WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 26, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
26 March 1971
No. 0363/71
Copy N2 4-3
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
SECRET
CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 25 March 1971)
Indochina: Withdrawal from Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
South Vietnam: Public Relations and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Laos: Action Up North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Cambodian War Drags On . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Communist China: A Shift to the Right? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Peking Reiterates Ideological Criticisms of Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Changing Yugoslav Reform . . . . . . . I I
Yugoslav Emigres Increase Terrorism in West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
USSR: Final Preparations Set Stage for Party Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Poland's Provincial Party Conferences Promote Renovation . . . . . . . . . . . 9
France-USSR: Political Consultations Intensify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5
Discussions of CES on Upward Swing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
West Europeans Press Studies on Uranium Enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Norway: No Surprises in New Government's Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Cairo Publicizes War Readiness . . . . . 17
More Soviet Economic Aid for Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Sierra Leone: Stevens Regime Shaken by Coup Attempt . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Pakistan: East-West Talkathon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Turkey: The Long Road Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Argentina: Military Junta Assumes Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Bolivia: The New Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Colombians Propose Hemispheric Arms Control Measure . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1A
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Mar 71
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
SEC R] '1'
FAR EAST
Indochina: Withdrawal from Laos
North Vietnamese infantry regiments along
with armor and artillery units pressed South Viet-
namese forces hard on several fronts as the allied
forces wound up their operations in Laos this
week. Fighting was heavy around each South
Vietnamese strongpoint abandoned between Ban
Dong and the border. Intense enemy antiaircraft
fire continued to hinder air support of embattled
South Vietnamese forces and impeded the with-
drawal of many of the last units.
Communist pressure in northern South Viet-
nam picked up sharply during the week with
steady shellings of Khe Sanh and other allied
positions, as well as occasional ground probes and
sapper attacks. Thus far these attacks have in-
flicted more materiel damage than casualties, pri-
marily because of the heavy concentrations of
supplies at forward bases in northern Quang Tri
Province.
It is not clear whether the North Vietnamese
plan to pursue the Saigon forces past the border
and continue their counterattack into the allied
support complex just inside South Vietnam. Here,
of course, they would run into American forces as
well as fresh South Vietnamese troops.
Near-term enemy intentions should be re-
flected soon in the movements of the enemy units
that have been deployed in eastern Laos to thwart
the South Vietnamese operation. Some of these
came from North Vietnam while others were
pulled out of South Vietnam. Where they go from
here may provide some clues to how they weath-
ered recent fighting, as well as some indication of
the enemy's present supply situation. F_
Page 1
Spring Phase of Enemy Action
Within South Vietnam itself, signs of Com-
munist planning for an intensification of military
and propaganda activities have been cropping up
regularly. Most of the current evidence points to
more shellings and sapper probes, beginning late
this month. Allied targets in the central highlands
and in the area around Da Nang will probably
come under the strongest pressure, but there may
be more limited actions farther south. The
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Mar 71
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
S]UKi l'
Communists near Da Nang also are planning an
especially vigorous propaganda campaign to play
up the recent fighting in Laos as a major South
Vietnamese defeat.
The weakened condition of many Commu-
nist units in South Vietnam and their relatively
modest activities during the past year or so sug-
gest that any new phase will not be strong enough
to cause any great damage to the allied position.
Nevertheless, the South Vietnamese drive into
Laos has given the Communists added incentive
to demonstrate that they are still capable of
bringing significant pressure to bear in the South.
This factor could lead the Communists to try for
a few attacks inside South Vietnam that will have
a more dramatic impact than those of recent
months.
South Vietnam: Public Relations and Politics
Like the enemy high command in Hanoi,
Saigon government leaders recognize that how the
South Vietnamese people and armed forces view
the operations now being concluded in Laos may
be as important as the physical damage suffered
by both sides. With this in mind, the government
has taken steps to mute criticism of the opera-
tion.
Government censors have removed offensive
news articles even from papers generally con-
sidered friendly to the government. Although
there was some more or less open criticism during
the early days of the attacks into Laos, even
opposition politicians have remained publicly
silent in recent weeks. Only Vice President Ky
voiced a generally criticial view during the past
week, telling the press that the troops needed
relief and calling for an end to the operation.
Although Communist agitators are being
instructed to convince the South Vietnamese
people that the Laos fighting has resulted in a
government defeat, the government hopes that 25X1
the people can be persuaded to admire the fight-
ing qualities of their forces operating in a center
of enemy strength.
The government is also en-
couraging emonstrations by a newly formed
"Movement for Rear Support of Soldiers at the
Front." Most South Vietnamese normally give
first consideration to the probable effects of an
operation directly on themselves and their fam-
lies, and it seems likely that the government will
emphasize that the Laos fighting has reduced the
:nemy's capability to attack within South Viet-
nam.
Strange Bedfellows
Minh and Ky are potentially Thieu's chief
rivals for the presidency, and their joining forces
against him would hurt the President's bid for
re-election. The differences between the Minh anc25X1
Ky camps over what the two men have agreed to,
however, suggest that each is hoping to use the
SECRET
2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Mar 71
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
SECRET
other to further his own presidential campaign.
This casts doubt on their ability to plan any joint
action to oppose Thieu.
Laos: Action Up North
The government suffered some sharp set-
backs in the Luang Prabang area on 21 March,
losing a number of defensive positions northeast
,of the city to well-coordinated Communist
ground attacks. Luang Prabang's threadbare outer
defenses caved in before small elements of the
North Vietnamese 335th Independent Regiment,
which has traditionally operated in this area. As
part of the pressure campaign, the Communists
hit the Luang Prabang airfield for the first time in
two years. Rockets damaged several aircraft and a
headquarters compound and destroyed an ammu-
nition dump.
The government moved quickly to mitigate
both the psychological and military damage.
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Defense
Minister Sisouk visited the royal capital on 22
March. Dismayed at the performance of govern-
ment troops and displeased with the performance
of the commanders of Military Region 1, Sisouk
ordered senior officers from the Vientiane Gen-
eral Staff to move to Luang Prabang and to
assume control of tactical operations. Some 850
reinforcements have been brought in to shore up
the city's defensive line, and some positions close
to' the airport are now back in government hands.
As a means of bringing some international
pressure to bear, Prime Minister Souvanna called
on the Geneva Co-chairmen to help alleviate the
threat to the city. The King canceled his tradi-
tional appearance at Army Day in Vientiane in
order to remain in the royal capital. The town's
citizenry believes that his presence affords the
town itself-if not its airfield and military facili-
ties-immunity from Communist attack.
This is not the first threat to Luang Prabang,
although the Communists are closer to the city
and in larger numbers than they have been before.
As in the past, the Communists could move al-
most at will into the city, but such a step would
be a major departure in North Vietnamese strat-
egy in Laos. Almost without exception, the North
Vietnamese have refrained from direct attack,
harassments, or terrorism against major popula-
tion centers, and Luang Prabang-because it is the
residence of the King-has been considered
uniquely inviolate. It seems more likely, there-
fore, that the current campaign near the city is
intended to further Communist objectives in the
countryside and to demonstrate once again to the
Lao leadership the town's vulnerability and the
essential precariousness of their country's situa-
tion.
