WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
2 July 1971
No. 0377/71
Copy
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 1 July 1971)
Page
Indochina: Action in North Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Vietnam: Pressure South of the DMZ . . . . 2
Cambodia: A Welcome Respite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Sino-US Relations: Outlines of the Taiwan Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Party Building in Communist China: Not All Ha , Stayed the Course . . . . . . . 7
Indonesia Prepares for the Polls . . . . . .. . 9
Mutual Force Reductions: Heavy Summer Diet for NATO . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Poland: Gierek Steamrolls Ahead . / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Tito Raises Anti-Sovietism Another Not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Accord Reached on UK Accession to ropean Communities . . . . . . . . . . 13
France: Pompidou as Europe's Maste/Builder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Malta-UK: Hard Bargaining Will Dor{iinate Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Organization of African Un y: Summit Conference Concludes . . . . . . . . . 19
Iraq: Recent Developmer3 s in Relations with Moscow and Peking . 20
Rising Oil Revenues in Middle ast Pose Challenge for the US . . . . . . . . . . 17
Pakistan: Road to Civilian G vernment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Panama: The Case df the Missing Priest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Barbados: Prime inister Hits US-UK "Interference" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Ecuador: Situati n Stabilizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
NOTES: IsraelyUSSR; Egypt-USSR; Saudi Arabia; Palestine National Council Meeting;
Turkey; India; India; Dominican Republic
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
FAR EAS-r
Indochina: Action in North Laos
Government forces are chalking up signifi-
cant gains as they press their rainy-season offen-
sive on the Plaine des Jarres. On 29 June an
irregular patrol penetrated as far as Xieng
Khouang airfield in the north-central portion of
the Plaine. Other patrols have pushed into the
northeast section of the Plaine, destroying numer-
ous small caches of supplies and equipment.
Government forces have not been present in this
area since February 1970 when they were driven
out by a North Vietnamese counteroffensive.
Q Government-held location
communist-held location
The government has also been successful in
action west of the Plaine. Irregulars have captured
Phou Seu, the strategic high ground on the west-
ern edge of the Plaine, while other government
forces have reoccupied Ban Na, an important ir-
regular artillery base captured by the enemy in
April 1971. On the southeastern edge, other ir-
regular units have reinforced Phou Theung, which
had been captured on 18 June.
The North Vietnamese clearly have been
caught off balance by the offensive. They have
been pulling back some of their units from for-
ward positions west of the Plaine, which in part
accounts for Vang Pao's gains. The North Viet-
namese, however, still have six regiments, with
artillery and armor support, in the general vicinity
of the Plaine.
The government experienced one setback
north of the Plaine when an enemy force overran
Phou Vieng, one of the few government positions
in the area. The irregular troops and about 2,400
civilians escaped to the northwest toward Phu
Cum. The enemy has continued to shell Bouarn
Long, the major guerrilla base north of the Plaine,
but no ground assault has developed.
In the panhandle, government clearing op-
erations continue eastward from Dong Hene.
Irregular patrols have penetrated as far as Muong
Phalane, but have met stiff resistance around the
town.
More Talking About Talks
On 22 June Pathet Lao leader Souphanou-
vong sent a letter to Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma again calling for Lao peace talks. The
Communists continued to insist that any progress
toward a settlement depends on a total US bomb-
ing halt, but they did add new proposals designed
to give the impression that they are flexible and
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
ready to move if their terms are met. Souphanou-
vong now is proposing that a cease-fire in Laos
coincide with a US bombing halt; previous terms
specified that a bombing halt must precede a
cease-fire.
In addition, the Communists have proposed
that Vientiane and the Plaine des Jarres serve
alternately as sites for the negotiations that they
say would follow a cease-fire. This is the first time
this year that the Communists have gone so far as
to discuss the modalities of talks.
Vietnam: Pressure South of the DMZ
North Vietnamese troops continued to press
their summer offensive just south of the DMZ
during the week. Enemy shellings and attacks
there have been more intense in recent weeks
than at any time since 1968.
Much of the fighting has been in the vicinity
of the abandoned, and subsequently destroyed,
Fire Support Base (FSB) Fuller, where South
Vietnamese forces have been trying to dislodge
the enemy from well-dug-in firing positions.
Fuller, once known as the "Rockpile," was one of
the key allied strongpoints built to inhibit the
movement of enemy men and materiel toward the
populated coastal lowlands. Other similar bases,
including FSB Sarge, have also been the target of
enemy attacks in the past few weeks. US forces
withstood prolonged sieges at some of these bases
in years past, but the South Vietnamese-now
largely on their own-apparently are trying to
avoid getting boxed in defending any one posi-
tion. Nevertheless, they have moved in thousands
of reinforcements from other parts of South Viet-
nam and appear determined to thwart any enemy
thrust eastward toward population sectors.
To suppaxt=opera rrs-irr--the-D hZ -area,---'the
North Vietnamese since early May have con-
structed an--eight-mile road through the western
end of the_DMZ_ rlto;t ie_Khe-San+yarea-at.Quang
Tri-Prow:iis_,Ahe_first__road-of_ its_ki
served in this area, may be intended to form a
junction with another new~road__under construc-
tion north of Route-609-'the latter links up with
Route 9, the main east-west road between the
border and ,fhe sea. Supplies and personnel have
moved through the DMZ for years over an exten-
sive network of trails, but this new road will
greatly enhance Communist logistical capabilities
= The tactical intentions of the North Viet-
namese in the northern provinces are not entirely
clear, but their recent advances may encourage
rt. ` VIETN
~
eruya~i~
r_he\San.h..R_?FSB
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
them to press farther south and east. They have
more than enough infantry and artillery units
along the DMZ and in the mountainous western
half of Quang Tri Province to put the South
Vietnamese to a severe test should Hanoi set such
a course. In the coming weeks, the strength of the
North Vietnamese push in Quang Tri Province
and the South Vietnamese response to this pres-
sure should provide a better indication of Saigon's
ability to pick up the security burden in this
region as US forces withdraw.
Factional Dispute Rocks Saigon Student Community
The assassination of a moderate leader of the
Saigon Student Union (SSU) this week has inten-
sified a dispute between student factions. Al-
though the student was murdered by an unknown
assailant, suspicion has fallen on the followers of
militant student leader Huynh Tan Mam.
In a disputed election last week, Mam's
group was voted out of the SSU leadership in
favor of a moderate slate that included the victim.
The militants charged that the vote was rigged
and broke up a meeting that was to validate the
results. Although leaders of both factions are still
trying to decide what to do next, it seems likely
that the militants and moderates will each set up
organizations claiming to be the legitimate leader-
ship of the SSU. Although-themoderates have
taken over control of the.SSU headquarters build-
ing without a struggle, the militants reportedly
.are.-prepared to.Jesar.t.to. force.
Mam and his followers may seek to use the
dispute to stir up renewed student agitation
against the government, but the assassination may
work against Mam's efforts to recruit new sup-
port. Factional disputes and lack of student inter-
est in protest activities have prevented the mili-
tants from launching many disruptive demonstra-
tions this year. For its part, the government has
been quietly encouraging the moderates in an
effort to curtail Mam's influence. It probably will
continue to do so, but it will move cautiously in
an attempt to prevent violence during the current
pre-election period.
