WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008800010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08800010001-6
I-WW Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
14 May 1971
No. 0370/71
Copy N2 0052
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NOW
Indochina: Southwest Monsoon to Begin Soon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Laos: A New Communist Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Cambodia: Down to Business Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Communist Insurgency in Burma: A Slow Season Quickens . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chinese Road Construction in Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
S inoff From US - Chinese Communist Contacts ? 7
Political Fallout From the European Monetary Crisis . 10
oviet Census S e s Li ton ationa ity Issue . . . . . . . . . . 12
Yugoslav Self-Managers Call for Greater Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Polish Government Narrows Information Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Fiscal Problems Beset UN Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Arab States - Israel: Reactions to Rogers' Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Egypt: Ins and Outs in Cairo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Jordan: Cooling Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
France-Algeria: Oil Impasse Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
India Pakistan: Frictions Persist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Chile: The Communist Party in the Allende Government . . . . . . . . . . . 22
-25
Panama Moves Forward on Three Fronts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guyana: Labor Peace Remains Tenuous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Haiti: Situation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
URUGUAY'S TUPAMAROS: THE NEW BREED OF REVOLUTIONARY
Notes: European Communities - UK; Romania; Czechoslovakia; Arms Control; Africa;
Ceylon; Bolivia
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' SECRET M"'
Thai
Nguyen.
NORTH
HANOI
Plaine des Ban Ban
Jarres
Prevailing winds during
~? the Southwest Monsoon
.,~ Area which receives little
~%,Z! or no rainfall during the
Southwest Monsoon
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LAOS
Luang Prabang
LAOS
Sarayane
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FAR EAST
Indochina: Southwest Monsoon to Begin Soon
Southeast Asia's monsoons play a key role in
military operations, both enemy and allied, and
military planners must take seasonal changes into
account. The hot season from mid-March to early
May, the southwest monsoon from mid-May until
mid-October, and the northeast monsoon from
mid-November through February bring differing
rainfall patterns and cloud cover that affect al-
most all operations.
The northeast monsoon season brings heavy
cloud cover and rains to the northern half of
South Vietnam during the winter months, and
clouds, fog, and showers frequently persist into
the spring months. Bad weather was still prevalent
last week in the northern provinces of South
Vietnam's Military Region (MR) 1, but that area
is now in a transitional weather period, and the
coming summer months are normally clear and
dry. Such weather will facilitate both allied and
Communist operations.
In Laos, Cambodia, and the southern half of
South Vietnam, on the other hand, the southwest
monsoon will begin soon, and rainfall will be
heavy until October. Weather conditions in these
regions will be unfavorable for close air support
operations as well as for ground combat.
The Communist Military Situation in the DMZ
North Vietnamese combat units in the vi-
cinity of the DMZ are heavily engaged in prepara-
tions for future attacks in northern Quang Tri
Province. The units involved have traditionally
operated in this region; they include elements of
at least five infantry and three artillery regiments.
There is no solid evidence they are being rein-
forced with any of the combat units that partici-
pated in the counteroffensive against the allied
operation in Laos earlier this year.
In addition to the southward movement and
emplacement of large-caliber artillery weapons,
the current enemy preparations include intense
reconnaissance of allied positions south of the
central and eastern DMZ.
In some areas of northern Quang Tri Prov-
ince shellings have become more frequent re-
cently, and sporadic small-unit actions have
erupted; these could be forerunners of a more
concerted and coordinated enemy effort in the
coming weeks as the weather continues to im-
prove. The usual targets, such as allied artillery
bases and field positions, will probably be struck,
and there may be some action against populated
areas in the lowlands along the coast. The Com-
munists may also be looking for a chance to take
on South Vietnamese units in larger engagements
in order to demonstrate that the recent operation
into Laos did not blunt Communist offensive
capabilities. The North Vietnamese might be
ready to pay a high price in casualties in the hope
of shaking the confidence of the South Viet-
namese as American troop strength in the north-
ern provinces continues to decline.
North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan
finally left Moscow on 9 May after a six-week
sojourn in the Soviet Union. He is now making
the stopover in China that has long been a
customary part of treks to and from Moscow for
Vietnamese Communist leaders.
The Tass announcement of Le Duan's depar-
ture from Moscow indicated that he had held
important discussions with the top Soviet leader-
ship-discussions that were interrupted by two or
three weeks of vacation and touring for the
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Vietnamese leader. The talks apparently resumed
around the first of May.
Tass acknowledges that Brezhnev and Le
Duan discussed both the international situation
and bilateral relations. The length of the visit and
the wording of the communiqu6 suggest that
there may have been less than full agreement on
both subjects, and the communiquo's assertion
that the two leaders "reiterated their desire to
further develop militant friendship, solidarity,
and all around fraternal cooperation" leaves the
impression that there is some room for improve-
ment, especially in bilateral relations. As Le Duan
left Moscow, there was no mention of the invita-
tion issued (and accepted) on 14 April to the
Soviets to send a high-level party/government
delegation to Hanoi.
There is no clue to the substance of the
discussions, however. Le Duan and Brezhnev
could have talked about new Vietnamese Commu-
nist military or diplomatic initiatives or about
Soviet aid, but they might also have found some-
thing to disagree about in a general exchange of
views.
C
The Communists have reiterated their condi-
tions for a settlement of the war in Laos. A
statement by the Lao Patriotic Front, which was
broadcast from Hanoi on 12 May, demanded an
unconditional US bombing halt throughout Laos.
After this, the statement said, both sides would
"immediately realize a cease-fire," and the Lao
parties concerned would "immediately discuss the
formation of a provisional coalition government."
The statement was essentially a condensed version
of the Communist proposal of 6 March 1970,
with the exception of the prospect of an "imme-
diate" cease-fire, to which only an indirect refer-
ence was made in last year's discussions.
Communist envoy SouK Vongsak, who re-
turned to Vientiane last week after a three-month
absence, delivered to Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma a letter containing the Pathet Lao pro-
posals on 12 May. Souvanna read the letter at the
Lao cabinet meeting that day and expressed his
disappointment that the Communists still refused
to admit the presence of North Vietnamese
troops in Laos. He stated that he would agree to a
complete bombing halt only after there was a
complete withdrawal of Hanoi's forces. Cabinet
members shared Souvanna's pessimism that much
progress toward a settlement could be made on
the basis of what the Communists had presented
so far. The prime minister plans to meet with
Souk in the next few days to outline the govern-
ment's initial response to the Pathet Lao pro-
posals.
The new initiative is clearly Hanoi's handi-
work and may represent, at least in part, a fresh
effort to drive a wedge between the prime minis-
ter and the US. For several years, the North
Vietnamese have been interested in securing a halt
to US bombing in the infiltration corridor in
return for a diminution of the fighting elsewhere
in Laos. So far these efforts have been a total
failure. There has not only been a considerable
increase in US bombing throughout Laos in re-
cent years
FHanoi may believe that
Souvanna is now more susceptible to persuasion,
but the North Vietnamese must also realize that
they will have to be extremely conciliatory on
matters of direct interest to Souvanna and other
Lao leaders if there is to be even an outside
chance of making headway on the bombing issue.
The new Communist proposal leaves open
the possibility of future diplomatic dialogue be-
tween the Communists and Souvanna. It does not
say that a bombing halt is a precondition for Lao
peace talks, only that it is necessary for a solution
to the war in Laos. In view of their exasperating
and unsuccessful efforts to get substantive talks
under way during the past year, the Communists
cannot be optimistic that they will have more to
show from this effort. At a minimum, the new
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proposal helps to portray the Communists as inter-
ested in a reasonable "settlement" to the Laotian
portion of the Indochina war, and attempts to place
the onus for a continuation of the war on the US
and its allies.
Military activity was at a relatively low level
throughout northern Laos during the past week as
Lao irregulars were unopposed in occupying two im-
portant high-ground positions northeast of Long
Tieng.
The Communists followed up last week's
seizure of Muong Phalane with moves threatening
Dong Hene, the next town to the west along Route
9. It seems unlikely that the government force as-
signed to Dong Hene will hold it if the Communists
attack. The Communists probably hope that their
drive along Route 9 will keep government forces off
balance and unable to harass the western portions of
the infiltration corridor.
The Communists also seem to be planning new
attacks farther south on the Bolovens Plateau. Re-
ports indicate that Ban Houei Sai, the chief govern-
ment base on the northern approaches to the pla-
teau, may be the enemy's first objective. In past
years, the Communists have maintained pressure
near the Bolovens well into the rainy season in con-
trast with north Laos, where longer lines of com-
munication and more difficult terrain have slowed
down the tempo of the war early in the monsoon
season.
Cambodia: Down to Business Again
Initial reactions in Phnom Penh to Prime Minis-
ter Lon Nol's new government have been generally
favorable. Young, reform-minded elements seem
pleased by the new faces in the cabinet, and conserv-
ative factions can draw comfort from the fact that
the top ministries are still held by establishment
figures. There appears to be widespread agreement,
however, that the government will be an interim ad-
ministration.
Prime Minister Delegate Sirik Matak is aware of
these sentiments and has indicated that he will in ef-
fect be directing a transitional government. In pre-
senting the cabinet to the National Assembly, for
example, Matak told the deputies that once a new
constitution has been ratified elections will be held
in "pacified areas" in order to choose a successor re-
gime. Matak also promised to pursue a stiff anticor-
ruption program, to instill discipline in the armed
forces, and to continue economic liberalization
where possible. Commenting on his own anomalous
position as "prime minister delegate," Matak ad-
mitted to the assembly that he is the de facto prime
minister.
Although the assembly lost little time in ap-
proving the new cabinet, it has indicated that it
plans to keep a close eye on the government's poli-
cies and performance. Early this week the legislators
narrowly elected veteran politician Yem Sambaur as
their new president, defeating one of Matak's close
associates, former interior minister Op Kim Ang. Al-
though Sambaur served in several ministerial posts in
the former Lon Nol government, he was often criti-
cal of the regime's tendency to circumvent constitu-
tional procedures. Running true to form, Sambaur
has told the assemblymen that he will stress con-
formity with the constitution. He also stated-in an
obvious reference to Lon Nol-that he is against
"worship of the individual."
Open Season on Route 4
The government's drawn-out military operation
to clear Route 4 successfully passed the acid test
when a 41-truck convoy traveled without incident
from the seaport at Kompong Som to Phnom Penh.
