WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009100040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
1 October 1971
No. 0390/71
Copy Ng 41
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OF-%..nr I ~..~
CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 30 September 1971)
Indochina: South Vietnam: Election Sounds and Fury . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cambodia: A Dry Season Dry Run? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Laos: Chinese Roadbuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Japan: Rough Sailing for Sato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Japanese Trade Liberalization Falters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
China's Leadership Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Tito Converses with Brezhnev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Soviet Diplomatic Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Mindszenty: Sighs of Relief in Three Capitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1
East - West Germany: Talks Resuming? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
East Germany Seeks International Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Austria: Election Campaign Nears Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A NATO MISSION TO MOSCOW
(Published separately as Special Report No. 0390/71B)
Egypt: More Talk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 14
Jordan-UN ...............................
Jordan-Fedayeen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
India-Pakistan: Politics and Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 17
NIGERIA UNDER GOWON
(Published separately as Special Report No. 0390/71A)
Octoberfest in Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chile : Overkill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Uruguay: Holding Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Brazil: Hostile Reaction to Church Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
NOTES: International Monetary Developments; Turkey; Cuba; Mexico; Bolivia
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FAR EAST
Indochina
South Vietnam: Election Sounds and Fury
With the approach of the presidential election
on 3 October, radical and opposition elements have
been trying to step up their protests ostensibly de-
signed to persuade the government to postpone and
reorganize the contest. Although scattered disorders
by small groups of students and veterans have taken
place in Saigon and several other major cities, the
demonstrations have fallen far short of what the
radicals had hoped to accomplish. The government
had ample warning. Police were able to prevent large
groups from assembling and to break up some of the
demonstrations before they got started. The protests
were contained quickly with a minimum of violence.
Vice President Ky has played a prominent role
in encouraging the demonstrations. He may try to
prolong the agitation after the election as he at-
tempts to unite all opposition elements behind his
leadership. He cannot draw much encouragement
from his efforts thus far. Some of the student and
veterans' groups Ky was counting on to mount pro-
tests showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the
effort and soon became discouraged ed in the face of
strong police countermeasures.
Ky did succeed in getting a group of radicals
and opposition politicians, including some former
government supporters, to agree in principle to a
broad opposition front. It is questionable, however,
whether the front will ever get off the ground or
whether it will bring in any new support for an
antigovernment campaign. Both Big Minh and most
of the leaders of the politically potent An Quang
Antigovernment Demonstration in Saigon
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Buddhists remain aloof from Ky's effort. An Quang
leaders apparently are still discouraging Buddhist
participation in violent demonstrations, although
they have yielded to pressure from some of their
more militant members to take a firmer stand
against the Thieu government, and have begun to
support nonviolent protests.
Moderate groups also are continuing to express
opposition to President Thieu's election policy.
Various Catholic organizations, formerly staunch
supporters of the President, have put some distance
between themselves and the government, though
most of them are unlikely to oppose him actively.
Even Prime Minister Khiem has been sharply critical
of Thieu in private. The ambitious prime minister
probably hopes to avoid being dragged down in the
event Thieu's position becomes untenable.I
President Thieu remains outwardly unmoved
by opposition to the election and is campaigning
hard for support. Last week, he went on television
to appeal to the population not to join protest
demonstrations. Although he has reduced the fre-
quency of his travels in the countryside in recent
weeks, he is counting on strong support from rural
areas, which have been largely unaffected by the
recent political tensions in Saigon and other major
cities.
Despite the fairly widespread unhappiness over
the election, Thieu seems almost certain to receive
what he can interpret as a strong vote of confidence
on 3 October. No organized groups have been urging
their followers to vote against the President, and
many voters will not understand how to cast a
negative ballot. Nevertheless, the call of the An
Quang Buddhists and some other groups for a boy-
cott of the vote may keep the turnout below what
Thieu would like.
Thieu may thus be able to weather the furor
over the election with little immediate damage to his
over-all political position. The protests thus far have
demonstrated that the opposition remains weak and
divided. Thieu should be able to make some gestures
to win back disgruntled moderate elements in the
postelection period. He is already making overtures
to several prominent politicians, implying they can
play an important role in the government in the
future if they will support him.
A Chinese delegation led by politburo member
Li Hsien-nien arrived unexpectedly in Hanoi on 24
September to sign the annual aid protocol with
North Vietnam. In public at least, Li talked more
about Chinese support for North Vietnam's nego-
tiating position than about economic assistance. In
an unusually comprehensive endorsement of the
Vietnamese seven-point proposal, Li specifically a25X1
proved Hanoi's call for US troop withdrawal and for
an end to American support for President Thieu.
Chinese inattention to the latter point in recent
months had apparently caused concern in Hanoi
that Peking's stand on the war had drifted away
from that of the North Vietnamese.
The Chinese gesture of sending Li to Hanoi
instead of requiring the Vietnamese to pay court in
Peking is the latest effort to assuage Vietnamese
anxieties about President Nixon's visit to China. The
Vietnamese were upset by the announcement and
resorted to unprecedented polemical lecturing of the
Chinese. Demonstrating sensitivity to the criticism,
Peking increased its propaganda support for Hanoi,
and Chou En-lai took the time to confer personally
with virtually every Vietnamese VIP who transited
Peking.
By late August, Hanoi's attacks stopped, and
Li's visit is probably intended to bury the hatchet.
At the same time, Peking clearly hopes that the visit
will safeguard Chinese interests as Hanoi prepares to
receive Soviet President Podgorny. He can probably
be expected to put the Soviets on record as com-
pletely supporting Hanoi war aims.
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Communists Return to the Cambodia-Vietnam
Border
The Communists have begun a new round of
action in the South Vietnam - Cambodia border
region. Heavy shellings followed on occasion by
ground assaults were launched last weekend
against South Vietnamese positions near Krek in
eastern Cambodia and against allied positions in
western and northern Tay Ninh Province. No al-
lied positions were overrun, but casualties were
relatively high on both sides.
Large-scale mortar and rocket bombard-
ments are often employed by the Communists to
Enemy ambush
mask the movement of men and materiel to for-
ward battle zones or staging areas. Some enemy
units have already blocked sections of Route 22,
the major north-south link between Tay Ninh city
and Krek, thus cutting off South Vietnamese
troops operating near Krek. General Minh, the
South Vietnamese commander in the area, has
sent parts of his 18th Division and some of the
Airborne Brigade to reopen the road.
There have been a number of reports that
the enemy will step up military action in Tay
Ninh and other parts of South Vietnam prior to
the election. Most of these reports suggest small
actions by local force and guerrilla units. 25X1
Kornpong Thom
-~ Tang Krasang
Fighting- a ?Kompong Thma, ,orie
Chamcar Andonge - Enemy attacks
Kompong'
Chhnang Bas Khnors
,OFSAIGON
so ~~Es
>3-OMETERS
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Cambodia: A Dry Season Dry Run?
The Communists seized the military initia-
tive last week in a series of sharp attacks against
government units and installations in the country-
side. Although it is too early to call this the
beginning of a dry season offensive, it does sug-
gest that, once better weather arrives, the Com-
munists will attempt to reverse the government's
modest gains during the rainy season.
Two government battalions engaged in pac-
ification work near Kompong Trabek lost 48
killed and 130 wounded when they were hit by
mortar and ground attacks. To the west, an en-
emy force raided the Prek Thnot Dam site, killing
eight and wounding 39 defenders. The Commu-
nists also destroyed a large number of construc-
tion vehicles as well as all fuel stocks.
In the Kompong Thom area, the Commu-
nists forced a river supply convoy to turn back 15
miles from Kompong Thom town. In the past,
river convoys had reached the isolated town with
little difficulty. Efforts to relieve the town over-
land have been stymied by Communist pressure
against a government task force near Tang Krasang.
Enemy harassing attacks were reported
against government patrols operating along Route
21 in the vicinity of the enemy-infested Chamcar
Andong rubber plantation. At the same time, the
Communists forced other government units
situated farther south on Route 21 to pull back
from their recently won positions at Bos Khnor.
Lon Nol's firing of First Deputy Prime Min-
ister In Tam dominated the political scene during
the week. Although the prime minister charged
that the able and energetic In Tam had not ful-
filled his duties effectively, it was clear that Lon
Nol's mistrust of In Tam's political ambitions was
the real reason. Both Lon Nol and Sirik Matak
apparently were convinced that In Tam's frequent
trips to the countryside to promote pacification
projects were actually designed to build his own
political base among the peasantry. In Tam's
backing of National Assembly President Yem
Sambaur, one of the government's strongest
critics, doubtless contributed to the decision to
sack In Tam.
25X1
The absence of any signs of sympathy within
the cabinet for In Tam seems to justify Lon Nol's
apparent confidence that his action would not
provoke a political crisis.
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O i )i Lx
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Government forces are consolidating recent
gains in both the north and south. Some 400 Lao
Army soldiers are holding the town of Muong
Soui, west of the Plaine des Jarres, which was
occupied by irregular assault forces on 24 Sep-
tember. The town can be used as a base to sup-
port Vang Pao's irregular units on the Plaine. Just
north of the Plaine, the irregulars so far have been
unsuccessful in their attempts to reoccupy high
ground positions near Phou San.
The government has launched a drive to
clear enemy units from high-ground positions
northeast of Luang Prabang. During the last dry
season, the North Vietnamese used the area as a
base for launching attacks on the royal capital.
The government wishes to deny it to the enemy
during the coming dry season.
Determined North Vietnamese resistance has
continued to thwart government efforts to take
Japan: Rough Sailing for Sato
The next three months promise to be the
most politically turbulent since the Security
Treaty reversion crisis in 1960 forced Prime Min-
ister Kishi from office. Chances are increasing
that Prime Minister Sato, confronted with a wide
range of legislative problems in the Diet session
Ch`INA
Area of
road map
Guvernment-halo location
? Coninuiniat-held lineation
Ban Houei
n Ho
_ .Paksong
Ban Phak Kout RRR
? Bolave
Plateau
u
Muong Phalane in the central panhandle and to
clear Route 23 between Paksong and Ban Phak
Kout. On 28 September, an irregular unit moving
eastward toward Paksong occupied one of the
enemy strong points blocking the road, but a unit
moving from Paksong westward is still held u
near the village of Ban Houei Man.
beginning next month, may leave office before
the new year. In the 60-day session, Sato will be
faced with a deep split within the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party on the China issue, difficulties
in securing the rapid passage of the numerous
measures related to Okinawan reversion, and
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criticism of his cabinet's response to President
Nixon's economic policies.
