WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 29, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
29 October 1971
No. 0394/71
Navy review State Dept. review
completed. completed Copy
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CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 28 October 1971)
India ~nPakistan Focus on Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . ,, .
The Sadat` Visit to Moscow . . . . . . . 3
China: The '&,-A Change of Chinas . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ' 5
FAR EAST
Indochina: Vietnam: Worrit~akor the Con4munists; L)ds: The Open Road; Cambodia: 8
Lon Nol Sticks to His Guns . . , . ? ?;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . '
13
Kosygin in Canada: A Mixed Picture. .'g . . N, ? ? ? ? ? ' ' ' ' ' . 14
'
s une ;;..... . . . . . . . . ,
Soviet Economy Dances to Agric iture
. . . . 15
Belgium: Political Tempo Ride( . . ? ? ? 15
WESTERN MISPHERE
1: 17 25X1
Panama Tortijos Thinks Ahead 3e 4 18
Cuba Dusts Off Its International image . . . . . . . .
Uru u2i`"'s Election Sta a Set Amid Strife 19
NOTES: Philippines; Germany; UN-Drugs; Argentina; USSR-Cuba; IThe Yenigns
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India and Pakistan Focus on Diplomacy
Troops of India and Pakistan remain massed
on the borders, but both countries are under-
iaking diplomatic initiatives. Some of these seem
more designed to score propaganda points than to
attack the crux of the problem. Islamabad pub-
licized UN Secretary General Thant's offer on 20
October to assist in defusing the crisis, as well as
the full text of President Yahya's affirmative re-
ply. Yahya called for UN observers on both sides
of the borders to oversee a mutual withdrawal of
military forces and requested the secretary gen-
eral to visit both countries to discuss a pullback.
Islamabad probably hopes this gesture will
induce major powers to press India for an equiva-
lent response or, at least, for restraint. The Pakis-
tanis undoubtedly consider it highly unlikely that
there will be a change in India's resistance to UN
mediation or to withdrawal from the borders.
They probably hope this gambit will help counter
the impact of Prime Minister Gandhi's three-week
tour of Western European capitals and the US.
Mrs. Gandhi justified her trip at this time by
the need to exchange views with world leaders
and to explain to them the "reality of our situa-
tion." Last week, she told visiting President Tito
that she could not rule out war as a solution and
that unless major powers used their influence
with Pakistan to bring about a return of the
refugees, India "would use all available means to
force a solution."
Before departing on her foreign tour, Mrs.
Gandhi met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Firyubin, who arrived on 22 October for allegedly
routine biannual talks.
According to a joint statement issued at
t e conclusion of the talks, the Indo-Pakistani
situation dominated the agenda. According to
pre-;s reports, a Soviet military delegation headed
by Deputy Defense Minister Kutakhov, com-
mander in chief of the air force, was to arrive in
New Delhi on 29 October, probably to assess
Page 1
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Prime Minister Eyskens Greets Indira Gandhi in Brussels
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be consider d near ready for military ag ion. The
remainder a & primarily college students who
would require considerable training efore being
able to functio effectively. In p. ctical terms,
therefore, the ca -up of reserves fovides an only
marginal strengthe ing of t_ndia's already superior
military position.
India's use of Soviet military equipment, possibly
to discuss further military aid.
._ e-mWtary side, Mrs. Gandhi on 23
October called up all of India's army reserves app
selected,, navy and Air force reserves. Althytiigh
India has-,about 700,00.0 army reserves, onl some
44 000 ar sufficientlV,trained and equped to
Along the Ind\ - -`Weft Pakistan border,
where the largest con ertrtions of troops and
equipment are, the I aps now have at least
200,000 men facing a 'akistan force of some
160,000. India has been eploying ground troops
as well as aircraft to they rder area since August.
now all of the large- gr> n uni s have been
moved. India's only-armo d division recently
moved from its ho e based the Jhansi-Babina
area in"north-centrajIndia to n+ rd the border with
West Pakistan, placjng most oaf dia's 1,300 tanks
near the border Pareas. Pa W or n probably has
moved most of ' s availableor s to the border
area.
In the east, India has more t n 100,000
troops near y surrounding ast Pakis n, with at
least four more divisions ear the b rder with
China. TII'e Pakistanis ha a force f about
80,000 the East, if the 10000 or so p Tice and
guard u its are counted. Indi's Air Force ips the
scales decisively in the East, where it s sta-
tioned/three squadrons of 16 IG-21s each nd at
least six squadrons of groud:support air raft.
The /Pakistanis have just 20 jgmg F-86 ground-
supj5ort aircraft, only about h1lf of which appear
to be combat ready. Pakistan's ability to resupbly
its forces in the East is at bQst questionable. In
any case, the Pakistanis need all of the forces they
can muster in the West, particularly aircraft, in
which the Indian Air Force-has a negrly two-to-
one edge in fighter
In sharp contrast to the usually bleak prog-
nostications about the food situation in East Paki-
stan, the latest assessment by the US Consulate in
,Dacca is that the danger of famine in the East has
subsided, at least until next spring. The improved
situation results from the outflow of over nine
million East Pakistanis, the intensive program to
distribute imported foodgrain in the countryside,
and the normal monsoon rice crop, which will be
harvested shortly. Localized food shortages have
been reported, but there have been no indications
of widespread hunger or starvation. If relief ef-
forts go on expanding, there should be enough
food available, during the winter period to assure
reasonably `a'dequate supplies in all but limited
pockets. The consulate thus concludes that hun-
ger is unlikely to be a reason fora continuing
large refugee flow to India this winter.
