(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008600050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 19, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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State Dept. review completed
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Page
Indochina: Maneuvering for Position . 2
Cambodia Passes a Milestone . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Mostly Quiet in the Other Laos;_ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Campaign Maneuvering in South Vietnam ./ . 4
China Issues a Warning , 8
No Basic Change in SinoSoviet Relations
' ................10
fi
The State of Play in Ostpolitik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Soviet Ambassadors Go Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
France-Algeria: Oil Dispute Straitfs Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Soviet Leadership on the ve of the 24th Congress of the CPSU
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MIDDLE EAST- AFRICA
Libya: The RCC Meets the People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Portugal-Zambi e Lisbon Considers Retaliation . . ' .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
India: Local Elitical Maneuvering Follows Mrs. Gandhi's _Victory . . . . . . . 20
Pakistan: Talks Under Way to Avert Split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Turkey: Military Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Hpnduran Elections: An Experiment in National Unity . . . . . . . . . . 24
Government-Labor Strife in Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . 25
Syria; South Africa
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Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Mar 71
Finland; Maritime Issues;
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lx ~' J 1030
3 f = .} 43 03 ~IO3
Main
network
Saravane
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Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Mar 71
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FAR EAST
Indochina: AUmmg~~rtion
South Vietnamese advances into the Tche-
pone area last week have triggered sharp Com-
munist counterthrusts. Heavy fighting raged this
week around a string of fire support bases just
south of Route 9.
actions-the attack on the Phnom Penh airport,
and the raid on the Kompong Som oil refinery.
Both of those attacks were carried out by small
numbers of enemy troops, and may well have
been executed as much for psychological as for
military or economic impact.
Communist pressure against the allied rear
also is likely to grow. More shellings of the kind
that struck Khe Sanh this week are certain, per-
haps in tandem with a stiff infantry attack or two
in this sector.
The government in Phnom Penh has begun
its second year in power with undiminished deter-
mination to resist Communist aggression but with
a future clouded by the prospect of more hard
fighting ahead and growing internal political dis-
cord. The regime can take pride in the fact that,
in the months that have elapsed since Sihanouk
was sent packing to Peking, it has managed to
survive continuing enemy pressure and other mis-
fortunes brought on by the war.
The Cambodian leadership can also be grate-
ful that the Communists have been either unable
or unwilling to bring more than a modest amount
of military muscle to bear against them thus far
during the current dry season. Late last year,
when the enemy launched a series of telling at-
tacks on government positions along Routes 4
and 7, it appeared that the Communists were
going to increase the scope and tempo of the war
in Cambodia. Following the successful interven-
tion of South Vietnamese task forces to break
their hold over the highways, however, the Com-
munists have staged only two significant military
For most of the current dry season the Com-
munists have confined themselves to a series of
minor harassing attacks against scattered govern-
ment positions in the countryside. Although they
have also kept a fairly steady and effective level
of pressure against main lines of communication,
they have not-as previously anticipated-done so
against major population centers. In Phnom Penh,
terrorist incidents have fallen off sharply.
Since early February, most of the Vietnam-
ese Communists' crack combat regiments have
been tied down in Kompong Cham and Kratie,
defending their bases and supply lines against
large-scale South Vietnamese clearing operations.
Their preoccupation with those operations and
their disruptive effects-as well as with the South
Vietnamese push into south Laos-clearly have
prevented them from doing more military damage
to the Cambodians.
Although the military situation is generally
calm for now, the political climate in Phnom
Penh is becoming more clouded. Lon Nol's ab-
sence, and the uncertainty surrounding his future
political role, have helped foster a spate of rumors
about antigovernment demonstrations, allegations
about coup plots, and speculation about potential
candidates to replace the ailing prime minister.
The government evidently is aware of much of
this restiveness, but the leadership appears con-
fident that it will not present any unmanageable
problems.
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Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Although the government has been unsuc-
cessful in pinpointing the ringleaders who would
be involved in possible demonstrations or other
antigovernment activities, it did take a number of
steps to ensure that the first anniversary of
Sihanouk's ouster passed quietly in Phnom Penh.
Demonstrations were banned, a curfew was im-
posed, and the army was placed on alert. Earlier
in the week, the regime put out the line that it
had foiled a plot to restore the monarchy. The
press in Phnom Penh was told that Acting Prime
Minister Matak had ordered the arrest of a num-
ber of officers who allegedly were moving to
place a member of his family on the throne.
Whatever the case, Matak has moved adroitly
to defuse what was potentially an explosive situa-
tion. Nonetheless, although the regime probably
can continue to count on broad support for its
conduct of the war, the relative political harmony
that existed before Lon Nol became ill is not
likely to be restored in the near future.
Mostly Quiet in the Other Laos
Ground action has remained at a fairly low
level throughout most of Laos for the past week.
Small-unit clashes and shelling attacks continued
around the Long Tieng complex, but no major
positions changed hands.
The situation on the E3olovens Plateau has
quieted down since the Communists overran Site
22 on 9 March. Only one enemy battalion re-
mains near the position, which has been leveled
by tactical air strikes, as other elements of the
NVA 9th Independent Regiment have pulled back
to thu east. For their part, government forces are
Page 3
regrouping and taking up positions near Ban
Houei Kong, west of Site 22.
There are continuing signs that the Commu-
nists may again move on Ban Houei Sai, a govern-
ment position on Route 23 near the northern side
of the plateau where the North Vietnamese suf-
fered a severe setback in early January. That
attack appeared to be intended to open the north-
ern approaches on the plateau and to force the
government to redeploy some of its troops from
positions on the eastern rim of the plateau over-
looking the Communist supply routes to Cam-
bodia. In view of their success in ousting govern-
ment forces from the eastern part of the plateau
this month, however, the Communists may see
little reason to make an all-out effort against Ban
Houei Sai at this time. They will probably con-
tinue to put pressure on the position, however,
particularly because it is now defended by regular
army troops.
~Spuvanna and the ComNnists
oth Moscow and eking have recently` re-
iterate their preferencp for Souvanna'sleader-
ship, de ite his acgq.4scence in the Sgdth Viet-
namese in ~rsion rr~to Laos. Both countries have
made it cleat` hat they regard Souvanina as crucial
to maintaining o_ lit al stability and keeping alive
the possibility afuture litical settlement
under the umbrel o ,theeva Accords. Al-
though the Communt is ay doubt the efficacy
of Souvanna's "neutra as a restraining in-
fluence on allied op.er ns in Laos, they are
clearly reluctant t1 e 1962 agreement,
which legitimizes Lao Co unist movement
and affords it p'`p ition in aalition govern-
ment, completely ab cloned.
Last J5all, the Ch`Ppese charge in ,/ientiane
provided ?the first indication of Chinas position
on thisfsubject when he ' stiid China wante to see
Laoseturn to "strict netrality," with theNeo
Lab Hak Sat (NLHS) participating in the govern-
,rnent. He also stated hewas doing everything he
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cold to persuade the NLHS to negotiate with the
25X1 Rod I Lao Governor it. Subsequently, in late
Febrary,
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Other ChmeSq officials in Vientiane
have also made it known .that Peking is backing
Souvanna nd that Ching, will support Laotian
neutrality aid all other previsions of the Geneva
Accords that iqoncern it.
~. t
Moscow lies also re ently stressed its con-
tinuing support 'for Souvanna Phouma's leader-
ship. During a cc nversation with a US Embassy
official in Moscowon 96'March, the deputy chief
of the Foreign Mlnistr 's Southeast Asian Di-
vision flatly stated,.thztt the Soviets still view
Souvanna as prime minter despite their official
position that the tripArt a coalition government
has collapsed. The So)ie told the Japanese es-
sentially the same thing pn 8 March. Moscow's
expressions of support ,fir Souvanna seem de-
signed in part to prevent possible challenges to
him from Laotian rightis. Like the Chinese,
Moscow clearly thinks puvanna's continued
presence at the head of y he Royal Laotian Gov-
ernment is far more dlesirable than the uncer-
tainties that would attend his overthrow by other
non-Communist elements.
Souvannaliimself has made another move in
the prolonged war of words about peace talks
with the Pathet Lao. He told the press of his
letter of 1 March to Lao Communist leader
Souphanoge"vong requesting renewed efforts to
move foryr`ard on internal Lao peace talks. The
Communists have yet. to reply to this message,
and it is,'likely that the contents of the fetter will
be leaked to the pressIfairly soon, furthering the
impression that Souvan a is eager for progress.
'Campaign Maneuvering in South Vietnam
The campaign strategies of the major con-
tenders for South Vietnam's presidency are
beginning to take shape.-'Big Minh is formulating a
Communist controlled tenitary
Contested territory
sition distinctly different from Presi ent
Thi increasingly hardline
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Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Mar 71
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urging them to t ke steps that will benefit specific
groups and presu ab y make them more f+ora-
bly disposed towar a government
A-hn the
.
Big ,Mini is seeking to build up support measures are a suspens n of tax payments by
within the milifery,and i,4lanning to back some peasants who have receiv tproperty under the
candidates in the Lo'we;House elections-to be land reform program, and at-,acceleration in the
held before the presiderlto
for their aid in his campi
n. M"rrrhalso is showing
e toward the election.
For hi ,pa"rt, Thieu has b'~en taking a firm
anti-Cgrrrmunist stance in rent pre-campaign
Junkets around the country. The President report-
edly has been meeting with province chiefs and
probably also is encour Bing an attempt by a
group-of basically progove ment parties to agree
on a common slate of can 'dates for the Lower
House elections. These can ' ates are to cam-
;.,rto campaign for his re- el ion. The President
development of housarsgg procts for disabled
veterans.
t
Thieu like Minh, plans~,o back those can-
did.ates in the Lower House elections who agree
paign in support of present go ernment policies
-:x
and to speak out strongly,,again any pacifist or
coalition-minded opponents. Lt i not clear how
well the parties will work together, however;
similar efforts at cooperation have 'Failed in the
past largely because of personal rivalries among
party leaders.
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Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Mar 71
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the dominant element i
ing that---' this had nev
would.
Chou's testimony n
evidence continues,.;,,to i
retains the dominant.po
posts in most provinces.
steps are being taken to
out of many time-consu
with Snow designed for
hou En-lai complained
rayal of the military as
Chinese politics, insist-
happened and never
twithstanding, available
itical and administrative
here are signs that some
ease regular army units
ingchores, but in most
merejy being replaced
eavingthe military in
instances the regulars are
by local garrison forces=
full control. At this stage,
ith the party appara-
tus far from being fully rekurrected, the outlook
is for a continued militar~ry presence in nearly
every sphere of civil endeavor simply because the
army is still the only cof esive overnin insrtru-
ment in China.
