WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLICTENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
5 March 1971
No. 0380/71
Copy N'~ 2 Q
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CONTENTS
(Inforrnation as of noon F,ST, 4 March 1971 J
Indochina: Tlhe Battle Joined .
2
Another Spectacular in Cambodia .
4
The Other War in Laos .
5
The Penetrating Viet Cong
5
....................
Electioneering in South Vietnam .
6
Communist Cluna: Military Under Fire
7
...............
France Renevrs Commitment to S ace Pro rams
9
Poor Countries to Receive ~mitea iraae tsreax
Polish Workers Persist with Demands
12
----o--- -
14
European Communities Debate Farrn Prices and Policies
Middle East: Diplomatic Maneuvering and Military Preparations
15
Palestinians: Parliamentary Powwow
16
Relations Between Syria and the USSR Warm Up
17
Sudan Rcvolration Flags
17
Drift Toward East Pakistani Secession Continues
19
SEPARATE :DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: The Bantustans
Chile: Elections and Foreign Affairs
20
Colombia's Troubles Increase
21
Cuba: Prens;r Latina Continues to Expand
22
Soviets Increasing Aid to Cuba
22
BRAZIL UNDER MEDICI
NOTES: Nationalist China; Burma; Yugoslavia-USSR; Austria;
~~
Africa-UK; Senegal-Guinea; Panama
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S.~CGKJ~;'1'
Tchepone urea
~~
125 .r =?~ _ - a-036
~~~ ~~~
-~ Location of US aircraft
fired on by SAMs
%/ General location of ARVN forces
[ll~ong`P~ne "~,,,~,
238 . J :Mugtt~?~.
V s
Rossible
alternate
network
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FAR EAST
Indochina: The Battle Joined
Some of the heaviest, bloodiest fighting of
the war is taking place as the Communists at-
tempt to thwart South 'Vietnam's dry-season of-
fensives into their strongholds in southern Laos
and Cambodia. Both skies are playing for high
stakes: the South Vietnamese seek to cripple the
enemy's war-making capacity and to impress
upon Hanoi that the rules of the game have been
changed; the Communists must protect their sup-
ply routes and are trying hard to inflict setbacks
on the South Vietnamese that could have wider
repercussions on the course of the war.
During the past ten days the Communists
have counterattacked South Vietnamese advances
vigorously in both Cambodia and southern Laos.
The attacks slowed the South Vietnamese drive
into the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex, but at
week's end Saigon's forces were beginning once
again to press westward. Casualties have been
heavy on both sides, but, both Saigon and Hanoi
seem willing to pay this price in pursuit of their
current objectives.
Long before the alliE:d operation into eastern
Laos was launched on 8 February, it was apparent
that North Vietnam would fight hard to defend
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This conclusion was borne
out during the first two vveeks of the operation as
the Communists rushed reinforcements to the
area and launched an accelerated drive to move
supplies south before the South Vietnamese could
stop them, But what w,as not so apparent-and
indeed what could only be a matter of specula-
tion-was that Hanoi might also view the situation
as an opportunity to bring its military resources
to bear against allied forces in a way that has
eluded the Communists in South Vietnam for
nearly two years. Recent enemy tactics strongly
suggest that the North Vietnamese do see such an
opportunity and that although defense of their
supply lines still has first priority, they also are
out to strike a blow against the South Vietnamese
and the allied Vietnamization program.
The developing action on the ground in Laos
during the past week gives some indication of
tow the North Vietnamese plan to pursue these
objectives. The strongest enemy thrusts so far
have come against the right flank of the South
Vietnamese operation, that is, the string of posi-
tions held by airborne and ranger troops on the
high ground north of Route 9. The Communists
apparently hope to bring such heavy pressure to
bear in this area that the South Vietnamese will
be reluctant to push deeper into the Ho Chi Minh
Trail complex to the west and south.
The upshot of these instructions was the
heavy North Vietnamese attack last weekend
against two South Vietnamese forward positions
on hills north of Route 9. The enemy suffered
heavy losses in the actions, but South Vietnamese
casualties were also substantial, and part of an
ARVN brigade headquarters was overrun. The
fighting took place just a few miles from the area
where a South Vietnamese ranger battalion had
been badly battered the previous week.
Fighting also has picked up in the area as-
signed to the South Vietnamese 1st Division
south of Route 9. The ARVN 1st Division with-
drew under enemy pressure from one hilltop po-
sition in this area during the week, and other
units of the 1st have been involved in a series of
sharp ground clashes. During the past few days
the South Vietnamese have resumed westward
movements toward Tchepone, leapfrogging by
helicopter to hilltop positions along Route 9. So
far the North Vietnamese have resisted these
moves with a hail of antiaircraft fire, but the
enemy has yet to carry out heavy counterattacks
with ground forces against this advance.
