WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE GAULLISTS AND THE COMMUNIST-POLARITY IN FRENCH POLITICS?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008700040002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 23, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008700040 02-3
secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Gaullists and the Communists-Polarity in French Politics?
Secret
N9 43
23 April 1971
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008700042NU802nn=33367/71A
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08700040002-3
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08700040002-3
 Approved For Release 2UQ>b$li4P1? D0927A008700040002-3
THE GAULLISTS AND THE COMMUNISTS-POLARITY IN FRENCH POLITICS?
The Gaullists now appear to have a secure grip on France, but concern for the future has
caused them to seek to broaden their base of support and to distribute responsibility for
government by forming coalitions with other parties. The Communist Party (PCF), the best
organized and most disciplined party in France, shows little ability to increase its vote and, like
the Gaullists, is cultivating cooperation with other parties, in this case with the leftists.
The Gaullist Union of Democrats for the Republic (UDR) holds the presidency and
majority control of parliament, and its leaders are capable and popular. Nonetheless, the diverse
political origins of the Gaullists and their opinions have led periodically to disunity within the
party. Leaders who assembled this month for the spring session of parliament are vocally
dissatisfied with the government and with each other. Lacking the political magic of De Gaulle,
President Pompidou is having some difficulty keeping the party together. The UDR's tactic is to
work with other parties of the center to create a grouping opposed to the parties of the left. To
the extent that the Gaullists can point to such a polarity, they can claim that the voters have
only the one choice-Gaullism or Communism.
The PCF can almost always count on capturing at least a fifth of the vote, but it is unlikely
to enlarge that following greatly because of the continuing distrust of Communism by many
Frenchmen. The PCF therefore sees association with other leftist parties as the best route to
power, and it has been promoting such cooperation skillfully. If the Gaullist government loses
its popularity, it is not impossible-although it is unlikely to occur soon-that a federation of
the left that included the Communists could win a national election.
The municipal elections that took place in March provided an opportunity for both
Gaullists and Communists to set patterns of cooperation with other parties. The results of the
voting pointed toward stability rather than toward change, but they also tended to show that
coalitions are valuable both on the right and the left and that the leftist parties, at least, are in
danger of losing what power they have if they refuse to cooperate with the Communists. The
elections have therefore encouraged the idea of polarity, and both Gaullists and Communists
may expect to benefit.
The emergence of a durable two-party system, however, is improbable. The Gaullists
endanger their party unity when they cooperate with non-Gaullist parties. The PCF, which also
has its factions, is hindered by its ties with Moscow, which it is unlikely to strain unduly. These
ties cast doubt on the independence and national allegiance of the PCF. Moreover, Soviet desires
to cooperate with the French Government tend to cause the PCF to work with the Gaullists
rather than to oppose them strongly. Although the parties in the middle are so disordered and
splintered that, to keep alive, they need to join coalitions, even with the Gaullists or the
Communists, they remain jealous of their independence and have not given up hope of achieving
power in a coalition of their own.
For the next few years, the Gaullists will probably have their way. For the longer term, the
command of power in France will rest with a fickle electorate that is likely-in the face of social
unrest-to vote for those who can convincingly offer stability.
Special Report
- 1 - 23 April 1971
Approved For Release 6 fjR WI-00927A008700040002-3
 Approved For Releasqqo,9-00927A008700040002-3
PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
AS OF APRIL 1971
ELECTED JUNE 1968
Some of those in the PDM, but not all, vote regularly
with the Gaullists and are considered part of the coalition.
hililill Parties included in government coalition
UDR Union of Democrats for the Republic
IR Independent Republicans
PDM Progress and Modern Democracy (Centrists)
PCF French Communist Party
Special Report - 2 -
23 April 1971
Approved For Release ZQw 1f ,C,q plk79-00927A008700040002-3
 Approved For Release 2004EIV?Ad927A008700040002-3
The elections of June 1968, following the
radical disturbances of May, gave the UDR con-
trol of the parliament, and the election a year
later of Georges Pompidou to replace Charles de
Gaulle as president affirmed and strengthened the
party's control. The UDR had never before had
such a large bloc in parliament; it had never
before had a president who identified himself
clearly with the party. No single party has ever
been so powerful at the center of government in
France.
But the UDR suffers significant weaknesses.
A party of voters, rather than of members, it
stands in recurrent danger of disintegrating into
the heterogeneous elements that De Gaulle had
pulled together. The politics of UDR adherents
were defined in effect by the concepts that De
Gaulle excluded: anarchism, Communism, Atlan-
ticism, supranationalism. When party spokesmen
now seek to define the positive legacy of De
Gaulle, they agree only in their general sentiment
for national prestige and progress and in their
support for a strong executive authority.