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Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Mar 71
C-pmmuni?t China: The Military Syndrome
Despite contgversy within the regime over
aspects"of the future-gf the armed forces in Chi-
nese politics, there are'ew signs that Peking is
moving to ctail the eno ous civil burdens that
the military has, assumed si o e the heyday of the
Cultural RevolutLon. This ii, ression has been
strongly reinforcedby
lydntinuing pervasiveness
of the military in everyday affairs. Not only are
army men playing key roles in rebuilding the
shattered Chinese CQmmuhist Party apparatus
and maintaining over-VII security, but they are
also charged with an unusually wide range of
"housekeeping" chores f the sort performed be-
fore the Cultural Revol ion by a civil bureauc-
racy many times larger than China's present
three-million-man military stablishment. -
The contrast with the army's low profile irt,
civil affairs before they' Cultural Revolution,
particularly striking in Peking itself.
of politburo member Hsieh Fu-chih, who WSs also
head of ublic_ security and chairman pf the Pe-
king Mun' ipal\ Revolutionary Committee, the
military mo d back into control.,.ot public secu-
rity. In the fall of 1970, troops also were obliged
to re-enter Pekin University following an unsuc-
cessful trial perio of civilian control. Discipline
and order in the s ool supposedly rapidly de-
teriorated following a departure of the army
because of feuding bet een militant students and
some of the professors ho had recently returned
to their positions after u ergoing severe criticism
during the Cultural Revol tion.
to,,'Peking the crew a,
airliner wore military
`ist Edgar Snow was a
ent military in his rec
on which some top
$ensitive. In an intervie
foreign consumption,
espread military influ-
to Peking. For example,
flight from Canton
service members of the
niforms. American journal-
o struck by the ever pres-
t travels in China, a point
about foreign press par
January, military contro in the city w wide-
spread. Uniformed troolps ere observe,flirecting
traffic, issuing ration coupons, rail -end airline
tickets, and operating telegraphic facilities in the
post office. The overwhelmiig majority of Peking
police were uniformed soldjers,,*ho in their po-
lice role are responsible for .6u rous duties far in
excess of those ,41 . by Western police
forces. These include poll cal indoctrination of
factory and office woi rs, overseeing the con-
struction of air raid she' ers, ensuring compliance
with the down-to-theA- 3yintryside movement, and
even some welfare pTogras.
Additiona[ evidence r cently received indi-
cates that the,fxtent of mill ry control of police
and civil d '(ies is still) shay ly affected by the
political cjrmate in the capit For example, fol-
lowing the abrupt disappear4nce in March 1970
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China Issues a Warning
As the dust begins to settle from Chou
En-lai's hasty visit to Hanoi, the outlines of a
more explicit and stronger Chinese assurance of
support as needed for the North Vietnamese ap-
pear to have emerged. North Vietnamese concern
on this score, and Peking's own concern that its
role in the conflict had been discounted both in
Washington and Saigon, were probably major fac-
tors leading to the visit. Thus, Chou's appearance
in Hanoi seems intended to spotlight Sino-Viet-
namese solidarity in order to play out the deter-
rent value of the specter of Chinese intervention.
The Chinese-probably under pressure from
Hanoi-for the first time in years began linking
the security of North Vietnam directly to that of
China. Chou En-lai on the first day of his visit on
5 March warned that "US expansion of the war in
Indochina is a grave threat to China." This in
essence was repeated in the joint communique
signed by Chou and Pharn Van Dong on 8 March;
the Chinese previously had limited their state-
ments to allied operations in Laos when discus-
sing the threat to China.
The question of what constitutes a direct
threat to China's own security is probably funda-
mental to any future course of action Peking may
decide to take in relation to allied actions on its
southern border. The decision to tie events in
Indochina generally to China's security, therefore,
was no doubt an important one, and there is
evidence that it was attended by high-level debate
in Peking.
In connection with Chou's visit, the Chinese
have publicized a new "quotation" from Chair-
man Mao, which is the first clear indication that
continuing internecine disputes in Peking have
spilled over into foreign policy matters. The quo-
tation declares that "if anyone among us should
say that we cannot help the North Vietnamese
people in their struggle against US imperialism
and for national salvation, it means mutiny, that
is, betrayal of the revolution." This is extremely
strong language and seems to be directed at do-
mestic critics who have apparently argued against
pulling Hanoi's chestnuts out of the fire. It is not
yet clear precisely what is at issue, but contin-
gency plans relating to China's role in Indochina
should the war expand were probably a factor in
the dispute.
The whole series of seemingly contradictory
events leading up to Chou's visit, in fact, points
both to the likelihood that certain strategy dif-
ferences between the Chinese had developed and
to the possibility of some pulling and hauling
between Peking and Hanoi as a result of allied
o erations in southern Laos.
Another curious matter is
Peking's treatment of the question of allied
"threats" to Chinese security. On 12 February,
Peking for the first time specifically cited allied
operations in Laos as a threat to China, and this
was given wide play in Chinese circles. Xuan
Thuy, however, shortly picked up these state-
ments and expanded them to include allied opera-
tions throughout Indochina as posing a threat to
China. The Chinese never repeated Thuy's state-
ments and subsequently dropped all references to
China's security in their own commentary for the
two weeks just prior to Chou's visit, at which
time the Thuy formulation was finally surfaced
again. The timing of Peking's hesitation and sub-
sequent reversal on the issue, moreover, coincides
with leadership meetings that were held in the
Chinese capital after mid-February.
Whatever the differences, the appearance of
Mao's quotation and Peking's emphasis on making
further "national sacrifices" on behalf of the
Vietnamese and its constant reminders of "pro-
letarian internationalist" responsibilities make it
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clear that the Chinese at this point have decided
on providing increased material assistance to
Hanoi as it is needed. There is no evidence to
indicate, however, that recent developments in
Peking will result in a radical break with past
Chinese prudence in the Indochina conflict or
that Chinese military forces will soon intervene.
Chinese official statements are still carefully
hedged and are not explicit on what action would
trigger Chinese intervention, although this con-
tingency is clearly linked to some expansion of
the war. In addition, Peking continues to empha-
size its faith in the ability of the "people of
Indochina themselves" to carry the fight through
to a successful conclusion.
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No Basic Change irk,: Sino-Soviet Relations
There is no sign of a y movement toward
resolution of fundamental political differences be-
tween Moscow,and Peking. An' uthoritative Chi-
nese editorial o?h_ 17 March eujgizing the Paris
Commune on its" -centenary has reiterated at
length Peking's long-standing criticisms of Mos-
cow's views and policiesJust, before the opening
of the Soviet 24th party cgngress. Although rela-
tions in the past year have' been characterized by
a lack of sustained public uarr:ling, Moscow will
certainly denounce the late st Chinese attack.
At the same time, ho ever, theLJSSR has
attempted to appear fortlhciming toward China.
Moscow claims it has extended an invitatiqn to
Peking to send representatives to the party t n-
gress. It has riot released the content of its invita-
tion, and there is no indica on that the Kremlin.;
expects Peking to respond positively. The Chir.es`e '
have been silent on the bid itself, but the editorial
has made plain that there will be no less ring of
Peking's ideological war with Moscow,nd that it
has no interest in a resumption of pity contacts.
The Peking border 1: ks-begun in October
1969-continue despite t Jack of any sign of
meaningful progress. Foll ing the return to Pe-
king of the chief Soviet, egotiator in mid-Jan-
uary, some Soviet dips rats have been claiming
that "most" of the baclground work regarding
the talks has been completed, and that the num-
ber of disputed arias ha! been reduced. The So-
viets admit, hovyever, tha ownership of the most
troublesome territories is till a matter of conten-
tion.
Moscow and Peking ve kept a wary eye on
each other's response to the intensification of
fighting in Indochina. Soviet propaganda broad-
casts to China have berate) the Chinese for "split-
Page 10
tism"-fau&ure to cooperate with other Com fnu-
nist patios in joint support of Hanoi. These
broadcasts uggest that Moscow may have once
again resorteto the ploy of appealing to Peking
for "united aclton" regarding Vietnam in order to
emphasize Chinq's isolation fro in other Commu-
nist nations.
Economic Relations on Upgrade
Sino-Soviet trade plummeted to about $55
miI}ion in 1969 front a peak of about $2 billion in
1959. Soviet official have admitted that trade in
1970 vvia~ even lower. The two countries signed a
new tracre_ agreement last November, however,
The relative e i g of the intense hostility
created by the Cultuu al Revolution and border
fighting of the late f9Us has enabled Moscow
and Peking to resume- some economic contacts
disrupted during that period:,
The extremely lov' levels of trade over the
past few years have been economically disadvan-
tageous to both countries, and there are sound
reasons for resuming it ~t higher levels-Neverthe-
less, as long as both sides are unable to resolve
their fundamental political dispute and each views
the other as a potential `military antagonist, trade
is likely to remain far short of the levels of the
early 1960s.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Mar 71
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EUROPE
The State of-Play in Ostpolitik
With prospects-4-apparently slim for progress
in the four-power talks on Berlin, the focus of
Ospolitik has temporarily shifted to East - West
German'16- and West Berlin city- East German talks.
Failure achieve a four-power agreement on
Berlin remai~t the Gordiari knot that is holding
up ratificatio1nonn of the Soviet and Polish
treaties with Westermany ahd threatening to
impede negotiations ` .vith Czechoslovakia and
,
Hungary.
Since the Warsaw Pacfmmit meeting in
East Berlin on 2 December 19 Q, it has become
apparent that the Commuists, 'I rticularly the
East Germans and the Soviets, he achieved
unity for negotiating purposes. In retbrn for giv-
ing up its insistence on dipotnatic recog-hition by
West Germany as a prerequi4ite for negot tions,/
Pankow has pledges from itsallies that its rt
ests will not be ignored in the course of r
negotiations with Bonn. Dur;ing the four owei`.
talks since then, the Soviet have hon ed this
pledge in a manner that turnsit into a egotiating
tactic. Thus East Germany, inconcer with Soviet
negotiators, has undertaken ,the sk of talking
directly with Bonn and the West erlin Senat, but
so far almost exclusively o subjects that the
Western Allies consider rese d to the four pow-
ers.
Even though thei 'main {purpose is to under-
mine the four-power Iks, theEast Germans have
come a considera distances they are at least
talking with the rest and have indicated a num-
ber of matters they might onsider negotiable
both in Berli and between he two Germanies.
