WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE PARTY FACES THE FUTURE

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Secret
D
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY.
Special Report
Czechoslovakia: The Party Facer the Future
Secret
25 June 1971
No. 0376/71B
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Czechoslovakia:
The Party Faces the Future
Power must expand or contract; it must be active
and successful, or it will decline and others will
take it over. Its foundation consists in a dyna-
mism operating on a basis of acquired capability.
It must be motivated by intelligence, sustained
by high morale and supported by economic pros-
perity. Lack of any one element may prove fatal
to the rest.
Thucydides
The Communist Party's 14th congress,*
held 25-29 May, brought to a close a momen-
tous chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia
and of the European Communist movement
and marked the full return of the regime to
Soviet tutelage and Communist orthodoxy.
The congress, the first to be convened by new
party chief Gustav Husak, served mainly to
hail the end of the long process of "consolida-
tion"-the dismantling of liberal innovations
introduced during the brief reform era under
Alexander Dubcek-and to legitimize the
Husak leadership.
Having rationalized the past, the regime
has turned its attention to Czechoslovakia's
future. The 1971-75 five-year plan launched
by the congress is the regime's first effort to
tackle systematically the country's economic
and social problems. The enormity of the
task, following the disruption of four years of
reform and counterreform, is recognized by
the leaders in Prague. They are aware of the
need to mobilize public support to accom-
plish their goals, but they have invested heav-
ily in the orthodox conservative socialist
system that in the past has proven inadequate
for the task.
*A hastily assembled "14th " party congress was
convened in support of Dubcek following the in-
vasion in August 1968 but it was subsequently an-
nulled at Soviet insistence.
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SF(~'R F T'
Husak has proclaimed the defeat of "revisionism" and has anxiously
embarked on the "construction of socialism," but it is clear that the
leadership will be haunted by the ghosts of the past. By the terms of its
succession and tenure and the atavistic nature of its domestic policies, the
regime has little chance of establishing credibility in the eyes of the people.
Some Czechoslovaks may privately acknowledge that Husak has the best
interests of the nation at heart, but for most he still remains the symbol aid
willing tool of Soviet repression. Moreover, in spite of claims of accom-
plishment by today's conservative leaders, there is unmistakable apprehen-
sion among them that liberal sentiment, now dormant, will one day rise
again. This paranoiac dread of renewed "right-wingism" (liberalism) is rot
the mood of leaders confident of the future.
The main danger against which we must struggle is
rightist opportunism and revisionism.... We must never
provide the slightest opportunity for them to assert
themselves. The completion of their ideological defeat
is an extraordinarily important task of' the party at
present.
zen in the political and social system, and the
loosening of the national economy from central-
ized control were all major planks in Dubcek's
program. In the eyes of his heirs, Dubcek's leader-
ship had prostituted socialism, and it was up to
them to rid the party of the vestiges of his tenure.
The major vehicle for the regime's ideologi-
Resolution of the 14th party congress. cal offensive was the Lessons document,* promul-
A congress responsive to the regime could be
convened only after exorcising from all levels of
the party any one who backed the ideological
heresies committed in 1968 in the name of "so-
cialism with a human face." The nationwide
purges of 1969-1970 were but the prelude to this
process-a mechanical chore made relatively easy
under the aegis of the Soviet occupation. Only by
inculcating the membership with orthodox Com-
munist tenets could the party justify its "leading
role."
The task of ideological purification was im-
mense. The reform movement that had brought
Dubcek to power in 1968 had overturned funda-
mental principles governing the party's control of
the state and its relationship to the individual
citizen. The separation of party and government
authority, the effective participation of the citi-
gated by the central committee in December
1970, which presented the regime's interpretation
of party developments since the 13th party con-
gress in 1966. It was only after that, the new
litany goes, that deviation set in, luring the party
from its correct path. As an apologia for the
orthodox Communist system of government,
Lessons sought to restore the legitimacy of that
system by blaming both former party chief
Antonin Novotny and his successor Dubcek for
the 1968 crisis. It was the failure of those re-
gimes, not inherent faults in the Marxist-Leninist
system, that lulled the party into a posture vul-
nerable to the "righ. >t onslaught." The docu-
ment also sought to rationalize the roles played
during the reform era by some of the party's
present leaders. This was a particularly delicate
task, because many of them were bitterly divided
over some of Dubcek's reforms and over the justi-
fication of the Soviet invasion itself.
