WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008800020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 21, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/10/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08800020001-5
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
21 May 1971
No. 0371/71
copy N_
0053
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v.L:,'.J.i'...i. i .L
The Communists Drive on in South Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
No Shortage of Headaches in Cambodia .. . . . . . . . . . . 5
MBFR Issue Picks Up Momentum . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
UN Secretary General Race Is Wide Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Romania: Ceausescu Takes His Road Show East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Czechoslovak Communists Prepare for Party Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
East European Agriculture: Problems and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Poland Appeases the Consumer . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Norway: Government's Foreign Policy Program Endorsed . . . . . . . . . . . 13
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Egypt: The End of Collegial Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Saudi Monarch Begins Far Eastern Trip . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Pakistan: Unsettled Situation Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
India: Parliament to Convene for Hectic Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Turkey Introduces New Economic Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Brazil's New Look Toward Latin America .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Argentina: Lanusse and His Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Hondurans and Salvadorans Talk Peace, But Border Is Tense . . . . . . . . . . 23
Bolivia: Political Cauldron Bubbles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Uruguay: Political Attention Shifts to Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
NOTES: South Korea; Burma; Five-Power Defense;) (Netherlands; Zambia;
Ivory Coast - South Africa; Afghanistan
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FAR EAST
Indochina: The Pace Quickens
The Communists are again about to step up
military action in many parts of South Vietnam;
most of it probably will occur next week during
the dark of the moon. Extensive combatprepara-
tions have been under way for several weeks near
the central and eastern Demilitarized Zone and
many enemy units elsewhere are now set for the
next flurry.
village militia units and territorial security forces
are the main targets. Some Communist units in
the delta are planning shellings and light ground
probes.
The scope and magnitude of this round are
not expected to vary much from similar efforts in
March and April. Those consisted of shellings and
ground probes, coupled with an occasional heavy
attack on a remote outpost or refugee center.
Nevertheless, the effect of these relatively cheap
ventures is to erode the government's position in
the countryside, at least temporarily. South Viet-
namese control of the population, for example,
suffered in the provinces where the greatest
enemy effort took place earlier this year, espe-
cially in the northern half of the country.
Stung Treng, further internal distribution of sup-
plies may be under way via Route 13 south to
Kratie. The supplies now reaching Cambodia are
probably the result of the Communists' intensive
supply effort through the Tchepone area of Laos
last March.
...and by Sea into the Mekong Delta
Hanoi also seems to have stepped up the
pace of sea infiltration to southern South Viet-
nam to compensate for the loss of the Sihanouk-
ville supply route. Since 6 May, allied helicopters
have destroyed 17 sampans up to 40 feet long off
the coast of An Xuyen, South Vietnam's south-
ernmost province. Six of the sampans were off-
loading supplies near where a 500-ton North
Vietnamese infiltration trawler was sunk early last
month. Others were in the vicinity of the hulk of
a large trawler discovered in late March.
the ommunists are moving
larger quantities of vital supplies by sea. Some of
these movements may also represent transfers
within the country. A group that coordinated the
offloading and transportation of such supplies
between 1965 and 1967 was re-established last
summer
The Communists have increased their logistic
activity in northeastern Cambodia. Road and river
traffic carrying supplies-probably mostly am-
munition and some arms-for both Cambodia and
South Vietnam moves south from Laos to the
main Cambodian transshipment points, the towns
of Siem Pang, Stung Treng, and Kratie.
moderate to heavy
truck traffic has been observed on three roads
north and west of Siem Pang, and from there
south toward Stung Treng on Route 13. From
sub-
stantial quantities of supplies have been moved to
the northern delta provinces from points farther
south. Although such supplies could have been
sent from existing in-country stockpiles, it is
more likely that they represent successful infiltra-
tion by sea.
The precise origin and route of travel of
these supplies, except for those brought in by the 25X1
large trawlers that come directly from North Viet-
nam, are unknown. Some possibly are being sent
from stockpiles in southern Cambodia. Others
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could be delivered to outlying islands by larger
boats and then transferred to smaller sampans,
which are better able to get past South Vietnam-
ese coastal patrols and slip into secluded water-
ways for movement deeper into the delta.
Sober View of War in Northern Provinces
do not discount the real
progress that has been made in recent years in
pacifying such places as Quang Tri and Thua
Thien provinces, but the results of the South
Vietnamese campaign in Laos this spring, the
sharp increase in enemy attacks in the northern
region since then, and the continuation of US
troop withdrawals all seem to have impressed
upon them that great dangers still exist.
the Communists had not been able to
take advantage of the diversion of South Viet-
namese units into Laos this spring to attack the
province's populated districts.
when the ast
brigade is withdrawn from a ong the DMZ there
may be no quick-reaction force to counter the
[the gen-
eral population is not confident that South Viet-
namese forces can replace US troop
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a coordinated south Laos offensive. In a series of
sharp, well-executed attacks on 16 May, the
enemy forced the government to abandon a num-
ber of strategically located bases in the central
Bolovens Plateau. Among the positions lost were
Ban Houei Sai, which guarded the northern ap-
proaches to the plateau, and Paksong town in the
central plateau, the largest population center on
the Bolovens. On 19 May the Communists com-
pleted their sweep by forcing government defend-
ers out of Ban Houei Kong, the last remaining
government position on the plateau.
The Communists Drive on in South Laos
heavy machine guns, and numer-
ous signs of tracked vehicles, sugges that the
North Vietnamese are supporting the offensive
with armor. The precise strength of the North
Vietnamese forces in and around the Bolovens is
uncertain but probably totals about 5,000. The
9th Independent NVA Regiment is operating on
the plateau as are some six combat battalions
under the control of the 968th Front. In addi-
tion, at least some elements of the 1st Viet Cong
Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division have moved
into the area.
The government has mounted a limited
counteroffensive in the central Bolovens hoping
to divert the Communists' attention and slow any
further westward advances, as well as to buy time
for its own presently disorganized and demoral-
ized forces to form new defensive lines. Eight
battalions of irregulars-whose 1,200 men con-
stitute virtually the only organized government
force left on the plateau-are securing a base area
between Ban Houei Kong and Paksong. Two bat-
talions have moved westward toward Paksong;
four other battalions are assigned to retake high
ground positions northeast of Paksong; and two
more battalions will be held in reserve and will
provide rear guard security.
additio
th
r
I
n,
e gove
nment has established
The Communists have inflicted severe set- block
n
backs on government forces in what appears to be east of Pakse lad has organized a receiving Ostatmiles
ion
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VIETNAM
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SOU
Ban Koral
a
Bolovens
Plateau
flops
49 Government-held position *Communist-held position
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for refugees now streaming off the plateau and
headed for Pakse. Nervousness in Pakse itself is
also on the rise, and some prominent Lao civilians
are moving their families across the Mekong. The
US Embassy has evacuated all American de-
pendents in Pakse because of the potential threat
to the town, although the embassy believes that
an attack on Pakse is unlikely.