Prospects ar- slight for im : ed iate progress in
these talks or for Easter passe for West Berliners,
but evenn questions affectin their alleged sov-
ereignty; the East Germans h ve privately indi-
cated that they might be flexib . Should the four
powgts ever agree to give the gdrahead to the two
German states and the West Berin Senat to con-
duct negotiations within specific limits, the East
Germans would as a result be committed to ex-
tensive negotiations and would then be faced with
the choice of reneging or settling on terms
amounting to k facto, rather than de jute, recog-
nition from BonnN ncl the West.
kow's attempts to dra
negotiations on Perlin.
hope that a sta mate in the
add to the pressures on th
e Soviets evidently
our-power talks will
West Germans to
scow continues to
proceed or.-their own, and M
use everyR'available public and private channel to
urge ss h a course on Bonn.
fr' Along with the question of a Berlin agree-
?rrnent, Moscow's energies ale concentrated on
pressing Bonn to ratify its treaties with the USSR
and Poland. There has bey'n no repetition of the
alarming-and Soviet-inspifed-press stories of last
month that threatened a omplete break with the
Brandt government, but he Soviets have never-
theless contrived to ake their displeasure
kn The The cool treatme t the Soviets have ac-
corcl a West German de gation that arrived in
Moscoon 9 March to n otiate the terms of a
civil air cement evident) was intended to con-
vey Soviet irritation with onn's persistence in
linking ratific~8tion to the co elusion of a satisfac-
tory Berlin agr kment. The 24th party congress
will give prom inerapprobaton to Moscow's Ger-
man policy, and it .,is, unlik y that the congress
will lead to any change'sJn S viet tactics.
Nevertheless, it is lik~t k that Soviet pressure
tactics will stop short of t e,. point where they
would destroy the credibil ty-gq,f Ostpolitik and
undermine the domestic o itical osition of the
Brandt government. Mos o$u's preence for the
Brandt government was clearly demo 5trated last
week when Soviet spokesrrlen issued a'-flurry of
optimistic statements about a Berlin accord after
the four-power meeting of"9 March, evident in
the hope of improving the showing of Bran Vs
Social Democrats in the West Berlin elections of
last Sunday.
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Soviet Ambassadors Go Home
Moscow is carrying out a massive overhaul of
its ambassadorial corps in Eastern Europe. Of the
seven Soviet ambassadors posted in Eastern
Europe-the USSR does not maintain diplomatic
relations with Alba-fi*e have been removed
from theireions this month. They are ambas-
sadors Benediktov in Yugoslavia, Aristov in
Poland, Basov in Romania, Titov in Hungary, aid
Puzanov in Bulgaria',Moreover, the status of the
o remaining am as-sadors-Abrasimov in East
Germany and Chervonenko in Czechoslovakia-is
uncertain. Chervonenko's departure has been a
subject of frequent rumor since the crisis of 1968.
The changes may be keyed to the political
maneuvering and personnel shifts connected with
the impending Soviet party congress, scheduled to
begin on 30 March. All of the departing ambas-
sadors are members of the party central com-
mittee, and the loss of their diplomatic positions
suggests that their party posts could also be in
jeopardy.
It is not likely that the changes are indicative
of a Soviet intention to alter policies toward
Eastern Europe. The ambassadors who have been
newly named-Stepakov in Belgrade, Pilotovich in
Warsaw, Drozdenko in Bucharest and Pavlov in
Budapest-seem to be cut from much the same
cloth as their predecessors. Stepakov is the former
head of the central committee propaganda de-
partment, Pilotovich is a Belorussian party ap-
paratchik with a record of hard-lining speeches in
support of ideological "vigilance," and
Drozdenko is a veteran of the Ukrainian party
organization.
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FINLAND: A dispute betwee e Communists
and Prime Minister Karjalainen over relatively
minor issue of extending certain price ontrols
has mushroomed into a full-fledged gover ent
crisis. The five-party, center-left coalition h
been racked with internal bickering since its in-
ception last July, largely because of Communist
maneuvering as a result of its own internal party
split. Karjalainen, hoping to force the Commu-
nists to give in on the price control issue, an-
nounced prior to Wednesday's parliamentary vote
on the price control bill that his government
would resign if the Communists failed to support
it, a threat that he carried out the same night. As
one of the major parties in the coalition entered
it h any great enthusiasm, only considerable
arm-tw by President Kekkonen is likely to
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France-Algeria: Qil Dispute Strains Relations
Algerian nationalis`Vtion of the greater part
of Frer~ch petroleum assets threatens to strain
French rel~itions with theUS as well as to bring
an end to the special relationship that exists be-
tween France and Algeria.
Top Age rian officials are now ta4iit1g steps
to counter ossible French moves,,uch as the
total withdrav I of the French oil ompanies, and
they are prepa'ng to recruit asmany as 800 oil
specialists if nec nary. The .Aso are giving maxi-
mum publicity t the si ing of contracts with
non-French firms ch to allay internal fears
that a French put ut would create economic
chaos as to put es ure on France to meet Al-
geria's minimyidema ids.
1'fThough the Frpch responded with re-
The French recently asked the US to refr4 j
from taking any actions at this time that
make it harder for the' i to work out a able
compensation with the "Algerians. As French
diplomat explained, the purpose of t ~fh demarche
was to dissuade the US and other fry dly govern-
ments from supporting loans to 4 4geria from the
World Bank or from USinstit ons at this diffi-
The Algerian obje"ive during negotiations
with France has bee of achieve control over its
petroleum resource X. Eartier this year, France re-
jected Algeria's and fir 51-percent control of
all petroleum Aerations. Rather than waiting for
the resumpti6n of negotiations, suspended early
in February, Prime Mini er Boumediene on 24
February" announced the ' ke-over of a 51-percent
share-'if all French oil companies, which produce
some 70 percent of Alge a's petroleum, and the
complete nationalization b f all pipelines and na-
tural gas facilities. Although Boumediene prom-
ised fair compensation for the seized assets, he
publicly rejected a press valuation of $800 million
for these assets.
strorfit to the nationalisation, Pompidou was re-
ization takes the last yubstance out of the 1962
accord reached at th2 end of the Algerian revolt
against France. Theyalso argue that it prejudices
the negotiations thafhave been conducted since
`'f st August under Pa pidou's personal direction.
Cr~it~cized in the Fr nch press for mismanaging
these alks, Pompid u is no doubt particularly
sensitiv,Jo events tha expose him to unfavorable
comparison with his l:Vedecessor and raise doubts
about his ablLk,y to m intain French influence in
the Mediterran'an region.
Last week the F nch gave the Algerians
their specifications for j~i t,compensation, making
clear that the continu4tiorh of the special rela-
tionship between the two countries hinges on this
question. The Algerian response.,, to the French,
delivered on 15 March; display "? a mixture of
intransigence and flexibility, a combination that
has also been evident irk talks now `rr progress
with the French companies. It appears doubtful
that the Algerians will be prepared to" -Meet
France's minimum demands, however./----] 25X1
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MARITIME ISSUES: The I,seabeds committee states with 200-mile't[aims pushed their candidate
this week broke the impasse that had-prevente. l its to chair the subc,Rromi tee on that subject and ar-
convocation and began planning for the 1973 Law' gue,.for continuing thechairmen's prerogatives. The
of the Sea conference. The impasse resulted m a compromise finally.wor ed out retained for the full
-
{ visions on controversial
over th powers 9Lsu-bt mmittee committee control over
procedural dispute
P
ts. -The Latin American issues.
a
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Libya: The RCC Meets the People
Last month, individual members of the Rev-
olutionary Command Council (RCC) held a series
of public meetings all over Libya in an effort to
bring home to the people the efforts of the gov-
ernment on their behalf. In general, the results
have been humbling for the RCC, although the
general and specific criticisms evoked from the
populace may ultimately prove educational to the
brash young leaders.
Premier Qadhafi announced on 2 February
that the RCC had decided to submit to the people
"an account of what we have done" since the
revolution of 1969. He said that the members of
the RCC would "meet the people" to discuss
national problems with "complete frankness and
clarity." Subsequently, from 22 February
through the 27th, RCC members Jallud, Hamzah,
Humaydi, Hawwadi, and Muqaryif held the an-
nounced meetings. In some areas, especially in
traditionally royalist Cyrenaica, the gatherings
were poorly attended.
At the rallies, the official speeches were fol-
lowed by a vigorous exchange of views with the
audience, which often expressed dissatisfaction
with material progress. Housing, employment,
health measures, television, and agricultural wells
all were subjects for criticism. Harsh dialogues on
such broader political issues as restrictions on
SYRIA: On 12 March, more than 99 ercent of
the voting electorate confirmed Hafiz sad as
"constitutionally elected president" fora ven-
year term. Asad later told one reporter that it
still premature to specify the nature of planne
cabinet changes, but he did indicate that he
would give up the Defense Ministry to a civilian.
Asad reaffirmed Syria's dedication to the "battle
party activity and the presence of foreign advisers
(read "Egyptian") indicated that popular griev-
ances were not limited to material demands.
RCC speakers often reacted to these criti-
cisms with displeasure and impatience, even ac-
cusing some questioners of laziness, ingratitude,
and greed. This irritated attitude was later re-
flected in an editorial in the official newspaper
al-Thawrah, which lamented the fact that "RCC
members are the only persons working for the
revolution" and urged the Libyans to awake and
serve their country.
The series of gatherings has probably gone
beyond its stated purpose of informing the people
by providing a rough-and-ready forum that has
revealed to both the RCC and the public the full
extent of the credibility gap that has grown up in
the year and a half since the revolution. The RCC
members appeared surprised and perhaps disap-
pointed by the critical reception they received,
and the meetings may prove to have a more
salutary effect on the council's relations with the
people than originally envisaged. At the same
time, the give-and-take of the rallies disclosed that
the Libyan populace is not as politically apathetic
as generally believed.
of liberation," claimed closer relations would de-
velop with Egypt, and appealed for national unity
among the Syrian people. One of his first tasks as
president will be to host a conference of the
embryonic Arab federation-Egypt, Libya, Sudan,
Dascus on 20 March. 25X1
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Portugal-Iambi a: bk-bConsiders Retaliation
The Zambian Government's refusal to accept
responsibility for Portuguese civilians captured by
a Zambia-based guerrilla organization has angered
the Portuguese
LUANDA
In mid-January, the Mozambique Revolu-
tionary Committee (COREMO), a minor insur-
gent organization that operates out of Zambia,
infiltrated Portuguese Mozambique, kidnaped six
civilians, and took them back to Zambia.
