WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008500030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 22, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2009/03/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500030001-7
low Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
22 January 1971
No. 0354/71
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(Information as of noon EST, 21 January 1971)
Page
FAR EAST
Vietnam: A Quiet Tet This Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Laos: Talk-Fight, Talk-Fight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Cambodia: Moving Into the Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Communist China: Progress and Problems in the Provinces . . . . . . 4
Philippines: Striking and Feuding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Polish Leadership Undergoes Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Preparations for Bulgaria's Tenth Party Congress . . . . . . . . . 10
Spain: Government Facing Military Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . 11
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Middle East: Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Jordan: Fedayeen Differences Increasing . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
USSR-Egypt: Podgorny Accentuates the Positive . . . . . . . . . 14
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA (CONTINUED)
Arab States: Arab Summit Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
International Oil Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Guinea: Postinvasion Drama Enters Final Act . . . . . . . . . . 17
Sudan: Soviet Economic Assistance Lags but Military Aid Increases . 17
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: Allende Continues His Subtle Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . 19
Bolivia: President Postpones Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Political Assassinations Continue in Guatemala . , . . . . . . . . 21
OAS General Assembly on Terrorism Still Poses Problems . . . . . . 22
Page ii
ambia; Brazil; Peru
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FAR EAST
Vietnam: A Quiet Tet This Year
The Communists continue to prepare for
increased military action soon, but
they will generally abide by their uni-
lateral four-day Tet cease-fire set to begin early
on 26 January. The three-day Lunar New Year
holiday actually starts on the 27th.
soldiers, for instance, continues to undermine the
morale and performance of the armed forces. A
number of senior officers have recently expressed
concern about the low pay, stating that it is at the 25X1
root of ARVN's misbehavior in Cambodia and the
high desertion rate.
Because of man-
power and supply problems created in part by the
Cambodian situation, the expected shellings,
ground probes, and other harassments in South
Vietnam are likely to be limited.
The areas most threatened include the north-
ern provinces and the sector northwest of Saigon
near the Cambodian border. North Vietnamese
combat units have recently either moved into, or
are positioned near, both of these areas and could
be used to put some pressure on allied forces.
Elsewhere, the Communists will continue to rely
mainly on their local forces and on guerrillas to
carry on the war.
Ground actions
are likely to be limited to allied military instal-
lations, mainly the more remote outposts and
field positions.
Low Pay Hurts ARVN
Despite the government's success in slowing
inflation, economic woes still persist in South
Vietnam. The less than subsistence pay for ARVN
With few exceptions, ARVN soldiers are pro-
vided a food allowance in cash instead of rations
or mess facilities. Because this allowance is insuf-
ficient, soldiers often steal food. Housing and
family allowances also are inadequate, and mili-
tary personnel steal goods for resale or "moon-
light" to try to make ends meet. Senior officers in
South Vietnam's Joint General Staff have esti-
mated privately that roughly 80 percent of the
12,000 desertions per month last year were
prompted by the economic squeeze.
From time to time in the past year or so, the
government has reviewed the problem and made
plans to establish commissaries, improve messing
facilities both at installations and in the field, and
grant regular home leave as well as transportation
home, but little has actually been done to imple-
ment these plans. Increased American aid was
provided on a crash basis last summer to help
build adequate housing for dependents; a modest
housing program has been under way for several
months, but it is only a beginning toward meeting
the need. Some Vietnamese military sources claim
that last October's pay raise already has been
overtaken by rising prices.
A distribution system for a $42.7-million
food supplement program supported by the US
for 1971 has just been approved and may begin
soon. This could alleviate the immediate problem
of hungry soldiers if implemented, but a much
more widespread effort to upgrade general living
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SEUKI; l' r
TET CEASE-FIRE PERIODS
Tet Holiday 27-29 January
Saigon
Washington
Communist
Begins
Jan. 26-0100
Jan. 25-1200
Ends
Jan. 30-0100
Jan. 29-1200
Allied
Begins
Jan. 26-1800
Jan. 26-0500
Ends
Jan.27-1800
Jan. 27-0500
conditions is needed before military service ceases personnel and junior officers. ~ I
to be a serious economic hardship for enlisted
Laos: Talk-Fight, Talk-Fight
The Communists are continuing to press for
talks in the Plaine des Jarres, although it is not
clear how far they are prepared to water down
demands regarding security precautions. In recent
remarks clearly intended to reach the US Govern-
ment, Soth Phetrasy, the Pathet Lao representa-
tive in Vientiane, said that if there were to be
further progress toward peace negotiations, the
US would have to weigh in with Prime Minister
Souvanna, who was taking an "intransigent
stand." Soth evidently was referring to Souvan-
na's refusal to discuss Communist demands pre-
sented to him in December that the US and Laos
observe a bombing halt in Xieng Khouang Prov-
ince as part of the security precautions for talks
in Khang Khay. The Communists then dropped
their insistence that the halt also apply to
Samneua Province, but the prime minister, who
was uncharacteristically abusive, did not offer a
counterproposal.
In an obvious effort to portray the Commu-
nist position as reasonable, Soth said the Pathet
Lao recognize that Vientiane and Washington
might fear that a bombing halt in Xieng Khouang
would jeopardize the Long Tieng complex. He
argued, however, that the bombing could be re-
sumed at any time Souvanna felt that the talks
were not getting anywhere.
Although Soth is a congenital optimist, his
remarks appear to be part of a fresh Communist
effort to revive the possibility of talks./
On 14 January the Communists
chimed in with another plea for talks. In a com-
munique, the Pathet Lao called on the prime
minister to overcome the opposition of the US
and the rightists and enter into "sincere" nego-
tiations. They again scaled down their require-
ments for the start of talks-referring to the need
to "de-escalate" bombing and air activity in Xieng
Khouang Province, but no longer calling for a
complete cessation. Souvanna was urged to an-
swer the proposals before Souk returned to Sam-
neua.
Fighting has been relatively limited in all
sectors of Laos. The government forces operating
against the infiltration corridor in eastern Savan-
nakhet Province have mined the road and have
encountered only token enemy resistance.Fi
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Cambodia: Moving into the Pass
The massive Cambodian - South Vietnamese
military operation to clear Route 4 entered its
second week with Communist elements still in
command of the Pich Nil pass. In the meantime,
two heavily protected fuel resupply convoys
reached Phnom Penh from South Vietnam via the
Mekong, helping to ease somewhat the pinch on
the capital's petroleum stocks.