Status Quo at Long Tieng
The pace of military activity in the key Long
Tieng area has been relatively high for the last
week, but the Communist offensive west of the
Plaine des Jarres is now two months old and has
yet to make any substantial gains.
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
On 21 March a heavy Communist bombard-
ment forced irregulars from their positions at
Phou Pha Sai, on the eastern approaches to the
Long Tieng valley. The North Vietnamese are
close enough to the main base at Long Tieng to
harass it on a regular basis, and incidents such as
rocketing, shelling attacks, small-unit clashes, and
probes are a daily occurrence.
No major enemy offensive has yet devel-
oped, however, and since their sapper attack on
Long Tieng in mid-February, the North Vietnam-
ese appear to have concentrated on resupplying
and repositioning their units, the bulk of which
now appear to be shifting east of Long Tieng. The
Communists have largely avoided costly, large-
scale ground assaults against fortified positions.
Nevertheless, some of their units have suffered
substantial casualties from air strikes and govern-
ment artillery bombardments. The government
has significantly reinforced the Long Tieng area,
and aggressive patrolling in recent weeks has
helped to keep the Communists off balance.
Although their offensive has lost some of its
momentum, there is no evidence that the North
Vietnamese are disengaging. As in the past, they
have the ability to strike swiftly and in force with
little warning. There are now, however, only
about two months of good weather remaining,
and if the North Vietnamese intend to try to take
Long Tieng, they will have to begin to push
harder in the near future.
The Cambodian War Drags On
For over two months now, the Communists
have been lying low in Cambodia. Except for the
occasional effective sapper attack, such as the one
that put the Kompong Som oil refinery out of
business in early March, Communist activities in
the Cambodian countryside have been limited to
the kind of small-scale harassments whose im-
mediate impact is strictly local and which, even in
their cumulative effect, do not add up to very
much. It is too early to tell whether this is only
an interregnum or, in fact, the emerging pattern
of the war in Cambodia.
Last week, the Communists stepped up the
action somewhat. A series of Communist harass-
ing attacks near a small government-held town
astride Route 5, some 25 miles north of Phnom
Penh, caused the temporary closure of that im-
portant highway. Government reinforcements,
backed by air strikes, soon forced the enemy
away from the town, but Communist troops re-
main in the area. A few miles away rocket fire
damaged the government's only river ferry at Prek
Kdam, the gateway town to Route 6. This action
apparently was designed to hinder the northward
movement of Cambodian troops and supplies to
Kompong Cham Province.
An attack by Vietnamese and Khmer Com-
munist forces on a sugar refinery 25 miles south-
west of Battambang city caused some heavy
damage to the facility. A large number of civilian
dependents of the Cambodian troops assigned to
defend the refinery were also killed. Enemy leaf-
lets scattered during the attack threatened a simi-
lar strike against Battambang's textile factory
soon. Jittery government officials in that city
have taken the warning seriously and have re-
quested additional troops-possibly including
some who are patrolling Route 5-to strengthen
the city's defenses. Such a pullback may have
been one objective in the Communists' warning.
The government is not leaving the military
initiative completely to the enemy, however.
Twelve Cambodian battalions, half of which are
crack Khmer Krom units, are trying to drive
north of Route 7 up to the Communist-controlled
Chamcar Leu rubber plantation. The operation
has made little headway thus far, and the force
has reported only a few skirmishes with enemy
troops.
With the bulk of the Vietnamese Commu-
nists' main-force units tied down defending their
base areas east of the Mekong against the South
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
Vietnamese dry-season offensive, Phnom Penh has
had a good chance to breathe new life into last
year's campaign to clear Route 6 between the
village of Tang Kouk and Kompong Thom city.
But Phnom Penh evidently still fears that it can-
not undertake any major military operations
without the help of South Vietnamese ground
forces and allied air support.
The South Vietnamese in Cambodia
No significant ground fighting was reported
in eastern Cambodia during the week, as South
Vietnamese forces there paused to receive fresh
supplies and troops. The Communists carried out
several mortar attacks against South Vietnamese
positions near the town of Krek, on Route 7 in
Kompong Cham Province, and near Snuol, in
southern Kratie Province. The South Vietnamese
suffered only light casualties as a result of these
attacks. The enemy mortar barrage in the vicinity
of Krek caused the destruction of approximately
48 tons of South Vietnamese munitions, how-
ever.
Chamcar Lau
Tang Plantation
Enemy Attack
Prek KdarnJ, -'~
7 tovernment
Operation
Phnom Penh*( -..~
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Cambodia
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
SECRET
Communist China: A Shift to the Right?
The regime's announcement last week that
one of China's missing politburo members has
acquired a key party post attests to the complex-
ity of the current infighting within the political
cockpit in Peking. The unexpected "election" as
first secretary of the Peking municipal party com-
mittee of Hsieh Fu-chhih, who has been out of
public view for nearly a year, suggests that a shift
has occurred in the balance of forces within the
politburo.
Hsieh Fu-chih:
In from the Cold?
China's present polit-
buro is composed of individ-
uals who were often bitter
rivals during the Cultural
Revolution and who must
necessarily be concerned
with securing tenable politi-
cal positions for themselves
and their followers in antici-
pation of the death of 77-
year-old Mao Tse-tung. In-
direct evidence suggests that
these rivalries have been re-
newed and extended by the
process of rebuilding the nation's party and gov-
ernment apparatus.
Hsieh Fu-chih, who concurrently served as
public security minister, was the first of a trio of
important politburo members to have dropped
from sight in the past year. Although the regime
never openly acknowledged that he was in dis-
grace, there were a number of strong indications,
including persistent rumors that he had been cen-
sured at a secret, high-level meeting last April,
that Hsieh was involved in behind-the-scenes in-
fighting within the politburo. Hence his new
appointment suggests that he has been rehabili-
tated politically, even though some of the circum-
stances related to his appearance may indicate
that he is not yet completely out of the woods:
he did not, for example, address the municipal
party congress; he has not yet been reidentified as
a politburo member and minister of public secu-
rity; and he has not appeared with other polit-
buro members at several receptions held since his
election.
Hsieh's previous disappearance may have re-
sulted from "leftist" pressure within the polit-
buro. In his position as head of public security he
was almost certainly involved in an investigation
that began in January 1970 to ferret out officials
who had supported the "May 16 Corps"--an
ultraleftist organization that had attacked Premier
Chou En-lai and a number of other senior leaders
at the height of the Cultural Revolution. Accord-
ing to Red Guard accounts, the "corps" was
backed by a number of members of the present
politburo, including standing committee members
Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. Consequently, Chen
and Kang may have felt the investigation
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
threatened their political positions. Since then,
they too have dropped from view amid rumors
that Chen was censured at a stormy party plenum
last summer for organizing the "May 16 corps."
