WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008800030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 28, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
28 May 1971
State Dept. review completed No. 0372/71
Copy N?. 0054
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 27 May 1971)
Page
Indochina: Time Out in Laos . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Enemy Military Action in South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Cambodia: Going Down the Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Communist China: Plot Counterplot in Peking?
.
The Specter of Communist China: Vibrations in Singapore and Malaysia . . . . . . 9
Heath and Pompidou Ponder European Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Egyptians Likely to Soothe Podgorny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Hungary Issues Bonds in the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
. .
Moscow Gropes to Forestall Peking's UN Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Movement Toward Detente to Dominate NATO Ministerial . . . . 15
Poland: Gierek Gains in Stature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
India-Pakistan: Crisis Posed by Refugees Continues . . . . . . . . 17
Fedayeen Movement Drifts into Disarray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Sierra Leone: Stevens Firmly in Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Kinshasa Seeks Long-Term Capital While Overlooking Economic Needs . . . . . 20
Peking's Economic Presence in Africa on the Rise . . . . 21
Oman's Problems Continue to Hold Back Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Chile: A Situation Report . . . 23
Argentina: Lanusse Maintains Course Despite Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Dominican Republic: Reaction to Government-Sponsored Terrorism . . . . . . 25
Colombian Liberal Party Splits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 25X1
NOTES: South Korea; Czechoslovakia; Zambia-Angola; UN-Cyprus; Bolivia;
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Government-held location
Communist-held location
Pakcong
Phak ilk Houei
'-Kout Kong
Bolovens
Plateau
heipone Quang Tri
ha vane
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b*C. KL 1
FAR EAST
Indochina: Time Out in Laos
Last week's military melodrama in south
Laos would have been a hard act to follow even
allowing for the histrionic atmosphere that is
normally produced in Laos following major set-
backs in the field. Both the Communists and the
government appear to be taking time to sort out.
where they go from here. There have been the
usual fears and disreputable reports that the
Communists were about to push on toward the
Mekong, but if that is what the North Vietnamese
have in mind, they did not tip their hand. The
week passed without a major new Communist
attack.
In the Bolovens Plateau area, regular army
forces retook the town of Ban Phak Kout to the
west of Paksong on 22 May, but the position
came under heavy attack and the government unit
withdrew to the west on 27 May. Government
irregulars operating north and east of Paksonq
have made relatively little progress in their efforts
to recapture key high ground positions. The
relative quiet on the plateau evidently has done
little, however, to quiet the fears in nearby Pakse,
the second largest town in Laos. The weal,
leadership and poor performance of Lao officials
in the town have contributed to the natural
tendency of the city's residents to believe the
worst. Statements by the Communists to villagers
on the plateau that they intend to hit Pakse are
gaining some credence despite the fact that the
enemy frequently puts out such stories to keep
inhabitants from fleeing to population centers
and to exert psychological pressure on the govern-
ment.
Farther north, in the Dong Hene - Muonq
Phalane area of the western panhandle, two
Communist regiments-plus independent combat
and artillery battalions-still pose a serious threat
to government forces defending Seno, Keng Kok,
and Route 13. The Communists, however, have
yet to move in force toward Seno.
The military situation in northern Laos has
eased during the past two weeks. Action around
the Long Tieng complex has slackened off, and
there are continuing indications that at least some
of the main-force North Vietnamese units in the
area are pulling back.
In the Luang Prabang area, government
forces have now reoccupied all of the ground lost
during the Communists' dry season offensive
north and east of the royal capital. The NVA
regiment responsible for the offensive appears to
have overextended its supply lines and to have
taken heavy casualties. It has now pulled back
toward more secure base areas and will probably
devote much of the coming rainy season to rest
and refitting.
To no one's great surprise, Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma has said publicly that the
government will not negotiate with the Commu-
nists while under military pressure. He reiterated
his position that the government would neither
bow to threats nor accept any bombing halt and
cease-fire unless these measures were immediately
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SFi Kt' l'
followed by the supervised withdrawal of all
foreign troops from Laos. Souvanna has not,
however, issued a formal rejection of the Commu-
nist proposal
sary-and indeed desired-by the Chinese as a
buffer state. These expressions of good will may
also, however, reflect Souvanna's growing disen-
chantment with the Soviets and their failure to
play a more energetic role in bringing the Lao
Communists and their North Vietnamese mentors
to the conference table.
Enemy Military Action in South Vietnam
Meanwhile, Communist propaganda from
Moscow and Peking as well as Hanoi continues to
stress the importance of the latest Pathet Lao
proposals. It is coming down particularly hard on
the necessity for a complete US bombing halt so
that an immediate cease-fire can be implemented
and talks begun on forming a provisional govern-
ment.
Despite his hard words for the North Viet-
namese, Souvanna appears to be developing a
softer line toward the Chinese Communists. On
two recent occasions-once in an interview with
the New York Times and once at a supper for
visiting US officials-he has noted that China has
been a good neighbor to Laos. He also has
expressed his belief that the current thaw in
US-Chinese relations reflects an increasingly flexi-
ble Chinese foreign policy that may also improve
Lao-Chinese relations. Souvanna stressed his de-
sire to maintain good relations with the Chinese,
reflecting his belief that a neutral Laos is neces-
The latest round of Communist military
action, which began late last week, has featured
some of the heaviest shelling attacks along the
DMZ in three years. Allied positions just south of
the eastern section of the DMZ have been hit
almost daily since 19 May by closely coordinated
artillery barrages, one of which killed 31 Ameri-
cans and wounded 43 others in a single bunker.
Communist local forces and sapper units also
have been active in other attacks. An American
ammunition dump near Quang Tri city was
penetrated by enemy forces who used satchel
charges to destroy rocket and artillery shells. A
few sappers set off explosive charges at a fuel
depot at Cam Ranh that resulted in the destruc-
tion of nearly two million gallons of jet fuel.
Scattered engagements have taken place in
and near the A Shau Valley as allied troops
participating in Operation Lam Som 720 continue
to seek out enemy forces and stockpiles. The
heaviest ground fighting of the current enemy
campaign, however, erupted in the central high-
lands. An abortive assault on a South Vietnamese
artillery base in western Kontum Province re-
sulted in 139 Communists killed and 31 weapons
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seized. An assault on a bridge east of Pleiku city
caused the death of 13 South Vietnamese soldiers
and the killing or wounding of some 36 civilians.
There also was a series of bloody firefights in
southern Pleiku Province last weekend that took a
steady toll of deaths and injuries on both sides.
Enemy action in South Vietnam's MR-3,
where Communist offensive capabilities are more
limited, generally remained at a low level. There
were a number of reports of enemy plans for
terrorist acts in Saigon, but only one incident
took place in the capital: a grenade was tossed at
an American billet on 23 May, but it caused no
damage.
Enemy-initiated activity increased quite
sharply in the delta provinces of MR-4 beginning
on 18 May. Action peaked in the southernmost
provinces when 21 incidents, including 12 shell-
ings and four ground attacks, were reported on 18
May. I n the northern delta, there were 47
incidents on 21 May, including 28 shellings and
five ground attacks. Nearly all of these attacks
were in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa provinces. On
21 May, a total of 67 incidents were recorded
throughout MR-4-the highest number for a single
day since last fall-but the intensity of the attacks
was low, and only two of the shellings consisted
of more than 20 rounds.
The new phase of enemy action is likely to
spill over into June, especially along the DMZ. In
addition, Lam Son 720 and a new South Viet-
namese drive in the central highlands could spur
new enemy reactions and keep the level of action
fairly high for the next week or so. If the
Communists follow past patterns, they will then
settle into a period of reduced activity during the
summer months to prepare for a fall campaign.
Cambodia: Going Down the Road
The government's military operation to clear
a section of Route 3, south of Phnom Penh, has
entered its second week. The highway, which
could serve as an alternate overland route to the
seacoast and the port of Kompong Som, was
closed by the Communists not long after the
fighting began last year. Although several key
government officials reportedly believe that the
reopening of the entire road is of considerable
importance-primarily because it runs through
densely populated agricultural areas-the current
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operation is apparently scheduled to stop at the
town of Angtassom, in Takeo Province.
The operation is being conducted by eight
Cambodian Army (FANK) battalions under the
personal direction of Lt. Colonel Lon Non, the
prime minister's brother. By mid-week the force
had pushed some ten miles south of its base at
Tram Khnar against light opposition. FANK
casualties totaled five killed and 48 wounded, the
heaviest losses occurring during a day-long battle
with enemy troops dug in on a hilltop some 30
miles southwest of Phnom Penh.
According to FANK officers involved in the
operation, the opposing forces are made up
principally of Khmer Communist troops. It re-
mains to be seen if any of the Vietnamese
Communist main force units assigned to the
Phuoc Long Front, which directs the enemy's
military operations in the southwest, will be used
to contest the Cambodian push. Several of these
units probably could move within striking dis-
tance of the government forces in short order.
Rainy season conditions, the generally open
terrain along Route 3, and other factors may
deter them from doing so, however.
The sharpest fighting of the week occurred
in Kratie Province when the Communists carried
out mortar and ground attacks against a South
Vietnamese Army task force in the town of
Snuol. Twelve South Vietnamese were killed and
62 wounded, while enemy losses totaled 75
killed.
In the northwest, the Communists continued
to put pressure on government positions in Oddar
Meanchey Province. Enemy troops apparently
have gained control of most of Route 68 north of
the provincial capital of Samrong and appear to
be closing in on a small Cambodian outpost at 0
Smach, on the Thai border. South of Samrong,
the Communists continued to harass FANK
forces defending the town of Chong Kal. Losses
on both sides have been relatively light, however.
According to a recent Vietnamese Communist
rallier, elements of the mixed Vietnamese/Khmer
Communist 203rd Regiment are responsible for
the current enemy military activity in Oddar
Meanchey.
Although the military situation continues to
be the government's main preoccupation, the
economic strains generated by the war are begin-
ning to be felt in Phnom Penh. The growing
pressure on the Cambodian unit of currency, the
riel, represents the first serious crack in the fragile
public confidence that has helped hold down
price increases. The black market value of the riel
has depreciated drastically in the past few weeks.
The price on the dollar in Phnom Penh, for
example, has climbed from about 144 riels on 10
May to approximately 250 riels on 25 May;
parallel movements have been reflected on the
Hong Kong market.
It seems likely that this wave of speculation
has been triggered by a combination of events,
including the fear of an imminent devaluation of
the riel, the finance minister's consideration of
new controls on bank withdrawals, the recent
arrival in Phnom Penh of "several tons" of newly
printed bank notes, and police crackdowns on
black market money lenders. To underscore the
government's concern over speculation, Prime
Minister Delegate Sirik Matak has publicly
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SOUTH KOREA: The elections on 25 May for
the nation's unicameral legislature went pretty
much according to script. President Pak Chong-
hui's Democratic-Republican party won a clear
majority of the seats in the enlarged 204-member
National Assembly. The opposition New Demo-
cratic party got well over one third of the seats,
while two of the four splinter parties that
contested the elections received a seat each. The
New Democrats' relatively strong showing will
help to undercut charges that the government
planned to rig the election.
The New Democrats' good showing is at
least partially a result of President Pak's decision
criticized recent price increases and has warned
speculators and hoarders that they face severe
penalties if they are arrested.