Cambodia: A Welcome Respite
Communist military activity seems to be
subsiding to lower rainy-season levels as govern-
ment forces northeast of Phnom Penh apply the
finishing touches to one of the Cambodians' most
successful military operations of the war. Govern-
ment troops evidently made an excellent showing
in the final phase of their prolonged effort to
dislodge the enemy from the marshes northeast of
the capital. A postaction assessment indicated
that Cambodian soldiers made unusually effective
use of firepower, maneuver, and air support to
drive elements of several North Vietnamese main-
force units from their prepared positions near
Kompong Chamlang. The success in the northeast
was fashioned primarily by US-trained Khmer
Krom troops, who have been the mainstay of the
Cambodian Army (FANK) since the war began.
Although they suffered heavy casualties in the
month-long campaign, the Khmer Krom forces'
performance undoubtedly gave Phnom Penh a
much-needed psychological lift.
The government apparently intends to main-
tain a sizable military presence in the Kompong
Chamlang area for the time being. Several multi-
battalion clearing operations were launched early
in the week near Kompong Chamlang to disrupt
possible enemy supply and infiltration move-
merits. These forays have not generated any sig-
nificant Communist resistance, however.
FANK troops also regained some ground in
the southwest, when they moved unopposed into
the town of Srang, which had been in Communist
hands for two weeks. The enemy was not entirely
inactive in the southwest, however. In the most
notable action on Route 4 since that highway was
reopened in early May, the Communists carried
out a heavy rocket and mortar attack on the
government's armored camp some 12 miles east
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
of the Pich Nil Pass. Efforts by enemy elements
to breach the camp's defenses were repelled with
the aid of air strikes. Combined military and
civilian casualties on the government side were
five killed and 25 wounded, while six Commu-
nists were killed.
Rice has virtually disappeared from stores in
Phnom Penh as a wave of hoarding has gripped
the capital. The shortage undoubtedly is attrib-
utable for the most part to the refusal of mer-
chants to sell rice at the artificially low price
imposed by the government.
Another contributing factor may have been
concern that intensified enemy action on Route 5
in recent weeks may interrupt rice shipments into
the capital.
Battambang merchants will smugb1. - i' into
Thailand rather than pay thhea i ribes exacted
at FANK outposts along-Route 5 and assume the
substantial risk-of losing the entire cargo to the
Communists: The recent deterioration of the
Cambodian riel relative to the Thai baht has pro-
To a ctrnnn i +' t ~9#tng"
meet the situation in Phnom Penh, the
government has begun selling its own stocks in
rationed amounts at official prices in the hope of
persuading merchants to release their stocks. The
government also intends to inaugurate a transpor-
tation program soon to expedite large-scale ship-
ments of rice from Battambang to Phnom Penh
via military-escorted truck convoys. Even if these
Page 4
measures ease the present crisis, there evidently is
a possibility Cambodia may yet have to import
some rice. The minister of commerce has claimed,
for example, that 32,000 tons of American rice
will be needed before the end of 1971 F_
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
Sino-US Relations: Outlines of the Taiwan Issue
Recent, high-level pronouncements from Pe-
king have restated the Communist position on the
Taiwan issue and Sino-US relations in both sweet
and sour terms. By focusing heavy attention on
their stand, the Chinese continue to make it
clear-as they have in other public and private
statements-that the issue will remain the first
order of business between the two governments as
far as Peking is concerned.
Premier Chou En-lai's remarks to American
newsmen in Peking on 21 June on the Taiwan
issue represent China's "sweet" approach to the
problem. Chou emphasized that the American
military presence on Taiwan and in the Taiwan
Strait is the key obstacle to improved relations
between China and the US. He remarked that if
US forces were withdrawn and Washington no
longer "considered Chiang Kai-shek as the repre-
sentative of China," it would amount to "recogni-
tion that the People's Republic of China was the
only lawful Chinese government." After that,
Chou said, all other problems would be solved
and the establishment of diplomatic relations
with Washington would follow.
Chou's comments do not signal a change in
Peking's long-standing position that the island's
status is strictly an internal matter to be settled
by the Chinese. Chou completely rejected the
notion of "two Chinas, or one China - one
Taiwan" formulations, which have long been
anathema to Peking. His carefully tailored re-
marks on Sino-US differences, however, were
meant to suggest that these differences were rela-
tively narrow and could be solved without a
complete overturn of established US positions.
For example, Chou continued to avoid mention
of the US defense treaty with the Nationalist
government.
and President Truman's 1950 directive that the
Seventh Fleet separate the combatants in the
Taiwan Strait. Speeches and broadcasts over the
weekend make standard references to US "provo-
cations" in and near Taiwan and stress that the
US, together with Japan, is scheming to separate
the island permanently from the mainland. A
New China News Agency article on 27 June, for
example, criticized visits to Taiwan by high US
officials and US pledges to fulfill its treaty obliga-
tions to the Nationalist government as evidence of
US intentions to "strengthen its military occupa-
tion" of the island. In the same vein, the article
also condemned US-Taiwan joint military
maneuvers in the region and accused the US of
helping to train secret agents for use by the
Taiwan government to "harass" the Chinese main-
land. Finally, statements connected with the
anniversary insist that US "imperialism" must
withdraw from Taiwan-a formulation broader
and vaguer than Chou En-lai's recent remarks.
The anniversary is generally an occasion on
which Peking stresses a hard-line approach to the
Taiwan problem, particularly in view of the fact
that it is observed in conjunction with the start of
hostilities in Korea. Nevertheless, this year's
tough statements have been less belligerent than
those made by Army Chief of Staff Huang Tung-
sheng last year. Moreover, the new formulation-
that US "imperialism" must withdraw from
Taiwan-leaves Peking's options open. The Com-
munists can either insist that the US must sever
all ties with the Nationalists or they can adopt
Chou's more restrictive-and probably more
authoritative-interpretation.
The generally mild and reasonable tenor of
Chou's earlier statements to the US corre-
spondents is clearly part of an attempt by the
Chinese to improve further the atmospherics sur-
In less than a week after Chou's interview
with the American newsmen, Peking showed its
"sour" side on the Taiwan issue in a series of
relatively hard-line statements keyed to the
anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war
rounding Sino-US bilateral issues. In fact, Chou
was careful to stress that Sino-US contacts would
continue to develop-at least on an unofficial
level-even in the absence of an agreement on
Taiwan.
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
Party Building in Communist China: Not All Have Stayed the Course
The last lap of China's party reconstruction
marathon has been accompanied by kaleidoscopic
personnel changes at the provincial level. In the
course of hammering out party settlements for a
number of long-troubled areas over the past two
months, Peking has downgraded and probably
purged five key province leaders. Numerous
secondary officials on the governing Revolution-
ary Committees established since 1967-1968 also
have failed to attain party posts, and outsiders
only recently transferred to the provinces in-
volved have leapfrogged to the top of the local
power structure. The drastic changes wrought by
Peking in the most recently formed party com-
mittees are partly a measure of the regime's frus-
tration over its inability to curb deep-seated divi-
Fions that have been hampering the consolidation
of local authority and the implementation of
soma key national programs. The personnel
changes also reflect the Byzantine manuevering
between rival politburo elements who are seeking
to enhance the political positions of their pro-
teges in the provinces.