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During the week the North Vietnamese
added surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to their al-
ready stiff air defenses in the general vicinity of
the Lam Son 719 area of operations. US pilots
reported being shot at by several missiles or
rockets a few miles we~~t of Tchepone and along
the Demilitarized Zone. SAM firings in the DMZ
area are rare but not unprecedented; the firings
from inside Laos may be the first the Communists
have made- with these weapons in that country.
Their introduction in Larger numbers could sig-
nificantly increase the threat to allied aircraft
supporting the South Vietnamese drive into Laos.
A Hotter War Around the Cy!up Plantation
South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) forces ran
into increasingly strong enemy resistance in east-
ern Cambodia during the week. Heavy Commu-
nist rocket and mortar barrages against ARVN
positions east of the Chup rubber plantation, par-
ticularly near the village of Dambe on Route 75,
caused ARVN losses of several hundred killed or
wounded. At the same time, air strikes on enemy
troops in this area reportedly resulted in some
sizable Communist casualties.
Some of the sharpest ground fighting took
place near Dambe east of the Chup rubber planta-
tion. ARVN troops clairried to have kilted about
270 Communists during a series of sharp battles
around Dambe toward the end of the week.
Fifty-eight ARVN soldiers were killed and over
200 were wounded. There are seven enemy regi-
ments maneuvering in i:he Chup plantation -
Dambe general area, where the Communists ap-
pear determined to keep ,ARVN forces tied down
so as to divert or delaythem from moving into
the important storage ancf base areas in the sur-
rounding countryside.
Enemy Reactions in South Vietnam
Communist forces are= using South Vietnam-
ese Army (ARVN) operations in Laos and Cam-
bodia to freshen appeals to their own troops to
fight harder in South Vietnam, but as yet these
have not matched words with action. Enemy at-
tacks and support did pick up somewhat in north-
ern South Vietnam during the past week, and
there are many signs that North Vietnamese artil-
lery and infantry elements plan to harass allied
positions stretched along Route 9 between Dong
Ha and Khe Sanh.
Er~emy activity in Military Region (MR) 2
has generally been at a relatively low level, except
for sharp attacks against ranger positions in the
central highlands. In MR 3, attacks have been
light and there is little to indicate that these will
grow significantly in the near future_ ~
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With the exception of a
rash of attacks_ against government security out-
posts and some skirmishes in the U Minh forest,
however, the level of military activity has been
moderate throughout the delta.
Moscaw registered its concern over events in
Indochina in a toughly worded government state-
ment last week and in an-oral demarche to US
Ambassador Beam by Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsav. Moscow's rc;sponse did not appear to
signal an expansion of the Soviet military aid
commitment to Hanoi but rather the seriousness
with which the Soviets view the possibility of
future action aimed directly at North Vietnam.
The Kremlin .specifically reminded Washington
that the DRV "is a socialist state" but only
vaguely warned that the USSR would "help"
repel any action again>t the North. The. USSR
clearly has same apprehensions that the US will
support incursions into North Vietnam and wants
to be firmly on retard against such moves.
Moscow warned that Indochinese develop-
ments may seriously d~~mage US-Soviet relations
and questioned the utility of carrying on negotia-
tions with Washington in the face of alleged US
violations of its Geneva. commitments regarding
Laos. Moscow- has made similar statements be-
fore, however, and therE: have been no indications
..thus far that.the USSR actually intends to disrupt
ongoing diplomatic contacts.
Moscow's reaction to Indochinese develop-
ments has reflected frustration over its inability
to significantly influence developments in either
Washington or Hanoi, pis well as unease over the
possibility that it might be called on to .take more
forceful action to back up the North Vietnamese.
The Soviets have sought to keep alive the possibil-
ity of a political settlement, but they have made
clear that the USSR considers itself powerless to
bring about serious negotiations at present. Unless
Hanoi shows some interest in diplomatic initiatives,
therefore, the Soviets are unlikely to make any
dramatic moves.
Another Spectacular in Cambodia
The Communists broke a five week stand-
down in major attacks against Cambodian targets
when they carried out a mortar and ground attack
against the country's only oil refinery at the sea-
port of Kompong Som. Although the attack did
not have the same psychological impact as the
raid against the Phnom Penh airport in late Jan-
uary, it was the first time the Communists had
brought the war -into the important seaport and
indicates that small-unit actions against popula-
tion centers may become a continuing feature in
Communist tactics in the coming months. Phnom
Penh's petroleum supplies will not necessarily be
disrupted as a result of the damage caused by the
attack, however.
Enemy elements succeeded in destroying
four large storage tanks at the refinery before
they were driven off by local government security
forces. The .Communists apparently did no dam-
age to the refinery itself, however. The enemy
also bombarded a nearby airfield with mortar fire,
forcing its temporary closure.
Only limited amounts of petroleum supplies
have been trucked to Phnom Penh since Route 4
was reopened in January because of subsequent
Communist harassing attacks against convoys
traveling that highway. The capital is continuing
to depend on the movement of petroleum sup-
plies up the .Mekong from South Vietnam to
maintain essential fuel stocks. Riverine convoys
to Phnom Penh have been arriving there with such
regularity that three-month-old restrictions on the
sale of gasoline and diesel fuels to civilians re-
cently were lifted.