*Full title - Lessons Drawn from the Crisis Development in the Party and Society After the 13th Congress of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
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General Secretaries Husak and Brezhnev and President Svoboda celebrating the "victory over revisionism."
Another ideological blast was set off in
March, when the regime published "theses" in
anticipation of the party's 50th anniversary. This
document. catalogued the difficulties and accom-
plishments of the Czechoslovak party since its
founding in 1921, recapitulated the ideological
themes promulgated in Lessons, and depicted the
14th party congress as the "logical conclusion" of
the period of crisis that had existed since the 13th
party congress in 1966.
The party's search for respectability, how-
ever, remains an elusive goal. Too many Czecho-
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slovaks reject its tortuous analysis of the past as
well as the inadequate steps it sets forth to meet
the political, economic, and social demands of the
future. As a result, the regime's efforts to reaffirm
the inherent worth of the Communist system
while forced at the same time to declare that two
previous regimes, both products of that system,
were incompetent has met with popular incre-
dulity and privately expressed derision.
The congress made clear that the ideological
offensive would continue. It reaffirmed the lead-
ership's view that only fully committed party
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members could be entrusted with the task of
guiding the further consolidation of Czechoslovak
society. But the country's leaders know that at
present such commitment is rare and, based as it
is on opportunism, also fragile.
The preoccupation of the top leaders, and
particularly those in the conservative wing of the
party, with the "virtues of socialism" thus reflects
a basic insecurity. They are acutely aware that
they hold no mandate from the people and that
their power and future rest on their usefulness to
Moscow. They know that moderate and liberal
Czechoslovaks, both Communist and non-Com-
munist, who to them represent the "right wing,"
will continue to be a threat that they alone can-
not resist. Explaining the psychology of the "col-
laborationists" and their obsession with "right-
wingism," one Czechoslovak has observed that it
is based on their fear that the deposed of today
may one day regain influence and sit in judgment
on those now doing the deposing. Thus, it is not
merely the dogmatists' ideological attachment to
Moscow or to Communist orthodoxy that drives
them, but also personal fear for their future.
The one major accomplishment of the con-
gress was the successful show of unity within the
top leadership. A sense of cohesiveness was appar-
ent that had not existed since Husak came to
power. To a man, the leading figures of the party
committed themselves to present party policies,
and to the personal leadership o_ Husak. Faction-
alism and dogmatism were both officially out-
lawed, a decree that for the first time appears
enforceable. At the same time, however, the con-
gress re-examined the party's glaring weakness-its
inability to engage the interest and support of the
14th congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party
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people. Faced with public apathy, the party for
all its newfound cohesiveness will probably not be
able to mobilize effectively the country's human
and material resources.
For the most part, the congress was a pro
forma affair, canonizing previously voiced doc-
trines and shibboleths and streamlining the party
structure. Political continuity and stability, Mos-
cow's first demand, were the essential require-
ment, and nothing was said or done to jeopardize
either.
Changes in the party leadership and organi-
zational structure were minor, designed either to
tie up loose ends remaining from the liberal era or
to manifest further the party's loyalty to the
USSR. Thus, Evzen Erban, a holdover from the
Dubcek leadership and the only presidium mem-
ber to lose his job, was replaced by conservative
Karel Hoffmann. To fit the Soviet model, Gustav
Husak changed his title to General Secretary and
future party congresses were scheduled at five-
year intervals. Probationary candidate member-
ship to the party was reintroduced as part of the
regime's effort to screen and train its rank and
file.
In order to recentralize the leadership's
power, the congress abolished the Czech party
bureau, a stopgap body created after the invasion
by reformists attempting to federalize the party
around equal Czech and Slovak party organs. The
demise of the Czech bureau returns the Slovak
party to its traditional subordinate, albeit sepa-
rate, status. Together with modifications in the
federal government structure earlier this year, the
move ends the Slovak drive for equal political
status with the Czechs.
The only major personnel shifts at the con-
gress were in the central committee. Over half of
the membership-holdovers from both the No-
votny and Dubcek eras-was removed. Many of
the newcomers are political unknowns, suggesting
that the regime was hard pressed to find persons
with an uncompromised past who were willing to
accept an uncertain future. For the time being,
the new central committee, reduced from 132 to
115, provides the leadership with a rubber stamp.
One troublesome issue was apparently resolved
when Novotny's party membership, suspended in
1968 for his complicity in the Stalinist trials of
the early 1950s, was reinstated. This move does
not mitigate his official disgrace but avoids raising
the sensitive issue of the early trials. The moder-
ates in the regime may have agreed to Novotny's
reinstatement in return for a commitment that no
action would be taken against the reformist lead-
ers of the Dubcek era.