COREMO apparently wanted to turn the prison-
ers over to the Zambian Government, but Lusaka
GAB,LRONE?
Porf-Francaui
Mbeya x.
FC[aleCteq route
of 3amZamWA
Lubumbashi
PEMBA
ZANZIBAR
DAR ES
SALAAM
Site of
kidnaping
ZOMBA
Kidnaping Creates Tension Between Portugal and Zambia
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reportedly refused to accept custody. It is vir-
tually certain now that the prisoners were sub-
sequently killed by COREMO. The Zambian Gov-
ernment, embarrassed and concerned over pos-
sible Portuguese retaliation, has attempted to dis-
claim knowledge of the incident. It has also as-
serted that it had denied the guerrillas permission
to bring the Portuguese into Zambia, and that it is
not responsible for CORE:MO prisoners.
Disturbed by what it saw as a lack of respon-
siveness, Lisbon publicly announced on 5 March
that it was holding Lusaka responsible for the
prisoners' fate. So far, the Portuguese have ap-
plied pressure by holding hostage three Zambians
who crossed the border into Mozambique without
documents and may be slowing the shipment of
SOUTH AFRICA: Libera church circles remain
apprehensive following wi read "search and
seizure" raids by the South ican security po-
lice against a score of individuals well as church
and student groups. The raids, whit occurred in
late February, allegedly were connectJ&with the
investigation of the Anglican dean of J' nnes-
burg, who was arrested in January for poss ion
of subversive literature and for other, as yet
specified acts. In addition, Pretoria has recent)
issued deportation orders to a number of foreign
clergymen, church workers, and their families,
most of whom are US citizens.
maize into Zambia over Angolan and Mozambican
railroads. In the past, similar tactics have caused
Lusaka to tighten its control over guerrilla groups.
Zambia's maize imports are especially necessary
now because of bad harvests.
The raids and deportations appear to be part
of an intensified effort by the Vorster govern-
ment to harass and intimidate some of the more
vociferous critics of its apartheid policies, particu-
larly among the clergy. They also exemplify the
government's overriding concern with internal
security. Although Pretoria has been trying for
some time to improve South Africa's interna-
tional image, it is willing to ignore the effects of
its heavy-handed tactics on world public opinion
when it comes to dealing with its critics. F___\ 25X1
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India: Local Political Maneuvering Follows Mrs. Gandhi's Victory
The Ruling Congress Party's (RC) landslide
victory on the national scene was accompanied by
important advances in two states that held simul-
taneous state assembly elections. In neither West
Bengal nor Orissa, however, did the RC secure a
majority, and even if the party eventually forms
coalition governments in these states, they will
probably lack the necessary strength for long-
term surviva : -?? - ... ............... ..
In violence-prone West Bengal, the number
of RC seats rose dramatically from the 38 gained
in the last state elections in 1969 to 105. Even so,
the party was unable to top the 123 seats won by
the six-member United Left Front led by the
Marxist Communists (C:PM). Since 1967, when a
CPM-dominated government was first elected to
power in West Bengal, the Marxists have made
several tries at ruling this key industrial state, but
they have failed to halit the economic decline or
,to calm political unrest there.
As the strongest political force in the state,
the Marxists had eagerly sought new elections
since March 1970, when New Delhi suspended
representative government and assumed direct
control through President's Rule. The CPM plural-
ity proves the Marxists are still a major contender,
but the returns also indicate they were hurt by
some weakening of the anti-Congress sentiment
that was so prevalent in 1967. Other factors in-
cluded voter repudiation of the CPM's inept ad-
ministrative performance and of its participation
in the feuding between rival Communist factions
that has cost hundreds of lives.
Prime Minister Gandhi, determined that elec-
tions would be held in West Bengal, approved the
unique move of calling on the military to prevent
electoral disruptions and to encourage a high
voter turnout. In a surprisingly peaceful atmos-
phere, the Bengalis voted in greater numbers than
expected.'The heavy showing suggests that many
are disenchanted with the CPM and are seeking a
remedy for the chaos that has bedeviled the state
in recent years.
Restoration of stable government, however,
remains an unlikely prospect, now that the CPM
and RC have, in effect, polarized West Bengal
politics. Neither party has the 141 seats required
for a majority, and both parties are presently
jockeying for allies. The wide ideological gap be-
tween the two suggests that West Bengal may be
on the verge of another round of political turbu-
lence, which could again lead to the imposition of
President's Rule.
In neighboring Orissa also, the RC saw its
position jump significantly, from 8 to 51, al-
though it still fell short of attaining a majority in
the 140-seat assembly. The RC could form a
coalition with a regionally oriented party, but this
is only one of several possible combinations, and
the ultimate decision will probably be taken in
accord with Mrs. Gandhi's wishes. Her position in
Orissa has been further strengthened by her par-
ty's capture of 15 (up from 4) of the 19 parlia-
mentary seats allotted to the state. If the RC
decides not to participate in a state coalition,
however, it is possible that no government will be
formed and fresh elections may be called for next
Pakistan: Talks Under Way to Avert Split
Discussions began on 16 March in Dacca
between President Yahya Khan and East Pakistani
leader Mujibur Rahman, who had just moved
toward formalizing his de facto control of the
province's administration.
Since Yahya's arrival in East Pakistan, he has
conferred with Mujib several times in an attempt
to find a solution to the crisis over the province's
demand for autonomy. Information regarding any
progress is fragmentary, but the arrival of a
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former law minister in Dacca on 17 March prob-
ably indicates that some constitutional formula is
under discussion. ,
At almost the same time that Yahya arrived
in Dacca, Mujib issued his gravest challenge yet to
the central government by announcing that he
had assumed what amounts to de facto control
over the administration of the province with the
Turkey: Milita y ervention
For the second time just over a decade,
the Turkish military has inter ed in the politi-
cal life of the country. For the oment, it has
stopped short of a direct assumptio f power in
favor of trying to work through the cons tional
system. If, however, there are what the m - ar
broad coalition government to end extremism/nd
promote a wide program of reforms, a mi tary
junta may yet take over.
The ultimatum, contained in the/12 March
memorandum to President Sunay, followed
exception of three major cities. The announce-
ment seemed to formalize a situation that had
developed following Mujib's call for a general
strike from 2 to 7 March and a subsequent week
of noncooperation. In connection with his an-
nouncement, Mujib issued a 35-point directive
aimed at eliminating confusion in ports, banks,
transportation and communications facilities, and
in other activities. According to this directive,
nongovernment commercial and industrial estab-
lishments could operate normally, but govern-
ment agencies, except for the police, were to
remain closed. The points were formulated by a
committee headed by leaders of Mujib's Awami
League, indicating that his party is probably pre-
paring itself to handle large-scale government
operations.
Oc asional scattered violen continued in
East Paki Late Iast wo small bombs
were explode th y of the building that
houses the US C ulate General in Dacca, and a
shotgun w fired the house of the consul
genera o one was ink d and no damage was
thererains a cle etermination to assume
ct military control o government if all
fails.
In eral, the man in the street has grudg-
ingly appro the military intervention. Para-
doxically, the itical left, against which the
move was prima aimed, has been most
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enthusiastic, apparen4ly under the delusion that
any military take-ove'\will ultimately pave the
way for a socialist syster
During the past week, esident Sun as
moved to quiet public conce and t initiate
formation of the type of coali n vernment
that will meet the demands of the matum. The
leaders of the two largest polit' I p ies, repre-
senting over 80 percent of P ament, a arently
have agreed, however relu ntly, to supp such
a government.
The militavy", claiming its action was
coup, has launched a purge of the officer corps.
This action suggests some realization on the part
of the military that it is on shaky constitutional
grounds. The purge has increased apprehension
withirlthe officer corps,
..Turks appear to be wondering if even the military
can-cope with the situation.
The military may yet find that it was easier
to move into the government than it will be to
disengage. An old Turkish proverb points out that
%lip who would take his ass up to the roof of his
h %Ss should first give thought as to how he can
get down. It remains to be seen whether the
Turkis military has profited from this wis-
dom. (SECRET E-?,i REIGN DISSEM)
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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Chile: Economics and the Municipal Vote
The Allende government is relying increas-
ingly on economic expediency to attract support
in the mu ,ipal elections of 4 April. The Presi-
dent realistica expects the well-organized Com-
munist Party (P ) to increase its percentage of
the vote by a great margin than his own Social
ist Party (PS). He will satisfied, however, if the
Popular Unity (UP) coa ion-consisting of the
PCCh, the PS, and the Radi Party-improves its
electoral showing from the mi rity 36.3 percent
in the September presidential ection to about
50 percent.
The government's strict price co trols have
sharply reduced cost-of-living increase despite
the administration's simultaneous pur it of
highly inflationary budget and monetary po ies.
During the first two months of 1971, the c
Sumer price index rose only 2.1 percent, co
pared with 12.2 percent for the same period i
1970. Government spokesmen have hastened
point out that as a result the recent 45-perct
wage increase is not being eroded by rapidly ruing
prices, as in the past. Although rising wage osts
and frozen prices are putting a tight squeee on
the business community, the boost in w ,rkers'
real income is an important political assetor the
UP coalition. 3
Opposition parties respond to thes -statistics
by emphasizing persistently high unem loyment,
but the UP campaigners successfully ounter by
charging the previous government with creating
the unemployment and by claiming o have cre-
ated 40,000 new jobs since Allende's: auguration
in November. Moreover, a governme t spokesman
announced 15 March that a portion of the
Chilean bu et disbursed at executive discretion
and formery applied to agricultural and mining
projects w I be used to fight unemployment.
Go ernment permissiveness in the face of
illegal nd seizures by peasants, largely in the
south n provinces, can be expected to improve
the 's electoral showing in that region. The
seiz es cause the landowners to request govern-
me expropriation of their lands as a means of
re izing at least a small return. Allende has wel-
ntion to expropriate as many as 1,000 farms
uring 1971. The announcement has probably,
had the effect of encouraging further land sei-
zures. Although this new peasant-government re-
lationship is to the UP's electoral advantage, the
land seizures may come under the control of the
extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left.
oreover, the Allende government may find it
ficult to impose its own agrarian reform in
are. where peasants already have obtained land
simp by seizing it.
In
peal, the g
er moves with widespread political ap-
ernment has taken over the operation
of two large
largest cemen
Anaconda Coppe
terest in both min
made on the grounds
to labor problems. A bi
alization of large US cop
production shortfalls due
to complete the nation-
to be acted on by the Chil
municipal elections.