In the meantime, the Communists continued
to carry out light harassing. attacks against several
main lines of communication. These actions were
largely ineffectual. Government forces in the
Phnom Penh special military region reported the
presence of sizable numbers of well-armed enemy
troops within striking distance of the city. No
heavy fighting occurred in the capital area,
however. Nevertheless, the Cambodians remained
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apprehensive that enemy pressure against Phnom
Penh wilt intensify as the first anniversary of
Sihanouk's ouster-1$ March-draws near.
The Communists, too, appear to be regroup-
ing and resupplying their combat forces around
the Long Tieng complex, which now also number
over 10,000 men.
In t south, Communist units are continu-
ing to hara government outposts on then h-
ern and Baste edges of the Bolovens Platga~but
have done rela 'vel little dama e.
Communist ground activity has been light
throughout Laos for most of the week, but Com-
munist forces in several ~~reas appear to be prepar-
ing for increased activit~~. I n the key Long Tieng
complex southwest of i:he Plaine des Jarres, ac-
tion has consisted principally of small-unit clashes
and shelling exchanges, ~jlthough two government
outposts, four miles northeast and 22 miles east
of the base, were overrun. Long Tieng itself was
hit by ten rackets on 4 March, but no facilities
were damaged. The government is strengthening
its forces in this area, and some 1,200 irregulars
from military Region III were moved into the
complex on 1 March, raising government force
levels to aver 10,000.
Several rockets did 't Pakse on
4 M ch, causing only limited damage, ccording
to preliminary reports.
The`Communists are still giving con
empha to subversive activities, and t
to be h in some success. In the
men errs o
the Viet Cori
T ene ratmg'"~"ie'e~bng
a majority of t
a orce outposts th
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ed from inside
erable
elta,
29 govern-
have fallen to
onths of 1971
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S~C~lir;'1'
have come to
bring the go
attempt
cont
Vi
'ast
egard the'
years, the Communists
erritorial units, which
to the people, as the
rnment close
threat to their
tivities. Viet Cong
o subvert these force
nded in the months a
to meet .with some succe
ndoubtedly will
d. They will
amese territorial andl police forc
are better
fined to cope with these Communist tactics.
Electioneering in South Vietnam
Playing new variations of an old theme, Pres-
ident Thieu has come up with a "Four No's"
slogan for his election campaign. Swinging
through the central highlands last week, Thieu
promised , no coalition, i~o neutrality, no terri-
torial concessions, and no permission far the en-
emy to operate as a legal political party in South
Vietnam. This seems to run counter to Thieu's
earlier, mare forthcominct offers to let the Com-
munists participate in elections. Thieu-has appar-
ently decided to take a more uncompromising
line in his campaign speeches in order to set the
stage to attack the opposition, especially Big
Minh, whom he probabl~,r will charge with soft-
ness toward the enemy.
Addressing his remarks to Hanoi, Thieu has
recently begun to threaten an invasion of the
North unless the latter stops sending its forces
into the South. His political motives aside, Thieu
clearly wants to keep North Vietnam thinking
about its own defenses while it weighs its strategy
and deploys its forces against the allied operation
into Laos. In the longer term, he probably wants
to drive the point home to Hanoi that the ground
rules of this war have been changed and that
Hanoi no longer enjoys the advantage of being
able to invade the South without much real con-
cern that the tatter's forces might move against
the North.
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Communist China: Military under Fire
Debate at the highE:st levels over the growing
role of China's armed forces in party and govern-
ment affairs is apparently intensifying. Although the
sensitive issue of the army's day-to-day role in poli-
tics has long been treated circumspectly in official
pronouncements, the ground rules appear to be
changing, and unusual public criticism is being
directed at alleged political failings on the part of
the nation's numerous millitary administrators.
The points at issue are complex. They include
Peking's desire to ensure centralized control over its
most viable governing instrument as well as concern
over the qualifications of some officers to hold posts
within both the army and the civilian party appar-
atus. Beyond these problems, however, the recent
propaganda outpourings also raise the possibility
that a divisive struggle is going on in Peking-a strug-
gle that in the past ye~ir already has resulted in
several major casualties among leaders whose fate at
least in part may have teen determined by their
attitude toward the army', future in politics.
The most recent public airing of deficiencies in
the armed forces came last week in an authoritative
article in the party theoreitical journal Red Flag. The
article launched a particularly harsh attack on the
performance of both senior and junior military offi-
cers-many o~F whom are directly involved in civil
administration. By implication they were charged
with bureaucratic shortcomings reminiscent of those
for which China's former party officials were cen-
sured during the Cultural I~evolution. Thus, the arti-
cle claimed that the performance of many officers is
marred by the twin evils of "arrogance" and "com-
placency" and called for an intensified ideological
struggle to eliminate these traits. According to Red
Flag, this struggle should take the form of regular
"open-door rectification"--a demeaning form of po-
litical harassment in which officers are forced to
suffer direct criticism and verbal abuse from "revolu-
tionary" soldiers and even, on occasion, from civil-
ians.