The complex character of some of the recent
settlements is graphically illustrated by Peking's
refusal to award the post of provincial party chief
in five instances to leaders who were selected to
head provincial governments during the Cultural
Revolution. The regime has offered no explana-
tion as to why these five were passed over, but all
were heavily embroiled in factional struggles, and
their political fate was almost certainly the
subject of intense debate in Peking. Their replace-
ment is a sharp departure from the practice fol-
lowed by the regime since last December whereby
all other incumbent provincial leaders have been
confirmed as the party chief of the corresponding
provincial party committee.
Although only four of China's 29 provin-
cial-level party committees remain to be formed,
it now appears that further major leadership
Page 7
changes are likely before the process is com-
pleted. The political situation in Tibet, Szechwan,
and Heilungkiang provinces seems particularly
tense, and recent radiobroadcasts indicate that in
Tibet, at least, the regional revolutionary com-
mittee chairman may have already been ousted.
Four of the recently downgraded provincial
leaders-Wang Hsiao-yu in Shantung, Liu Ko-ping
in Shansi, Li Tsai-han in Kweichow, and Teng
Hai-ching in Inner Mongolia-were all supported
by local extremists and appeared to be proteges
of some of the radical ideologues on the polit-
buro. Their fate apparently reflects the declining
ability of their patrons to broaden their bases of
power in the new party structure and reinforces
the impression that effective leadership in most of
China's provinces remains heavily weighted in
favor of conservative-oriented military men and
veteran civilian officials.
Nevertheless, the influence of the more mili-
tant elements in the regime on the committee
formation process cannot be entirely discounted.
Countervailing leftist pressure, for example, seems
responsible for the recent failure of alternate
politburo member and Hopeh provincial govern-
ment head Li Hsueh-feng to obtain the chief
party post in his bailiwick. Li probably was sacri-
ficed, in part, because of objections raised by the
ideologues that too many veteran cadres, in-
cluding some prominent victims of purges carried
out early in the Cultural Revolution, have re-
cently been given ranking provincial posts. Li's
ouster does not appear to be a complete victory
for the ideologues, however, because his replace-
ment in Hopeh appears to share his conservative
predilections. The fact that a similar situation has
developed in Inner Mongolia, where a radically
inclined leader has been replaced by one of simi-
lar persuasion, suggests that a careful but perhaps
inherently unstable balancing act is still being
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
carried on by moderate and leftist forces within
the politburo and at lower levels as well.
Given the complex pattern of Peking's per-
sonnel juggling and logrolling, it appears that the
mere establishment of provincial party com-
mittees will prove no panacea for overcoming the
political divisions, passions, and leadership dislo-
cations engendered by the Cultural Revolution.
Indeed, the results of the provincial-level staffing
process seem to demonstrate that many old per-
sonal rivalries have been submerged rather than
eliminated, that factionalism has been institu-
tionalized in the new party structure, and that a
number of the "solutions" certified by Peking in
recent months ma prove more apparent than
real.
COMMUNIST CHINA: Key Dropouts in the Provincial Party Marathon
Teng Hai-ching
ousted
SINKIANG
2
Province boundary
Party committee not yet formed..
Hsueh-feng Revolutionary Committee Chairman who failed
to make the party committee or whose-
status is uncertain
Revolutionary Committees. The majority of these ii Tsai-han
new leaders are transfers from other provinces. ousted
SECRET
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
Indonesia Prepares for the Polls
The Suharto government appears likely to
come out on top in the 3 July elections, Indo-
nesia's first national polls in 16 years, despite
some revulsion over the government party's
heavy-handed campaign practices. Although elec-
tions are being held at both national and pro-
vincial levels, the principal stakes are 360 seats in
the 460-member Parliament, a body of relatively
limited legislative powers. The remaining 100
members will be appointed by the government.
This Parliament will constitute half of the
920-member congress that formulates national
policy and in 1973 will choose the next president
and vice president. The government's immediate
aims, therefore, are to ensure both a responsive
Parliament and a congress that two years from
now will re-elect President Suharto for another
five-year term.
The campaign officially ended on 26 June,
but the government party, SEKBER GOLKAR,
probably will remain active to the final day. GOL-
KAR, an army-affiliated coalition of occupational
and social groups such as youth, labor, and
farmers, has steamrolled its way through the
country, proselytizing groups attached to the
other political parties and demanding the alle-
giance of government employees. Although its
rapid accumulation of a following has been im-
pressive, its arm-twisting methods could be coun-
terproductive. Its goal is half (180) of the elected
parliamentary seats but it will be satisfied with a
strong plurality. Even if its tally should drop to
something between 70 and 131 seats, the govern-
ment probably could still develop a parliamentary
following of sufficient size to approve Suharto's
programs.
The election essentially is a contest between
GOLKAR on the one hand and the nine political
parties on the other. Only three of these have a
significant following-the secular National Party
(PNI), the traditionalist Moslem Nahdatul Ulama
(NU), and the modernist Indonesian Moslem
Party (PMI). The PNI and NU have resisted GOL-
KAR as firmly as they dare without provoking a
government reaction and should do fairly well in
densely populated Java and parts of Sumatra. The
PMI, which has been consistently obstructed by
the government, expects-by its own admission-
to win only a small portion of the popular vote.
The army, which dominates the Suharto gov-
ernment, distrusts political parties largely as a
result of the irresponsible behavior of parties
during the 1950-57 period of unstable parliamen-
tary government. It sees the parties as lacking a
sense of national purpose, and it regards party
activity as disruptive to national unity. The mili-
tary and those civilians who are working with it
are concerned over the long-term problem of
developing stable representative government in a
nation of diverse peoples where parties have
tended to represent geographic, ethnic, and re-
ligious differences-cleavages that can easily be
surfaced and exploited. The army takes the view
that a GOLKAR electoral victory would be the
first step toward some form of political restruc-
turing that would de-emphasize these national
cleavages. Although ideas on restructuring are still
only vaguely formulated, SEKBER GOLKAR
seems to be a move toward at least experimenta-
tion with a single mass party that would enlist
support from all significant groups in Indonesian
society.
SECRET,
9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
EUROPE
Mutual Force Reductions: Heavy Summer Diet for NATO
At a time when alliance activity usually is
entering the summer doldrums, the attention
of the Allies is riveted om'the quickening pace
of the dialogue on mutual and balanced force
reductions (MBFR). NATO has planned an in-
tensive work program for, the weeks ahead to
flesh out a negotiating p sition and to deter-
mine how and when to ove toward negotia-
tions. On both questions, allied views diverge.