The apparent eclipse of Chen and Kang and
the confirmation of Hsieh in an important party
job therefore suggest that the balance within the
politburo has now swung in favor of a loose
grouping of relative moderates that includes Chou
En-lai and some powerful central and regional
military leaders. This tentative conclusion is
supported by other evidence indicating that in the
process of reconstructing the party and the
government some of the militant ideologues
closest to. Mao appear to have been losing ground.
These militants seem to have been unable to form
many bases of power in the reconstructed local
party organs, most of which are led by military
men and veteran officials, many of whom were
once victims of political attacks inspired by
radical leaders such as Chen and Kang. The
formation of party committees at the important
provincial level did not in fact begin until after
the disappearance of Chen and Kang.
Kang Sheng
Neither of these two has been publicly de-
nounced, and it is possible that they also may
eventually be "rehabilitated." Nevertheless, even
their return to the limelight would not erase the
impression that the "leftists" on the politburo
have lost a round in the ongoing struggle and have
even less chance than before to carry much politi-
cal clout in the post-Mao era. Indeed, this latest
development seems to tarnish Mao's image be-
cause of his close personal and philosophical ties
with Chen and Kang, and suggests that there are
constraints on Mao's authority.
Peking Reiterates Ideological Criticisms of Moscow
On 17 March a long, authoritative editorial
by the major Chinese propaganda organs surfaced
Peking's strongest polemic against Moscow since
last April. This new blast seems intended to drive
home the point that, despite recent improvements
in state-to-state relations, Peking has not kow-
towed on the fundamental ideological differences
between the two parties and has no interest in a
resumptionof party contacts. The Chinese clearly
wish to set the record straight on that point
before the 2',4th Soviet party congress begins on
30 March and, in a sense,, the editorial can be
taken as their response to the invitation to attend
the congress, which the Soviets claim to have
proffered.
Page 7
The attack, woven around a eulogy of the
Paris Commune on its centenary, reiterates Pe-
king's long-standing criticisms of the Soviet
ideological position and of Soviet policies, both
domestic and foreign. In contrasting Chinese ad-
herence to revolutionary violence with the Soviet
brand of revisionism, the editorial accuses Mos-
cow of going all out in the arms race while op-
pressing people at home and abroad, and repeat-
edly denounces Soviet party leader Brezhnev by
name. Specific grievances against Moscow, such as
the putative threat to Chinese territory-which
were raised in last April's attack-are avoided,
however, presumably because the occasion calls
for a more theoretical or ideological statement of
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
SECRET
Peking's position. Indeed, the article appears to
have been drafted with a view to avoiding insofar
as possible language that would hamper Peking's
diplomatic offensive in both the Communist and
non-Communist worlds.
Moscow on 21 March made an initial re-
sponse to the Chinese attack in a brief TASS
rejoinder accusing Peking of new anti-Communist
actions and noting that the editorial was wel-
comed by the "imperialists" because it coincided
with the intensified fighting in Indochina and
could aggravate Sino-Soviet relations. Moscow
may hold off any detailed, authoritative rebuttal
until after the party congress in order to avoid
dramatizing its differences with Peking and di-
verting attention from the conclave. Meanwhile,
in an apparently coincidental action, Moscow
released a book by nine Soviet Sinologists that
attacks Peking for obstructing aid to Indochina,
attempting to reach a detente with the US, and
seeking to foment a Soviet-US war. Although
these are standard themes in Moscow's propa-
ganda arsenal, press accounts suggest that the
book developed them in an unusually explicit
manner. Nevertheless, Sino-Soviet relations over
the past year have been characterized by a lack of
sustained public quarreling, and it is likely that
the current exchange will cease once Moscow
feels the Chinese charges have been properly re-
futed.
Peking has already moved to soften the mili-
tant impression created by the polemic. Accord-
ing to press reports, on 21 March Chou En-lai met
for four hours with Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov
and chief border talks negotiator Ilichev to dis-
cuss questions of interest to both sides. Although
details are not available, Chou may well have
attempted to separate the problem of continuing
fundamental ideological differences between the
two parties from that of improving state-to-state
EUROPE
USSR: Final Preparations Set Stage for Party Congress
Soviet leaders have completed preliminaries
to the party congress that opens on Tuesday in a
manner suggesting that they are working to make
it a routine and undramatic occasion. Procedural
anomalies and undercurrents of disagreement dur-
ing the preparations, nevertheless, are a reminder
of the always-present possibilities for political
clashes along with their unpredictable results.
On 22 March the central committee
approved party chief Brezhnev's report on the
leadership's activities since the last party congress
as well as Premier Kosygin's report on the new
five-year plan. Both of these will be presented to
the congress. Consideration of Kosygin's report at
this stage is unusual and appeared designed partly
to make up for the central committee's failure to
meet in February to approve the draft directives
of the plan. A central committee plenum would
normally act on Brezhnev's report about three
days before the congress. Calling its members to
Moscow this far ahead raises suspicions of in-
tensive politicking behind the scenes.
The last of the republic congresses-that of
the Ukraine-closed on 20 March. There was con-
siderable confusion in the scheduling of these
congresses, but their proceedings were short on
polemics. Efforts at the republic congresses to
enhance Brezhnev's public stature followed the
regional pattern of support for the general
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
secretary evident in recent months but no band-
wagon movement emerged. He received special
attention and occasionally was referred to as
"head of" the politburo at the Kazakh, Kirgiz,
and Uzbek congresses in Central Asia, at the
Armenian and Azerbaydzhan congresses in the
Caucasus, and at the Moldavian congress. On the
other hand, he was not mentioned in Estonia, and
the first secretaries of (Latvia, Lithuania, and
Belorussia stressed the theme of collective lead-
ership.
Party secretary Suslov won considerable per-
sonal credit last week by persuading the Japanese
Communist Party, which boycotted the last con-
gress, to attend next week's conclave. Suslov is an
important counterweight to Brezhnev in the polit-
buro, and his continued activity somewhat offsets
frequent conjectures by observers about his possi-
ble retirement because of age and ill health.
Discussion of political issues was muted at
the republic congresses, and foreign policy ques-
tions received a minimum of attention. The issue
of Stalin's rehabilitation, raised in 1966 in Belo-
russia, Moldavia, Azerbaydzhan, and Georgia, was
conspicuously avoided. An anti-Zionist theme was
evident only at the Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and
Turkmen congresses.
The economy will apparently be the major
topic at next week's congress. Omission of key
investment and other figures in the draft direc-
tives suggests that important decisions on the
five-year plan are still to be made. The economic
reform of 1965 found a handful of defenders at
the republic congresses, as did some other in-
novations in economic management, and these
Poland's Provincial Party Conferences Promote Renovation
The key themes stressed by Poland's top
leaders in recent weeks--renovation and dis-
cipline-are now being hammered home at pro-
vincial-level party conferences throughout the
country. Everyone subscribes to the concept of
renovation, which is now holy writ, but the re-
peated calls for discipline suggest that neither the
workers, who want rapid change, nor the middle
levels of party leadership, who fear for their jobs,
are yet satisfied with the course and speed of the
renewal process.