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Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Mar 71
ppper mines and the nation's two
manufacturers. The US-owned
Company has a 49-percent in-
Congress after the
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Honduran E:Iectigns: An Experiment in National Unity
1\
Vo'~ers will go to the polls
on 28 Mar to elect a new gov-
ernment in hich the country's
two major rties will share
power. The Nationalist Party of
President Lopez nd the Liberal
Party will vie for to presidency,
but each is assure half of the
congressional seats. addition,
there will be a bipar 'san cabi-
net, and the party de ated in
the presidential race will ontrol
the Supreme Court.
The unity plan worked out by Presic9gnt
Lopez, business, labor, and political leaders d r-
ing December and January was designed to avoi
partisan strife and to promote honesty and com-
petence in government. It temporarily ended
months of speculation that Lopez would refuse to
step down when his term ended in June 1971.
Early enthusiasm for the plan waned some-
what in February, when the parties' congressional
slates revealed that the lofty
rhetoric about bringing new
faces into government and at-
tracting only the most qualified
citizens had wrought no real
changes. The selection of party
hacks for congressional seats,
the lackluster campaigns of the
two presidential candidates, and
the continuing unhappiness of
students and other political ele-
ments frozen out of the unity
arrangement eroded the notion
that a real change in Honduran
politics was imminent. Despite
Lopez' assurances of complete
government neutrality, there is
skepticism that elections will be
free and that Lopez actually
will relinquish the presidency.
There is not likely to be
m ch difference in policy direc-
tio whether the 68-year-old
Ramon Ernesto Cruz
Nationalist Party Candidate
Jorge Bueso Arias
Liberal Party Candidate
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Nationalist Party candidate, Ramon Ernestp Cruz,
or the more dynamic 51-year-old Liberal; Jorge
Bueso Arias, wins what now promises to be a clbse
election. Both are expected to pursue a policy of
friendship with the US and both are agreed on a
general program of government with particular em-
phasis on increasing economic growth, resolving the
border dispute with El Salvador, and renewing ef-
forts to restructure the Central American Common
Market.
Moreover, a new administration may have to
operate under a number of constraints and thus find
itself with relatively little room for maneuver. It will
have to deal carefully with the opposition party if it
to make the national unity concept work. The
neVv,.government will also have to demonstrate to
the tWilitary that it has the capacity to govern or
General opez may find it "necessary" to save the
country 'from the politicians as he did in
1963. 25X1
Government-Labor Strife in Argentina
The Levingston government was plunged into a
new crisis this week as a result of violent strikes in
the industrial city of Cordoba. Rumors of major
governmental changes, including the resignation or
removal of President Levingston, circulated widely
in Buenos Aires as the President faced his most
serious test since coming to power last June.
The violence in Cordoba, which resulted in two
deaths, many injuries and extensive property dam-
age, reached its high point during a 14-hour general
strike on 15 March. Radical leaders of the Cordoba
labor movement were seeking a confrontation with
the government, and the death of a young worker in
a well-organized strike on 12 March apparently pro-
vided the martyr necessary to bring large crowds of
workers and students into the streets for demon-
strations on thel5th. Following the funeral, roving
bands of workers and students took over portions of
the city and local police were able to control the
looting and burning only after several hours.
Emergency meetings of the commanders of the
three armed services to consider the Cordoba situa-
tion touched off the rumors of imminent changes in
the government. The President, however, met with
the commanders in chief the day following the riots
and apparently all were agreed on a series of tough
measures to counter the politically inspired labor
violence in Cordoba. A military governo as een
named to the province, replacing the unpopular one
whose appointment on 1 March had provided radical
labor leaders with a vulnerable target. Other meas-
ures taken include arrest orders for the leaders
charged with instigating the strikes and violence and
the intervention of all the Cordoba unions repre-
sented on the strike committee.
Despite these tough measures more strikes are
likely in Cordoba where the unions have now had a
taste of victory-the forcing of the governor's res-
ignation.
Although the events of the past week in Cor-
doba have introduced new strains into Levingston's
relations with the military, the President and the
military commanders appear to be working together
to restore order. The over-all result of the Cordoba
disorders, however, is likely to be a reappraisal by
the regime of its political and economic policies and
increased pressure for an early return to an elected
representative government.
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Secret
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Soviet Leadership on the Eve
of the 24th Congress of the CPSU
Secret
N2 13
19 March 1971
No. 0362/71A
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THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THE EVE OF THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU
The 24th Soviet party congress will convene on 30 March, one year past the
statutory time limit and five years after the last congress. As the party's most
authoritative forum, the congress will endorse policy guidelines and realign the top
political hierarchy to fit changes in power relations that have taken place since the
last session.
As the meeting approaches, there have been signs of fierce pulling and hauling
among opposing factions within the party to influence the general tone and direc-
tion of the congress. To some extent this involves bureaucratic competition among
important interest groups-regional as well as central-for more money and greater
power. But the main cleavage is between those who would like to see the congress
endorse an acceleration of the present conservative drift in Soviet policies and those
who would have it mark a return to a more flexible and innovative approach. The
leadership appears to be fairly evenly divided between moderates and conservatives,
and there is still no clear evidence as to what direction the congress will take. There
will certainly be no major shift in policy unless there is a major shake-up in the
leadership, and that does not appear to be in the offing.
General Secretary Brezhnev, the most powerful figure in the leadership and
spokesman for the generally middle-of-the-road faction, has markedly enhanced his
authority since the last congress. It would be surprising if some of his followers did
not improve their positions at this session. But existing checks and balances still
appear to be strong enough to safeguard the system of collective decision-making
and to prevent Brezhnev from establishing the kind of domination enjoyed by Stalin
and to a lesser extent by Khrushchev.
It has indeed appeared difficult for the leadership to make any changes in its
ranks. There have been no alterations in the composition of the eleven-man polit-
buro since the last congress, although several members at the very least seem due for
retirement. This meeting will therefore determine whether such changes will be
made on a timely basis or whether immobility will persist.
Functions of the Congress tion. According to the script, it is composed of
delegates elected in a democratic manner at re-
gional convocations by delegates who in turn have
According to party texts, the congress is the been elected at district meetings. In practice,
"indisputable authority of party power," the however, the delegates are carefully selected in
formal apex of the party's hierarchical organiza- advance by Moscow.
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- 1 - 19 March 1971
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STRUCTURE OF TOP SOVIET PARTY BODIES
(on Eve of 24th Party Congress)
PARTY CONGRESS
APPROX. 5,000 DELEGATES
Democratically elected
by party members
(indirect election through
lower party organizations)
Supreme party body
meets every four years
CENTRAL AUDITING
COMMISSION
73 MEMBERS
Checks or speed and correctness
of activities of central party
bodies and condition of
party finances
Frequency of meeting unspecified
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
190 FULL (VOTING) MEMBERS
148 CANDIDATE MEMBERS
Directs work of party
between congresses
Meets at least once every
six months
11 FULL (VOTING) MEMBERS
9 CANDIDATE MEMBERS
Directs work of central
committee between plenums
PARTY CONTROL
COMMITTEE
Trial and appeals board for
cases of party discipline
11 MEMBERS
Directs current work of the party
chiefly checking on
implementation of party decisions
and selection of personnel
Functions continuously
ELECTS
INSPECTS
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I n the early years party congresses partici-
pated actively in policy making, but under Stalin
they degenerated into a rubber stamp forum de-
signed to give the leadership a semblance of
democratic legitimacy and to propagate the re-
gime's policies. Although congresses have been
convened with greater frequency and regularity in
recent years, their role and operations have not
essentially changed.
The convocation of a party congress is, nev-
ertheless, an event of great importance in Soviet
political life. It is the occasion for reviewing party
activities and for authoritatively defining basic
policies. It is also a primary reference point in
party annals and historiography. Pronouncements
of the 23rd party congress are frequently cited as
basic guidelines, and even those held during the
Khrushchev era are occasionally mentioned.
The convening of a congress also helps to
bring into the open the crosscurrents of political
and policy disagreements within the leadership.
Furthermore, it forces a review of the member-
ship of the ruling bodies--the politburo, the secre-
tariat and the central committee-and thus is a
time when individual leaders seek to place their
followers in positions of influence.
As general secretary of the central commit-
tee, Brezhnev will deliver the "accountability re-
port," which, in theory, is an accounting to the
party's highest body of the activities of the cen-
tral committee since the preceding congress. This
keynote address reviews developments in the in-
terval, defines the current situation, and outlines
a program for the future. It is usually divided into
three major sections-the international situation,
domestic affairs, and the state of the party-and is
followed by discussion.
If there are any "dramatic" moments at the
congress, they are most likely to occur in Brezh-
nev's speech itself or duririg subsequent discussion
of it. Kosygin's report on the five-year plan, the
only other significant report scheduled, seems
likely to be an exposition of the draft directives
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of the 1971-1975 plan published in the Soviet
press in mid-February.
The session, which is expected to last more
than a week, will close with the election of a new
central committee that in turn will meet to elect
the other ruling bodies, the politburo and the
secretariat. In both cases decisions concerning
membership will already have been made. The
congress will be attended by representatives of
foreign Communist and some left-wing parties.
The foreign representatives will present greetings
from the various "fraternal parties" but will not
participate in the deliberations.
Conflicting Policy Directions
The collective leadership that succeeded
Khrushchev has proved to have considerable polit-
ical staying power. The group has avoided any
open, destructive struggle for power, but it has by
no means been free of internal disagreements. As
the congress approaches, jockeying to influence
its tone and direction has become apparent. Es-
sentially the struggle involves the question of how
far Soviet policy should move away from Khru-
shchev-symbolizing change-and back toward
Stalin-symbolizing the old way of doing things.
At one extreme of the Soviet political spec-
trum are those who would like to return to tough
Stalinist policies in domestic and foreign affairs.
They are not represented in the politburo, al-
though their voices may well be heard in the
Kremlin. They consider Khrushchev's de-Stalini-
zation drive a grave mistake that has led to the
erosion of Soviet power in the Communist world
and to unrest at home. They favor stern measures
against domestic dissident elements and distrust
any innovations that might tend to weaken party
and government controls. They are obsessed with
the dangers of ideological subversion from the
West and doubt the wisdom of closer relations
with capitalist countries, particularly if it entails
more than minor concessions on the Soviet side.
They put much stock in the importance of recon-
ciliation with the Communist Chinese and seem
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to have been able to convince themselves that this
is simply a matter of removing revisionist ele-
ments from Soviet political life.
At the other extreme are those who believe
that, without some basic economic reforms and a
further democratization of political and social
institutions, it will not be possible to get the
country moving and to solve its economic ills.