Moreover, many of the Allie are worried that
MBFR is in danger of becming primarily a
tion to MBFR is no longer tenable, and the
government is reviewing its entire approach. As
part of this review, Paris plans to initiate bi-
lateral talks with Moscow to probe Soviet ob-
jectives, but how, or whether, Paris will con-
cert its efforts with those ofi'the other Allies is
uncertain.
Bonn, apparently reassured after Brandt's
recent consultations An Washington, appears
somewhat less pessifistic about the effect on
Western defensesof force reductions even if
these initially include only US and Soviet
forces
The merman G
f
.
overnment
eels strongly,
London remains among the most skeptical however hat any Western decisions on force
of the Allies, questioning wheth r any force reductions must be coordinated within the AI-
reductions can be negotiated that will not un- liane Defense Minister Schmidt has cautioned
dercut Western defenses. The Brit is also fear ?a the two superpowers must not ignore the
that the drift toward negotiation is out- members of NATO in agreeing even to sym-
stripping allied preparations and that ~ashin bolic troop reductions. Bonn favors movement
ton's rush to the bargaining table," as. one toward eventual multilateral MBFR talks, but
British official put it, is aggravating t iprob- would prefer that this stage be delayed until a
lem. The UK also thinks it premature ap- Berlin settlement is reached.
point an emissary to discuss MR with the
East prior to the meeting play ied for Octo er
advocated by Canada ar ' Italy. A number o
.
Allies nevertheless w i't to keep this option
open while an initial negotiating position is
being worked out.J'
Paris'' generally shares London's skepticism
and is/particularly concerned about news re-
ports that forward-based nuclear systems might
be included in MBFR talks. France reportedly
now considers, however, that its simple opposi-
Meanwhile, Moscow has continued to urge
that NATO clarify its position and move more
quickly toward negotiations. Soviet Charge
Vorontsov told US officials last week that be-
cause MBFR was a Western idea, NATO should be
roviding answers and specific proposals instead
o asking questions. Although in no way defining
the Soviet position more precisely, Vorontsov as-
serte that the current method and pace of bilat-
eral echanges would lead nowhere and claimed
that scow is "read for substantive discus-
sions."
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
Poland: Gierek Steamrolls Ahead
Party leader Gierek has taken further steps
to consolidate his primacy in the hierarchy and to
push his policy of national "renewal."
At a central committee plenum last week,
hard-line, anti-Semitic politburo member
Mieczyslaw Moczar was dropped from the secre-
tariat, where he had long been responsible for
military and internal security affairs. The move
had been heralded earlier in the week when parlia-
ment appointed him to the chairmanship of the
Supreme Chamber of Control, a politically unin-
fluential government body. Although Moczar may
remain on the politburo for cosmetic reasons un-
til the party congress at the turn of the year, his
downgrading signals the effective political retire-
ment of a man who had long been considered a
rival to former party leader Gomulka and, at least
potentially, also to Gierek.
Moczar's ouster from the secretariat was in
part anticlimactic because, at least since his re-
ported heart attack in April, his responsibilities
have been exercised by party secretary Kania.
Indeed, there is some evidence that Moczar may
have been deprived of these functions soon after
the change of regime last December, and that his
role since then was increasingly limited to repre-
senting the splintered remnants of the hard-line
faction he once headed.
The central committee also dismissed party
secretary Starewicz, a Gomulka holdover and the
only Jew in the party hierarchy. With Moczar's
ouster, Starewicz apparently was no longer
needed on the secretariat to balance off-if only
symbolically-the party's anti-Semitic forces.
Neither of the two slots was immediately
filled, suggesting that Gierek's penchant for
streamlining the bureaucracy may extend to top
party organs. Since last December, dismissals of
holdovers from the Gomulka regime have reduced
the politburo from 12 to 10 members and the
secretariat from nine to seven. If Gierek does not
intend a permanent reduction, he may fill these
vacancies at the party congress, using the coming
months to select reliable and efficient men.
Gierek seems to be demonstrating his com-
mand of the situation by purging even such sensi-
tive areas as the security apparatus. Once the
prime base of Moczar's power, the Interior Minis-
try is now undergoing a series of shifts marked by
the recent dismissal of a deputy minister and the
arrest on criminal charges of four staffers. All five
men were closely allied to Moczar. These develop-
ments form part of Gierek's housecleaning in the
party, state, and trade union apparatus that began
early this year with shifts in the middle and local
echelons. Gierek has made clear that this process
will extend to the party rank and file in coming
months. With a responsive apparatus and no per-
sonal rival in sight, Gierek seems certain to domi-
nate the party congress.
Long-range economic policy, stressing the
needs of the hard-pressed Polish consumer, was
the main substantive topic of the plenum, and
once again reflected Gierek's efforts to deepen his
popular support. This goal was also furthered by
parliamentary passage last week of a bill granting
the powerful Roman Catholic Church legal title
to former German church property in the ter-
ritories gained by Poland after World War 11. This
step toward fulfilling the regime's commitment to
"normalize" church-state relations will be
welcomed by the overwhelmingly Catholic
population as it already has been by the epis-
copate, and may give new impetus to the ongoing
negotiations between the church, the regime, and
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
Tito Raises Anti-Sovietism Another Notch
Since May, President Tito has been trying to
unify his fractious nation by increasingly playing
on Yugoslav fears of Soviet intentions. Domestic
dividends have begun to appear, and there are
signs that Tito now\is also willing to take steps in
the foreign policy field to strengthen the nation's
will and ability to resist future Soviet pressure.
After the Brioni presidium session in late
April, which met behind closed doors to discuss a
budding nationality crisis, Titostumped the coun-
try calling for purges of malefactors and deliv-
er ing strong-but undocumented-warnings of
hostile foreign interference. His pu a threats had
superficial success in quieting temporarily the
loudest of the nationalists, but the vigi' nce theme
was even more effective and gave Tito a onsensus:
that he has turned successfully against hr polio
cal opponents. During the past week eat n the
Croat party leadership, which in May pf ced .ito
changed gears in an unusual call, for moves against
extreme nationalists. Further ore, the Slovenian
party, which has been satisfied with diversion
of Slovenia's wealth t6 poorer areas, held a meet-
ing on 28 June t produced a firm commitment
to the principl that Yugoslav security overrides
individual republic interests.
,fie stimulus for these important changes of
tone was provided by a party commission meeting
n 23 June that criticized Moscow's allegedly
(hostile intentions toward Yugoslavia and warned
of a possible deterioration in relations between
the two countries. The meeting took the unusual
step of ordering that the discussion be dissemi-
nated to the lowest party levels.
This extension of Belgrade's polemics with
the Kremlin, however, is only in part tactical. The
Yugoslavs are keenly aware of untraceable rumors
of Soviet-backed invasion schemes, and the re-
ported scheduling of Warsaw Pact military
maneuvers in the area has augmented the impact
of these otherwise unrealistic rumors. Halfway
through a crucial political reform period, Tito can
ill afford to allow openings for Soviet pressure.