Cambodian Army (FANK) troops are now
spearheading the task force attempting to push
through the northern end of Pich Nil, but spo-
radic Communist harassing fire and rugged terrain
have slowed their advance. The bulk of the South
Vietnamese marines who were supporting them
were airlifted to the south side of the pass in
midweek in order to reinforce the other arm of
the pincer movement on Pich Nil. The limited
resistance offered by the Communists on the
northern front indicates that the enemy intends
to keep the losses there to a minimum.
Enemy resistance to the FANK - South Viet-
namese drive south of the pass has been sharper,
however. In one engagement with the Commu-
nists near the village of Stung Chral, which is the
planned linkup point for the two task forces,
South Vietnamese marines claim they killed over
30 enemy troops and captured a sizable quantity
of ammunition.
South Vietnamese forces also played a prom-
inent role in providing air and naval cover for two
fuel convoys that reached Phnom Penh. The first
escorted convoy arrived without incident, but the
second received some ineffectual enemy attacks.
This latest instance of Saigon's growing assistance
to the Lon Nol government followed consulta-
tions between officials of the two countries to set
up a joint Mekong River defense command.
Under the new arrangement, Phnom Penh has
deployed a number of FANK battalions to try to
ensure the security of the river's banks between
the capital and the South Vietnamese base at
Neak Luong. For its part, Saigon is to use some of
its air, ground, and riverine resources to defend
shipping on the Mekong from Neak Luong south-
ward to the border.
Prime Minister Matak is receiving much of the
blame for the government's most glaring domestic
deficiencies. Some of the regime's strongest sup-
porters among the middle class, the bureaucracy,
and the youth evidently hold him primarily
responsible for the failure to reduce corru tion
and curb inflatio
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unconsciously than not-that Cambodia is still
being governed in much the same way and by
many of the same people as during Sihanouk's
day. If corruption continues to flourish, if the
National Assembly again becomes a rubber stamp
Matak's official position, his royal blood, his for the leadership, and if the press is discouraged
sometimes abrasive style, and his identification from publicizing abuses in and out of govern-
with the old order combine to make him a natural ment, then some of these more politically aware
target for such criticism. His detractors elements may begin to wonder more vocally just
exactly what was gained by the events of last
, appear to be protesting-perhaps more March.
Communist China: Progress and Problems in the Provinces
Despite an evident desire to increase the
tempo of its lagging party rebuilding campaign,
Peking faces some major problems in the prov-
inces. Nearly one third of the provincial govern-
ment chiefs designated during the hectic 1967-68
period have been purged or transferred to new
posts. Thus, there is no obvious candidate in these
areas to fill the post of provincial first party
secretary, in contrast with the situation in the six
provinces where party committees have been
formed since mid-December. If Peking hopes to
have all 29 provincial level committees formed by
the party's 50th anniversary this summer, it will
have to move with unaccustomed speed toward
making some key personnel assignments in the
months ahead.
I n each of the six new provincial-level party
committees announced thus far, the committee
head has been the chairman of the corresponding
revolutionary committee-the administrative unit
that emerged as the key governmental authority
during the Cultural Revolution. By simply con-
firming incumbent government leaders as the new
party chiefs, Peking avoids rekindling the bitter
personal and factional rivalries that marked the
formation of the revolutionary committees.
In nine province-level units, however, the
chairman of the original revolutionary committee
is no longer on the scene. These vacancies do not
appear to follow any particular geographic or
regional pattern and vary in point of time from
the Tsinghai post in the northwest, rendered
vacant by the transfer of the province chief to
Peking in March 1968, to the chairmanship of the
Yunnan revolutionary committee in the far south-
west, which has opened up as a result of the death
of the province chief just last month.
Five and possibly six of the missing province
chiefs appear to be purge victims. Foremost
among these is Peking city boss Hsieh Fu-chih,
who, as a politburo member and minister of pub-
lic security, was a major figure on the national
scene as well. The others are all members or
alternate members of the party's prestigious cen-
tral committee formed after these men acquired
their provincial governing posts. They still appear
to be in political difficulty, however, probably
stemming from their actions during the Cultural
Revolution.
The death of Tan Fu-jen in Yunnan must
have come as particularly disquieting news for
those in Peking most responsible for resolving the
complex personal disputes that emerged earlier in
the Cultural Revolution. Tan was sent to Yunnan
in mid-1968 as a compromise candidate to
smooth over the intense factional rivalry between
the supporters of Chou Hsing, the former gov-
ernor of Yunnan, and Chen Kang, a local military
commander. Now the problem of putting
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Communist China: The Missing Leaders
Province with party committee headed
by revolutionary committee chairman
Liu Hsien-chuan transferred
to Peking in March 1968.
Tan Fu-jen died
due to illness
0
in late 1969
following poster attacks,
appeared
since May 1969.
t._
~SHEN51
SZECHWAN
I WEICHOW
~v
INNER
ONGOLIA
LIAONING
PEKING---?~~
JJrs` r
Hsieh Fu-chih
dropped
out of sight
G Wang Hsiao-yu
has not appeared
21 KIAN
HUNAN KIANG
t FUK1E
Li Te-sheng
transferred
Li Tsai-han
reportedly
Province with revolutionary committee chairman
but no party committee
Province with missing revolutionary committee chairman
several major turnouts
in the east two months-
-111
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together a leadership team in the province has
come full circle, with no ready solution in sight.
Whatever the outcome behind the hard de-
cisions confronting Peking, there does not appear
to be any fundamental shift under way in the
present mix of military and civilian leadership in
the provinces. At the time of the formation of the
revolutionary committees, army men outnum-
Philippines: Striking and Feuding
The Marcos government has emerged from a
week-long, violence-ridden crisis only to face the
likelihood of new student demonstrations early
next week. President Marcos is sufficiently con-
cerned over the situation that he has taken steps
to ensure the loyalty of the military and to im-
prove security force capabilities in the Manila area
should he feel compelled to impose a state of
martial law,
Trouble began in early January when a hike
in petroleum prices sparked a series of demonstra-
tions by Manila's transport workers and the
drivers of the city's jeepneys-converted jeeps
that provide a large part of the capital's transpor-
tation. Attacks on buses, taxis, and private vehi-
cles brought city life to a near standstill. Student
activists joined the jeepney drivers and began
criticizing the American oil companies involved in
the gasoline price hike.
The fatal shooting of several youths by
Manila police on 13 January has aggravated an
already ugly mood on the part of the students,
although a temporary respite was achieved when
Marcos rescinded the gasoline price increase tem-
porarily. Subsequently the oil companies were
advised they could not raise prices on regular
grades of gasoline despite a stiff increase in tariffs.