As for India's economy, at a meeting this
week in Paris of the 13-nation consortium of aid
donors India was successful in securing a pledge
of additional funds to assist in shouldering the
costs imposed by the deluge of Pakistani refugees.
This sort of aid to India so far has been slow to
materialize. At the same time, the consortium
declined to consider Pakistan's request that its
debt be rescheduled. Islamabad may now be
forced to negotiate with each consortium member
individually to extend its six-month unilateral 25X1
moratorium, which saved Pakistan $60 million in
scarce foreign exchange. The moratorium expires
this week.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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.7t lJ1tL. 1
The Sadat Visit to Moscow
Moscow and Cairo are trying to create the
impression that President Sadat's three-day visit
tD the USSR has deepened Soviet-Egyptian
friendship, but there are signs that the talks were
tough enough to leave a healthy residue of resent-
ment on both sides. Relations between the two
countries have been clouded in the past six
months by the removal and trial of leftists from
the Egyptian Government and the anti-Commu-
nist purge in the Sudan which was supported by
Sadat. These factors ma have been the primary
reason for Sadat's visit.
Egyptian news media are claiming full Soviet
support for Cairo's position in the wake of the
visit, but two articles by a member of the Egyp-
tian delegation state that the two sides were "ex-
tremely frank and outspoken" in discussing their
differences. Lutfi al-Khuli, a member of the cen-
tral committee of Egypt's only political party,
wrote that the Soviets wanted an explanation of
Sadat's description of 1971 as the "year of deci-
sion" and of Cairo's connection with the anti-
Soviet slogans being heard in the Middle East. The
Egyptians reportedly wanted a Soviet comparison
between arms they have given the Arabs and US
arms given the Israelis. They also wanted Soviet
views on how high an Israeli withdrawal from
Arab territory ranked in the general framework of
Soviet strategy on world issues. AI-Khuli did not
say what answers were given to these questions
but noted that the discussions enabled Arab-
Soviet relations to pass over a "pool of troubled,
putrid water." An Egyptian journalist who was
with Sadat agreed that the early sessions were
tense.
The communique that capped the visit indi-
cated that the two sides could only agree super-
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ficially on the role of the Confederation of Arab
Republics and the threat of anti-Communism in
the Middle East. The Soviets hitherto have been
lukewarm in their praise of the confederation,
fearing that Libya's role in the triad is not in
Moscow's interest. The communique's strong con-
demnation of "attempts to spread anti-Commu-
nism in the Middle East" offers a reminder to
Sadat that his support for the purges in the Sudan
last summer was anathema to the USSR. The
communique also notes that the two sides have
agreed on "measures aimed at further strength-
ening the military might of Egypt."
So far, there has been no sign of a Soviet
airlift of materiel, which has followed previous
successful visits of an Egyptian president to Mos-
cow. The USSR already has provided Cairo with
nearly all types of modern conventional arms in
the Soviet inventory. In ground armaments only
a new tank and an armored personnel carrier
might be offered to Egypt, but these would not
significantly alter Israel's superiority over Egyp-
tian ground forces. In both naval and air forces,
the Soviets could supply some new types of weap-
ons but these either would offer no significant
improvement in capabilities or would be beyond
current Egyptian capabilities to operate. In sur-
face-to-air missiles, the combination of the SA-2
and SA-3 is the best the Soviets have for the
Egyptian theater of operations. Continued train-
ing in the operation and maintenance of existing
weapons systems-and not new systems them-
selves-offers the most practical method of im-
proving Egyptian military capabilities. All of this,
of course, does not rule out the provision of
additional conventional weapons.
Moscow is taking the line that while it con-
tinues to provide military assistance to the Arabs,
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Oct 71
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U.L U1 \L 1
UNEASY COMARADERIE: Sadat in Moscow with Podgorny, Kosygin, and Brezhnev
it opposes a military solution to the Arab-Israeli
deadlock:
Perhaps in response to Soviet admonitions
during his visit, Sadat has been referring less fre-
quently to the decisive nature of 1971, and has
blunted the sharp edges of his earlier rhetoric.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Oct 71
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Or,un.r, I
China
The UN-A Change of Chinas
cialized agencies, particularly the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund. The mission
said Taipei has decided in principle to attempt to
stay on in all specialized agencies, which will
decide individually on the modalities of Chinese
representation. The wide margin in favor of the
Albanian resolution suggests, however, that Taipei
will in most cases face great difficulties in main-
taining a position. The Chinese Communist acting
foreign minister said on 26 October that Peking,
for its part, was already considering sending a
delegation to New York, but this is unlikely be-
fore Taipei's position is clarified.
The General Assembly's expulsion of Na-
:ionalist China late Monday night is sure to in-
crease the erosion of Taipei's international posi-
:ion, but should not have an immediate impact on
Taiwan's internal stability. Peking is certain to
make full use of this dramatic blow to Nationalist
prestige to undermine Taipei's diplomatic rela-
tions even further. Belgium announced recogni-
tion the day after the vote, and such states as
Argentina, Peru, Togo, and Senegal are likely
soon to open diplomatic relations with Peking.
Chinese Nationalists: Bloody but Unbowed
The Chinese Nationalist UN mission has said
that Taipei's withdrawal statement applied only
to the UN and its subsidiary organs, not to spe-
The General Assembly vote did not come as
a complete surprise on Taiwan either to officials
or to the public.