At the same time they were making sub-
stantial gains in the Bolovens area, the Commu-
nists were also pushing west on Route 9 farther
north in the panhandle. On 17 May they forced
government units out of Dong Hene and nearly
destroyed the town with a heavy mortar and
rocket attack. Government units attempting to
withdraw westward were subsequently ambushed
and lost most of their armor and artillery.
This is the farthest the Communists have
penetrated westward along Route 9 in large num-
bers and they are now in a position to threaten
the towns of Keng Kok, 20 miles to the south,
and Seno, 20 miles to the west. Communist pris-
oners and ralliers have said that Seno would be a
target if Dong Hene fell, and Communist forces
have already been sighted in the vicinity of Keng
Kok. Enemy forces in the area-elements of at
least three North Vietnamese regiments plus sup-
port units-are strong enough to permit the con-
tinuation of the offensive. If the Communists
follow past practice, however, they will undergo a
period of consolidation before undertaking major
new activity. Moreover, the rainy season is due to
begin in earnest in this area, and the Communists
may have second thoughts about extending their
supply lines much farther at this time. In any
event, it will probably be several days, or even
weeks, before North Vietnamese intentions be-
come clear.
A number of possible objectives are served
by the Communists' current offensive in south
Laos. Clearly, they want to tie down government
forces near major population centers along the
Mekong River and thus keep them from harassing
the western infiltration corridor during the rainy
season. The coincidence of the attacks with the
recent Communist cease-fire proposal indicates
that the southern offensive has political objectives
as well. Major territorial gains in the south would
clearly strengthen the Communists' position at
the bargaining table should Lao peace talks get
under way, and they would also increase pressure
on the government to negotiate on Communist
terms. The short-term effect, however, is likely to
be just the opposite. Prime Minister Souvanna will
probably respond negative) to the Communists'
peace proposal
No Shortage of Headaches in Cambodia
The new government is slowly settling down
to work and has not yet made any important
policy decisions. It is becoming clear, however,
that the regime intends to devote a good deal of
time and attention to finding ways to combat
inflation and price problems and to getting an
effective pacification program going in the coun-
tryside.
It is also clear that progress in meeting these
difficult problems is going to be slow. The much-
discussed pacification program, for example, has
already run into controversy. First Vice Premier
In Tam has been seeking to reorganize and rein-
force the national police, who are now under
military control, and bring them under his com-
mand in the Ministry of Interior. He has been
maintaining that a revitalized and independent
police force is a necessary element for the success
of his ambitious plans for expanding the govern-
ment's influence in the countryside. In Tam has
also let it be known that control over the police
was a precondition to his entry into the new
cabinet. Thus far, however, he appears to have
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run into fairly widespread suspicion that he is
trying to organize a "private army" for his own
political purposes.
The pacification program has also captured
the attention of another prominent political per-
sonality. Son Ngoc Thanh, who evidently still
views himself as a possible successor to Lon Nol,
has gone to Sirik Matak with a plan to organize a
pacification campaign to help prepare for the
elections the government hopes to hold after a
new constitution has been adopted.
Thanh has told US officials that under his
scheme he will tour extensively through the coun-
tryside as a missionary for the pacification effort.
This clearly would provide him with an excellent
opportunity to do some political proselyting on
his own behalf. Thanh has claimed that Matak has
agreed to this venture in principle, but stipulated
that the ministers concerned must also grant their
approval.
Another of the government's major projects,
the reduction of corruption in the ranks of the
military, apparently also faces serious problems.
Many Cambodian Army (FANK) enlisted men
reportedly are skeptical that Sirik Matak will
make any real headway in his cautious but appar-
ently determined effort w upt of-
ficers. FANK 25X1
soldiers claim that the ettort to cut army payroll
padding is not working well because the investi-
gating teams have no means of independently
determining the number of troops in a unit if it is
in the field.
The soldiers also complained that many of
the more corrupt officers are using their high-level
contacts to prevent charges being brought against
them. Many enlisted men apparently are con-
vinced that corruption can only be curbed by
replacing assimilated officers-those who pur-
chased commissions or were granted them
through political influence-and by the establish-
curacy of unit rosters
SOUTH KOREA: The government is assured of
retaining control of South Korea's unicameral
National Assembly in the 25 May elections. Be-
cause the Assembly will be enlarged from 175 to
204 members, attention is focused on whether
the opposition New Democratic Party can in-
crease the 45 seats it now holds. The New Demo-
crats probably can count on doing well in tradi-
tional opposition strongholds like Seoul and the
populous southwestern provinces. Their prospects
have been damaged, however, by public infighting
among the party's leaders over the selection of
candidates and the allocation of campaign funds.
In recent years Assembly elections have been
much dirtier than those for the presidency; but
the Pak regime this year seems bent on mini-
mizing public criticism. The issues in the cam-
paign have been largely the same as those in the
presidential election won by Pak last month, only
with greater emphasis on bread-and-butter issues.
Stumping the country on behalf of his party's
candidates, Pak says he must have a strong
government majority to preserve stability and to
ensure the continuing success of his economic
policies. The opposition is bearing down hard on
such well-worn issues as official corruption and
authoritarianism plus the administration's failure
to implement the constitution's s provision for
local self-government. 25X1
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51";UXEJ'
BURMA: Former prime minister U Nu's rebels
are making deeper penetrations into Burma from
their Thai bases and are showing a greater willing-
ness to engage the Burmese military. The rebels
have expressed satisfaction with a sharp skirmish
with Burmese army troops near Moulmein on 5
May, and have called for follow-up "victories."
Rebel propaganda and recruiting teams have
ranged through the remote border areas of eastern
Burma since the first of the year but previously
have tried generally to avoid military contact.
Although U Nu's 500-man exile force now
may feel ready to open the repeatedly postponed
military phase of its operations, its capabilities
remain extremely limited, and Nu's dream of "lib-
erating" Burma from the Ne Win regime still
appears fanciful. Nevertheless, sustained rebel
action around Moulmein, where resentment is still
strong over the regime's forceful repression of
student disturbances last November, could re-
kindle quiescent Burmese popular interest in U
25X1 Nu's resistance movement.