It seems unlikely that this latest diatribe pre-
sages another round of purges in the military, but its
threatening tone and critical style almost certainly
will impose additional strains on the morale and
possibly on the cohesiveness of China's politically
overburdened military hierarchy. Moreover, it is ap-
parent that some army men, if not the majority, are
opposing open criticism of the military's political
performance on the grounds that it undercuts the
army's authority. That this reaction is becoming
widespread is suggested by Red Flag's unusually
frank attack on the idea that one should not wash
one's dirty linen in public.
Although it is difficult to determine exactly
which elements in the regime are authorizing the
present assault on the military, it seems safe to
assume that the current complaints are the product
of long-standing divisions over the proper limits of
the army's political role. Indeed, such divisions may
have been a major factor contributing to the uncer
twin laarlcrehir. .,~~+,.,-? ~., o,.i..~_ _.._._ ~~__ __ ~ 25X1
it is possible that the more recent fall of
po I uro member Chen Po-ta was precipitated in
part by his support of opponents of the army
during the Cultural Revolution.
In any case, concern over the military establish-
ment seems to be one discernible thread running
through the murky, behind-the-scenes leadership
struggles in Peking. The issue appears still unre-
solved, and the fact that a recent Mao directive
ordering army men not to fear criticism has not yet
been widely publicized suggests continuing disagree-25X1
ment over the manner and extent to which the
prescribed rectification campaign within the armed
forces should be carried out.
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NA~'`f~NA IST CHINA: Tai ei's claim to sover-
eignty``~yer the Senkakus--officially registered for
the first"'?,~time last weep, will probably not be
allowed. to~`eopardize relations with Japan. The
dispute over? oil exploration rights in the East
China Sea are~~ has been brewing for the past 18
months, and . T~. ei no ,doubt felt it politic to
claim the islands rurally in view of the fact that
Peking did so last ecember, and also because of
mounting domestic ~ essure to take a more forth-
right -stand on the iss .Taipei's previous position
had been merely to nay Japan's claim to the
islands, and it has publi ignored Peking's. The
Nationalists' latest prono~ cement also claims for
Taiwan "full and unrestric d" rights in explora-
tion and exploitation of th continental shelf in
that area. Despite this, tl~e N ionalists probably
hope to proceed with the ex loration through
informal. agreements reached with Japan since last
November. At the same Lime, they will probably
give face-saving propaganda play to their new
BURMA: General Ne Win's emergency medical
evacua 'on to London on 20 February be se of
a bleedi ulcer spurred the rulin utionary
Council in considering the cession for the
first time. 11 rangy military figures who
form- the uppe e~e*Yon of the Revolutionary
Council-pluses ~eld commanders summoned
hastily tortf-goon amed Army Chief of Staff
San Yu,~~ take over I~~uld Ne Win depart the
scen~~~`5an Yu, a long-tirn'eti,~hometown friend of
Ne Win, is considered adult, h rd-working profes-
sional soldier.
Burmese Government press releases on 27
February reported that Ne Win was improving
and would be discharged from the hospital
shortly. Continuing uncertainty in the coming
months over Ne Win's health, however, combined
with San Yu's lack of leadership qualities, may
give rise to intensified maneuvering by others in
the Revolutionary Council who might aspire to
succeed to the leadership. Any period of
instability following a weakening or removal of
Ne Win's heavy. hand would reduce Rangoon's
ability to cope with its multiple problems, par-
ticularly ethnic and Communist insurgency and
former prime minister U Nu's efforts to mount a
resistance movement from Thailand.
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EUROPE
France Renews Cornmitment to Space Programs
The Fre
(CNES) announ
a budget of $13
during 1971. This
million for space programs munity.
the second largest budget
CNES has ever receiJ
declining budgets, reflec
and, after two years of
a renewed commitment
h space efforts.
by the government to FrE~
The budget had risen teadily from $3.4
million in 1961 to a high of so e $140 million in
1968, then declined for two ors because of
national economic strain and a r -evaluation of
some space activities. The 1971 bu et allocates
$84 million to program investments d $49 mil-
lion to R&D and operating expenditure
The program investrnent sector inclut~s
million for the European multinational
organizations, suggesting a strong French
mitment to the developrrient of the Europa sp
boosters and application~~ satellites. France mai
tains that these programs are essential to seriou
European participation iin space exploration and'
applications. In actuality, the programs probably
do more to further Fr~~nce's own independent
space efforts, already more advanced and compre~
hensive than those of all other European cou
tries combined.
In addition to the E=uropean programs, 30
million will be spent on bilateral projects re ted
to the development of the French-in" fired
Symphonie communications satellite systeh and
studies for upgrading the Diamant-B.:~ space
booster, presently the basic workhorse~-of the
French space program. Even if its capabilities
were improved through ~~uch a joint prc~~ect, the
new missile still would remain a French space
booster and, as with the Diamant-B, Fr,~nce prob-
ation is $10
space experi
joint studi
of anot_he
launcher.