As one left-wing leader of the party has
explained, the big UDR group in parliament in-
cludes 30 to 40 on the right, 50 to 60 with
"right-wing reflexes," 50 to 60 on the left, and 10
to 20 who are aligned behind the center-leftist
ambitions of former minister Edgar Faure. Presi-
dent Pompidou's prime minister, Jacques Cha-
ban-Delmas, appeals to a broad central group that
stands between these groups on the right and the
left and that looks toward social reform. All these
different elements tend to keep their individu-
ality, and a number of them have their own
organizations, such as the Presence and Action of
Gaullism, founded after the General's resignation
in 1969 to maintain the purity of party tra-
ditions, or the Front for Progress, a group that
has a leftist orientation.
Party cohesion over the past two years has
resulted partly from Pompidou's success in bal-
Special Report
ancing the different elements of the party and
partly from the logic of self-interest. Although
Pompidou is a cautious pragmatist who has more
feel for style than for boldness of decision, he has
kept his cabinet balanced between liberals and
authoritarians, and has defined his policies in such
general formulae as "order and progress" to en-
sure the support of most of the UDR. Because of
the power vested in the president, who is elected
for a seven-year term, and the relative weakness
of parliament and the cabinet, fractious and ambi-
tious party leaders hesitate to break with the
Elysee. Their only opportunity for influence and
position at this time is through Pompidou, and
their only chance for future influence and posi-
tion is through participation in the group that
elects a new president. They have no practical
alternative now but to support the UDR or one of
the party groups allied to it-the Independent
Republicans (IR) and a part of the Centrist party
(PDM). Pompidou's policy of "ouverture" allows
for coalitions with such parties in the center and
center-left of the political spectrum and paves the
way for alliances that the UDR may need after
the next parliamentary elections, to be held by
June 1973. It also helps the UDR to develop
rapport with a broad group of potential adherents
who can make a vital difference when the next
presidential election comes around in 1976.
The municipal elections of March 1971
proved the value of the "ouverture" policy. Hav-
ing failed in previous elections to establish an
extensive presence and power at the local level,
the UDR was most successful where it adopted
flexible tactics of seeking and accepting alliances
with local politicians most likely to win. Alliances
with such traditional opponents as the Fourth
Republic leader Pflimlin in Strasbourg and the
long-exiled Gaullist apostate Soustelle in Lyons
succeeded in placing the UDR on town councils
where it was not in a position to take leadership
against the left. In results that generally favored
stability rather than change, the UDR succeeded
in winning some power from the non-Communist
left and in establishing in a number of regions a
local presence more nearly in proportion to its
national role.
-3- 23 April 1971
Approved For Release 200U&MFMffM-AC927A008700040002-3
 Approved For Release 2006/ fc-Ji4 7A008700040002-3
GENERAL ELECTIONS 1956 - 1968*
Center Parties
(MRP & Successor Socialists and
Gaullists Parties) Radicals
Communists
percent
percent
erc
nt
o
p
e
percent
v
tes
of votes
votes
of
votes
votes
f
o
o
v
tes
votes of votes
1956
1.1
5.1
2.4
11.1
5.6*
26.5...
5
5
25
9
1958 '
4.2
20.4
2.3
11.1
4.7
23,0
.
3.9
.
19
2
1962
6.6
36.3
1.6
8.9
3.7
20.1
4
0
.
21
7
1967
-
8.6
38.2
3.0
13.5
4.2
18.8
.
5
0
.
22
5
1968
1 0.2
46.0
2.7
12.2
3.6
16.5
.
4.4
.
20.0
**Excluding right-wing Radicals who ran separately
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1965 AND 1969*
1965
1st ballot
2nd ballot
percent
percent
votes
of votes
votes
of votes
De Gaulle (UDR)
10.4
43.7
12.6
54.5
Mitterand (FGDS)
7.7
32.2
10.6
45.5
Lecanuet (Center)
3.8
15.8
1st ballot
2nd ballot
percent
percent
votes
of votes
votes
of votes
Pompidou (UDR)
9.8
44.0
10.7
57.6
Poher (Center)
5.2
23.4
7.9
42.4
Duclos (PCF)
4.8
21.5
Defferre (PS)
1.1
5.1
Special Report
23 April 1971
Approved For Release 20@OIjgLA7A-P0927A008700040002-3
 Approved For Release 2CWW/ k'4 Ii 00927AO08700040002-3
Although the municipal elections showed
varied results and often reflected purely local
factors, the UDR does appear to be taking votes
away from the far right and to be making progress
toward forming at least local coalitions with par-
ties or splinter groups in the center, ranging from
elements properly called "conservative" to dissi-
dent groups of Socialists. They include some Rad-
icals and those Centrists, led by the 1965 presi-
dential candidate Lecanuet, who have not joined
the Pompidou government. For these groups, the
election results were mixed: the Radicals suffered
the biggest losses of any party, and Lecanuet
scored a personal triumph in Rouen. With the
possible exception of the Radicals, who look
primarily to the Socialists for partnership, these
traditional groups appear to be in no immediate
danger of extinction. In the next parliamentary
elections they will be able to choose independent
candidacies or coalitions with the UDR, and these
in turn could lead to parliamentary cooperation
on the model of those party groups that now
share a role in the government.