BAY
OF
AREA ,
OF MAP
t
ON
i Moulmelnn,
THAILAND
yawadi
Area of
rebel activity
,\BANGKOK*
FIVE-POWER DEFENSE: Preparations for the
implementation of the Five-Power Defense Ar-
rangement, consisting of Malaysia, Singapore,
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK continue to
limp along, as new problems keep cropping up.
The three Western members are still willing to
stand by their commitment to their small Asian
partners, although both the Australians and the
New Zealanders have complained about Singa-
pore's demands that they pay rent for facilities on
the island. The most serious conflict among the
powers remains that between Malaysia and Singa-
pore; Singapore is fearful that Malaysia's current
dickering with Communist China will promote
pro-Peking sentiments at home. Singapore's Prime
Minister Lee recently reminded his people that
they are Singaporeans first and Chinese second
and he recently cracked down on local news-
papers that the Singapore security service believes
are getting funds from Peking. Further problems
are bound to emerge and, if the Arrangement is
ever to get off the ground, it will take far more
cooperation and understanding among the par-
ticipants than exists at the present time.
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~iEURET
EU ROPE
MBFR Issue Picks Up Momentum
Recent top-level Soviet statements of inter-
est in mutual and balanced force reductions
(MBFR) have enhanced prospects for a more
extensive East-West dialogue on force reductions
in Central Europe. The Soviets' statements, aimed
at retaining the diplomatic initiative and at of-
fering evidence of their desire to reduce tensions
in Europe, have come close enough to NATO's
MBFR proposals to challenge the West to move
the dialogue further along.
Brezhnev, in a speech on 14 May that was
later seconded by Kosygin, stressed the Soviet
willingness to "start negotiations" on MBFR. In
both instances, however, the Soviets continued to
be reluctant to furnish substantive details and left
it up to the West to take practical steps toward
beginning such negotiations.
Following Brezhnev's speech, Ambassador
Beam met with Foreign Minister Gromyko in an
effort to obtain clarification of Soviet thinking on
MBFR. Gromyko kept his options open but he
did indicate a preference for negotiating on
MBFR independently of a conference on Euro-
pean security (CES). Although this emphasis
could be significant, the Warsaw Pact has never
specified any particular forum in which to discuss
MBFR. The Soviets do not want MBFR, like
Berlin, to develop into a precondition for CES.
Rather, they may wish to use MBFR as an in-
centive for parallel movement toward CES, with
its anticipated enhancement of Soviet prestige.
Gromyko confirmed that Moscow is pre-
pared to discuss reductions of either foreign or
foreign and indigenous forces, although he sug-
gested that there might be fewer complications if
foreign troops were considered first. Gromyko
also indicated that the "B" in MBFR might be a
future source of controversy. He said that the
word "balanced," which could imply larger re-
ductions in Warsaw Pact than in NATO forces,
put him "on guard."
There has been no official reaction from the
other pact members, but public media have gen-
erally supported Brezhnev's offer to negotiate.
Their failure, however, to explore the implica-
tions of MBFR suggests that the East Europeans
are hesitant to take a stand on issues involving the
superpowers. Most regimes there will clearly fol-
low the Soviet lead, seeing in MBFR a chance to
reduce their own defense burdens, as well as to
stimulate movement toward a CES and detente in
general.
The tenor of these recent Soviet initiatives
indicates that, over the short term, they are di-
rected toward the upcoming NATO ministerial
meeting in Lisbon. The Soviets have thus gained a
temporary diplomatic and propaganda advantage.
Beyond this, however, a favorable NATO re-
sponse will return the burden of the dialogue to
the Soviets' side and force them to clarify their
intentions on MBFR.
Most of the NATO permanent representa-
tives on 18 May agreed that in light of the pub-
licity given the recent Soviet comments and the
favorable US response, the organization cannot
afford to appear reluctant to follow up on what
has been a NATO initiative. Secretary General
Brosio described Moscow's belated response to
this initiative as a "moment of truth" for the
Alliance.
There was wide disagreement among the
representatives, however, on how the new Soviet
position should be treated in the ministerial com-
munique. Some allies, including the UK, called
for coordinated bilateral explorations with Mos-
cow. The Dutch representative, in advocating
multilateral explorations, argued, however, that
the bilateral approach would allow the Soviets to
exploit differences that might occur in statements
by the various Allies.
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A number of Allies see pitfalls in too rapid
an acceleration of the MBFR dialogue, par-
ticularly if the Soviets are now prepared to begin
multilateral talks without waiting for Western
consent to join in preparations for a CES. The
West Germans are especially concerned lest rapid
pursuit of MBFR reduce Western leverage in the
slow-moving four-power talks on Berlin. Although
the West Germans do not propose to make a
Berlin agreement a precondition for MBFR talks,
they would not want to see East German par-
ticipation in such talks prior to a successful reso-
lution of the Berlin issue. Bonn fears specifically
that East Germany's participation in early MBFR
talks would make it even less willing than now to
compromise on Berlin and on other inter-German
issues.
The Canadian representative, in an attempt
to get around Bonn's difficulties, has suggested
that NATO members appoint "a trusted member
of the Alliance" to explore MBFR with Moscow.
He argued that such explorations could be dressed
up to look like negotiations and that NATO could
be forthcoming in Lisbon without making any
firm commitments while, at the same time
deferring the problem of East Germany.
UN Secretary General Race Is Wide Open
Austria's UN delegate Kurt Waldheim met Moscow apparently favors another term for
earlier this week with Soviet Ambassador Malik to Thant because he is an acceptable, known quan-
pursue more vigorously his unannounced can- tity. The Soviet UN official in Geneva said that if
didacy to succeed U Thant as secretary general. Thant wants another term "he will et the back-
The Waldheim effort, delayed by his unsuccessful ing of Moscow."
campaign for the Austrian presidency, comes at a
time when his chief European rival, Finland's Max
Jakobson, appears to be losing ground.
Other potential suc-
cessors have yet to obtain even regional backing.
Waldheim, however, maintains that
Thant has been advised by his doctor not to serve
another term. Contradictory reports on Thant's
availability are likely to continue into the fall,
when the Security Council will recommend and
the General Assembl will elect a candidate for
the next term.
Romania: Ceausescu Takes His Road Show East
President Ceausescu will travel to Peking,
Hanoi, and Pyongyang, probably in early June.
Although he visited Communist China once be-
fore, this will be his first trip to the Orient as
party and state leader.