The principal reason for the country's pre-
carious financial position is the continuing mone-
tary expansion that has been necessary to main-
tain the army. Currency in circulation increased
88 percent during 1970 and another 15 percent in
the first three months of 1971. US aid will
probably offset a smaller portion of Cambodia's
1971 budget deficit than originally had been
projected because the government has moved
slowly in using these aid funds. As a result, actual
US aid deliveries for calendar year 1971 are
expected to fall short of amounts obligated. With
export earnings at only a fraction of prewar levels
and reserves committed to debt servicing and to
the importation of essential items, Phnom Penh
has insufficient foreign exchange reserves of its
own to make up the shortfall in US deliv-
late in the campaign that it was necessary for the
opposition to win at a minimum about one third
of the seats. The New Democrats at the time
seemed to be badly handicapped by the public
feuding of their leaders and the strong support
being given to administration candidates by
provincial and local officials. Pak appears to have
become concerned that the growing evidence of
illegal election activities by the authorities would
add to the public criticism of his own election last
month. An added consideration probably was a
desire to maintain a credible appearance of a
two-party system.
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Communist China: Plot Counterplot in Peking?
Peking may be edging toward some public
revelations on the political fate of Chen Po-ta,
Mao's personal secretary and fourth-ranking mem-
ber of the ruling politburo, who has not appeared
with other leaders since last Au ut
an article condemning "idealist apriorism" in the
latest issue of the party theoretical journal, Red
Flag, was an attack on Chen, although he was not
directly named. During the past few weeks, sim-
ilar articles have ap-
peared in the provincial
press, apparently tar-
geted against Chen and
other leftist leaders on
the politburo who ap-
pear to have come under
increasingly heavy pres-
sure because of their
identification with the
excesses of the Cultural
Revolution and their op-
position to post-revolu-
tion reconstruction pro-
grams.
The Red Flag arti-
cle excoriated sham
Marxists who dispute Mao's view that theory
must not be divorced from practice. Chen has
long been the regime's leading theoretician, and
the article evidently is intended to be official
acknowledgment that his voice in regime councils
has been silenced. Nevertheless, Chen's political
demise is clearly not based solely on personal
shortcomings; it presumably results primarily
from the long-standing dispute over power and
policy between the radical ideologues-part of
Mao's inner circle since the beginning of the Cul-
tural Revolution-and a more vague grouping of
proponents of relative moderation in domestic
and foreign policies whose principal spokesman
appears to be Premier Chou En-lai.
Chen got into seri-
ous trouble because of his association with the
notorious "May 16 Corps," an extremist organiza-
tion that was denounced as "counterrevolution-
ary" in 1967 for its attacks on Chou En-lai, a
number of his vice premiers, and several major
regional military figures who are now on the
politburo. An investigation under way for more
than a year into the activities of the May 16
group apparently is a major effort, perhaps
backed by Chou, to undercut the power of leftist
elements in the politburo.
The investigation may be directly related to
an alleged "anti-Mao" plot cited in an article by
Wilfred Burchett, the left-wing Australian journal-
ist who recently returned from Peking and claims
he was officially informed of the plot. Burchett's
article discusses an extreme leftist "shadow cabi-
net" that tried to manipulate itself into power
during the Cultural Revolution. The journalist
claimed that the names of the "plotters" would
be revealed when the investigation was com-
pleted.
One of the plotters to whom Burchett's arti-
cle refers is Kang Sheng, the fifth-ranking member
of the politburo and the regime's top security
specialist, who has been out of public view since
last November. The absence in Peking of any fifth
anniversary celebrations for the 16 May 1966
Central Committee directive on the Cultural
Revolution, from which the "May 16 Corps"
took its name, lends support to the supposition
that Kang Sheng continues to be in serious trou-
ble. Kang was mentioned in the 16 May directive
as the only "good" member of the group Mao
previously had charged with launching the "revo-
lution" in 1965.
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%-)L %--Al'\L 1
The setback to Chen Po-ta and the current
press polemics suggest that a major decision has
recently been taken in Peking against the leftist
forces on the politburo. They have been losing
ground for several months in their disruptive
campaign to secure more tenable political posi-
tions for themselves and their followers in China's
post - Cultural Revolution power structure. Given
the present fluid situation within the politburo,
however, it probably would be erroneous to as-
sume that the fortunes of the left are completely
on the wane. There have been clear signs during
the past few days that the sensibilities of the
leftist leaders have been taken into account in
several major provincial party appointments as
well as in some personnel shifts within the
important Peking Military Region. Indeed, until
the so-called May 16 affair is brought to a close,
the complex political bargaining and infighting at
the top of the regime is likely to continue and
may even intensify.
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The Specter of Communist China: Vibrations in Singapore and Malaysia
The countries of Southeast Asia are moving
into the early stages of a period of adjustment to
what may develop into a new relationship be-
tween the region and Communist China. As Pe-
king pursues its current policy of promoting
better relations with some, if not all, of the coun-
tries of the region, it is becoming increasingly
clear that in some cases the adjustments will be
painful. This is already evident in Thailand, where
Foreign Minister Thanat, the chief proponent of
closer relations to Communist China, is in politi-
cal hot water, and in Singapore, which because of
its ethnic Chinese population has a particularly
difficult if not entirely unique problem.
Last week Singapore's Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew cracked down on three local news-
papers, probably in part because of what he re-
gards as the increasing expressions of Chinese
cultural chauvinism in the Singapore press. Lee
constantly reminds his people that they are Singa-
poreans first and Chinese second, and he believes
that any close cultural identification with China
could strengthen political sympathy for Peking,
thereby threatening internal security, He has
accused two of the papers of being subsidized by
Peking (and has intimated that the third is fi-
nanced by CIA).
Lee's actions may also be a result of his
concern over the recent expansion of contacts
between Malaysia and China. Kuala Lumpur has
decided to slow down this developing relationship
and has no intention of establishing formal trade
or diplomatic relations with Peking in the near
future.
Though the specter of China appears to have
been a factor in Lee's suppression of the press, his
actions probably are also attributable to personal
pique. All three newspapers have been critical of
him, although none has any real potential for
endangering the government. He believes, never-
theless, in keeping his country, including the
press, at close rein and has no qualms about using
tough tactics to keep down the opposition.
Hence, the detention of several leaders of one of
Singapore's major Chinese-language papers, the
forced shutdown of a small English-language
paper, and the attempt to put another English-
language paper out of business by forcing a bank
foreclosure are all in character. He has since
backed down to the extent that he may allow
another bank to take over the latter paper's finan-
cial problems, and, in general, local criticism of
his moves seems to be abating.
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EUROPE
Heath and Pompidou Ponder European Issues
Last week's summit meeting between Prime
Minister Heath and President Pompidou has vir-
tually assured that the negotiations on British
membership in the European Community will
come to an early agreement.
The most troublesome of the remaining is-
sues is what will happen, in the enlarged Com-
munity, to the special treatment Britain now gives
the dairy products it imports from New Zealand.
Pompidou reportedly gave a "positive response"
to the British request for an accommodation, but
a bargain acceptable to all parties remains to be
struck. The two also pledged to work toward
agreement on the details of Britain's financial
contribution to the EC during the transition pe-
riod, the general principles of which have already
been decided.
The central theme of the discussions was
not, however, the negotiations themselves, but
"the overall concept of Europe, its organization,
its functioning, and its future," in Pompidou's
words. He and Heath stressed that this construc-
tion should be built on the further development
of the economic and monetary union,
and Heath evidently made more ex-
plicit commitments that sterling
would not stand in the way. They
further agreed that the enlarged Com-
munity should lead to a united
Europe that can play an important
role in the world. Defense was dis-
cussed only briefly, both leaders
thinking that it should be a topic for
the future.
In his statement to the Com-
mons, Heath came close to endorsing
Pompidou's evolving concept of a
European "confederation," saying
that "the identity of national states" should be
preserved in the developing community. Although
the EC Commission should continue to have a
valuable role, according to the Prime Minister, the
important decisions should be made by the ex-
plicitly national representatives composing the EC
Council and these decisions should be taken by
unanimous agreement "when the vital national
interests of any one or more members are at
stake."
The EC's treaty provides that most Council
decisions may be taken by majority vote on the
basis of proposals submitted to it by the Com-
mission, but virtually all have been made unani-
mously since the Luxembourg compromise of
1966, which was the price the EC had to pay for
France's return after a nine-month boycott of
Community institutions. Whether Heath is merely
affirming his agreement with present Community
practice, or whether he and the French think that
the Luxembourg compromise should become a
Community principle, is not clear. All the Six
agreed last year that the institutional provisions
of the existing treaty should be retained in the
enlarged community.
Ted et Georges: Sunshine Finale
London Evening Standard headline
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On the institutional question-and in gen-
eral-Britain and France will not be deciding the
future of Europe alone. Except for the French,
the members of the Community believe that in
the long run an enlarged Council using the una-
nimity rule simply could not work. Although the
Community has been able to survive and even
thrive despite this disagreement, an attempt now
to nail down one view or the other could slow
progress on enlargement.
Egyptians Likely to Soothe Podgorny
Soviet President Podgorny's arrival in Cairo
this week for an indefinite stay was the clearest
sign to date of Moscow's concern about Egyptian
President Sadat's recent purge of his government.
The official Soviet line is that what has been
going on in Egypt is strictly "an internal matter."
Moscow, however, seems genuinely confused
about the import of the changes in Cairo and
probably wants both an explanation and first-
hand reassurances that Soviet interests there will
not suffer.
Podgorny is accompanied by a fairly senior
group of officials. Included in it are Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko, Deputy Defense Minister and
Commander of Soviet Ground Forces Pavlovskiy,
and Boris Ponomarev, the senior CPSU official
responsible for relations with nonruling Com-
munist parties. A Soviet economic delegation,
headed by Moscow's top ranking foreign aid of-
ficial, Semen Shachkov, has been in Cairo since
20 May. His visit, which was also laid on just
recently, is presumably for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether the newly concluded Soviet-
Egyptian economic agreements will be affected
by the recent political changes.
The Podgorny visit, which apparently re-
sulted from a Soviet initiative, is being billed as
one in a continuing series of traditionally friendly
visits, and according to the initial reports, the
Soviets have reaffirmed their political, economic,
and military commitments to Egyptian President
Sadat. Moscow, however, is not nearly as anxious
to reassure as it is to be reassured that Egypt will
meet its commitments to the USSR.
For his part, President Sadat presumably will
seek to dispel Soviet concern that the purge of
key Egyptian officials more or less closely identi-
fied with Moscow will have repercussions on So-
viet-Egyptian relations. Soviet influence in Egypt,
in fact, hinges less on connections with highly
placed Egyptian figures than on Cairo's de-
pendence, for the foreseeable future, on Soviet
military aid.
Cairo's warm reception for the Soviet delega-
tion and the generally laudatory treatment of the
Soviet Union during the visit underscored Sadat's
main effort to reassure Podgorny that domestic
political developments had not jeopardized Soviet
interests in Egypt. At the same time, a categorical
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rejection of foreign "intervention in domestic
affairs" in a front-page editorial of the semi-of-
ficial AlAhram seemed designed as a low-keyed
warning to the Soviets that although they had a
right to be briefed on recent political changes,
Sadat would not tolerate outside interference in
internal Egyptian politics.
Sadat nonetheless is aware that Soviet inter-
ests and sensitivities impinge on his freedom of
action in the Middle East negotiations and in his
efforts to improve relations with the US. With
this in mind, Sadat, in his discussions with
Podgorny, probably sought to counter Soviet 25X1
fears that a US-Egypt rapprochement might ex-
clude the Soviets from playing a role in efforts to
reach a settlement with the Israelis.
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St (JK11
Hungary Issues Bonds in the West
In a first among communist countries,
Hungary has issued $25 million in ten-year bonds
on the international money market. The USSR
has at least tacitly approved this move inasmuch
as the Soviet-owned Narodny Bank in London is
participating in the underwriting. Two other
British banks are involved, one of which is loosely
affiliated with a US bank.
