of the names
by writing in the names of his
favorite candidates closer to
the top of that party's list.
This is called "preferential
voting." If not enough voters
express a particular prefer-
ence, the priority established
by-the party is used to assign
the seats that are won.
When the balloting is
concluded, the electoral com-
mission divides the total num-
ber of votes cast in each col-
lege by the number of
deputies to be elected, plus a
"correction factor" of two.
The result is the minimum
number of votes, or the
electoral quotient, required to
elect a single candidate in that
district. This figure is divided
into each party's total vote as
many times as possible and the
remainder is transferred to a
central national pool, the Uni-
fied National College (UNC).
The seats within an electoral
college that have not been al-
located because of the lack of
sufficient bloc votes are also
transferred to the UNC.
Only parties that have
won at least one seat in one of
the 32 electoral colleges and
have obtained at least 300,000
votes nationwide may qualify
to have their remainder votes
transferred to the UNC. The
UNC determines a new
electoral quotient by dividing
the total number of votes it
has received by the total num-
ber of seats transferred there.
Seats are then assigned to
parties possessing the
quotient, or multiples thereof,
with any remaining seats given
to the parties having the high-
est unused remainder.
The candidate must be
40 and the voter 25. The
country is divided into 20 re-
gions. A candidate may run in
only one region, but he may
present himself in as many as
three electoral colleges within
the region by a system called
"linking." The candidate is al-
lowed to associate himself
with other candidates in dif-
ferent electoral colleges in the
same region. The other candi-
date need not be of the same
party although he almost al-
ways is. Another alternative is
to run in three electoral col-
leges and link with yourself. It
follows, therefore, that candi-
dates for the Senate run semi-
independently rather than on
party lists like candidates for
the Chamber of Deputies.
If a candidate receives 65
percent of the vote in his col-
lege he is elected, but this is
rare. More often, an "electoral
figure" is assigned to each
group of linked candidates and
an "individual figure" to each
candidate in the group. The
electoral figure equals the vote
total of all candidates in the
group. The individual figure is
determined by multiplying the
number of votes received by
the candidate by 100 and di-
viding the answer by the num-
ber of voters in the college. A
candidate running in more
than one college is assigned
the highest "individual figure"
he obtains.
The electoral figures for
all groups in the same party
are totaled and then divided
successively by one, two,
three, etc. Seats are awarded
to the party on the basis of
the highest quotients thus ob-
tained in descending order un-
til all the seats are alloted.
Seats won by each party group
are then distributed to those
who have the highest indi-
vidual figure within the party
group.
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Over the past year, the growing divergencies
within the center-left alliance have been spot-
lighted against a backdrop of unsolved problems
and popular losses at the polls. Premier Emilo
Colombo's government had squeezed through
some reforms and was pressing for others when
the Republicans, the smallest of the four partners
in the fragile coalition, threatened to withdraw
support. Traditionally concerned about fiscal
responsibility, the Republicans were apprehensive
about the cost of additional social-welfare pro-
grams, particularly in view of the country's gen-
eral economic slowdown.
The second largest coalition partner, the
Socialists, preferred to move leftward-even if it
meant reaching accommodations with the Com-
munist Party. This orientation became apparent
during the presidential elections in December
when the Socialists aligned with the Communists.
Leone was eventually elected president by a com-
bination of parties of the center and without
Socialist support. Faced with this flagrant lack of
discipline and the absence of general agreement
on a governmental program, Premier Colombo
resigned to give the center-left parties the choice
of patching their differences or moving toward
early elections.
Negotiations to form a new government
widened other cracks in the coalition and made
the formation of a new center-left alliance im-
possible. Disagreements over measures to revi-
talize the sagging economy and to arrest the
breakdown in law and order drove the coalition
partners further apart, but the divorce refer-
endum proved to be the issue on which there was
no margin for compromise. The Socialists and the
Republicans were adamant in their refusal to par-
ticipate in a government without prior agreement
to block the referendum intended to repeal the
divorce legislation of 1970.
When it became apparent that the country
was moving toward its first post-war experience
with parliamentary dissolution and early elec-
tions, Italy's largest party, the Christian Demo-
crats, maneuvered into a position where it could
govern alone during the campaign period. Noting
the electorate's drift to the right, the Christian
Democrats wanted to free themselves from their
former center-left partners so the electorate
would be aware that the Christian Democrats
would be open to other coalition combinations
after the elections. The Christian Democrats also
reasoned that, if they governed with vigor and
purpose during the interim, they might be able to
shed the center-left's image of a do-nothing gov-
ernment.