When addressed to the workers, exhortations
on discipline are more like an appeal; when di-
rected to party members, however, they have a
commanding ring. The leadership wants the work-
ers to know that they have no reason to fear
repression, but they also want them to under-
Page 9
stand that the country cannot afford any further
concessions. The constant need to reinforce these
points indicates that worker unrest, which is still
being reflected in small-scale strikes, continues to
give the new leadership anxious moments.
Meanwhile, the party leadership is insisting
on action from its local organizations. Politburo
members attending provincial party conferences
as guest speakers have cited the policies that party
leader Edward Gierek developed at the central
committee plenum last month as guidelines for
rapid renovation and modernization. In a hard-
hitting address to the Warsaw city party conclave,
Gierek made clear that only qualified candidates
who can implement modern management prac-
tices should be elected. All others, he implied,
have lost touch with reality.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Mar 71
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
About half of Poland's 19 provincial-level
organizations have now c,omp!eted their confer-
ences, and it is already apparent that Gierek's
message is being heeded. In some cases the entire
secretariat-except for the first secretary-was re-
placed. Some regions report dramatic increases in
the number of workers and peasants elected to
regional central committees. The inclusion of
authentic workers in local party organizations will
not only reinforce Gierek's doctrine of more
party contact with the masses, but in some cases
it will have the added value of incorporating the
leaders of the workers' revolt into the estab-
lishment.
Gierek is determined to keep renovation
from becoming an empty slogan, and more per-
sonnel changes may be necessary to overcome
passive resistance in local organizations. Not all
the replacements will be "Gierek men" but they
will owe their jobs to Gierek's program for change
and they probably will give him the endorsement
he needs at the next party congress.
Yugoslav Emigres Increase Terrorism in West
There seems to be an element of desperation
in the actions of the more radical anti-Communist
Yugoslav emigres around the world. There are
recurrent attacks on Yugoslav installations abroad
and last month some terrorists seized the Yugo-
slav Consulate in Goteborg, Sweden. They at-
tempted to ransom its occupants for $100,000
and the release from a Yugoslav jail of convicted
terrorist and murderer Milijenko Hrkac.
Emigre attacks on Yugoslav installations in
the West have been frequent over the years, and
only recently has Belgrade had success in per-
suading host countries to clamp down on those
responsible. Organizations such as the anti-
Communist, Croat nationalist Ustashi find it more
difficult to operate, for example, in West Ger-
many where the government, because of excellent
relations with Yugoslavia, keeps close tabs on
their activities. With their freedom curtailed and
sanctuaries in jeopardy, the emigres have become
bolder. Last year witnessed bombing attacks on
the Yugoslav mission in Brussels and the Yugoslav
Consulate in Melbourne, and a fire at a Yugoslav
exhibit in Frankfurt. Early this month several
persons were arrested in Vienna for smuggling
arms to the Ustashi in West Germany.
Mindful of Tito's plans to visit the US this
year, officials in Belgrade are concerned that such
terrorists, finding it increasingly more difficult to
operate in Western Europe, will target Yugoslav
personnel and installations in the US. Yugoslav
officials claim to have reports of a plot to kidnap
their ambassador in Washington and their consul
in Cleveland.
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
The Changing Yugoslav Reform
Speaking on 16 March to a conference of the
mass organization SAWPY, President Tito pub-
licly admitted that his proposed reorganization of
the Yugoslav federation was proving more com-
plicated than first envisioned. Tito conceded he
originally had in mind the creation of a collective
presidency and only later did the need for federal
reorganization and constitutional change become
apparent.
A lively debate, invited by Tito himself, has
forced some alterations in the proposed collective
executive body's makeup. Gone is the idea of
including representatives of the party presidium
and mass organizations, and at this stage it looks
as if they will be replaced by republic and pro-
vincial assembly presidents. This is supported in
the Belgrade daily Politika, which reports "ru-
mors" that the proposed collective presidency
will be eight men larger than originally planned.
Interrepublic rivalries, disagreements over the dis-
tribution of power between the republics and the
federal government, and the need for the federa-
tion to retain the power to intervene in the econ-
omy have caused a major slowdown of plans for
far-reaching decentralization.
For the same reasons that political reforms
are in difficulty, Belgrade has been unable to
move decisively in tackling the country's eco-
nomic problems, and there continue to be serious
disagreements over the federal budget and stabili-
zation program.
The tone of the current arguments indicates
that differences are likely to continue until basic
constitutional questions are resolved this summer.
One of the more explosive problems surfacing
during the reform debate is regional chauvinism,
and public recriminations have recently broken
out between Serbian party officials and promi-
nent Croatian political figures.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SI LRI'1'
France-USSR: Political Consultations Intensify
France and the USSR have moved toward
holding more frequent political consultations, as
agreed during President Pompidou's visit to Mos-
cow last October. Results so far, however, have
been more in the nature of form than of sub-
stance.
Over the past month, Kosygin and Pompi-
dou have exchanged messages through their am-
bassadors on the Middle East, and Deputy For-
eign Minister Kozyrev has visited Paris. Foreign
Minister Schumann will visit Moscow early in
May, at which time the French hope to settle
plans, long under discussion, for a summit-level
Soviet visit to France in October.
The protocol signed provided for consulta-
tions between the foreign ministries twice an-
nually as well as for emergency sessions when
situations arise that threaten the peace. The
Schumann visit to Moscow is presumably to be
the first of the semiannual political meetings, and
the first special consultations were held at Soviet
request in February following President Pompi-
dou's public disapproval of the South Vietnamese
move into Laos. The Soviets, evidently interested
in giving the impression of coordinating with Paris
on the subject, announced the consultations in
Pravda.
Since the De Gaulle trip to Moscow in 1966,
France has sought to play up its contacts with
Moscow to enhance its influence and to demon-
strate its independence from the West. The es-
sentials of that policy remain the same. An in-
tensification of the dialogue with Moscow, how-
ever, is especially useful at this juncture. France
recently has been moving closer to its Western
allies on such issues as increased cooperation with
NATO, and frequent contacts with the Russians
are a reminder to the West that France intends to
maintain a balance in its relations with the two
sides. In Paris' view, an ongoing dialogue with
Moscow increases both its policy options and its
leverage.
Moscow, for its part, has evidently seized
upon the latest developments in Indochina and
the Middle East as an excuse to intensify its
"special" relationship with France. Soviet cultiva-
tion of President Pompidou during his visit to the
USSR made it clear that France and West Ger-
many share pride of place in Moscow's efforts to
expand its influence in Western Europe. Moscow
undoubtedly hopes to use its relationship with
Paris as a lever to slow progress toward Western
European integration. Although the Soviets have
been unable to crown their efforts with concrete
agreements, they probably are satisfied with the
pattern of bilateral consultation that has been
Norway: No Surprises in New Government's Program
The minority Labor government led by
Trygve Bratteli, which took office on 17 March,
has presented its program to parliament. The
main lines in domestic and foreign policy estab-
Page 13
lished by the outgoing bourgeois government are
maintained, and little resistance to the program
from the opposition parties is expected.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
I n foreign policy, the new government
pledges to continue membership negotiations
with the European Community (EC) and to keep
the parliament and public thoroughly informed
on the course of the talks. The government has
also promised to protect the special interests of
the farming and fisheries sectors in the negotia-
tions and to hold a national referendum before
parliament makes its final decision. On other is-
sues, the government has endorsed continued
membership in NATO, the convening of a confer-
ence on European security, cooperation with
other Nordic countries, and increased aid to de-
veloping countries.