Ceausescu probably has considered for some
time paying a visit to his Chinese benefactors,
who extended a sizable, long-term credit to
Romania late last year. The trip may have been
arranged during the visit of one of the many
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Romanian delegations that has traveled to Peking
over the last year or so. Aside from the obvious
discussion of ways to continue improving bilateral
relations, the most important topics will concern
mutual relations with the US and the USSR. The
Chinese have long given stout moral support-and
are now beginning to add tangible aid-to Bucha-
rest's efforts to maintain political and economic
independence from Moscow.
The Romanians are fully aware that Ceau-
sescu's somewhat flamboyant excursion to the
Far East will antagonize the Soviets but they
apparently are not overly concerned.
Czechoslovak Communists Prepare for Party Congress
The 14th party congress opening on 25 May
shapes up as a victory celebration to mark "con-
solidation" of the country's return to orthodox
Communism and the destruction of all liberal and
democratic institutions created in 1968. The con-
gress will also ratify the policies of party first
secretary Husak and his administration. On the
ideological front, the congress will cap the re-
gime's year-long campaign to replace the heretical
ideas of the Dubcek era with the traditional
philosophy of the use of power according to
Soviet tenets.
The delegates are expected to endorse the
strict, though relatively moderate, course that
Husak has set for his country's future, and the
congress will re-establish Czechoslovakia interna-
tionally as a total subordinate of the Soviet
Union. Husak will emerge as the recognized head
of the party, but the congress is likely to reaffirm
that his pre-eminence has been earned at the cost
of fundamental policy compromises with his con-
servative colleagues on the presidium. Husak will
be personally applauded for his role in stabilizing
the country, but his status is not expected to rise
above primus inter pares. Nor will he be able to
bring under complete control the conservative
faction that dogs his steps looking for weaknesses
that it can utilize to enhance its own power
position.
The proceedings of the subordinate Slovak
party congress last week strengthen the view that
no major leadership or policy changes will occur
during the Czechoslovak party session. Slovak
party boss Lenart's endorsement of the first secre-
tary virtually commits his party to give full sup-
port to fellow-Slovak Husak. This is a major
achievement because in the process of becoming
national party chief Husak alienated many in his
old power base in Slovakia. Husak's own per-
formance at the Slovak congress indicates that he
has settled his major differences with his native
constituency. The first secretary's whittling away
at Slovak autonomy under the federal system has
been a particularly troublesome issue.
The congress may be more objective in deal-
ing with Czechoslovakia's future than with its
past. The draft of the 1971-75 economic plan
accurately portrays the sluggish state of the
economy and deals forthrightly with specific ills
such as the inadequate labor force and irrational
investment programs. Both consumer-oriented
and CEMA "integration" interests are well repre-
sented in the plan, which is clearly aimed at
ensuring public tranquility as well as continued
good relations with Czechoslovakia's Warsaw Pact
allies. The plan falls short, however, of providing
an imaginative program that would substantially
improve the lethargic economy. The plan will
probably receive unanimous approval, testifying
to the lack of expertise, or political courage, of
the party's planners. 25X1
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East European Agriculture: Problems and Prospects
Unfavorable agricultural results throughout
Eastern Europe last year jeopardized plans of
most countries to reduce agricultural imports and
to increase supplies of domestic fodder in order
to boost livestock production. Instead, they have
been forced to allocate more scarce foreign ex-
change for importing grain, other fodder, and
meat.
East European net agricultural production
declined for the third consecutive year in 1970.
The most significant shortfall was an 11-percent
drop in total grain output. There was some im-
provement in the region's total production of the
more important row crops-potatoes, sugar beets,
vegetables, and oilseeds-over the bad year of
1969. Excellent harvests of green fodder and lush
fall pastures were the brightest feature of crop
production in all the countries.
Improved production of poultry and eggs
was the major achievement of the livestock sector
in 1970. No significant change occurred in milk
production, however, and meat production ex-
cept poultry declined for the second consecutive
year.
As unsatisfied demands for livestock prod-
ucts continue to grow with higher incomes, the
regimes have assigned number-one priority to
boosting livestock production in 1971-75. Never-
theless, the northern countries and Hungary are
continuing to maintain a high level of meat im-
ports during the first half of the year and little
improvement can be expected much before late
1971.
The combination of the 1.1-percent drop in
the 1970 grain harvest and government moves to
increase meat production will push East European
grain imports to an estimated record 9.2 million
tons in the present fiscal year, which ends in
June. This represents a 30-percent increase over
last year. Record Polish imports will account for
almost one third of the region's total. Soviet grain
will constitute 42 percent of total imports, but
free world grain imports-45 percent of which are
to be from the US-also will be slightly higher. In
addition to grain, most East European countries
have expanded their imports of oilseed cake and
meal to meet the demands for more and better
high-protein feed mixes. This, too, has benefited
the US; imports of these two commodities
doubled in 1970.
Current prospects for 1971 indicate a sub-
stantial improvement in the output of winter
grains over last year. If sustained, a good grain
harvest will reduce import demand, especially for
wheat, but requirements for feed grains will re-
main strong in 1972. US exports to the region
may fall by at least one third in fiscal 1972,
largely because of an expected cutback in wheat
exports to Romania. Demand for US soybean
meal, however, is expected to continue strong in
the coming year.
Poland Appeases the Consumer
Foremost among current Polish economic
problems is consumer dissatisfaction. During the
past few months the leadership has modified its
economic policies and plans to bring about an
improvement in living standards.
National income, consumption, and wages in
the new 1971 economic plan are all slated to
grow more than originally planned. Imports are to
be increased by $250 million, a move made pos-
sible in part by Soviet credits. Most of this in-
crease will be in meat and consumer goods. This
same trend is expected to be reflected in the final
version of the 1972-75 plan, which is to be dis-
cussed at a party plenum next month.
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The regime has made additional concessions
to city dwellers since December. These include
increases in wages and social allowances for
low-income groups, planned construction of
additional housing, and a rollback of food prices
to their pre-December levels. The draft of the new
labor code, which updates labor practices and
standardizes labor relations, appears to increase
protection of workers' rights.
A number of recommendations adopted at
the ninth party plenum last month were cal-
culated to improve conditions for the farmer.
Prices paid for some farm products were increased
and items for improving production such as feed
and fertilizer were reduced in price. Investments
in agriculture are slated to rise. Next January the
unpopular statute requiring compulsory delivery
to the state of grain, slaughter animals, and
potatoes by private farmers will be abolished and
replaced, at least in part, by increased rural land
taxes. The regime hopes that these moves will
stimulate livestock production, but a significant
improvement cannot be expected before late
1971 or early 1972.