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A series of forthrig' h ar-
ticles in the island's controlled press had prepared
the populace for the possible defeat of the US-
sponsored resolutions supporting Taipei's mem-
bership. The loss of UN representation has thus
far not aroused popular emotion on Taiwan, and
there is no indication that antigovernment reac-
tions will take place as a result of the repudiation
of the regime's claim to represent all China-the
stock justification for mainlander minority rule
on the island.
Despite Moscow's unhappiness with the idea
of Peking's UN membership, the Soviets appar-
ently engaged in no behind-the-scenes manuever-
ing to forestall Peking's admission prior to the
decisive vote. I n fact, the Soviets spoke in favor
of Peking's entry earlier in the debate and in each
case voted in a way favorable to the eventual
adoption of the Albanian resolution. Pravda sub-
sequently called the vote a "triumph of common
sense."
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R't ~'V ETNAkI
Hanoi `Haiphong
Vientian
TH IrA_ND LAOS
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Indochina
Vietnam: Worries for the Communists
An authoritative Hanoi foreign policy article
has added to earlier indications that North Viet-
nam fears that its ability to set an independent
course in the war is threatened by the prospect of
negotiations between its major Communist pa-
trons and the US.
The review, written by Foreign Minister
Trinh and published in the October issue of the
Hanoi theoretical journal Hoc Tap, is designed to
pass the current Vietnamese Communist foreign
policy line to key officials. It conveys a bleak
message. In resurfacing the concern over big-
power summitry that produced a rash of anti-
Chinese polemics last summer, Trinh leaves the
clear impression that the Vietnamese have not
been fully reassured by Moscow's and Peking's
continued protestations of support or by the
visits to Hanoi of President Podgorny and Chinese
Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien.
Trinh seems particularly concerned over the
possibility that Soviet and Chinese military aid
may be reduced. He is lavish in his praise of the
economic assistance from Peking and Moscow,
but expressions of satisfaction with military sup-
port are conspicuously absent. Instead, the of-
ficials are given standard exhortations to be self-
sufficient and slightly defensive passages are de-
signed to remind them of the war's importance to
the Communist movement as a whole.
Trinh also displays great sensitivity over
Hanoi's loss of initiative in its negotiations with
the US. He promises to step up Hanoi's diplo-
matic activities in support of its war effort. He
resurrects a line, which has not been prominent
for some time, to the effect that diplomacy is a
"front of strategic importance" in its own right.
The article naturally reveals few specifics
about what Hanoi intends to do on the diplo-
Page 8
matic front. It could, of course, presage some
reformulation or change in Hanoi's terms for a
war settlement. There is nothing in the text of the
article, however, that indicates this is in the of-
fing. It does appear that Trinh's article conveys a
message to the officials that Hanoi is going to
have to rely to a greater extent in the coming
period on diplomatic and political efforts to
achieve its objectives in Indochina. Although
Trinh nods to the importance of military action,
pledges a continuation of protracted warfare, and
promises total victory eventually, he significantly
omits its importance in reinforcing diplomacy and
leaves the net impression that Hanoi realizes the
war is entering a phase in which political ma-
neuvering on both sides may play a greater role in_
the development of the conflict thanr in the past.
`Communists Withdrrw from Border Fighting
The Communi is appear to be abando ling
the'i'r month-long n ilitary campaign in outh
Vietn m's Tay'Ninh Pr vince and along the Cam-
bodian -border. Althou some scattered fighting
continues,. the Commu ist 7th Divi i6n and its
three subdrdinate regi ents have -departed the
South Vietnkmese b tlefields..~`
When the f kiting begga`fi, it appeared that
the Communists ,tende"Eo sustain their offen-
sive for several r the aptured documents in-
dicate that the egm`--.j_ ign was launched to tie
down Saigon's formes i.q northwestern Military
Region 3 and there`b`y, prevent the South Vietnam-
ese Army from tagin a major push against Com
'
s
munist base as in Ca bode However, Saigon
forces, s ported b masse e US bombing,
blunted he Communi offens a and inflicted
heavy casualties on the enemy.
Buists Debate Anti-Thu Tactics
1 The An Quang Buddhists apparently, still
discussing tactics for dealing with Prident
Thieu, although their most influential leader ap-
parently intend to continue pursuing a relati~Rly
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moderate course avoiding an open confrontation
elected Lower f-louse, where various political fac-
tions have been trying, behind the scenes, to set
up coalitions.
The An Quang monks- are concerned that
they might lose prestige and influence within the
Buddhist community if they appear too moderate
and willing to cooperate with Thieu. The senior
monks are being challenged by a group of
younger activists who are hopeful that, some of
their seniors can be discredited through identifica-
tion with a policy of cooperation with Thieu. The
activists believe this would give them an opor-
tunity to gain influence within the Buddhist com-
munity. Thus far, the senior monks ha-fe been
able to block the activists from instigating Bud-
d-ist antigovernment demonstrations. But pres-
sure from the activists may have beed responsible
for the An Quang's adoption of a harsher position
in opposition to Thieu's re-election in the final
days before the referendum.
Although relatively rrr3derate leaders still
seem to have the most influence within the An
Quang, continued pi~,essuye from activist elements
could eventually induct them to move toward
more open oppositid to Thieu. This would be
particularly true if Ern Quang's legislative repre-
sentatives prove ineffective or if some new situa-
tion develops in'which the government shows
signs of weakness. Internal divisions among the
Buddhists pert and this could weaken their
force of any O position they try to mount.