I ighted
scientifi
flector
the money for bilateral cooper-
illion for various Franco-American
ents, but only about $1 million for
of space with the USSR. The
'et studies will center on the launching
French solar cell package by a Soviet
Last year's joint efforts were high-
the landing on the moon of a Soviet
package containing French laser re-
he French space budget also includes some
illion for programs the French will conduct
selves, such as sounding rocket launchings,
ospheric balloon projects, and laser experi-
nts. Most of this sum, however, will be spent
developing and launching three satellites this
ear from France's new space center in French
Paris took an early and continuing lead
ong European countries in supporting space
rams. France's expenditures on space activi-
ties
one t
whole,
recent years have amounted to more than
Ord of the total for Western Europe as a
d this proportion is increasing. France
also is t
ently to
only West European country consist-
end more on national and bilateral
space proje
s than it contributes to Europe's
multinational
activities as haJ
rograms. France views its space
g provided invaluable inputs to a
whole range of s
entific, aerospace, and military
programs, as well a
community.
SECRET
h National Space Studies Center ably would offer,~to make it available on a fee
d last week that it had received basis for use b the European scientific com-
having contributed to placing
t of the European scientific
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YUG?SLAVIA-USSR: Although both si es ex-
pressed satisfaction with the visit of Yugoslav
Foreign Minister Tepavarent refusal to accept
Egypt's demand that it withdraw from all terri-
tory it occupied in the June 1967 war.
The formal Israeli response to Ambassador
Jarring's initiative reportedly was a more detailed
version of the cabinet communique of 21 Febru-
ary in which the Israelis rejected an Egyptian.
offer to make peace in return for Israel's com-
plete withdrawal from Sinai.
Although the Israeli reply was described as
not being specific on borders, Israeli officials have
begun to spell out what they regard as minimal
acceptable boundaries in any settlement. In a
speech on ?_5 February, Prime Minister Golda
Meir said, "We will not be able to leave the Galan
Heights, Jerusalem, or Sharm ash-Shaykh." In a
radio interview the next day, Foreign Minister
Abba Ebacr also indicated that Israel would insist
on .retaining these three areas. On 27 February,
Deputy Prirne Minister Yigal Allon stated on
radio that it was essential for Israel to retain
control over Sharm ash-Shaykh and a strip of land
connecting it to Israel proper, as well as retaining
a defense line-along the Golan Heights. Although
all three officials indicated that their statements
did not represent an official decision on borders,
their views appear to be shared- by a majority of
government members.
The final- Egyptian position on extending the
cease-fire is not clear. T'he Egyptians are appar-
ently willing, at least for the time being, to permit
the US to continue -its efforts to persuade the
Israelis to be more forthcoming on the with-
drawal issue. It is notev~rorthy that, as the dead-
line of 7 March approaches, the tone of Egyptian
propaganda- has been consistently less strident
than it was just prior to the previous expiration
date of 5 February. President Sadat told a meet-
ing of the Palestinian National Council in Cairo
on 28 February that Egypt intends to explore
fully the possibilities of a political solution to the
Arab-Israeli crisis before resorting to war. Interna-
tional efforts to gain- from the Israelis a more
positive commitment on withdrawal, together
with international appeals for continued military
restraint, could provide Cairo with sufficient justi-
fication for continued reliance in the immediate
future on political rather than military action.
The USSR, meanwhile, in an obvious at-
tempt to increase pressure on the Israelis, has
issued one of its infrequent government state-
ments on the Middle East. The statement, re-
leased on 27 February, contrasts the alleged rea-
sonableness of the Egyptian response to Jarring's
proposals with the Israeli communique an-
nouncing Israel's refusal to withdraw to the pre-
1967 boundaries, and it attempts to link Israel's
position to the latter-'s relationship with-the US.
The statement also warns that the onl~~ alternative
to a political settlement is a "military clash" and
affirms that ali states interested in peace must act
vigorously to prevent Israel and "its patrons"
from frustrating such a settlement. It ends with
the standard reiteration of all-out Soviet support
for the Arabs in their struggle to regain their
lands.
Military preparations by both the Egyptians
and the- Israelis appear to involve contingency
planning and the alerting of forces, but there are
no indications that either side is mobilizing or
redeploying forces to initiate hostilities. The stra-
tegic standoff that has developed is unlikely to
change in the near future. Egypt's military leaders
appear. to be aware that alarge-scale crossing of
the Suez Canal would only produce another Arab
defeat. The Israelis, on the other hand, have little
to gain from another round of fighting.
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Palestinians:. Parliamentary Powwow
The meeting in Cairo this week of the Na-
tional Cauncil, the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion's (PLO) parliamentary body, concentrated its
attention on the problem of unifying the various
fedayeen organizations.