These concessions are expected to add over
eight percent to consumer income this year. Steps
are being taken to stimulate production of addi-
tional goods and services to absorb this purchas-
ing power. Investment outlays in industries con-
cerned with consumer goods have been increased,
and other moves to accelerate their production
are promised. Increased imports of food and con-
sumer goods as well as utilization of some com-
modities in reserve stocks will also make addi-
tional supplies available. Meanwhile, the govern-
ment is trying to dampen pressures for new wage
increases until more marketable goods can be pro-
vided.
seeks to improve their lot.
Although these reforms have not been in ef-
fect long enough to produce significant results,
they probably have brought some temporary im-
provement in the standard of living of the lowest
paid Polish workers. Moreover, party chief Gierek
seems intent on providing over the long run for
increased consumption at the expense of indus-
trial growth. He has warned the populace, how-
ever, that dramatic improvements should not be
expected in the next few months. The Polish peo-
ple, in turn, seem to recognize that their best in-
terests require a period of patience while Gierek
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Norway: Government's Foreign Policy Program Endorsed
Prime Minister Bratteli's government gained
an overwhelming endorsement of its foreign pol-
icy program from his Labor Party at a congress
held last week. The size of the vote demonstrates
the basic strength of the two-month-old minority
regime.
The greatest debate was prompted by the
government's decision to continue negotiations
for membership in the European Communities
(EC). Although opposition within the party was
greater than the leadership anticipated, the con-
gress delegates voted by a three-to-one ratio in
favor of Bratteli's policy. The congress also sup-
ported the government's decision to hold a na-
tional referendum on the question of EC member-
ship before parliament makes a final decision.
The prime minister's insistence that Nor-
way's security policy is firmly based on member-
ship in NATO and his reluctance to undermine
West Germany's Ostpolitik were also supported
by an overwhelming majority of delegates, who
soundly defeated resolutions calling for with-
drawal from NATO and recognition of East
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the convening of a conference on European
security, but adhered to the government's reserva-
tion that a satisfactory outcome of the Berlin
talks would have to precede multilateral prepara-
tions for such a conference.
The smooth progress of the Labor Party
congress is a great success for Bratteli, particularly
its support of his stand on the EC issue. He will
probably use the mandate on membership negoti-
ations to keep reluctant Labor legislators in line
when parliament debates EC entry later this
month. 25X1
to the prolabor wings of the confessional parties.
On 15 May, the Queen entrusted Professor
Steenkamp, the intellectual mentor of the Catho-
lic Party, with the task of reconciling the differ-
ences, especially over economic policy, in the
respective party platforms, but he is skeptical that
a compromise can be found. Many observers be-
lieve he will be only the first in a series of indi-
viduals attempting cabinet formation.
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Germany. The congress placed the government on
notice, however, that special efforts would have
to be made in NATO and other international
organizations to restore democracy to Greece and
Portugal,to end the latter's colonial policy, and to
bring arms deliveries to both countries to an end.
The congress also went on record in favor of
improved trade relations and closer nongovern-
mental ties with East Germany.
The government's moves toward eventual
recognition of North Vietnam were met with
general satisfaction, and no demands for speedier
action were made. The congress also supported
NETHERLANDS: The lower house failed to
select a government formateur on 12 May, thus
foreshadowing a lengthy period of negotiation
before a new government is formed. The govern-
ing four-party coalition composed of the three
confessional parties and the Liberal Party has
been bargaining with a right-wing socialist party-
the Democratic Socialist '70-but the latter's pro-
gram of strict governmental austerity is anathema
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Egypt: The End of Collegial Rule
President Sadat's sweeping disposal of his
major critics and potential rivals last week marks
the end of collegial rule in post-Nasir Egypt and
secures Sadat's personal control over the coun-
try's affairs.
Although many of the details of the up-
heaval are still unclear, the ouster of several
powerful figures appears to be mainly a result of
Sadat's determination to establish himself as
master of his own house. In taking his case to the
people on 14 May, Sadat portrayed the dismissal
plot.
The ouster of Interior Minister Goma and
Minister for Presidential Affairs Sharaf had been
augured by rumors circulating in government cir-
cles, as a result of the dismissal of Vice President
Ali Sabri on 2 May.
An intensifying conflict between Sadat and
his detractors over the past few months came to a
head in late April over the question of Egypt's
accession to the Federation of Arab Republics
(FAR). A confrontation during meetings of the
Arab Socialist Union (ASU) executive and central
committees clearly exposed the breadth and bold-
ness of Sadat's opposition, led by Sabri but also
including the powerful Goma and the ASU top
leadership.
Sadat's critics' intemperate questioning of
his right to decide on the timing and the condi-
tions for Egypt's entry into the FAR provided
him the opportunity to act. He was aware that if
he retreated on this issue, he could probably
expect concerted attacks from his opponents on
the far more important questions of his efforts to
achieve a peaceful settlement with Israel and of
his tentative steps toward rapprochement with
the US.
It seems plausible that Sadat used Sabri's
dismissal to test official and popular reaction to a
more comprehensive purge. When Sabri's sacking
proved to be widely popular, Sadat probably felt
he could safe) complete his housecleaning of the
government.
The boldness with which Sadat reasserted his
authority indicates a high degree of confidence in
his ability to make the changes stick. In this he
appears to have been encouraged by the favorable
response to his cultivation of the major military
commanders, whose support is crucial to his re-
tention of power. Naming his followers to head
the security services re-establishes his personal
control over the power centers that were Goma's
and Sharaf's domains and are second in impor-
tance only to the armed forces.
If Sadat is successful over the long term in
consolidating his power-which now seems
likely-his hand may be strengthened to pursue
his policies without hindrance. Despite the fact
that his main antagonists have been jailed, how-
ever, it is by no means certain that his opposition
has been permanently neutralized. To a large ex-
tent, therefore, Sadat's ability to maintain his
position in the shorter run will hinge on whether
he can demonstrate tangible progress toward
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25X1
25X1
The extent to which the Soviets have really
been hurt is still not clear, probably not even to
the Soviets. There is no evidence to suggest that
Moscow encouraged Sabri and company to chal-
lenge Sadat. Moscow, in fact, would probably
have taken issue with Sabri's opposition to the
Arab federation as well as to Sadat's efforts to
achieve a peaceful settlement. Moscow has ex- 25X1
perienced "setbacks" before in Cairo and prob-
ably believes it would be imprudent now to react
until the situation has sorted itself out.