Lower House in the Political Spotlight
The National Assembly, which began its fall
term after the presidential election, has been slow
to organize itself. The process should pick up
steam next week after President Thieu's inaugura-
tion. Attention has been focused on the newly
Page 9
L The government also wishes to
limit the amount of time available for the house
to consider the bud et for 1972. The constitution
stipulates that the Lower House must act on the
fiudget and forward it to the Senate by 30 No-
vember. The budget has been a frequent source of
friction between the executive and the assembly,
and Thieu may be anticipating considerable
trouble this time in view of the apparent increase
in opposition strength in the Lower House.
The government's concern about its position
in the house may be well-founded, since some
ostensibly progovernment deputies are really
lukewarm toward the palace and others dislike
being regarded as government lackeys. Opposition
blocs have been coalescing around the An Quang
Buddhists and the Progressive Nationalist Move-
ment. When the house gets down to business,
however, the. government still seems likely to re-
tain majority support on most issues.
Inaugural Preparations
The government is heavily engaged in prepa-
rations for President Thieu's inauguration this
weekend. Thieu appears determined that an im-
pressive ceremony be held as a further demonstra-
tion of his strength and popularity. Thousands of
members of the military and the bureaucracy are
being transported from the provinces to Saigon
for the affair. Security officials are somewhat
concerned about possible attempts by the Viet
Cong or by extremist non-Communstgroups to
disrupt the inauguration, but most of tfe;officials
are confident that any incidents will , e mi-
nor.
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Laos: The Open Road
Route 23, the main road across the western
portion of the Bolovens Plateau, has been re-
opened to civilian traffic, although some portions
are subject to harassment by Communist units in
the area. Sweep operations and patrols are being
conducted but, despite the presence of two com-
panies, enemy troops on 25 October were able to
ambush a government convoy near Paksong. De-
fense forces in Paksong town have been strength-
ened: 4..,a;rlval of two more.:. irregular bat-
talicns, bringing the, total- to- six irregular bat-
talions plus a three-battalion `regular army task
farce.
North Laos: Preparations Continue
Although military activity around the Plaine
des Jarres has been confined to small-unit actions,
probes, and shelling attacks, there is evidence that
the Communists are continuing to prepare for a
dry season offensive. Enemy activity has been
particularly heavy northeast of the Plaine: Route._.
7, -the 'principal line of communication., into the
Plaine from North Vietnam, carried sustained
heavy traffic last week. Road cuts from air strikes
were quickly bypassed or repaired: Pilots have
also noted a',continuing supply buildup in the
Khang Khay area on the northeastern edge of the
Plaine.
Pilots have also spotted large groups of
North Vietnamese in the open,,during the last
several days. The troops were innew uniforms
and failed to take cover when the" planes ap-
proached, suggesting that the were newl'' arrived
from North Vietnam.
Cambodia: Lon Nol Sticks to His Guns
Seemingly unperturbed by the adverse inter-
national reaction or by the limited displays of
domestic disapproval to his strong speech of 20
October, Lon Nol is maintaining the position that
authoritarian measures are called for under
present wartime conditions.
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Lon Nol has wisely used a much more mod-
erate approach in dealing with Buddhist elements
in Phnom Penh who demonstrated against the
transformation of the National Assembly and
who wanted him to replace Cheng Heng as chief
of state. He informed the Buddhists that the
government wants to adopt a new constitution as
soon as possible in order to hold general elections,
after which he implied he could become the re-
public's first president. Thus reassured, the Bud-
dhists have not followed through on earlier
threats to stage additional protest demonstrations.
Page 11
Early in the week, Finance Minister Sok
Chhong announced the government's reforms to
help stabilize the economy. The program includes
cuts in spending, higher tax rates, stronger credit
control, and a possible relaxation of price con-
trols. The key elements are liberalization of im-
ports and abandonment of the official exchange
rate of 55 riels per US dollar in favor of a flexible
rate. These moves are essential if inflation is to be
checked.
Implementation of the reforms will clear the
way for a $20 million US cash grant needed to
bolster Cambodia's critically low foreign ex-
change reserves. Action on the reforms is also
considered a prerequisite to obtaining foreign
contributions to an exchange support fund, now
under active consideration. Cambodian officials
hope to complete plans for the fund at a donor's
meeting in Paris in early November.
The Communists moved against several main
roads during the week. Enemy forces launched a
coordinated series of ground and rocket attacks
on 27 October against a number of Cambodian
positions on Route 6 between Rumlong and Tang
Krasang. Four government battalions in and
around Rumlong reportedly have suffered sub-
stantial casualties. Reinforcements are being sent
from Skoun to Rumlong, and the army high com-
mand apparently is confident that it can with-
stand the increased pressure against Route 6.
The Cambodians are concerned, however,
over the major bridge farther south on Route 6
that has been partially destroyed by the Commu-
nists. It apparently will be difficult to repair, thus
hampering the government's ability to move sup-
plies to its troops strung out along the road.
In the southwest, light harassing attacks in
the Pich Nil Pass have temporarily closed two
miles of Route 4. Government forces have not yet
made an sust fined effort to reopen the hi h-
way.
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9V4~
r- Treaty Limits of the Philippines
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PHILIPPINES: The long-smoldering Muslim dissidence in the southern Philippines flared up
again on 25 October when insurgents launched a series of attacks in Lanao del Norte Province.
In the most serious incidents, 17 men of a 22-man government force were killed while en
route to relieve a besieged constabulary garrison. Armed violence between the private armies
of Muslim and Christian political leaders has been endemic on Mindanao for some time,
though most observers have regarded the problem in Lanao as less deeply rooted than that in
nearby Cotabato Province.