These problems may well be exacerbated by
large-scale street demonstrations and an increased
use of violence by radical students and terrorists.
In past years, the opposition parties have evoked
considerable public sympathy with claims that
the Liberal Democratic Party has rammed con-
troversial legislation through the Diet. Should
Sato be tempted to employ heavy-handed parlia-
mentary maneuvers to meet deadlines in the pas-
sage of the Okinawan reversion measures, the
demonstrators would have a clear target for pro-
test.
Rival faction leaders within the party are
jockeying for position in the post-Sato era, thus
further weakening Sato's control over legislative
action. The front runners in the race to succeed
him have been sharply critical of his China policy
in attempts to disassociate themselves from the
government's support of the Republic of China
and to exploit the growing mood for rapproche-
ment with the Peoples' Republic of China. Much
will ride on how the contest for China's seat in
the UN comes out.
The atmosphere in which Sato's departure
takes place is critical, for most of the serious
problems confronting his cabinet are intimately
concerned with Japanese-American relations. If
the Japanese attribute their government's difficul-
ties to a policy of cooperating too closely with
the US, Sato's successor would be forced to re-
examine the basic premises of that relation-
ship.
Japanese Trade Liberalization Falters
(okyo's much publicized eight-point liberal-
ization program has bogged down in recent
weeks. Although the Japanese indicated that ma-
jor steps would be taken at the cabinet-level meet-
ings held last month in Washington, Tokyo failed
to produce any great departures from past poli-
cies. Only minor concessions were made, includ-
ing a few reductions in import quotas and a
partial elimination of their restrictive import li-
censing-system.
'i he prospect that Japan might take signifi-
cant steps has receded, for both economic and
political reasons. The contenders to succeed
Prime Minister Sato are not willing to take a
strong stand in favor of liberalization for fear of
alienating support among business and agricul-
tural interests, especially those hurt by the US
surcharge. Moreover, some Japanese believe that
implementation of further liberalization measures
would make recovery from the current economic
slowdown more difficult. Finally, Tokyo is less
willing to take significant measures now that the
yen has been allcwed to float upward and pres-
sure for an early revaluation has mounted. One of
the goals of the eight-point program was to avoid
a yen revaluation-., at least during the current
recession.
Since Japan launched its trade and capital
liberalization program three months ago, it has
offered little that is radically new. Much of the
program was a reworking of earlier schemes, while
other aspects that: appeared new have been de-
ferred for furthe study. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development recently
pointed out that the Japanese have done little in
their seven years )f membership to ease restric-
tions on direct foreign investment in their coun-
try. Some additional liberalization steps probably
will be taken in the months ahead, but the con-
sensus for a full-scale overhaul of Japan's foreign
economic policy has not yet developed. Without
it, Tokyo will continue to do onl as much as
external pressures dictate.
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China's Leadership Puzzle
The low-key National Day celebrations to-
day are unlikely to shed much light on the leader-
ship troubles that prompted Peking's decision two
weeks ago to curtail the festivities. Although most
of the active members of the ruling politburo
have appeared in public since the unpublicized
leadership meeting on 12-15 September, Peking's
decision appears deliberately designed to avoid
the full top-level turnout required for the holiday.
This probably was necessary to conceal dramatic
changes that have recently occurred in the central
power structure. Eyewitnesses report that out-
ward calm continues to prevail in the capital but
behind-the-scenes tension in Peking remains high.
gle between moderate and radical forces in the
politburo has entered a new and more serious
phase. This impression has been reinforced by the
comments this week by Jack Chen, a regime
publicist in Hong Kong. Chen urges Western
journalists to focus on the possibility of leader-
ship changes as the cause for the unusual develop-
ments in China rather than speculate on the death
of Mao.
During the past week, various Chinese
spokesmen have been denying that Mao is ill.
There have
been increasing indications that un-
certainty over Lin's future po itical role may be a
crucial factor in the current crisis. Most Chinese
spokesmen have shown a marked reluctance to
comment on Lin's status
Whether or not the status of Mao or Lin is
the central issue, the events of the past two weeks
strongly suggest that the prolonged power strug-
25X1
Because the jockeying for position between
these forces has produced several civilian victims
in the politburo over the past two years without
causing the curtailment of holiday celebrations, it
seems likely that the present phase of the struggle
centers on the political futures of China's top-
ranking military leaders. Chief of Staff Huang
Yung-sheng, Air Force Commander Wu Fa-hsien,
and Navy Commissar Li Tso-peng have all been
out of sight since 10 September and are almost
certainly heavily involved-as is Defense Minister
Lin Piao, if he is not ill. There have been recent
indications of political squabbling among the
central military leaders over the issue of major
personnel assignments in the pivotal Peking Mili-
tary Region.
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EUROPE
Tito Converses With Brezhnev
The talks last week in Belgrade may have
eased tensions but they failed to resolve funda-
mental differences. Some Yugoslav officials al-
ready take a critical view of the outcome.
The downward trend in Yugoslav-Soviet rela-
tions, evident since the 1968 invasion of Czecho-
slovakia, accelerated sharply this summer. By late
August, because of negative effects on its Euro-
pean "peace offensive," Moscow seemed to cur-
tail its pressure. Tito, sensing an advantage and
probably encouraged by the prospect of winding
down recriminations before they reached danger-
ous proportions, agreed to a discussion of joint
problems.
Despite his stake in an amicable meeting,
Brezhnev commenced the visit by snubbing Tito.
Similar incidents occurred throughout the four-
day tour. Differences arose over the agenda and
the final communique, but the two leaders man-
aged to maintain public decorum.
The joint statement was pro forma. It men-
tioned the 1955 and 1956 declarations guarantee-
ing Yugoslav party and state independence. It
called for the usual increase in party-government
liaison and in economic cooperation. Tito re-
ceived a conciliatory nod toward his nonaligned
foreign policy, as well as his stand on a nuclear-
free zone in the Balkans and on reciprocity in
information exchanges. The Soviets, in turn, re-
ceived general statements of support for disarma-
ment and European security talks, and a promise
by Tito that he would try to curtail Yugoslav
press attacks on the USSR.
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The statement avoided major contentious is-
sues, such as party equality, noninterference in
internal affairs, and Yugoslavia's relations with
China and the US. Moreover, Brezhnev's public
statements were ambiguous on the key issues of
Yugoslav sovereignty and the validity of the
Brezhnev doctrine. There are already reports that
Yugoslav officials doubt the durability of its pro-
visions. Brezhnev probably intended the docu-
ment to be provisional, governing relations during
the last years of the Tito era or until the Soviets
have succeeded in convening a European Security
Conference. It may not avert conflict even that
long.
The Soviet leader's apparent hedging on the
"Brezhnev doctrine" may well backfire elsewhere
in Eastern Europe. Press commentary from Hun-
gary, Romania, Poland, and even Czechoslovakia
has seized on his partial disavowal of the Brezh-
nev doctrine and on his recognition of the impor-
tance of national differences in building socialism.
En route home, Brezhnev stopped off in
Hungary and Bulgaria to brief his allies-again
deliberately skipping over Romania. Hungary's
Kadar will be relieved by any easing of relations
with Belgrade and may now be thinking about
renewing his once friendly relationship with Tito.
There is also a strong likelihood of Yugoslav-
Romanian consultations-perhaps between Tito
and Ceausescu-in the near future.
SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY
Soviet leaders have added to their already
crowded fall travel itineraries, and further sur-
prises may yet be in store. At home, moreover,
Soviet leaders will host a variety of foreign digni-
taries. Although each undertaking has a rationale
of its own, taken together they seem to be part of
an over-all effort both to foster an attitude of
European detente and to counter China's recent
diplomatic gains. Britain's action this past week in
expelling 105 Soviet diplomats for espionage ac-
tivity came as a rude and unpleasant shock, and
Moscow already is voicing concern that the expul-
sion may have a detrimental effect on Soviet
efforts to convene a European security confer
ence. 25X1
Visitors to Moscow
14-17 Sept
16-18 Sept
27-29 Sept
1- Oct
10-15 Oct
Soviet Visits Abroad
22-25 Sept
25-26 Sept
26-27 Sept
1 Oct
2 Oct
-10 Oct
mid-Oct
8-12 Oct
mid-Oct
17-27 Oct
28 Nov
5 Dec
Dec
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Afghanistan King Zahir
West German Chancellor Brandt
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi
Yemen(Aden) Prime Minister
Ali Nasir Muhammad
Egyptian President Sadat
Brezhnev Yugoslavia
Kosygin
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Mindszenty: Sighs of Relief in Three Capitals
Cardinal Mindszenty's departure from Hungary
ended a long-standing embarrassment for the Vati-
can, Hungary, and the US. The cardinal's fifteen-
year isolation in the US Embassy left the Vatican's
highest authority in Hungary useless in all but title.
It was a chronic irritant in US-Hungarian bilateral
relations and faced the Hungarian regime with a
ubiquitous symbol of its past brutality. With his
departure and the removal of this thorn, the Holy
See is free to nominate, and the regime to approve, a
more flexible successor. The US is honorably ac-
quitted of an awkward housekeeping obligation.
The 79-year-old cardinal's dramatic departure
also provides the Hungarians with an opening, if
they wish to use it, to try and improve bilateral
relations with the US. Party boss Kadar earlier this
year expressed a desire to do so. Budapest's Foreign
Minister Peter is scheduled to meet with Secretary
Rogers at the UN next month and could well use the
removal of the cardinal to sound out the US on
beginning a dialogue on other issues.
Though the Vatican has urged Mindszenty not
to engage in political activity, he has not pledged to
remain mute. The fifteenth anniversary of the 1956
revolt falls on 23 October, and the tenacious car-
dinal could seize that opportunity to speak
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~Ll ~Kl, 1
,wall
East - West Germany: Talks Resuming?