The issue, nevertheless, probably is seen by many
Filipinos as one involving US economic im-
perialism.
bered their civilian counterparts about two to
one. Of the six new provincial first secretaries,
four are military and two are veteran party ca-
dres. Military dominance in focal political affairs
is also evident in the over-all makeup of the six
party committees. Of the 29 secretaries and
deputy secretaries thus far identified, 16 are mili-
tary officers, 9 are party veterans, and only 4 fall
into the category of "revolutionary acti-
vists."
A key factor in the present situation is the
feud between Marcos and the family of Vice
President Lopez. The Lopez-owned Manila elec-
tric power company has been seriously affected
by the oil price increase, and there are strong
indications that the jeepney drivers' strike was
abetted and financed by some of the Lopez fam-
ily in an effort to embarrass the President. A
power blackout on 12 January covering Manila
and adjacent provinces quickly raised ill-founded
rumors of a coup against Marcos and had the
earmarks of a ploy to heighten tensions. Marcos
obviously believes that the blackout was deliber-
ately caused by the Lopez family. The resignation
of the vice president from his concurrent post of
Minister of Agriculture and Resources was ac-
cepted by the President last week with public
recriminations against the Lopez clan.
Given this combination of potentially dis-
ruptive factors, further violence is a distinct pos-
sibility. The students, after a summer and fall of
relative inactivity, now appear to have found a
cause. The events in the immediate future most
likely to provoke new disorders, primarily by the
students, are Marcos' state-of-the-nation message
on 25 January and the anniversary on the 26th of
last year's serious student riots that developed
sharp anti-American overtones. At the moment,
Marcos seems to have backed himself into an
uncomfortable corner. If he elects to invoke mar-
tial law to thwart the student demonstrations, he
may stir up even neater unrest.
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EUROPE
Polish Leadership Undergoes Test
Polish party chief Gierek's strength as a na-
tional leader is being tested by his ability to
respond adequately to persistent labor unrest
along the Baltic coast and, without either ap-
peasement or repression, to prevent it from
spreading throughout the country. His meetings
in Warsaw this week with workers' delegations
from the area indicate his willingness to try to
satisfy workers' economic and political demands.
Gierek's dilemma is posed by conflicting
party and popular imperatives, which are giving
rise to political and social instability. He and the
party leadership need popular support and calm
before going into the next central committee
plenum, which is slated to chart the country's
future course. The workers, having felt the power
of toppling and installing a new regime and
spurred by Gierek's new style of encouraging
popular participation in government, are unwill-
ing to give him the needed support before the
party answers basic questions and presents a clear
outline of future plans. Publicity for the up-
coming plenum, which had been expected in late
January, has already ceased, suggesting that labor
unrest may cause a postponement.
The workers' grievances continue to focus
on economic issues, especially wages and working
conditions, that have been aggravated as a result
of mishandling by local authorities. Younger
workers tend to articulate, in addition, more
volatile political demands, such as those for the
ouster of two politburo members who they be-
lieve share the blame for the December riots. The
workers also are impatient with what they regard
as the government's substitution of words for
quick action. The willingness of the local press
and radio in the Baltic area to air workers' griev-
ances has partially mollified them, but continued
official silence on the details of the riots in De-
cember-including accurate numbers of persons
killed and the fate of those arrested-is leading to
tension, speculation, and a distortion of public
opinion.
There is no evidence that the regime views
the unrest as reflecting organized opposition,
either from outside or from within the party.
Instead, it has acknowledged that there is a lack
of organization among the workers who present
demands. This fact, together with the low profile
being maintained by police and other internal
security organs, suggests that Gierek has con-
fidence that a combination of firmness and
conciliation will ultimately cause the unrest to
lose momentum. Although Gierek in effect was
installed by the workers, he cannot be per-
manently beholden to them, and he must show all
the Polish people, as well as the Soviets, that he is
a national leader in charge of his own house.
The thrust of the next party plenum evi-
dently will be determined by intervening events,
especially whether labor peace is restored. The
plenum is expected to approve high party per-
sonnel changes. The conclave will also have to
deal with such recently surfaced, ill-defined ideas
as that mentioned by two politburo members
envisaging "a system whereby leaders would
assume and leave their positions normally and not
under crisis situations." The plenum's promised
program for the future, however, will hinge on
economic reforms, and these reportedly are still
being debated.
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EUROPE
IAEA: The special committee on verification
procedures of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) this week entered what may be
the final phase of its effort to draft an agency
position on safeguards required by the Nonpro-
liferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of fis-
sionable material from peaceful uses. With agree-
ment already achieved on the frequency and in-
tensity of inspections, the chief remaining issue is
that of financing the safeguards. A number of
competing schemes may be advanced, and the
developing countries lacking nuclear plants will
again express their desire that they not be as-
sessed for the safeguards, including those applied
to US and UK facilities voluntarily opened for
inspections. Meanwhile, the EURATOM countries
have yet to resolve their differences over the sort
of inspection agreement they wish to negotiate
with the IAEA.
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Preparations for Bulgaria's Tenth Party Congress
Todor Zhivkov, who heads both the party
and the government in Bulgaria, has for months
been putting great effort into orchestrating a
party congress designed to perpetuate his power
and to modernize the country's government and
economy. He has worked hard to wipe out fac-
tionalism and today is surrounded by men whom
he appointed. He also has paid more attention
than formerly to nationalist elements, most
graphically manifested in his policy of Mace-
donian irredentism. At the same time, however,
he makes no pretense of masking his close ties to
the Kremlin. The Bulgarian party meeting was
purposely scheduled to begin after the long-
delayed 24th Soviet party congress, now an-
nounced for 30 March, in order to have the bene-
fit of any new winds blowing from Moscow.
The party assembly will convene on 12 April
to endorse a new constitution-the first in 24
years-adopt the first long-range party program,
and approve a series of economic plans, including
further modification of economic reforms and a
move away from even the limited decentralization
programs of the late 1960s. New economic plans
call for the formation of large industrial and agri-
cultural complexes, all with limited autonomy
and using cybernetics extensively for planning
and operations.
Zhivkov has struggled for over a year to
establish the best possible political atmosphere in
which to hold the congress. His foreign policy
preparations have included efforts to improve
relations with Bulgaria's neighbors-with the glar-
ing exception of Yugoslavia, where friction over
Macedonia has prevented success.
As the congress approaches, there appears to
be little opposition to Zhivkov's rule. He seems to
be relatively secure, as illustrated by his appoint-
ment of a large number of real or potential po-
litical enemies as diplomatic envoys abroad.