Following through on a commitment in the
Labor Party program drawn up prior to the 1969
parliamentary election, the Bratteli government
has announced that it will "take steps with a view
to seeking to establish mutual diplomatic rela-
tions with North Vietnam." It is generally be-
lieved that the commitment to recognition was
the price Bratteli had to pay to his party's left
wing for the strong EC and NATO planks. Ameri-
can officials in Oslo have been assured that the
government will not move precipitately, and there
is some speculation that the act of recognition
may be postponed until after the beginning of the
new parliamentary term next October.
The government's domestic policy planks in-
clude such noncontroversial proposals as balanced
economic growth, a more just tax system, special
economic assistance to the more remote areas of
Norway, state management of the oil industry
based on the new finds in the North Sea, en-
hanced environmental protection, and liberaliza-
tion of the social welfare system. The government
has also pledged itself to decentralizing the deci-
sion-making process by giving more authority to
the county councils, and to redistributing the
responsibilities of the ministries to accord with
the needs of modern society.
Reaction to the government's program has
for the most part been positive. Leaders of the
bourgeois parties have, however, taken some ex-
ception to the government's announced intention
to recognize Hanoi.
Despite these objections the probability that
the bourgeois parties will unite to overthrow the
government on this or any other part of the
program is slight at this point. The bitterness
between the Center and other bourgeois parties
engendered by the fall of the Borten government
remains, but all parties will probably wait until
after the nationwide local elections next Se tem-
ber before making new political moves. - p~ 25X1
West Europeans Press Studies on Uranium Enrichment
West Europe is searching for an answer to ties-"supranational" arrangements
the difficult and politically charged question of EURATOM framework.
where it will get the supplies of enriched uranium,
costing into the billions of dollars, it will need by
the end of the decade. The US now meets these
needs, but the Europeans believe that it will not
be able to do so by 1980. Among the options
Europe must therefore consider are development
of national capacities, cooperative arrangements
with non-Europeans, multinational cooperation,
and-for members of the European Communi-
Following up a February announcement of
its intention to start construction over the next
five years of eight to ten new nuclear power
plants, France recently disclosed that it is pro-
ceeding with a feasibility study for a commercial
enriched-uranium facility based on its already-de-
veloped gaseous diffusion technique. Although
hoping that other West European countries will
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
participate, the French insist that, if necessary,
Paris will consider constructing the facility alone.
In publicizing the feasibility study at this time,
France is no doubt aware that the US is currently
considering an offer to share gaseous diffusion
technology with acceptable foreign partners. In
addition, the French proposal is clearly intended
to compete with the tripartite (Dutch-British-
German) project launched last year for producing
enriched uranium by the gas centrifuge technique.
This intensifying rivalry for the European
market has already attracted the attention of the
Soviet Union as well as certain non-European
countries possessing native sources of natural
uranium and cheap electric power. The USSR has
discussed the provision of enrichment services to
Western Europe, and an enrichment contract with
France was announced last week. France has
already suggested to Australia the possibility of
jointly constructing an enrichment plant there or
in France. The Australians are known to be
interested in exploring various possibilities, in-
cluding eventually purchasing centrifuge tech-
nology from the tripartite arrangement.
The tripartite centrifuge project is the only
multinational production arrangement presently
under way, but data on whether it will be feasible
to proceed beyond the pilot-plant stage will not
be available before mid-1973. The Italians and
Belgians are unhappy with terms offered so far
for "junior partnerships" in this effort and pre-
sumably are still candidates for participation in
other schemes.
Meanwhile, the initial report of a EURA-
TOM study group commissioned last December to
collect comparative data on projects for diffusion
and centrifuge, as well as "jet-nozzle," separation
is expected to be ready late this month. Whether
this report will end support to the EC Commis-
sion's earlier call for the establishment of an en-
richment facility under the aegis of a presumably
enlarged Community remains to be seen. The
huge investment costs, the difficult problems in-
volved in managing such a partnership arrange-
ment as the tripartite scheme, and the commit-
ment to a common energy policy argue for a
Community approach. On the other hand, EURA-
TOM has long suffered from national rivalries that
are likely to be aggravated as the market for
nuclear energy gains in importance.
Discussions of CES on Upward Swing
Preparations for the NATO ministerial meet-
ing in Lisbon in June and renewed overtures from
the Warsaw Pact side are provoking increasingly
active consideration by the European NATO allies
of the possible modalities of a conference on
European security (CES). Although the position
the NATO countries will eventually adopt is far
from clear, the drift ol: opinion in Europe seems
to be toward one less skeptical than that ap-
proved by the Alliance Mast December.
Moscow clearly wants to sustain this inter-
est. Following up the Pact foreign ministers' con-
ference in Bucharest on 18-19 February, Soviet
ambassadors last week delivered "informal"
papers on the CES issue to the US and other
NATO capitals. These papers reiterated Soviet
support for such a conference, blamed Washing-
ton for obstructing it, and repeated standard So-
viet objections to Western demands for linkage of
CES preparations to a Berlin settlement.
Most NATO allies now accept the inevitabil-
ity of a security conference, and assume that an
initial conference probably would be only the
first of a series. Many allies also think that some
permanent institutions for dialogue with the East
will be established. Although the British are still
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
SECRET
taking a comparatively hard line in NATO discus-
sions of CES, Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home
recently said that he also regarded a CES as inevit-
able. Moreover, a British position paper has sug-
gested that the participants at an initial CES es-
tablish permanent machinery-possibly along the
lines of the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament. Although the British say they will
not press this point, they have in effect breathed
new life into a project originally initiated by the
Labor government.
The UK and the six members of the Euro-
pean Communities (EC) are convinced that the
Soviets hope to use the CES process to slow the
pace of West European integration. As a conse-
quence, the British paper suggests a CES role for
an enlarged EC-an idea that might also emerge
from the newly initiated EC consultations on
CES. The Six are taking these consultations very
seriously, and the timing of their study suggests
that they may come to the June NATO minis-
terial with similar views on a number of CES-re-
lated questions.