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regaining Egypt's lost territory on terms that do
not inflict unacceptable damage to Egyptian
dignity and do not open him to telling criticism
from his domestic opponents and his Arab allies.
The USSR is maintaining a low profile in
regard to the recent changes in Cairo. Soviet
media are beginning to give a better picture of the
recent political upheavals in Cairo, although there
still has been no mention of Sadat's allegation of
coup plotting. There has been no independent
Soviet commentary either, although al-Ahram
quotes a "responsible official source in Moscow"
as saying the USSR considers the changes in Cairo
"an internal matter."
Private Soviet commentary, is somewhat
more revealing. It also suggests that the USSR is
not inclined to overreact, but in addition it be-
trays genuine concern about the implications for
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Saudi Monarch Begins Far Eastern Trip
King Faysal on 16 May embarked on one of
his infrequent, good-will journeys abroad, which
is expected to extend into the latter part of May
at least. After meeting with the Shah of Iran at
the airport in Tehran, the King flew to Taiwan
before going on to Japan and the US.
As a major exporter of crude oil to the Far
East, Saudi Arabia believes that closer bonds of
friendship should be encouraged with pro-
Western, politically moderate, oriental nations.
Nationalist China welcomes such visits as proof of
its claim that it enjoys world-wide support, and
Japan possesses large investments in the oil
industry of Saudi Arabia. A globe-circling voyage
might also afford Faysal a chance to pay a short
visit to Washington at a time when good relations
with the US are gaining favor in the Arab states.
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ZAMBIA: The general conference of the ruling
United National Independence Party (UNIP) that
met last week resulted in decisions that strength-
ened President Kaunda's hand in controlling party
factionalism. Party unity has been seriously
strained by tribal-oriented politicking ever since
free elections were held for the UNIP central
committee in 1967. To curb this tribalism, the
conference ratified a new party constitution re-
quiring party leaders to support a balanced "of-
ficial" slate of candidates. This requirement is
designed to ensure that all major party factions
are represented within the UNIP leadership.
UNIP leaders later agreed on a slate of 21
central committee nominees, representing all
important factions; all were elected by the con-
ferees without opposition.
IVORY COAST - SOUTH AFRICA: Ivory Coast
President Houphouet-Boigny failed last weekend
to get strong backing for his call for an African
dialogue with South Africa from his partners in
the Council of the Entente, a grouping of five
moderate, French-speaking West African states. A
communique, issued by the Entente following a
two-day summit meeting in Upper Volta, con-
fined itself solely to economic and social matters.
During the meeting several hundred Voltan stu-
dents demonstrated against Houphouet and his
policies. In responding to questions from the
press, Niger President Diori-the current president
of the Entente and Houphouet's closest ally
within it-avoided any endorsement of Houphou- 25X1
et's initiative, but he left the way open so that
Houphouet could bring the issue up at the OAU
AFGHANISTAN: Prime Minister Etemadi and
his cabinet resigned on 16 May in the face of
growing dissatisfaction in Parliament with their
generally weak performance. Etemadi-led govern-
ments have held office since late 1967. Dr. Abdul
Zahir, a prominent politician and diplomat who is
a close friend of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, is
Etemadi's probable replacement. The King, how-
ever, will remain the dominant force, and the new
government in all likelihood will continue the
country's cautiously reformist domestic program
as well as its nonaligned international pos-
ture. 25X1
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Pakistan: Unsettled Situation Continues
Government troops have continued to con-
solidate their control of East Pakistan, but Ben-
gali nationalists appear to be resorting to guerrilla
warfare. Previously, most of the Bengali military
effort has gone into futile efforts to hold territory
against the much stronger army. In the most
significant operation so far, the Bengalis captured
a river steamer along with its 300 passengers, and
eight barges carrying about $400,000 worth of
jute. Bengali forces are also able to prevent the
regular use of roads and railways in some parts of
the province, especially along its eastern border
with India. A few progovernment East Pakistanis
have been assassinated, and there have been a
small number of bombings in Dacca.
officials say they fear the number could even-
tually reach 10 million. An increasingly large pro-
portion are Hindus-possibly 80 percent of those
arriving in recent days-raising speculation that
Pakistani authorities are deliberately driving out
East Pakistan's large Hindu minority. India's relief
capabilities are badly strained; substantial UN aid
for the refugees seems assured, although New
Delhi regards the proffered amount as inadequate.
Despite the acceptance of Swiss good offices
by both New Delhi and Islamabad, the problem
of repatriating the diplomats in Dacca and Cal-
cutta has not been solved. The two countries con-
tinued to trade charges in the UN Economic and
Social Council, but that body does not appear
likely to take any action. India has again sounded
out the US on taking the East Pakistani issue to
the Security Council, claiming the refugee influx
undermines international peace and security.
There has been some economic recovery in
East Pakistan, but jute mills are operating at only
about ten percent of capacity, ports are still func-
tioning far below their normal level, and road,
rail, and water transport has been only partially
restored.
Pakistani officials estimate that two million
tons of food will be required for East Pakistan
during the next fiscal year beginning in July.
They claim sufficient food is now available in
East Pakistan for the next few months but that
they need coastal ships and barges to distribute it.
Pakistan has indicated that it will accept an inter-
national relief effort, but the amount of interna-
tional supervision that Islamabad will accept has
India: Parliament to Convene for Hectic Session
The new parliamentary session, which con-
venes on 24 May for approximately two and a
half months, promises to be busy, bombastic, and
bellicose.
Prime Minister Gandhi enters the session
strengthened by her triumph in national elections
last March, by a well-managed cabinet reorganiza-
tion this month, and by the toppling of the rival
Organization Congress Party from power
Gujarat State, its last remaining stronghold.
Although Mrs. Gandhi's Ruling Congress
Party has a strong majority in parliament, all will
not be smooth sailing. The situation in East Paki-
stan will be up for discussion and "young Turks"
in her own party as well as opposition politicians
eager to discredit her will denounce the
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government's cautious policy toward Bangla
Desh. The refugee problem-over three million
refugees by Indian count have entered India since
fighting began in East Pakistan on 25 March-will
be a particularly emotional issue. India is ill pre-
pared to handle the influx, and some legislators
may urge Mrs. Gandhi to "carve out" a refugee
sanctuary within East Pakistan if the flow does
not cease soon. The Indians have already warned
US officials in New Delhi that India is prepared to
take unspecified "unilateral action" to stem the
flow of refugees. The Bengali cause is a popular
one and if the "hawkish" voices are loud enough,
and the refugee flow continues unabated Mrs.