The Lanao dissidence has been closely associated with a personal struggle for supremacy
between the area political boss, N,aci alista arty Congressman Dimaporo (a Muslim) and
Liberal Party Governor Quibranza (airistian .When violence broke out in early September,
President Marcos resolved it primly throf:h a political settlement by which Governor
Quibranza agreed to withdraw from eggubexnatorial race in favor of a compromise candi-
date. Quibranza later had second th9 tsbut foie election commission rejected his bid to file
as an independent candidate. In an f t to dJs Aver what triggered the latest antigovernment
violence, President Marcos is tryr'n ntDimaporo and other Muslim leaders. At the
same time, he has ordered more trodpsg5t theprovince and has placed the army in charge of
security operations.
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Kosygin in Canado: A Mixed Picture
Canadian and Soviet officials breathed a sigh
of relief on 26 October, when Soviet Premier
Kosygin departed alive and unhurt for Cuba. The
Canadian visit probably is looked upon by both
sides as a qualified success. It provided Prime
Minister Trudeau an opportunity to underline his
ef-iorts at diversifying Canada's foreign affairs. It
allowed the Soviets to draw attention again to
their detente policies and to take another step in
developing a special/relationship with an ally -of
the US.
Efforts by minority groups to remove some
of the luster from the visit were successful. Dem-
onstrations, bomb threats, and an assailant who.,
mauled the Soviet premier managed to distrqcl
Kosygin in Canada: '-Smoking the Pipe of Peace?
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from the favorable notice giver. 'the trip. The
Canadian press gave predomi brit space to the
demonstrations. The press also distorted and sen-
sationalized Trudeau's,>r'emarks about Soviet-
Canadian friendship.,.Although most Canadians
approve of Trud qu 's efforts to provide Ottawa
with more varieged political and economic con-
tacts, the pulp#ic generally was indifferent to the
visit.
Fair the most 'part, the two leaders were
careful to avoid statements that would give of-
flense to Washington. One exception was Ko-
,,-=sygin's luncheon toajt given on 19 October, at-
tempting to fan Canadian resentment over US
economic policies. The Soviet premier did not
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repeat this effort, however, and at a news confer-
ence the following day passed up several oppor-
tunities to be critical of the-,US. For his part,
Trudeau balanced his professed desire for warmer
relations with Moscow with aV('knowledjment_oJ
the many differences between the two, cocrntries.
On bilateral issues, th a two sides agreed on a
general exchanges agreement. The Soviets re-
buffed Trudeau's suggestion 'for an international
conference on the arctic, even though both sides
agreed to expand bilateral cooperation on arctic
problems, ,particularly the prevention of pollu-
tion. Kosyginlreeeated the Soviet proposal, raised
during Trudeau'sNay visit to Moscow, for a sep-
arate agreement co,7&ring economic development
and technological and, industrial cooperation, but
the final communique noted only that the Cana-
dians promised to givb further study to the pro-
posal.-The two counj ies also agreed to continue
discussions on maritifne shipping and air transpor-
tation as well as to negotiate an extension of the
bilateral trade agreement for another four
years.
Soviet Economy Dances to Agriculture's Tune
Moscow reported that by the end of the
third quarter industrial growth, although still at a
respectable rate, had slipped from its midyear
pace. As for agriculture, the Soviets are continu-
ing to buy grain from the West despite a near-
record grain crop this year.
Civilian industrial output is estimated to
have grown by about five percent during July-
September over the same period in 1970, com-
pared with nearly seven percent achieved at mid-
year. The growth in industrial materials and con-
sumer nondurables such as food and clothing fell
several percentage points below the rate achieved
during the first six months. Growth in the civilian
machinery sector, however, exceeded the rela-
tively high rate of growth reached at midyear.
As in 1970, the third-quarter decline can
probably be attributed in large part to the diver-
sion of labor and trucks from the industrial sector
to support harvest operations in August and Sep-
tember. Strong support?for the agricultural sector
also is indicated by the high growth rates of
mineral fertilizer and agricultural machinery.
Unusually good weather during the recent
harvest period improved the prospects for this
year's grain crop. The grain -harvest will be at least
145 million tons and may approach the 1970
record level of 150 million tons. Nevertheless, the'
Soviets are still in the market for Western grain.
By September, they had contracted for about 4
million tons of Canadian and Australian wheat
worth about $305 million. M rket-s races-reporter
$300-350 million more, mainly
-fed-grains. -Altogether these deals equal about
-fourth of the country's ann.ualz,hard cu rency
~-earnings.
Both foreign and domestic demands prob-
ably influence Soviet decisions to buy grain. De-
mand for grain by Soviet client states could reach
7.5 million tons during this fiscal year, which
began in July. Domestically, harvesting conditions
and storage problems in the past two years re-
duced the quality of some wheat stocks. More
importantly, the program to increase livestock
holdings, as a long-run solution to meat supply
problems, has drawn down stocks of wheat and
intensified the need for greater amounts of fod-
der. Large grain imports, in addition to the meas-
ures taken to ensure a good harvest, illustrate the
regime's firm intention to improve the quality of
consumer diets. This year, there has been a mod-
erate upturn in the amount of wheat available per
capita after several years of stagnation.
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Belgium: Political Tempo Rises
Both
arties in the present government,
Social Christi
additional seats
November. This
s and the Socialists, should win
the parliamentary election on 7
of recent years. T
whether the Socialist
key question, however, is
can win enough seats to
become the dominant p
with the opposition Libera
arty.