The agreement between the Hungarian Na-
tional Bank and the underwriters provides for the
floating of Eurodollar bonds on the free market
to be purchased by individuals and financial in-
stitutions. The bonds should sell rapidly because
they are guaranteed by the excellent reputation
of the underwriters. Budapest and other Com-
munist borrowers generally have raised hard cur-
rency in the West through bank credit, often
backed by Western governments. Government-to-
government credits also have been obtained, but
these have always been tied to specific purposes.
Hungary's flotation of bonds to acquire hard
currency on the international money market
marks the latest step in Budapest's program to
normalize its commercial relationships with the
West. The Hungarians have been in the forefront
among Communist countries in attracting Western
technical assistance and in participating in joint
ventures. Successful flotation of the bonds may
result in similar agreements by Hungary as well as
by other Communist countries that have a record
of financial responsibility in their dealings with
the industrialized West. In general, most Com-
munist states have been scrupulous in observing
their financial obligations in agreements reached
with Western partners.
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~E JKVIl
Moscow Gropes to Forestall Peking's UN Entry
As a US decision on handling the Chinese
representation issue at this fall's UN General As-
sembly draws closer, Soviet officials are becoming
more open in voicing unhappiness over the pros-
pect of Peking's entry into the UN.
Although the USSR continues to profess
support for Peking's membership, it appears to be
hoping that some variant of the "two Chinas"
approach will win sufficient backing to stave off
Peking's accession. Moscow appears to be cal-
culating-correctly-that Peking will reject admis-
sion as long as Taipei remains in the UN. Soviet
diplomats have discreetly suggested that Western
countries tailor their strategy to this calculation
in order to foil Peking.
The purpose of this subterfuge would be
defeated, however, if the Nationalists were to
walk out the minute Peking was admitted. Mos-
cow, therefore, seems to be trying to dissuade
Taipei from such a course. A Soviet diplomat in
Geneva, for example, expressed obvious disap-
pointment when the Nationalist ambassador there
told him Taipei would leave the UN if a "two
Chinas" concept were adopted.
Moscow has also been attempting to dis-
courage support for Communist admission by
spreading back-corridor gossip that Peking would
be a disruptive influence in the world body.
Moscow, recognizing the limited effective-
ness of its own discreet efforts, probably views
the forthcoming US decision as the key to Chi-
nese representation this year. Consequently,
Soviet officials have demonstrated an intense in-
terest in ferreting out Washington's planned
course. They seem to be hoping for continued US
opposition to the entry of Peking, which might
result in excluding Communist China and also
would chill the recent warming trend in Washing-
ton-Peking relations. Should the US adopt such a
course, Moscow obviously intends to stand on the
sidelines, giving pro forma public support to
Peking.
Moscow's search for some means to delay or
even prevent Peking's UN entry is certainly moti-
vated by the spoiler role the mainland could play
in a number of UN areas of Soviet concern-the
selection of a Secretary General this fall, any
Middle Eastern peace settlement requiring Secu-
rity Council concurrence, and disarmament mat-
ters. Moscow also fears Peking would use its UN
membership as a forum for anti-Soviet views and
would try to undercut the USSR's support among
third world countries.
Some Western friends of the Nationalists
generally favor some sort of dual representation
formula, which could command a majority this
year, but they are anxious that it not appear to be
a gimmick to exclude the Communists. Last year,
the "Albanian" resolution to admit Peking and
expel Taipei received a majority for the first time,
although it failed to be adopted because it did not
obtain the two-thirds required as an Important
Question. However, many UN members have
strong qualms about evicting Taipei.
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~ihuKr,1
Movement Toward Detente to Dominate NATO Ministerial
The NATO foreign ministers will meet in
Lisbon next week amid enhanced speculation on
the prospects for movement toward further nego-
tiations on central European issues. Because of a
variety of concurrent developments-Soviet state-
ments on mutual and balanced force reductions
(MBFR), the debate in the US over troop levels in
Europe, movement in SALT, and intensified spec-
ulation on the prospects for a Berlin agreement-
most foreign ministers will favor moving the
NATO detente position forward in Lisbon, partic-
ularly on MBFR.
It is unlikely that Moscow will further illu-
minate its views on force reductions in the next
week. Most of the NATO members, however, will
be prepared to move ahead on the basis of what
the Soviets have already said. The question for
the ministers will be how to advance the MBFR
dialogue while avoiding the pitfalls of too rapid
an acceleration. The West Germans remain con-
cerned that moving too quickly would reduce
Western leverage in the four-power talks on Ber-
lin. Bonn is fearful that if East Germany partici-
pates in such talks prior to a Berlin agreement, it
would be even less willing than now to compro-
mise on Berlin and on other inter-German issues.
Nevertheless, Brandt has said that Bonn will not
ask the other allies to require a Berlin agreement
prior to beginning talks on MBFR.
Some allied interest has developed in the
Canadian suggestion that, to get around the prob-
lem of East Germany, the foreign ministers
appoint an individual or a member government to
explore MBFR with Moscow and other interested
governments on behalf of the Alliance. London
apparently favors giving outgoing Secretary Gen-
eral Brosio this assignment. The British NATO
mission believes, however, that London will fol-
low Washington's lead, as will many of the allies
who have not yet decided on what approach to
take in Lisbon.
Many of the allies favor making some change
in the preconditions they set last December for
moving to multilateral preparations for a Confer-
ence on European Security (CES), namely a Ber-
lin agreement and progress in other "ongoing
talks." A number of allies-including France and
West Germany-have already said that they favor
removing the requirement for progress in "ongo-
ing talks." Other members would simply prefer a
wording that looked less like a formal precondi-
tion.
The French position on the Berlin precondi-
tion appears increasingly uncertain as the minis-
terial approaches. In Paris, French officials con-
tinue to say that they will not attempt to change
the Berlin-CES linkage in Lisbon. The deputy
chief of the French mission to NATO, Andreani,
however, reportedly has said that Paris is not
prepared to repeat the Berlin precondition as it
now stands, and that France would even dissoci-
ate itself from the language in the communique if
it is not changed. He said that Paris believes that
the linkage should be stated in a "positive sense."
He suggested that the communique could note
that progress has been made on Berlin and could
express the hope that further progress in the
four-power talks will justify multilateral CES
talks.
Paris has recently been outdoing all the
other allies in expressing its support for an even-
tual CES, as was evidenced by Foreign Minister
Schumann's comments during and after his recent
trip to Moscow. Given the optimistic French
assessment of the status of the Berlin talks, it
remains possible that Andreani's comments re-
flect the trend of thinking in Paris. Strong French
insistence on a change would make it very diffi-
cult for the allies to emerge from the ministerial
with the appearance of a unified approach to the
Berlin-CES relationship.
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Or,v.tS.r, I
Poland: Gierek Gains in Stature
Party leader Gierek is consolidating his posi-
tion, with Moscow's support, by gradually reduc-
ing the influence of those men who are incom-
patible with his style of rule. If he can maintain
this momentum, he will soon dominate the party
apparatus at all levels and will be in an excellent
position to put his personal stamp on the regime
when the party congress convenes at the turn of
the year.
Hard-line politburo member and party secre-
tary Moczar appears to have been virtually elimi-
nated as a power factor within the hierarchy and
as a potential rival to Gierek. Even though he
remained in the background following the worker
riots last winter his well-known ambitions for
personal power were one of the main elements of
potential political instability.
Moczar's important responsibilities as
overseer of the military and security apparatus,
among others, have been assumed by newly ap-
pointed party secretary Stanislaw Kania. Kania
has close links with candidate politburo member
and Defense Minister Jaruzelski, who also appears
to be a rising star within the Warsaw leadership.
In addition, there are signs that Moczar's
ally, the ultraconservative candidate politburo
member and Warsaw party chief, Josef Kepa, has
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: The Communists opened
their party congress on 25 May by trumpeting
their defeat of Czechoslovak liberalism. First
Secretary Husak said the period of "consolida-
tion" was over and proclaimed Czechoslovakia's
return as a strong member of the socialist camp.
These claims were ratified by Soviet party boss
Brezhnev, who also spoke of the "high prestige"
that Husak had earned in the socialist com-
munity.
lost ground and may be ousted soon. For a time
Kepa appeared intent on trying to inherit Moc-
zar's role as symbolic leader of the party's hard-
line faction, but it now seems that he has neither
the influence nor the time to organize Moczar's
associates, who are becoming increasingly divided
among themselves.
The creation last week of four working
groups-each headed by a politburo member-to
prepare for the party congress provides further
indications of the relative standing of members of
the hierarchy. Excluding Gierek and Premier Ja-
roszewicz, the four politburo members who failed
to get specific assignments are all holdovers from
the Gomulka team and appear to be losing influ-
ence. None of them, especially Moczar and titular
head of state Cyrankiewicz, is likely to remain in
the top leadership after the congress.
25X6
Meanwhile, Gierek is following up his re-
shuffle of provincial party organizations earlier
this year with calls for a "re-evaluation and con-
solidation of party ranks" down to the lowest
level. Some elements within the local party appa-
ratus evidently are still resisting Gierek's programs
or, conversely, are seeking to maintain the grass
roots influence they gained in December. Re-
gional party meetings now under way could thus
signal an early housecleaning of party ranks. Fur-
ther indications of how far and how fast Gierek
intends to remold the party hierarchy and the
rank and file in his own image may emerge next
month at a scheduled central committee plenum.
The Czechoslovak leader reminded his
audience that socialist discipline both within the
party and society was lax. His exhortations for
hard work were a fresh reminder of the
fundamental weaknesses at the local party level.
The congress closes on 29 May with the formal
adoption of documents and elections to the major
party organs. 25X1
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itUKL-1
MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA
India-Pakistan: Crisis Posed by Refugees Continues
Although the continuing influx of refugees
from East Pakistan has created serious problems
for India, it appears that for the immediate future
New Delhi will rely on political rather than mili-
tary efforts to resolve the crisis. In a speech to
Parliament on 24 May, Prime Minister Gandhi
stated she was convinced there could be no mili-
tary solution to the problem of East Bengal and
that a political answer must be sought. This ap-
pears to indicate that India will seek to marshal
world opinion in an attempt to compel Pakistan to
halt the flow of refugees, now estimated by
Indian authorities at over 3.5 million. Mrs. Gan-
dhi, however, is under considerable pressure both
from her own party and from the opposition to
grant diplomatic recognition to Bangla Desh.
Pakistan has also injected a slight element of
caution in its statements over the crisis, without,
however, completely dropping its charges of
Indian interference. On 21 May, President Yahya
Khan issued a statement that, in passing, urged
the refugees to return, but it was largely con-
cerned with heaping blame on India for encour-
aging the exodus. The generally harsh tone of the
statement probably destroyed any effectiveness it
might have had in stemming the flow of refugees.
In a press conference three days later, Yahya took
a more conciliatory tone toward India and em-
phasized that refugees not guilty of crimes were
welcome to return, but an official note to India
on the same day was again sharply critical of New
Delhi's "responsibility" for the refugee problem.
Despite the apparent desire of both sides to
avoid hostilities, the situation remains tense and
either side could make a miscalculation that
would result in war. Clashes continue along the
East Pakistan border, with casualties on both
sides. There have also been some signs of possible
Indian contingency measures on its western bor-
der. On 20 May, for example, an Indian infantry
battalion with 600-800 men and about 12 T-55
tanks was seen moving westward, apparently pass-
ing from central India toward the West Pakistan
border. The troops were in full battle dress, and
all vehicles and tanks were camouflaged.
Meanwhile, President Yahya has reaffirmed
his intention to transfer power to civilians as soon
as circumstances permit. In his press conference
on 24 May, he said he would issue a policy
statement concerning the transfer in a few weeks.