For these rre" ons, Belgrade has taken two
circumspect foreign policy steps to enhance its
internatio.naf position and to provide tangible
reassu~ce to the people. First, the Yugoslav
fo rgfgn minister made a trip to China from 8 to
June, and the treatment of this visit by
Yugoslav media was intended to emphasize that
common cause-oppositon to Moscow-can, in a
crisis, override ideological differences. At the
same time, the Yugoslavs cautiously avoided
direct involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The move for which Belgrade probably has
Highest hopes, however, is the recent overture
closer military ties with the US. On 25 June
US military attache in Belgrade was informed
Assist nt Defense Minister Dolnicar that
Yugoslavia k now ready to discuss arms pur-.
chases, trainir9 of Yugoslav officers in US
military schools; and other exchanges. Dolnicar
emphasized that nos compromise of Yugoslavia's
nonaligned posture or,-,'fierce independence" was
envisioned or acceptable,' but he clearly indicated
that new op ortunities for im roved relations are
welcome.
Page 12
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
Accord Reached on UK Accession to European Communities
The accord reached in Luxembourg last
week between Britain and the six members of the
European Communities virtually assures agree-
ment on an accession treaty by the end of the
year. The accord was generous on the issues of
real emotional concern to the British. New
Zealand has been granted outlets for its dairy
products through 1977 and the`,opportunity to
retain a special relationship with the UK there-
after. Britain's contribution to the EC budget will
be a good deal higher than its initial offer, but
much less than the French had proposed, and
attenuation of the full burden after 1977 is pos-
sible. The community conceded the need to re-
consider its fisheries policy, also an issue on
which crucial votes are at stake in the British
Parliament.
Although the Heath government still faces a
hard political battle to obtain ratification, and
entry in any case is a year and a half away, Britain
is in a sense already a participant in the com-
munity. Interim consultative arrangements have
been set up, and the community is unlikely to
take major decisions without allowing for the
prospect of UK membership. In a broad range of
questions going beyond specific EC matters, Lon-
don will likewise be taking into account its basic
new commitment.
With the increased likelihood of an
enlarged community, speculation is intensifying
about the political and institutional future of
the EC. In effect responding to concern over
the possibility that the` UK might align with
France in opposition _'to the principle of ma-
jority' voting in the EC Council and to a
stronger European,"Parliament, Bonn's Foreign
Minister Scheel ;,fast week publicly aired his
"conviction" that the EC would be more
democratic with Britain in it.
The community will now have to decide
pry arrangements with the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) members that are not
candidates for EC membership. The Council
will soon begin debating two options presented
by the Commission. The first proposes that the
six EFTA noncandidates be permitted to
'maintain their present arrangements with the
new EC members for two years following the
co,m m u n i ty's enlargement-with subsequent
arrangements to be studied. The second option
would institute free trade in industrial goods
between the noncandidates and the enlarged
EC. Full-scale discussions with the non-
candidates will begin this fall. Sweden and
Switzerland, in particular, are expected to want
closer ties. The Commission, however, is
concerned that there be minimum interference
with community procedures from nonmembers.
Although its proposals would seem to grant
the noncandidates access to the EC market
without institutional obligations, the Com-
mission may believe that in the long run the
noncandidates will seek full membership be-
cause they will feel a necessity to participate
in EC decision-making.
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
France: Pompidou as Europe's Master Builder
In a television interview last week on his
second anniversary as president, Georges
Pompidou dwelt at some length on his views
regarding the future of Europe. Clearly pleased
that recent polls show that the public considers
his European policy his greatest success since
taking office, Pompidou often`-.stressed the role
that he personally played in unbloc ing Europe
and opening the way for British entry to the
EC. His statements suggest that he is determd
to project and enhance his image as a "European"
statesman, and to become the architect and
master builder of a new Europe.
While the characteristics of his "confederal"
Europe bear a resemblance to the "Europe of
States" advocated by General deg ~raulle, the
emphasis and context of Pompiou's European
policy are different. Whereaf5e Gaulle's primary
goal was detente, entente; and cooperation with
f;
the East-a Europe,-,66m the Atlantic to the
Urals-Pompidou -gives priority. to the organiza-
tion of WesternEurope. Writing in Le Monde, the
respected commentator Michel Tatu put it this
way: "Not only has it not been a question of
East-West relations or of 'detente'; [Pompidou's
statements] seem toconcretize the existence of a
'Soviet world' which the West can scarcely in-
fluence." Tatu concludes that rather than seeking
to reconcile the two halves of Europe, Pompidou
is intent on strengthening Western Europe so that
Using a map to illustrate his prrt; Pom-
pidou spoke of Western Europe asad "small, fra-
gile and menaced peninsula" tvveen two super-
powers, the US to the wesand the Soviet Union
to the east. The po FCa edifice Pompidou would
construct excludes the Americans, "our friends
and allies...b who are not Europeans." And
hile,a:thming that Europeans want excellent
Pompidot?s;.,'goal is an independent Western
Europe that "through the pooling of resources,
would find "its '''own place in the world," and
therefore be able to rival both Washington and
Moscow.
Pompidou asserted that the construction of
the Europe he envisions will be more complicated
after the enlargement of European Communities
because, as he put it, the British have a different
way of approaching problems. He also identified
as a potential roadblock Britain's "special com-
mitments in certain areas, such as defense."
Nevertheless, he concluded, "if one wants, one
ought to be able to construct Europe."[--
Malta-U K: Hard Bargaining Will Dom, inate Talks
Prime Minister Dom Mintoff's f r-st order of Mintoff has outlined concept of what
business since taking office on 1. une has been should be included in,~a,-{`r`~`ew agreement, but he
his proposal to revise the r'nse and financial has not specified i' he considers "adequate
Mme,
agreements with the UKweight them more in compensation ~r use of Maltese facilities, such
Malta's favor. Lond9P which has adopted a wait- as airfields,,,_ tf wharves. London expects that the
and-see attitude, ` til it learns more details of the price wil;rr- e high. The prime minister in -effect
proposal, is:-~ repared to take a tough bargaining asks F;;f straight compensation in return for use of
~
position _current
th`#e' facilities as opposed to the
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
combination of loans and grants. He also demands
that any new agreement include, among other
things, a strict definition of. the facilities to be
offered and the restriction of such facilities to UK
forces.
Mintoff's demands raise many problems, a
prime one being the relationship between NATO
and UK forces on Malta. London does notfeel it
would be useful to pursue such questions`'vyith
Mintoff now, but it does want to determine what
facilities Malta would provide, particularlyN
whether and under what circumstances they .
would be available for NATO purposes. The UK is
meeting Mintoff's requirements and at present is
pessimistic about reaching an agreement that
would not cause London major difficulties. The
British already believe that they are paying more
for present facilities and, rights than they are
worth, and London's final decision to meet
Mintoff's monetary demands may depend on
whether NATO is interested in helping the UK
maintain a military presence on Malta.
intoff's Malta Labor Party has expressed
interest'''n promoting better relations with the
Arab statesin the Mediterranean, and during the
recent political campaign the party indicated it
was prepared to^s,ign an economic agreement with
Libya. Mintoff's zest for seeking closer ties with
Tripoli will depend largely on the success of his
negotiations with London. He seems to be using
the possibility of a rapprochement with Tripoli to
put pressure on the UK and other Western nations
to increase their aid and investments.
MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA
ISRAEL-USSR: The recent visit of Soviet:journa-
list Victor Louis to Israel, Foreign Minister Eban's
expressed willingness to resume a dialo ue with
the USSR,
L__J have inspired numerous press rumors that the
re-establishment of Soviet-Israeli relations is im-
minent. The Soviets in the past have used Louis
to carry out unofficial contacts with countries
with which they do not have relations, and his
visit to Israel does indicate that the USSR has
some interest in assessing thee reaction both in
Israel and the Arab states-'to unofficial Soviet-
Israeli contacts. Althoujh there is no evidence
that relations between the two countries will be
restored in the :near future, the resumption of
unofficial contacts would provide both sides with
an additional channel to try to head off another
round.,of hostilities in the Middle East.
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
EGYPT-USSR: Egyptian Deputy Premier ---a
Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad arrivedin Moscow
on 29 June on the first leg of a plomatic swing
that also includes stops in Pr ue, Budapest, and
Belgrade before his retur o Cairo on 17 July.
The exchange of instr ents of ratification for
the USSR-Egypt T aty of Friendship and Co-
SAUDI ARABIA - EGYPT: King Fay is strong
endorsement of President Sadat's feign policies
at the c/nn visit to Cairo
last Satthe Egyptian
leader's East negotia-
tions. Fssued prior to
his depahich shoulders
the "bigct with Israel,
deserves According to
the CairKing's exten-
sive discr cabinet-level
officials t negotiations,
FaysaI's , the future of
operation was the highlight of Riad's five-day stay
in the USSR; he is also holding comprehensive
discussions on Middle East developments with
Foreign Minister Gromyko and other Soviet offi-
cials. One of the subjects Riad seems almost cer-
tain to raise is the possibility of direct Soviet-
the Persian Gulf, the proposed Arab summit
conference, and Jordanian military pressure
against the fedayeen: Following up their meetings
with fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat, the two heads
of state agreed to send a Saudi Arabian and an
Egyptian emissary to Amman in an effort to
reconcile Jordanian-Palestinian differences.
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEET- Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), whh has sent
ING: The ninth session of the Palestine LH:id`a-' only a token delegation to prey us sessions of
tion Organization's (PLO) parliamentary body, the council, has decided to p cipate fully in the
the Palestine National Council.,,rrow scheduled to coming meeting
The P intends to
resent a
.
p
meet in Cairo on 7 July,..ely to be as unpro- critical report onpolicies and activities of the
ductive as previous. atherings. Disputes have entire fedaye~movement since the June 1967
already arisen ong the representatives of the war, be ' ng with a discussion of its own mis-
major feda y organizations regarding the dis- takesothh Fatah and PLO Chairman Yasir Ara-
tributiorseats at the council, and the date and f may also come under heavy attack by the
the site of the meeting have as usual been change , `yradical group for allegedly obstructing the unifica-
at the last minute. The Popular Front far-=tFie tion of the guerrilla movement.
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
Rising Oil Revenues in Middle East Pose Challenge for the US
During the past year the eight Middle East
oil producers (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait,
Iraq, Algeria, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar) that are
members of OPEC have concluded agreements
with the oil companies that ensure massive in-
creases in the countries' oil revenues through
1975. Receipts will be raised even further by
rising production in most of these countries.
Annual oil revenues in the producing countries
are expected to swell from less than $6 billion in
1970 to nearly $16 billion in 1975.\0.
With more hard currency the o6states will
increase their imports, and as a result f =ere may
be a sizable growth in US exports tote area,.
particularly of capital goods associated wilti tie
petroleum industry or with general econofnic
development programs. In addition, there nr y\l e
a significant increase in US military eq;pmen
sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia. US sas to the
Middle East oil states, although amounting to
only about two percent of total S exports, al-
ready greatly exceed US imports from these
countries.
At present the transferto the US of earnings
by American oil companies operating in the
Middle East is more important to the US balance-
of-payments position than commodity trade with
the Middle East oil ;'producers. Private American
oil investment in the area yields an annual return
of $1.6 billion, whereas the US surplus in trade is
only one third of this amount.
Prospective increases in Middle East imports
will not be sufficient to prevent a huge increase in
the foreign-exchange reserves of several of the
producing states. Holdings in the eight countries
are expected to rise from about $5.6 billion at the
end of last year to more than $25 billion at the
end of 1975." Reserves are likely to approach $8
billion in each of three countries-Libya, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait-and holdings in Abu Dhabi
and Qatar will be impressively large relative to
the irYSpopulations.
Possession of large amounts of hard currency
will make it possible for the Middle East oil
exporters to pursue several actions unfavorable to
the US. These include nationalization of the oil
companies; even if equitable compensation were
paid, nationalization would result in considerable
damage to the US' balance of payments because
`\of the end of profit repatriation. The increased
,,serves could also be used to subsidize political
movements and less affluent governments in the
area?\ oil money already is being channeled to
Egypt; Jordan, and the fedayeen. Moreover, the
rise ineserves could be used to bring financial
pressure on the West as, for example, by convert-
ing dollar assets into gold. Such financial actions,
however, probably could not be carried out with-
out some cost to the producing states themselves,
and governments-of most of these countries have
shown little interest in this type of adventur-
ism.
TURKEY: The foreign trade.., raw promulgated in
April to maximize foreign-exchange earnings by
keeping export prices up/ a`nd import prices down
is having detrimental sje effects. The government
is facing enormous, problems in implementing a
system that calls fo'r` the Ministry of Foreign Eco-
nomic Affairs to% `set minimum export prices and
maximum im. t prices and to approve almost all
trade transactions before they take place. Several
large orders have been lost because of govern-
mental delays in responding to export requests.
The new program also is reportedly causing a
shortage of some imported raw materials. Unless
the system is modified before the major agricul-
tural export season begins this fall, it could have a
serious effect on Turkey's foreign-exchange earn-
ing capability.
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
Pakistan: Road to Civilian Government
The plan for transferring power to a civilian
government, which President Yahya Khan an-
nounced on 28 June, gives the politicians a much
smaller role than they had under the rules in
effect before 25 March. The transfer is to be
made in "four months or so" depending on the
circumstances at that time.
An appointed committee, rather than
elected representatives, will draft the new con-
stitution, and, according to Yahya, even after
civilians begin to govern they will have at their
"disposal the cover of martial law for a period of
time." This may mean that the army intends to
retain ultimate control.
Although Yahya again promised maximum
provincial autonomy, he also made it clear that
the federal government will have "adequate"
authority. It is unlikely that provincial power will
approach what many East Pakistanis were de-
manding before fighting broke out last March.