Few policy changes have'een promised in
the campaign:- Rather,. the. rull'gg?parties take
liti?
PCB- Communists
PSB- Socialists
PLP- Liberals
FDF-RW- Coalitio of Francophone Democratic
Fron and Walloon Rally
GERMANY: The . inter-German talks have pro-
duced agreement onsome technical details affect-
inc sealed-fright in `transit between West Berlin
and West Gerrrilany._ Np progress has been made
on thornier issues such' "85 one-day passes for West
Berliners to visit East -Berlin. The West Germans
have expressed satisfAction with the "bu51n s-
like" way the East German negotiatgrs--t r ap-
proaching the talks/ but warn=,agTnst overopti-
mism and believe th0t e= g otiations will not be
concluded befojeJ [e end of the year. The East
Germans appear willing to agree on those issues
that do not impinge ion their notion of statehood
strength from constitutional reforms that have
eased tensions between the country's French- and
Dutch-speaking commun lies and have weakened
the appeal of the milit4ylt parties, such
The Soci hristians, stressing continuity
and expertis are hopeful that they can recover
votes lost the Volksunie in Flanders. They are,
however vulnerable to charges that Prime Min-
ister skens called the election to avoid legisla-
tio romised the French-speakers as part of the
r orm package. The co-president of the Social-
sts, Leburton, who would like to be the next
prime minister, has been particularly vocal on this
score. He has made little political mileage, how-
ever, and the Socialists' self assurance, is waning.
They are now stressing standard "progressive"
themes.
The Liberals, the other major party, are split
on ial and linguistic issues. Like the other
opposi n parties, they were caught off guard by
the gover ent's call for early elections and have
not campaig d effectively.
badly.
The contest particularly hard fought in
Brussels. The govetnment's municipal reform
program has done little for the city's predomi-
nantly French-speaking population and, as a con-
sequence, the government parties may suffer
but apparently hope to gain concessions by drag-
ging out talks d playing on West` Germany's
desire for progress in its Ostpolitik. There is,
however, speculatib that the Soviets may not
support prolonged fqt-dragging by the Pankow
regime. `This is fueled by the achievement of
peripheral progress folf~wing the 20 October
--whirlwind trip to Moscow by the East German
foreign minister and senior. East German negotia-
tor s. Tile East German leadership may also find it
more difficult` to-appear Unreasonable in dealing
with the new Nobel" Peace Laureate, Chancellor
Brandt.
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Gierek's Poland: Calm Without Contentment
During his first ten months as party leader,
Edward Gierek has reduced the hostility of the
workers with selected ad hoc solutions to their
complaints and by creating channels through
which they can communicate new grievances.
Gierek's policies have established a freer atmos-
phere and have been well received, even though
they have not satisfied all of the populace's de-
mands. These same tactics have proved unpopu-
lar, however, with many of the party's middle and
lower cadre who believe that Gierek's "renewal"
has encouraged the public to become too assertive
in pressing demands upon the regime.
One of Gierek's more popular innovations-a
television program called the "citizens' tribune,"
through which the people can question national
leaders and voice opinions about the country's
problems-has been adopted for use in several of
the large industrial enterprises. Earlier this month,
workers at the Lenin Combine in Krakow sub-
mitted 3,600 questions to party and industrial
leaders, including the provincial party chief. This
type of dialogue has become a permanent fixture
at the Warski shipyard in Szczecin. In Poznan,
provincial government leaders man phones two
hours a week answering questions from the
citizens.
The dialogues reveal that the workers want a
broad spectrum of economic and social benefits,
especially better living accommodations, modern
work facilities, and recreational opportunity. A
worker summed up one aspect of the problem
when he asked, "In the summer we can go to the
park, but where can we go in the winter?" The
authorities neither have a satisfactory answer, nor
can they ignore the question after last winter's
riots.
Gierek believes it is better to explain why all
inadequacies cannot be overcome immediately
rather than have them smoulder, but he cannot
count on the cooperation of large segments of the
party bureaucracy inherited from Gomulka.
These include mossbacks who are unaccustomed
to making decisions on their own, or to defending
their actions from public scrutiny. They would
have been unable to cope, for example, at a
recent meeting with a worker who, amidst the
cheers of his co-workers, told his director, "We
shall force the authorities to finance the con-
struction of a cultural center."
Top party officials have served notice that
passive resistance of local bureaucrats to Gierek's
programs will not be tolerated. Most recently,
politburo member Jan Szydlak warned that party
officials who avoid the "inconvenience" of estab-
lishing links with the workers should prepare for
the consequences. Indeed, three cabinet ministers
and several deputies lost their jobs this week. The
middle layer of the party apparatus may be exten-
sively overhauled next month at the provincial
party conclaves that precede the party congress in
December. By contrast, Gierek is in firm control
of the top levels of party and government, al-
though he may make some additional personnel
shifts at a precongress party plenum.
UN-,DRUGS: Despite final report that was op- amendments v ijl be considered formally at a con-
pose1 by the _US, basic American objectives were ference in Mar 1972. Illicit trafficking in the
achieved at the recently cancluc a24,day meet Middle East rece ed special attention at the ses
ing of the UN's Commission on Narcotic rugs,; Sion, and an ad h c committee was created to
Most delegates favored U proposals that would Zeal with the probl . Little support was given,
amend the 1961 Single nvet5tion on Narcotic however, to the UN - and for Drug Abuse Con-
Drugs to give more iat tude for action to the trot, to which the US=has provided $2 million in
International Narcotics Control Board. The recent months
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Panama: Torjo's Thinks Ahead
With one eye. on the status of canal negotia-
tichns with the US,*General Torrijos is considering
chap to-Z. he cabin et and in the National Guard.