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25X1
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vL VisL 1
Fedayeen Movement Drifts into Disarray
The approach of the next scheduled meeting
of the Palestine National Council, the nominal
legislative body of the Palestine exiles, finds the
principal fedayeen organizations still beset with
the problems of internal discipline and relations
with host governments as well as with their con-
genital inability to achieve over-all unity.
Little progress has been made in preparing
for the council session now set for June. The
five-man committee appointed by the last council
to draw up a list of candidates for its new
150-man successor group has still not met. F_
Meanwhile, still smarting from their recent
setbacks in Amman, the fedayeen are now becom-
ing apprehensive about their position in Lebanon.
As a result of the debate that has been going
on within the various fedayeen organizations
since the showdown in Jordan last April, a split is
emerging in the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP). A leftist faction that calls
itself the "progressive wing" has begun attacking
PFLP leader George Habbash. The group is issuing
communiques calling for "reforms" in the PFLP
and has threatened to break with Habbash if its
demands are not met. The other organizations,
including Fatah and Saiqa, have also been ex-
periencing similar splits between hard-line mili-
tants and traditional leaders.
rise.
Fatah's attempted take-over of the National
Council is unlikely to be acquiesced in by the
other organizations, and any pretense of
cooperation between the various groups will
probably disappear. Moreover, with the
movement in greater disarray than ever, the
possibility of one of the organizations instigating
a clash with the Lebanese Army is likely to
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Sierra Leone: Stevens Firmly in Control
President Siaka Stevens, very much on top
after his near ouster by disaffected army elements
last March, continues to consolidate his domestic
political position. At the same time, he has begun
to broaden his government's contacts with the
Communist world.
Since declaring the country a republic and
assuming the office of president under the new
governmental system he created last month,
Stevens has been busily installing in office the
people who stood by him during the latest crisis.
This consolidation process is reflected in a cabinet
reshuffle carried out last week in which Solomon
Pratt, a long time Stevens confidant, was named
foreign minister.
In an earlier move, S. I. Koroma, a volatile
party man who commands strong support among
the urban poor in Freetown, was named to fill the
new office of vice president. His appointment
appeases a large block of tribal supporters pre-
viously unrepresented in the leadership. Koroma
has been behind most decisions to use more vio-
lent tactics against regime opponents. Although
primarily a ruthless opportunist, he is a member
of a radical party faction pushing Stevens to
adopt more leftist policies.
Stevens also is taking steps to refurbish his
badly eroded popular image with the electorate,
including speaking tours upcountry. He continues
to pursue a vindictive course against leading op-
ponents, however. Two former cabinet members
who led a challenge against him last fall remain in
jail uncharged, while a dozen other prisoners
whose treason convictions were recently over-
turned by an appeals court will be retried under
new charges.
Stevens' efforts to bolster his domestic posi-
tion were given added urgency by the withdrawal
this month of more than half of the 200 Guinean
troops whose timely arrival last March enabled
him to survive the coup attempt and reassert his
authority. The withdrawals, which probably re-
flect Guinean President Toure's anxiety to end his
military intervention in Sierra Leone as quickly as
possible, are certain to have increased Stevens'
apprehension about his security. Recent rumors
of impending attacks and new coup plots could
be a Stevens' stratagem to slow or stop the with-
drawals.
Stevens meanwhile has begun to dilute his
country's traditional ties with the West by broad-
ening contacts with Communist states and by
stressing a more neutral stance in foreign affairs.
A move toward Peking has been evident since
April when Chinese Premier Chou En-tai warmly
congratulated Stevens on his declaration of a re-
public and called for the "further development of
friendly bilateral relations." Some two weeks
later, the Stevens government indicated privately
that it will vote next fall for Peking's admission to
the UN. Vice President Koroma will travel to
Peking this week for talks that seem likely to
result in Peking replacing Taipei before too long
as the Chinese representative in Freetown.
Several Communist delegations have visited
Freetown recently. A Soviet military mission
made an unannounced visit on 3 May, setting off
speculation of future arms aid. In mid-May, a
Soviet destroyer paid a five-day visit. The Sierra
Leone press gave good coverage to the visit of
North Korean journalists for independence day
celebrations late last month. In addition, Guinea
is pressing Stevens to allow the East German
ambassador in Conakry to visit Freetown. -
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Kinshasa Seeks Long-term Capital While Overlooking Economic Needs
President Joseph Mobutu's official visits last
month to France, Japan, and Taiwan to attract
foreign investment gained his country promises of
long-term financial and technical assistance. Al-
though he has been promoting the Congo's future
development, current budget and balance-of-
payments problems are becoming urgent and Mo-
butu may have to appeal for help to meet the most
pressing of them.
Mobutu's recent gains are all far-sighted. The
Japanese Government agreed to look into financing
an $80-million railroad and bridge that is part of a
scheme to complete an all-Congolese rail link from
the Atlantic to the copperbelt and thereby lessen
the Congo's dependence on neighboring countries
for transport. The French agreed to increase tech-
nical assistance personnel and project aid to $3.6
million a year-roughly twice the level of 1970.
They also agreed to guarantee French private invest-
ment in the Congo and to facilitate capital trans-
fers. In Taiwan the government announced that it
would increase its small agricultural assistance pro-
gra m.
The concentration on new long-term foreign
investment overlooks an immediate need to finance
what could become a $100-150 million budget def-
icit this year. The price of the Congo's leading
export, copper, fell last year by some 40 percent,
causing a serious drop in receipts. Lavish spending
by the government, which had become a habit
during the copper boom, has not slackened. In fact,
revenue was already falling when the Congo Gov-
ernment spent large amounts during 1970 celebrat-
ing its tenth anniversary of independence, entertain-
ing visiting King Baudouin of Belgium, and staging
presidential and legislative elections in the fall.
Though these expenditures were one-time
sprees, wide-ranging salary increases to government
employees in January and an increment in army
personnel added additional financial burdens. De-
spite a slowdown in capital expenditure, govern-
ment spending remains only slightly below what it
was when copper receipts were highest. Although
copper prices may rise if an anticipated US copper
strike curtails supply of the metal, it is unlikely that
sufficient revenue will be generated to prevent a
sizable deficit.
The balance-of-payments is also strained. Mo-
butu's promotional trips abroad over the past two
years have not attracted enough new foreign invest-
ment to offset outflows of business profits, capital
transfers, and debt and other financial obligations.
Imports, including basic foodstuffs and low-cost
manufactured goods, have kept price levels rela-
tively stable, but have been rising twice as fast as
exports. Reduced copper earnings in 1971 may
accelerate the decline in foreign exchange reserves
that began in mid-1970. To avoid restricting im-
ports, which could be strongly inflationary when a
massive budget deficit is imminent, the Congo may
again have to seek import assistance such as was
provided by the US in the mid 1960s.
ZAMBIA-ANGOLA: Reprisals against Zambia for
its support of anti-Portuguese guerrillas took a new
turn last week as Angola-based Zambian dissidents
launched cross-border raids into remote northwest-
ern Zambia. According to the Zambian minister of
home affairs, about 90 men crossed from Angola on
16 May and attacked a paramilitary police post and
a bus. The minister claimed that one policeman,
SECRET
three civilians, and four attackers were killed, and
that 15 civilians were wounded. Sporadic reports of
subsequent smaller raids have not been confirmed.
The dissidents are most probably members of the
small Lunda tribe that lives in the area.)
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~Ll )1Er, 1
Peking's Economic Presence in Africa on the Rise
During the past year Communist China in-
creased its economic commitments to African
countries as part of its efforts to gain diplomatic
recognition and votes for admission to the UN.
This, more than competition with the USSR, un-
derlies recent efforts by Communist China to
establish itself firmly in Africa where Nationalist
Chinese influence is waning.
Equatorial Guinea, which recognized China
last October, has signed economic and technical
cooperation agreements with Peking in expecta-
tion of reducing its heavy economic dependence
on Spain. Ethiopia-another country that rec-
ognized Peking late last year-probably antici-
pates a Chinese aid offer and already has arranged
for coffee sales to China. Nigeria has carried on a
small amount of trade with the Chinese, and
following recognition in February officials of the
two countries agreed there should be a formal
bilateral trade agreement.
Peking has committed substantial economic
assistance to several African countries that rec-
ognized Peking years ago. In April, Mauritania
received more than $20 million in credit to build
a deep-water port at Nouakchott. This will in-
crease China's economic commitment to Mauri-
tania more than fourfold. In Somalia, Peking re-
cently revived a 1963 credit by agreeing to con-
struct a cigarette factory and to survey a road.
This move should be particularly gratifying to the
Somalians, because other Communist countries
have not been forthcoming with economic assist-
ance since the coup in October 1969.
A delegation from Mali recently visited Pe-
king to discuss expansion of several Chinese-built
light industrial plants as well as financing for the
construction of the Manantali Dam, which is ex-
pected to cost more than $100 million. Peking,
however, apparently did not make a firm offer for
this project during the visit. It did agree to allow
Mali to resume drawing on credits extended in the
early 1960s that were not fully utilized. The
outstanding portion of these credits--$17 mil-
lion-had been frozen since Mali's present leaders
overthrew a Peking-supported regime in 1968.
The Chinese appear to be moving according
to schedule in the construction of the estimated
$400-million railroad in Tanzania and Zambia. It
is to be completed by 1975. Around 7,000 Chi-
nese technicians currently are involved in the
project, and as many as 13,000 Chinese report-
edly may eventually be involved.
Early this year about 50 Chinese technicians
arrived in Sudan to begin implementing a $42-mil-
lion credit extended last year. In addition, a
Sino-Sudanese trade protocol for 1971 has been
signed, calling for total trade to reach almost $70
million, double the level for 1969.
UN-CYPRUS: The Security Council voted this
week to extend the mandate of the UN force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months. Inter-
communal tensions on the island once again ap-
pear on the rise, sparking more statements on the
need for both sides to make concessions. Since its
creation in 1964, UNFICYP generally has oper-
ated at a deficit, with the US and the eight
nations contributing troops faced with the prob-
lem of covering the gap. Concern over this fund-
ing problem has been shelved temporarily because
of the greater problems on the island, but the
issue may be revived before the end of this
year I
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Oman's Problems Continue to Hold Back Change
The reform regime of Sultan Qabus, which
took control from Qabus' father in a virtually
bloodless coup last July, has failed to make
significant headway toward solving Oman's many
problems. The Sultan's British advisers are blamed
for causing friction between him and his prime
minister, with the result that their working
relationship remains uneasy. Development of for-
eign relations has been retarded by the failure to
carry the good will of Saudi Arabia, whose
friendship is a prerequisite for Oman's full accept-
ance by other Arab states.
Since the July coup, Oman has begun to
emerge from the feudal state deliberately fostered
by the former sultan. The tight grip that he
exerted over even insignificant domestic matters
has been relaxed, and the new reform program
has been well received by the populace, especially
now that several of the development projects have
gotten under way. Political reform has lagged
behind economic development, however, and the
security situation in parts of the hinterland
remains precarious.
The British advisers, who control the armed
services and the security forces, report only to the
Sultan, and he continues to act on their advice
much in the manner of his father, without
consulting other members of his government.
Prime Minister Tariq, who is also the Sultan's
uncle, claims that he has not even seen the chief
British military adviser for more than two
months, despite the fact that the Sultan has been
on vacation in Europe. In budget and develop-
ment matters as well, the British experts have
almost totally excluded the inexperienced and
inexpert Omani officials, even though these fields
are keys to domestic reform.
The prime minister has not improved the
situation by his own behavior. He admits that, in
the absence of the Sultan, he should have held
open public court daily and should have made
inspection trips to the disgruntled interior. The
prime minister was bred in the suspicious political
climate of earlier days in Oman, however, and
does not want to give Sultan Qabus cause to
remove him on the suspicion that he was building
up his own body of support.