The inter-German talks, begun in a flush of
official optimism following the initialing of the
quadripartite treaty on Berlin early last month,
may be about to enter the stage of substantive
negotiations. The atmosphere of mutual recrimi-
nation following last week's suspension of the
Bahr-Kohl meetings was sharpened by West Ger-
man protests over shooting incidents along the
East - West German border and the Berlin Wall,
and by East German attacks on official West
German meetings in West Berlin. Each side ac-
cused the other of undermining progress toward
detente in the heart of Europe.
At issue is the unofficial German text of the
quadripartite agreement. After agreeing to com-
mon verbiage on 3 September in order to clear
the way for US initialing of the agreement, Pan-
kow then pulled back to a version based on the
Russian text, which construes West Berlin's ties to
West Germany more loosely than does the West
German-and English-wording.
The West Germans have attempted to get the
East Germans to admit that a common wording
was achieved, admitting the existence of close ties
between the Federal Republic and West Berlin,
but the best the East Germans have offered in
return is continued use of two German texts, with
neither side engaging in attacks on the correctness
of the other's version. West German efforts to
achieve a compromise solution within the context
of negotiations on a postal agreement between
the two states may lead to a removal of the
barriers to negotiations in the Bahr-Kohl chan-
nel. 25X1
East Germany Seeks International Status
Pankow's bid to achieve parity with Bonn in
international affairs has perhaps accelerated in the
wake of the Four-Power agreement on Berlin.
Present areas of interest are the current safeguards
negotiations with the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the question of participation
in the UN Conference on the Human Environ-
ment to be held in Stockholm in 1972.
To the distress of the Western powers, Direc-
tor General Eklund of the International Atomic
Energy Agency has told East German Foreign
Minister Winzer that the agency is prepared to
negotiate a safeguards agreement. Accession to
such an agreement would be a breakthrough for
the East Germans. Since Eklund's remark, there
has been a concerted Western effort to dissuade
the agency's secretariat from accepting language
tantamount to recognition of East Germany. The
so-called Vienna formula that generally governs
treaty accession rights also applies to entry into
UN-related agencies. Pankow clearly hopes to
exploit it as a back door to international accept-
ance.
The key preparatory meeting for the Stock-
holm conference concluded this past week, with
the issue of East German participation left to the
UN General Assembly this fall. The Soviets want
to see Pankow participate fully; the Western
powers counter that the East Germans should be
given no more than observer status.
Bonn seeks to prevent a "premature" en-
hancement of Pankow's status as a result of the
Berlin agreement. The West Germans, who par-
ticipate in UN-related agencies and sign inter-
national conventions on the basis of the Vienna
formula, maintain that upgrading East Germany
at this time could jeopardize future inter-German
talks.
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Austria: Election Campaign Nears Conclusion
With little more than a week before the polls
open, interest centers on the personality of
Chancellor Kreisky and his Socialist Party's drive
to attain a parliamentary majority. The campaign
has been leisurely. Except for the domestic econ-
omy, few issues separate the competing parties.
Disagreement over foreign policy is all but non-
existent; dissatisfaction stirred by Kreisky's re-
form of the armed services appears confined to
the officer corps.
Personal income tax levels and a predicted
inflationary rate of 5 percent annually are the
primary electoral concerns. Kreisky and Finance
Minister Androsch have been under heavy pres-
sure, especially from the Socialist-dominated
Austrian Trade Union Federation, to reduce
personal income tax rates in order to increase real
wages. Grasping a chance to cut into Socialist
voting strength, the People's Party has proposed
income tax reductions. In response, the Socialists
have sought to tempt the traditionally conserva-
tive farm vote from the People's Party by empha-
sizing the cabinet's recent approval of a 25-per-
cent increase in funds allocated to agriculture.
The Socialists are confident that they can
better the 48.5 percent of the vote they scored in
1970. An electoral reform law passed last fall,
however, increases the prospects for small party
representation. The Freedom Party (liberal)
expects to double its six-man parliamentary dele-
gation and the Communists-campaigning on a
platform of antimilitarism and socioeconomic
reform-may return to parliament for the first
time in twelve years with a seat from Vienna.
Kreisky has preserved the option of a mini-
coalition with the liberals if he fails to gain an
absolute majority. The Freedom Party, a postwar
party of quasi-Nazi origins, may not be the pliable
and forward-looking ally that Kreisky expects,
however. Party chairman Friedrich Peter has re-
jected the idea of a binding coalition pact. More-
over, party spokesmen recently reiterated the
party's controversial pan-German sentiments. Al-
though the statements were framed in cultural
terms, such political adventurism will fuel opposi-
tion within the Socialist Party to any future
alliance with the Freedom Party.
The People's Party is trying to forestall de-
feat by nominating "independent" candidates-
among them a former Freedom Party official.
Early this summer, provincial People's Party
leaders challenged the legality of the elections
based on outdated census figures. Although the
court will not rule on the appeals until four days
after the balloting on 10 October, there is a slim
chance that the results might be invali-
dated.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOP-
MENTS: The annual meeting of the International
Monetary Fund opened this week on a note of
cautious optimism that the monetary confronta-
tion between the US and other major financial
countries could be put on the road to resolution
by the end of the year. The Europeans, believing
the US is willing to compromise on its surtax and
the price of gold, see a possibility of meaningful
negotiations. The fund's managing director re-
flected the position of most non-US financial
powers in his keynote address when he urged the
removal of the surtax and devaluation of the
dollar so the way would be cleared for agreement
on exchange rate reform. A proposed resolution
of the fund's Board of Governors calls for prompt
action in establishing a new structure of exchange
rates. Additionally, several countries, including
France, lined up behind the proposal by Britain's
chancellor of the exchequer that the international
financial system be based on special drawing
rights.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Egypt: More Talk
President Sadat will go to Moscow to consult
with Soviet leaders in the next two weeks. A
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs official has
stated that Sadat will arrive on 10 or 11 October
for a stay of three or four days. Among the topics
he will wish to discuss are the coordination of
Soviet-Egyptian strategy on the Middle East ques-
tion, lingering strains in relations between Cairo
and Moscow in the wake of the pro-Communist
coup last July in the Sudan, the role and policies
of the newly formed Federation of Arab Repub-
lics, and continuing Soviet defense assistance to
Egypt. Sadat may plead for additional military
hardware such as sophisticated electronic equip-
ment that would be needed to strengthen or ex-
tend Egypt's air defense system.
Both sides are try-
ing to dispel the impres-
sion that there is any
urgency about the talks.
The Soviet press has
described Sadat's visit-
his second to the Soviet
Union since becoming
president a year ago-as
a natural development
in keeping with the
Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation. The
treaty, signed last May,
calls for regular consul-
tations on "all important questions affecting the
interests of both states."
On 28 September, Egyptians marked the
first anniversary of Nasir's death. Although the
day was not an official holiday, tens of thousands
of persons visited Nasir's tomb. Appropriate mes-
sages of tribute were received from the Soviet
Union, Arab states, and other countries. In a long
commemorative speech, President Sadat eulogized
Nasir's leadership in organizing the revolution and
building the Egyptian state. On the other hand,
Sadat used the occasion to place considerable
stress on his own role as one of Nasir's chief
lieutenants from the early days of the revolution.
In addition, he put the major powers on notice
once again that 1971 is a decisive year for a
settlement with the Israelis "either through peace
or fighting."
Federation Summit Meeting
Next week, the Egyptian, Libyan, and Syr-
ian heads of state--Sadat, Qadhafi, and Asad-are
to attend the Federation of Arab Republics' presi-
dential council in Cairo, the federal capital. The
meeting is the first since the federation's constitu-
tion was approved by popular referendum in the
three member states on 1 September. One of the
first items of business presumably will be the
election of a council chairman who will serve for
a two-year renewable term.
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TURKEY: The aura of harmony surrounding the
military-backed government of Prime Minister
Erim appears to be fading. Two cabinet ministers
resigned this week, public criticism of the Erim
government is increasing, relations between the
cabinet and parliament are strained, and the
Justice Party under former Prime Minister
Demirel is becoming restless. The recent debate
on the martial law issue, unlike other debates
since Erim assumed the premiership last March,
was heated and the government was sharply
criticized on a variety of unrelated issues. This
week top military commanders tried to whip the
politicians into line behind the government's
broad reform program, which most members of
Parliament are reluctant to authorize by executive
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Jordan-UN
The Security Council last week deplored Is-
raeli activity in Jerusalem. Its resolution was sub-
stantially the text worked out between the US
and Jordan, although the paragraph calling on
Israel to rescind measures taken to change the
status of the city was a Syrian amendment. The
resolution calls on the secretary general to report
back to the council within 60 days on whether
Israel has complied. U Thant is free to use any
means he chooses to determine the facts, includ-
ing sending a mission or a special representative.
After intensive lobbying among the Egyptian and
Syrian delegations, Jordan succeeded in obtaining
the blessing of the entire Arab group. Syria com-
plicated the debate by introducing several amend-
ments, but eventually withdrew all except one; it
abstained on the resolution as a whole, which
passed 14 to 0.
Jordan-Fedayeen
Both sides came to the "conciliation confer-
ence" in Jidda expecting to accomplish nothing.
They were not wrong. Jordan sent its delegation
primarily in response to Saudi pressure. Amman
expected that the fedayeen would insist on unac-
ceptable concessions based on the Amman agree-
ment forced on King Husayn by Arab public
opinion last October.
on Jordan by adopting sanctions.
By remaining in Jidda after the departure of
the Jordanian delegation, the fedayeen hoped to
convey the impression that the Jordanians with-
drew unilaterally from the talks. This is the line
being taken in Egypt's influential daily AIAhram.
The fedayeen are likely to be content with this
"victory." Indeed, they are so divided they might
be hard put to produce delegates for another
round of talks. They will doubtless urge both
Egypt and Saudi Arabia to step'up the pressure
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India-Pakistan: Politics and Refugees
According to Indian data, refugees from East
Pakistan passed the nine-million mark last week.
Indian officials and foreign observers agree that
the current rate of immigration is about 30,000 a
day and shows no signs of abating. Indian officials
expect an increased refugee flow next month
when traditional crossing points, blocked for
weeks by flood waters, can again be used. The
flow would be further accelerated if food condi-
tions worsen in East Pakistan.