In the near term, the active discussion of
CES in Western Europe is not likely to undermine
NATO's requirement that a Berlin settlement pre-
cede multilateral East-West CES preparations. But
some allies might wish in June to leave Berlin as
the only prerequisite, dropping insistence on
progress in other "on going talks." Given the
favorable inclination of many of the allies toward
a CES, it might in the future become increasingly
difficult even to make multilateral preparat
talks deDendent on RP in. 25X1
MIDDLE EAST _ AFPIro
Page 16
SECRET.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Mar 71
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
SECRET
It is doubtful whether the government could
adopt a much more forthcoming position on
withdrawal and survive. The future course of the
National Religious Party (NRP) is crucial to the
government, because Mrs. Meir will have to find
some way to keep about: half of the NRP from
joining the opposition even to gain Knesset ap-
proval for a settlement such as that outlined in
the Times interview. The implication in her inter-
view that Israel would give back much of the West
Bank to Jordan presented the NRP with a major
crisis of conscience. For the moment, the NRP
has been mollified by Mrs. Meir's protest that her
statement did not constitute official policy. Also,
the value the party places on its alliance with the
dominant Alignment and its politically profitable
ministerial portfolios will continue to exert a
strong pull. Nevertheless, future government com-
mitments regarding the West Bank will almost
certainly raise a similar crisis, and perhaps a split
Cairo Publicizes War-Readiness
Cairo media this week focused on a series of
Egyptian political and military meetings designed
to increase the state of war-readiness in the coun-
try. President Sadat had held daily conferences
with various groups of military commanders ear-
lier in the week, ostensibly for the purpose of
clarifying the current phase of the confrontation
with Israel.
In discussing action on the diplomatic front,
Egypt's press played on the theme of increasing
US-Israeli differences and termed Foreign Minis-
ter Eban's meeting with Secretary Rogers last
week "chilly." The Egyptians' belief that they
had made a significant move by agreeing to enter
into a peace settlement with Israel and that the
Israelis now must act was expressed in an al-
Ahram article that stated, "The ball is now in
Israel's court." The press also continued to stress
the need for the US to prove its sincerity in
wanting a peaceful settlement in the Middle East
by pressing Israel to withdraw from occupied
Arab territory.
Egypt's continued diplomatic efforts were
emphasized by the announcement of Foreign
Minister Riad's projected trip to Rome and Paris
at the end of the month for discussions with
Egypt's ambassadors to Europe. In an interview
aired on French television, President Sadat reit-
erated his continued adherence to the proposal he
made on 4 February to reopen the Suez Canal in
return for a partial Israeli withdrawal from the
Sinai.
Some division of opinion was evident in the
Cairo press over the current course of national
action. The prestigious al-Ahram gave consid-
erable treatment to diplomatic moves as well as to
various military developments, while Egypt's
other newspapers adopted a more pessimistic and
somewhat more militant tone. There also was
more evidence of the feud over the state of the
country's military preparedness between the chief
editor of al-Ahram, Muhammad Haykal, and the
more hawkish press influenced by Egypt's sole
legal political organization, the Arab Socialist
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
SECRET
More Soviet Economic Aid for Egypt
Moscow's recent extension to Egypt of sub-
stantial new economic assistance reinforces its
influence in Cairo and in the country's long-range
economic development. As in the past, however,
the aid will have little early impact, and Moscow
will continue to avoid becoming involved in day-
to-day problems that plague the Egyptian econ-
omy. The 1971 trade protocol, also agreed to last
week, calls for a continuation of trade at roughly
the same level as in recent years.
The new Soviet aid package worked out with
an Egyptian economic delegation headed by
Minister of Industry Sidgi apparently amounts to
as much as $200 million for various projects. In
addition, the discussions covered certain other,
unspecified projects valued at more than $200
million. These may have been included under past
aid pacts: about 75 percent of a $324-million
credit extended in 1964 for project assistance
remains unused. Total Soviet economic assistance
to Egypt so far has amounted to more than $1
billion.
Included in the nearly $200 million in new
aid is a rural electrification program for which the
Soviets have agreed to provide almost $70 million
worth of equipment. This project will use elec-
tricity generated by the Aswan Dam and the total
cost is expected to be more than $250 million. In
addition, the Soviets agreed to provide $40 mil-
lion to cover the reclamation of an additional
100,000 acres of land. Although the USSR ex-
tended about $67 million for reclamation of
200,000 acres in 1964, little information on the
progress of this project has been reported. The
Soviets also agreed to provide more than $30
million for the construction and expansion of
cement factories and for building a ceramics
plant. In addition, $55 million in Soviet credits
will be allocated for construction of silos and
flour storehouses.
The Soviet economic aid program in Egypt
has slowly been moving ahead despite the prob-
lems generated by the Arab-Israeli conflict. In-
auguration ceremonies for the Aswan Dam, a So-
viet showpiece, were held in mid-January, and
work is continuing on the expansion of the
Helwan iron and steel complex. Planning has been
substantially completed on several other plants
that will consume electricity from the Aswan
Dam. The Soviets continue to explore for oil in
the Western Desert although they have had little
success thus far.
Trade this year will remain at about its cur-
rent level of roughly $470 million. The protocol
specifies that Egypt will ship primarily consumer
goods to the USSR and that Moscow will furnish
crude oil, petroleum products, fertilizer, and cast
iron to Cairo. Bilateral commercial trade is ex-
pected to continue to be far more advantageous
to Egypt than to the Soviet Union. The USSR
and Eastern Europe probably will continue to
serve as dependable markets for surplus Egyptian
cotton. The USSR probably will again purchase
Egyptian crude oil for shipment to other Com-
munist countries and to buy much of the excess
output of Egypt's manufacturing industries.
Moscow's support for Cairo is also being
manifested in the diplomatic and propaganda
fields as well. Israel's reply to the Jarring
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Mar 71
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
memorandum gave Soviet propagandists a new
opportunity to press the line that the US has no
intention of exerting pressure on Israel.
Moscow's desire to respond to Cairo's need
for progress in the diplomatic arena is probably
behind the abandonment of its usual propaganda
reticence on the Four Power talks. On several
occasions in recent weeks, the Soviets have pub-
licly castigated the US for its "obstructionist"
behavior in this forum. Soviet media, however,
have generally evaded any discussion of guar-
antees or of an international peacekeeping force,
and have not acknowledged any of the recent
statements by US officials about Washington's
willingness to help guarantee a settle-
Sierra Leone: Stevens Regime Shaken by Coup Attempt
An abortive coup attempt this week by the
commander of Sierra Leone's badly factionalized
army has plunged the country into new political
turmoil that may yet bring down the civilian
government of Prime Minister Siaka Stevens. Al-
though some of the army elements that prevailed
over the commander proclaimed their loyalty to
Stevens, other soldiers have apparently been urg-
ing his removal. As of noon on 25 March no one
had emerged in clear command of the army, and
its squabbling factions were still trying to reach
some agreement.
Political tensions it Freetown had been ris-
ing in recent weeks as Stevens renewed active
consideration of his controversial plan to trans-
form Sierra Leone into a republic. Army chief
Bangura had voiced growing disaffection with
Stevens' highhanded methods, particularly his at-
tempt to involve the army in support of his politi-
cal objectives. Increasingly distrustful of the
army, Stevens had last week arranged for military
support from his political mentor, Guinean Presi-
dent Toure. Over the weekend, an initial con-
tingent of some 40 Guinean soldiers arrived in
Freetown to serve as a special security unit for
Stevens. Their arrival probably triggered the move
on 23 March by an army contingent to kill or
capture Stevens, during which Bangura an-
nounced that he was taking power. In the face of
opposition by other-apparently more powerful-
army elements, however, Bangura's support
quickly evaporated and he himself was arrested.
