WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT INSURGENCY IN MOZAMBIQUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009000030002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 13, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Insurgency in Mozambique
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
Na 40
13 August 1971
No. 0383/71A
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Insurgency in Mozambique
For almost seven years, Portugal has
been fighting insurgency in its African
province of Mozambique. Although Portu-
guese forces have exhibited a surprising
degree of aggressiveness in the past year
by carrying the fight into guerrilla terri-
tory, it is apparent that Lisbon cannot
win a conventional military victory
unless it deprives the guerrillas of
the external support provided by
black African states, espe-
cially Tanzania and Zambia.
Portugal is not likely to
mount a military effort
against these states, how-
ever, because of its lim-
ited resources and the po-
litical furor that would ensue.
Nevertheless, Lisbon is firmly committed to maintaining its presence in
Mozambique and is resigned therefore to a long-term struggle. Faced with the
impracticality of attacking guerrilla sanctuaries across Mozambique's borders,
Portugal believes that its best bet is to keep insurgency confined to remote,
unimportant areas of the province. Over the short term, it can take comfort in
the fact that its offensive last year hurt the insurgents and that a continuation
of the offensive-currently under way-is likely to give Portuguese forces the
upper hand for the present.
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DEM. REP.
OF THE
CONGO
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-- tl'ahcl 6oa~Jary
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Lusaka;
SOUTHERN) RHODESIA
tU K.)
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The Mozambique nationalist movement
dates back to the early 1960s, when a number of
small exile groups were established in Tanganyika,
Kenya, and Northern Rhodesia to prepare the
Mozambican population for eventual armed strug-
gle against Portuguese colonial rule. The nuclei of
these groups were native Mozambicans educated
in Lisbon or elsewhere abroad and caught up in
the rising tide of nationalism in southern Africa.
The Portuguese stepped up their suppression
of opposition political activity in the African ter-
ritories after rebellion broke out in Angola in
1961. This hampered the development of a na-
tionalist movement within Mozambique, but had
little effect on the development of exile organiza-
tions. In June 1962, several of these organizations
merged to form the Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique (FRELIMO) with headquarters in
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Under the leadership of
its first president, the late Dr. Eduardo Mond lane,
FRELIMO called for the elimination of Portu-
guese rule in Mozambique and for the establish-
FRELIMO soldiers placing mines
in Cabo Delgado Province
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ment of an independent, black-ruled, single-party
state.
FRELIMO initiated armed insurgency
against the Portuguese in September 1964, when
about 250 guerrillas slipped across the Ruvuma
River from Tanzania and quickly established a
foothold in the extreme northeast of Cabo Del-
gado District. By early 1965, FRELIMO had set
up several sizable base camps and a supply net-
work that ran from Tanzania into Cabo Delgado.
It had organized a small force in Niassa District
and was making limited forays into Zambezia and
Tete districts. Once having established this foot-
hold, however, further expansion was held back
by a lack of manpower and materiel. For the next
several years, FRELIMO's leaders directed most
of their efforts toward recruiting and training
cadre, and canvassing African and Western sources
for arms and supplies. Insurgent tactics in Mozam-
bique during these years followed a pattern of
harassment and small-unit, hit-and-run operations.
Open confrontations with Portuguese troops were
avoided in favor of ambushes of patrols and sup-
ply convoys, as well as terrorism against local
inhabitants.
Portuguese troops-who numbered about
20,000 throughout the province-made only a
limited response designed simply to contain the
insurgents. Little effort was made to carry the
fighting into guerrilla territory, largely because of
a weak command structure, inadequate logistics,
and a cleneral unfamiliarity with unconventional
warfare. Portuguese policy was essentially that of
maintaining a cordon militaire along the periph-
ery of insurgent territory, a strategy that kept
Portuguese casualties down to an acceptable level,
about ten per month.
During the first three months of 1968, the
frequency-although not the strength-of
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FRELIMO freedom fighters preparing to ambush
FRELIMO ambushes and small-unit probes in
Cabo Delgado showed a sharp increase. FRE-
LIMO stepped up its use of road and antiperson-
nel mines as well as its mortar attacks on military
outposts and fortified villages. Portuguese casual-
ties were unusually heavy during this period (68
killed, three times the quarterly average) even
though the rainy season runs roughly from
December to May and Portuguese patrols are held
to a minimum.