Although Indian figures are subject to error,
they are the best available. The official Pakistani
estimate is two million, but a UN representative
in East Pakistan has stated he was "privately
informed" that this figure represented a reduction
from a government assessment showing 5.3 mil-
lion refugees in India in early September. Other
UN officials speculate that the official Pakistani
figure may reflect the number of refugees, largely
non-Hindu, that Islamabad would be willing to
take back.
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Aid pledged for the refugees now amounts
to slightly over $200 million, some $114 million
of which has been extended through the UN. US
aid accounts for almost 40 percent of the total.
Included so far are some 300,000 tons of rice,
40,000 tons of wheat, 57,000 tons of edible oil,
1,848 vehicles, and shelter for 3 million people.
Still, India is being forced to dip deeply into its
own pocket. Costs of $300 million have been
incurred so far, half again as much as has been
pledged from abroad. The World Bank reportedly
estimates that $400 million will be needed in the
next six months even if the refugee influx stops.
Contributions to the UN relief program in
East Pakistan--a program separate from that in
India-amount to about $150 million, 90 percent
of which has been pledged by the US. Food
accounts for the great part of the US aid.
The head of UN relief operations in East
Pakistan reports that the UN task is more compli-
cated than he had imagined. He recited the famil-
iar litany of a throughly disorganized and ineffi-
cient government apparatus in East Pakistan, the
nearly complete disruption of inland communica-
tions and transport:, the attitude of passive resist-
ance and noncooperation from the civilian popu-
lation, and the expected growth of violence and
sabotage by the guerrillas. Five ships, including
two Pakistani food carriers, were damaged last
week. The guerrillas have reportedly agreed not to
disrupt UN food distribution within the province,
but their adherence to this policy is still uncer-
tain. Attacks on carriers bringing food into the
province would hinder the relief program. I
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Octoberfest in Panama
For the past two months, the junta govern-
ment has been moving ahead with plans for a
mammoth celebration to mark the third anniver-
sary of the coup that raised General Torrijos to
pre-eminence. The high point of a weekend of
festivities is to be a massive public rally on 11
October in Panama City, only a couple of blocks
from the Canal Zone. Anxious to avoid a con-
frontation with the US at this time, the govern-
ment has apparently decided not to play upon
anti-US themes. There is concern, nevertheless,
that some in the crowd may not get the message
and that incidents-perhaps even incursions into
the zone-will occur.
The government's primary objective in hold-
ing the rally is to create the image, both at home
and abroad, of a regime that enjoys wide popular
support. Torrijos has made it clear to government
officials that he wants a turnout of at least
100,000, and substantial government funds have
been made available to ensure a large crowd.
Government workers are being pressed to come
and to bring their friends, and campesinos will be
trucked in from around the country.
From the standpoint of domestic politics, a
large turnout will help the government to wash
out the bitter taste of the Gallego case-the disap-
pearance in June of a young Roman Catholic
priest. Although the government steadfastly
denies any responsibility, it has been under pres-
sure ever since to "clarify its role" in the disap-
pearance. The Catholic Church has been able to
mobilize crowds of 12,000 persons on the Gallego
case. One of the government objectives, therefore,
is to impress the church and other domestic
critics that its own support far outweighs that of
its opponents.
Torrijos' interest in a highly visible demon-
stration of public confidence is keyed also to the
US-Panamanian treaty talks, which have been un-
der way since 29 June. Such a demonstration
would presumably quiet any allegations that the
US is dealing with an unrepresentative govern-
ment. In additior, he would hope to impress on
the US that, whatever internal political differ-
ences may exist, Panamanians of all persuasions
are united in supoort of the government's nego-
tiating position. Fulfilling these latter objectives
would require skill and perhaps luck, for any
positive manifestation of Panamanian nationalism
could easily turn along essentially negative, vio-
lent, and xenophobic lines.
When plans for the October celebrations
were first being formulated, the government was
not yet clear as to what public posture it would
adopt on the treaty issue. In an effort to keep all
of its options open, one theme that was empha-
sized was the Panamanian need to gain sover-
eignty over the zone. Of late, the government has
been more sanguine about the negotiations and is
unwilling to do anything that might jeopardize
their success. Nevertheless, opponents of the re-
gime, some of whom support deposed President
Arias and others who blame the government for
the disappearance of Father Gallego, may seek to
embarrass Torrijos by turning the anniversary
celebration into an anti-US demonstration. An-
archistic student elements and some peasants who
have been influenced by earlier government prop-
aganda may be receptive.
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Chile: Overkill
President Allende's very hard stand on ex-
propriated Kennecott and Anaconda operations
in Chile indicates that he is prepared to risk a
showdown with the US Government over com-
pensation. Allende's charge on 28 September that
the two companies owe Chile $774 million in
"excessive profits" realized since 1955 ensures a
substantial negative indemnification balance since
it is greater than the assumed total book value of
their expropriated interests. The Chilean con-
troller general, a nominally autonomous official,
must accept Allende's figure. Moreover, in de-
termining the companies' net worth by 15 Octo-
ber, he must also consider exaggerated claims of
about $1 billion already made against the
companies for alleged equipment deficiencies and
mine damage.
Allende did not keep his promise that com-
pensation for the two companies' remaining 49
percent interest would be negotiated after they
were taken over in July. The negative balance will
more than cancel debts still due Kennecott and
Anaconda for the 51-percent interest bought by
Chile during the Frei administration. Such a
balance could be used by Allende to justify reneg-
ing on his promise that Chile would honor
$350-400 million in foreign debts incurred by the
companies in extensive copper production expan-
sion programs only recently completed. In an
attempt to retain some respectability in interna-
tional financial circles, Chile may be more
generous in repaying the approximately
$100-million portion of those debts owed to Jap-
anese and European financiers than the larger
amount due the US Export-Import Bank. The
Chilean Government's action will trigger claims
for several hundred million dollars of insurance
that the two companies hold with the US Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation.
The Cerro Corporation probably will receive
compensation for its mine that started producing
only a few months ago. The $56 million in-
volved-already negotiated but not signed-would
be a small price for Chile to pay for Cerro's recent
agreement to serve as purchasing agent for equip-
ment necessary to maintain all the expropriated
US copper installations. Such a gesture, as well as
other recent settlements with smaller US and
other foreign investors, would be used to reassure
potential creditors and investors that the Allende
government is reasonable and selective in its
policies. This is important because, with few ex-
ceptions, Allende's otherwise successful nurturing
of substantial international cordiality toward his
"worthy socialist experiment"' has not brought
Chile the credits so desperately needed to bail it
out of its deepening economic difficulties. His
partisans refer to the announcement on 28 Sep-
tember as the "Allende Doctrine," the position
that developing nations have the sovereign and
natural right not only to control their basic re-
sources but also to seek "reparation" for past
exploitation by development countries. The selec-
tion of Anaconda and Kennecott, and the argu-
ment that their Chilean profits far exceeded those
from their other operations as well as interna-
tionally acceptable profit norms, looks like a
clever move by some of Allende's astute advisers.
One of those advisers, Edurado Novoa, was
the legal architect of Allende's copper policies. He
also heads the National Security Council that has
successfully withstood challenges to government
intervention of the telephone company, 70-per-
cent owned by a US firm, on the grounds that its
insufficiencies are a threat to Chilean national
security.
The Allende government's increasing exploi-
tation of nationalistic issues may be one way of
trying to strengthen his domestic political posi-
tion so he can launch an overdue austerity pro-
gram and other measures to solve the economic
difficulties that he considers his first prior-
ity.
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Uruguay: Holding Operation
With elections set for 28 November, Presi-
dent Pacheco is pursuing a political strategy that
is aimed at preserving his image as a man tough on
subversion while at the same time avoiding the
abrasive tactics that have repeatedly cost him
political support. Near-term political priorities are
becoming paramount in the economic field as
well, and government actions increasingly reflect
a search for stop-gap measures that may boost the
government's support at the polls.
Pacheco responded to the Tupamaros' mass
jailbreak last month in typical fashion, by turning
over responsibility for the counterterrorist effort
to the military. Although the armed forces are
making plans for several changes, including a
special army-run prison for Tupamaros, there has
been no new initiative against the guerrillas__
Indications of a somewhat more cautious
trend-in the administration's actions, if not its
rhetoric-have been evident in other areas as well.
In response to student agitation, the President
presented the legislature with the draft of a new
law establishing greater government control over
education, rather than closing the schools as he
did last year. The strict provisions were very
much in keeping with Pacheco's no-nonsense
reputation, but he significantly chose not to
designate his legislative proposal an urgent matter.
This means that the General Assembly will a,most
surely recess it mid-October before considering
the bill, and thus not aggravate the poor rebations
between the executive and the legislature. It will
also spare Pacheco another conflict with the
student sector.
Despite a constitutional prohibition against
civil service wage increases during the year pre-
ceding national elections, the administration has
decreed a modest monthly "loan," payment of
which began in August and will continue through
February, to employees of the government and
state corporations. The method of repayment was
conveniently left to be established at a later date,
and it is understood that the repayment will be
forgotten. Betweer now and the elections, the
government is expected to grant a 25-percent
wage increase to all private sector employees. It is
hoped that these efforts will help offset previous
austerity measures, including wage freezes, which
have been especially unpopular in the capital.
The government has adopted similar
short-term policies on foreign fiscal matters. A
multiple exchange rate system, which provides for
different rates for some types of transactions and
thereby eases pressure on the "official" rate, is
being used to stave off outright devaluation. This
would be political)\r disadvantageous just prior to
the elections. Furthermore, the government is at-
tempting to renegotiate its foreign debt repay-
ment schedule in order to ease pressure on its
balance of payments and so avoid more stringent
exchange controls.
Despite the economic sweeteners, the Presi-
dent is determined to make the elections a refer-
endum on the single issue of law and order. A
campaign advertisement features his picture
alongside a poster of the Frente Amplio party, a
leftist coalition that includes the Communists,
with the legend "i will never permit it." If the
President begins to feel that forceful measures
against the left are necessary, he will not hesitate
to act. For the moment, he has adopted some-
what more subtle tactics.