Members of this persuasion believe that if the
Soviet Union is to make rapid progress in modern-
izing its economy, it will have to accelerate the
use of Western technology. They favor a flexible,
essentially nationalistic, foreign policy. Moreover,
they tend to see Communist China, rather than
the West, as the greatest potential threat to the
Soviet Union, not only from a military point of
view, but because Chinese arguments play into
the hands of the neo-Stalinists at home.
The range of views represented at the top
policy-making level does not encompass these ex-
tremes, and certainly no one leader wholly em-
braces either of these programs. The two ex-
tremes do, however, help to define the limits
within which policy debates take place and to
identify the ingredients that go into the "mix" of
Soviet policy.
There is a fairly even balance in the leader-
ship between conservative and moderately liberal
interests, but it is evident from the direction that
Soviet policy has taken since Khrushchev's ouster
that the conservatives have generally come out
ahead in the argument. They are now clearly
pushing their advantage in hopes of achieving
some major gain at the congress, possibly even the
further rehabilitation of Stalin. Their capability
Politburo Lineup
Front row (left to right)-Voronov, Suslov, Podgorny, Kosygin, Brezhnev
Back row-Pelshe, Shelepin, Mazurov, Kirilenko, Polyansky
(the empty chair belongs to Shelest)
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INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATE: PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
25X1
POLITBURO OF
CENTRAL SECRETARIAT OF
COMMITTEE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
GENERAL
SECRETARY
Brezhfe4
Kogygin,.'
PRdgorhy
Special Report
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PRESIDIUM OF
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SUPREME SOVIET
FIRST DEPUTY
CHAIRMEN
- Mazurov
- Polyansky
DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
Dymshlfs
Novikov, I. T.
Boybakov
KirillIn
Lesechko
SmIrnov
Novikov, V. N.
Tikhonov
Yefremov
Members E. Officio
(the 15 Republic Premiers)
Voronov
ShSha,4#skY
49 Min_icters and
other S fficlois of
Ministerial Rook
(Titular Chief
of Store)
-DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
(The Chairmen 4f the
Presldiyeis of~~"he
15 kepubticn)
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to do so without a major change in the composi-
tion of the politburo is problematical. Such a step
would have a severely inhibiting impact on all
domestic policy innovations and an adverse effect
on the political fortunes of those in the leadership
who have been associated with a push for change.
The alignment within the politburo and even
the position of some of the individual members
have changed fairly dramatically in the five years
since the last party congress. General Secretary
Brezhnev, as "chairman of the board" and its
most powerful member, still hews to the middle
ground, but this grourid has gradually shifted
toward the conservative end of the political spec-
trum. Those in the leadership who appear to
make up the hard core of his political support-
the "Ukrainian group"-have increasingly come to
be identified with a tough line on domestic and
foreign policy matters. The independent members
of the 11-man politburo, including both past and
present rivals and critics of Brezhnev, now seem
to have landed in the moderate sector.
On the eve of the 23rd party congress, held
in 1966, the leadership was still united in its
resolve to back off from many policies associated
with Khrushchev, particularly his drive against
Stalinism. The leadership had not given up hope
that, with Khrushchev out of the way and with
the taking of a decision to stop all criticism of
Stalin, the major problems in relations with Com-
munist China might be ironed out without further
ideological concessions. The two leaders who had
been closest to Khrushchev and who had appar-
ently disagreed with this line on Stalin-Mikoyan
and Podgorny-had already been moved to posi-
tions of lesser importance. Furthermore, the new
leadership's self-styled, "business-like" approach
to economic problems embodied in the agricul-
tural and economic programs of 1965 was still
too new to come under fire. Even so, three groups
could be discerned in the politburo.
Premier Kosygin, with his overriding interest
in improving the performance of the economy
Special Report
and his general willingness to deal with the West
on a businesslike basis, was the leading figure of
the moderate faction. He had a very influential
voice in policy-making and had gained a relatively
free hand in the administration of the economy.
A gentlemen's agreement had been reached after
Khrushchev's ouster that the top party and gov-
ernment posts would not be held by one man
and, although Kosygin has never seemed per-
sonally ambitious, this agreement on separation
of powers made him a natural counterweight to
Brezhnev.
At the other end of the spectrum were two
conservative groups-an ideologically motivated
one headed by veteran party secretary Suslov and
a neo-Stalinist wing led by Shelepin. The Shelepin
group favored a return to the use of fiat, as in the
Stalin era, in directing the economy, but without
the old reliance on terror and on the personality
cult. Brezhnev was seen by many observers at that
time as a weak leader-a compromise candidate
upon whom all factions could agree.
Shelepin's association with the neo-Stalinist
wing seems to have been more politically than
ideologically motivated. He has always been por-
trayed by Soviet sources as dynamic, driving, and
impatient with inefficiency, but above all ambi-
tious for power. In the period following Khru-
shchev's ouster he apparently tried to use the
issue of Stalin as a political device to weaken
Kosygin's influence and to unseat Brezhnev. In
any event, he seems to have underestimated
Brezhnev's political skills, as others have.
Brezhnev bested Shelepin by an age-old tac-
tic-he moved to protect himself against political
attack from the conservative wing by adopting
Shelepin's position on a number of issues, while
at the same time maneuvering to oust Shelepin's
supporters from positions of power on charges of
factionalism. Brezhnev was assisted in this by the
general fear among the other politburo members
of Shelepin's ambition and by their suspicion that
his commitment to the principle of collectivity
was not strong. As a result, at the 23rd congress
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Shelepin was stripped of his key responsibilities
on the party secretarial:, and one of Brezhnev's
closest associates-Kirilenko-was brought into
the organization.
While Shelepin's
base of support was be..
ing steadily chipped'
away, he continued to
be identified as head of
the neo-Stalinist wing.
The turning point apparently came at the
central committee plenum following the June
1967 Arab-Israeli war, when the ranking members
of the politburo put down a challenge by Shel-
epin's ally-Nikolay Yegorychev, then head of the
Moscow party organization-and Shelepin himself
was transferred to the relatively powerless post of
head of the trade union organization.
Since then there have been indications that
Shelepin has gradually moderated his views. With
his former power base eroded and Brezhnev and
his supporters solidly holding down the conserva-
tive position, Shelepin was much in need of a new
constituency and new issues. A member of the
Soviet intelligentsia insists that Shelepin used to
be a neo-Stalinist but is now a new man-that he
began to develop contacts with liberal intellec-
tuals in 1968 and as a result of these contacts has
been converted to more moderate views. He is
also reported to have made peace with Khru-
shchev, and to have told a Western official that
Khrushchev had been right after all in pointing to
the dangers of Maoist China. The reports are
fragmentary and mostly third-hand, but they all
suggest a rather remarkable political transforma-
Special Report
tion. It is not clear that Shelepin has formulated
any coherent domestic program, or that he has
been won over to the merits of economic reform,
but he no longer seems to be at the opposite end
of the political spectrum from Kosygin.
Party secretary Suslov also seems to have
moderated his views, becoming more flexible and
less doctrinaire. Shelepin's transformation appears
to have been the result of political factors, but
Suslov's change of heart may have been the result
of his growing concern over the threat from Pe-
king and his constant exposure to diverse and
frequently revisionist opinions within Western
Communist parties. The emergence of Suslov and
Shelepin as members of the more progressive wing
of the party was evident during the Czechoslovak
crisis.
Moreover, Suslov still stands as the only So-
viet leader since 1964 to criticize Stalin publicly
for a political mistake. In a speech in March 1969,
he accused him of having erroneously branded the
social democrats as the main enemy in the 1920s
and 1930s, rather than Hitler's Nazism. Suslov's
initiative thus laid the theoretical groundwork for
an overture to West Germany that became possi-
ble after Brandt's election in late 1969 and ulti-
mately led to the treaty signed with West Ger-
many in August 1970.
It is probably no coincidence that Suslov's
peace offering to Western social democrats came
only a few weeks after the Sino-Soviet border
clash on the Amur River island of Damansky.
Suslov, by failing to identify the West as the main
enemy, seemed to be trying to mute ideological
disagreements in that quarter so as to permit the
Soviet Union to concentrate on the "main
danger" from the East.
Shelest Assumes the Mantle of the Conservative Party
With Shelepin and Suslov playing leapfrog in
the political arena, the mantle of leadership of the
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conservative faction that once belonged to Shel-
epin now seems to be worn by Ukrainian party
urt ermore, t e recent pub icity given the c is-
covery of "new" evidence of another wartime
Nazi atrocity in the Ukraine looks very much like
an attempt to stir up sentiment against the So-
viet - West German treaty.
On domestic affairs, however, Shelest hardly
fits the conventional image of a Soviet conserva-
tive. His views on matters inside the Soviet Union
stand in striking contrast with those, for example,
of Polyansky, who is a strong advocate of central-
ized management and takes a tough line toward
intellectual ferment. Shelest has consistently pro-
tected a revival of Ukrainian nationalism in lit-
erary and cultural life and has pushed for greater
authority and independence of action for local
officials. In fact, his reactionary stand on Soviet
relations with the West may be inspired, in part,
by the need to cover for his political vulnerabili-
ties on the domestic front. Shelest has clearly had
a strong influence on Brezhnev, but their relation-
ship is ambiguous. There are signs that Shelest
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aspires to a higher post in Moscow, and he may
not have been among Brezhnev's supporters in
recent political struggles in the leadership.
An extended period of tension in the leader-
ship was precipitated in the early months of 1970
when the final figures on the 1969 plan fulfill-
ment showed a disappointingly poor economic
performance, which resulted in disagreement over
the draft five-year plan for 1971-75 up for pre-
liminary review at that time.
As the year wore on, the thorny issue of
resource allocations-specifically the question of
agriculture's share of the investment pie in the
draft five-year plan-spilled over into public view
in an argument between Polyansky, the regime's
leading agricultural administrator and a close
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Kosygin (center) and his two deputies, Mazurov and Polyansky
matter up at a politburo session by pointing out
to him that the Communist Chinese had praised
the novel in question. Even Kirilenko, a fellow
member of the Ukrainian clique, is said to have
chided Polyansky at the meeting with a remark to
the effect that he thought: Polyansky had enough
to worry about with all the problems in agricul-
ture. On balance, although Polyansky has clearly
gained a victory in the field of resource alloca-
tion, he does not seem to have been rewarded by
any great increase in prestige.
With the confirmation of Kosygin as pre-
mier, the period of crisis seemed to have passed,
and collective leadership returned to an even keel.