These domestic political difficulties have
permitted little forward movement in vital foreign
policy matters. The `hew regime has failed to
mollify Saudi Arabia, long the patron of Omani
rebels, although King Faysal would probably
welcome an excuse to drop his support for the
ineffective dissidents he still finances. As the most
important ruler of the Arabian Peninsula, the
King's approval is also a prerequisite for accept-
ance of the new regime by the Arab League, a
loose coordinating body for the Arab states.
Essentially, there is no conflict between the
Sultan and his prime minister, as both seek the
betterment of Oman. Until petty problems of
personality and communication can be overcome
by the two leaders, however, both domestic and
foreign policies will probably remain
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: A Situation Report
President Allende's first state of the union
speech, made at the inauguration of the congres-
sional year on 21 May, was essentially a restate-
ment of his plans for fulfilling the Popular Unity
(UP) coalition's commitment to bring socialism to
Chile. He again called for a unicameral legislature
and a socialist legal system. The President did not
demand special economic powers or present con-
crete legislative proposals as many had expected.
He did mention the need for a new constitution
and may adopt the proposal of a Socialist splinter
group to convoke a constituent assembly. Such a
move would bypass congress and may be Al-
lende's choice as the most palatable way to bring
about the institutional changes the UP considers
necessary to consolidate its power.
Allende's implication that he expects the
opposition to resort to violence and that he is
ready to respond with force, which the US Em-
bassy notes has become one of his constant
themes, was interpreted in different ways. Some
Chileans consider it an attempt to capitalize on a
deep-seated desire to maintain a peaceful unfold-
ing of the political process as well as an appeal to
the armed forces to maintain their traditional role
of impartial guarantors. Many others, including
the independent daily El Mercurio, see it as black-
mail-the threat that violence will be used against
Chileans who might obstruct in any way the UP's
manipulation of existing legal norms to construct
a socialist state.
This implied threat against dissenters is at
variance with what is described as Allende's
"velvet glove on a steel fist" approach, which the
Chilean Communist Party also favors as the least
likely to arouse opposition while accomplishing
the UP's aims. This caution is not shared by
hard-line Socialists and the radical Movement of
the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The sometimes
discomfiting criticism and actions of these hard-
line supporters inside and outside his administra-
tion indicate that Allende cannot always placate
them in the constant political balancing act that
he performs behind the scenes.
Socialists, for example, played a large role in
the intervention in the operational and financial
control of the mammoth El Teniente copper mine
on 20 May. Due for complete nationalization
under a constitutional amendment that will
become law in July, El Teniente is now owned 51
percent by the Chilean government and 49
percent by the Kennecott Corporation. Chilean
officials have blamed recent production shortfalls
at the mine on Kennecott, whose management
contract is violated by the intervention. On the
other hand, members of a congressional
committee that investigated the situation this
month placed responsibility on the government
for the technical difficulties, political persecution,
absenteeism, resignations of key technicians and
officials, labor indiscipline, and lack of financing
that the legislators said were the cause of the
production shortfalls.
Recent statements by the ministers of
economy and agriculture indicate that the
government is ready to move more confidently in
the centralization of planning and production and
in emphasizing the role of labor. 25X1
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Argentina: Lanusse Maintains Course Despite Problems
President Lanusse is moving forward with his
plans to reorganize the political system and even-
tually to hold elections, despite plotting in the
armed forces and an increasing problem with
urban terrorism. The recent round-up of the lead-
ers of two military conspiracies appears to have
bought Lanusse some time to pursue his political
plan, but the rising tide of terrorism, marked by
the kidnaping this week of the honorary British
consul in Rosario, could put new obstacles in his
path.
there are indications that the leaders of the Gen-
eral Confederation of Labor hope to reach a
working relationship with the government.
Lanusse also has gained the public support of the
moderate Peronists and their allies in the Hour of
the People movement on the condition that he
continues to move toward free elections. The
Hour of the People remains a loose grouping of
moderate politicians, but the parties participating
in the movement represent a large majority of the
voters in past elections.
The kidnaping of Stanley Sylvester, an act
directly related to his position as manager of the
US-owned Swift Packing Company rather than his
honorary diplomatic assignment, was the action
of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). The
ERP, a Trotskyite group that has modeled many
of its activities on those of the Tupamaros in
Uruguay is the largest and most active of several
terrorist groups in Argentina. Bank robberies, ter-
rorist attacks on police outposts and military per-
sonnel, and now the kidnaping have prompted
serious concern among military officers. To help
allay this growing concern, Lanusse intends to
strengthen the judicial processes by forming a
federal court with nationwide jurisdiction over
subversive activities.
Despite the efforts by military conspirators
and terrorists to stall the President's plan to re-
turn the country to a constitutionally elected
government, Lanusse has not lost the momentum
he gained in the first weeks after assuming power
on 23 March. Labor, except for a few extremist
unions, appears satisfied with the wage negotia-
tions that now are nearing conclusion. In addition
The details of Lanusse's strategy for putting
together a workable political system will not be
clear for several months, when a law governing
the organization of political parties will have been
drawn up and a final decision will have been made
on reforming the constitution. Opinion on that
strategy may begin to crystallize as early as next
month, however, following the release on 31 May
of the recommendations for a political plan
drawn up by an advisory commission.
A cabinet reorganization also is expected in
the near future. This could provide Lanusse with
an opportunity to bring labor and the Hour of the
People movement into direct participation in the
government. The principal move expected is the
dissolution of the Ministry of Economy and
Labor and the creation of four new ministries-
labor, finance, agriculture, and industry. There is
widespread speculation that two of the more na-
tionalistic holdovers from former President Lev-
ingston's cabinet-Economy Minister Ferrer and
Secretary of Industry Chescotta-will leave the
Lanusse government at the time of the reorganiza-
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Dominican Republic: Reaction to Government-Sponsored Terrorism
Outraged public reaction and the threat of a
general protest strike have prompted President
Balaguer to call a halt, at least temporarily, to the
activities in northern Santo Domingo of a police-
sponsored, anti-Communist terrorist group
popularly known as La Banda. The terrorists'
excesses, the government's culpability, and broad,
critical press coverage have elevated the matter to
a national political issue, according to the US
Embassy.
La Banda reportedly was organized on the
orders of National Police Chief Enrique Perez y
Perez some three months ago, perhaps in relation
to the strong warning Balaguer issued to leftist
extremists in a speech on 24 February. It came to
public view during the first two weeks in May,
when members vandalized private homes, as-
saulted several schools and at least one church,
carried out "citizens' arrests," and participated
openly with the police in a raid on the head-
quarters of the Chauffeur's Union, where some 40
union members were arrested. The Dominican
military, although not involved in La Banda's
activities, approves the use of "calculated coun-
terterror" as the best way to "neutralize" leftist
extremists. The military has, however, been criti-
cal of the lack of professionalism displayed by the
police-led group.
The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD)
and representatives of leftist groups responded by
discussing a general strike.
The government and La Banda have dis-
claimed any relationship. On 18 May Police Chief
Perez y Perez issued a statement assuring the
public that the authorities would not permit ter-
rorism of any kind
Since then, several La Banda members have been
detained. With La Banda's stand-down, the threat
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of a general strike, never very strong, has dimin-
ished further although the 40 chauffeurs are still
in custody.
Despite vociferous criticism of La Banda's
methods from all quarters of Dominican society,
its inactivity is probably only temporary. There
was little effort to conceal the police hand in the
group, perhaps not so much because of a "lack of
professionalism" as because the government
wants to provoke open confrontation with leftist
activists, mainly the MPD, in order to destroy
them. The labor movement also appears to be a
target of governmental wrath, presumably to dis-
courage the growth of opposition political
strength.
The sudden death on 23 May of exiled MPD
leader Maximiliano Gomez in Brussels adds a new
and potentially explosive element to the situa-
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The weakness of the MPD and the rest of the
left and the government's undisputed strength
Colombian Liberal Party Splits
The Liberal Party convention last week
formalized the split that had been apparent in the
party for many months. The convention broke
into two factions when the followers of former
President Carlos Lleras Restrepo and Alfonso
Lopez Michelsen walked out and established a
rump convention. The main group, led by former
senate president Julio Cesar Turbay, then elected
a National Liberal Directorate that included
Lopez and Turbay. Lopez, however, will not par-
ticipate.
Lleras' rump Liberals, who are now calling
themselves the "Progressive Liberals," did not
want to attend the convention because they knew
Turbay controlled the party machinery. The
"Progressives" talked about moving their faction
to the left at their rump session, and have decided
to form a national executive committee for politi-
cal and parliamentary action.
cessor and was instrumental in his ultimate elec-
tion. The former president has become disen-
chanted with Pastrana, however, because he has
not defended the previous administration nor suf-
ficiently praised Lleras' leadership.
The split will create many problems for
Pastrana. He will now be forced to recognize one
of the factions as the legitimate representatives of
the Liberal Party. This in turn may lead to cabi-
net changes. Pastrana, however, will probably
wait until the Conservatives, who are also divided,
hold their convention before taking action. Given
Turbay's control of the Liberal machinery and his
open support of the administration, the President
probably will rely almost exclusively on him for
continued Liberal support. As a consequence,
prospects that congress will approve the admin-
istration's legislative program are dim, because the
Lleras-Lopez faction will vote against it.
The Lleras-Lopez faction can be expected to
attack the Pastrana administration openly now
that the split has been formalized. Under the
unique National Front system that ends in 1974,
the Liberals and Conservatives agreed to alternate
the presidency and share equally all cabinet posts,
high governmental positions, and legislative seats.
Lleras picked Pastrana, a Conservative, as his suc-
cannot guarantee the government absolute con-
trol of the situation. Balaguer, with the support
of his administration, is making it abundantly
clear that opposition activity will not be tol-
erated. The left has a choice: withdraw entirely
from the contest, as many will do; or, resort to
increasingly desperate measures despite the prob-
able consequence of being wiped out by the mili-
tary and the police. Extinction or paralysis seem
to be the only alternatives the revolutionary left
The splits in Colombia's two traditional par-
ties are obviously benefiting ex-dictator Rojas
Pinilla's National Popular Alliance (ANAPO),
which ran a close second in last year's presidential
elections. However, they may also help former
President Carlos Lleras. Lleras may believe that it
would be of use to him to have Turbay lead the
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Liberals identified with the Pastrana administra-
tion in the assembly and municipal council elec-
tions next year. An anticipated strong ANAPO
showing in these elections, along with a close
association with conservative Pastrana, could
significantly weaken Turbay's position for the
1974 presidential elections.
BOLIVIA: The Torres government has moved
against dissident military and political groups. In
a news conference last weekend, Interior Minister
Jorge Gallardo accused the National Revolution-
ary Movement and Bolivian Socialist Falange of
conspiring with a group of forcibly retired mili-
tary officers to overthrow the government. Ac-
cording to Gallardo, recent strikes and incidents
of violence throughout the country designed to
foment a "state of convulsion favorable to the
coup" have been part of the "rightist" plot. The
interior minister also charged that some "revolu-
tionary organizations" were infiltrated by "native
agents of the imperialist intelligence services."
Exhorting students to cease their continual chal-
lenges to the regime, Gallardo declared that by
persisting in illegal occupations, blockades, and
do's charges.
disruptions, the "infantile left" was allowing itself
to be manipulated by the right.
Gallardo's denunciation of the plotters ap-
pears to have been no more than an effort to keep
opposition groups off balance. The government
has thus far refrained from carrying out large-
scale arrests and the dissident elements have not
allowed themselves to be provoked into an impul-
sive and uncoordinated coup attempt. The MNR
reportedly plans to continue its activities and the
other groups involved are unlikely to be deterred.