This prepare the way for revision of the
constitution"and legalization of the junta govern-
ment. Torrijos'`` mestc moves will be well con-
sidered and cautiol executed but, at least in
the short run, he is lily to adopt a more aggres-
sive posture on the canal fide.
He has measured his stren kh against that of
the church, the economy elite, ar'rsI the political
parties. He has gained' control ove
the news
ti
media. He has even---co-opted the Cm munist
Party, and has built/at least the beginnin of a
political base a4nong students, labor, qd
present one, cf anges might have more administra-
tive than political significance.
More important would be changes within the
National Guard to deal wijl{ known rivalries,
especially those`,between sta'fif officers Lt. Colonel
Noriega and Lt% Colone(Paredes. Noriega, who
has been Torrijos' a$_tiet man, is sympathetic to
`
the government-Co
munist modus vivendi, while
Paredes is suspici'ou Hof growing leftist influence.
Torrijos is b9lieved t be interested in becoming
the next president-a 1osition in which he would
have considerably less ime to devote to guard
matters. With this in mid, he may wish to review
tbe'performance of his hilitary commanders and
.,eliminate rivalries that r light lead in the future to
the first steps toward legitimizing the revoIu- osupport is the guard, Torrijos would have to move
tionary governmeri. The 1946 constitutian'is to
be amended withinix months, and election of an
assembly has been
1972. The assembl
stii:ution and elect a
omised no later fhan August
will approye'the new con-
of the republic, thu
government with a co
residentsand vice president
repjdcing the provisional
stitutional one.
After three yp4 Fsfin power, Torrijos is more
confident of his`abiliy to govern, but he is also
mere aware of the complexity of his country's
problems and the intractability of the bureauc-
racy. In =an effort to get greater efficiency and a
new sense of dynamism, Torrijos may go ahead
with 'his second cabinet reorganization this year,
without waiting for any constitutional change. As
any feasible cabinet would be as loyal as the
ARGENTINA: The Lanusse government is faced
with a ne'Vor and of labor problems in Cordoba,
where labor strile"s-dpd to serious rioting twice
in the past three years aft- ha5?contributed, at
least indirectly, to the ouster of the"presid?ents in
power at the time. Following a successful gel ral
strike last week, the government ordered the
take-over of the extreme leftist labor unions at
the Fiat automotive plant and the public em-
ployees union. It apparently hopes to eliminate
the extremist and Trotskyist influence in these
M h great circumspect
1k ,the same timi
negotiate its may ho
future. He ?'Sould,
ceptance of any,treat
objectives: an e
creased compensati
over the zone. Nevert
he is well aware that canal
d the key to his political
course, win popular ac-
that met Panama's primary
the perpetuity clause, in-
nd significant jurisdiction
ess, concerned about his
compelled to push hark ir$he next couple of
months for maximum cbncess ns from the US.
Not until he is faced with; the choi of a treaty in
early 1972 or waiting until after the S electoral
campaign is Torrijos likely to decide ether to
compromise or go for broke. 25X1
major unions. If successful, it should help defuse
the volatile Cordoba political situation over the
long term. President Lanusse apparently believes
that his generally good relations with Peronist
labor and rank-and-file disenchantment with
political strikes-ten so far this year in Cordoba-
ll limit the adverse reaction. The more moder-
ate unions`1n- C,prdoba, however, will probably
feel constrained Vd'*' emons.$.rate some active
support for the affected 'unio'ns./
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Cuba Dusts Off Its International Image
After a long period of preoccupation with
domestic concerns, the Castro regime is entering the
world spotlight with a burst of activity designed to
demonstrate that the continued international isola-
tion of Cuba is neither popular nor feasible.
One manifestation of this activity is the current
visit to Cuba by Soviet Premier Kosygin. Havana
pulled out all the stops to welcome Kosygin when
he arrived on 26 October. The current meeting of
the two leaders, unlike the visit in June 1967, comes
at a time when Soviet-Cuban relations appear to be
on an even keel. Economic problems would appear
to be the major topic of discussion. Castro's coming
visit to Chile and Cuban relations with other Latin
American countries may also come in for attention.
The duration of the Kosygin visit is uncertain, but
Castro will be eager to portray it as a further indica-
tion of solid Soviet support.
Havana's apparently deliberate efforts this
week to embarrass the US by sending Cuban dele-
gates without US visas to a privately sponsored
international conference of sugar cane technicians in
Louisana may be a further reflection of Castro's
current interest in world recognition and publicity.
The fact that the delegation arrived unexpectedly
and refused to leave without orders from Havana,
and the identification of the Cuban pilot as a senior
civil aviation official who has led Cuban delegations
to international air safety conferences, suggest that
Castro engineered the incident primarily for its
propaganda potential.
At the same time, Cuba is showing consider-
ably more interest in regularizing and expanding its
USSR/CUBA: The Soviet naval task group off
Florida"'5-east coast is scheduled to arrive in Havana
on 31 Octobe _10r ?-a?,. terl? ,,ay visit. A week ago,
Moscow announced, "Two antisub_ifiarines,s, two
submarines, and a tanker will pay a friendly visa o
Cuba," and the ships have since been slowly moving,,
south in the Atlantic about 200-300 miles off the
diplomatic contacts with Latin American and other
governments. One aim of such contacts is to show
that OAS sanctions against Cuba are no longer
viable. The most recent example is Cuba's having
become a member of the so-called "Group of 77."