The increase in FRELIMO's activity during
this period seems to have been largely intended to
draw attention away from its move into Tete
District. Shortly after the end of the rainy season
in the spring of 1968, FRELIMO began opera-
tions there and by August
Since then Tete has become the focal point
of FRELIMO activity. The true extent of opera-
tions there has been glossed over by the Portu-
guese, however, because of their sensitivity over
FRELIMO's ability to open up a new front and
their concern for the security of the $300-million
plus Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project.
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This project, now in the initial stages of
construction, will cut across the Cabora Bassa
gorge on the Zambezi River, about 80 miles up-
stream from the district capital. It was originally
promoted as a means of accelerating agricultural,
industrial, and mineral development along the
Zambezi, but the full scope has been temporarily
restricted in favor of producing electricity, pri-
marily for export to South Africa, whose agree-
ment to purchase large blocks of power has made
the project economically feasible for the finan-
cially strapped Portuguese, who are depending on
multinational financing to develop the project. In
terms of ultimate capacity, Cabora Bassa will be
able to generate more electricity than the com-
bined output of Egypt's Aswan Dam and the joint
Rhodesian-Zambian Kariba project.
FRELIMO leaders realize that the Cabora
Bassa project will open new areas to settlement
and development, and thus strengthen the ability
of the Portuguese to hold on to the province. The
guerrillas view the disruption of development in
Tete as absolutely necessary if they are to weaken
Lisbon's will to remain in Mozambique.
Lisbon's determination to make the project
succeed as a symbol of Portugal's durability and
power in Africa is, however, as strong as FRE-
LIMO's desire to make it fail. Within the past two
years, the military has committed some 5-6,000
troops to Tete, augmented by several hundred
militia and special troops. The construction site
itself is protected behind a series of concentric
defense perimeters extending out some 18 miles.
Workers are recruited from Mozambique's south-
ern districts, which have been untouched by the
insurgency, and they are carefully screened for
any links with the north.
The importance the Portuguese attach to
Tete was underscored in May of this year when
Lisbon centralized military control over the coun-
terinsurgency effort in the district by combining
the posts of military commander and district gov-
ernor under an army general officer. The district
has also been reorganized as a semiautonomous
military zone, and the Portuguese plan to commit
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Despite some internal disagreement, FRELIMO has grown steadily from its
inception under the unifying leadership and political tutelage of US-educated Ed-
uardo Mondlane. Mondlane's assassination in February 1969
aggravated intraparty conflicts and led to a
period of severe action infighting, is lasted until May 1970, when FRELIMO's
military commander, Samora Machel, was named acting president. Under his guid-
ance and astute military ability, FRELIMO has regained much of its momentum.
In 1968, FRELIMO leaders claimed to have well over 8,000 armed followers.
Although that figure may be close to FRELIMO's total membership, it is doubtful
that the organization has more than 4,000 armed insurgents in the field at any given
time. The others are at training, educational, and headquarters facilities in Tanzania,
studying abroad, or operating branches in various A--rican and European capitals.
Support has come from a wide variety of sources and in many forms. The
African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity has provided
more than $200,000 over the past seven years. The bulk of FRELIMO's military aid
comes from Communist China and the Soviet Union, which have supplied modern
small arms as well as light and heavy machine guns, mortars, bazookas, rocket
launchers, and even several small antiaircraft guns that have been in limited use since
1968. The Chinese have also provided some tw?nty instructors for FRELIMO's
training camps in Tanzania, while the USSR has accepted both combatants and
medical personnel for training.
Western sources have also made contributions, primarily for humanitarian
purposes. Over the past several years, the Swedish Government has provided about
$70,000, and in July 1970 the Danish Governmen-: announced a grant of $27,000.
These funds, channeled through the UN High Commission for Refugees, have gone
for nonmilitary supplies such as medicinesand clothing, and for the maintenance of the
Mozambique Institute, FRELIMO's educational arm in Dar es Salaam. The Ford
Foundation, which underwrote the initial costs of the institute, and other private US
organizations have continued to give modest contributions. In addition, a number of
FRELIMO students have scholarships to various US universities.
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an additional two battalions there in the near
future.