It was considered virtually certain that
Husak would emerge from the congress as undis-
puted head of the party. The thoroughness with
which he had dismantled the liberal movement
and his firmness in quieting public dissent had left
his conservative opponents no lever with which to
challenge his position as first secretary. Moreover,
the dedication with which he aligned Czecho-
slovak policy with Soviet interests and his per-
sonal allegiance to Brezhnev earned him the all-
important backing of Moscow. This and his
success in re-establishing Czechoslovakia's role as
a reliable member of the "socialist camp" were
his guarantee of tenure. The issue on which he
appeared most vulnerable-his failure in 1968 to
sanction the invasion-was largely diluted by his
public accession at both the Soviet and Czecho-
slovak party congresses to the thesis that the
invasion was in response to "appeals" by true
Czechoslovak Communists. -
There is also no sign that Husak has recently
had any serious rivals for his position. The two
presidium members most frequently mentioned in
this role-Alois Indra and Vasil Bilak-have shown
no desire to initiate a power struggle. Their recent
public praise for Husak and exhortations for
party "unity" are convincing evidence that, for
the present at least, they are more concerned with
maintaining stability than with enhancing their
own influence.
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General Secretary Gustav Husak *
Other members of the
Secretariat
Vasil Bilak *
Peter Colotka
Karel Hoffmann t
Gustav Husak
Alois Indra t
Antonin Kapek t
Josef Kempny t
Josef Korcak t
Jozef Lenart *
Ludvik Svoboda t
Lubomir Strougal t
Vasil Bilak * - international relations
Jan Fojtik t - ideology
Miloslav Hruskovic * - economics
Alois Indra t - appointments
Josef Kempny t - Czech party bureau
Oldrich Svestka t - press
Jozef Lenart *
Miroslav Moc t
Frantisek Ondrich t
Candidate members of
the Presidium Miloslav Hruskovic
Vaclav Hula t
* - Slovak
t - Czech
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I I
The congress, however, was not an unquali-
fied personal triumph for Husak. By stressing the
collective nature of party authority, the congress
underscored the fact that he paid for his pre-
eminence by compromising fundamentally with
his conservative colleagues. The re-election of all
but one member of the presidium virtually guar-
antees a continued balance of power between the
"conservative" wing of the party headed by Indra
and Bilak, and moderates such as Svoboda,
Strougal, and Colotka, who lean to Husak. Party
decisions in the future are likely to be determined
by consensus, with no individual or "clique"
within the presidium developing decisive power.
Brezhnev's endorsement of Husak, along with
"others" in the leadership, was indicative of
Soviet approval of the present combination of
political interests within Prague's ruling body.
A strong indicator of the limitations placed
on Husak's power was the shelving of his "recon-
ciliation" campaign. His attempt to strike a bar-
gain with the deposed liberal community was a
key element in his early political program and the
major issue setting him apart from the conserva-
tives. "Reconciliation" involved exoneration of
the thousands of Czechoslovaks who had sup-
ported the reform movement in exchange for
their "atonement" and future cooperation with
the party. The lure of jobs and social status was
not enough to earn the allegiance of the liberals.
The failure of "reconciliation," however, resulted
just as much from the refusal of the party actu-
ally to put it into practice. Where the more practi-
cal Husak could envision a tactical alliance with
the liberals for the sake of "normalization" the
conservatives could not. Conservative party mem-
bers considered it beyond the pale to seek rap-
prochement with their countrymen who so re-
cently had turned on them.
Husak's ability and willingness to revive
"reconciliation"-whether tacitly or explicitly-
may be one key to Czechoslovakia's political
future. The bitter legacy of 1968 must be miti-
gated before the regime can hope to implement
any forward-looking domestic policies. The
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talents of the disenfranchised economists, admin-
istrators, teachers, and even the hated and feared
intellectuals are an asset the Communists cannot
in the long run do without.
During his two years in office, Husak has
earned a reputation as a shrewd practitioner of
political gamesmanship. He has displayed his
ability to recognize the limits of his. personal
power, to judge the proper moment for compro-
mise, and to reverse himself for the sake of polit-
ical expediency. His timely warnings in mid-1968
that the reform movement should not overreach
itself, his about-face since the invasion on such
crucial issues as federalization and the "'invitation
to invade" thesis, and even his present servitude
to the men in the Kremlin all are the mark of a
pragmatic, if opportunistic, man.