Gandhi could feel forced to make some gesture-
short of recognizing Bangla Desh-to accommo-
date the critics.
Earlier this month President Giri issued a
tough national security ordinance-designed pri-
marily to deal with refugees suspected of being
Pakistani agents-that empowers the government
to detain individuals for specified periods without
trial. Although Mrs. Gandhi may be able to avoid
presenting the measure to parliament for ap-
proval, opposition groups who fear, with some
justification, that she may use the ordinance
against them may attempt to use the par-
liamentary forum to castigate the government for
its "undemocratic" action.
At the same time she is coping with the
problems raised by the Pakistani situation, the
prime minister will be attempting to pass legisla-
tion implementing her promised "progressive"
program. Last year the Supreme Court voided a
government decree divesting India's former
princely rulers of their constitutionally guar-
anteed stipends and privileges, and Mrs. Gandhi
may again present legislation to put the politically
popular measure into effect. In addition to dis-
cussing the budget and presenting several adminis-
trative reforms, bills to formalize last week's de-
cree nationalizing general insurance companies as
well as one to do away with the constitutionally
guaranteed privileges enjoyed by members of the
Indian civil service are being readied. The service
was established by the British before independ-
ence, and many Indians have long considered the
VIP treatment accorded its members a hangover
from colonial times. None of these "showpiece"
measures is expected to give the government
much trouble because their economic impact will
not be great and because they will affect a rela-
tively small number of people with little real
political power.
Turkey Introduces New Economic Program
The new government that took the reins of
power two months ago under threat of military
take-over is giving high priority to its economic
reform program. According to government
spokesmen, the reforms will redress economic
shortcomings, especially those neglected by the
Demirel government.
The program covers several broad areas of
policy that affect agriculture, cooperatives, state
economic enterprises, and taxes. Emphasis is be-
ing placed on a bureaucratic reorganization,
which the government hopes will generate greater
efficiency in dealing with economic problems.
Moreover, Prime Minister Erim plans to reduce
the size of land holdings in the eastern and south-
eastern parts of Turkey and to spread tax collec-
tions over a broader base-especially in the agri-
cultural sector, which has borne only a nominal
tax burden. Ankara will exert greater control over
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the agricultural cooperatives, and it will try to
streamline the State Economic Enterprises
(SEEs), which produce about 50 percent of Tur-
key's industrial output.
The reform program will undoubtedly meet
with staunch resistance from well-entrenched in-
terest groups. Agricultural interests will strongly
oppose the government's efforts at land reform,
and wider tax levy will be very unpopular. The
SEEs are greatly overstaffed and many employees
are unsuited for their jobs. Their reorganization
has been on the agenda of various governments
throughout the 1960s, and two laws passed in
1964. designed to control them have not been
implemented.
The Erim program could well result in
changes of form only, unless the government,
with military backing, is able to override political
pressures and attack the protectionist trade
policies that have been largely responsible for the
inefficiency of industry. This will not be easily
accomplished in the face of Turkey's long history
of introspection and xenophobia.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Brazil's New Look Toward Latin America
Foreign Minister Gibson has launched an am- One of Gibson's additional aims is to isolate
bitious program to strengthen Brazil's ties with Chile from other Latin American nations.
other Latin American countries. To this end he is
carrying out an unprecedented schedule of visits
to several South American nations and most of
Central America and is inviting many other for-
eign ministers to come to Brasilia. F
One major goal is to give these governments
a better understanding of the Medici administra-
tion's long-range political and economic objec-
tives, and thus to soften its image as an authori-
tarian, military regime. Gibson also hopes to ex-
plain Brazil's opposition to seeking solutions to
some Latin American problems through the tradi-
tional mechanisms of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, a forum in which Brazil has recently
met some defeats. He is particularly interested in
getting other countries to unite behind the
200-mile territorial waters claim in preparation
for the world-wide Law of the Sea conference
scheduled for 1973. The foreign minister also
hopes to organize and articulate a unified Latin
American position that might alter US policies on
reducing foreign aid and on increasing protection-
ism.
Gibson
apes t at the Marxist trend in Chile will prompt
the US to react-as it did after the socialization of
Cuba under Fidel Castro-by giving massive aid to
Latin America.
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Argentina: Lanusse and His Problems
President Lanusse has frustrated, at least
temporarily, the plans of his major adversaries in
the army by forcing the retirement of seven colo-
nels and disciplining three others. A large body of
opposition to Lanusse and his policies remains,
however, and the President will face many more
problems in implementing his plans for political
reform and the eventual return to elected gov-
ernment.
Lanusse moved quickly against the leaders of
the so-called "colonels' movement" that was plot-
ting against the government when the recent abor-
tive military uprising in Tucuman Province pro-
vided him with a pretext. The Tucuman incident
and the activities of retired General Labanca
apparently caught the plotting field-grade officers
in the Buenos Aires area unprepared, and the
President took the opportunity to pick off the
leaders of the movement one by one.
Lanusse retained the support of all the top
army generals and most of the major troop com-
manders in putting down the younger challengers
to his authority, but the cohesion of the army has
been severely strained. There is no consensus on
what approach should be taken to deal with
Argentina's pressing political and economic prob-
lems, so no matter what Lanusse does, he will
offend one segment or another. To many, par-
ticularly the younger officers, Lanusse is closely
identified with the failures of the military govern-
ment since it seized power in 1966. He is seen as
continuing many of the same policies that cost
President Ongania and then President Levingston
first their prestige and finally their jobs.
Recognizing the danger of just such a break-
down in military unity, Lanusse long has believed
that the armed forces must detach themselves
from direct involvement in government. He real-
izes, however, that the military's disengagement
must be orderly and that a framework for gov-
erning that has some chance of achieving stability
must first be established. Some observers doubt
that this can be done in the three years Lanusse
allotted to the process when he took personal
control of the government last March.
The political plan detailing how the govern-
ment will be returned to civilian control will not
be released for a few months, but the basic plan
includes integrating Peronism-without Peron-
into the political system and bringing new and
younger leadership to the fore to replace the old
politicians who have been discredited by many
failures in the past. As a start, the government has
initiated discussions with Peronist leaders and is
allowing considerable freedom of political action
by activists of all stripes.
In carrying out this plan, Lanusse is stirring
the fears of staunch anti-Peronists in the military
who foresee their archenemy returning to power.
He also is threatened by the rising tide of Ar-
gentine nationalism, the adherents of which
believe that only an authoritarian, military gov-
ernment can carry out a nationalistic revolution
similar to that currently in process in Peru.