This was the first through traffic on the highway
since late February. Although the Khmer Krom
forces that led the final push into the Pich Nil pass
have returned to Phnom Penh, there are still some
20,000 Cambodian Army troops scattered along the
highway to help ensure its security.
Despite this successful journey, there is some
evidence that the government may soon put more
emphasis on reopening alternative routes to Kom-
pong Som. First Deputy Prime Minister In Tam re-
cently stated that he favors undertaking military op-
erations to clear Routes 2 and 3, which also connect
Phnom Penh with the southwestern seacoast. These
roads run heavily o ulated agricultural
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thus of greater economic and political importance to
the country than Route 4, which is more difficult
and costly to defend.
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Communist Insurgency in Burma: A Slow Season Quickens
Communist insurgency along the Chinese
border in northeast Burma is stirring from the
doldrums of the past half year. The first signifi-
cant assault on a government position during the
now-ending dry season was reported on 29 April,
when a large rebel force attacked the town of
Mong Maw near the Chinese border. The govern-
ment claims that it killed over 100 Communist
insurgents before being forced to withdraw from
the town.
The insurgents have been increasingly active
over the past two months in other villages along
this portion of the frontier with China. The gov-
ernment believes that in some villages the Com-
munists were looking primarily for Chinese irregu-
lar intelligence teams rather than seeking contacts
with Burmese troops or village defense units.
Action has also icked u farther north
along the border.
Although the
rebels have not yet mounted any ground assaults,
they have shelled army positions.
This flurry of activity still falls far short of
the levels reached last year, when the insurgents
moved out of their border sanctuaries and hit
government towns and lines of communication in
the interior. The more conservative activity of the
insurgents during most of this dry season prob-
ably was in part a consequence of losses inflicted
by a Burmese Army offensive last fall. It probably
also reflected a decision by their Chinese mentors
to play down provocative action during the Sino-
Burmese contacts that led to the resumption of
ambassadorial ties in March.
Peking may continue to hold the insurgents
in check while it tests Burmese attitudes during
the initial months of fully restored state relations.
t e attention to improving the in-
surgents capabilities-including stepped-up re-
cruiting and training, plus the recent inauguration
of a Burmese Communist Party clandestine radio
station-indicates that the Communists are kee -
in their o tions o en.
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Chinese Road Construction in Laos
Chinese road builders have added relatively
little mileage to their roadnet in northwest Laos
during the dry season that ends this month. They
have concentrated instead. on improving and up-
grading existing roads toward the Mekong and
North Vietnam. Ample manpower is available to
continue this work as long as weather permits.
Chinese forces supporting road construction in
Laos increased again this year as air defenses were
expanded and upgraded.
The Chinese constructed some 140 miles of
new roads in Laos from the fall of 1968 to the
nesybriiit road
Little activity
70-1 dry season
Constructed ossible bridge
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fall of 1970. During this period, a road south
from Yunnan Province, China, to Muong Sai was
completed, and work was started on routes 46
and 45 extending southwest and northwest, re-
spectively, from Muong Sai. During this dry
season the main Chinese construction effort has
been to gravel most of Route 46 between Muong
Sai and Muong Houn and to complete a number
of bridges and culverts. The Chinese did not ex-
tend Route 46 south of its February 1970
terminus near Muong Houn, about 25 miles from
the Mekong. Several short access roads have been
constructed around and to the south of Muong
Houn.
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Some 21 miles of new road were constructed
to extend Route 45 from its previous terminus
north of Muong La to the Nam Ou. Improve-
ments on this road section are continuing, and
work may have been started recently on a bridge
across the Nam Ou to link Route 45 with Route
19 from North Vietnam. The only other new road
work undertaken this dry season is a recently
constructed spur extending several miles west-
ward from Route 412 near the China border,
apparently in the direction of Nam Tha.
Chinese military personnel and air defenses
have been gradually increasing since 1968 in keep-
ing with expanding road construction. The
strength of Chinese military forces now in Laos is
estimated at between 16-20,000. Many of these
troops provide security for road builders and man
the hundreds of antiaircraft positions located
along the roadnet, particularly at important sup-
ply and command centers and water cross-
ings.
Spinoff from US - Chinese Communist Contacts
The sense of movement generated by Pe-
king's recent diplomatic efforts is beginning to
have its effect on China's neighbors to the south.
Several of these traditionally anti-Communist gov-
ernments, though by no means all, have taken
hesitant steps to adjust their positions so as to
avoid becoming isolated in their relations with the
Chinese regime.
Thailand publicly endorsed the recent thaw
in US-Chinese relations but apparently is planning
no early moves to improve its own relations with
Peking. Despite considerable talk in Bangkok in
recent months that trade with China might help
solve some of the country's growing economic
difficulties, the Thai National Security Council
(NSC) has decided unanimously against establish-
ing formal trade relations. Prime Minister Thanom
and other senior government officials on the NSC
took the position that such a move would have a
negative economic impact; they also raised the
old canards that Peking would use trade relations
to subvert the large Chinese minority in Thailand
and would channel trade profits to the support of
Thai insurgents.
The NSC decision suggests that the regime's
hard liners are continuing to call the shots on
relations with China and that any moves toward
rapprochement will be cautious. In an effort to
placate Foreign Minister Thanat and others who
have urged a more flexible approach to Peking,
the NSC did agree to tone down gradually Thai-
land's propaganda against China. The decision to
temper polemics also indicates that the conserva-
tives in the government may give ground if Peking
takes some initiative toward improving relations.
The aura of friendliness surrounding the
mainland visit of the US table tennis team was
probably an important factor in Philippine Presi-
dent Marcos' decision to permit the current visit
of an unofficial trade delegation to Peking. The
Chinese probably hope that Premier Chou En-lai's
cordial meeting with the delegation on 8 May,
coupled with continued Chinese circumspection
in attacking the Marcos government, will reduce
Philippine suspicion of China, which was reflected
in Marcos' refusal to accord the delegation official
status.
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Marcos last week directed his foreign affairs
department to make a thorough study of tradi-
tional Philippine opposition to seatin Peking in
the UN.
The focus of
the review will no ou e o assess the UN
line-up on the next membership vote, and particu-
larly on what US intentions might be. Although
there will probably be no early relaxation of
Manila's wariness of direct political ties with Pe-
king, Manila does not want to get into the posi-
tion of being among a small minority of states
showing unyielding hostility toward the main-
land.
Malaysia, in its efforts to promote an image
of nonalignment, is also relaxing its public opposi-
tion to China on the assumption that Peking may
be more receptive to friendly gestures in the light
of the US ping pong visit. Kuala Lumpur has
followed up the very successful performances in
Malaysia of a mainland dance troup by allowing a
private trade group to visit Peking. There is as yet
no evidence, however, that Kuala Lumpur intends
to go beyond informal trade arrangements and
establish diplomatic relations.
The Australian Government, which has been
closely watching US attitudes toward Peking, has
been forced by maneuvers of the political opposi-
tion to adopt a more accommodating public
stance toward Peking. Prime Minister McMahon
reacted quickly to dilute the effect of Labor
Party parliamentary leader Whitlam's announce-
ment on 11 May that Chinese permission had
been received for a Labor delegation to visit
Peking. McMahon stated that-in view of Peking's
apparent receptivity to wider contacts-gov-
ernment efforts will be undertaken to open a
"dialogue" that could lead eventually to normal-
izing relations with the mainland. Although the
government felt compelled to undercut the Labor
Party's initiative, Canberra probably will not
hasten to recognize Peking or to change Aus-
tralia's position on the UN representation issue.
McMahon asserted that Peking's record of subver-
sion dictated caution and emphasized that no
steps would be taken that would prejudice Aus-
tralia's relations with the Republic of China.
The note of caution interjected by McMahon
is also apt to be the prevailing approach adopted
by the governments closer to China. Although
none of them wishes to find itself left behind
vis-a-vis Peking and each will continue to try to
improve the atmosphere in its dealings with the
Chinese, none of them is likely to grant early
diplomatic recognition to the mainland re-
gime.
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EUROPE
Political Fallout from the European Monetary Crisis
The pressures on a number of European curren-
cies, especially the Deutschemark (DM), that led
several of the countries to float or revalue their
currencies or institute other control measures
have strained relations within the European com-
munity, given impetus to strong criticism of US
economic policies, and renewed debate about re-
form of the international monetary system.
The major options open to West Germany to
cope with inflationary pressures resulting from
the recent flood of Eurodollars were outright
revaluation of the DM, imposition of exchange
controls, or as Bonn elected, letting the mark seek
its own level in the exchange markets. Arguing
against revaluation were the finality of such a step
and uncertainty over what the new parity should
be. Exchange controls remain anathema to Ger-
man monetary authorities-although some such
measures finally were taken along with the deci-
sion to float.
Bonn's decision implies that it might even-
tually refix the mark at its presently suspended
parity. Furthermore, the move corresponds to
Economics Minister Schiller's strong penchant for
more flexible exchange rates in general. In fact, in
his initial proposals to the EC last weekend,
which were rejected, Schiller suggested that the
Six permit EC currencies to float as a bloc vis-a-
vis the rest of the world and offered to fund a
stabilization mechanism to maintain existing pari-
ties among community currencies. Such a scheme
would have been a major advance toward a mone-
tary union among the Six; it would also have
confirmed the pre-eminence of the mark.
The measures favored by the EC Commis-
sion would have controlled capital movements
while avoiding the parity changes that damage
intracommunity trade, especially in farm prod-
ucts covered by the EC system of common prices.
Because this approach was not acceptable to
Bonn, however, the community's only alternative
was to authorize an exceptional floating of the
mark. The Dutch did not favor this course, but
felt forced to float the guilder because of the
German action. Outside the community, mean-
while, the Swiss and Austrians revalued to coun-
teract anticipated pressures on their currencies.
French resentment over the German action
is strong. Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing re-
portedly sought to break up the 8 May emergency
meeting of EC ministers rather than give in to
dered the subsequent announcement that French
experts would not participate in further EC mon-
etary union discussions so long as EC members'
currencies continued to float. Paris will not, how-
ever, boycott discussion of community measures
to deal with the disruptive flow of Eurodollars
inasmuch as France has long desired such meas-
ures.