For all of his servility to Moscow, however,
Husak is not without plans of his own for Czecho-
slovakia. As the man who drew up the original
federalization plan and who, in the face of
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considerable opposition, offered amnesty to the
reformists, he does not fit the image of a mere
hireling. Some Czechoslovak observers, with little
reason to support the man, have dubbed him the
ultimate practitioner of "Schweikism," a typical
willingness by Czechoslovaks to conserve their
energy, through sycophancy to superior power,
while awaiting more propitious circumstances for
asserting their interests.
Alois Indra, believed to have been Moscow's
initial choice to replace Dubcek as first secretary,
by most accounts is number-two man in the
party. A presidium member and party secretary in
charge of official appointments, Indra is believed
to enjoy widespread support among the party's
"old guard" in Bohemia and Moravia. By his early
opposition to Dubcek's reform program and his
defense of the party bureaucracy in 1968, Indra
has earned credentials as the top conservative in
the hierarchy. He is unqualifiedly loyal to Mos-
cow and has maintained personal contacts with
Kremlin leaders. Politically shrewd and intellec-
tually polished, Indra would be the odds-on favor-
ite to replace Husak should the latter leave office.
current regime, represent the "collaborationist"
wing of the party. Kapek heads the powerful
Prague party committee and is believed to be one
of Husak's more persistent gadflies. Bilak, who in
1968 headed the Slovak party, is the most con-
servative Slovak in the hierarchy, and the re-
ported enmity between him and Husak seems
merely to have been papered over.
Husak is not without his "moderate" allies
on the presidium. Svoboda, Colotka, and Strougal
are believed to line up behind Husak on the most
important issues. Strougal, once a contender for
Husak's job, has apparently accepted the fact that
his political future now depends on his perform-
ance as premier, and he is maintaining a low
profile on party matters.
The complexion of the regime in Prague is
also in part dependent on the political proclivities
of men filling subordinate positions in the party..
For instance, the two candidate presidium mem-
bers seem to have earned their positions by virtue
of respectable careers as economic administrators.
Both apparently remained cautious enough in
1968 to avoid the stigma of reformism and are
today considered "reliable." The installation of
proregime functionaries in regional and district
party organs earlier in the year and the election of
a largely conservative central committee at the
congress provide a politically homogeneous bu-
reaucracy from which to draw future leaders. The
promotion of a large number of political
unknowns to the central committee could, how-
ever, represent Husak's intention to minimize
political rigidity in the hierarchy and to en-
courage future flexibility.
Three other members of the presidium, Vasil
Bilak, Antonin Kapek, and newcomer Karel Hoff-
mann are solidly in the "conservative" camp. Like
Indra, they were early critics of the reform move-
ment and, more than any other members of the
To raise the party's capability to act, it is of decisive
importance to have consistent compliance with the
principles of democratic centralism, to have strict and
voluntary discipline on the part of every Communist
stemming from deep conviction, dedication to the
party, and the determination to press for the accept-
ance of its political line.
Resolution of the 14th party congress
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The self-satisfaction that party leaders have
evinced over restoring the party's "unity" and
ideological purity is clouded by two organiza-
tional problems that impair its political viability.
First, many local functionaries fail to supervise
effectively the economic and social institutions
under their charge. Second, those social classes
most important to the economic and social devel-
opment of the country are underrepresented in
the party rank and file. Workers constitute only a
fourth of the membership, and the over-all aver-
age age of members is 49.
Most party members who survived the purge
of 1968* have not proved to be the militant
"vanguard" of society that the regime sought.
Whatever loyalty to the new regime the bulk of
the rank and file has developed has been diluted
by the organizational disruptions of the past three
years that seriously affected the party's local ef-
fectiveness. Such organizational problems were,
of course, inevitable. But, in the past year the
regime has publicly admonished party function-
aries for their administrative lethargy and in-
ability to install on-the-job discipline and motiva-
tion among the workers. Husak has led the assault
on inefficiency and has warned bureaucrats that
"no one is irreplaceable."
The congress made abundantly clear that the
rank and file can expect close supervision from
the top. In his report to the congress, MilosJakes,
head of the party's powerful Central Control and
Auditing Commission, warned that the activities
of all members would be continually scrutinized
and that deviations from party policies and inef-
fectual performance would not be tolerated.