The danger for the UDR is that, in broaden-
ing its appeal and cooperating with other parties
in lasting alliances, it may lose its drive, its mys-
tique, and above all its unity. Some of De Gaulle's
most devoted followers, including those who
formed the Presence and Action of Gaullism, have
periodically shown concern about this problem.
They have expressed uneasiness, for instance, at
the compromise with the Centrists that is implicit
in Pompidou's relatively positive and flexible
Common Market policy. To such Gaullist die-
hards, who regard Gaullism as a progressive alter-
native to traditional capitalism, a UDR coalition
with other parties of the right and center could
signify contamination by traditional bourgeois
concepts.
The preparation for the municipal elections
brought these worries briefly to a head. In Febru-
ary, the new UDR Secretary General, Tomasini,
voiced the sentiments of the Gaullist purists by
expressing disapproval of alleged judicial leniency
toward violent radicals and of Chaban-Delmas'
Special Report
relatively liberal information policy, an issue on
which Chaban is more in accord with the center
and the non-Communist left than with Pompidou.
Still more clearly demonstrative were the resigna-
tions from the Gaullist group in parliament of
two prominent old Gaullist deputies, one of them
De Gaulle's brother-in-law, in protest over the
electoral alliance with Soustelle. Dissident Gaul-
list purists even ran a few separate-and very
unsuccessful-local slates in the municipal elec-
tions.
Pompidou-as well as the majority of the
UDR-appears to be convinced, however, that,an
emphasis on Gaullist purity with De Gaulle gone
would result in a serious loss of popular support
and a corresponding improvement of chances for
a coalition on the left, including the Communists,
to take power in France. Pompidou appears to
think that the policy best calculated to keep the
UDR in power would combine flexibility and
inclusiveness, holding the UDR open to coopera-
tion with other non-Communist parties while con-
tinuing to stress heavily the Gaullist objectives of
order and progress. Despite the centrifugal forces
that may ultimately prevail, the UDR will prob-
ably cohere and dominate the scene for the next
few years, forming alliances as necessary for elec-
tions and for effective government.
Between 1965 and 1968, the dominant
competition in French politics was that between
the UDR and Francois Mitterrand's Federation of
the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS), a
non-Communist alliance of the left that the Com-
munists were generally prepared to support. The
FGDS fell apart after the disturbances of May
1968 and the ensuing parliamentary elections that
set back all the leftist parties. Despite efforts now
under way to reconcile the non-Communist par-
ties of the left, they are internally so divided and
so uncertain of holding their followers that the
disciplined and aggressive PCF has an exceptional
opportunity to win their cooperation.
-5- 23 April 1971
Approved For Release 6 ft;fjpf4fyA7f-00927A008700040002-3
 Approved For Release R4)]g '@ 00927A008700040002-3
The PCF has recovered from the severe set-
backs it suffered during De Gaulle's first years in
power. Its membership, estimated at 260,000 to
280,000, remains constant in number and far
exceeds the membership of any other French
party. What is more important, its activists,
estimated at about 60,000, are hard working and
loyal. Furthermore, although anti-Communism
remains strong in France, opinion polls suggest
that a majority of the French electorate sees a
useful role for the PCF on the political scene and
would be prepared to accept a Communist pres-
ence in a future cabinet, at least-as in De Gaulle's
first government at the end of the war-in min-
istries that have solely technical responsibilities.
Election results that consistently give the
PCF 20 to 25 percent of the vote indicate both
the strength and weakness of the Communists'
political situation: they are fairly sure of holding
what they have, but they are unlikely to get
within striking distance of direct government
power except by alliance with other parties.