Although the crisis is at least a temporary
setback for the EC's monetary union plans, the
Six did agree earlier this week on measures to
preserve common farm prices. The compromise
will permit rebates to be paid German and Dutch
farmers for their exports, but only when their
currencies trade at more than 2.5 percent above
the suspended parities. This agreement may add
to other pressures to limit floating and return to
fixed parities.
In Germany, the opposition has blamed the
government for provoking a "crisis of confi-
dence" in the community. Although this will
aggravate intracommunity recriminations, the
member countries are virtually at one in attrib-
uting the ultimate cause for the present difficul-
ties to the US. EC Commissioner Barre told
Ambassador Schaetzel early this week that there
could be unfortunate consequences for
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US-European relations generally should Washing-
ton permit intimations that the US was enjoying
the troubles the crisis has caused the Common
Market.
In a Bundestag debate this week, Schiller
confirmed that Bonn's actions were intended to
facilitate reforming the international system in
the direction of more elasticity, and he alleged
that Germany would have more allies in pushing
for this at next fall's International Monetary
Fund meeting. That one of the major causes of
the crisis was the unregulated market for Euro-
dollars is likely also to stimulate further debate
on direct methods for controllin such
fl
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Soviet Census Sheds Light on Nationality Issue
The recently released section of the 1970
Soviet census that included data on nationality
and language questions suggests that the pace of
Russification has slowed, particularly in the non-
European republics. The Russians still outnumber
all the other Soviet nationalities combined, but
their lead has narrowed. Although these trends
pose no threat to Moscow's control over the prov-
inces, they do point to the continuing vitality of
the cultures of many of the Soviet minorities and
suggest that the multinational character of the
USSR may become a factor of increasing political
and economic significance in Moscow.
This first portion of the census was to have
been ready for release by the end of 1970 but was
not published until mid-April. The information,
however, was undoubtedly available to top offi-
cials before the 24th party congress at the end of
March and may account in part for the sudden
upsurge in attention to the nationality question at
the congress. The lavish praise of the Russians by
Brezhnev and speakers from many but not all of
the non-Russian areas suggests that there may
have been behind-the-scenes debate on the ques-
tion.
The census confirmed earlier evidence of a
striking disparity between the birth rate of the
Europeans and the non-European nationalities. As
a result, the Russians now represent 53.4 percent
of the total population as against 54.8 percent in
the last census in 1959. The people of Central
Asia and the Caucasus far outdistanced the Rus-
sians and other Slavs as well as the Baltic peoples
in rate of growth. If the present trend continues,
the Russians will cease to be a majority in a few
decades.
The census data indicate that the Russians
continued to migrate in substantial numbers to
the non-Russian republics. In some areas, such as
Estonia and particularly Latvia, where the birth
rate of the native population is perilously low,
this influx threatens to put the native population
on the "endangered species" list. The Russians
now constitute 30 percent of the population of
Latvia. This clearly is a sensitive issue and helps to
explain the defensive remarks of Latvian party
chief Voss at the congress justifying the immigra-
tion of Russians into the republic.
In Central Asia the influx of Russians has
been more than offset by the high birth rate of
the native populations. As a result, the percentage
of Russians in the populations of these republics
has dropped. The Caucasian republics had the
lowest level of Russian immigration, and Georgia
was the one republic where the absolute number
of Russians has declined since the last census.
This exodus undoubtedly was prompted in part
by the strong nationalist and anti-Russian senti-
ment that prevails among the Georgians. Georgian
party boss Mzhavanadze's prideful and somewhat
pointed remarks at the congress about the antiq-
uity of the Georgian culture reflected this senti-
ment. Because of Georgia's small size, however,
its nationalism is more of an irritant than a prob-
lem to Moscow.
The census data showed that the people of
the different nationalities continue to have a
strong affinity for their native languages. AI-
though considerable emphasis has been placed on
Russian instruction, a larger percentage of the
major nationalities consider their native language
their primary language than in 1959. There is a
marked shift to dependence on Russian, however,
among the dispersed ethnic groups such as the
Jews and Germans. The former, moreover, unex-
pectedly registered a sharp decline in numbers,
presumably because of assimilation.
The use of native languages also declined
among the Ukrainians and the Belorussians, and
other indicators in the census material point to a
continuing trend of Russification in these repub-
lics. The census does not, of course, tell the whole
story. The Ukrainians because of their large num-
bers would still seem to present a greater poten-
tial problem for Moscow than would the increas-
ing national consciousness amon the numerically
smaller peoples.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - UK: In three
days of negotiations ending in an all-night session
on 12-13 May, the Six foreign ministers and Brit-
ish negotiator Rippon achieved a substantial
breakthrough on issues involved in Britain's acces-
sion to the Common Market. Their progress was
due in good part to fortuitous political circum-
stances. The current antagonism between Paris
and Bonn over monetary issues made it easier for
the French to be conciliatory toward London and
reach agreement on three key issues-a broad plan
for Britain's contribution to the Common Market
budget, safeguarding the interests of Common-
wealth sugar producers, and Britain's transition to
the EC's agricultural system. London appears also
to have sensed that this was the critical moment
for the negotiations. By suddenly scheduling his
meeting with Pompidou for 20-21 May, Heath
ROMANIA: General Secretary Ceausescu
strongly reasserted his country's independent for-
eign policy at the Romanian party's 50th an-
niversary celebrations last week in terms that
suggest renewed interparty squabbling with Soviet
leaders. Flatly rejecting the idea that the Com-
munist world movement should be directed from
Moscow, Ceausescu insisted that Romania's
pursuit of national interests does not weaken in-
ternational socialist unity. To underline his point,
created a situation in which the lack of progress
this week could have been disastrous. Of the
remaining issues, only the problem of New Zea-
land's dairy exports looms large, and there will be
hard bargaining on this. Prospects are for con-
tinued haggling as well over the precise amounts
Britain will have to pay to the community
budget.
Although the recent monetary crisis con-
firmed Germany's economic strength and made
Paris more eager to facilitate British accession to
the EC, the relative subordination of the franc
may make Paris even more wary of the possibility
that sterling could become the community's re-
serve currency. This issue is likely to figure, how-
ever indirect) , in Pom idou's meeting with
Heath.
the general secretary specifically rebutted recent
Western press allegations that Romania has been
moving away from its nationalistic position.
Ceausescu's frequent praise of the Chinese Com-
munists and his revival of other contentious issues
are sure to irritate Moscow. He is known to prefer
regular consultations to iron out problems with
the Soviet leaders, but the two sides have not met
privately in recent months, and this may account
in Dart for Ceausescu's outspokenness
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: The leadership on 9 May
culminated four days of self-effacing obeisance to
Moscow with observances of National Day. These
included effusive thanks to the Soviet Army for
restoring Czechoslovakia's independence in both
1945 and in 1968. The stage was thus set for the
Slovak party congress on 13-15 May, which is the
precursor of the 14th national party congress
scheduled to open on 25 May under the banner of
the party's 50th anniversary. The Slovak party
meeting could be important for determining the
future of the remaining Slovak moderates as-
sociated with national party chief Husak. Their
fate in turn could indicate whether or not Husak's
influence on the national level may be further
eroded. The Czechoslovak congress is likely to
stress that stability has been achieved with
Moscow's help. If pressed, however, no
Czechoslovak would seriously dispute that even
the conservative orientation of the party cannot
paper over the bitter legacy of 1968, and that
continuing tensions will keep the Prague re ime
on probation in the a es of Moscow 25X1
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Yugoslav Self-Managers Call for Greater Power
At their congress in Sarajevo last week,
Yugoslav self-managers, representing a nationwide
network of workers' councils, called on the gov-
ernment to give them more political and eco-
nomic power. The self-managers' positions were
heavily influenced by Edvard Kardelj's precon-
gress report and appear to reflect genuine workers
interests.
In effect the 2,100 conferees said that
workers want recognition of their "inalienable
rights" to directly influence their firm's invest-
ments through the workers' councils. Such power
already existed in theory, but in practice plant
directors, banks, and government officials have
dominated investment decisions. The workers'
proposal would mean freeing local industries from
excessive federal and regional taxes and keeping
more money in local hands. At the same time, the
self-managers fully endorsed contributions for
federal programs on improving the economic
status of underdeveloped areas, keeping a unified
national market, and maintaining national welfare
standards but with an improved retirement sys-
tem.
Demands were also made for equal pay for
those working at the same jobs irrespective of the
state of individual plant's technological advance-
ment. The congress further endorsed a plan for
providing more labor intensive, albeit "less pro-
ductive," jobs as a hedge against current and
future unemployment. Economic organizations
were requested to set aside more funds for wages.
These demands run counter to government efforts
since 1965 to promote efficiency and combat
inflation.
The political edge of the resolutions was
provided by a demand for constitutional recogni-
tion of municipalities as the basis for the self-
management system. This call for further decen-
tralization appears to set the stage for a "second
wave" of constitutional amendments that may
follow Tito's current program. The delegates
clearly want worker influence to extend from the
councils upward through stronger municipal
bodies, as opposed to the current reforms, which
only invest republic and province governments
with new authority.
The self-managers created a series of com-
missions to produce a "self-managers' code" be-
fore the next national party conference. The
code, among other things, is to define the self-
managers' position on workers' rights, including
the right to stroke.
Kardelj's and probably Tito's advocacy of
the adoption of uniform wage standards for equal
work will aid realization of this objective. Other
demands by the congress, however, including
wage increases, expensive new social welfare proj-
ects, and greater worker control of investment
may never be implemented.
Polish Government Narrows Information Gap
The Polish Government is moving to satisfy informed press as the key to a valuable two-way
the demand voiced by the workers last winter for flow of information that will keep it in touch
honest press reporting of the country's problems. with popular demands, opinions, and expecta-
The top leadership envisions an informative and tions and will inform the populace of the
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leadership's efforts to improve their way of life.
There have been some signs, however, that the
middle levels of leadership are not as-enthusiastic
as their superiors about this program.
Premier Jaroszewicz recently directed gov-
ernmental executives to make facilities available
for media representatives to maintain contacts
within factories and obtain factual information
about social problems affecting the community,
This mild reprimand was intended to overcome
the footdragging of those officials who are re-
luctant to have the shortcomings of their enter-
prises aired in public.