The initial sessions of the council were taken
up with speeches by Vasir Arafat, Council Chair-
man Yahya Hammuda, and others who reaffirmed
their intention to continue the military struggle
against Israel. Meeting at the same time as the
council was the "Popular National Conference."
This assemblage, presumably responding to a
fedayeen-inspired invitation, reportedly drew to-
gether awide spectrurri of once-distinguished Jor-
danians and East Ban4~; Palestinians. Both groups
were expected to call for the prevention of any
further conflict betweE~n the two peoples and to
condemn King Husayn's regime. The conference
also underscored the rn~ed for the unity of Pales-
tinians on both banks of the Jordan River.
In his welcoming speech opening the coun-
cil, President Sadat of Egypt rather brusquely
told the Palestinians to restrict themselves to their
proper concerns. He pointed out to the delegates
that the responsibilities; and potential strength of
the fedayeen movement had been exaggerated
from the beginning bar various states to enable
them to avoid fulfilling their own obligations. The
Egyptian leader counseled the guerrillas to fore-
stall any further attempts to liquidate them by
concentrating on unifying the Palestinian move-
ment. Whatever they decide to do, Sadat now has
served notice on the Palestinians not to interfere
in Cairo's attempts to achie,~e a peace settl
seeming)
ious feda
1
mittee co
m
a Palestin
e Li
attempte
d to
into an a p
cce ta
council in fait,
unsolvable problem of uni
~n organizations. A tl~
l_ used of a Fatah, an
d gyration Army (P
~,eld various ~F
l_ a formul
th
the enti cou
ront for het
sented to
Popular
F
again played the mai
struct any effectiv
boycotting the m
part in any deci
sought to
two quic
by o
with the
ing the var-
ependent, and
A) representative
oposals for unity
at was to be pre-
for its approval. The
iberation of Palestine
role in attempting to ob-
~ement toward unity by
tings
and by refusing to take
nd other PL
p any quarrels in
decisions. The Conte
he bud by making
ity was avoided
ent of a Palestinian eri
tting it from the agenda
reased to six
in an effort to assuage PLA~'commander ?~?~
Arafat and others.) 25X1
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leaders apparently
nd the PLA's
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last mor~t;ti apparently wzis a considerable success
on all frorrtSR will be "very I~rfje" establishment of an intergovernmental Commis-
this year. ~"' sion for Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-
a ,.
During the past decade when?Cub~n-Soviet
trade doubled, Havana has run a growing d'eflcit
that reached an estimated $42~ million in 19~9t
This deficit, after falling drtically last year, will
again increase and proba'bfy will be close to $400
million by the end of the year. At that time
Cuba's total debt to. ?the USSR will amount to
about $3 billion, the bulk representing balance-
of-payments support. Oder the years, moreover,
the USSR. has provided more than $1 billion in
subsidies through the preferential price it pays for
Cuban sugar.
operation. Most of the members are at the deputy
ministerial level reflecting the importance appar-
ently attached to this body by both sidess. Al-
though it is too early to assess the commission's
prospects, it is likely to have a difficult future in
;,view of the erratic shifts that have characterized
~u,ba's economic policies in the past.
S~rvjet military deliveries last year were
routine, ahd,, available evidence points to more of
the same in'~1971. Shipments have consisted of
newer equipment to replace materiel in Havana's
aging military inventories:
negotiations on more important issues. In a well-
publicized press interview Torrijos characterized
relations with the US as "good" although com-
plaining about the violation of Panamanian sov-
ereignty. Torrijos also advanced the standard re-
jection of the "in perpetuity" clause in any new
canal treaty and stated that his government has
last weE~k, top government lead-
ers criticized the US for refusing to return a
minor Panamanian official arrested in the Canal
Zone on drug charges. Despite earlier threats of
violent demonstrations, However, the government
has thus far confined itself to diplomatic protests
in the wake of a US decision to fly the prisoner to
Texas to stand trial. General Torrijos apparently
has concluded that furtPier steps would not only
be futile but also would jeopardize chances for
no interest in establishing diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union at this time. 25X1
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Secret
DIRECTO:[~ATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
'S'eparate 1~evelopnaent in South Africa: The Bantustans
Secret
NB 16
5 March 1971
No. 0360/71A
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~,C,l~t'Cr, 1
SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE BANTUSTANS
Gee fan only safeguard the white man's control over our country if we move in `the:
direction of separation-separation in the political sphere at-any rate.
The late Prime Minister Hendriic Verwoerd, 1959
SincE~ coming to power in 1948 the Afrikaner-dominated National Party has
had as its primary goal the implementation of its policy of separation of the
races (apartheid). In the last decade, the keystone of that policy has become the
bantustan,~, the African tribal homelands. In theory, these territories will even-
tually become self-governing, independent states, and Prime Minister Vorster has
said that his government hopes to grant "independence" to one or two bantu-
stans in the next few years. The chances, however, that any of the homelands
will ever become self-supporting and really free of dependence on white-ruled
South Africa are almost nonexistent.