Stevens, in a recorded speech broadcast on
24 March, claimed that he was again in full con-
trol. In fact, however, he appears to have retired,
accompanied by his Guinean bodyguard, to a
sanctuary where he is awaiting a decision by the
military. Since Wednesday the army's officers
have been conferring among themselves and with
the lower ranks of the 1,500-man force to settle
on a new leader and to decide whether to allow
the Stevens regime to continue. Deep tribal divi-
sions, conflicting loyalties, and personal rivalries
are all contributing to the soldiers' indecision. To
some extent, at least, Stevens' cause has been
damaged by his reliance on Guineans, a move
particularly resented by many enlisted men.
In neighboring Guinea, meanwhile, President
Toure continues to broadcast statements pro-
claiming his "unreserved solidarity" with Stevens
and pointing, characteristically, to "imperialism"
as the source of the trouble in Sierra Leone. I n an
even more direct effort to influence the outcome,
Toure has since 23 March periodically sent
Guinean MIGs on low overflights of Freetown. He
has also kept Guinean Army units on alert, con-
tributing to fears of a Guinean "invasion" in
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
Pakistan: East-West Talkathon
Some progress apparently has been made in
negotiations between President Yahya Khan and
political leaders, but a final solution may con-
tinue to prove elusive.
Yahya and East Pakistani leader Mujibur
Rahman made enough headway in their talks,
which began on 16 March, to enlarge their meet-
ings to include top aides on both sides. Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, whose party holds a majority of seats
from West Pakistan in the national assembly,
arrived in Dacca on 21 March to join the
discussions.
On 22 March Yahya announced that he was
again postponing-this time indefinitely-the
opening of the national constituent assembly in
order to "facilitate the process of enlarging the
areas of agreement among the political parties."
Because he made the announcement after con-
sulting with both Bhutto and Mujib, the post-
ponement this time aroused little negative reac-
tion in East Pakistan and was apparently taken as
a sign of progress in negotiations.
Although Bhutto claimed on 22 March that
he was studying an agreement already reached
between Yahya and Mujib, the latter publicly
denied that any agreement existed.
Yahya in his message to the nation
on 23 March, Pakistan's National Day, asserted
that "the stage is now set" for the politicians to
achieve a "smoothly working, harmonious sys-
tem." The next day leaders of several minor West
Pakistani parties who had just returned from
Dacca claimed that Yahya and Mujib had reached
"complete agreement" on a solution to the crisis.
The seemingly contradictory assessments by
the three principal figures could stem from their
differing views of what remains to be accom-
plished. Mujib may think that details yet to be
worked out are so important as to preclude any
statements at present about a solution. Bhutto,
by alluding to his role in reviewing the alleged
agreement, may be trying to ensure his position as
principal spokesman for West Pakistan. Although
some press reports at midweek claimed that plans
for an interim government had virtually collapsed,
Bhutto affirmed there was a 50-50 chance that
such a government would be formed.
Occasionai incidents of violence have con-
tinued in East Pakistan, the most serious on 24
March when several East Pakistanis were killed in
clashes with West Pakistani troops. National Day,
celebrated in East Pakistan as "Bangla Desh Re-
sistance Day," was generally peaceful, but unsuc-
cessful attempts were made in Dacca to firebomb
two offices occupied by US firms.
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Mar 71
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
Turkey: The Long Road Back
The threat of a military take-over hung
heavily over Ankara for two critical weeks, but
Turkey's constitutional system now appears to be
gradually headed back toward normal. The basic
terms of the military ultimatum have been met-
Prime Minister Demirel has resigned and a non-
partisan government, pledged to restore order and
undertake a broad program of reforms, is about
to be announced. Although Turkey's political life
can never be quite the some as before this military
"coup by communique," the new regime may,
initially at least, be an improvement over its
predecessor, which had been dogged by inter-
minable delays, frustrations, and increasing ter-
rorism.
During the two weeks since the military
leaders forced. Demirel to step down in favor of a
nonpartisan coalition government, President
Sunay has held meetings with the leaders of all
political parties, including the Marxist-oriented
Turkish Labor Party. On 19 March he requested
political moderate, to
head a new government.
Nihat Erim, a well-
known and respected
By training, experience,
and temperament, he ap-
pears to be a reasonably
good choice for the as-
sign ment. Like many
Turks, however, Erim re-
portedly sees Turkey as
being in need of another
Ataturk or of a De
Gaulle and believes that
a clever and able politi-
cian might be able to play that role. As yet he
has refrained from casting himself in the part.
Erim has received the necessary pledges of
support from the major parties and has moved
ahead with the formation of his government.
Although it will consist mostly of political tech-
nicians from outside Parliament, it will also
include several ministers from three of the four
largest political parties. Some cabinet posts re-
portedly will soon be abolished and their func-
tions absorbed by others. Three new ministries
may eventually be created, including one for
foreign trade. Although no top party leaders will
be included in the cabinet, their continued
support will be essential. The political situation
will remain tense until the new government
receives a vote of confidence, probably in about a
week. The government's program must first be
submitted to Parliament for debate. Meanwhile,
the predominant Justice Party continues to press
for national elections by October 1971.
The purge of known and suspected plotters
within the armed forces, including several general
officers, has been accomplished with no serious
disruption. Purges of lower echelons may
continue in low key for some time as the military
tries to weed out dissidents and to justify its
intervention.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Argentina: Military Junta Assumes Power
The commanders of the three armed services
assumed power in Argentina on 23 March follow-
ing President Levingston's abortive attempt to
remove army commander General Alejandro
Lanusse. The junta claims this represents no inter-
ruption of the Revolutionary Government in-
stalled by the military in 1966. Most Latin Ameri-
can governments accept this interpretation and
see no problems involving recognition.
Levingston's power play came the evening of
22 March following a meeting in which he appar-
ently was taken to task by Lanusse for the firing
of the chief of the joint general staff, Air Force
General Martinez. General Lanusse was briefly
held under house arrest but was released when
word began reaching Buenos Aires that troop
commanders 'throughout the nation rejected the
President's action. The commanders of the navy
and air force expressed their support for Lanusse
and even the general narned to replace him re-
jected Levingston's authority. There was a brief
show of force by the presidential guard, but
Levingston soon recognized that his gamble had
failed and he submitted his resignation.
The final rift between Levingston and
Lanusse apparently was sparked by the Cordoba
riots of the previous week for which Levingston
sought to blame General L.anusse. The President's
removal, however, was the culmination of a slow
deterioration in his position brought on by popu-
lar unrest over economic problems and by the
President's increasing proclivity to act inde-
pendently of the service commanders.
The junta of commanders-in-chief opted to
take direct control of the government this time
rather than name a figurehead president as they
did nine months ago when they selected General
Levingston to replace President Ongania. General
Lanusse, the strong man of the junta, is known to
favor an accelerated return to constitutional
processes; moving the country toward elections
undoubtedly will be one of the high priorities of
the new government. This, of course, will be
tempered by a desire to ensure that the Peronists
cannot regain control of Argentina.