The blast against the "infantile left" appears to be
a plea for student support in the face of the
common enemy, but may also be a veiled warning
that the regime's patience with student antics is
wearing thin. Student leaders have rejected Gallar-
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Berlin Negotiations
Special Report
W
EEKLY IRZIVIEW
Secret
N8 540
28 May 1971
SC No. 00762/71A
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S A Ki I
The Berlin Negotiations
The divided city of Berlin has always been the archetypical symbol of the Cold
War. West Berlin, deep inside East Germany, is a vivid example of the freedom and
prosperity of the West, and as such seems to the Communists to be a threat to the
security and stability of the regime in Pankow. The Communists' recurrent, and
sometimes vigorous, efforts to eliminate the West Berlin irritant have produced a life
of tension for the Berliners and created some of the most dangerous periods of
postwar US-Soviet relations, notably the crises of 1948-49 and 1958-61.
However, for differing reasons 14 months ago, the four wartime allies-the US,
UK, France and the Soviet Union-saw advantage in opening negotiations aimed at
ameliorating conditions in Berlin. Today the city is a litmus test of the ability and
willingness of East and West to bridge the division of Europe. Also, largely because
of a link established by Bonn, the Berlin talks are the key to the fate of other
East-West negotiations-principally those of West Germany's Ostpolitik and the
Soviet proposal for a Conference on European Security (CES). Since the four power
talks began on 20 March 1970, there have been 20 meetings of the four power
ambassadors, more than a dozen formal meetings of the senior advisers of the
ambassadors, and countless "informal" exchanges between diplomats of the US,
USSR, UK, France, and West Germany. On the fringes of the four power talks, the
East Germans have begun their own dialogue with representatives of Bonn and the
West Berlin Senat. Strictly speaking, the Germans have no juridical right to negotiate
on the terms of a Berlin agreement, which is within the competence of the Four
Powers, but the East Germans have been unstinting in their efforts to do so.
In spite of all this activity, progress toward an agreement has been excruciat-
ingly slow. Both the Allies and the Soviets have now tabled draft agreements, but
there are wide discrepancies between them. The Western draft focuses on improve-
ments in access and inner-city movement, but the Soviet proposal concentrates on
reducing the political links between West Germany and West Berlin. The two drafts
are basically summations of the contradictory positions delineated in the talks so
far. In spite of the efforts to reconcile differences, there is little prospect for a broad
agreement without a major substantive shift by one side or the other. The Soviets
have shown no willingness to change their position, but they stand to suffer serious
political losses if the talks fail. They may therefore feel compelled eventually to
consider at least limited concessions in Berlin to preserve their budding dialogues
with Bonn and other Western capitals.
Special Report
28 May 1971
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Authorized Surface Access Routes to West Berlin
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28 May 1971
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Prelude to Negotiations
The man most responsible for bringing the
Berlin talks into being is West German Chancellor
Willy Brandt. A former governing mayor of West
Berlin, Brandt took the first steps even before he
came to power in Bonn after winning the national
elections in September 1969.. As foreign minister
under the Grand Coalition government of Chris-
tian Democratic Chancellor Kiesinger, Brandt
urged and was largely responsible for consulta-
tions in early 1969 with representatives of the
US, UK, and France-the occupying powers of
West Berlin-regarding a "sounding" of Soviet
willingness to negotiate practical improvements in
and around the city.
The "Berlin sounding," as it took shape in
the first half of 1969, concentrated on the pros-
pects for negotiating guarantees for civilian land
access to West Berlin, easing the restrictions on
the movement of citizens between the East and
West sectors of Berlin, and making minor border
rectifications intended to eliminate Western en-
claves within Communist territory.
The Western need for improvement on all
items of this agenda-particularly the first two-
was obvious. The three highways to West Berlin
were exposed to the constant threat of East Ger-
man harassment. There was a long history of East
German interruptions of West German civilian
traffic in retaliation for "objectionable" West
German political activities in West Berlin. Free
movement of West Berliners between the East and
West sectors of the city had been virtually elimi-
nated since the construction of the wall in 1961.
It effectively severed economic, personal, and
even familial ties, and there has been no signifi-
cant personal travel since the last Easter pass
agreement between the West Berlin Senat and
Pankow in 1966.
In return for concessions in these areas, the
Allies hinted at a West German willingness to
desist from political activities most objectionable
to the Soviets and their East German proteges.
Special Report
Although the West German offer was not spelled
out, Western thinking was centered on possible
agreement to bar meetings in West Berlin of the
Bundesversammlung (the body that elects West
Germany's presidents) and plenary sessions of the
Bundestag.
Brandt's desire to get Berlin negotiations un-
der way was only part of his larger interest in a
diplomatic opening toward the East designed to
effect a political reconciliation between the
Federal Republic and the East Europeans. This in
turn was considered an essential political prereq-
uisite to winning Soviet approval forastrength-
ening of contacts between East and West Ger-
many and a beginning of efforts to close the
widening gap between Bonn and Pankow.
Berlin and Moscow's European Policy
Both the inter-Allied consultations and the
ambitious plans of Brandt and his supporters
would have been in vain had they not coincided
with a quickening of Soviet interest in East-West
negotiations. Moscow had its own reasons in 1969
for looking favorably on the possibility of four
power talks on Berlin. The most immediate was
its desire to overcome the onerous political and
diplomatic aftermath of the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia. The crushing of the Czechoslovak re-
form government in August 1968 had cast doubt
on Moscow's professed interest in detente and a
lessening of tensions in Europe. The invasion
brought to a temporary halt the promising diplo-
matic offensive in Europe that Moscow had begun
with the Bucharest Declaration of 1966. Among
other measures the Soviets suggested to enhance
European detente was a proposal for an "all-Euro-
pean Conference" on security. Moscow was
anxious to get this campaign under way again,
and East-West talks on Berlin, the very symbol of
the Cold War, offered a convenient means of
demonstrating the Kremlin's sincerity in reducing
East-West tensions. Further impetus was added by
the Sino-Soviet border clashes in the spring of
1969, which presumably led Moscow to believe
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that a lessening of tensions on its Western flank
was highly desirable.
The Soviets had also been awakening to the
possibilities of negotiating with the West Ger-
mans. Although this trend lagged well behind
Moscow's broader interest of developing a diplo-
macy of smiles in Western Europe, by mid-1969
the Kremlin had taken note of the budding
Ostpolitik advocated by Foreign Minister Brandt
and of its implications for Soviet interests. Mos-
cow's central interest in Germany lay in winning
Bonn's acceptance of the postwar loss of German
territory and of the existence of a separate East
German state.
Clear hints of a more forthcoming attitude
toward Moscow had already emanated from
Bonn, and an initiative on Berlin offered Moscow
a ready means with which to encourage this
trend. In addition, East Germany's de facto con-
trol over civilian access and communications to
Berlin offered good prospects that the West
would have to take account of the role of Pan-
kow, thus enhancing its status and helping to
reduce the isolation that had been imposed upon
it by the Western Allies and Bonn.
These presumably were the considerations
that lay behind Soviet Foreign Minister Gro-
myko's dramatic gambit in July 1969. Addressing
the Supreme Soviet, Gromyko for the first time
in recent years publically indicated Soviet interest
in Berlin negotiations. He proclaimed that the
USSR was ready for "an exchange of opinions on
how to prevent complications now and in the
future" with respect to "West Berlin." He also
indicated the parameters of the Soviet offer, say-
ing that Moscow would not agree to any steps
that would harm the "legitimate interests of the
GDR" or affect the "special status" of West Ber-
lin,
The significance of Gromyko's remarks was
underscored by the presence in the USSR of a
high-powered East German delegation led by
Erich Honecker, the heir to party chief Walter
Special Report - 4 -
Ulbricht. The interests of Pankow were most di-
rectly affected by the prospect of negotiations on
Berlin, and it was obvious that the Soviets were
taking care to bring the East Germans into line
behind their position. Pankow's attitude was not
clear, but Gromyko's speech was larded with
enough qualifications to make the point that Mos-
cow was not disposed to sell Pankow short.
The Initial Exchanges
Gromyko's speech had the effect of speeding
the delivery to Moscow on 6-7 August 1969 of
the document embodying the West's "Berlin
sounding." In its final form, the "sounding" ex-
pressed Western interest in seeing "the situation
with respect to Berlin improved, particularly as
regards access to the city." It called for "Soviet
steps" that would contribute to this end, and
conveyed the interest of the Federal Republic
(FRG) in negotiating with Pankow on railroad
matters, inland waterways, and posts and tele-
communications. It also promised that in return
for "a constructive attitude" on the part of Mos-
cow and Pankow, Bonn would be willing to make
"certain compromises" on Federal activities in
Berlin.
The Soviet reply was not long in coming. On
12 September 1969-again preceded by consulta-
tions between Soviet and East German officials-
the Soviets affirmed their interest in an exchange
of opinions on "averting complications now and
in the future around West Berlin." The Allies
responded in December with a formal proposal
for four power talks, and final agreement on the
beginning of talks was reached in February 1970.
At the suggestion of the Soviets, it was agreed
that the talks would be held at the ambassadorial
level in the former Allied Control Council Build-
ing in West Berlin.
The first meeting was accordingly held on 26
March 1970. The Allies were represented by their
ambassadors to Bonn-Rush for the US, Jackling
for the UK, and Seydoux for France. The Soviet
Union was represented by its long-time
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ambassador to Pankow, P. A. Abrasimov. Ambas-
sador Seydoux-who now heads the embassy in
Moscow-was later replaced by Ambassador
Sauvagnargues, but aside from that change, the
cast of characters in the talks remains the same.
The Soviet Approach
The Soviets began the talks with assurances
that they were prepared to consider either a
broad settlement or a more limited agreement
dealing with specific problem areas. The latter
course was the one favored by the three Western
powers, which had no interest in throwing open
to negotiations the occupation rights and author-
ity they exercise by "right of conquest" in their
sectors of Berlin. As the Allied notes to the So-
viets had suggested, and as the Allied ambassadors
made clear in the meetings that followed, the
Western powers were chiefly interested in nego-
tiating specific improvements in the existing ar-
rangements for West German civilian access and
inner city movement. They did not consider the
legal basis of their position to be in question.
Moscow, however, is persistent in its attempts to
buttress its views on the juridical aspects of the
Berlin question, to the detriment of Western pre-
rogatives.
Moscow's insistence on confining the scope
of the four power talks to West Berlin reflects this
ambition. The Soviets do not accept the Allied
argument that the talks should deal with the
original four power sphere of competency, i.e.,
the three Western sectors of Berlin and the Soviet
sector as well. They maintain that they have
granted full sovereignty over their sector to the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) and that
East Berlin is now the capital of a sovereign state.
Further, the Soviets have disputed the Allied
claim to "rights of conquest" in Berlin. As early
as the third ambassadorial meeting on 14 May
1970, Abrasimov asserted that the Soviets were
the actual conquerors of Berlin, and that the
Allies therefore had only those rights that had
been agreed to by Moscow.
Special Report -5-
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The Soviets have advanced their own thesis
that West Berlin represents an "independent polit-
ical entity," legally and juridically distinct from
both East and West Germany. This is a stream-
lined version of the old "free city" concept ad-
vanced by Khrushchev in 1958 and written into
the Soviet - East German treaty of 1964.
In essence, this concept would place the
three Western sectors of Berlin under a degree of
four power control, or at least provide a Soviet
voice in the administration of West Berlin. As a
corollary, it also would involve a renunciation of
Bonn's claim to residual sovereignty over the city
and the elimination of overt political links be-
tween Bonn and West Berlin, such as working
visits by West German leaders and sessions of
parliamentary bodies. Berlin is the most effective
symbol of German unity, and the Soviets see this
sort of arrangement as conclusive to maintaining
the division of Germany. Soviet officials have not
been loath to confirm that the latter is still the
chief objective of Moscow's German policy.