As expected, the congress trumpeted Czech-
oslovakia's return as a reliable member of the
socialist camp. Except for Romania, all of the
Warsaw Pact nations sent their top party leaders
to welcome the errant comrades back into the
fold. Soviet party leader Brezhnev could hardly
have spoken more highly of the Czechoslovak
leaders who led their party to "victory over the
enemies of socialism." His reference to the "inter-
national prestige" that Husak and his colleagues
had earned should put to rest the doubts Prague's
allies might still have had over the "reliability" of
the regime. With the events of 1968 in mind, one
could well imagine a grateful sigh of relief as
Brezhnev kissed Husak in true Slavic style.
Nevertheless, other events at the congress
suggested that the Soviet-led invasion of Czecho-
slovakia would long remain a contentious issue
both within the Warsaw Pact and the Communist
movement as a whole. By not attending the con-
gress, Nicolae Ceausescu reaffirmed Romania's
opposition to the invasion itself, and to the
"Brezhnev Doctrine" in general. References by
Romania's delegate to the congress, Dumitriu
Popescu, to the "exclusion of the threat of force"
in international relations and his call for "nonin-
terference" in the internal affairs of other states,
though not directly linked to the invasion, carried
the intended message. Popescu also stressed that
"differences of views" between socialist countries
should not be allowed to affect their relations.
The Soviets made it quite plain that the
Czechoslovak experience should serve as a warn-
ing to other Eastern European countries who
might seek to modify their own political systems
or policies independently of Soviet interests. It
was no doubt with the Romanians primarily in
mind that Brezhnev advertised Prague's analysis
of the 1968 reform movement, embodied in the
Lessons document, as a lesson for the whole
camp.
The sharpest note of discord at the congress
was raised by the Yugoslav representative, whose
remarks suggest that relations between Prague and
Belgrade have not measurably improved. He not
only specifically referred to Belgrade's "well-
known" position on the events of 1968, but
*Some 300,000 were purged, and another 200,000 resigned voluntarily. Current membership is 1,200,000.
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ticked off the international rights of states-na-
tional sovereignty, territorial integrity, and free-
dom of internal development-that by implication
were violated by the invasion. As expected, Com-
munist China was not represented at the congress.
Peking's assignment of a new ambassador to
Prague following the congress was presumably at
Chinese initiative and does not signal any major
improvement in bilateral relations.
Prague's relations with other, Western Com-
munist parties also were not improved during the
congress. The French Communist Party delegate
Raymond Guyot pointedly reminded the Czecho-
slovaks (and Soviets) of the basic differences that
have separated their two parties since 1968. The
Italian Communist delegate failed to read a pre-
pared message from his party sharply critical of
the invasion and of subsequent developments.
The message was subsequently released in Rome
following Italian Communist charges that they
were not given the podium at the congress. The
British and Spanish Communists, boycotted the
congress, apparently to avoid treatment similar to
that received by the Italians. In a virtual admis-
sion of their pariah-like position in much of the
Communist world, the Czechoslovaks referred in
their party resolution to the good relations they
now had with the "absolute majority" of Com-
munist and workers parties.
There was no indication at the congress that
Prague intends to pursue new foreign policy initi-
atives toward the West. On all major East-West
issues, such as the Conference on European Se-
curity (CES), Mutual Balanced Force Reduction
(MBFR), and European detente, it is content to
follow Moscow's lead. West Germany is the only
West European country with which Prague is
conducting substantive political talks. The pos-
sibility of these two countries' settling their post -
World War II differences appears distant, how-
ever, having run aground on the issue of the 1938
Munich agreement. Prague has not eased its de-
mand that Bonn annul the agreement ab initio,
which, for a myriad of technical reasons involving
reparations and the citizenship status of the-
Sudeten Germans, Bonn is unwilling to do. A
solution to the impasse is not likely to be found
until Moscow decides that Czechoslovak - West
German rapprochement fits into its over-all Euro-
pean negotiating scheme.
The political prospects of the Husak regime
are linked to the sluggish economy. He and his
colleagues realize that their predecessors came to
grief in part because of the accumulated eco-
nomic problems of Czechoslovakia. Yet Husak
has little room for economic experimentation. He
has no choice but to revert to the highly central-
ized Soviet model. Indeed, he can hardly expect,
in the short run, to allow even as much decentral-
ization as have the Polish and East German lead-
ers. This is the case, first, because he cannot
afford to remove loyal party hacks from impor-
tant jobs and, second, because most of the com-
petent people who have managed to survive are
afraid to take any initiative. Within these limits he
still must try to show improvement.
Despite the disorganization resulting from
the reforms and counterreform