To facilitate the flow of information down-
ward the government appointed its first official
press spokesman, Wlodzimierz Janiurek, and gave
ARMS CONTROL: The 25-nation Geneva dis-
armament conference adjourned on 13 May for a
six-week spring recess. The highlight of the ses-
sion was the Soviet presentation of a draft con-
vention curbing biological weapons (BW). The US
and the other Western delegates this week gave
generally favorable responses to the Soviet text,
which represents a virtual reversal of Moscow's
earlier position that any agreement must also in-
clude chemical weapons (CW). The nonaligned
delegates at the talks are unhappy at the lack of a
firmer superpower commitment to negotiate
limits on CW in the future, but they probably can
be induced to accept the present draft by the end
of the summer session. Attention thereafter is
him the rank of deputy minister. Janiurek intends
to organize press conferences on a regular basis
during which ministers, party secretaries, and
even party leader Gierek will answer questions
posed by journalists. In addition, work has begun
on a new press law to streamline the dissemina-
tion of news.
The new regime has no intention of drop-
ping press censorship, but it does want more
information circulated and more criticism voiced
through proper channels. This not only provides a
safety valve for the frustrated working class but
has the added advantage of discouraging rumor
and gossip, which became dangerously prevalent
during the winter crisis. Freedom of expression is
contagious, however, and the regime may ex-
perience some difficulty keeping it within speci-
likely to focus on further studies of verification
problems relating to a CW ban.
The conferees also agreed this week to take a
closer look at prospects for a comprehensive
nuclear test ban (CTB) when they resume work in
late June. Canada and Japan have been especially
eager to achieve at least some steps toward a CTB
that might prevent the US this fall from carrying
out Project Cannikin, a planned high-yield under-
ground test of an ABM device in the Aleutians.
The Soviets continue to reject the US insistence
on on-site inspection to verify compliance with a
CTB. Recently Moscow has added that it could
not accept a CTB agreement to which Peking was
not a art .
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Fiscal Problems Beset UN Organizations
The UN has been in financial difficulty for
several years, largely as a result of the refusal of
the Soviet Union and France to pay their assess-
ments for UN peacekeeping operations in the
Congo (K). The deficit problem has been exacer-
bated recently, however, principally because
assessments have not matched accelerating budg-
etary commitments-a trend also seen in several
UN-related organizations.
The deficit from the peacekeeping ventures
could be erased by voluntary contributions of
$36 million from the USSR and its allies and $15
million from France. The Norwegian president of
the General Assembly, Edvard Hambro, has
sounded out the delinquents, but thus far he has
been rebuffed. Hambro has also failed to interest
those governments that purchased bonds to cover
the financing deficit of the mid-1960s to write off
a portion of their claims as a contribution to solve
the present crisis. The UN's cash position is so
bad that the June payroll may not be met. Vari-
ous devices can probably be found to avoid such a
calamity during the summer months, but the issue
certainly will intrude itself early in the fall session
of the General Assembly.
The conflict among the major contributors
over the old peacekeeping debts has tended to
make it more difficult for them to work together
to prevent further increases in the UN budget.
The less developed countries (LDCs) favor such
increases because assessments made on them are
small, while at the same time they receive sub-
stantial aid from the UN. The rapid increase in
Japan's gross national product on the other hand
has led to a significant boost in Tokyo's assess-
ment, and it is beginning to express the same
reluctance as the Big Four. Caught in the middle
of this conflict between the major powers and the
LDCs is the UN Secretariat, which hopes to draft
a budget for 1972 that the largest contributors
can support. None of them voted in favor of the
1971 budget. _
Among the UN-related agencies, the current
fiscal strains of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) are similar to those of the UN
itself and typical of the problems of other affili-
ated agencies. The international inspections re-
quired by the Nonproliferation Treaty are a major
new responsibility of the IAEA, and the LDCs
have secured a financing arrangement on the safe-
guards that takes their limited resources into
account. With the US prohibited by an act of
Congress from contributing more than one third
of the expenses of an international agency, the
remaining states feel that they are being squeezed
to cover a rapidly expanding program.
Despite these difficulties, there have been
some salutary effects from the current fiscal crises
in the international organizations, accentuated
this week by the effects of the European mone-
tary problems. The need to pare costs has led to
greater efficiency in operations in the UN Devel-
opment Program, the UN Relief and Works
Agency, and the International Labor Organiza-
tion. The US remains in hot water, however, over
its recent refusal to pay its full assessment to the
ILO.
The debate over how much should be spent
by the UN will no doubt be a continuing one.
Although the LDCs are the primary beneficiaries
of its aid programs, the regulatory activities in
which the UN is increasingly engaged primarily
benefit the developed world, and whatever the
UN contributes to the maintenance of peace is
universally shared. Moreover, the total expendi-
tures of the UN last year-some $830 million-
were only about 20 percent of the bud et of the
Euro can Communities.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Arab States - Israel: Reactions to Rogers' Visit
Secretary Rogers' tour of the Middle East has
enabled both Egypt and Israel to claim that their
positions now are fully understood and appreciated
by the US. In this sense, spokesmen for both sides
have declared that the visit had positive benefits. In
terms of progress toward a settlement of the dispute
or toward an agreement on easing the confrontation
along the Suez Canal, however, both sides stressed
the difficulties that remain to be overcome.
ments attributed to Defense Minister Dayan, how-
ever, raised speculation that some points in the
Egyptian canal-opening proposal were receiving
serious attention from the Israeli and Egyptian gov-
ernments, and there was a general belief in Israel
that Assistant Secretary Sisco's return to Cairo was
intended to advance this process.
The Egyptian reaction was somewhat more
critical. Although presidential adviser Muhammad
Riad described Rogers' visit as "very useful," he
added that the differences between the Israeli and
Egyptian viewpoints remained "large and continu-
ing." On Monday, Egyptian President Sadat briefed
top political leaders and reaffirmed Egypt's principal
demands, including a call for Israeli agreement on a
timetable for complete withdrawal from all oc-
cupied Arab lands. On Wednesday, Sadat spoke
personally with military commanders on the canal
front, continuing his policy of enlisting the armed
forces support for each step taken in the negotiating
process. Emphasizing the negative, Sadat assessed
the chances for peace at "one percent," adding that
only the strength of Egyptian arms provided the
incentive to the US and Israel to work toward a
peaceful settlement.
An Egyptian radio commentary on 9 May said
Cairo had hoped that three things would develop
from the visit: a clear and frank US definition of its
stand; US pressure on Israel; and something new in
the way of a US initiative. According to the radio,
none of these expectations has been fulfilled. As-
sistant Secretary Sisco's return to Cairo after the
stopover in Israel bolstered spirits in Egypt some-
what and resulted in speculation that some conces-
sions had been obtained from the Israelis. The
Egyptian press was clearly disappointed at the out-
come of the secretary's talks in Israel, however, and
warned that Sisco's visit would not change Egypt's
conditions for partial withdrawal from Sinai or for 25X6
permanent peace in the Middle East. The authorita-
tive Cairo daily al-Ahram pointed out that the US
attempt to change the Israeli attitude on withdrawal
was the last chance before the world becomes fully
convinced of the futility of political means to end
the crisis.
Soviet media are treating Secretary Rogers'
visit negatively, but in low key. Moscow has relied
chiefly on selected Arab commentary to convey the
impression the trip was only a political maneuver
that accomplished nothing.
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Egypt: Ins and Outs in Cairo
President Sadat, perhaps impressed with his
success in eliminating one major rival for power in
Egypt, has disposed of another. His actions have
put the Cairo rumor mill in high gear, producing
speculation about further changes.
After warming up last week with the dis-
missal of Vice President All Sabri-a perennial
troublemaker who had overstepped the bounds of
collegial criticism-Sadat yesterday "accepted"
the resignation of Interior Minister Sharawi
Goma, whose control of the security apparatus
made him one of the three or four most powerful
members of the inner circle of Nasir's heirs.
Sadat replaced Goma with Mamduh Salim,
an administrator with intelligence service ex-
perience who was considered one of Nasir's close
personal friends. Rumors current in Cairo had
suggested that Sadat would replace Goma with
someone more personally loyal to him, and Salim
may fit this bill. Goma was known to covet higher
office, but it was generally thought that he was
content to wait until a later time, and he has ap-
peared to support Sadat's policies.
Removing Goma will considerably
strengthen Sadat's personal control, but it is a
sizable undertaking, nevertheless. Following the
announcement, Cairo Radio interrupted normal
broadcasting and switched to martial music and
selected quotes from ex-President Nasir, a clear
indication that the possibility of trouble was an-
ticipated. It would appear, however, that Sadat
would not have moved unless he were extremely
confident of backing from the country's military
leaders, whom he has been assiduously cultivating
since assuming the presidency.
If Sadat acted in order to consolidate his
control and not to counter a sudden threat, he
undoubtedly believed he had the unquestioned
support of the armed forces. The day before the
latest dismissal was announced, he addressed a
large gathering of front-line military commanders
to defend his policies. As in other recent appear-
ances of this type, Sadat reportedly received a
general ovation from his uniformed audience.
The President's latest display of personal au-
thority is so unusual as to suggest that he has
either acquired a towering sense of confidence or
that he felt threatened by a more ominous chal-
lenge than that posed by Ali Sabri and his leftist
supporters. The dismissal of Sabri had already
generated rumors of further changes, many of
them contradictory.
None of the rumors explains, however, why
the President, who has yet to exercise unques-
tioned leadership in the Nasir style, should believe
he now has the strength to move against these
two powerful ministers. Moreover, although Sadat
has attracted wide support for his efforts to
achieve a peaceful settlement with Israel, he will
eventually become vulnerable to strong and po-
tentially dangerous criticism if he cannot demon-
strate tangible progress in the negotia-
tions.
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Jordan: CoolingOff
Few incidents between government forces
and fedayeen have taken place recently, and Jor-
danian authorities believe it will be safe to reduce
somewhat the military presence in the capital by
the end of May. The most serious remaining prob-
lem is occasional shelling across the Syrian-
Jordanian border, and both countries are cooper-
ating to restrain such outbreaks.
The governors and military commanders on
either side of the border in the Irbid-Daraa region
have met informal) to work out ioint controls on
feda een activit .
the Jordanians-applying a esson
earne rom the Israelis-are heavily bombarding
any area from which firing originates, hoping that
the local Syrian population will blame the feda-
yeen and support tougher official measures
against them.