Three power and West German acceptance
of West Berlin's independent status constitute the
most favorable possible outcome of the Berlin
talks for Moscow, but it is unlikely that the
Soviets consider such a general abandonment of
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long-standing Western positions likely. At a mini-
mum, the Soviets probably will settle for nothing
less than a halt to the steady growth of the West
German presence in West Berlin, which they may
still fear is aimed at full incorporation of the
Western sectors into the Federal Republic. Be-
yond this, they seem to be aiming at a significant
contraction of the West German official presence
in West Berlin and an enhancement of their own
limited presence in the city.
A lessening of the Federal presence has been
an expressed Soviet objective since the beginning
of the talks. Abrasimov frankly indicated during
the opening session that Soviet concessions on
access were dependent on such a reduction, be-
cause, in the Soviet view, East German harass-
ment of civilian traffic to Berlin is a legitimate
form of retaliation against "illegal" West German
activities in West Berlin. Thus, the Soviets have
indicated that they would be willing to offer
improvements in access only after the West had
indicated its willingness to cut back "provoca-
tive" West German activities. Bonn, for its part, in
late 1969 scaled down its activities in West Berlin
to improve the atmosphere for the ambassadorial
and the bilateral West German - Soviet talks.
Whatever they may hope to obtain in this
sphere, the Soviets entered the negotiations with
a detailed shopping list. A tabulation of "objec-
tionable" West German activities submitted dur-
ing the third ambassadorial meeting on 14 May
has remained basically unchanged. The list was
included in the Soviet draft agreement tabled on
26 March 1971. It includes demands for the ban-
ning of official acts or activities in West Berlin by
the Federal President, the Federal cabinet, the
Bundestag and Bundesrat (including meetings of
committees and party factions), the Bundesver-
sammlung, and "other federal and Laender gov-
ernmental agencies of the FRG" and for the ces-
sation of West German "military" activity in the
city. In addition to the governmental activities
they wish to see banned, the Soviets would also
Special Report -6-
6 -
prohibit a wide range of nongovernmental activ-
prohibit
ity, including national conventions and congresses
of West German political parties and national
organizations.
The prohibitions are obviously aimed at
fortifying the juridical "independence" of West
Berlin, although the Soviets have indicated their
willingness to accept a minimal level of federal
activity exercised through a "liaison" office. This
would permit the West Germans to carry on
routine administrative functions of a "non-politi-
cal" nature.
Abrasimov and his senior advisers have indi-
cated that as a logical consequence of the "inde-
pendent" status of West Berlin, the official Soviet
presence in West Berlin should be strengthened.
Their chief objective, and one which is enshrined
in the Soviet draft of 26 March, is to have a
Soviet consulate general in West Berlin. In addi-
tion, the Soviets would require most favored na-
tion treatment for the USSR in its economic
relations with West Berlin, the opening of ware-
houses and offices for Soviet trade organizations
in West Berlin, the right for Soviet citizens em-
ployed in these offices to reside in the Western
sectors, and the elimination of any discrimination
against the property or property interests of the
USSR. Moscow aims at putting an end to the
restrictions that the Three Powers have imposed
upon Soviet activity in the Western sectors. At
present the Soviets maintain only four offices in
West Berlin-Intourist, TASS, Soveksportfilm,
and Novosti-Izvestia. All were established in
1960-62, but are maintained in physicaliy distinct
offices. Moscow is evidently intent upon remedy-
ing its lack of any central representation in West
Berlin, and thus accentuating the unique and
"separate" status of West Berlin and diluting the
authority of the Allies.
The "Linkage" Complication
Regardless of the original objectives of the
parties to the Berlin negotiations, their character
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and importance changed substantially in May and
June 1970 when the West Germans raised the
ante by making ratification of their draft treaty
with the USSR dependent on progress in the
Berlin talks. By the following December, the
NATO alliance had formally made Western agree-
ment to a Conference on European Security
(CES) also contingent on a Berlin agreement ac-
ceptable to the West.
The origins of the West German action are
not precisely clear; both the Soviets and the West
were apparently taken somewhat by surprise, al-
though Egon Bahr, the chief negotiator of the
West German - Soviet treaty, hinted at linkage in
his talks with Gromyko. In retrospect, its inspira-
tion most likely can be found in Bonn's failure in
its bilateral negotiations with the Russians to ac-
quire any obvious gains. Given the attitude of its
Special Report
domestic opposition, the Brandt coalition no
doubt concluded that the treaty (and a similar
one subsequently negotiated with the Poles)
could only win favor in West Germany if the
government could show itself capable of hard
bargaining, and also come up with some clearly
discernible prize.
During the West German - Soviet negotia-
tions, Bahr made no small effort to impress upon
Moscow the importance to Bonn of a satisfactory
Berlin settlement. He does not seem, however, to
have made an explicit linkage; this was first done
in a public statement by Brandt in June. Aside
from the domestic pressures, Bonn may have de-
cided that the Soviets were sufficiently anxious to
have the treaty ratified to justify trying a power
play. In any case, it is now a West German politi-
cal fact of life that Bonn's formal agreement to
Willy Brandt and Company in Red Square ...what price ratification?
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Moscow's territorial rearrangement of Eastern and
Central Europe will be forthcoming if progress
toward a satisfactory Berlin agreement is well
advanced.
The establishment of a linkage between the
Berlin talks and Soviet desiderata in other policy
areas was soon interpreted in some quarters as a
strengthening of the West's bargaining position in
the Berlin negotiations. The Soviets, on the other
hand, have resisted the contention that any "link-
age" exists, and in effect have put the Berlin
negotiations in a holding pattern while they ex-
plore possible alternatives to a Berlin agreement
to achieve some of the same objectives.
One line of advance that probably seemed to
Moscow particularly easy to pursue was that of
enhancing East Germany's international stature,
and Bonn was clearly the weakest link in the
Western position. The West Germans had already
unilaterally accepted the fact that East Germany
was a separate state and that it would play some
role in the negotiation of a Berlin accord. More-
over, Bonn was most anxious to engage East Ger-
many in negotiations to lower the barriers be-
tween the two German states, a process that Bonn
thought it had begun early in the year, but which
Pankow had broken off in the spring. Moscow
might have tried its German gambit even if "link-
age" had not been established, but thereafter an
effort in this area seemed particularly desirable.
The Soviet move came in October 1970,
when the East Germans formally proposed the
beginning of talks between the East and West
German governments. The East German offer re-
portedly proposed that questions involving West
German traffic to West Berlin and West Berlin
traffic to West Germany could be settled in talks
with representatives of the FRG and of the West
Berlin Senat respectively. The West Germans,
while jumping at the chance to talk with Pankow,
countered with their own offer to talk on the
basis of Chancellor Brandt's Twenty Point pro-
gram-first presented to the East Germans at the
Kassel summit meeting between Brandt and East
German Premier Stoph on 21 May 1970. For
Bonn to enter negotiations on access in the ab-
sence of prior four power agreement would have
been to accept the Soviet argument that access is
a matter for inner-German rather than four power
discussions.
Even though the two sides were unable to
reach agreement on an agenda, the talks between
Egon Bahr and East German Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Kohl began on 27 November 1970.. Pankow's
willingness to open talks with Bonn did not
signify any modification of its-or Moscow's-ob-
jectives, although in a significant tactical shift
Pankow had earlier dropped its requirement for
recognition as a precondition to talks with Bonn.
Kohl has continued to press Bahr to begin nego-
tiations on the question of access, even though he
has attempted to take note of West German and
Allied sensibilities by offering to subsume them
under the general heading of talks on "traffic."
Very interesting... but not With some waver-
negotiable.
ing, the West Germans
have held firm against
the temptation to probe
East Germany's readi-
ness to make concessions
in this private forum.
The East Germans came
closest to success in Feb-
ruary 1971, when Bahr
agreed to discuss
"models" for a transit
agreement. However,
faced with the united
opposition of the Three
Powers and probably
with some misgivings in
government circles in
Bonn, Bahr retracted his
offer to table a draft in a
meeting on 8 March. Since that time, the Bahr-
Kohl talks have reflected in microcosm the stale-
mate in the four power talks.
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East German - West Berlin talks began on 6
March between Ulrich Mueller, a representative of
the West German Senat, and Guenther Kohrt, an
East German official, following a proposal made
by East German Premier Stoph in a February
meeting with a West Berlin Communist leader.
Stoph indicated that Pankow wished to negotiate
a broad agreement with the Senat to regulate
questions of access, movement within the city,
and ties between East Germany and West Berlin.
Significantly, however, the question of passes
through the wall for Berliners was last on a five-
point East German agenda.
This offer also constituted an effort to in-
fringe upon the substance of the four power talks.
Nevertheless, the Senat-with Allied-imposed lim-
itations-began the talks, principally out of hope
that the East Germans could be persuaded to
agree to a limited pass agreement for the Easter
holidays in April. Holiday passes had been regu-
larly negotiated in the middle 1960s, but not
since 1966.
The East Germans, however, soon demon-
strated that they had no immediate intention of
settling for anything less than the broad agree-
ment they had outlined in their original proposal.
The hoped-for pass agreement did not materialize,
and the talks have since fallen into the pattern of
deadlock typical of the Bahr-Kohl and four power
talks.
The Soviet negotiators have attempted to
turn the generally accepted format that has
evolved in the talks to the service of their legal
concepts. Both the Allied draft of 5 February and
the Soviet draft of 26 March are organized into
three distinct parts. Part I is intended as a vehicle
for the "general principles" of an agreement, and
Probably again. ..but when?
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Special Report
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would represent an agreement between the four
powers. Part II would incorporate the arrange-
ments on access and movement, the federal pres-
ence, the representation of West Berlin interests
abroad, and Soviet interest in West Berlin. It
would involve both commitments undertaken by
the four powers and agreements on implementa-
tion to be concluded among the German princ-
ipals. It was originally agreed that the last part
would in some manner link the four power agree-
ments to the supplementary agreements con-
cluded between the Germans, thus reaffirming the
supreme authority of the four powers for Berlin.
Despite the common acceptance of the three
part format, there are vast differences between
the two drafts. The Allied draft assigns the greater
weight to the four power commitments, while the
Soviet paper leaves the bulk of a Berlin agreement
to the inter-German talks. Thus, in the Soviet
draft, the final part of the agreement would make
no direct and binding link between the four
powers and the results of the inter-German nego-
tiations. This approach is meant to undermine the
position of the Three Powers.
In return, the Soviets have offered some
limited concessions of their own. They have of-
fered to accept West Germany's right to conduct
consular representation for West Berlin interests
abroad. They have also claimed a willingness to
support East German arrangements that would
permit "uninterrupted" access to West Berlin and
travel by West Berliners "to the GDR" (a phrase
which the Soviets use to include East Berlin).
The offer, however, falls short of the mini-
mum the West is seeking. The Soviets have not
indicated much give in their opposition to West
German political representation of West Berlin
abroad. This responsibility they would leave to
the three Western powers, which would "continue
to exercise their competence in matters concern-
ing relations between Berlin (West) and other
states." Nor have they been willing to spell out
the nature of the guarantees that would protect
the access routes and ensure the right of West
Special Report
Berliners to travel to East Berlin. These, they
insist, must be decided between Bonn and Pan-
kow, without "dictation" from the four powers.
The Soviets at times have sought to make
their offer more palatable by insisting that it is
the best they are willing to make. They have also
sought to make this point by reminding the West
of the preponderance of strength they enjoy in
the area. West German civilian access to Berlin has
been subjected to significant harassment for pe-
riods of up to six days on four occasions since the
beginning of the talks. Each incident was directed
against a West German political party conclave,
thus emphasizing Moscow's-and Pankow's-will-
ingness and ability to take unilateral action to
protest these alleged "provocations."