President Giovanni Leone selected fellow
Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti to form a
Christian Democrat monocolore government.
Andreotti's minority government failed to win its
initial vote of confidence. Leone then dissolved
parliament on 28 February, set the date for early
elections, and appointed Andreotti to head a care-
taker government. The dubious constitutionality
of allowing a government that never gained parlia-
ment's confidence to remain in power until new
elections has caused some grumbling, but Leone's
action has not been seriously challenged.
Thus, the country slipped into early elec-
tions, not by popular demand but because a ma-
jority of center-left politicians had come to want
it that way. The Christian Democrats had par-
ticular grounds for advancing the electoral time-
table. The 1971 census confirmed a large popu-
lation shift away from areas-the countryside and
the south-where they are traditionally strong.
Parliamentary seats have not yet been redis-
tributed to reflect this migration, but they would
have been by 1973.
Early elections promised to offer other
advantages that the Christian Democrats share
with some of their center-left partners. In the first
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place, local elections have indicated a shift to the considerable portion of the populace, as well as
right that most center-left leaders fear will gather some of their coalition partners, favored divorce.
more momentum by 1973. Then, too, although On the other hand, the Christian Democrats dared
the center-left administration must bear respon- not cross the Catholic Church, one of their tra-
sibility for the current economic slowdown, the ditional pillars of support.
majority of center-left leaders were not confident
that they could have revitalized the economy this
year. Moreover, the renegotiation of major labor
contracts this autumn involving about four mil-
lion workers is expected to cause considerable
strife. Since the state plays a large role in eco-
nomic guidance and production, the ruling parties
preferred to have the elections before they antag-
onized such a large segment of the population.
Finally, the law provides that dissolution auto-
matically postpones for one year thedivorceref-
erendum originally scheduled for June 1972.
In short, a majority of the center-left came
to want early elections before they were forced to
confront issues that might further erode their
popularity. This strategy is not without risks.
Placing the country's problems in a holding pat-
tern may only reinforce the center-left's image as
a government that avoids, rather than solves, prob-
lems.
Divorce: The tortured history of Italy's di-
vorce legislation is a classic example of the cen-
ter-left's inability to come to grips with problems
that divide the country. First introduced into
parliament in 1966, the divorce bill generated
four years of debate, unparalleled for acrimony,
before it was passed in December 1970. Last
summer, the law survived another test when the
Constitutional Court declared it did not infringe
the 1929 Concordat between the Vatican and the
government. Yet, while all this energy and time
was being expended on the passage of the divorce
legislation, an equal amount of energy and time
went into passage of a referendum law designed
to nullify it.
Christian Democrat poster warns Italian women that
The Christian Democrats are largely respon- Socialists and Communists support divorce which
sible for this net zero result. They sensed that a threatens family life.
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The dilemma was side-stepped in December
1968 in negotiations on the formation of a cen-
ter-left government following the national elec-
tions. The four coalition parties agreed that the
divorce law would not be an issue on which
government solidarity was expected. The coali-
tion program did include, however, a draft law
allowing a national referendum if 500,000 sig-
natures from the electorate were obtained. The
divorce law was passed in 1970 and, in June
1971, well over a million signatures were sub-
mitted for a referendum to abrogate the freshly
printed legislation.
In effect, both those who favored and those
who opposed divorce indulged in fruitless and
contradictory efforts designed to avoid facing the
problem. This kind of procrastination, all too
common, has not endeared the center-left to the
electorate, which recognizes that such manu-
evering prevents the government from dealing
with more pressing issues. The postponement of
the referendum has placed the divorce issue on
the back burner, but it could be an obstacle in the
formation of the next government if enough
parties insist on a program to derail the refer-
endum.
The large number of women voters (2.3 mil-
lion more than men) poses special problems in the
formulation of campaign techniques to deal with
the divorce question. Above the age of 65, there
are two women voters for every male; four mil-
lion out of a total electorate of 37 million are
women over 60. This age group can be counted
on to stand firmly against divorce.
The younger generation of females are not
that predictable. They are not as fearful as their
mothers that divorce is a threat to their security
and the fabric of family life. Instead, they are
beginning to question the subservient position of
the wife in most Italian marriages, and some are
equating divorce with liberty. The standards of
Italian society, as of others, are changing rapidly.
Traditional male freedoms are not as sacrosanct as
in the past.