Recognizing the logic of these circumstances, and
determined for reasons of party image and senti-
ment and of international policy to maintain a
constitutional approach to power, the PCF has
more or less consistently sought to arrange elec-
toral alliances with other parties of the left. In
1965, in the combined left's most notable effort
since World War II, its presidential candidate Mit-
terrand won 45.5 percent of the runoff ballot
against De Gaulle. Other election results, how-
ever, suggest that a leftist federation would not
normally win such a high percentage of the vote.
The PCF is inhibited by external and inter-
nal factors from taking full advantage of its
present opportunities. Its tie to Moscow often
causes the party to emphasize short-term interna-
tional Communist objectives over long-term aims
of improving its position on the national scene.
On the other hand, to the extent that the PCF
cooperates with the moderate left, it exposes its
members to the suasions of the Maoist and
Trotskyite revolutionaries who have emerged
since 1968 on the far left and who view the PCF
as a prop of the established order.
Special Report
Disputes have developed within the PCF
over the cautious policies of the party both in
asserting independence from Moscow and in seek-
ing to create a broad basis for PCF influence in
France. A number of party leaders have wanted
the PCF to condemn Soviet errors, to enter into a
bold dialogue with left-wing Catholics and other
non-Communist supporters of social reform, and
to make an effort to move toward power through
nonparliamentary channels.
During 1970, the party dealt with these
problems in a characteristically ambivalent man-
ner. First it expelled the chief proponent of
independent views, Roger Garaudy, and then it
adopted, in modified form, some of the tactics he
recommended. In November, the acting secretary
general of the party, Georges Marchais, in an
unprecedented interview with the independent
Catholic newspaper La Croix, proposed coopera-
tion between Communist and Christian workers.
Also the party has tried to give the impression
that it is not under Moscow's thumb by making
gestures such as emphasizing its disapproval of the
Leningrad hijackers' trial and by speaking out
against any possible Soviet intention to revive the
cult of Stalin.
Nothing is more alien to our ideal than regi-
mented Communism, the drabness of a society in
which differences in taste and aptitude would be
leveled or in which thought itself would be cloaked in
uniform.
There are now 14 socialist states. Each one mani-
fests its own idiosyncrasies in the construction of a
new society. If the experience of each of them is of
inestimable value for all the others-and for our-
selves-it is also true that not one of them can consti-
tute a model for the others to emulate, a model
within which their futures can be shaped.
PCF Acting Secretary General Georges Marchais,
in a speech to an international colloquy on the
50th anniversary of the founding of the PCF,
3 November 1970
- 6 - 23 April 1971
Approved For Release 20V/QW I fI-jE2,J g0927A008700040002-3
 Approved For Release 206 'J iMo927AOO87OOO4OOO2-3
Although the PCF has been flirting with
attitudes of disapproval for Soviet deeds over the
past ten years, its position in recent months
comes close enough to endangering relations with
the Soviets to represent a step toward some
genuine independence. The PCF put forward this
position most clearly and emphatically during the
Moscow party congress this month when it pub-
licly and explicitly rejected the Brezhnev doctrine
of the limited sovereignty of Communist coun-
tries. Although the PCF will not wish to provoke
the Soviets to exert financial or ideological pres-
sures, its present posture implies that the majority
of PCF leaders are determined to free the party
enough so that it can give-and make evident that
it is giving-more wholehearted devotion to
"French considerations."
The party has also been making a strong
effort to provide itself with a new image in other
ways. It has opened cell meetings to coverage by
television; it has held public discussions at which
it has answered all questions freely; and Marchais
even conducted an extemporaneous radio dis-
cussion with Mitterrand by telephone.
The activities of the past winter were aimed
at the municipal elections in March. These elec-
tions are always of special importance for the
opportunities they offer the PCF to win the
power to exhibit model administration by Com-
munist mayors. The PCF has held a number of
mayoralties since the 1920s, and its record of
administration has generally been good. The elec-
tions this year provided the occasion to work
toward cooperation with the non-Communist left,
following a pattern that the PCF had pursued
with limited success in the last such elections six
years ago.
In extended discussions with the Socialist
Party (PS), the PCF resumed previous efforts to
set a basis both for electoral agreements and for
collaboration in a future government. The pro-
visional results, published in December, included
a long list of agreed positions and a short but
important list of unresolved problems. The latter
Special Report
included the question of cooperation and integra-
tion with other Western countries and the key
domestic issue of democracy after victory: the
PCF would agree to the continued existence of
different parties, but it tries to avoid an explicit
promise to give up power if the "socialist" gov-
ernment should be voted out. The PCF seems to
have compromised about as much as it could; the
Socialists have kept their distance by announcing
that the agreement has no formal status.