Portuguese authorities have maintained strict
security on the extent of insurgent activity in the
area. This, plus the reorganization, has led to
much speculation by both local inhabitants and
STRENGTH ESTIMATES (1871)
PORTUGAL
FRELIMO
Total: 54,500`
Total: 8000
Arrny"
43,000
Fiplri vrength:
Navy
3,500
Cabo Delgado
4,000
Air Force
3.500
Tete
1,100
Public Police
4,000
Nita:)
800
Secret Police
500
dues not include several thnumrnd local militia
"" aphroximarelr 35% luealir re,nmited
foreign observers that FRELIMO is stronger in
Tete than the Portuguese are willing to admit in
public. A Portuguese military bulletin issued in
late April of this year, however, predicted in-
creased insurgent activity with the advent of the
dry season and specifically focused on Tete as a
problem area. The bulletin estimated that there
are now at least 1,000 insurgents in the district
and predicted that the number would double by
the end of the year.
So far, FRELIMO's activities have been
limited to probings of the Cabora Bassa defense
perimeters, sporadic ambushes, the planting of
mines along approach roads, and terrorism against
the local population to discourage it from coop-
erating with the Portuguese. FRELIMO also
hopes that its operations will frighten off foreign
investors and technicians. At the present time,
FRELIMO does not have the ability to mount a
major offensive against Cabora Bassa, and there is
little likelihood it will even be able to impede
construction seriously. Harassment is likely to
continue, however, and as the project progresses
it will become increasingly vulnerable to sabotage,
particularly when construction of power lines and
substations begins.
Special Report
I n June 1970, Portuguese authorities,
alarmed by FRELIMO's ability to extend its
operations and dissatisfied with the pace of
counterinsurgency, initiated their first major of-
fensive into guerrilla territory. The campaign was
centrally coordinated from headquarters in
Nampula, and was personally directed by the new
commander in Mozambique, General Kaulza de
Arriaga.
The primary goal of the offensive-Opera-
tion "Gordian Knot"-was to seize and hold FRE-
LIMO base camps and to cut infiltration and
supply routes, particularly in the Mueda Plateau
area of Cabo Delgado. For the first time, helicop-
ters were used on a large scale in order to give the
Portuguese forces greater mobility. Official Portu-
guese communiques claimed that Gordian Knot
extended to the Tanzanian border and involved
between 35,000 and 40,000 men; probably less
than half were combat troops, however.
Whatever the number of troops actually in-
volved, the offensive did seize several major in-
surgent camp areas in Cabo Delgado and inter-
dicted numerous supply routes. From June to the
end of the dry season in October 1970, the Portu-
guese claimed they destroyed 25 guerrilla base
camps, killed or captured 1,000 guerrillas, and
seized 40 tons of supplies. Although these figures
may have been inflated, it is clear that the offen-
sive, temporarily at least, disrupted FRELIMO
operations in Cabo Delgado, interrupted the flow
of supplies to other areas, and forced the insur-
gents to give up a part of their already limited
territory.
Early in May 1971, the Portuguese resumed
their offensive into Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and
Tete districts in an attempt to offset any gains
FRELIMO might have made during the wet sea-
son lull. As with last year's campaign, the major
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Samora Machel
Samora Machel, a close
confidant of the late Dr.
Eduardo Mondlane, was
elected president of FRE-
LIMO by its central com-
mittee in May 1970. He has
been commander of its army
since 1966, and was a rnem-
ber of the ruling triumvirate
established shortly after
Mondlane's assassination.
Born in southern Mozam-
bique in 1934, Machel failed
to finish secondary school. He met Mondlane in 1961 and
joined FRELIMO in 1963. After military training in
Algeria, he returned to Dar es Salaam to organize and
train the group of guerrilla fighters that entered Mo-
zambique in September 1964. According to US officials in
Tanzania, Machel is arespected military commander, and
spends the greater part, of his time in the field,
thrust is into Cabo Delgado, where the Portuguese
have pushed out from positions they seized last
year. The Portuguese have again claimed that they
are inflicting heavy casualties on the guerrillas and
that FRELIMO operations in northeast Mozam-
bique have been severely disrupted.
In conjunction with the military drive, the
Portuguese are also waging a determined psycho-
logical action program designed to demoralize the
insurgents and cut them off from the population.