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Brazil: Hostile Reaction to Church Criticism
President Medici has removed the controver-
sial commander of the Superior War College for
defying the chief executive's instructions to can-
cel a lecture at the school by a prominent Cath-
olic prelate. The prelate, Archbishop Avelar
Brandao, in an address at the school on 23 Sep-
tember, criticized the government for being
obsessed with "national security" to the point
that it had created a climate of fear in which
citizens were afraid to defend their legitimate
rights. He told the audience that unless the gov-
ernment could learn to distinguish between valid
criticism and subversion, serious injustices would
occur. He urged more understanding and toler-
ance in dealings with the nation's youth and
nonconformists. The archbishop attempted to
balance his criticisms, which received extensive
press coverage, by praising the government's eco-
nomic development programs and noting that the
government's opponents shared the blame for the
lack of dialogue.
President Medici reacted to the disobedience
of his personal instructions by relieving General
Jordao Ramos of command of the prestigious
school. The general's outspokenness on political
as well as military topics and his abrasive person-
ality have earned him many enemies within the
army high command, and the reaction of his
adherents among younger officers is unlikely to
go beyond criticism of his ouster. The incident
demonstrates anew the administration's hostility
to criticism on issues concerning national secu-
rity, particularly when it comes from the church.
CUBA: Fidel Castro's speech on 28 September.
commemorating the eleventh anniversary of the
creation of the Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution-a nationwide network of local ad-
ministrative organs first created as neighborhood
security units-focused primarily on familiar
themes concerning domestic problems. There was
the standard Castro promise for a better life for
the Cuban people because Cuba's problems wil;
be resolved by "following an order of priorities."
He asked the people to "demand of themselves
more than they demand of others." Castro lauded
the defense committees for their efforts to allevi-
ate worker shortages during the past year and
asked that increased efforts be made in the fields
of construction, street repairs, education, and
housing.
The only significant reference to external
issues came in an aside, when he accused the US
of seeking to make "cheap propaganda" about
the imminent conclusion of the Cuban refugee
airlift to the US. He strongly implied that Cuba
would encourage the hijacking of US aircraft to
Cuba if the US were to attempt to stimulate the
illegal departure of refugees from Cuba after the
airlift ends. The threat was probably more a
rhetorical gesture than a carefully considered
statement of policy. Havana's discomfiture with
some hijackers now in Cuba would presumably
make him think twice about encouraging
others. 25X1
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MEXICO: The unprecedented kidnaping of a
Mexican official has added to the unease over the
security situation, and a strenuous crackdown on
the left is likely. Mexico's civil air chief, Julio
Hirschfeld, was captured early this week by a
self-styled revolutionary group of the type that
has been proliferating over the past six months.
Other groups that have come to light have en-
gaged principally in robbery and guerrilla training
but, even so, their antigovernment zeal and admi-
ration for active terrorist movements in other
BOLIVIA: The government continues to charge
that foreigners have been among the estimated
two dozen guerrillas killed in recent clashes and
now has added the claim that the nation has been
invaded. There is no conclusive evidence that
Cubans, Chileans, or other foreigners are now
operating with Bolivian guerrilla groups.
Its ability
to implement plans for a full-scale campaign of
urban terrorism is doubtful. Since 1967, the
group has operated only sporadically and has re-
mained small and generally ineffective.
countries have corcerned security officials. Police
have made dozers of arrests of young people
connected with these fledgling subversive organ-
izations. Despite the consequent availability of
"political prisone~s," kidna ers demanded
f and for Hirschfeld.
Nevertheless, the bloodshed of the revolu-
tion and the Banzer government's severe crack-
down on the extreme left have alienated and
further radicalized many, especially among the
student population. Whether or not these dissi-
dents choose to serve under the banner of the
National Liberatio,i Army, they are potential per-
petrators of violent acts of opposition which the
regime could use 'o justify its repressive actions.
The National Libe?ation Army will be anxious to
demonstrate that it is viable, and isolated but
dramatic terrorist .acts, which require only limited
resources, would serve this purpose. These efforts
may be directed against resident Americans as
well as the government and could be timed to
coincide with the 9 October anniversary of the
death four years ago of the group's founder,
Ernesto "Che" Guevara./
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OWN
Secret
Secret
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Nigeria Under General Gowon
Secret
N2 41
1 October 1971
No. 0390/71A
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51;(:l~r 1
Nigeria Under
General Gowon
The Nigerian civil war, which
ended in January 1970, settled the
question of whether Africa's most
populous country would be broken up
by secession. The federal victory did
not, however, resolve a number of
more fundamental problems that lay
dormant during the civil war but are
now surfacing again. Tribalism, region-
alism, and other sources of friction
undermine Nigeria's hard-won unity.
Nigeria's el:onomy has benefited from
an oil boom that has made the coun-
try the ninth-ranking producer in the
world. The government has made im-
portant gains in its drive to increase
both its take from oil and its control
over production. In foreign affairs, the
government is clearly more assertive
than its predecessors in its efforts to
carve out a leading role for Nigeria on
the African continent.
General Gowon's government is
popular, but criticism of inaction in
domestic affairs has increased. Little
has been done to reshape Nigeria's
institutions or to prepare the country
for a return to civilian rule, now
scheduled-for 1976. There has been
slow adjustment on the local level to
the new 12--state structure, which has
diluted the power of the major tribes.
In the background is the usual pleth-
ora of scheming politicians who have
so far avoided a confrontation with
the military government.
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Gowon is probably unsure about the best
way to achieve his objectives. He sees himself as a
mediator who operates by consensus, and he has
on occasion been shouted down by his associates.
A modest man who lives simply and reads the
Bible daily, Gowon has the reputation of being
relatively free from the corruption endemic in the
Nigerian political system.
The most recurring domestic criticism of
Gowon's leadership is that he is not making the
hard and unpopular decisions that are necessary
but is seeking to divert attention from pressing
problems. Certainly, there has been drift in gov-
ernment leadership. Gowon designates no deputy
while he is out of the country and all decisions
have to await his return. This situation, added to
the normally cumbersome workings of the Ni-
gerian bureaucracy, means that things move
slowly, when they move at all.
The 36-year-old head of the federal military
government has gathered experience and confi-
dence since taking over the government in 1966.
Gowon's major strength lies in his neutral and
conciliatory image. As a minority tribesman and a
Christian, he is not identified with any of the
three major tribes: the Yorubas in the west, the
Muslim Hausa-Fulanis in the north, or the Ibos in
the east. Since taking over, Gowon has developed
an important constituency among the minority
tribesmen, who hold real power in the federal
government through their control of senior posi-
tions in the army. Gowon appears to have wid-
ened this constituency in the past year. Some-
thing of a hero at the end of the war, he has
garnered additional popular acceptance through
speeches and widely publicized trips throughout
Nigeria. Among Gowon's main advisers are a num-
ber of key civil servants, who are particularly
important in economic matters.
The 280,000-man army has been called
Nigeria's thirteenth state. Any challenge to
Gowon would have to come from within it, or
from politicians who have links with army offi-
cers. There are rumors of coup plotting at ir-
regular intervals, but the division commanders are
personally loyal to Gowon; in addition, the large
size of the army and its dispersal throughout the
country would make it difficult to mount a suc-
cessful coup.
There are no immediate plans for demobili-
zation of the large force (it was 12,000 before the
war) which costs the government more than $1
million a day. The army is very much under-
employed, but there have been only a few clashes
with civilians. Most of these appear to have been
spontaneous incidents.
Some of the army's most senior officers have
been implicated in corruption. This is a touchy
issue for Gowon, who has pledged to eradicate
corruption. He risks losing the support of his
senior officers if he brings charges against them;
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yet, if he continues to avoid prosecuting them he
alienates junior officers.
Reconciliation Policy
At the war's end, Lagos announced a con-
ciliatory policy toward the Biafran secessionists,
including the absorption of "misguided" army
and police personnel and the reinstatement of
civil servants. This policy has led to an impressive
degree of reintegration and a near return to nor-
malcy in the Ibo East-Central State. Several
thousand former Biafran policemen have been
reabsorbed, as have Ibo enlisted men and non-
commissioned officers who wished to return to
the army. A federal military tribunal that was set
up to screen officers completed its work months
ago, but thus far no army officers have been
reabsorbed. Secessionist officers from Mid-West
State-not originally a part of Biafra-are regarded
as "traitors" and are still in prison, while Ibos
from the East, officially considered "misled,"
have been allowed to return to civilian life. The
highest ranking secessionist officer still in the
country, Col. Effiong, has been allowed to return
to his farm. Secessionist leader Ojukwu remains in
Ivory Coast, where he has been prohibited from
engaging in any overt political activity.
Over 3,000 civil servants of East-Central
State origin have been reintegrated into the gov-
ernment. Some 50,000 Ibos have returned to
northern Nigeria, where more than 350,000 lived
before the war. For the most part, they have
returned as wage earners rather than as entre-
preneurs. The lbos have been warmly welcomed
back to the north, where they are very slowly
regaining their property. The northerners appar-
ently prefer them to the assertive Yorubas, who
in many cases took the Ibos' place after the
exodus. The Ibos have not been so fortunate in
Rivers and Southeastern states where minority
tribesmen, freed from Ibo domination by the
outcome of the war, are determined to keep the
Ibos out. I n Rivers State, the Ibos have been
unable to regain their valuable property in Port
Harcourt, a predominantly Ibo city before the
war.
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On the whole, things are moving along well
in Iboland. The state has one of the better func-
tioning governments. Food shortages have ended,
agricultural recovery is encouraging, and key
businesses are being reactivated. The federal gov-
ernment has been generous in its aid to the East-
Central State, allocating $35 million for rehabili-
tation, in addition to direct payments of $90
million to the state treasury. There are, however,
still large numbers of unemployed and a shortage
of capital.
There has been little political activity in Ibo-
land. Ibo tribesmen have been preoccupied with
rehabilitation, and little dissatisfaction-or even
interest-in the state administration is evident.
The most popular figure among the Ibos is the
commissioner for economic development and
reconstruction, Sam Ikoku, a well-known leftist.
An embrace for Sir Louis Mbanefo former Chief Justice of
Eastern Nigeria immediately after the collapse of seces-
sion, January 1970. Center is Lt.Col. Philip Effiong who
formally renounced secession.