At the recommendation of Peru, Cuba was accepted
on 20 October as the 95th member of this loose
group of developing countries that seek to formulate
a joint strategy to protect their economic interests.
Cuba has sent a high-level delegation headed by
Foreign Minister Raul Roa to attend the meeting of
the "Group of 77" that opened in Lima on 25
October.
Castro's real chance for grandstanding in the
Latin American arena will come when he makes his
long-awaited trip to Chile. It will be his first trip
abroad since 1964. Latin American media have been
giving extensive play to stories about the trip and
have speculated that Castro will arrive in time to
help celebrate the first anniversary on 4 November
of President Allende's inauguration. Both Cuban and
Chilean officials have refused to pinpoint the dates
of the visit, however, and it is quite possible that
Castro might arrive a little later to be on hand for
the first anniversary of Chile's resumption of
diplomatic relations with Havana on 12 November.
Castro may boost his prestige even further by
meeting with other Latin American leaders during
his travels to and from Chile. Cuban Foreign Min-
ister Raul Roa may arrange for talks with Peruvian
officials should Castro's plane make the usual tech-
nical stop in Lima. Peruvian President Velasco has
indicated an interest in meeting Castro at the air-
port. F_ I
In addition to the pending naval callwa-Bear
D naval reconnaissance planes fletca.Hlavana's Jose
Marti Airfield on 27 O,ctab` r The Soviets have
made five such fl, .ghts-since April 1970, and this is
e third tim-e one has been made in conjunction
wi ` r"' 'r av l visit. These planes will probably remain
in Cuba a fe tys.zojd may provide reconnaissance
US east coast conducting trairrfng maneuvers and support for the naval fore be:Qre returning to the
carrying out some,-AS1N operations. I USSR.
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Uruguay's Election Stage Set Amid Strife
President Pacheco's long awaited selection of
an "alternate" candidate in Uruguay's compli-
cated election next month has provoked an un-
favorable reaction. It has probably erased any
lingering hopes that the President might win his
re-election bid. Despite the intraparty strife
caused by Pacheco's choice, the country's unique
electoral system helps to cushion the party
against damage to its prospects, and the governing
Co orados remain favored to win.
On 22 October, a presidential spokesman
announced that Minister of Agriculture Borda-
berry and Minister of Labor Sapelli were Pa-
chE!co's "designated" presidential and vice presi-
dential candidates. The voters on 28 November
will consider: 1) a constitutional amendment al-
lowing for immediate re-election of an incumbent
president; 2) a slate of presidential candidates
that will include Pacheco; 3) a separate ballot,
which will list Bordaberry in place of Pacheco and
wh ch will be valid in the event the proposed
amendment fails.
Several significant defections from the
Colorado group promoting Pacheco's re-election
followed the selection of Bordaberry. Vice Presi-
dent Abdala and Director of the Budget Lanza,
both disappointed "alternate" aspirants, with-
drew. Both the Civil Service director and the
secretary to the presidency resigned. Those op-
posed to Bordaberry can cite his former member-
ship in the Blanco government coalition of 1962
and his lack of Colorado credentials. Another
facet of the trouble is that the President again
trampled on political sensitivities by failing to
consult with close supporters before announcing
his Decision.
These defections further dim the pros-
pects-never bright-for approval of the constitu-
tiorial amendment. With several other Colorado
candidates in the combined primary-general elec-
tior;s, however, most of the dissatisfaction should
be expressed in the form of votes for other
Colorados rather than result in a bolting of sup-
porters to their major opponents, the Blancos. In
addition to the Pacheco slates, the final election
line-up includes three other Colorado candidates,
although only one-Jorge Batlle-can come close
to equaling President Pacheco's drawing power.
The Blancos have entered two slates, and the
leftist coalition, Frente Amplio, has put up a
single presidential candidate. The most-voted can-
didate of the most-voted party wins the presi-
dency.
An electoral survey last month showed the
Colorados leading on a country-wide basis, with
the Frente running second in the important capi-
tal area but trailing both established parties in the
country as a whole. More than 25 percent of the
voters were still undecided, and all three parties
will be making a major effort in the campaign's
closing weeks.
Although the law-and-order question is the
primary campaign issue, the terrorist scene has
been subdued in recent weeks. The most recent
political kidnaping, that of a prominent news-
paper publisher, has been claimed by a new ter-
rorist group, the Popular Revolutionary Organiza-
tion-33, which is probably an anarchist group of
limited capabilities.
Armed forces leaders, recently charged with
responsibility for counterterrorism, have empha-
sized that they plan no major effort against the
chief terrorist group, the Tupamaros, prior to the
elections. The Tupamaros have done little to pro-
voke military reaction since their mass escape in
early September, and security forces have been
slowly recapturing some of the fugitives:
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MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
THE YEMENS: Further border incidents are likely
25X1 in the wake of the military incursion last week by
Adeni forces of at least brigade strength into Yemen
(Sana). The three-clay foray, which ended on 19
October, was directed at,anti-Adeni dissidents who
have been conducting terrorist operations against
targets in Yemen (Aden) from Yemen (Sana). The
?
operation apparently was successful;. Over 100 rebels
allegedly were killed, and a large quantity of arms,
ammunition, and documents was captured. Only
one day after the conclusion of the operation, a land
mine explosion-the second fatal one in ten da s-
took the life of an Adeni officials.
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Secret
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