The major focus of this program is to establish
village clusters where the population of an insur-
gent area can be relocated. Called "aldeamentos,"
most of these villages are provided with their own
defense militia and are situated near roads to
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General Kaulza -Oliveira de Art ago
Army General Arriaga, commander in chief of the
armed forces in Mozambique since-March `1970, has given
new drive to counterinsurgency operations in Mozarrr-
bique. Unlike his predecessors, who anchored themselves
firmly to their desks, he shows himself in the field-and has
walked away from at-least-one: helicopter crash in the:
and African service are generally considered prerequisites
for these, positions.
bush. Now 56, Arriaga was
instrumental a decade ago in
the modernization of the
Portuguese Air Force and
played a key role in the dew
velopment of a military air
transport service linking the
metropole with the_ overseas
provinces. Known for his po-
litical flexibility and astute-
ness, as well as for, his- mili
tary competence, Azriaga isl
frequently mentioned as a-,
future minister of defense-
and possible presidential
prospect; troop command
permit rapid assistance by Portuguese forces if
attacked.
This network of villages has denied FRE-
LIMO access to much of the population for pur-
poses of recruitment, subversion, and supply.
There are about 300 aldeamentos in Cabo
Delgado and Niassa, and some 60 in Tete. Al-
though population figures are closely held by the
Portuguese, US officials in the province have
estimated that the aldeamentos in Cabo Delgado
and Niassa contain about 90 percent of the
roughly 850,000 people in the two districts. The
prograrn in Tete is not doing as well, and Portu-
guese officials have admitted that it is at least six
months behind schedule.
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Captured FREUMO weapons
The government has also had a measure of
success with its "open arms" policy, which offers
land and food to refugees who return to Mozam-
bique or come out of hiding in the bush. In
addition, the authorities offer money to insur-
gents who defect and bring their arms with them.
I n order to foster allegiance to the metropole,
military units provide medical and educational
facilities to the local population. All these pro-
grams suffer from a general lack of resources,
however.
The Portuguese regard external support as
the primary factor sustaining the insurgency.
FRELIMO's use of Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi
for sanctuary, supply, and staging has in fact been
a major stumbling block to Portuguese counter-
insurgency efforts. Lisbon recognizes, however,
that unless it is willing to accept the international
furor and pressures that would result from
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destroying these bases, the war is likely to drag on
interminably.
Tanzania has been the most fervent, sup-
porter of FRELIMO ever since President Nyerere
allowed it to establish headquarters in Dar es
Salaam and a major training base at Nachingwea.
In addition to allowing FRELIMO use of Tan-
zanian territory, Nyerere also permits logistical
Tanzania, with access to the sea, can afford
to be more independent in its support for FRE-
LIMO than can landlocked Zambia and Malawi,
both of which are dependent on Mozambique for
rail and port facilities. This dependence has often
led to strained relations between Portugal and
Zambia. Since mid-1966, there have been spo-
radic, occasionally serious incidents along the
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border. Attempts to reach agreement on border
integrity have been hampered by mutual suspi-
cions and recriminations. The Portuguese on
several occasions have temporarily closed their
railroads to Zambian use in retaliation for guer-
rilla operations from Zambia. Relations have been
further strained by occasional Portuguese incur-
sions into Zambian territory, either in pursuit of
insurgents or in reprisal for guerrilla raids.
Assistance from South Africa and Rhodesia
has been limited thus far, however.
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Malawi, in order to maintain its credentials
in black Africa, has also allowed certain privileges
to FRELIMO, but it has not gone as far as Zam-
bia or Tanzania because of President Banda's
policy of open cooperation with the white-
minority ruled states. Banda has given FRELIMO
permission to establish offices and rest facilities
and to transit Malawi's territory. On the other
hand, in order to avoid antagonizing the Portu-
guese, he has put strict limitations on the group,
including the prohibition of armed raids from
Malawi and the transportation of arms through
the country. Despite these bans, FRELIMO has
continued to use remote border regions for
staging areas, but it has done so on a limited scale
so as not to jeopardize its position in Malawi.