Nevertheless, there are some signs of disagreement
among the leadership. The main issue apparently
revolves about whether or not Zhivkov should
drop his claims to Macedonia and reach a detente
with Tit
Evidence of dissension can be seen in a
recent attempt, presumably Zhivkov's, to suppress
the Defense Ministry's daily paper, Narodna
Armiya, which had been in the forefront of the
Macedonian campaign. In late December, it was
ordered curtailed from a daily to a weekly, but
was subsequently continued as a daily without
explanation.
As a result, there is room for speculation
that nationalism is still strong among the military
despite the fact that many of its early practi-
tioners were purged after an abortive military
coup in 1965.
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Spain: Government Facing Military Criticism
Events in connection with the Basque na-
tionalist trial at Burgos are expected to force the
government to do something about the critical
attitude of army officers toward Opus Dei, a
Catholic group favoring economic liberalization
that has dominated the government since the last
cabinet reshuffle in October 1969. Madrid's
endemic speculation about a new cabinet is rising
but Franco's dislike for acting, under pressure may
delay chancf .
In early 1970 Opus Dei's prospects seemed
rosy. Besides cabinet strength, it could count
among its assets its close association with Prince
Juan Carlos and Vice President Carrero Blanco,
heirs apparent to Franco as head of state and
head of government, respectively. In addition, the
group was given much of the credit for the coun-
try's continuing economic growth, although in-
volvement of some members in a government
credit scandal had tarnished its reputation.
An indication of military dissatisfaction with
Opus Dei influence came at the graduation cere-
mony of the Army General Staff School last May
when the commanding general spoke sharply be-
fore high government officials of inequities to the
disadvantage of the military in the distribution of
the country's growing wealth. Military salary in-
creases in fact have been badly outpaced by in-
creases in the average hourly wage for civilian
labor. Many of the younger officers reportedly
moonlight. The staff school commandant was dis-
missed from his job within the week, however, for
airing an unpleasant truth in public.
In mid-December during the tense period
preceding the sentencing of 16 Basque nation-
alists, a second high-ranking army officer-Gen-
eral Angosto of the Canary Islands command-
referred to the military's constitutional mission to
defend the nation's security at home as well as
abroad. In an evident warning to Opus Dei, he
declared that "all should know that we are ready
to take up these same arms... although we under-
stand we should act only as a last resort." The
officer's speech followed closely on mass pro-
army, anti - Opus Dei demonstrations throughout
Spain, and, perhaps because of the delicacy and
unpredictability of the situation at that time or
perhaps because he spoke without specifics,
Angosto has kept his post.
After Franco on 30 December commuted
the death sentences handed down by a military
court at Burgos, a third general officer attacked
Opus Dei as a group that "under the guise of
noble aims, seeks to spread and create discord."
Similar opinions are reportedly widespread among
the military, who believe a firmer government
hand would reduce the incidence of disorders.
Nevertheless, Franco immediately removed the
general from his command, possibly because of
the directness and public character of the verbal
attack.
Although the statements of only high of-
ficers have received publicity, murmurings of
military dissatisfaction with Opus Dei's role in
government are reported to be greatest among the
younger officers. Military discontent has thus far
been kept within bounds by the respect of older
officers for Franco, but it is obviously a factor
that the government must take into account.
How the desires of the military will be dealt
with is not clear but some adjustment to ac-
commodate them is likely. In the political sphere,
cabinet changes giving greater representation to
the military are a possibility. Another way of
placating them would be to increase allocations to
the armed forces including funds for higher
pay.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
25X1
Egyptian paper. In part, however, this tone may
have been introduced by Jarring who redrafted
the Egyptian response to make it more palatable
to the Israelis.
An Israeli Foreign Ministry official con-
cerned with intelligence matters told US Embassy
officials on 19 January that he now expects the
Egyptians to postpone calling for a Security
Council meeting for two or three weeks at least.
He was also sure that the Egyptians would allow
the cease-fire to continue, either de facto or even
possibly through formal extension, for a limited
period.
The question of the fedayeen attitude
toward the Jarring negotiations was also raised
this past week. I n a report that was subsequently
both disowned and reaffirmed by various feda-
yeen spokesmen, Cairo's semiofficial al-Ahram on
20 January claimed that the entire membership of
the fedayeen central committee had reversed its
previous opposition to Egyptian and Jordanian
acceptance of Secretary Rogers' peace nego-
tiations formula. Even if the al-Ahram report is
factual, both it and a subsequent explanation by a
guerrilla spokesman in Cairo clearly point out
that any change in the commandos' attitude is
contingent upon the recognition by Egypt and
Jordan that the fedayeen have a legitimate right
to continue their armed struggle against Israel.
Thus, rather than signaling a possible end to the
commando war against Israel, the al-Ahram
episode constitutes merely a public admission by
some fedayeen leaders that they are powerless at
present to influence either Jordan's and Egypt's
participation or negotiating positions in the Jar-
ring talks.
SECRET
Middle East: Negotiations
Secretary General Thant and UN mediator
Jarring are reported to be "cautiously optimistic"
following the exchange of peace proposals be-
tween Israel and Egypt through Ambassador Jar-
ring.
According to the press, the Israeli proposals
passed to Jarring during his visit to Jerusalem on
8 January listed what were termed "indispensable
essentials" for a peace settlement between Israel
and Egypt. Included among the several "essen-
tials" were the establishment of secure, recog-
nized, and agreed boundaries and the assumption
by each country of responsibility for ensuring
that "no warlike act, or violence, by any organiza-
tion, group, or individual originates from or is
committed in its territory against the population,
citizens, or property of the other party." The
Israeli proposal also referred to the withdrawal of
military forces "from territories lying beyond
positions agreed in the peace treaty," thus reaf-
firming Israel's position that a peace treaty should
precede any withdrawal and still leaving Israel's
future boundaries open for negotiation.
The Egyptian response to the Israeli pro-
oosal was submitted to Jarring on 15 January.
Although the Egyptian
response took issue with the Israeli document on
these two key issues, informed observers did not
regard it as a rejection of the Israeli suggestions.
Israeli radio and television newscasts described
the Egyptian paper as leaving the door open for
the continuation of negotiations. Noting that the
Israeli and Egyptian positions remain far apart,
Israeli commentators found encouragement in
what was described as the "moderate" tone of the
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Jordan: Fedayeen Differences Increasing
While Jordan enjoyed a week of unusual
calm with the effective implementation of the
latest agreement between the government and the
fedayeen, long-simmering differences between the
commando organizations rose to the surface.