Within Jordan, the army has conducted two
recent raids on commando bases and is making
routine daily roundups of individuals. No serious
incidents have been touched off, and the army is
confident that planned arms searches of refugee
camps can be carried out just as smoothly. The
fedayeen continue to broadcast reports of wide-
AFRICA: Only a month remains before the Afri-
can foreign ministers meet to prepare for the
eighth annual conference of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), but the issue of where the
meeting will be held is still causing controversy.
The session was originally planned for Kampala,
Uganda, but the leaders of several radical re-
gimes-Zambia, Tanzania, Guinea, and Somalia-
are opposed to the government of Uganda's Pres-
ident Amin, who gained power through a coup
last January. Led by Zambian President Kaunda,
this year's chairman of the OAU, the radicals are
pressing to move the meeting to Addis Ababa.
Current sentiment among the 41 OAU members
seems to favor Addis, and as many as 22 members
are believed ready to back the change.
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spread disorder in Amman, but these are widel
known to be entirely without foundation s 25X1
Jordanian authorities are aware that a num-
ber of unarmed fedayeen are returning to
Amman, having deserted their organizations or
o enl resi ned.
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Most governments, however, remain non-
committal on the question of seating the Ugan-
dans, the issue that will determine the success or
failure of the conference. The radicals success-
fully blocked a resolution of this problem at an
OAU foreign ministers' meeting in February, and
since then only Nigeria's General Gowon has
clearly spoken out on behalf of the Ugandans.
Amin might be agreeable to Addis Ababa, but
probably not without some assurance that the
Ugandans will be seated there. If a solution is not
reached soon, the session may have to be post-
poned until later this year.
France-Algeria: Oil Impasse Continues
The dispute over oil shows no sign of resolu-
tion and continues to strain relations between the
two countries. Both France and Algeria, however,
evidently intend to avoid a rupture.
The talks between representatives of the
French and Algerian oil companies have not been
resumed since France broke off state-to-state ne-
gotiations in mid-April, and moves on both sides
have served to increase pressures. The French
companies have stopped taking Algerian oil and
have sought to organize an international boycott
of Algerian petroleum. Prime Minister Bou-
mediene has warned the Algerian public that the
difficulties may be prolonged, and the govern-
ment apparently has cut back on its purchase
orders of French goods.
The French companies indicate they are
ready to withdraw from Algeria altogether if they
cannot reach an over-all agreement on future pe-
troleum operations, including oil prices and com-
pensation to the French oil companies for the
controlling interest the government seized last
February. The companies apparently have been
able to conclude contracts with non-Algerian
sources that will cover all of France's short-term
oil needs, and the French probably can get along
in the future on supplies from other sources.
Algeria's immediate concern is to find new
markets for its oil. As a result of the French
boycott, less than half of Algeria's normal pro-
duction is now being exported. The major inter-
national oil companies are unlikely to buy the
remaining oil under present conditions. If the
present impasse is prolonged, Algerian foreign-
exchange reserves will probably be adequate to
finance Algerian spending at current levels only
through the end of this year, and the ambitious
Algerian industrial development plan will prob-
ably be set back. Nevertheless, Algeria may be
able to obtain some foreign financial assistance
and seems to be prepared to hold out for some
time if necessary.
The French Government is attempting to
maintain a careful distinction between state-to-
state relations and negotiations between the
French companies and the Algerian state com-
pany Sonatrach. While lending general support to
its companies, Paris is seeking to avoid any action
that would cool relations with Algeria below the
level of business-like objectivity that has replaced
the previous special relationship.
In the past ten days, the Algerian Govern-
ment has elicited some generalized statements of
support from other oil-producing states, notably
from Libya and from the headquarters of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Algiers also sent out a tentative feeler toward the
French companies by suggesting the possibility of
lowering the price of crude oil and modifying its
requirements on investment, and there is some
indication that com an talks may resume next
week.
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India-Pakistan: Frictions Persist
Several issues continue to aggravate India-
Pakistan relations. Border incidents are still oc-
curring, the status of diplomatic personnel re-
mains unresolved, and East Pakistanis continue to
flee to India.
India has accused Pakistan of several more
border violations. Such incidents appear to result
primarily from hot pursuit of armed insurgents or
refugees. In most cases, Pakistani troops have not
actually crossed the border, but they have fired
into Indian territory.
Both New Delhi and Islamabad have ac-
cepted Swiss good offices in their dispute over the
repatriation of diplomatic personnel in Dacca and
Calcutta. Pakistan has refused to allow the
repatriation of the Indians unless Deputy High
Commissioner Masud-a West Pakistani-is al-
lowed to interview individually each East Bengali
defector from the mission in Calcutta. The
Bengalis-who claim they now represent an in-
dependent Bangla Desh-insist that they will
come only as a group to see Masud. The presence
of a Swiss diplomat at individual meetings has
been suggested as a way around the impasse.
According to official Indian figures, nearly
two million East Bengalis have fled to India.
Caring for the refugees has strained Indian capa-
bilities, and local officials are attempting to have
the central government move at least some of the
refugees to other parts of India. New Delhi, how-
ever, does not want to take any action that would
decrease the likelihood of the refugees returning
to East Pakistan. Nevertheless, about half the
refugees are Hindus who may choose to sta in
India whatever happens in East Pakistani 25X1
CEYLON: Although relatively few incidents have
occurred recently, insurgents are continuing to
harass the people and on occasion to attack
security patrols. Three areas that had been placed
under military control have been restored to civil
authority, leaving nine districts still under the
military. The curfew, which had been relaxed for
Buddha's birthday, has returned to earlier, restric-
tive hours. The education minister says he does
not expect universities to reopen for a long time
because "most" students were "involved" in the
insurgency.
The Ceylonese military, meanwhile, is plan-
ning to expand its strength by about 7,000 men.
The largest addition would accrue to the army,
but the navy and air force would both double in
size.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: The Communist Party in the Allende Government
Having conceived and organized the Popular
Unity (UP) coalition that elected Salvador
Allende to the presidency last year, the Chilean
Communist Party (PCCh) envisioned itself as the
major political force in the new government. In
the intervening months the Communists have
often found their role unsatisfactory and their
plans frustrated, but the adaptability of party
leaders, their political realism, and their persist-
ence have sustained PCCh influence.
When Allende took office in November, his
Socialist Party (PS) took four cabinet posts in-
cluding the two most important ones, while the
Communists settled for the vulnerable ministries
of finance, housing, and labor. Economy Minister
Vuscovic is also considered a Communist and
most of the key decision-making posts that went
to the PCCh (one third of the total) were eco-
nomic. The government's populist economic
measures strengthened UP popularity for the
April municipal elections, but the PS rather than
the PCCh reaped most of the benefit and assumed
pre-eminence in the coalition. The PCCh im-
proved its voting strength very little and remains
saddled with the responsibility for persistent and
unresolved economic problems such as housing
shortages and rising unemployment. The PCCh
leaders' initial dismay over the Socialists' electoral
showing has been modified by the rationalization
that the PS will now bear the brunt of the inevi-
table antigovernment dissatisfaction-
PCCh Secretary General Luis Corvalan ini-
tially took an aggressive attitude but he and other
Communists tempered their position where it
proved counterproductive. Although the party
still believes that strong measures must be taken
to consolidate real power and to ensure that the
revolutionary process cannot be reversed, the
means to accomplish this are most often discussed
and planned in the privacy of party councils. The
many rivalries that have grown in years of politi-
cal association with the more extremist PS have
been submerged because the PCCh considers
cooperation the most important ingredient in the
Brezhnev: We wish you well in Chile, Comrade
Corvalan. Thank you for attending the 24th Party
Congress rather than wasting time with elections.
Remember, we arrange elections here and always re-
ceive 99.9 percent of the vote.
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relationship. The party stopped its open attacks
on the PS-sponsored Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (MI R) when Allende chose to co-opt
the MIR rather than confront it. Even the take-
over of the PS leadership by a hard-line faction
under Senator Carlos Altamirano, who was
formerly anathema to the PCCh, has not dis
turbed the cooperation, and a ranking Socialist
accompanied Corvalan to the 24th Congress of
the Soviet Communist Party, where both received
especially cordial treatment.
Both Marxist parties place a high priority on
the control of most news media, broader interna-
tional support-both official and nonofficial-for
the Chilean revolution, the elimination of US
influence in Chile, and the rapid destruction of
economic and political power bases of Chilean
moderates and conservatives,. Both also realize
the importance of the acquiescence of the Chilean
armed forces during this period while the UP is
gaining control of the levers of power. Neverthe-
less, differences between the two persist as they
get deeper into the daily business of sharing
power and transforming Chile into a socialist state
without provoking serious opposition. Differences
of approach to agrarian reform and to negotiating
the nationalization of foreign investment, as well
as competition in labor matters and local politics,
sometimes surface and could cause future prob-
lems.
The Communists are aware that many
Chileans are suspicious of their ties with Moscow
while the Socialists are considered primarily na-
tionalistic. For the present, the PCCh will prob-
ably concentrate on building up its membership-
already about 65,000 in a country where only a
minority belongs to any party-and on strength-
ening groups such as local UP committees and
labor unions that it controls.
BOLIVIA: The National Liberation Army (ELN)
has apparently succeeded in its first major urban
operation since the collapse of its rural guerrilla
effort last year. In a communique released last
Friday, the ELN took credit for the kidnaping on
4 May of a West German businessman, and
claimed to have received $50,000 fo, his release
two days later. If the ELN's account of the in-
cident is true, it is the first time the group has
used kidnaping to raise funds and indicates a shift
in emphasis from rural to urban terrorism.
A direct descendent of the ill-fated revolu-
tionary movement founded and led by Che
Guevara, the ELN has concentrated on guerrilla
warfare in the countryside and remains basically
rural oriented. After a disastrous campaign near
Teoponte last year, however, the ELN added
cities to its list of future areas of guerrilla activity.
Whether
ieidnapmg of an unarmed private citizen will
significantly improve the ELN's tarnished image
and boost its standing with its Latin American
friends remains to be seen.
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Panama Moves Forward on Three Fronts
The Panamanian Government under General
Torrijos is currently moving ahead along three
parallel paths. It is seeking to isolate and extirpate
the few remaining centers of political opposition,
notably the followers of deposed president Arias.