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States and Tribal Groups of Nigeria
Kano
KANO
NORTH
CENTRAL
Jos
.florin
WESTERN
Ibadan?
LAGOS VEnugu,
J LAGOS Benin City EAST
CENTRAL
MID-
WESTERN
RIVERS
?
Port
Hatep(
? State capital
Selected tribe
O 50 100 150
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\SOUT
EASTER
OCalabar
EQUATORIAL
GUINEA
CHAD
0 Maiduguri
CAMEROON
Kaduna
Northern
Western
?lbadan
Lagos ~' city
Mid-Western,
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who spent the last years of the prewar civilian
regime in Nkrumah's Ghana. Ikoku is adept at the
game of tribal politics and, as the principal
spokesman for Ibo interests, appears to be ready-
ing himself to go after a wider political con-
stituency.
The carving up of the old Northern Region
into six states, which occurred in 1968, has
broken the power of the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy
over the minor tribes. It has also set in motion a
chain of events that will ultimately shift most
power from these traditional leaders to the state
governments. The emirs and chiefs retain enor-
mous influence, but they have been stripped of all
important powers except local taxation and con-
trol over primary school education. They are al-
lowed to keep 80 percent of the taxes they
collect. In addition, federal funds for develop-
ment are being channeled into new organs of
government, which are taking over many of the
aristocracy's old functions.
The momentum with which these changes
are taking place varies greatly from state to state,
but is slow everywhere. Some powerful emirs in
the far north have been able to circumvent re-
forms, and there has not been much real change
so far in local government personnel. A struggle
appears to be developing between young, edu-
cated civil servants and those clustered around the
traditional rulers. Because many of the reformers
are themselves part of the feudal social structure,
there is always the possibility of backsliding.
Although the pace of change is uncertain,
the old solid north is gone. Each of the state
capitals now faces toward Lagos, rather than
Kaduna, the old regional capital. The few com-
mon services the states share will probably be
terminated in a year. Nevertheless, a psychologi-
cal consciousness of "north" as opposed to
"south" probably still exists and will tend to
haunt Nigeria for some time to come. Northerners
recognize the fact that they are far behind south-
Special Report
erners in education and economic development,
and they are quick to complain if they think they
are being discriminated against. A group of north-
erners, in fact, has bitterly criticized the four-year
plan for being "socialist," "southern," and not
sufficiently cognizant of "northern sensitivities."
Nigeria's economic prospects are good, but
the country faces a number of problems typical
to Africa: inflation, unemployment, endemic cor-
ruption, and a serious shortage of managerial
skills. Price inflation-severe since the end of the
war-appears to be subsiding somewhat as a result
of an increased supply of goods from liberalized
imports and the current harvest. Another infla-
tionary spiral may occur, however, if cost-of-
living salary and wage increases now being con-
sidered by the government are granted. The
foreign exchange situation is improving.
Booming oil production continues to be the
brightest spot: production is running at 1.5 mil-
lion barrels per day. The government has made
important gains in its drive to increase both its
take from oil and its control over production.
New financial terms, negotiated with the oil com-
panies last spring, combined with anticipated out-
put of about 1.7 million barrels per day by the
end of the year, could push government revenues
as high as $900 million this year compared with
$300 million last year. If military expenditure-
now accounting for over a third of federal spend-
ing-does not increase too much, there should be
a small surplus for development needs.
The military government has announced an
ambitious four-year economic development pro-
gram that includes planned investments of almost
$4.5 billion. It has set up a national oil company
that will play a major role in future exploration,
production, and marketing. Nigeria recently
joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries and can be expected to exact price
increases similar to those granted to other mem-
ber countries; it has also demanded majority
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J.C. I do J: 1
participation in all new oil ventures. In a further
nationalistic thrust, the government has reserved
certain businesses exclusively for Nigerians.
The military government had some trouble
at the beginning of the year with labor unrest and
student protests. For a while it looked as if the
students and unions might make common cause, a
prospect that rattled the government. The situa-
tion is now calm, although there could be further
strikes and demonstrations later this year by
groups disgruntled with proposed wage and salary
increases.
Last year on the tenth anniversary of Ni-
gerian independence, Gowon announced a nine-
point program for a return to civilian rule in
1976. The program extended the ban on politics
and called for several time-consuming procedures,
including a new constitution and a census. The
thorny issue of adding new states to the present
12-state structure-which some tribes want and
others oppose-was put off until 1974.
One year after Gowon's announcement, vir-
tually no progress has been made in carrying out
the program. The prospect of five more years of
military rule has generated little open opposition.
There has been press criticism and some grum-
bling from former politicians, most of whom have
been skulking on the safer stage of state rather
than national politics. Although political parties
are banned, several ex-politicians have been
quietly building their local bases. For the most
part, they have been using the informal organiza-
tions or network of contacts that existed before
the war.
Behind-the-scenes political activity is highest
in Western State, home of the Yorubas, who are
inveterate political maneuverers. The most public
Special Report - 6 -
politicking surfaces in the newspapers of the
state's former political parties; when the Action
Group's daily takes a position, it is assumed that
Chief Awolowo. leader of the Yoruba, is speak-
ing. Awolowo, who was the highest ranking
civilian in the government until his resignation
last June, has been quiet over the past few
months but no one believes he has given up his
political ambitions. The 62-year-old Awolowo,
however, has so many enemies that his chances of
winning the leadership of an eventual civilian gov-
ernment seem remote. His Action Group, based
largely on the personal followings of various lead-
ers among Yoruba subgroups, is probably the best
organized of the former political parties and has
managed to establish some influence within the
civil service.
In northern Nigeria, a number of old-line
politicos have been meeting to discuss matters of
common interest. Small, informal groups have
also coalesced around minority interest groups
like the various tribal separatist movements. On
the whole, however, the politicians are biding
their time and avoiding a frontal attack on mili-
tary rule.
Foreign Affairs
General Gowon has been carving out a more
activist role for Nigeria in African affairs. In a
series of successful state visits to African coun-
tries, he has pressed for regional economic ties
and for the reconciliation of differences. Nigeria
has resumed relations with two of the African
countries that supported Biafra during the war-
Tanzania and Zambia-and re-established contacts
with the other Biafran supporters-Gabon and
Ivory Coast. Nigeria's influence has also been felt
within the councils of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), where the country clearly intends
to play a leading role.
At the same time, Nigeria has adopted a
more militant African nationalist line, drawing
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General Gowon with President Haniani Diori of Niger
closer to those African countries considered in
the "progressive" camp. Gowon is one of the
leading opponents of Black African dialogue with
white-ruled South Africa. At an OAU summit
meeting last June, he went a step further and
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called for the "liberation of at least one colonial
territory within three years." Gowon's rhetoric,
probably designed to increase Nigeria's stature as
a leader in the struggle against Africa's white
redoubt, fits well with the idea that Nigeria, as
Africa's most populous country, must be "a ban-
ner of hope and an instrument of achieving self-
respect for the black man"-a recurrent theme in
propaganda out of Lagos.
Nigeria has so far not given much backing to25X1
the African liberation movements, but it can be
expected to step up its material and propaganda
support.
The Soviet Union, which improved its image
during the war through its support of the federal
government, has not been able to consolidate its25X1
position. Nigerian military leaders have never
been enthusiastic about expanding ties with the
Communists
The USSR has extended a $$6.7-million credit for 25X1
geological prospecting, and an extensive Soviet
geological survey has begun in the north.F
In keeping-with its
policy of balancing East and West, Nigeria this
year recognized Peking, but the federal leaders'
natural affinities remain with the West.
There is a residual sensitivity in Nigerian-US
relations resulting from the belief that the US
gave moral, if not material, support to the Biafran
secessionists, but Gowon wants good relations
with the US. US companies have some $500
million invested in Nigeria and larger commit-
ments are planned. Expatriate and foreign
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business interests must expect, however, to
encounter some prickliness from Nigerians be-
cause of a growing feeling on their part that a
certain number of businesses should be reserved
for Nigerians and that the number of expatriates
should be reduced.
Nigeria's pursuit of an assertive and national-
istic foreign policy will of course depend irr large
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part on a relatively quiet domestic front. It is
highly unlikely that the present military gov-
ernment can resolve Nigeria's peacetime problems
within the timetable it has set for itself. Nigerian
tolerance is high, however, and the military gov-
ernment will probably be able to stay in power at
least for the next year or two.
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,quo, ~Wfll
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
A NATO Mission to Moscow
Secret
N9 41
1 October 1971
No. 0390/71B
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-F 4
ATO MISSION TO MOSCOW
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On 5-6 October, NATO will hold a high-level session of the North Atlantic
Council to decide on the next allied move toward East-West negotiations on mutual
and balanced force reductions. Since the NATO ministerial in Lisbon last June, the
allies individually have been probing Soviet and East European attitudes in the wake
of Brezhnev's positive reply last spring to NATO's proposals on force reductions.
The NATO countries now are prepared to advance the East-West dialogue and will
appoint retired Secretary General Brosio to visit Moscow and other interested
capitals to present current allied thinking and seek out further Soviet views.
The high-level meeting will also consider the readiness of the alliance to enter
negotiations if the explorer's mission is successful. At this point, much remains to be
done. The allies have not determined their position on such questions as what types
of reductions would be acceptable, what risks would be involved, what forms of
verification would be advisable, or what to do about nuclear warheads, delivery
systems, or tactical aircraft. The European allies realize that they can do little until
the US provides a lead on these points; their concern will innensify if the pace of
detente politics continues to quicken and pressures grow on the NATO foreign
ministers, who meet in December, to take a definite stance on force reduction
negotiations.
Moscow pushed the idea of force reductions
in Europe as a self-serving diplomatic device in
the 1950s. By 1965, the Soviets had dropped the
issue, partly because they hoped for unilateral US
reductions and partly because they feared an
accusation, particularly from the Chinese, that
mutual cuts would enable the US to shift troops
to Vietnam.