The government has also announced a new
budget that calls for maximum austerity and in-
creased self-reliance. The budget appears to be
less than completely realistic, however. For
example, it is unlikely that, given the grim state
of the economy, new taxes will produce the
expected 11.3-percent increase in revenue. The
new budget also presumes a 20-percent increase in
foreign aid. Much of this aid is already in the
pipeline from previous commitments, but if the
outlook for additional aid does not improve, the
development budget, which is now slated for a
small cutback, is likely to suffer a further reduc-
tion. The one area that probably will not be
scanted is military expenditures, where a 6.3-
percent increase is called for.
I n East Pakistan, clashes between the army
and the insurgents continue. The Mukti Fouj
(liberation force) is having some success-
especially along the province's eastern border-in
preventing the restoration of normal transporta-
tion and communications. Nevertheless, the level
of guerrilla activity so far does not threaten the
army's hold on major towns, nor does it prevent
the army from moving into any part of East
Pakistan.
In India, agitation for an invasion of East
Pakistan persists. Prime Minister Gandhi, how-
ever, has told Parliament that New Delhi will not
embark on "any adventurist policies." arLiam
ent
has been very critical of the US for allowing-
further shipments of arms to Pakistan: 'the
Indians believe that the US violateda'promise to
halt all such shipments. IndyariiForeign Minister
Swaran Singh, back-from his recent foreign tour,
told Parliamefif that he was dissatisfied with
Wash:ingtonn's explanations and claimed that US
P61 is :cabLo s:
Top-level UN officials will meet in Geneva
next week to try to iron out the several problems
in the international community's refugee relief
efforts. One substantial problem-the presence of
Indian and Pakistani troops along the border-has
inhibited aid to nearby refugee camps on both
sides of the frontier. The UN high commissioner
for refugees has considered seeking an allocation
of UN troops, but there is no likelihood that such
a mandate could be obtained in the Security
Council at this time.
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
INDIA: On 29 June New Delhi assumed control
of the administration of West Bengal, the nation's
most troublesome state, after `,'the state govern-
ment had resigned the day before. Prime Minister
Gandhi's Ruling Congress. `Party had been the
leading partner in a multiparty coalition, but
ruled with a paper-thin' majority. The threat of
defections from the., coalition, the burden of
coping with five mi,l,lion East Pakistani refugees,
and the government's inability to curb a wave of
lawlessness and political assassinations led to the
INDIA: Mrs. Gandhi's new petroleum minister
favors policy changes that could,provide an incen-
tive for greater Western collaboration in India's
exploration efforts. If adopted, these changes
would reduce India's reliance on Soviet-assisted
exploration programs, w7iich have produced only
limited results during/the past 20 years. Other
fall of the three-month-old government. The
Marxist Communists, the largest single party in
the former government, branded the dissolution
"undemocratic," but probably favored the move
in hopes of winning a majority when new elec-
tions are held. Elections may be far off, however,
because each of the last two periods of central
rule lasted about a year. West Bengal joins three
of India's 18 states that are currently being gov-
changes now under consideration include retail
price increases and rationing. These revisions will
be subject to public and parliamentary objections,
but New Delhi will have to take some action if it
is to avoid an increasingly serious fuel short-
age.
Organization of African Unity: Summit Conference Concludes
The eighth annual chiefs-of-state conference
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
ended in Addis Ababa ahead of schedule on 23
June. The meeting, the shortest in the OAU's
history, was attended by only ten heads of state
of the 41 member countries.
The most controversial matter that faced the
conference was the proposal of Ivory Coast Presi-
dent Houphouet-Boigny, originally floated last
November and presented in Addis Ababa by the
Ivorian foreign minister, that African states have
official contacts and begin a dialogue with South
Africa. The delegates refused an Ivorian request
for a discussion in depth of the subject-
Houphouet-Boigny's immediate objective-and
quickly dispensed with the issue by passing a
strong resolution condemning any dialogue unless
Pretoria first modifies its raciall policies. OAU
opposition, however, is unlikely to deter
Houphouet-Boigny, who indicated that he intends
to hold his own meeting with representatives of
the few African governments-suc:h as Malawi and
Gabon-that are in sympathy with his position.
The conference also endorsed the strongest
pro-Arab resolution on the Middle East situation
yet adopted by the OAU. The resolution called
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces
from all Arab territories, expressed full support
for Egypt, and empowered the OAU chairman to
begin an African effort to bring about a Middle
East settlement. The presence of Mauritanian
President Ouid Daddah-elected OAU chairman
for the coming year-and Somali President Siad
and Sudanese President Numayri-both of whom
were among the six newly elected vice chair-
men-was probably a factor in the adoption of
the pro-Arab resolution.
The delegates decided to hold the next sum-
mit in Rabat, Morocco, although Kampala,
Uganda, had been expected to be the next site.
Kampala had been the original choice for the
1971 summit, but the meeting was shifted to
Addis Ababa after some African leaders raised
objections to the military government that seized
power in Uganda last January. As a result Uganda
boycotted the summit conference after attending
a preliminary ministerial meeting. Summit
officials announced that because of Uganda's
absence the next summit conference could not be
held in Kampala and that Morocco, the only
country to extend an invitation, was "se-
Iraq: Recent Developments in Relations with Moscow and Peking
Recent discussions have brought Baghdad its
first economic credit from Communist China and
a reaffirmation of economic commitments by the
USSR. At the same time Moscow made little
headway on reconciling its differences with Iraq
over Middle East issues.
Peking extended almost $40 million in credit
for plants, equipment, and technical assistance
during the recent visit to Peking of an Iraqi dele-
gation headed by Baghdad's minister for oil and
minerals. Repayment on the interest-free credit is
to be in Iraqi goods during the period from 1984
to 1993. Although the announcement of the
agreement did not specify the type of plants the
Chinese will provide or the kind of Iraqi goods to
be used in repayment, the composition of the
delegation suggests that the talks may have
focused on Iraq's oil and petrochemical in-
25X1 dustries
A high-level Soviet delegation headed by V.
N. Novikov recently visited Baghdad for more
than a week of discussions covering a wide range
of topics. The two sides signed a protocol cover-
ing the second stage in the development of the
North Rumaila oilfield and the construction of a
canal to regulate the Euphrates River. Production
of oil at North Rumaila is expected to reach
nearly 20 million tons annually with the comple-
tion of the second stage; oil from the first stage is
to begin flowing early next year.
profitable.
Although the economic talks went well,
political discussions seem to have been less warm.
The final communique included a favorable men-
tion of the Palestine resistance movement but
reflected little progress toward gaining Baghdad's
support for a political settlement of the Middle
East situation. Discussions aimed at easing the
friction between the ruling Baath Party and the
Iraqi Communists apparently were equally un-
SECRET
Page
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Panama: The Case of the Missing Priest
The case of Father Gallegos, the priest who
was kidnaped and may have been secretly killed
by the National Guard early last month, has con-
tinued to simmer. The church has completed its
investigation of the incident and now appears to
be moving to confront the Torrijos government
with its evidence. The regime, facing its first
serious domestic crisis, has attempted to weather
the storm without admitting or conceding any-
thing.
Unsuccessful in its
efforts to shift suspicion
away from itself, the
government had hoped
that with press censor-
ship and the passage of
time the matter would
be forgotten. Public in-
terest in the case has
persisted, however.