Because the mauling the fedayeen movement
suffered in the September 1970 confrontation
with the Jordan Arab Army was precipitated
largely by incidents instigated by the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the
Fatah-dominated fedayeen central committee has
since attempted to keep the PFLP under control.
When the PFLP was accused last week by Fatah
of attempting to torpedo the latest cease-fire
agreement by ambushing a Jordanian Army
patrol, the PFLP reacted by stating it had reserva-
tions about the agreement and would not adhere
to the provisions requiring its militia to surrender
its arms. Both the PFLP's leader, George Hab-
bash, and its official spokesman added to the
growing polemics by calling for the overthrow of
King Husayn. Fatah then responded by charging
that the PFLP was collaborating with the Jor-
danian Government inasmuch as its violations of
the agreements gave the army pretexts for crush-
ing the entire fedayeen movement. As proof of its
allegation of collusion, Fatah claimed that each
time it moved to force the PFLP to subordinate
itself to the fedayeen leadership, these actions
were pre-empted by the initiation of government
military campaigns against all fedayeen organiza-
tions.
The PLA, a relatively unified
and disciplined o y, considers itself the only
Palestinian organization able to recoup some of
the losses suffered by the fedayeen movement
since the September 1970 clash with the Jorda-
nian Government. The PLA also seeks to change
the composition of the Palestine National Coun-
cil, the legislative arras of the PLO, so that non-
fedayeen Palestinians have greater representation
in that body.
Much of the ferment in the fedayeen move-
ment accrues from the fact that in microcosm it is
subject to the same ideological conflict-the strug-
gle for ascendency between local and Arab na-
tionalism-that is being experienced in the rest of
the Arab world. For the fedayeen, local nation-
alism is Palestinian nationalism. It is exemplified
by Fatah and the PLO and is concerned with one
goal-the destruction of Israel and the creation of
a Palestinian state in those areas traditionally
known as Palestine. I n order to succeed, Pales-
tinian nationalists realize that they must have the
support of various Arab governments, each of
which has its own parochial interest. To gain this
support Palestinian nationalists have learned to
make accommodations with governments whose
domestic policies they frankly abhor.
Arab nationalism, as propounded by the
PFLP and its even more extreme offshoot, the
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PDFLP), is concerned with the creation
of a unified Arab nation with radical economic
and political policies. The liberation of Palestine,
these Arab nationalists argue, can only be
achieved when the Arab world is cleansed of all
reactionary regimes and unified.
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In their turn, the Arab governments-the dilemma by fully opting for either one or the
PFLP considers them all reactionary-believe it other brand of nationalism, the fedayeen move-
necessary to try to maintain severe restrictions on ment has turned upon itself. Its future role now
the fedayeen movement as a whole for fear that it depends on wl- atever accommodation it is able to
may some day be the captive of the PFLP. An- make with itselfj
gered and confused by this basically hostile atti-
tude of the Arab regimes and hesitant to solve the
USSR-Egypt: Podgorny Accentuates the Positive
Soviet President Podgorny's visit to Egypt Cairo. The ceremony at Aswan was, of course, the
from 13 to 19 January for ceremonies marking high point of the visit, but Podgorny's much-
completion of the Aswan High Dam afforded publicized side trips to Alexandria harbor and the
Moscow a unique opportunity to show off the Helwan iron and steel complex underlined the
"constructive" side of its close relationship with scope and variety of Moscow's assistance.
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Business alternated with ceremony through-
out the visit as Podgorny and Egyptian President
Sadat met behind closed doors on several occa-
sions. They almost surely discussed diplomatic
developments since the last high-level Soviet-
Egyptian contacts in December, and they presum-
ably also touched on military and economic
assistance. The tone Podgorny probably set in his
talks with Sadat came through in a speech on 18
January in which he cautioned that a "difficult,
persistent, and many-sided struggle, including
political and diplomatic struggles, is still to be
waged..." and warned that it will call for a "real-
istic assessment of the situation, statesmanship,
Arab States: Arab Summit Meeting?
Discussions are under way that may lead to
the holding of a full-scale Arab summit meeting in
Kuwait in the near future.
With the approach of the end of the Middle
East cease-fire, Libyan strong man Qadhafi has
begun drumming up support for a convocation of
Arab heads of state to discuss his plan for "pan-
Arabizing" the battle with Israel. The Libyan
strategy, which calls for the commitment of all
Arab resources against Israel, has met with a cool
reception outside of Libya since it was first
advanced last May.
Qadhafi has proposed the summit be held on
25 January and has asserted that at least six
self-control, and flexibility." These remarks, im-
plicitly critical of Sadat's fiery oratory in recent
days, lend weight to recent reports that Moscow
disapproves of Sadat's tough talk.
The Soviets took advantage of Podgorny's
presence in Cairo to offer their assistance in an
Egyptian rural electrification program estimated
to cost as much as $276 million and requiring five
years to complete. A visit by Podgorny and Sadat
to the Soviet helicopter carrier "Leningrad" in
Alexandria on 16 January served as a reminder of
Moscow's military support for the Eavo-
states-Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Sudan,
and Syria-have already agreed to attend. Kuwait
is to contact the remaining Arab countries to
obtain their assent but is not eager to participate
in or host such a gathering. Kuwaiti officials prob-
ably hope that the reluctance of other Arab lead-
ers to attend will delay or indefinitely postpone
the holding of the proposed summit.
Meanwhile, the leaders of the quadripartite
alliance of Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Syria met in
Cairo this week. Discussions covered not only
cultural and economic ties, but, with foreign and
defense ministers in attendance, probably in-
cluded military problems and the advisability of
convenin a full Arab summit as well. 25X1
International Oil Situation
In a series of parries and thrusts the oil-
exporting countries and the oil companies have
been testing each other's resolve on the issue of
greater revenues demanded in December by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). A hard-nosed position by the oil-export-
ing countries has been met with equal adamancy
by the oil companies, and although interspersed
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with threats, including a shutdown of production,
discussions are taking place that could lead to
meaningful negotiations.