More recently, Moscow has exerted pressure
in regard to the question of foreign representa-
tion. The West German Embassy has been refused
access to a West Berliner arrested in March in the
USSR on criminal charges on the grounds that he
was not a West German citizen. In the past, Mos-
cow has tacitly accepted a West German role in
affairs of this kind, but now the Kremlin ob-
viously has an interest in convincing Bonn that it
has something to gain from the Soviet offer to
accept Bonn's role as consular representative for
West Berliners.
The Soviets have not been visibly deterred
by the limited degree of success their efforts have
had to date. While continuing to use the arena of
the four power talks-indeed, they occasionally
call for an intensified pace of the meetings-their
actions suggest they are still trying to shift the
negotiations to the inter-German forums. Thus,
Abrasimov has declined to commit himself
further on the question of access and freedom of
movement, but has instead pressed, if not for
prior, at least "parallel," negotiations between the
East and West Germans and the four powers.
Part of the Soviet purpose undoubtedly is to
promote strains between Bonn and the Western
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allies. Throughout the course of the negotiations,
the Soviets have coupled their tough stance in the
four power meetings to private suggestions that
progress could be made more quickly in bilateral
talks. All of the Allies-including the US-have
been the targets of such approaches, but the So-
viets have concentrated most heavily on the West
Germans.
The Soviets are aware that the political
credit of the Brandt government is heavily com-
mitted to its Ostpolitik and that it has far more at
stake in the success of the negotiations than any
of its Allies. Moscow has sought to play upon the
anxieties of the Brandt government by suggesting
that its Allies are responsible for the lack of
progress in the talks, and that left to their own
devices, they may succeed in ending all prospects
BERLIN
WERDER
J
EAST
Special Report
for an agreement. Bonn has informed the Allies
on several occasions of Soviet approaches of this
sort, and there may be other incidents unre-
ported.
It is quite likely, for example, that Soviet
officials have taken this tack in their private meet-
ings with Egon Bahr in West Berlin. These meet-
ings began last summer during the final stages of
the Soviet - West German negotiations and have
since continued intermittently. The Soviets have
usually been represented by Valentin Falin, now
the ambassador to West Germany, or Valeriy
Lednev, a journalist and German specialist.
Thus far these efforts would appear to have
had only limited effect. Last fall, when Moscow's
attempts to promote inter-German negotiations
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on access were at their height, the West Germans
indicated their willingness to talk with Pankow
under an "interim"-i.e., nonbinding-four power
commitment. Bahr's promise to discuss the
"model" of a transit agreement with Kohl also
suggested a willingness to skip the intermediary
stage of a four power commitment. Nevertheless,
despite these vacillations, Bonn has not broken
ranks with its allies. To some extent, Moscow's
maneuvers have even been detrimental, as they
have heightened suspicions of Soviet sincerity and
have produced counterpressures for Allied unity.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Soviets
regard their efforts as wasted. They are undoubt-
edly encouraged by the occasional evidence of
disagreement that erupts in the West. For ex-
ample, their estimate of the firmness of Bonn's
agreement with its allies in regard to the most
recent Soviet proposals must have been affected
by statements by Chancellor Brandt and other
West German officials indicating that they per-
ceived "positive" elements.
The West Germans are concerned, moreover,
that the Soviets are still trying to outflank the
Berlin negotiations. Having played out its own
hand in inner-German talks to no avail, Bonn has
interpreted the recent Soviet invitation to the
West to negotiate a reduction of armed forces in
Central Europe as yet another ploy to enhance
East German stature in the same sense as might a
Berlin agreement and a CES, which Bonn expects
to ensue. Bonn is therefore urging its allies not to
allow the Soviet proposal to distract them from
the Berlin negotiations and not to move more
rapidly on this front than in the Berlin talks.
The Pressure Upon Moscow
The Soviets are by no means free of pres-
sures similar to those that affect some of the
Western participants in the talks. Even though
Moscow undoubtedly is encouraged to persist in
its tough negotiating stance by occasional evi-
dence of disunity in the West, it cannot face the
prospect of a complete collapse of the negotia-
tions with any degree of equanimity. It has com-
mitted itself too strongly to a diplomacy of smiles
in Western Europe for that. The "detentist" cast
of party leader Brezhnev's remarks on Europe to
the 24th party congress in March indicates that
Moscow is still wedded to this course. If the
Berlin negotiations were to collapse, with the
Soviets saddled with the blame, many of Mos-
cow's would-be diplomatic interlocutors would
question Soviet sincerity. The aftermath probably
would carry over to affect the short-range pros-
pects for other Soviet initiatives and interests.
Despite frequent attacks on the concept, the
Soviets have had to recognize a de facto link
between a Berlin settlement and ratification of
the treaty. They are undoubtedly sophisticated
enough observers of the West German political
scene to appreciate that the failure of the Berlin
talks would immensely strengthen the arguments
of the West German opponents of the treaty.
Nevertheless, rather than succumbing to
these pressures, the Soviets until now have con-
centrated their energies on efforts to force the
West Germans into retreat on this point. Soviet
spokesmen have on occasion attempted to estab-
lish a reverse linkage. They have suggested that
the future development of relations between the
Soviet Union and the Federal Republic, and the
prospects for a Berlin settlement, are dependent
on West German ratification of the treaty.
Further, they have pointedly stressed the effect
on trade relations of any serious deterioration in
political relations between the two countries.
However, their efforts on this point have been no
more successful than those of the West Germans
to put similar pressures on the Kremlin.
The Existing Balance
Moscow's unwillingness to make substantive
concessions and its inability to extract major con-
cessions from the Western allies have combined to
retard progress toward an agreement. Recent pro-
cedural advances in the talks, such as the agree-
ment on 7 May to try to bridge the differences in
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the Allied and Soviet draft treaties, do not essen-
tially alter this stalemate. Indeed, they only con-
vert to a formal written procedure the more in-
formal oral debate that has formed the substance
of the four power meetings since the Allied draft
was delivered on 5 February.
What is necessary now to break the impasse
is not procedural consensus, but substantive
movement on Moscow's part. A Soviet decision to
improve the guarantees for civilian access, to fa-
cilitate movement within the city, and to mod-
erate the USSR's own requirements for a sever-
ance of all West German political links with the
city could readily provide the basis for an agree-
ment. But such decisions would be anything but
easy for Moscow. They would require a consid-
ered judgment that the prospective gains to be
produced by a Berlin agreement would outweigh
the prospective costs. On the one hand, Moscow
could expect that a Berlin agreement would pave
the way for rapid movement toward a CES, per-
haps a greater Soviet voice in the affairs of the
Western half of the European continent, and West
German ratification of the treaties with Warsaw
and Moscow. Over the longer term, Moscow could
hope that Berlin settlement and a CES would be
the beginning of the end for US influence in
Western Europe and that the basis would be laid
for a real rapprochement with Bonn that could
lead it to disengage from its alliance with Wash-
ington.
However, the possible costs are also of real
consequence. Above all, the Soviets must reckon
the effect of any major concessions upon the
stability of the regime in Pankow. From the point
of view of the East Germans and their sym-
pathizers in Moscow, the legitimization-however
restricted-of a West German political role in Ber-
lin would in effect substantiate Bonn's claim to
be the rightful successor of the historic Reich,
and thus pose a continuing challenge to the
legitimacy of the East German regime.
In addition, it must be assumed that any
leadership having the demonstrated caution of the
Soviet politburo will find it extremely difficult to
make immediate concessions for the sake of pros-
pective future gain. After all, the Soviets have no
assurance that any of their longer range hopes will
be fulfilled, while any guarantees extended now
would be difficult to undo at a later date.
The difficulty of coming to a major policy
decision on this question in Moscow is com-
pounded by the hydra-headed character of the
Soviet collective leadership. Certainly there is
ample evidence-albeit mostly circumstantial-to
suggest that not all the Soviet leaders are of one
mind concerning the present trend of Soviet pol-
icy toward Europe, and specifically toward Ger-
many and Berlin. General Secretary Brezhnev, for
example, who is clearly intent on claiming the
laurels for the successes that have already at-
tended Moscow's policies, has intimated that
there are those in the USSR who do not share his
views. In view of the conservative and orthodox
cast of the Soviet hierarchy, this is not surprising.
It is far from certain that Brezhnev-even with the
enhancement of his status at the 24th Congress-
has either the political strength or the inclination
to ride roughshod over strong opposition on an
issue of such sensitivity.
A decision to break off the talks completely
would be equally difficult for the Soviets. Mos-
cow would have to accept a certain, though prob-
ably not fatal, setback to its plans in Europe. As
suggested earlier, the ratification of the Soviet -
West German and Polish - West German treaties,
along with Moscow's hopes for the speedy con-
vocation of a CES, would be the most likely
casualties. In addition, an action of this kind
would require a reversal of the apparent existing
policy consensus in Moscow. On balance it is not
likely that Moscow would willfully turn its back
on a policy that still has some prospect of success.
In the near future, at least, it is more likely
that the Soviets will adopt an approach that falls
between these two extremes. It would be easiest
for them to follow the course of least resistance
and continue down their present path-i.e., to
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couple a substantively tough negotiating position
with patient efforts to exploit and aggravate dif-
ferences among the Allies. A continuation of this
policy would have the advantage of requiring no
politically difficult leadership decisions.
However, it would have the disadvantage of
possibly ensuring a continuation of the fruitless
results the negotiations have had for the past
several months. This could carry the danger that
the West would despair of Soviet sincerity in
seeking a negotiated agreement and turn away
from dealings with the East. The risk would be
particularly great in West Germany, where the
Soviets must bear in mind the possibility that the
failure of Ostpolitik could eventually lead to the
fall of the Brandt government and its replacement
by a more conservative and nationalistic regime,
hardly a prospect to Moscow's liking. The end
result of a protraction of the present stalemate,
from the Soviet point of view, might be little
different from a sudden break-up of the talks, and
equally disadvantageous to Soviet interests.
The Soviets have an additional alternative. In
the face of a possible acrimonious stalemate and
waning of West German interest in Ostpolitik,
they could opt to leave the larger issues aside and
grant certain limited improvements in access and
inner city movement in return for a moderate
reduction in the West German presence. This in
effect is what all sides originally agreed they were
seeking, but what they have been unable or un-
willing to separate from the broader juridical is-
sues.
Nevertheless, the basis for such a limited
agreement exists in large part. The West Germans
already have committed themselves to scale down
formally-but not to end-the range of their ac-
tivities in the city. The Soviets have repeatedly
hinted of willingness to improve the conditions of
inner city movement for West Berliners and to
extend "adequate" guarantees for access-but not
to throw open the border between East and West
Berlin or completely renounce Pankow's claimed
authority over access.
That grounds exist for an agreement, how-
ever, does not mean an agreement is near or even
likely. It is improbable that the Soviets have made
the positive political decision that is required for
an agreement of even limited scope to become a
reality. If this decision is made, it will be based on
a judgment that no other course is politically
feasible. This judgment will depend on Moscow's
assessment of the minimal negotiating require-
ments of the West and the unity and resolve of
the Western Allies to attain them, and on the
objective and subjective need that the Soviets feel
for "detente" with the West. This in turn is re-
lated to Moscow's assessment of the demands of
Soviet security in the broadest sense, and particu-
larly to the weight attached to Eastern Europe in
that context. However, the threats, challenges,
and opportunities that the Kremlin perceives are
not fixed, but rather reflect the changing circum-
stances of Moscow's relations with the outside
world. The imponderables in the situation make it
impossible to ascertain with any certainty when
or if the Soviets will feel called upon to revise
their approach to the four power talks, or what
their decision will be when it is taken.
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