Beset by the militant black African states,
the Portuguese in Mozambique have had to look
south for moral and political support. Although
they have carefully tried to avoid identification
with the blatant racial policies of white-ruled
South Africa and Rhodesia, which conflict with
their own professed multiracial attitudes, the
Portuguese have found one common bond with
white southern Africa. All three countries view
themselves as forming the last bastion against
Communist subversion in Africa, and both South
Africa and Rhodesia are acutely aware of the
insurgency in Mozambique. Also, South Africa
has a special interest in the outcome of the war
because of its deep involvement in the Cabora
Bassa project and its interest in keeping the Portu-
guese territories in Lisbon's hands as a buffer
zone.
Special Report
several ri is - esigne Vampire jets have been
supplied by South Africa for Portuguese use.
Rhodesia has provided limited air support for
Portuguese operations in Tete, both in the form
of aerial reconnaissance and air-to-ground strikes.
In addition, Rhodesia had a small detachment of
ground troops in Tete for a short time over the
turn of the year when it became apparent that
insurgent activity there was increasing.
Neither South Africa nor Rhodesia is likely
to become too deeply involved in helping the
Portuguese, however, so long as Lisbon appears
able to hold its own. Moreover, there are no
indications that Portugal desires any substantial
support from these countries because it would tie
Lisbon closer to Pretoria and Salisbury at a time
when the racial policies of those two capitals are
under strong attack.
The insurgency shows every indication of
grinding along for a long time to come. Neither
the Portuguese nor FRELIMO appears capable of
achieving military victory in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Although the Portuguese are exhibiting a
new-found aggressiveness under General Arriaga,
"final victory" rests on depriving FRELIMO of its
external support and foreign sanctuaries. An all-
out drive in this direction is unlikely because
Portugal's human and economic resources are
limited and are already spread thin by three
African insurgencies. Moreover, Lisbon sees no
real need to go for a total victory so long as the
insurgents are contained in the far north.
For the most part, the Portuguese military is
prepared for a drawn-out struggle. Within the
junior officer corps, however, there are signs of
restiveness over the poor prospects for a perma-
nent solution and the continued disruption of
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personal lives. Although morale within the mili-
tary appears to be generally high-and the Portu-
guese commitment to the African provinces is
strong-protracted conflict could lead to serious
disgruntlement over the long term.
Fortunately for the Portuguese, FRELIMO
has failed to take hold as a broad, popular-based
nationalist movement. Although it enjoys the
sympathies of many Mozambican refugees in Tan-
zania and Zambia, within Mozambique itself it
has access to less than ten percent of the coun-
try's 300,000 square miles and controls less than
three percent of the country's population of over
7.5 million. It has virtually no organization in the
southern part of the country nor in the main
population centers or urban areas.
F R E LIMO's effectiveness also has been
undercut somewhat by internal disagreements.
The proud and fierce Makonde tribesmen of
northern Mozambique, who have traditionally
made up close to 90 percent of FRELIMO's fight-
ing force, resent their lack of proportional repre-
sentation in FRELIMO's policy-making circle.
Although Makonde resentment is less now than in
early 1969, when a tribal elder who was a mem-
ber of the central committee defected to the
Portuguese, ill-feelings still exist. This contributes
to a general sense of unease within the FRELIMO
hierarchy, and may have a dampening effect on
FRELIMO'sability to take stronger action.
Special Report
To its advantage, however, FRELIMO enjoys
a virtual monopoly in the insurgency game and is
likely to continue so for the foreseeable future.
Its closest competitor, the Mozambique Revolu-
tionary Committee (COREMO), formed in 1965
and based in Zambia, is light years away in both
numbers and external support. With a total
strength of less than 1,000, it has limited itself to
modest, one-shot cross-border operations ever
since it was squeezed out of Tete District by
FRELIMO in 1968. External support for
COREMO has been limited and has come mainly
from Zambia and Communist China. Peking was
originally attracted by COREMO's pro-Viaoist
line, but later became disenchanted by its poor
showing and for the past few years has provided
only token support.
Over the long term, Portugal believes its best
bet lies in keeping the insurgents off balance and
restricted to the northern hinterlands, where they
can slowly wither on the vine. For its part, FRE-
LIMO's strategy is to avoid serious confrontations
and simply hang on. It hopes thereby to build up
a legitimate claim as the sole nationalist, move-
ment in Mozambique and the heir to the govern-
ment when Portugal, through economic necessity,
international pressure, and historical inevitability.
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