The burden of discussion thus far has fallen
on a two-man oil-company team and an Iranian,
Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian Committee in Tehran
representing only the Persian Gulf members of
OPEC, which also includes Libya, Algeria, Indo-
nesia, and Venezuela. The committee has indi-
cated that proposals presented by the companies
on 16 January could provide a basis for negotia-
Thus far, OPEC has continued to postpone
a general meeting to permit further exchanges of
views at the Tehran talks. These postponements
may have resulted from mounting evidence of
unity by the oil companies and statements by
most governments of consuming countries back-
ing the oil-industry negotiating effort. Currently
ZAMBIA: Xenophobic government officials,
fearful both of trouble from resident whites and
of cross-border attacks by the Portuguese, have
generated an atmosphere of nervousness in
Lusaka. Army units are guarding several govern-
ment installations in the capital, and armored
patrol units are on alert. Other security precau-
tions affecting local British residents have also
been ordered by the Zambian defense minister.
it appears that such a general meeting will not
take place before 25 January.
Although Libya has threatened to take
"appropriate measures," it may now be awaiting
some indication of the outcome of the Tehran
talks before making further moves. The com-
panies involved, however, are not sanguine about
their future in Libya.
Algeria, also a member of OPEC pushing for
major concessions by the oil companies, is carry-
ing on bilateral negotiations with France that
cover, among other things, their oil-industry rela-
tions. Although the stormy negotiations with
France were being conducted outside of OPEC,
Paris, modifying its earlier go-it-alone stand, has
announced that it supports the unified Western
approach to OPEC. Algerian-French talks that
had been suspended earlier this week have now
resumed in lower key.
He apparently believes that these actions are
necessary to prevent the whites from sabotaging
Zambian installations in retaliation for the gov-
ernment's bitter opposition to British sales of
naval arms to South Africa. In addition, many
government leaders are concerned that Lisbon
may mount paramilitary raids into Zambia similar
to those into Guinea last November. ~
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Guinea: Postinvasion Drama Enters Final Act
President Toure's carefully orchestrated
campaign of political harangues and sweeping de-
nunciations of enemies of his regime has reached
its denouement. This stage began last week when
party militants, at nationwide meetings ordered
by Toure, demanded harsh penalties for those
Guineans and foreigners found guilty either of
complicity in the Portuguese-directed attacks on
Guinea last November or of broadly interpreted
"subversion."
Guinea's National Assembly-constituted as
a special "revolutionary tribunal"-has been meet-
ing since 18 January to hear the evidence and to
sentence those found guilty. At the session on 19
January, the government's Commission of Inquiry
portrayed West Germany, whose ambassador and
aid personnel were expelled last month, as play-
ing, with Portugal, a leading role among the re-
gime's foreign foes. The commission charged
Bonn with operating a spy ring in Guinea and
named as key members two West German na-
tionals arrested in December-one of whom the
commission said had committed suicide while im-
prisoned. Several French and Lebanese citizens
long resident in Guinea, along with alleged local
collaborators, are also being held either as partic-
ipants or accomplices. Despite the allegations, the
only known link among these people is the likeli-
hood that some were involved in black-market
dealings.
Also due for sentencing by the tribunal are a
still-undetermined number of African commandos
of the Portuguese Army and Guinean exiles who
were captured during the November attacks. Al-
though a UN investigation team that visited
Conakry in November reported that close to 60
such persons were being held, the names of only
13 have been listed by Guinea, prompting rumors
that many have already been executed.
Guineans accused of subversion-but not ex-
plicitly tied to the November attacks-constitute
a special category of "internal opposition." Toure
is using the postinvasion security scare as a pre-
text for eliminating Guineans he long has sus-
pected of disloyalty. Included among these are
some leading members of Guinea's largest tribe,
the Foulah, who have traditionally opposed
Toure's rule. Foulahs predominate among the top
leadership of the Guinean exile group that partici-
pated in the attacks on Guinea. Prominent
Foulahs were included among a few cabinet offi-
cials and their proteges at various levels of the
bureaucracy who were arrested after the attacks.
Toure probably considers these vaguely defined
subversives the most important of all the de-
tainees.
The tribunal's final verdicts are expected to
be severe. In opening the proceedings on Monday,
President Toure again said he would not grant
clemency and asked the tribunal to be equally
exacting. Moreover, resolutions adopted last week
by the party apparatus-a good clue to the final
sentences-called for widespread application of
the death penalty and for public executions. Ap-
parently preparing the ground for an early break
with West Germany, the resolutions also called
for severance of relations with governments
whose nationals are adjudged guilty of working to
Sudan: Soviet Economic Assistance Lags but Military Aid Increases
Despite President Numayri's prediction that
Sudan's economic relations with the USSR would
be "noteworthy," there has been little imple-
mentation of Soviet economic aid since the coup
of May 1969. Meanwhile, the pace of Soviet mili-
tary deliveries has increased appreciably.
Last week the USSR and Sudan finally
signed a three-year -trade agreement, although
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earlier Soviet press reports had suggested that
conclusion of a five-year pact was in the offing.
Trade is to expand over the period of the agree-
ment, with Sudan exporting cotton in exchange
for machinery and equipment. Trade relations
since the coup, however, have not gone smoothly.
Early in 1970, a Soviet economic delegation
failed to straighten out problems encountered
with a $43-million barter deal involving exchanges
of Sudanese cotton for Soviet consumer goods,
machinery, and equipment. The Soviets at that
time refused to supply goods that the USSR
could sell elsewhere for hard currency or to take
Sudanese cotton that had been stored for some
time.
During Numayri's visit to Moscow in late
1969, the Soviets discussed several economic de-
velopment projects and, according to Sudanese
press reports, extended some $40 million in cred-
its. The Rahad irrigation project, for which the
Soviets agreed to provide nearly $29 million in
credit, had been planned by the previous regime,
which had been unable to find financing. Al-
though other Communist countries also were
slated to participate in the financing, there is no
evidence that they have indeed extended any as-
sistance or that work on the project has begun.
Moscow also considered participating in ef-
forts to improve Sudan's transportation network,
but no estimate of the cost was mentioned. Con-
struction of a road between Khartoum and Port
Sudan and expansion of the capacity of the rail-
way running in the same vicinity were among the
projects considered. The only action taken thus
far was the arrival in March 1970 of twelve Soviet
technicians to study the possibility of expanding
the railroad. The USSR also has begun an off-
shore geological survey that will require about
two years to complete.,
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
BRAZIL: The 70 Brazilian prisoners who were
exchanged for the freedom of the Swiss ambas-
sador have lost no time in launching verbal at-
tacks on the Medici government following their
arrival on 14 January in Santiago. On their second
day in Chile, leaders of the group were permitted
a three-hour press conference at which they de-
livered a manifesto denouncing oppression in
their country and claiming that many of them
had been tortured. The manifesto pledged that
kidnaping of diplomats would continue as long as
repression and torture persisted. Newspapers con-
trolled by President Allende's coalition have used
the manifesto to accuse President Medici of being
personally responsible for torture, characterizing
him as a "sadistic, blood-thirsty gorilla." The
Chilean Foreign Ministry reportedly will furnish
passports and visas to the Brazilians; Cuba,
Switzerland, and Italy have offered to take some
of them.