Special Report
Law and Order: The Italian people have
been deeply troubled in recent years by what
they view as a breakdown in public order. In this
they include a whole catalog of woes ranging
from urban warfare and record-breaking traffic
jams to the government's inability to implement
what laws it does manage to legislate.
Actually, statistics show the level of dis-
orders and violence has declined in recent years,
but the voters-bombarded daily with sensational
press accounts of crime, student unrest, strikes,
and political violence-do not appear convinced.
They expressed their discontent in local elections
last June by giving the neo-fascist party, which
bills itself as the champion of law and order,
impressive gains at the expense of the Christian
Democrats.
Following these elections, the center-left
government stepped up its efforts to reduce law-
lessness and violence. Law enforcement forces
were increased and modernized. Training pro-
grams to improve police techniques, particularly
in riot control, were introduced. In turn, the
police have become very active against both or-
ganized crime and petty criminals. In addition,
the authorities have moved, with obvious relish,
against terrorists at both poles of the political
spectrum.
All parties are campaigning on a law-and-
order plank. With the exception of the Socialists,
who tend to side with the Communists on law
and order, the center-left parties blame the vio-
lence on the Communists and the neo-fascists.
The Communists and neo-fascists fault the Chris-
tian Democrats for being unable to contain the
threat from right or left, and disclaim any associ-
ation with the fanatical groups that hover around
their fringes.
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A street in Milan becomes a battleground during a recent student protest.
The Christian Democrat caretaker govern- onstrated that they intend to be much more as-
toward crime and violence during the campaign
should reap benefits at the polls. In March, the
government activated 3,000 police reservists to
ensure order during the campaign. In April, the
police staged a massive anti-crime swoop through-
out Italy, checking the identities of over 163,000
people. The dragnet scooped up over 400, led to
the confiscation of large quantities of arms and
ammunition, and was well-received by the average
citizen. Political violence also has been kept under
control-in fact, confined to confrontations be-
tween political extremes.
Labor: Labor unrest has made a major con-
tribution to the general malaise in Italian society.
A new generation of workers-one third of those
in the industrial north are under 30-have dem-
sertive than their fathers. The political loyalties
dating from World War II resistance movements
do not have the old impact. The younger workers
have never experienced a recession and are deter-
mined to extract a bigger share of the rewards
from Italy's postwar economic boom.
Italian workers won unprecedented gains
both in monetary returns and union rights fol-
lowing the massive labor turmoil that rocked the
nation during the "Hot Autumn" of 1969, but
they want more. Dissatisfied with the inefficient
manner in which the government has looked after
their social and economic interests, rank-and-file
union members have exerted considerable pres-
sure for an autonomous labor movement that is
more independent of political influence. Italy's
three major labor organizations, despite the
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misgivings of their leaders, adapted to this climate
and initiated merger talks in late 1970.
The Communist-dominated Italian General
Confederation of Labor, the largest of the three
major labor organizations, has always favored
unity, believing a merger would enable it to
dominate the entire union movement. Communist
Party leaders were dubious, however, for fear
merger would mean an organized and inde-
pendent labor movement freed from traditional
party loyalties. Unity was even more controversial
within the other two confederations, the leaders
of which were concerned that it would open to
the Communists further inroads into the institu-
tional fabric of Italian society.
Despite such misgivings, last November rep-
resentatives of the three confederations reached a
formal, albeit shaky, accord to unite by 1973.
Hopes for unity miscarried in March, however,
when the central committee of the Italian Labor
Union, the smallest of the three confederations,
voted down the merger. This setback may cause
the Italian worker to lose confidence in his union
organization and resort to more wildcat strikes,
work stoppages, and absenteeism. Union leaders
may try to offset grass-roots resentment by
adopting a more militant posture vis-a-vis manage-
ment. Such a trend already is evident. Strikes are
commonplace, cause constant inconveniences,
and are harmful to the economy. Italy cannot
afford a repeat of last year when over 100 million
man-hours were lost to work stoppages.
Economy: The sociopolitical issues that have
beset the Italian people in recent years could be
overlooked so long as the economy prospered.
The economic performance last year-the worst
since World War II-made this sort of absolution
much more difficult. Domestic investments fell
10.3 percent, industrial production dropped 2.6
percent, and the GNP increase in real terms was
only 1.4 percent. Even though total employment
declined slightly, industrial and agricultural wages
were up 11.9 and 13.7 percent, respectively, and
contributed to a 6.6 percent increase in general
price levels. With a quarter of their productive
capacity unutilized and their profit margins
squeezed, manufacturers need a clearer political
picture and assurance of a sustained increase in
demand to induce them to invest.