The regime is also trying to organize a base of
support from groups that it considers part of its
natural constituency-students, the rural poor,
and labor. Finally, it is preparing for treaty
negotiations and building its case for jurisdic-
tional control over the Canal Zone.
A more fundamental objective of the govern-
ment, however, is to translate its amorphous pop-
ular appeal into an institutionalized political
framework. Late in 1969 consideration had been
given to the formation of an official party, but a
coup attempt resulted in an unwillingness to
permit any political activity. The cabinet re-
shuffle last month, which saw the re-emergence of
two prominent leftists, signaled renewed govern-
ment interest in developing a more permanent
vehicle for enlisting popular support for official
programs and objectives.
Guyana: Labor Peace Remains Tenuous
Prime Minister Burnham has apparently
failed thus far to reassure apprehensive bauxite
workers that the government is capable of pro-
tecting their rights and securing their future once
it assumes control of the bauxite industry.
Burnham was met with howls of protest and
a storm of questions concerning wages and pen-
Concerned about the possibility of an eco-
nomic downturn and increased unemployment,
chafing under tight budgetary constraints, and
convinced that a new canal treaty with attendant
economic advantages is improbable in 1971, Tor-
rijos is likely to opt for headline-grabbing policies
that will hide his government's basic inability to
deal with emerging problems and at the same time
win popular support. At a minimum, the standard
"revolutionary" themes of agrarian and educa-
tional reform, a new labor code, and efficiency
and honesty in government will be stressed. More
radical measures that would affect the interests of
the oligarchy might also be forthcoming. These
would be encouraged by the Communist Party,
which is seeking to parlay its current role as a tool
of Torrijos into something more substantial.
A stress on nationalism can also be expected.
Torrijos, with the assistance of the Communist
Party, can be expected to try to channel domestic
discontent against the US and in support of gov-
ernment efforts to gain full jurisdiction over the
Canal Zone. In what may be the opening gun of
such a campaign, the government this week
granted asylum to two soldiers who escaped from
a US military stockade in the Zone and to an
airman under investigation for larceny. Also, in a
widely publicized move, the government arrested
two US soldiers accused of attempting to kidnap
the asylees. Torrijos is unlikely to allow such
harassment to go too far, but on the other hand,
he will be loath to pass up any opportunity to
embarrass the US.
sions when he visited the strike site at Linden on
6 May. His blunt approach to the workers' de-
mands did little to restore their confidence in
him.
Black militant leader Eusi Kwayana's public
criticism of the government's actions during the
strike is likely to make Burnham's task of
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securing a satisfactory settlement even more diffi-
cult. Kwayana admitted that his statements might
cause a cooling of relations between him and
Burnham, but he said that there were bigger
things than this relationship.
For the first time since its formation early
this year, the black radical organization calling
itself the Movement Against Oppression (MAO)
has taken a strong public position against the
government. Following the sentencing of West
Indian black students in Montreal on 30 April for
their participation in the wrecking of the com-
puter center at Sir George Williams University on
11 February 1969, MAO issued a press statement
denouncing both the Guyanese and Canadian gov-
ernments and called for a united struggle against
"external and internal assaults on black dignity."
While MAO leaders are not generally considered
close to Kwayana, their statements paralleled
Kwayana's criticism both in substance and in
timing and may indicate agreement to work in the
same direction if not for the same ends.
Burnham's displeasure with his administra-
tion's poor showing in settling the strike is not
likely to result in any cabinet dismissals, but the
discredited Mine Workers' Union leader, Verbeke,
probably will have to resign to make way for
militant young leaders who emerged during the
strike. It appears that the government will have to
withdraw its support for Verbeke and give in to
workers' demands that he be replaced.
Should Burnham fail to secure a satisfactory
settlement with the workers within the next four
weeks and fail to provide them with some tangi-
ble evidence that the government can guarantee
their futures, the strike could resume. This would
further erode public confidence and enable the
opposition to continue its attack on the govern-
Haiti: Situation R eport
Although there are rumors that several mem-
bers of the government are irritated with the way
Minister of Interior and National Defense
Luckner Cambronne has tried to "move in and
take over," there are no outward signs of stress as
the administration begins its fourth week in of-
fice.
According to US Embassy contacts, Cam-
bronne, who was one of the late president's
staunchest supporters, has quarreled with com-
mander in chief of the Armed Forces General
Claude Raymond and has antagonized many of
the President's advisers. Some conflict between
the minister of defense and the country's top-
ranking military officer would not be unusual.
The President's mother, Madame Simone Ovide
Duvalier, is said to play an important role in the
government and to be a protector of Cambronne.
The arrival in Port-au-Prince on 11 May of
Paul Antoine Colas, an obscure Haitian ex-
patriate, in what may have been a Haitian Govern-
ment ploy, may lend some credibility to the gov-
ernment's offer of amnesty to all exiles except
known oppositionists. At a well-attended press
conference Colas praised the amnesty and sup-
ported the continued exclusion of those who
would return to disturb public order.
The government continues to give the ap-
pearance of business as usual, and the rumored
clashes between Cambronne and others may be
only the inevitable, but not necessarily fatal, diffi-
culties that beset consensus government. Sympto-
matic however of general skepticism toward the
government's durability is the flurry of rumors
generated on 8 May that a military junta had
taken over and that the Duvalier family had fled.
The rumors were touched off, probably by the
exiles, when two members of the President's
family left for Paris on an apparently routine
trip.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Uruguay's Tupamaros.? The New Breed of Revolutionary
Secret
N! 40
14 May 1971
No. 0370/71A
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URUGUAY'S TUPAMAROS: THE NEW BREED OF REVOLUTIONARY
In the last 15 years Uruguay has degenerated from an economically
thriving democracy into an aimless, drifting nation. Nothing has exemplified
its recent troubles so dramatically as the rise of the terrorist National
Liberation Movement, popularly known as the Tupamaros.
The Tupamaros are representative of the new breed of terrorist in Latin
America. During the past few years the organization's successes have been
the most spectacular on the continent, and the group has influenced terror-
ists in other countries. Disregarding the guidelines laid down by such ro-
mantic revolutionaries as Che Guevara and Regis Debray, the Tupamaros
have concentrated their operations in the city rather than in the countryside,
and they typify the flexible approach to revolution currently in vogue in
Latin America. Taking maximum advantage of a generally permissive society
and of security forces unaccustomed to anything except political tranquility,
the terrorists have grown from a political curiosity into a major problem for
the Pacheco government. Imaginative and daring, they continue to recruit
successfully, and the government's efforts against them, though becoming
more effective, have yet to curb their attacks.
The guerrillas are currently in the second phase of their planned
revolutionary offensive. Having concentrated on attracting public support
and building their organizational network, they now aim to sow fear and
confusion in the government before moving to total confrontation. In earlier
years the terrorists' tactics emphasized expose and political embarrassment
of the government, but intimidation and assassination are now more impor-
tant parts of their strategy. A tactical objective is to force the government to
depart from the democratic principles that have governed Uruguayan politi-
cal life for more than a century, a goal that is being pursued with some
success. The scheduled presidential and congressional elections in November
furnish the group with another opportunity to disrupt society.
Barring a major overreaction by the government, the guerrillas are not a
major threat to stability under the present circumstances. Nevertheless, the
administration has shown that it cannot eradicate the organization with
present methods, and the group is likely to be a disruptive facet of the
Uruguayan political scene for the next several years. It has become a symbol
of the government's drift and of society's resulting frustration.
Special Report - 1
14 May 1971
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The Roots of Frustration
Until the mid-1950s, Uruguay was touted as
the "Switzerland of Latin America," a seeming
anomaly in the political chaos that often swept
the continent. The country was a showcase of
social reform as a result of the progressive labor
and welfare statutes adopted early in this century.
The two-party governmental system functioned
smoothly; during the years 1952-67 the country
adopted a plural executive system patterned on
the Swiss model. The population, basically of
European descent, was highly literate and nearly
fully employed.
The system, however, extracted a price. The
burgeoning welfare network was laudable in
theory. But it became a staggering economic bur-
den.,for a government caught in a financial pinch
precipitated by falling export earnings and pro-
longed economic stagnation that helped bring on
an inflationary spiral. The essentially pastoral
economy fell further behind the times with each
passing year. The plural executive, and the senti-
ment that led to its creation, acted as an effective
brake on the much needed exercise of strong
executive leadership. The rolls of government em-
ployees became bloated, and administration was
inefficient. Neither the Colorados, who ruled for
93 years, nor the Blancos, who served from
1959-67, were able to halt the decline, and the
country's complex political system operated to
discourage the emergence of an alternative. Older
Uruguayans were mildly disaffected by the recol-
lection of better times, and the educated youth
were dissatisfied with a system that they regarded
as an anachronism. Thus, Uruguay was ripe for
exploitation by a determined group of dissidents.
Although the National Liberation Movement
(MLN) did not emerge as an organizational entity
until 1966, its origins date back to the early
1960s and center around the activities of Raul
Sendic, one of the founders of the group. Sendic
was a law-school dropout and a member of the
Special Report - 2 -
Socialist Party of Uruguay (PSU). By 1962 he had
become a well-known peasant leader in the north-
ern part of the country. He organized dramatic
marches on the capital to emphasize demands for
better treatment of rural workers, but despite his
success as an organizer, his efforts had limited
practical results. At the same time, the PSU suf-
fered a serious setback in the 1962 elections. The
lack of success at the polls and mounting dissatis-
faction with the soft-line leadership of the party
prompted Sendic and others to leave the Socialist
organization, and they soon abandoned the parlia-
mentary process for good. Sendic became a fugi-
tive after he led a raid on a gun club in 1963, and
he moved his base of operations from the rural
northwest to the capital soon after this incident.
Sendic and other Marxist dissidents from the
PSU, along with some members of the peasant
groups he had organized, formed the core of the
MLN. They were probably joined by several an-
archists, whose own movement had faded from
the prominence it enjoyed in earlier decades, and
by a few radical independents. The entire group
numbered no more than a few dozen. During the
period 1963-66 the group, or its members, carried
out isolated terrorist acts such as robberies. They
won considerable publicity at Christmastime in
1963 with the theft and redistribution of meat in
a poor section of the capital.