The junta will be faced with the same do-
mestic problems that contributed to Levingston's
downfall including growing inflation, rising un-
employment, and continuing labor unrest. The
junta has probably bought some time on the labor
front with its removal of the wage ceiling imposed
by Levingston, but the large wage increases the
unions will now demand will complicate the
over-all economic problems.
General Lanusse appears to have broad sup-
port within the armed forces at this time, but the
military now will bear direct responsibility for
governing and will view any failures as a blow at
its institutional prestige. Thus, the junta is likely
to experience considerable pressure from all sides
and growing dissension within the armed forces in
the weeks and months to come-F---] 25X1
SECRET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
Bolivia: The New Cabinet
President Torres' long-expected cabinet re-
organization has not produced a notable shift in
the group's political orientation and is not likely
to lead to a significant change in the government's
avowedly revolutionary policies. None of the
seven new ministers is a significant political per-
sonality. The appointments of a well-known
Marxist and several leftists were balanced by the
removal of several other leftists. The military rep-
resentation was reduced from seven members to
four. This move meets with the approval of the
armed forces, which have been pressing for a
reduction in the number of military officers in
political positions.
The most significant omission is that of lead-
ing members of the moderate leftist Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement (MNR), the country's
largest political party. Their absence could indi-
cate that Torres made a sincere but unsuccessful
attempt to convince them of the benefits of co-
government. It appears more likely, however, that
Torres concluded that there were no significant
political gains to be made by public cooperation
with members of this broadly based but internally
divided political force.
Ousted Minister of State Jose Ortiz Mercado
had participated in several meetings with MNR
leaders over their possible participation in the
government. His removal from the cabinet indi-
cates that these negotiations did not meet with
Torres' approval. In his resignation statement,
Ortiz said that the government requires the par-
ticipation of the most important political par-
ties-a seeming reference to the MNR. If he
chooses, Ortiz now is free to try to weld the
divided MNR into a unified group that could
attempt to seize power by force. The factions'
history of internal disagreement, however, makes
it unlikely that a successful coup could be
mounted in the near future.
Torres has also announced plans to establish
a Political Secretariat for Revolutionary Co-
ordination. Although its role was not specified,
the President said the new group would co-
ordinate the country's revolutionary forces in
support of the revolutionary process. Such a gov-
ernment-sponsored organization has been under
discussion for several months. This new group is
probably seen by Torres as a more pliable instru-
ment than the labor/student dominated Popular
Assembly, which was created by leftist groups in
the aftermath of Torres' seizure of power in Oc-
tober and which has only recently received his
grudging approval.
The probable infighting among leftist groups
for domination of the new group may take some
of the pressure off the government for the next
few months. The formation of the new organiza-
tion also will enable the government to select the
political groups that are most amenable to govern-
ment direction and to try to gain some measure
of badly needed popular support.
Colombians Propose Hemispheric Arms Control Measure
Colombia has proposed that the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) consider a study
of "unnecessary and disproportionate" arma-
ments in order to eliminate by common agree-
ment superfluous military expenditures by mem-
ber states. The suggestion avoids discussion of
disarmament, but envisions a progressive cutback
in military spending. The Colombians are sound-
ing out hemispheric opinion, and if they can
obtain the necessary two-thirds support, they will
enter the proposal on the OAS agenda at the
opening General Assembly session on 14 April.
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
The Colombians may be successful in bring-
ing the question before the OAS, as most Latin
American states are unlikely to take a strong
stand against the principle of arms control. Costa
Rica and Chile have already indicated their whole-
hearted support. Few, however, appear ready to
move beyond general discussion and toward any
concrete agreement. The area's long-standing ter-
ritorial disputes and historical animosities, as well
as its sensitivity to any proposal that might in-
fringe on a country's "sovereign rights," are sub-
stantial impediments to any arms agreement.
There are already indications that the Vene-
zuelans, who are engaged in a border dispute with
Colombia, will view the proposal as a cynical
Developments in Chile
Political Affairs
Attempts by Chile's political parties to
strengthen their positions for the municipal elec-
tions on 4 April are beginning to affect the gov-
erning Popular Unity (UP) coalition in several
potentially unsettling ways, but President Allende
is not likely to be weakened by these develop-
ments.
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) has
belatedly challenged the Allende. government in
Congress and, the press, seizing on issues such as
the involvement of administration officials in a
shady copper sales maneuver on the world
market. These actions indicate that the PDC lead-
ership may have realized at last that its accom-
modating attitude has only helped to strengthen
Allende and the UP's steady consolidation of
power, and that by continuing to play the govern-
ment's game the PDC could only damage its slim
chances in the elections.
Strains are also showing within the UP itself.
Radical Party (PR) leaders suspect that their weak
attempt by Bogota to freeze arms purchases. The
Venezuelans believe that their neighbor, which
recently signed a contract for Mirage aircraft, now
has an edge, and they are therefore unlikely to
support the measure. In indirect reply to the
Colombian initiative Venezuelan President
Caldera has reiterated the need to "renew armed
forces equipment." I n Central America,
moreover, mutual suspicion still persists as a
result of the 1967 Salvadoran-Honduran war, and
both countries remain interested in acquiring
further armaments. Also, the Guatemalan foreign
minister, because of his government's intention to
increase the country's arsenal, has indicated he is
opposed to the Colombian plan, although he
professes to support arms control in
theory.
role in the coalition is threatened by hard-line
Socialists (PS). For one thing, the latter are the
source of charges that Mines Minister Cantuarias,
a Radical, is involved in the copper scandal. All
coalition candidates in the election must run on
their own party tickets, and the PR is particularly
eager to make a good showing. The Communist
Party (PCCh), meanwhile, is determined to win
the largest vote of any UP party, but is concerned
that the PS might surpass it. PCCh leaders are
irritated over the increasing and outspoken oppo-
sition to the government, and it plans to counter-
attack with a series of demonstrations and other
mass exhibitions of popular support for the
administration.
UP press announcements that major share-
holders of two more banks have agreed to sell
SECRET
Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
SECRET
their shares to the government mean that eight
private banks, including one of Chile's largest, will
soon be under state control. Thirteen remain in
private Chilean hands. Two textile mills have been
expropriated and a third soon will be. The govern-
ment claims that production has increased in the
seized plants as well as in the nitrate, coal, and
other expropriated industries; financial diffi-
culties, however, persist in all of them.
Administration efforts to blame copper pro-
duction shortfalls on US management have been
rebutted by PDC members. One has cited steeply
rising absenteeism and lack of discipline amonq
copper workers, a high turnover in supervisory
personnel, and the use of informers, threats, and
political pressures by UP labor leaders as the real
causes. Increased sales of consumer goods in the
first quarter of 1971 have not been reflected in
industrial production, which has declined. On 20
March Allende probably reflected government
concern when he announced that "committees
for the defense of production" would be set up.
Strikes by bus drivers and bakery workers in
Santiago were settled quickly this week by the
government, probably because both had immedi-
ate impact on the daily lives of most work-
ers.
SECRET
Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A008600060001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
Iq
Next 15 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3
Next 41 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08600060001-3