In a front-page editorial in its final issue of
the year, the Milan daily financial newspaper II
Sole/24 Ore said "Forget 1971." Few have, how-
ever, and pessimism prevails in the early months
of 1972. Business leaders, discouraged by the
uncertain political situation, continued labor
unrest, and the probability of difficult nego-
tiations with some four million workers whose
contracts expire this year, are reluctant to make
the investments that are necessary to refuel the
economy.
The Christian Democrats and most of their
center-left partners appreciate their vulnerability
on the economic issue and are scrambling to im-
prove their images. Premier Andreotti's Christian
Democratic caretaker government has promised
to accelerate the release of funds for reforms
L 'e con omia a/ primo posto
ne//n camp agna elettorale
Front-page headline in La Stampa highlights the importance of the economy in the election campaign.
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Numerous campaign posters vie for the voters' attention.
approved last year. The Christian Democrats also
have committed themselves to implement a 1969
law that increases pension scales for the self-
employed and have promised to introduce in the
next parliament a similar bill for wage earners. In
addition, the implementation of the value-added
tax, which was expected to increase consumer
prices three percent, was postponed.
These moves will curry favor with the elec-
torate, but the business community, the key to
economic recovery, probably will remain dis-
trustful. To stimulate investment, the government
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lowered the discount rate in April, but most in-
dustrialists will postpone capital commitments
until they have had time to assess the results of
the election. If they conclude that the new gov-
ernment can provide a healthy economic environ-
ment, Italy should be able to reverse its economic
slump.
The Italian voter clearly is disenchanted with
the outgoing center-left administration's legacy of
broken promises and unmet goals. Even its few
28 April 1972
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accomplishments-tax and housing reforms-have
left a bad taste. Many voters are leery about the
implementation of tax revisions, and the recent,
bitter debates over the housing bill produced a
compromise that is unlikely to come close to
satisfying the country's needs. The widely her-
alded reforms of universities, the judiciary, public
transport, and public health services either bogged
down in parliamentary debate or never reached
the floor.
Many voters will be tempted to spurn the
center-left group because of the decline in the
economy, the reputed increase in violence, and
legislative inaction. The simplest way for such
people to register their disapproval is to vote for a
Marxist party of the far left or the neo-fascists on
the extreme right. The Italian electorate's long-
evident desire to prevent extremists of any kind
from gaining control sets limits on this type of
voting and may account, at least in part, for the
rightward drift of the electorate in the past year.
Those who are determined to cast a protest vote
may feel safer voting for the neo-fascist party
because it is smaller, and therefore less of a threat
to democratic institutions than the extreme left.
Evidence that a bloc of protest votes exists was
apparent in local elections in Sicily last June.
Although Christian Democrat losses accounted
for most of the neo-fascist gains, the returns
showed that some voters had few ideological con-
straints about switching from the Communists to
the neo-fascists.
Most voters probably will take the more
difficult route and try to sort out the five parties
and their many factions in the middle of the
spectrum. The campaign, as well as the maneu-
vering that preceded the dissolution of parlia-
ment, has helped clarify the voters' options.
The Socialist Party, the second biggest party
in the center-left, is campaigning on a platform of
collaboration with the left, including the Com-
munists. The Christian Democrats have pledged
not to collaborate with the Communists or the
neo-fascists and are emphasizing "centrality." In
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campaign speeches, Christian Democrat and
Social Democrat leaders have warned the Socialist
Party that intransigent leftism could exclude it
from the future government. The smallest coali-
tion party, the Republicans, again seems content
to stress fiscal responsibility.
The dispute between the Christian Demo-
crats and the Socialists is interpreted by the Lib-
erals, a center-right, anti-clerical party, as a favor-
able omen. The Liberals can now envision the
possibility-after ten years in the wings-of being
a determining element in future coalitions. Chris-
tian Democrat and Social Democrat leaders have
hinted that an accommodation with the Liberals
would be quite acceptable, and the Liberals are
pointing up their compatibility by including a
reform program in their electoral platform.
The pre-election cleavage in the center-left
over what role the Communists will play in future
governments has placed the voter in a position to
pass judgment on this issue. If he cannot tolerate
the thought of another sterile marriage of the
Party
1953
1958
1963
1968
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