Another example of the group's flair for
public relations that was later to bedevil the gov-
ernment was the terrorists' christening of the
movement as the MLN-Tupamaros. Tupamaro is a
shortened form of Tupac Amaru, the name
adopted by an Inca descendant who led a major
uprising against the Spanish crown in the vice-
royalty of Peru in 1781. Although the revolt was
bloodily crushed, Tupamaro has become synony-
mous with a call to revolution against the oppres-
sor. Artigas, the father of Uruguayan inde-
pendence, and his gaucho followers were also
known as Tupamaros during their guerrilla war
against foreign forces in the 19th century.
The organizational structure of the MLN be-
gan to emerge in 1966, when the first National
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Convention, attended by about 20 members, was
held. The organization's statutes call for the con-
vocation of a national convention at least once
every 18 months, circumstances permitting, but
except for a second meeting in 1967 and perhaps
a third in 1968, no conclaves are known to have
been held. In any event, the group does not place
heavy reliance on formal structure. Central leader-
ship, to the extent that it is exercised, is vested in
an Executive Committee, which has full powers
between meetings of the National Convention.
Sendic apparently was a member of this direc-
torate.
From its inception, the Tupamaros' organi-
zation has concentrated the revolutionary struggle
in the cities, ignoring the more traditional rural
activity popularized by Castro, Guevara, and
Debray. Uruguay lacks the conditions necessary
for prolonged guerrilla struggle in the country-
side. The rural terrain is predominantly flat and
offers little protection. Eighty-two percent of the
people live in urban areas, and political activity is
concentrated in Montevideo, the capital, which
contains half the population. The city supplies
the movement with recruits, and communications
and logistical problems are minimized in urban
areas.
Nonetheless, the movement has not com-
pletely disavowed traditional concepts. It envi-
sions a continent-wide struggle, with the develop-
ment of "many Vietnams" in which Uruguay may
act as a supply zone for the guerrilla struggle in
other countries.
Special Report
A pamphlet signed by the Tupamaros was
found after a bombing incident in mid-1965, but
the organization did not begin to receive real
public attention until December 1966, when a
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Forest (remainder of country mainly
grassland or under cultivation)
Uruguay's relatively small land area and general lack of forests or mountains, in conjunction with its pre-
dominantly urban population (82%) which is distributed throughout the country, make it unsuited for a prolonged
rural guerrilla insurgency.
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police investigation of a stolen vehicle erupted
into a gunfight and the first MLN member was
killed. He was one of the few casualties on either
side during this preliminary stage of activity.
25X1 During these years, the Tupamaros concen-
trated their energies on a Madison Avenue ap-
proach to revolution: popularizing the struggle
and selling their revolutionary line to the people.
Violence was shunned for the most part, and
operations were designed to embarrass the gov-
ernment while at the same time building the or-
ganization's prestige and attracting recruits. Be-
tween the end of 1966 and mid-1969, only one
guerrilla and two policemen were killed.
During this period, the Tupamaros' strategy
had considerable impact. In addition to robberies
and bombings, they mounted many spectacular
and publicity-grabbing operations. In mid-1968,
they kidnaped a generally unpopular administra-
tion official who was a personal friend and adviser
to the president and released him unharmed after
a five-day detention. In early 1969 they robbed a
finance company and turned over the company's
books to judicial authorities, charging high gov-
ernment officials with questionable financial
deals. A cabinet minister resigned shortly there-
after. During a five-month period later in the
year, the terrorists seized control of several radio
stations? and broadcast propaganda appeals. I n ad-
dition, they used their own portable transmitter
both to take over the frequencies of local radio
programs and to broadcast on their own fre-
quency. The police were unable to locate the
transmitter. To mark the visit of Governor Rocke-
feller in 1969, the terrorists burned the offices of
General Motors, causing damages estimated at $1
million. After several of the more spectacular
thefts, the Tupamaros offered to return the
money and valuables that were the property of
the "common man."
The group's choice of targets, its nonviolent
approach to revolution, and its unbroken string of
successes made it a household word in Uruguay.
Magazine and newspaper articles touted its mem-
bers as modern Robin Hoods. By early 1969, a
local opinion poll reported that 40 percent of the
people surveyed believed that the MLN was a
group of well-intentioned revolutionaries. In tacit
recognition of the success of its strategy, Presi-
dent Pacheco imposed censorship laws in mid-
1969 that forbade any mention of the MLN or
publication of the word Tupamaros.
Phase IT Post 1969
(From mid-1969
onrara , itbecame increasing y apparent that the
terrorists had decided to abandon their Robin
Hood role and to place increasing emphasis on
violence. In half a dozen simultaneous attacks on
police in early July, five policemen were disarmed
and one was killed.
In October, the guerrillas commemorated
the death of Che Guevara with their boldest oper-
ation to date. About 40 or 50 terrorists, disguised
as members of a funeral procession, raided the
town of Pando, about 15 miles from the capital,
robbed three banks, and took over the local po-
lice and fire stations. Police and riot control
forces from Montevideo converged quickly on the
town, however; gun battles resulted in the death
of three MLN members and one bystander and
the wounding of three policemen. Twenty of the
terrorists were captured, and the money taken
from the banks was recovered. In addition to
causing significant personnel losses, the Pando
raid destroyed the MLN's aura of invincibility and
drained away public support. This operation may
have been a maximum effort for the MLN at the
time.
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Ithe Tupamaros have
actively pressed their violent strategy. Early in
1970, the police formed a new counterterrorist
unit to deal with the MLN; the chief of the unit
was assassinated soon after his appointment. In
May, the Tupamaros pulled a surprise raid on the
naval training center in Montevideo and carried
off about 400 weapons and significant quantities
of ammunition without firing a shot. During the
subsequent search operations by security forces,
the Tupamaros again attacked individual police-
men, killing one and wounding three others.
From a public relations standpoint, the ter-
rorists' most serious gaffe occurred as a result of
their multiple kidnap operations in July and Au-
gust of 1970. I n the space of a week, the terror-
ists took three hostages and narrowly missed on
three other attempts. When the government re-
fused their demand that it release all "political
prisoners" in exchange for US AID adviser Dan
Mitrione, he was murdered.
Raul Sendic Antonaccio,
imprisoned MLN leader
"A country for all-or no country
at all. "(Tupamaro slogan
Special Report
Mitrione's murder caused the first wide-
spread public outcry against the terrorists and
increased the public's support for the security
forces. Because of the general sense of revulsion
created by the killing, the populace was more
prone to furnish the police with anonymous
leads.
The Government's Countercampaign
The arrest of Sendic and eight other MLN
activists in a raid in August 1970 was one of the
first major police successes against the terrorists.
Before mid-1970, the guerrillas for the most part
had been successful in seizing and holding the
initiative against security fnrrac
7FiY1
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e entire 25X1
security system su ere rom care ess operation.
The prisons, for example, were administered by
the Ministry of Culture rather than by the Minis-
try of Interior or by the security forces-a reflec-
tion of the Uruguayan emphasis on rehabilitation
President Jorge Pacheco Areco
"I refuse to serve merely as Uruguay's
undertaker; I will be President. "
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btLlCE 1
The MLN has given a lukewarm and quali-
fied endorsement to the efforts of the new Broad
Front-a leftist coalition that could become the
first major threat to the two-party dominance of
the Colorados and Blancos in more than a cen-
tury. Although the Tupamaros recognize that a
strong Front showing probably will work to their
advantage, their primary objective presumably is
still to attempt to force the cancellation of elec-
tions. Thus chances for the assassination of a
prominent public figure or for a major terrorist
raid will remain high through the 28 November
presidential election. The MLN would choose to
hold down the level of violence only if it became
convinced that the Front had a reasonable chance
to win the elections-an unlikely development at
this point.
Police successes and the terrorists' own fail-
ings have altered the situation of a year ago, when
the initiative threatened to pass into the hands of
the Tupamaros. The disruption in the terrorists'
ranks has not, however, significantly lessened
their over-all capabilities, in part because of their
continued ability to replace imprisoned members
with new recruits. Other factors continue to work
to the guerrillas' advantage as well, such as the
still-inefficient penal system and a judiciary that
metes out lenient sentences. Continued police
problems, such as the legal restraints that hinder
Special Report
effective interrogation, are contributing factors
pointing toward a prolonged period during which
the guerrillas will be able to maintain a high level
of activity. That level of activity is likely to
embarrass the government on occasion and some-
times strain the capability of security forces. As
the Tupamaros' strategy makes clear, it is aimed
not at a near-term overthrow of the government
but designed to prepare a "revolutionary con-
sciousness." The Tupamaros recognize that their
ultimate objective is dependent on factors outside
their control. In concert with a Communist Party
driven underground or into open rebellion by
harshly repressive government measures, the
Tupamaros could constitute a major threat to
stability. Such a situation would be precipitated,
however, only by a major government overreac-
tion.
After decades of tranquility, the Tupamaro
guerrillas are a disquieting reminder of mounting
dissatisfaction with the Uruguayan system, but
the government has the resources to withstand a
buffeting from terrorist tactics. The government's
viability will depend largely on its reaction to the
growing challenge centered in the legitimate polit-
ical arena. The Tupamaros are a highly visible,
vocal, and violent part of the over-all challenge,
but they ar a ca I st for, rather than the focus
of, dissent.
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S.C,I_;KL 1
South American revolutionaries and, given the
Tupamaros' proven skill at providing documen-
tation and cover, it is reasonable to assume that
they have extended aid to other guerrillas as well.
Within Uruguay, the Tupamaros have con-
sulted with several other extremist groups but
have shied away from any merger. The MLN has
sapped much of the strength from several of its
sister organizations and it is confident that they
will eventually be caught up in the revolutionary
groundswell and have no choice but to meld with
the Tupamaro organization.
The Tupamaros and the large Communist
Party have eyed each other warily for several
years, both conscious that they will eventually be
competing for the allegiance of the same indi-
viduals. Thus far, however, their common objec-
tives have overcome their mutual suspicions. The
Tupamaros now command widespread sympathy
in the student sector, and the PCU controls labor.
Neither has made a major effort to undercut the
influence of the other. The Tupamaros have, how-
ever, made a few limited forays into the trade-
union field. The Tupamaro strategy attaches con-
siderable importance to the control of labor, and
it seems that the MLN threat to the PCU's treas-
ured labor hegemony eventually will put the
groups at loggerheads. At present, however, many
of their activities are complementary and mutu-
ally beneficial.