NATO's own proposals for mutual and bal-
anced force reductions have their genesis in the
soul-searching examination of the alliance that
culminated in 1967 in the Harmel Report. This
report recommended that NATO, in addition to
maintaining its chief function of providing for the
defense of the West, take on a second function of
promoting detente with the East. In approving
the report, the allies pledged themselves to in-
tensify the study of arms control measures. In
June 1968, the allied foreign ministers issued a
statement intended as a signal to the Soviet Union
of allied interest in mutual force reductions. The
signal was repeated at the semi-annual NATO
ministerial sessions in 1969, even though Moscow
had shown no interest in the subject since 1965.
In 1969, the NATO staff began to work on
"models" of var!ous reduction formulas. The
models were to serve as a basis for NATO con-
sideration of whether a given approach that
would preserve allied security would also be nego-
tiable. The exercise revealed how difficult it
might be to harmonize these requirements, and it
helped the allies to recognize some of the prob-
lems that would lie ahead were the Soviets to take
up NATO proposals.
In May 1970, the foreign ministers reiterated
in Rome their interest in exploratory talks on
force reductions, out they specified four criteria
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on which their offer rested. These four points
have become known as the Rome Criteria, and
remain basic to NATO's position.
By the next month, Moscow's continued
silence on force reductions, hardly in keeping
with its attempt to project a detente image, ap-
parently had become tactically disadvantageous
for the Kremlin. Moscow and its Warsaw Pact
allies, meeting after the NATO ministerial, finally
responded. The response was couched in terms
carefully relating force reduction talks to the
Soviet proposal for a Conference on European
Security. The pact communique professed an
Eastern interest in discussions concerning "reduc-
ing foreign armed forces on the territory of Euro-
pean states."
The Soviet response was viewed with skep-
ticism in NATO. Many allies suspected that it had
been forced by Moscow's concern for its interna-
tional image. The tie-in with a security conference
led them to question whether the Soviets had a
real interest in opening a serious dialogue on force
reductions. The allies concluded, however, that
they could not afford to treat lightly the East's
offer on foreign forces. At their ministerial ses-
sion in December last year, the NATO countries
announced that they were ready to explore the
possibility of reductions in stationed (i.e., for-
eign) forces if the reductions were "part of an
integral program for the reduction of both sta-
tioned and indigenous forces." Following this
NATO response, the issue lay dormant in Moscow
until Brezhnev raised the subject of troop limita-
tions in "Central Europe" as part of his "peace
plan" in his report to the 24th Party Congress on
30 March 1971. This proved to be only the open-
ing shot in a salvo on the issue. From 'that date,
varying degrees of interest have been evident in
speeches and private comments by Soviet officials
and in Russian propaganda media.
The sudden display of Soviet interest in mu-
tual force reductions caught most of the allies off
guard. Western proposals for force reductions had
always appealed to the allies as a useful counter
to Soviet calls for a security conference and as a
way of fending off pressures for unilateral US
troop cuts. Now, however, the alliance was faced
with the prospect of actual negotiations before it
had fully appraised the potential risks and advan-
tages of force reductions, and before it had firm
ideas of how they could be accomplished. The
European allies were also perceptibly troubled by
the specter of a bilateral dialogue on troop cuts
between Washington and Moscow. They became
sensitive to the fact that their future security
situation could depend on the outcome of force
reduction talks.
Mutual force reductions should be compatible with the Alliance's vital security inter-
ests and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side;
2. Reductions should be reciprocal and phased and balanced as to their scope and timing;
3. Reductions should include both stationed (foreign) and indigenous forces and their
weapons systems in the areas concerned;
4. There must be adequate verification and controls to ensure observance of agreements.
Special Report -3--
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Potential Force Reduction Areas
Reduction areas
0 Rapacki area
O NATO guidelines area
BELGIUM NATO member
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YUGOSLAVIA
ITALY BULGARIA
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At the NATO ministerial in Lisbon this June
the allies, largely on the initiative of the US and
Canada, moved nearer to agreement on the pro-
cedures for force reduction explorations. The US
proposed, and the other allies agreed, that bilat-
eral probes of Soviet attitudes should lead up to a
meeting this fall of the allied deputy foreign min-
isters. This meeting would decide on the next
moves, depending upon the outcome of the bilat-
eral soundings. At Canadian urging, the allies also
said that they would at some point nominate an
emissary, representing the members of the alli-
ance, to explore with the East prospects for ac-
tual negotiations. The allies also agreed to accel-
erate work on preparing substantive NATO
positions.
Allied Attitudes Three Months After Lisbon
The allies have become increasingly nervous
in the last three months about the minimal prog-
ress made toward establishing an agreed negoti-
ating position. They expect and want the US to
provide leadership for this undertaking. Each has
distinct political, economic, and security interests
at stake, however, which translate into a variety
of positions regarding a desirable approach to
force reductions.
The West Germans have for some time been
the leading advocates of proposals for force re-
ductions. Bonn's original support was based pri-
marily on its view that such proposals, in addition
to being a logical corollary of Ostpolitik, were
useful as a Western counter to Soviet calls for a
security conference. As pressures mounted in the
US, however, for unilateral troop reductions in
Europe, the Germans saw another important di-
mension. In a tactical sense, the proposals them-
selves could help stave off demands in the US for
unilateral cuts. In the longer term, if US cuts
prove inevitable, Bonn reasons, they might be
matched by at least some cutbacks in the East.
The West Germans are also very interested in
negotiating reductions in indigenous as well as
foreign forces, because of the economies Bonn
could realize and to avoid a postreduction situa-
Special Report
tion in which German troops would constitute an
increased proportion of Western forces.
Bonn nevertheless is cautious. In NATO dis-
cussions, the Germans have continued to urge a
slow, orderly progression, beginning with limited
and verifiable reductions in order to build confi-
dence in the good intentions of both sides. This
approach probably was intended, prior to the
conclusion of the Four-Power phase of the Berlin
talks, to postpone multilateral talks on force re-
ductions until a Berlin accord was achieved. It
probably is still viewed by Bonn as the most
judicious course.
The British count themselves among the
most skeptical students of mutual force reduc-
tions. Harold Wilson's Labor government had
shown some enthusiasm about the role of force
reduction proposals as NATO detente initiatives.
The Heath government has emphasized within the
last year, however, that any reductions that could
be negotiated with the Soviet Union would de-
tract from NATO's defense posture. The recent
revelations of Soviet spy activities in the UK
leading to London's expulsion of Soviet personnel
can only reinforce British caution regarding Euro-
pean security questions.
In spite, or possibly because, of this circum-
spect attitude, British representatives are urging
that the alliance intensify its preparations for
actual talks and reach conclusions on the ele-
ments and options of an initial Western negotiat-
ing position. In recent bilateral talks with the
Germans, the British called for "hard-headed"
consideration of what reductions of forces and
hardware are acceptable to the alliance. They
want a risk assessment and allied agreement on
the outer limits for such reductions, an agreement
on what verification measures would be accept-
able to the West, and a determination of the
potential role in force reductions of nuclear war-
heads, delivery systems, and tactical aircraft.
London, in sum, believes that NATO must pre-
pare itself for negotiations, although it is doubtful
that a complete allied position can be reached
soon.
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France, the third major European ally, has
abstained from every formal signal on force re-
ductions from NATO to the East. French absten-
tion, until last year, was based primarily on the
judgment that joining in such a signal would vio-
late Paris' opposition in principle to bloc-to-bloc
dealings. French substantive examination of the
topic up until a year ago had resulted in little
more than Defense Minister Debre's assertion that
he found it "terribly boring." The French did
not, in fact, believe that the Soviets would agree
to negotiate mutual troop cuts.
As diplomatic activity on force reductions
increased in the last year, the French have begun
to devote more serious attention to the subject.
Secretary general of NATO from August
1964 until his retirement this month, Brosio
is unanimously respected for his skillful serv-
ice to the Alliance. Prior to his NATO assign-
ment, Brosio's diplomatic career included
duty as Italian ambassador to the US, France,
and the USSR. Brosio, now 74 years old,
remains a vigorous defender of the Atlantic
Alliance and an advocate of close Western
defense cooperation. He speaks fluent English
as well as French and Russian-abilities that
further enhance his qualifications to lead the
NATO MBFR mission to Moscow.
Special Report
The outcome of this effort has been a French
assessment that any kind of troop reductions,
whether unilateral US cuts or mutual cuts with
the East, might lead to lessened military prepared-
ness throughout Western Europe and a concomi-
tant increase in the political influence of the
Soviet Union. Paris argues that such reductions
should come only after there have been more
substantive improvements in the East-West polit-
ical climate, improvements that Paris argues could
at least partially be realized through a Conference
on European Security.
The French position is motivated also by a
desire to occupy a distinct position on detente
questions among tie Western powers, particularly
to obtain greater leverage vis-a-vis West Germany.
Paris would rather direct attention toward a se-
curity conference--an area of detente politics
where, so far, it is ahead of Bonn. A long-range
French consideration must be that an agreement
on force reductions would both imply greater
explicit reliance on the US nuclear shield and
require some form of more integrated common
European defense system-corollaries that Paris is
reluctant to accept at the present time.
The further that East and West move toward
negotiations, however, the more of an anomaly
the French position will become. The Soviet
Union may very well insist that French forces in
Germany be included in any reduction formula,
and Paris -may not be comfortable occupying a
blocking position on such an important area of
East-West deliberations. A French official, in fact,
recently said that although Paris remains opposed
to troop reductions, the French NATO delegation
had "left open the option for French participa-
tion in the military aspects of a Conference on
European Security"-a position that could leave
the French room for maneuvering. Recognizing
that its interests are involved in allied discussions
of force reductions, Paris has decided to be repre-
sented by an observer at the meeting next week
of deputy foreign ministers.
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Iftw
Most of the smaller allies realize that their
leverage is limited. They are nevertheless assessing
more thoroughly the potential impact of force
reductions on their interests. A coalition of south-
ern allies-Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Portugal-is
emerging to oppose any expansion of the geo-
graphical coverage to include their territory. Their
concern is not so much that their forces would be
included, but that limitations might be placed on
the US presence in the Mediterranean. Norway
and Denmark, on the other hand, apparently are
not opposed to discussions involving reductions in
the Nordic area.
The Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers
When the deputy ministers meet next week,
the allies will select Manlio Brosio, now retired as
NATO's secretary general, to explore prospects
with the East on behalf of the members of the
alliance (except France). Brosio has said that he
will accept the call. He will be supported on his
mission by a small staff of three or four experts.