Granting nominal independence soon, however, could have certain advan-
tages for Pretoria. It would probably reassure Afrikaner supporters of the
government that it is moving ahead-albeit slowly-with separate development. It
could also further the Vorster government's efforts to improve relations with a
select nurnber of black-ruled states and thus sow dissension among African
leaders wl~o are already at odds with each other over how best to deal with
South Africa.
The government hopes the bantustans will eventually become the homeland
of most of South Africa's blacks, and it is attempting to remove the Africans
from white-designated areas by converting the black urban labor force, on which
the economy is dependent, into a migratory one. The problems confronting the
government in accomplishing this, however, are monumental, and whether the
Nationalists will succeed in turning present planning into practice is clouded
with uncertainty.
Special Report - 1 -
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51,1~KL 1
i ~ Transkei Legislative Authority
Tswana Territorial Authority
Zulu Territorial Authority
OSiter Bantustans
Special Report - 2 - 5 March 1971
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There .must be a white South Africa and a black
South Africa politicc!lly divided but peacefully
and cooperatively coexistent.
S. Pienaar, prominent Afrikaner journalist
Apartheid, though cruel in practice, is idealistic
in theory.
Alan Paton, author of Cry, the Beloved Country
It is impossible to travel in South Africa
today without noticing the distinctions that are
made between the ra~~es. Separate facilities for
whites and "non-whitE~s" are almost everywhere:
at airports, post offices, beaches, graveyards, even
in those areas set aside for the African. In
Umtata, the capital of the Transkei, for example,
there are hotels where the chief minister of the
territorial government, an African, cannot stay.
South African law excludes the African from na-
tional political affairs and also dictates where he
may live and what kind of job he may hold.
Although most of South Africa's 3.8 million
English- and Afrikaans,-speaking whites consider
white minority rule essential and social segrega-
tion desirable, only the ruling National Party, the
political voice of masi: Afrikaners, espouses the
apartheid ideology of complete racial separation.
Afrikaners` racial fears and sense of superiority
are deeply rooted in i:heir history as a frontier
people among hostile fafrican tribes and in their
17th century Calvinist religion with its doctrine
of the elect. For them, regimentation of blacks
has always been a matter of survival, and since
coming to power in 19~t8 the Nationalist govern-
ment has done its utmost to shore up, formalize,
and extend the country's traditional system of
racial discrimination.
In the last ten ye~srs or so the focus of the
government's racial polilcies has become the ban-
tustan, the Africans' tribal homeland. Afrikaner
political leaders and intellectuals contend, with
some justification, that South Africa is not one
but several different "nations" as incapable of
forming a single political and social unit as, say,
India and Pakistan. In order for the white man (as
well as the non-white) to maintain his own iden-
tity and keep what he believes is rightfully his, it
is argued that each "nation" should be allowed to
develop .in its own way with its "own institutions,
attitudes, and values." Until such time as this can
be brought about, however, discrimination, or
what has come to be known as "petty apartheid,"
will remain in force.
By definition tribes are considered nations,
and the government has gone to some lengths to
bolster the authority of traditional tribal chiefs in
African-designated reserves (bantustans) and to
revive tribal ties among Africans in urban areas.
Tribal dialects have become the language of in-
struction in African schools, and the government
has established separate universities for some
tribal groups. The government-owned South Afri-
can Broadcasting Corporation also has regular
programing in the tribal languages. In urban areas,
officials have begun to divide Africans residen-
tially along tribal lines. Above all, the government
has promoted its bantustan program as the answer
to South Africa's troubling racial problems.
Although the idea of separate homelands for
blacks is a logical outgrowth of apartheid, it is
also a response to foreign critics who have
branded South Africa's racial policies as harsh and
totally, oppressive. If current government plans
are carried out, all Africans eventually will be-
come citizens of these homelands, which will be
given the formal trappings of independent states.
In theory, Africans would then be free of white
political control, and whites would retain exclu-
sive rights in their part of the country where
blacks would be treated as foreign migrant work-
ers. What the relationship between these "inde-
pendent" bantustans and white South Africa
would be is unclear, although government leaders
sometimes speak of a "commonwealth" of South
Africa.
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To those, therefore, v,rho criticize the South
African Government for withholding political
rights from the Africans, Pretoria holds up the
panacea of a future multir~rcial, but racially sepa-
rated, union of South Africa. To the opponents
of apartheid, however, sep~rrate development is at
best a utopian, self-deluding policy, and at worst
(and more likely) an attempt to pull the wool
over the eyes of the outside world and to provide
a moral basis at home for continued white su-
premacy rule. They are deeply skeptical of the
government's claim that "petty apartheid" is only
transitory and that the bantustans will ever
achieve real undependence.