Lanusse has earned the enmity of the po-
litical extremes, both civilian and military and on
both ends of the political spectrum. He has
sought to pre-empt some of his political op-
ponents by advocating some nationalistic
economic policies, but these policies are creating
economic problems that will soon begin to hurt
him politically. Thus, the President has won the
first round by breaking up the plots against him,
but he can expect more-and probably more
serious-trouble, particularly if the fragmented
opposition can rally around one leader or coalesce
on a particular issue.
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Hondurans and Salvadorans Talk Peace, But Border Is Tense
Although formal peace talks between El
Salvador and Honduras opened this week in a less
than auspicious atmosphere, the fact that secret
negotiation is taking place provides a basis for
hope, albeit slim, that some minimal progress
toward normal relations can occur. The greatest
danger appears to lie in the increasing potential
for a serious clash on the border, where some
provocative military situations have built up in
recent weeks.
General pessimism surrounds the bilateral
working group meetings, which were inaugurated
on 19 May as arranged at last month's OAS con-
ferences, but even the least optimistic officials
believe that some positive movement is possible
from ongoing confidential talks arranged by the
Costa Ricans. These talks may lay the ground-
work for progress after Honduran president-elect
Cruz is installed next month.
Incumbent President Lopez has made clear
that he does not intend to work at paving the way
for a peace settlement with El Salvador but in-
stead is promoting a propaganda barrage to create
public hostility toward it. The Salvadorans are
being blamed for the poisoning of a presidential
guard unit in Marcala, where 38 soldiers died
from pesticides apparently introduced into food
as a result of sloppy barracks conditions. Also, to
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divert attention from its inaction in the face of
grave damage done by a series of forest fires over
the past two months, the Honduran Government
inspired the fiction that fifth column Salvadorans
out to destroy Honduras' economy were respon-
sible.
Border activity has also heightened tensions,
particularly in the Arcatao-Mapulaca region of
the undefined frontier, where there are almost
daily exchanges of fire. OAS observers have con-
firmed Salvadoran complaints that Hondurans
have increased forces in several areas, terrorized
Bolivia: Political Cauldron Bubbles
Disjointed opposition activity could soon
develop into a challenge to President Torres.
Related political developments also portend
trouble for Torres. Long-standing animosity to
ward the MNR by high-ranking officers has been
reduced by assurances that the military will be
preserved and strengthened "when the MNR re-
turns to power. In addition, anti-Torres senti-
ment among younger army and air force officers
is increasing
The coalescing anti-Torres movement, never-
theless, will be hard pressed to come up with a
realistic plan for taking power immediately; the
and deterred Salvadoran campesinos from spring
planting, and looted and burned homes. The Sal-
vadoran chief of staff, claiming that the OAS
observers are ignoring Honduran violations of the
border pacification agreement, now has rein-
forced his side with additional men and stronger
weapons. The OAS observers, who are down to
ten and due to phase out entirely by the end of
July, have expressed concern that, because the
commanders and junior officers on both sides are
eager and volatile the situa 'on is extremely dan-
gerou s.
conviction that united action is essential seems to
be taking hold, but the level of trust among
opposition factions is low. Organization and pre-
paredness, however, are not necessarily prerequi-
sites for action in Bolivia. Torres previously has
moved to neutralize threats to his position in
their formative stages, and he has proven himself
adept at keeping plotters off balance. Even so, the
President is aware that an ill-conceived pre-
emptive move might trigger an impulsive coup
attempt and precipitate a chain of events beyond
his control.
Torres realizes that he has little active sup-
port from any organized sector of Bolivian so-
ciety and that his regime has survived mainly
because of inaction by others rather than because
of his own political strength. An attempt to cre-
ate a base of political support in the hinterlands
fell apart last week when worker and student
groups in Santa Cruz refused to join a govern-
ment-sponsored "Popular Revolutionary Alli-
ance." The President may have to accede to leftist
demands for "revolutionary" action such as the
expulsion of the Peace Corps, currently under
fierce attack, if he hopes to secure a commitment
from the " o ular forces" for the defense of his
regime.
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Uruguay: Political Attention Shifts to Elections
Political activity now is focusing on the pres-
idential election scheduled for the last Sunday in
November. This contest gives early promise of
being one of the most complicated and critical in
recent decades.
President Pacheco is constitutionally barred
from a second term, but his backers have been
actively seeking support for a constitutional
amendment to be placed on the ballot in Novem-
ber. The President touched off a flurry of politi-
cal comment early this month when he broke his
political silence on the election issue to hint at his
support of a unity slate from the two major
parties. Pacheco's comments were welcomed by
his supporters as the opening move in a re-elec-
tion bid and condemned by other presidential
aspirants as an effort to perpetuate an inept
administration. Proposed constitutional amend-
ments require 150,000 signatures to be placed on
the ballot, and Pacheco's supporters are reported
to have more than 400,000 on their petition. As
in 1966, when Uruguayans approved a change
from a multiple to a single executive system, this
would result in two simultaneous elections. For
example, Vice President Abdala is a declared
presidential candidate, but he also expects to be
entered as a vice-presidential nominee with
Pacheco on a re-election ticket.
Although several other presidential candi-
dates have emerged in recent weeks, the situation
remains extremely fluid. Months of political
bargaining lie ahead, because the lists of candi-
dates and coalitions do not have to be finalized
until 20 days before the elections. Uruguay's
involved electoral system, which combines both a
primary and general election and allows factions
within the same party to run different slates of
candidates, further complicates the situation. In
1966, there were more than1,300 different lists of
candidates for national and departmental offices.
Challenging the traditional two-party system
this year is the new Frente Amplio, a coalition of
leftists, Communists, and dissidents from the
major parties. It opened its campaign in March,
well ahead of the Colorado and Blanco parties,
and has attracted widespread publicity. Vice
President Abdala and others remain confident,
however, that the political machines of the two
major parties will smother the Frente effort.
Uruguay's unprecedented terrorism is a
product of the Tupamaro organization-a group
over which the Soviets have no control and which
is ideologically opposed to the Moscow line-and
the Pacheco administration's inability to control
it has become a major issue. Countermeasures to
date offer little prospect of significantly curtailing
guerrilla activity in the months ahead.On 14 May,
the Tupamaros carried out their eleventh kid-
naping since 1968, seizing a former minister of
agriculture after an unsuccessful attempt against
an industrialist the same day. The Tupamaros
now hold four hostages, including the British
ambassador kidnaped in early January, and have
given no terms for their release.
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