His first and most important stop undoubtedly
will be Moscow. As for the rest of his itinerary,
the allies agree that he should not visit East Ger-
many unless all three phases of the Berlin negotia-
tions have been concluded although some stops in
Eastern Europe are anticipated. Many allies think
that means also will have to be found to accom-
modate the interests of the neutral and non-
aligned European countries.
The most difficult task for the allies has
been to work out instructions, or a mandate, for
the explorer. The allies agree that he should not
attempt to negotiate or appear to invite negotia-
tions. They will direct Brosio to explain the views
of the allied countries on principles of force re-
ductions, sound out his interlocutors regarding
their intentions, and explore the possibility of
finding common ground on principles. The stick-
ing point, however, has been to obtain allied
agreement on these principles and to decide how
far the explorer should go in discussing each ele-
ment of them. Brosio is not happy with what now
appears to be a very limited substantive mandate,
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but he probably does not expect it to be ex-
panded greatly at the high-level meeting.
MBFR Principles
Since the Lisbon ministerial the allies have
attempted to develop agreed positions on the
main substantive features of a mutual and bal-
anced reduction of forces. Major differences
among the allies and the lack of definitive US
positions, however, have prevented agreement in
some areas and have led to only vague formula-
tions in others.
Area for Reductions: In discussions this
summer, Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands
supported the US preference for an area including
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and West Ger-
many. These countries were specified by Polish
Foreign Minister Rapacki in his European disarm-
ament proposals elating from 1958. West Ger-
many, however, would prefer not being isolated
on the Western side of the reduction area and
strongly favors the "NATO Guidelines Area,"
which adds Belgium, the Netherlands, and Lux-
embourg to the Rapacki area. Bonn has been
supported by the UK, Turkey, Luxembourg, and
Belgium, the last preferring also to add Hungary
on the Eastern side. Now, only the Dutch appear
to be holding out for the Rapacki area. Bonn's
concern therefore may lead the allies to accept
the NATO guidelines area as the basis for Brosio's
mandate, although other options will probably
not be precluded from future consideration.
Possible Extension of Geographic Coverage:
As already noted, the southern flank allies would
prefer that their area be explicitly excluded from
reductions. Denmark and Norway have continued
to favor the possibility that the reduction area
might at some point be expanded to cover the
northern flank. Brosio probably will be permitted
to leave open the possibility of some eventual
expansion of the area of coverage beyond central
Europe.
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Types of Forces to Be Reduced: Most of the
allies, particularly West Germany, prefer a posi-
tion that envisages reductions in both stationed
and indigenous forces. The US has expressed an
interest in emphasizing reductions in stationed
forces, and Brosio's mandate will probably direct
him to express an interest in both types with the
proviso that stationed forces "could" be empha-
sized.
Disposition of Withdrawn Forces: The allies
agreed that the explorer should not discuss
whether the "foreign" forces, once withdrawn,
would have to be disbanded. Brosio, however, has
pointed out that if NATO insists that Soviet units
be disbanded, Moscow would counter with the
same requirements for withdrawn US forces.
Naval Forces: The southern flank allies
would like specifically to exclude reductions in
naval forces, fearing eventual Soviet demands for
cutbacks in the US Sixth Fleet. Brosio will prob-
ably not discuss this subject in his explorations
but will be guided by the general rule that as long
as reductions are limited to Central Europe, naval
forces should not be included.
Nuclear Weapons: Although there is no clear
allied position on nuclear weapons, Brosio prob-
ably will be able to tell the Soviets that they have
not been excluded from consideration.
Categories of Forces: Brosio would like to
have definitive guidance on whether combat air-
craft, tanks, and nuclear delivery systems could
be included. There are differences among the
allies on this point. He will probably be author-
ized to say that such weapons have not been
specifically excluded.
Verification: The allies are split between the
US and Canada-who oppose requiring any on-site
inspection-and a number of European allies, who
feel that the posing of such a requirement would
serve as a good negotiating tactic. Belgium has
also noted that on-site inspection would be nec-
essary for the "tranquility" of allies that do not
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have unilateral inspection capabilities. This split
may persist and Brosio probably will be able to
say only that any agreement should have some
effective means of monitoring or constraining the
movement of forces.
Participants in Negotiations: The allies agree
that the negotiating forum should be effective,
flexible, and manageable. They also agree that
participation would be most effective if limited to
states within the reduction area, or to those hav-
ing forces in it, but they recognize that participa-
tion could expand to include some neutrals as
well as all NATO and Warsaw Pact members.
Relationship of MBFR to CES: The allies
remain highly uncertain about how to relate the
timing of force reduction talks and those pertain-
ing to a conferencf~ on European security. If nego-
tiations on the former should start first, there is
allied agreement that they should be set up in
such a way that they could later be placed under
a European security umbrella. A security confer-
ence could conceivably place force reductions on
its agenda and endorse any agreements sent to it.
If, on the otheo hand, a security conference
should take place first, the alliance could still
attempt to place force reductions on the agenda
and preserve a linl? between the two.
What Reception in Moscow?
Although the Soviets would prefer not hav-
ing an ex - secretary general of NATO as the
explorer, they are likely to accept him and listen
with interest to what he says. They will certainly
not appoint a Warsaw Pact official to handle the
talks in Moscow and Eastern Europe but will
emphasize that the talks are between Brosio and
individual countries. Moscow obviously wishes to
avoid granting NATO, as an institution, a formal
role in disarmament and detente. In addition, the
noninstitutional approach would leave Moscow
greater flexibility regarding eventual Eastern rep-
resentation at negotiations on force reduction.
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Both in the talks with Brosio and in future
bilateral contacts, the Soviets will be likely to
raise points where they believe the US is vulner-
able (for instance, regarding the US military pres-
ence in Italy and Spain). In fact, Gromyko has
told Ambassador Beam that Moscow did not limit
its view to central Europe. Nevertheless, to the
extent that the Soviets really are interested in
troop reductions, that is where they will continue
to focus.
The evolving Soviet line was recently relayed
to US officials by a first secretary at the Soviet
Embassy in Washington. He confirmed Soviet
emphasis on "the central region" and stated that
this comprised at a minimum the two Germanies.
He confirmed statements by other Soviet officials
that weapons systems as well as personnel ought
to be discussed and that discussions should be
between the individual states involved in the area
of reductions and not between blocs. He also
confirmed that each side should decide on the
proportion and choice of its national components
to be reduced, adding that Moscow is currently
thinking of reductions in all force components
(army, navy, air) and of reductions of indigenous
as well as foreign troops. He reiterated that Mos-
cow does not presently feel that talks on troop
reductions need to be directly connected with a
security conference. The points that the reduc-
tions should not be limited to the Germanies and
that foreign and indigenous forces should be in-
cluded were subsequently stressed by Brezhnev in
his recent conversations with West German Chan-
cellor Brandt.
There are several reasons to expect con-
tinued Soviet interest in force reduction talks. In
the first place, the current Soviet detente policy
centers on Europe-a primary area of concern to
Moscow. Force reductions constitute an obvious
part of this detente policy. Moscow has consider-
ably more troops than it needs for internal secu-
rity in Eastern Europe and would probably be
more than willing to pull a number of them back
to the USSR in return for a significant lessening
of the US military presence in Europe. The So-
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viets know that there is strong sentiment in the
US for American troop withdrawals from Europe
and probably also feel that the subject is divisive
within NATO. They probably judge that pressure
on this issue can exacerbate both situations. In
addition, discussions of troop reductions will
eventually have to include Pankow and thus con-
tribute to the important Soviet objective of gain-
ing formal recognition of East Germany. It could
also provide a forum for Moscow to raise the
subject of US forward-based nuclear delivery
systems in Europe, and perhaps open possibilities
for the reduction of US tactical nuclear weapons
in Europe.
On the debit side, Moscow must always be
concerned with the risk that a detente atmos-
phere in Europe will make it more difficult to
exercise control of its East European empire, par-
ticularly if such an atmosphere removes much of
the credibility of the eternal Moscow bogeyman
of West German revanchism. The Soviets cannot
be certain that involving the East European coun-
tries in such specific detente activities as mutual
force reductions and a Conference on European
Security will not whet their appetites for more
independent and productive contacts with the
West.
With all this in mind, Moscow has been care-
fully vague about details of its thinking on force
reductions, obviously hoping to receive Western
views before showing its cards. In several discus-
sions with Soviet officials during the summer,
Western diplomats received the impression that
Moscow had not yet fully formulated its policy.
There is evidence, in any case, that Moscow has
not done any serious coordination with its War-
saw Pact allies.
In the talks with Brosio, Moscow will likely
maintain that his position is not sufficiently
forthcoming and will continue to press the West
to speed up its activity while offering few more
details on what the Soviets have in mind. The
Soviets obviously would derive satisfaction if they
could appear out in front on this issue. They may
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ultimately present a formal demarche to US and
West European capitals calling for discussions
within a specified time on force reductions in
order to create the impression that the NATO
countries are dragging their feet.
The deputy foreign ministers' meeting, is not
expected to produce major surprises, but it will
mark another Western step toward force reduc-
tion negotiations: The alliance, as the British
warn, is ill-prepared for any such negotiations.
Most of the allies generally feel that they are
committed, nevertheless, to pursue the subject
because it is their "baby." They may also feel
pressed by the expectation of their publics that
the West will keep the initiative in the East-West
dialogue on force reductions. As long as impor-
tant US decisions remain outstanding, the allies
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will be disturbed by a lack of direction in their
work at a time when they see an accelerating
movement toward negotiations. They will remain
dismayed not so much because they are zealous
advocates of force reductions, but because they
suspect that this may contribute to pressures for
unilateral cuts in US forces.
Brosio's mission to Moscow may not reveal a
great deal more about Soviet intentions. It will,
however, buy time for the allies to sort out their
own ideas on the subject. They realize that by the
time of their ministerial meeting in December, a
conclusion of the second and third phases of the
Berlin negotiations may face them with little
choice but to authorize multilateral talks to lead
to a Conference on European Security. Whether,
upon receiving the report of the explorer's mis-
sion, they will be ready and willing to move also
to talks on troop reductions may prove to be a
troublesome question for the allies.
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