At the same time, the 24th party congress was
finally set for March 1971, with Brezhnev and
Kosygin scheduled as the main reporters. And,
although there was to be further confusion in
working out the draft five-year plan even after the
rough treatment it had received earlier, the main
decisions concerning the congress probably had
been made.
The Business of the Congress
The congress will be focused primarily on
domestic problems and is unlikely to serve as a
forum for any dramatic initiatives in the foreign
policy field. Its over-all tone and mood are
bound, however, to affect the way specific for-
eign policy issues are treated by individual speak-
ers and, indirectly, to affect future Soviet initia-
tives in the international arena.
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Speakers at the party congress will probably
adopt self-congratulatory and fairly predictable
language regarding Soviet policy in most areas of
the world. Advances by the Soviets in the Medi-
terranean area will be heralded if balanced by a
restatement of their desire for a political settle-
ment. Moscow will evince satisfaction at the shift
from fighting to talking with China, but will
couple this with routine condemnations of "Mao-
ism." The Soviet treaty with West Germany will
come in for particular praise.
Although it is unlikely that anything will be
said at the congress that would close the door to
continued US-Soviet negotiations on various is-
sues, relations with the !US will probably be made
to appear particularly gloomy in contrast with
other areas of foreign relations, which will be
viewed optimistically. Congress speakers will
probably see no improvement in these relations in
1971 and will flay the US for its actions in
Indochina and for its continuing arms build-up.
By all accounts, the congress will concen-
trate on economic matters. Although 1970, the
last year of the current five-year plan, was gen-
erally a good year for Soviet industry and agricul-
ture, the growth rate of the Soviet economy has
continued to disappoint the leadership, and the
technological gap between the East and West has
not narrowed. The necessity of coming up with a
new five-year plan on the basis of these results has
presented the leadership with some hard decisions
and has generated intense debate over the past
year.
The five-year plan is a crucial blueprint for
future Soviet economic development. Though
subject to change, it nevertheless sets the goals of
the regime and ties up investment funds and labor
for lengthy periods. The formulation of plans
always generates intensive infighting by individual
leaders to protect vested interests in the alloca-
tions of scarce resources.
Special Report
After a long delay and numerous revisions,
draft directives were published in mid-February.
Essentially these directives appear to be a con-
tinuation of the past plan and do not reflect any
major shifts of allocations from one sector to
another. The absence of some crucial figures and
the unorthodox and hurried way the draft was
issued, however, suggest that some aspects of the
plan may still have been undecided at the time of
its publication. The murkiest area seems to be the
gap between the lofty promises in the preamble
of priority attention to consumer goods and the
figures in small print. The projected growth of
consumer goods output at a faster rate than
producer goods is unprecedented in a five-year
plan, but the few statistics given suggest a some-
what lower rate of progress in consumer welfare
as compared with 1966-70.
Questions of administrative reform have
been even more intractable and politically sensi-
tive for the leadership than the debate over alloca-
tions. Soviet economic growth has been seriously
impeded by an outmoded administrative structure
and a system of management that is not suf-
ficiently flexible for running a modern economy
and promoting technological progress.
The basic problem confronting the Kremlin
is how to get better returns on capital investments
and labor resources in industry and agriculture.
The leaders have been hampered in their search
for new methods, not only by bureaucratic in-
fighting and political rivalries, but by their fear
that reforms could lead to a loss of the party's
monopoly of power. Events in Czechoslovakia in
1968, where pressure from liberal elements for
economic reform quickly led to a dissolution of
party control, forcefully brought home to the
Soviet leaders the dangers of such reform. On the
other hand, more recent events in Poland point
up with equal vigor the dangers in failure to get
the economy moving. In Poland it was protests by
the vaunted working class over food shortages and
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the high cost of living that forced changes in the
political hierarchy. Thus Soviet leaders are, in a
way, damned if they do and damned if they
don't. Certainly, the verbiage devoted this winter
to future production of consumer goods suggests
that the Kremlin has been trying to read the
"lesson" of the December strikes in Poland, but it
is by no means clear that the leaders agree on
what that "lesson" is.
It is a measure of the frustration of the
leadership in this dilemma that the proposals for
"reorganization" of the economy recently under
discussion are extraordinarily anemic in compari-
son with measures discussed in Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, even these wan Soviet gestures of
"experiment" manage to generate partisan debate
in the Kremlin and suggest the regional political
pressures to which the politburo is subject, in
addition to the more conventional institutional
ones.
Fate of the 1965 Economic Reform
The 1965 economic reform was only half of
a curiously complex legislative package that also
involved the dissolution of Khrushchev's terri-
torial economic administrations (sovnarkhozes)
and the re-establishment of central ministries. The
package was the product of an unlikely alliance
between the central government bureaucracy and
liberal economists. It aimed at stimulating the
economy by giving individual enterprises greater
operational freedom and by shifting from admin-
istrative methods to greater reliance on economic
levers and material incentives for the workers.
Some of the more radical aspects of the
original scheme were never implemented-they
fell victim to the growing caution and conserva-
tism of the leadership and to the fears aroused by
the Czechoslovak experiments. Reform-minded
elements within the leadership were put on the
defensive after the invasion, and they have never
regained their forward thrust.
The reform has now been introduced in
most of the larger Soviet enterprises, but the
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results have been disappointing in terms of pro-
duction figures and costs. High-level support for
the principles of the reform has seriously eroded.
Few members of the politburo gave more than a
passing nod to the subject in their election
speeches last June. Premier Kosygin, who was
most responsible for the adoption of the reform,
was the only one to discuss it at any length.
Although he defended it vigorously for what it
had already accomplished, he said nothing about
carrying it any further. An article in the January
issue of the party's leading theoretical journal,
Kommunist, contained an unusually warm de-
fense of the 1965 principles, however, suggesting
at least that the issue is not yet dead.
Planks in Political Platforms
As hopes for this reform have dwindled,
Soviet politicians have squabbled about a number
of other proposals in economic management.
These schemes are not of far-reaching economic
significance, but they do reflect a certain measure
of innovative spirit, as well as the historical pro-
clivity of Soviet leaders to believe that some rear-
rangement of the administrative structure can
solve basic economic difficulties. Perhaps more
important, these proposals are usually designed to
favor special bureaucratic or regional interests,
and they therefore become a basis of political
competition. Thus the way in which they are
treated at the congress will provide clues as to the
political fortunes of their promoters in the lead-
ersh ip.
One scheme that has been advanced as a way
of streamlining the economy is the creation of
regional production associations. The concept es-
sentially involves the grouping for planning and
management purposes of enterprises in a given
geographic area that manufacture similar products
or use similar technology. Advocates of the
scheme promise increased efficiency through
specialization as well as savings in manpower and
money. Regional officials have promoted it as a
way of recapturing the power lost to Moscow
when Khrushchev's decentralization scheme was
abandoned. Associations were promoted in
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Mazurov (left), an advocate of associations and
integrated planning
Leningrad in the early 1960s, and the Lenin-
graders fought unsuccessfully to get the concept
firmly established in the 1965 legislative package.
Former Leningrad party boss Tolstikov, now
ambassador to Communist China, was one of the
strongest advocates of the associations. His suc-
cessor in Leningrad, Rornanov, has continued this
support. Experiments with associations also have
a long history in the Ukraine and presumably
have the backing of Ukrainian party boss Shelest.
The idea has also caught: on strongly in Belorussia
and the Baltic, and has been publicly endorsed by
former Belorussian party boss Mazurov, who now
serves as one of Kosygin's first deputies.
The main opposition to production associa-
tions has come from the central ministries, which
could lose considerable authority and control.
Recent efforts to create all-union, rather than
territorial-based associations, even though the
former have a valid economic rationale, also
smack of an attempt by the central bureaucracy
to turn the scheme to its own advantage. Oppo-
sition has also come from enterprise managers
who, in joining an association, could lose some of
their recently acquired operational freedom.
Kosygin's equivocal comments on the subject sug-
gest that he sees little virtue in the idea.
The present leaders have made considerable
progress in improving farming conditions by in-
creasing the flow of money, machinery and fer-
tilizers. The cost of agricultural production is
exceedingly high, however, and this has generated
debate and pressure for reform.
The administrative system for agriculture
clearly needs improving. Part of the reason for the
disappointing return on investment is the lack of
coordination in the planning and performance of
the various branches associated with agriculture.
As a result the farms do not receive the kind of
machinery they need, and crops rot in the fields
for want of processing facilities while food queues
grow longer in the cities. Persistent disagreement,
rivalries, and jurisdictional disputes between
various regional and central agricultural interest
groups, however, have hindered the finding of
solutions. The search for answers is complicated
by the existence of two types of farms, i.e.,
state-run farms and the nominally peasant-man-
aged cooperatives (kolkhozes), which create prob-
lems in working out a new form of administra-
tion. As in the case of the industrial sector,
programs approved at the 23rd party congress
have since been watered down, and consensus has
yet to be reached on new directions.
One of the schemes advanced and ultimately
defeated was the concept of collective farm
unions. At the 23rd party congress Brezhnev en-
dorsed a proposal, put forward by several regional
party organizations, to establish a hierarchy of
elected unions to look after the interests of the
collective farms. The proposal was backed by
Shelest's Ukrainian party organization and by
leaders of other republics where collective farms
considerably outnumber state farms. Brezhnev
presumably sponsored the proposal at the con-
gress because of his political ties with the Ukrain-
ian leaders, but he may also have seen an oppor-
tunity to advance the authority of the party at
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the expense of the central state bureaucracy. The
Ministry of Agriculture stood to lose considerable
authority if the scheme was approved, and the
minister made no bones about his opposition.
Polyansky, the regime's top agricultural adminis-
trator, evidently also sided with the ministry.
Polansky--Spokesman for agricultural bureaucracy
Despite the decentralization feature of the
proposal that should have appealed to regional
leaders, there was considerable opposition to the
idea from areas such as Belorussia and Estonia,
where the leaders apparently felt that a kolkhoz
union would conflict with a local interest in inte-
grated regional planning. It fell to the outspoken
Estonian party boss, Kebin, to present publicly
the arguments against the scheme. The combined
weight of these republic: leaders and central min-
istries smothered the proposal at the Collective
Farm Congress in the fall of 1969.
Agricultural Reorganization Schemes
The issues of agricultural organization are
hardly significant enough to be the focus of a
disruptive dispute. If they surface in disputes at
the congress they will most likely be symptomatic
of deeper divisions within the leadership.