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Chile: Allende Continues His Subtle Maneuvering
President Allende's genius for tactical ma- that it is ready to
neuvering is becoming increasingly evident. In Bethlehem.
two recent cases the government undertook
strong actions and then, perhaps because of the
reaction, drew back to positions that would give
the administration what it wanted without incur-
ring unnecessary opprobrium.
On 13 January the government sent a large
tax investigation team into the offices of El Mer-
curio, the most prestigious newspaper in Chile.
Not content with financial investigation, the team
seized and sealed other records. As a result, the
newspaper, which had opposed Allende's election
but since had taken a conciliatory line, came out
in open opposition to the government, running
editorials detailing a "systematic" attack on the
publishing company and specifically mentioning
Allende's animosity toward it. The paper also
recalled foreign concern about press freedom in
Chile. On 15 January the government restricted
the investigating team to a standard income tax
review that will not interfere with the paper's
normal operations.
A similar development has occurred with
respect to the nationalization of Bethlehem
Steel's Chilean operations. On 14 January the
government, falsely claiming publicly that Bethle-
hem had solicited the take-over, gave the com-
pany until 1 February to conclude a sales con-
tract on Chile's terms. The announcement sur-
prised Bethlehem officials, who had hoped to
operate normally under the Allende administra-
tion. Shortly thereafter the minister of mines said
that talks with Bethlehem were proceeding "satis-
factorily" and that the government envisioned a
settlement resembling that planned for the copper
companies. On 18 January the head of the gov-
ernment steel industry, which would be taking
over the Bethlehem operations, told the US am-
bassador that Allende was unhappy at the way
the whole matter had been handled. The govern-
ment now claims that no deadline is involved and
receive a counteroffer from
The constitutional reform project for copper
nationalization is expected to be presented to the
full senate soon. The review committee has
accepted an amendment proposed by the
Christian Democratic Party and the Popular Unity
parties that would safeguard the rights of copper
workers, long the most favored group within
Chilean labor. This assurance may be increasingly
important in view of unemployment figures
announced recently by the minister of economy.
Between September and December 1970 the
unemployment rate in Santiago rose from 6.4
percent to 8 percent. In the same period in 1968
the rate declined; in 1969 it remained constant at
5.4 percent.
Political maneuvering, never very far below
the surface in Chile, is claiming increasing
national attention. On 4 April there will be
municipal elections as well as a by-election to fill
the senate seat vacated by President Allende. The
Christian Democratic Party has nominated Andres
Zaldivar, a strong supporter of former president
Frei. If Zaldivar wins, the PDC moderates will
receive a strong boost. His chances for victory will
be enhanced. if the conservative National Party
withdraws its candidate; the Popular Unity co-
alition has nominated an unattractive Socialist.
The Socialist Party holds its national
congress the weekend of 29 January, and policy
documents prepared for it could exacerbate
differences within the party. The more radical
members, many of whom believe that Allende is
not revolutionary enough, will be doing their best
to gain control of the party and to make their
ideas official party doctrine. In addition, another
leftist group has obtained a Socialist Youth docu-
ment severely critical of the Socialist secretary
general and is considering publishing it to increase
tensions within the Socialist Party.
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Bolivia: President Postpones Problems
President Torres' overreaction to last week's
abortive coup has ended-at least temporarily-
the threat from the military, but it has also
helped exaggerate the left's importance and the
extent to which the government is dependent on
it. The President, therefore, will be forced to
exercise all of his political ability to prevent a
complete mortgaging of his government to the
left.
The suspension from the armed forces, ar-
rest, or promised exiling of the leading military
plotters has effectively destroyed Torres' immedi-
ate moderate opposition within the military. By
extending these measures to potential plotters,
the government has warded off an immediate
reaction from the military. But this action, com-
ing so soon after the demonstrated lack of mili-
tary unity in the October coup, is likely to result
in a further demoralization of the military, which
is the only group in Bolivia that can maintain
stability over the long run.
The support of the left was not crucial in
overcoming the military threat, but the left has
been led to believe it was, both by the dramatic
government call for workers and students to "de-
fend the revolution" and by the official welcome
given the leftist, "antifascist" demonstrations on
11 and 12 January. Significantly, neither the ini-
tial leftist response nor statements made during
the public rallies reflected approval of the Torres
government but rather support for the general
principle of a leftist, "revolutionary," antirightist
government. This distinction has been evident
since the October coup and indicates continuing
leftist unhappiness with the slow pace of govern-
ment revolutionary actions. Now, however, the
left believes its support is critical to the govern-
ment's continued existence. The public state-
ments of individual labor leaders and the shouted
demands during the two rallies show that the left
is determined to be repaid for the support it
believes it provided the government; it plans to
increase pressure to obtain more and faster leftist
changes in the government.
Some of the President's statements and
actions, such as the abrogation of a contract with
a US firm, the promise to study a "popular par-
liament," and the qualified promise to arm the
people when weapons become available, are con-
cessions to the left. Torres, however, did not
accept demands for more radical actions, such as
executing the military plotters, announcing plans
to nationalize the US-owned Matilde Mine,
formulating plans for the immediate socialization
of the country, or expelling US agencies. Since
taking power in October, Torres has generally
given lip service to some of the left's less extreme
demands, but then dragged his feet in imple-
menting them, thereby postponing a complete
break between his government and the left. His
generally lukewarm response to public leftist
pressure during the past week indicates he hopes
to continue this policy. Now, however, it will be
harder because the suppression of the most vocal
military opposition has destroyed a balance to
leftist pressure and also because the left now is
more confident of its power and its ability to
force demands on the government.
Two of the more interesting figures in last
week's events were Jorge Gallardo, Minister of the
Interior, and his brother, Colonel Samuel Gal-
lardo, the Army Chief of Staff. The former was in
the forefront of government spokesmen calling
for public defense of the Torres regime against
the "fascist hordes," while the latter was held
briefly by the military plotters on the morning of
the abortive coup. The interior minister normally
exercises an important position in the government
hierarchy, and Jorge Gallardo appears to be using
this power to reinforce his position with the left
and to encourage the destruction of nonleftist
opposition to the government.
he is becoming s ronger and could 2,25X1
play a crucial role in undermining Torres' efforts
to brake a rapid government shift to the
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organizer, was machine gunned in the presence of
a family wedding party by two men who his
fellow labor leaders believe are government
agents. The murder is likely to provoke inter-
national labor reaction because Oliva was being
groomed as a candidate to
lead an inter-American peas-
ant organization.