Some Afrikaner intellectuals are also highly
critical of the bantustan program, not because
they disagree with it but I~ecause they want the
government to do more to make it a reality. In
fact, the government's efforts have often been
compared unfavorably to the plans to industrial-
ize the reserves proposed in the mid-50s by one of
its own special study groups-the Tomlinson
Commission.. But the late Prime Minister Ver-
woerd, whom many Afrikaners look upon as the
prophet of apartheid, rejected this course. As a
result, the government hays concentrated largely
on the more dramatic and less expensive effort of
political development.
Tkiey are -valleys of ald men'. and old women, of
mothers anc~ :children. ThE ,men are away, the
young men and.the girls areaway. The-soil can-
~not k ~her~ uny more.
Cry, the Beloved Country
Nearly half of South Africa's 15 million
blacks now live in the eight; reserves set aside for
them. These Homelands make up less than 12
percent of the land area of South Africa, and by
one recent official count a~nsist of 276 bits and
pieces of territory scattered mostly over the east-
Special Report
Typical scenes in the Bantustans
ern half of the country. Although the government
is committed to buying over 5,000 more square
miles of land consigned to the reserves under the
1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act, it does not plan
to consolidate many, if any, of the bantustans
completely. This would entail the removal of too
many white farmers, not to mention some white
towns and major cities.
Over the last decade Pretoria has pumped
roughly $400 million into the homelands for land
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purchases, township planning, housing, and other
social services, as well as for agriculture. Annually
that amounts to less than two percent of the
government's expenditures. Although agricultural
development has been ciiven priority, officials
have had to combat not only chronic drought
conditions that afflict much of the country but
the African peasant's traditional indifference to
farming and his strong resistance to change as
well. Because of African neglect as well as over-
population, soil erosion ,and cattle overstocking
are still widespread, and food shortages are fre-
quent.
Many young blacks in the reserves, more-
over, prefer to seek industrial jobs rather than
farm because as wage earners they have at least
some opportunity to eases their harsh living con-
ditions. Industrial development in the reserves,
however, is practically nonexistent. Since 1961
only 35 government-backed factories have been
built, employing a total of 945 Africans. In con-
trast, over a million and a half blacks now work as
migrant laborers in the white-controlled econ-
omy, and an estimated 35,000 additional Africans
from the reserves join the labor market each year.
Officials claim that tf?iere are just not enough
experienced African businessmen and ski-led la-
borers in the bantustans yet to make industrial
development feasible. Although true, this is at
least partly the result of the government's own
apartheid labor laws that exclude Africans from
holding managerial and most skilled jobs. Until
recently, moreover, white corporate business in-
terests were not allowed to~ operate in the reserves
under any conditions. Now this restriction has
been modified, but because of the lack of ade-
quate water, electrical power, housing, roads, and
rail facilities, few companies have shown any in-
terest in investing in these remote areas.
In sharp contrast with its economic program,
Pretoria has put enormous effort, particularly in
the last three years, into erecting administrative
structures in the homelands ranging from local
tribal to territorial authorities. Since 1968, seven
Special Report
of the reserves have acquired territorial status-
theoretically the penultimate step before full
independence-and two of them, Tswanaland and
Northern Sotho, are expected to gain limited par-
liamentary self-government within the next year
or so. The South African parliament will probably
also bestow homeland citizenship on blacks this
year.
All of this is in preparation for at least some
form of eventual political autonomy for the
homelands. Prime Minister Vorster stated late last
year that his government hopes to grant "inde-
pendence" to one or two bantustans in the next
few years. If so, the Transkei will probably be the
first. Unlike the other homelands it consists virtu-
ally of one large solid block of land. The territory
also has a long history of local self-government
dating back to the 1890s, and as the oldest ban-
tustan it has had most of the trappings of a
modern state since 1963. It boasts a constitution,
a cabinet, a partially elected legislative assembly,
and a civil service (largely black), as well as a flag,
an anthem, and an official Language. The Trans-
kei's economy, however, is still based primarily
on subsistence agriculture and migrant labor, and
its government is almost entirely dependent on
Pretoria for regular financial support and develop-
ment funds. Consequently, the development of
the Transkei into aself-supporting independent
state is at best a very distant goal.
Granting nominal independence soon, how-
ever, could have certain advantages for Pretoria. It
would probably reassure most Afrikaners that the
government is moving ahead with separate devel-
opment. Moreover, for some time Prime Minister
Vorster has been trying to improve his govern-
ment's relations with a select number of black-
ruled African states, particularly Malawi, (the
only African state with which it has diplomatic
relations) the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and the Mala-
gasy Republic.
Last year Pretoria made some progress in
this direction. In November, President Hou-
phouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast made a public
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~r,~,rcr~ 1
Literally built atop soiree of the richest gold mines in the world, Johannesburg
is South Africa's largest city. 't'oday, its population is almost 60 percent black.
.__........
appeal far a "dialague" between black- and
whii:e-ruled African states, thus breaking the sur-
face unity of black African opposition to Sautfi
Africa. Tlhat same month, Tananarive accepted
$6.5 million in economic aid from Pretoria. P.
gesture toward his awn blacks, some observers
believe, u