The problem of how to bring some order
into relations among farms and associated state
Special Report
enterprises still remains, and out of the wreckage
of the collective farm union scheme came new
bursts of interest in the concept of agro-industrial
complexes. This proposal involves the grouping
together of both farms and enterprises within a
given region to produce, process, and market one
or several related products. The scheme has found
favor with the Belorussians and Balts, whose lead-
ers may hope that the regional basis for planning
and management will lead to some decentraliza-
tion of power by Moscow. In a sense the agro-
industrial complex is the logical companion to
industrial associations.
Several recent articles in the Soviet press
have proposed that planning and administration
at the national level should be accomplished on
the basis of the agro-industrial concept, rather
than by using the present narrow branch ap-
proach. The authoritative tone of the articles sug-
gests that they had high-level support. It is tempt-
ing to see Deputy Premier Polyansky's hand in
this. As things now stand, he is responsible for
agricultural production but he has no direct au-
thority over the industries that produce the
machinery and material for agricultural produc-
tion or over the industries that process agricul-
tural products. The creation of an agro-industrial
sector would give Polyansky the opportunity to
extend his "empire" significantly.
On the other hand, the need to move from
branch planning to integrated planning is a theme
sounded by First Deputy Premier Mazurov and
favored by his fellow Belorussians. A possible clue
that he may be involved in the initiative was the
insistence in one of the articles on the subject of
agro-industrial complexes that the consumer in-
dustry should have the leading role; the consumer
sector comes under Mazurov's purview.
Another approach attacks the problem of
lagging agricultural production at the lowest
level-the organization of labor and the payment
of wages on the farms. This is a proposal for the
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establishment of small-
farm production subdi-
visions called "links." A
number of kinds of
"links" are being widely
experimented with, but
the basic form is one in
which a section of the
farm and the machinery
necessary to farm it are
assigned to a small group
of farmers for an ex-
tended period of time.
Unlike the usual farm
brigade paid on a piece-
work basis, the members
of the "link" are respon-
sible for the full cycle of
work, from sowing to harvest. Their wages are
then tied to the size of the harvest.
The proposal has been vigorously pushed by
Voronov, premier of the Russian Republic. He is
the only member of the politburo who has
spoken out on the subject. The "link" has been
widely introduced into the Russian Republic and
in Belorussia, but there are important pockets of
opposition. The Shelest-led Ukrainians are
strongly opposed to the idea, and the USSR min-
ister of agriculture-probably representing Pol-
yansky's views-has also strongly resisted it.
There is also an obvious personal-political
aspect to the debate. Voronov is a long-time rival
of Polyansky and a frequent critic of the agricul-
ture lobby. He has used the issue of the "link" as
a political device to embarrass the agricultural
administators and through them Polyansky, and
to drive home the need for more reform and less
money in agriculture.
Voronov's campaign for "links" seems to be
one aspect of a larger but less clearly articulated
movement to develop socialist democracy, specifi-
cally by encouraging greater worker participation
Special Report
in management. I n a
sense, this push for
worker participation,
while falling far short of
anything like the Yugo-
slav experiment, seems
to be aimed at giving a
new emphasis or direc-
tion to the economic re-
form-to overcome criti-
cism that it merely en-
courages management
and workers to "chase
after rubles." Suslov and
Shelepin have been no-
ticeably cool in their
public treatment of economic reform, and there
are hints that they, as well as politburo member
Pelshe, are all to one extent or another behind the
new emphasis on socialist democracy. Pelshe, who
is believed to be a close associate of Suslov, dis-
cussed the subject at length in a speech in Milan
last fall, and several calls for greater worker par-
ticipation have appeared in Trud, the official
newspaper of Shelepin's trade union organization.
In two recent speeches Suslov also has
treated socialist democracy and the need to in-
volve workers in management affairs at some
length. Characteristically he casts the issue in a
larger ideological framework. There are, for exam-
ple, hints that he is attempting to shape his views
into a program that could be represented as a new
advance in the building of Communism-possibly
a move "forward" from the present stage of
building its material and technical base to one
emphasizing equal concern with building its social
base.
Suslov has strongly endorsed a more impor-
tant role for the hierarchy of Soviets as a counter-
weight to the state apparatus. It is evident that he
views the Soviets-with the party at their el-
bow-as vehicles to temper the state administra-
tion's overriding concern with production matters
and as a vehicle for increasing citizen involvement
in communal affairs. A party decree published in
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mid-March outlining measures to increase the
authority of local Soviets suggests that this will be
a significant theme at the congress.
The 1970 tension in the leadership was ap-
parently resolved, or at least brought under con-
trol, without ripping the collective leadership
apart. Although Shelepin and Voronov have
clearly lost ground politically, they remain on the
politburo. The sharp rivalries and personal ani-
mosities that surfaced during 1970, however, sug-
gest that there has been some hardening of differ-
ences within the collective. Whereas in the past
there was evidence of considerable fluidity from
issue to issue and from one moment to another,
this no longer seems to be the case, to the same
degree. This could make Brezhnev's position as
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the "chairman of the board" more difficult in the
future.
It has also become clearer that it is now
Suslov, rather than Kosygin, who is the main
counterweight to Brezhnev and the man in the
leadership to whom the moderates turn. This is
partly because Kosygin's authority has diminished
in the years since the last congress as a result of
the failure of his economic reform to live up to its
original promise and also because of Brezhnev's
repeated incursions into his field. Furthermore,
Kosygin has taken a less independent stand on
policy issues in recent years, and his views seem
more in harmony with Brezhnev's now than in
the past.
Suslov's rumored willingness to take the lead
in criticizing Polyansky last July is illustrative of
The "Seniors"
Left to right (front)-Podgorny, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov
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his new role. His unusual participation in Novem-
ber at a meeting on the work of rural Soviets
sponsored by Voronov, served, whether intention-
ally or not, to give a much-needed lift to the
latter's sagging political fortunes. Suslov is, never-
theless, a frail reed.
Over the years Brezhnev has been able suc-
cessfully to play one faction off against another
and has been the chief beneficiary of the Krem-
lin's delicate balance of power. He has emerged
from last year's political low in a far stronger
position than before. The promotional campaign
in the Soviet press in his behalf in recent months
and his forceful assumption of the trappings and
substance of authority are clear signs that he is
determined to put himself in the strongest posi-
tion possible as the congress approaches.
Although there is little reason to doubt that
he will remain the dominant figure in the leader-
ship, existing checks and balances still appear
strong enough to guard the system of collective
decision-making and to prevent him from com-
pletely dominating the leadership as Khrushchev
did. Collectivity rests on a number of organiza-
tional and procedural safeguards that were in-
formally agreed upon by Khrushchev's successors
and have become increasingly institutionalized
with the passage of time.
These safeguards include not only the deci-
sion to keep the two top posts in different
hands-certainly one of the main obstacles to the
re-emergence of one-man rule-but also an appar-
ent agreement to limit political patronage by
denying any one leader control over key party
and government posts at all levels. This has led to
the development of a more bureaucratic approach
to the assignment of personnel, one rather akin to
a civil service system. As a result, Brezhnev has
been able to bring about the removal of various
supporters of Shelepin and of other rivals, but he
has clearly not had a free hand in selecting their
Special Report
successors. Thus preliminary information on the
new central committee to be elected at the con-
gress suggests that it will include a somewhat
larger number of Brezhnev's associates than be-
fore but not an overwhelming majority.
The system of collectivity is also protected
to a certain extent by an elaborate system of
mutual checks that prevent any one institution
from dominating the policy-making process, or
one individual from establishing a foothold in
more than one institution. This inhibits a member
of one faction from moving against his rivals or
his boss. Thus the membership on the eleven-man
politburo is evenly distributed among the leading
institutions-for instance, there are three mem-
bers from the party secretariat and three members
from the council of ministers. A careful effort has
been made to avoid any dangerous overlapping of
membership between the various institutions.
Thus when Andropov was appointed to the gov-
ernment post of KGB head, he was immediately
dropped from the party secretariat; his promotion
at the same time to candidate member of the
politburo, however, broadened his access to all
eleven full members. Finally, there is the main-
tenance of a balance of power among individuals
at all the levels of the party and government. For
instance, the influence of Brezhnev's associate,
Kirilenko, in the party secretariat is balanced by
the presence of Suslov. Again, there are two first
deputy premiers, Polyansky and Mazurov, both of
whom are associated with rival political and re-
gional groupings.
I n fact, the system appears to have worked
almost too well. There have been no alterations in
the composition of the politburo since the last
congress, suggesting that the delicate balance of
power has made it exceedingly difficult for the
leadership to make any change in its own mem-
bership. Even the most routine change might en-
danger this balance. Thus several members of the
politburo who appear due for retirement because
of advanced age or poor health may be held in
office because of problems in replacing them. At
the very least the congress should make a decision
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concerning the ambiguous status of Suslov and
Kirilenko. Suslov was given protocol ranking as
the secretary second to Brezhnev at the last party
congress, but since then Kirilenko has gradually
taken on most of the responsibilities as Brezh-
nev's second-in-command.
It would appear, however, that there will be
no significant personnel actions or shift in the
present balance of the (leadership's power. This
being the case, Brezhnev will have to continue to
search for the middle ground and to work for
compromises among the same factions and group-
ings that presently exist. While Shelepin, his prin-
cipal rival in the past, has lost considerable
ground politically, many Soviet officials still see
him as potentially the strongest leader. Shelepin
has now apparently joined with others in pressing
Brezhnev to adopt more flexible, innovative poli-
cies. Brezhnev in the future must either get rid of
him or pay heed to his views.
The seeming stalemate in the leadership is
symbolized by the ambiguous status of Stalin's
image. Since the 1965 "rehabilitation" of his
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record as the man who led the Soviet Union to
victory in World War II, there have been various
low-key attempts to broaden this to include other
facets of his career. Both his collectivization of
agriculture and his industrialization program of
the 1930s have been branded "successes" and
declared off-limits to criticism. These "successes"
are usually credited to the party and not to Stalin
by name. It has not been possible, however, to
erase from Soviet memories Khrushchev's revela-
tions of the bloodshed and injustice that were the
price for these achievements. The excesses of col-
lectivization and the bloodshed of the Great
Purge apparently has proved too difficult to treat
publicly, and the long version of the official party
history published this winter simply skipped the
years from 1930 to 1937.
In the past, Soviet liberals used Stalin's "mis-
takes" as arguments for change. Conservatives
now would like to use his "successes"-and
Khrushchev's "mistakes"-as arguments against
change. The two main participants at the 24th
party congress may be the shades of Stalin and
Khrushchev, engaged in a struggle for the soul of
the congress.
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