Prayers for Gallegos of-
fered at every mass, a
day of national penance,
and a televised sermon
by Archbishop McGrath
have helped to keep the
Bishop McGrath
issue alive. Students who supported the work of
the liberal priest, as well as peasants whom he had
helped, have demanded justice. Moreover, groups
that have long been dissatisfied with Torrijos have
recognized the explosive potential of the case and
have encouraged a showdown between the church
and the government.
Archbishop McGrath has not been particu-
larly forceful in his dealings with Torrijos in the
past,
with growing public support and pressure from
within the church, he
cannot back away from
a fight this time. He
probably will urge the
government publicly to
repudiate and punish the
guilty, to commit itself
to avoid any further
interference with the
church, and perhaps to
bring to an end the re-
pressive tactics that it
has used on occasion.
Flexibility or a will-
ingness to` compromise,
however, have been lack-
General Torrijos
ing on the government side. Torrijos has thus far
refused to open the case to public scrutiny 25X1
One reason may be that re-
sponsibility for Gallegos' disappearance may rest
at the top of the Guard hierarchy, perhaps even
with Torrijos himself. Nevertheless, if the church
can sustain its current momentum, government
action will become necessary. Torrijos will run
grave risks should he decide to attack the church
openly.
SECRET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
Barbados: Prime Minister Hits US-UK "Interference"
Prime Minister Errol Barrow's emotional at-
tack on 24 June against the US and Great Britain
for alleged meddling in the internal political af-
fairs of Barbados probably is related to the elec-
tions to be held late this year. The unexpected
and so-far-unexplained charges were followed by
a threat to request the withdrawal of US and
British nationals as well as diplomatic representa-
tives. His use of the public media rather than
private diplomatic channels for leveling his ac-
cusations suggests that he is more interested in
establishing a reputation for political independ-
ence in the election campaign now getting under
way than with arranging the settlement of
genuine grievances with Great Britain or the US.
The incidents Barrow cited as examples of
foreign interference were defined only vaguely.
Perhaps the most serious was his contention that
a leading member of the opposition, the Barbados
Labor Party's Bernard
St. John, had been asked
by a New York founda-
tion to comment on a
"confidential" report on
Barbados before the re-
port had been submitted
to the cabinet. The re-
port allegedly was given
to St. John by the
Twentieth Century Fund
and was said to have
concerned a survey by
the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank. St.
John later denied Bar-
row's charge and charac-
terized the prime minister's statements as election
propaganda.
Other charges by Barrow included a con-
fused accusation that the US had used "the big
stick" method against Barbados because it had
rejected a proposed $7 million US loan guarantee
for low-cost housing. He also said the US was
"squeezing Barbados" by refusing to sign a bi-
lateral air transport agreement. He charged that
the US had opposed independence for Barbados
because "it wanted this country to remain a
colony for economic reasons," and said that the
US had given the opposition political group
"moral and other support" to oppose independ-
ence in 1966.
Barbados' last elections were held in Novem-
ber 1966 when it became independent, and new
elections must be held within five years from that
time. Although no specific date has been set,
Barrow's party has already announced its slate of
candidates. Barrow's attack, therefore, seems to
fit into the context of using the US and Great
Britain as convenient whipping boys during the
local political cam ai n.
Nevertheless, Barrow may
entertain some genuine fears that the opposition
is courting support from abroad. His press confer-
ence may have been designed to serve the double
purpose of asserting his own freedom from for-
eign domination and warning the opposition to
avoid seeking assistance from, foreign inter-
ests.
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
SECRET
Ecuador: Situation Stabilizes
President Velasco may enjoy a brief respite
from attempts to unseat him noW that he has
successfully banished two antigovernment figures.
Assad Bucaram, a popular opposition leader and
former prefect of Guayas Province, had returned
clandestinely to Ecuador some weeks ago from
exile in Panama. He was apprehended on 20 June
and the following day was exiled to Paraguay,
where his political activities are likely to be se-
verely limited. Several days later General Luis
Jacome, who had figured prominently in military
plotting, agreed to accept exile in return for full
pension rights and left for Venezuela on 25 June.
There was no significant public reaction to either
who recently re-
turned from a visit to outlying military units, has
reported that the Jacome exile has caused little
reaction among senior officers. Junior officers,
however, were outspokenly critical of President
Velasco and the defense minister. Many of these
younger officers admitted that with Jacome's
exile they no longer have a leader but added that
"somehow" a way would be found to get rid of
the corrupt Velasco regime. Although some mili-
tary elements may not be happy with the present
situation, their ability to formulate plans and
carry them out will be severely curtailed without
strong leadership.
With the opposition under-control, at least
temporarily, the government has announced its
plans for a return to constitutional government.
At a convention of Velascofollowers on 25 June,
Minister of Government Jaime Nabot announced
that elections will be held in June 1972 for the
presidency, the vice presidency, and congress. At
the same time the voters will be offered the
opportunity to indicate whether they will accept
the 1946 constitution as amended or whether
they wish the incoming congress to write a new
one. President Velasco would turn over the gov-
ernment to his successor on 31 August 1972. The
coupling of the constitutional question with the
regular presidential and congressional elections
probably will disarm many of those who might
otherwise attack the plan, as the ambitious politi-
cians cannot afford to abstain from the elections.
The announcement of.the plan to hold elec-
tions and the government's new-found firmness in
dealing with opposition leaders and would-be mil-
itary plotters point up the President's determina-
tion to finish his term in office. The 78-year-old
Velasco has been elected five times and removed
from office three times. His apparent desire to
finish his current term indicates that he is likely
to bow to any reasonable demand that will ensure
SECRET
Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
SECRET
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In an unprecedented
and highly dramatic broadcast over nationwide
radio and television on Wednesday night, Presi-
dent Joaquin Balaguer accused former General
Elias Wessin y Wessin of plotting-ta.oyerthrow the
government. Surrounded by the entire"h'iglcgm-
mand of the armed forces and national police
Balaguer displayed Wessin y Wessin in custody
and accused him face-to-face of masterminding a
coup attempt. The President offeredas evidence a
recording purported to have been made by Wessin
y Wessin in which the former general allegedly
announced the downfall of the "corrupt and
brutal" Balaguer government. Balaguer then
turned Wessin y Wessin over to the military for
judgment and demanded that a verdict be quickly
returned.
Details of the alleged plot are scanty. A few
enlisted men had been arrested for involvement in
pro - Wessin y Wessin activity prior to the tele-
vised spectacle, but there=is nothing to indicate
that the plot posed" a real threat to the govern-
ment.tThe carefully staged humiliation of Wessin
ssin, however, indicates that Balaguer has
chose,.t.o destroy completely the former general's
potential ias=a>threat to his government. Although
the harsh treatment accorded 'Nessin y. Wessin
may seem out of proportion to the seriousness of
the threat, Balaguer's method of handling the
incident will discourage anyone, who might have
been tempted to come to the former general's
support or who might be involved in independent
plotting.
SECRET
Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900020001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900020001-4