The PCF was most aggressive in seeking
specific electoral arrangements, particularly with
the Socialists. At the same time it sought to limit
its potential partners by drawing a firm line
against cooperation with the Maoists and the
Trotskyites or with the PDM or Gaullists, parties
on the left and the right of a potential leftist
federation. The negotiations resulted in coopera-
tive electoral agreements in many more cities than
in the last such elections. Although the results of
the elections themselves brought only limited
rewards to the PCF, they confirmed the viability
of the party's tactics by proving that the PCF and
the Socialists were most successful where they
were united. Important Socialist mayors who did
not choose to join forces with Communists, for
instance, found that they needed Communist help
in the runoffs in order to stay in office. Those
Socialists who oppose cooperation with the Com-
munists will now find their position more dif-
ficult to sustain.
The PCF's immediate ambition is restricted.
However successful it is, through confident self-
assertion and tactical skill, in establishing a role in
a united left, distrust of the Communists by the
non-Communist parties of the left and among
French voters generally probably will remain
strong enough to keep the party from achieving
open leadership of such a coalition. The PCF
must therefore attempt to use the Socialists as a
front behind which to win influence and ultimate
power. Although desiring that the moderate left-
ist parties be strong and useful allies, the PCF
must also want them to be weak enough so that it
can set conditions for cooperation in parliament
and in a later bid for presidential power.
23 April 1971
Approved For Release 20 VI:IDI,.{' QMA-N927AOO87OOO4OOO2-3
 Approved For Releas
f 4E* Ngifjk[ P79-00927AO08700040002-3
The PCF is making progress, however. It is
having some success in presenting itself as a
responsible, constitutional party independent of
foreign control, and as a reliable, useful electoral
ally of the non-Communist left. In placing itself
in a position to take advantage of any change of
voter sentiment away from the government, how-
ever, the PCF's position is further complicated by
its ambiguous relations with the UDR-dominated
government itself, for beneath surface antago-
nisms there are undercurrents of understanding.
The PCF and the UDR constantly attack
each other on ideological grounds, but they have
often had more in common with each other than
with other parties as regards some important
aspects of policy. In foreign affairs particularly
the PCF, like Moscow, has been satisfied with
Gaullist policies in most major matters, and
despite some modifications of French positions
that have occurred since Pompidou took power, it
is exceptional for the PCF to speak out against
the government. In January 1971, when the PCF
criticized the government for aligning France too
clearly with the US, West Germany, and the Com-
mon Market, it referred to Pompidou's "commit-
ments" to Moscow, evidently hoping to influence
French policy. PCF efforts to reach agreement
with the government on foreign policy are recip-
rocated implicitly by elements within the UDR.
Gaullists who have founded the Movement for the
Independence of Europe-an organization that
has also won leftist supporters-tries to persuade
the government to stand by foreign policy views
that accord with those of De Gaulle-and of the
PCF.
In some fundamentals of domestic policy,
too, differences between the UDR and the PCF
are more theoretical than practical, for both the
parties include large elements that desire order
Special Report
and stability more than change. This type of
conservatism on the part of the PCF tends to
stand in the way, for instance, of PCF coopera-
tion with radical Catholic groups.
At times in the past, it has been clear that
the PCF was supporting the Gaullists for reasons
of international policy, and in the desperate days
of May 1968, the PCF in effect helped to keep
the rebellious students and workers apart and to
prevent the spread of disorder. It would seem that
on a number of occasions in recent years the
Gaullists were able to make deals with the
PCF-or with the Soviets-to maintain favorable
features of foreign policy in exchange for PCF
help in ensuring social tranquility or for its tacit
agreement not to provide electoral backing for
popular Centrist candidates. Such silent coopera-
tion would become more difficult to the extent
that the two parties took a leading role in two
mutually exclusive electoral alliances.
Although the attitudes that the UDR and
the PCF hold in common would be no impedi-
ment to a genuine two-party system, the two
parties are unlikely to be able soon to overcome
the difficulties that stand in the way of such a
system. Both parties appear to lack sufficient
assurance about dealing with internal factions,
and the PCF cannot cut the tie to Moscow. Al-
though the other parties are prepared to form
coalitions of convenience, they prefer a multi-
party system in which such alliances do not result
in the lasting dominance of one or two parties.
These parties have not given up hope that the
right leader will be able to take advantage of voter
disenchantment with the government and bring
them to power in a coalition of their own. None-
theless, for the next few years, the UDR will
probably continue to dominate the scene, while
the PCF will form electoral alliances without
being able to gather the other leftist parties last-
ingly around it.
8- 23 April 1971
Approved For Release~e#2,6 1 1 9-00927A008700040002-3
 Apggvvtl jpr Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08700040002-3
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08700040002-3