The MLN has parted with its Robin Hood
mystique and lost much of the popular appeal it
once claimed, but it sacrificed these assets in a
calculated effort to advance its revolutionary
strategy through an escalation of violence.
Special Report
Although they have failed to force the gov-
ernment to grant any concessions in exchange for
hostages, they show no signs of abandoning kid-
naping as a tactic. For the moment, they are
satisfied with the publicity they gain from a suc-
cessful kidnaping and with the enhanced reputa-
tion resulting from their demonstrated ability to
hold hostages for lengthy periods. Both American
agronomist Fly and Brazilian consul Gomide were
detained for six months in the MLN's so-called
"peoples' prisons" before being released early this
year. Fly, set free after he suffered a heart attack,
had received professional medical treatment in
one of several "peoples' hospitals." The Tupa-
maros' current tactics toward kidnap victims, in-
cluding trials and sentences for crimes against the
people, are designed to emphasize a muckraking
image and to lend the organization a quasi-legal
facade. The income from ransoms is also a lucra-
tive and attractive side benefit. The terrorists have
successfully carried out ten kidnapings and at
present hold three hostages. Until the police can
break this string of successes, further attempts are
a near certainty, and diplomatic personnel will
remain prime targets.
Propaganda activities, although no longer the
primary focus of the Tupamaros, have not been
neglected. The terrorists are well aware that their
efforts to expose corruption in government ranks,
even through the use of kidnapings, have won
generally broad public acceptance. Such actions
are likely to continue. During the past year, the
Tupamaros on numerous occasions have taken
control of downtown movie theaters and factories
and held audiences at gunpoint while publicizing
the party line. The tactic is of questionable
utility, and the improved police response has
sometimes made it a costly one. This is likely to
be increasingly the case and could prompt the
terrorists to abandon the practice. Intimidation
efforts such as raids on private residences and
similar operations, which entail minimal risk, will
continue. The incidence of robberies and bomb-
ings is likely to proceed at the pace that has
become "normal" for Montevideo in the last two
years.
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Ulyses Pereira Reverbel
Head of State Utilities
Company and adviser
to the President
Caetano Pellegrini Giampietro
Prominent Banker
Daniel Pereira Manelli
Judge who had sentenced
several Tupamaros
Aloisio Gomide
Brazilian consul in
Montevideo
Daniel Mitrione
US AID adviser
Claude Fly
US agronomist
Geoffery Jackson
British ambassador
in Montevideo
Guido Berro Oribe
Uruguayan Attorney
General
Ricardo Ferres
Uruguayan financier
and businessman
Special Report
9 September 1969
28 July 1970
31 July 1970
31 July 1970
7 August 1970
8 January 1971
10 March 1971
13 April 1971
Released on 11 August 1968
but kidnaped again on 13
April 1971 and remains hos-
tage.
Released on 21 November
1969 after personal friends
made a donation to charity.
Released on 4 August 1970
Released on 21 February 1971
in exchange for $250,000 ran-
som paid by his wife.
Murdered after Uruguayan
Government refused to release
' olitical prisoners"; his body
was discovered on 10 August
11WO.
Released on 2 March 1971 af-
ter having suffered heart at-
t,;ck.
Remains a hostage.
Released on 23 March 1971
Remains a hostage.
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sympathizers, and probably active collaborators,
in some of the ministries. Part of the explanation
lies in the fact that Uruguayans enter the lethargic
government bureaucracy at the earliest age possi-
ble. Of the 18,000 university students, 50 percent
work; government employment accounts for the
largest sector of the active labor force.
earn money by day to ease the potential financial
strain.
The MLN has a close ideological kinship
with the Cuban revolution
Moscow supports the soft-line PCU in pre e
to the terrorist MLN.
Circumstantial evidence also suggests the
group is free from foreign support. Although
MLN upkeep requires a substantial monthly
budget, the terrorists have become adept thieves,
and the inputs from robberies and ransoms have
matched estimated operational expenses. In addi-
tion, raids have netted the organization a sizable
arsenal, with no need for a foreign arms supply.
The group's urban base also allows members to
Special Report
The MLN has a long-range, grandiose objec-
tive of bringing about the unification of revolu-
tionary groups in the southern cone of Latin
America and eventually on the entire continent.
Uruguayans are less parochial and nationalistic
than many of their Latin American brethren, and
the Tupamaros will continue to foster coopera-
tion among revolutionary groups and lend aid to
the extent permitted by their resources. In addi-
tion, Montevideo is a well-known transit point for
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other minor splinter groups on Uruguay's far left.
Not surprisingly, the MRO has since faded to the
point where it now commands no more than
about three to four dozen activists.
As several of the Tupamaros' operations
have made evident, the organization possesses a
significant technical capability. Priests; politi-
cians, doctors, and lawyers have been discovered
in guerrilla ranks. Despite the presence of such
talent, the list of those arrested makes it apparent
that the majority of the rank-and-file activists are
disaffected youth. The median age is only about
25 years, too young for the individual to be
established in a profession. Some of the terrorists
used in harassing attacks against private residences
have been in the 17 to 21 age group.
Despite their tarnished
image with the public at large,
the Tupmaros command a sub-
stantial following at the univer-
sity, and their exploits have
earned them public plaudits
from both students and faculty.
Sympathy-and radicalism-
extends into secondary school
ranks as well. The terrorists have
made some effort to organize
support committees in high
schools, and outbreaks of vio-
lence last year prompted Pres-
ident Pacheco to close down sec-
ondary institutions until he
could reopen them under
strengthened government con-
trol.
Special Report
Body of Ricardo Zabalza, son of a senator, who was killed during the
guerrilla raid on Pando. Ecuadorean Magazine Vistazo, September 1970
The schools thus present a ready pool of
educated, middle-class youth who see the Tupa-
maros as the only viable alternative to a decaying
system. The University of the Republic in Monte-
video has more than 18,000 students, and it prob-
ably will not require a major recruitment effort
for the Tupamaros to continue to attract enough
people to sustain their operations at or around
the present level for the near future. Their appar-
ent use of raw recruits in recent operations, al-
though indicative of police successes, also attests
to their continued attractiveness to youth.
Youths have gravitated to the MLN from all
points of the political spectrum. The son of Car-
los Quijano, a noted leftist intellectual and news-
paper publisher, is a Tupamaro. Raul Bidegain, a
high-level MLN activist arrested last August, is the
son of a former police chief. Both sons of a
Blanco party senator who was a member of the
ruling National Council in 1959-60 were members
of the terrorist band; one was killed during the
Pando raid and the other is currently in prison.
The Tupamaros are presumed to have access
to low-level information in many of the govern-
ment agencies, and there have also been several
disquieting instances of Tupamaro penetrations at
a higher level. It is likely that there are MLN
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militants as well. Some of their operations re-
sembled training missions. The clocklike precision
that had characterized earlier efforts gave way to
a greater number of incidents more amateurish in
nature. Several operations in September were il-
lustrative. Two MLN members were killed in the
poorly timed bombing of a bowling alley. A seem-
ingly ill-conceived operation involving the multi-
million-dollar burning of a textile warehouse,
which robbed Uruguayans of jobs and profits. was
unpopular with the eneral populace.
resigned from the govern-
ment in April. The resident's closure of leftist
publications by executive order has earned him
enmity from a legislature accustomed to consulta-
tion and responsibility and concerned about the
abridgement of press freedom. Although Pacheco
has been granted unprecedented suspensions of
constitutional guarantees on two occasions, simi-
lar requests to Congress have been rebuffed dur-
ing the last few months.
Who Are the Tpamaros?
From the outset of the terrorist problem,
President Pacheco has taken a tough stand. He
was the first Latin American leader to refuse any
dealings with kidnapers, and he has shown little
disposition to change this policy. Nonetheless, the
government's over-all record of achievement
against the terrorists remains mixed.
Despite the large number of terrorists im-
prisoned, the group remains capable of mounting
fairly large scale operations. The kidnaping of
British Ambassador Jackson in January was an
elaborately staged affair that involved an esti-
mated 40 to 50 people. In addition, the jailed
MLN members still enjoy considerable freedom of
action.
The President's shuffling of ministers has at
times borne the mark of a clumsy political opera-
tion that has done little to increase government
effectiveness. The competent undersecretary of
defense, Carlos Piran,
Special Report
The Tupamaros have a professional organiza-
tional image with limited emphasis on individual
leaders. Sendic, by personal inclination, was op-
posed to any personality cult and seemed to make
a real effort to subordinate his identity to that of
the organization. The emphasis on clandestinity
and autonomy aided the effort. The group has
survived the imprisonment of almost all its early
key leaders, and others have replaced them in the
decision-making apparatus. The Tupamaros'
growth from a nucleus of about two dozen people
into a group still capable of a high level of activity
despite the imprisonment of several hundred of
its members is the result of several factors.
Prior to the appearance of the Tupamaros,
the Uruguayan political scene had no leftist or-
ganization whose revolutionary fervor went much
beyond a sterile ideological exercise. The large,
legal Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) with a
membership of about 40,000 is a soft-line, pro-
Moscow party and an established part of the
political process. Therefore, when the pro-Castro
congressional deputy Ariel Collazo established his
Revolutionary Movement of Uruguay (MRO) in
the early 1960s, it grew quickly to a membership
of nearly 1,000 with about 5,000 sympathizers, a
number of whom were probably drawn from the
PCU. It too, however, proved to be largely an
exercise in polemics. The Tupamaros, who both
preached and practiced an activist line, probably
siphoned off a significant number of converts
from organizations such as the MRO, PCU, and
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The intensive use of city-wide sweep patrolling in the capital has resulted in numerous arrests of terrorists.
Steps have been taken to correct some of the
more obvious government failings. Responsibility
for the prison system was transferred to the Min-
istry of Interior in January 1971. The adminis-
tration also is considering building a new high-
security prison facility to house the more impor-
tant Tupamaro prisoners. The reaction time of
Special Report
the Montevideo police has improved measurably,
The police roundup especially has had an
impact on the guerrillas. In 1970, the terrorists
began to place greater emphasis on relatively
low-level harassment of police and prominent
citizens-a reflection not only of a change in
tactics but possibly of a lack of experienced
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