The more activist
Rebe Armed Forces does
not seem to have suffered
seriously in the counterter-
rorist campaign, but it is
obvious that it is more dif-
ficult for both revolutionary
groups to operate under the
s....
t i ' t it measures
r n
en
g
{{
s
y Leftist congressman Adolfo
Mijangos, killed by security forces
A military police guard
was killed inside the British Consulate, re-
sumably by Communist terrorists.
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Political Assassinations Continue in Guatemala
A major peasant leader and a well-known
leftist congressman have become the most recent
victims in Guatemala's accelerating round of po-
litical assassinations. The strong public reaction to
what appears to be the government's policy of
eliminating leftist intellectuals seems sure to en-
courage a Communist response in kind and may
in time lead to mass political protest.
The congressman, Adolfo Mijangos, was
killed
e prominence a enjoye as a clever, articulate
intellectual as well as his confinement to a wheel-
chair made the attack on him particularly repug-
nant. The intellectual community and the demo-
cratic left have publicly accused the government
and rightist political groups of the murder, and
the Communist-oriented student association
called for a public uprising. The press, which has
been chafing under the state of siege, used the
incident to flout censorship, and even the most
staid daily printed extensive accounts of the
murder and published antigovernment declara-
tions from community leaders.
The attack on Mijangos probably negated
the public relations advances that had been made
by the government in previous weeks. Favorable
comment on recent official successes against the
terrorists and on the more courteous conduct of
the security forces toward the general public had
buoyed the administration.
The murder Sunday of the peasant leader
Tereso Oliva y Oliva is bound to intensify criti-
cism of the government and fear among the left
wing. Oliva, Guatemala's foremost rural labor
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OAS General Assembly on Terrorism Still Poses Problems
Members of the Organization of American
States (OAS) remain badly divided over the pro-
posed convention on terrorism that will be con-
sidered at the OAS third special session of the
OAS General Assembly beginning in Washington
on 25 January. Although most countries will
probably make a concerted effort to avoid open
squabbling, prospects do not appear bright that
they will be able to come up with a strong agree-
ment that can be quickly ratified.
Both the Venezuelan and Colombian foreign
ministers have expressed considerable pessimism
over the lack of preparation and the failure so far
to achieve a consensus. The Venezuelan Foreign
Ministry terms the present draft "completely un-
acceptable," and proposes a narrow definition of
terrorism. Brazilian officials, on the other hand,
continue to press for a wide-ranging agreement.
They believe a majority of states will vote with
them and have indicated that they will be reluc-
tant to modify their position even if a majority
lines up in opposition.
It is likely that the meeting will decide that a
convention can be adopted and opened for sig-
nature by a simple majority vote. The session will
be judged a failure, however, unless near un-
animity can be achieved on a convention that
goes considerably beyond last year's general reso-
lution repudiating terrorism. In addition, failure
to achieve a consensus will probably make many
states slow to ratify whatever agreement emerges.
Should divisiveness and rancor surface at the
meeting, it could portend problems beyond the
immediate issue of terrorism. Any bad feeling or
inability to reach agreement on a unified stand
that might result from the current meeting would
make it even more difficult to establish agreement
on the more serious problem of hemispheric
policy toward Cuba.
Given the spread of nationalistic sentiment
and increasing Latin dissatisfaction with the US
over issues such as trade, the OAS may be en-
tering a critical period. The question of OAS
member countries' relations with Cuba looms as a
problem that could seriously weaken the organi-
zation. Venezuela, which lodged the original
charges that led to diplomatic and economic
sanctions against Cuba in 1964, has again hinted
strongly that it is moving toward re-establishing
relations with Castro. If it does, others are likely
to follow suit soon, even if the OAS ban is not
PERU: A strike at a government-owned petro-
leum facility and a threatened strike against two
US-owned mining firms may force the govern-
ment to reconsider two of its current labor poli-
cies. For over a year, the government has made
political gains by permitting workers in privately
owned industries to receive dramatic wage, in-
creases and by acquiescing in the gains of Com-
munist-led unions in order to weaken. the power
base of the rival American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance. Workers at the Talara petroleum facility
went on strike on 17 January to support the
demands of their Communist-infiltrated union for
a 25-percent wage increase, double the amount
offered by the government. This installation was
expropriated in October 1968 from the US-
owned International Petroleum Company. Com-
munist-dominated unions at the Southern Peru
Copper Company and the Marcona Company
have issued strike notices for 21 January. South-
ern Peru has already rejected a government re-
quest that it "transfer" four company officials
who are US citizens; the union is demanding that
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Latin American Guerrilla Today
Secret
N! 44
22 January 1971
No. 0354/71
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~)t',1 llclrl1 v
THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA TODAY
For more than ten years Fidel Castro has been encouraging and aiding Latin
Americ-an .revolutionaries to take to the backlands and mountains of their own countries
to imitate his guerrilla campaign and victory, Today, however, there arefewer than
1,000 rural guerrillas holding out in only a few countries. They are weak, of declining
immportance and do not pose serious threats to the governments. Guerrilla insurgency in
the finterlands became increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant in many Latin Ameri-
can countries in the decade of the 1960s as societies urbanized and modernized at
accelerated- rates.
As= rural guerrilla fortunes have faded, however, a new breed of revolutionary has
appeared it the cities. In Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala urban guerrillas
have engaged in spectacular acts of terrorism and violence. Six foreign ambassadors have
been kidnaped during the last three years, of whom two were murdered. About a dozen
other diplomats and a large number of government officials also have been kidnaped.
Robberies of banks and arms depots, airline hijackings, arson, sabotage, and killings of
police and security officials have reached unprecedented proportions in several coun'-
tries. Terrorism is ikely to increase in at least a half-dozen Latin American countries this
year and could challenge the governments of Uruguay and Guatemala.
Prominent students of the Cuban revolution
believe that Castro never intended to wage a rural
guerrilla war when he landed in Cuba from
Mexico in 1956, but that he hoped to join in a
quick urban putsch. His experience during the
preceding ten years as a student radical, ad-
venturer, and violent revolutionary was acquired
in the cities. Even after Castro was forced into the
sierra after his expedition foundered, he con-
tinued to rely heavily on urban support groups.
His radio appeals were beamed mainly to middle-
class, nationalist audiences, and in April 1958 he
helped organize an abortive national strike in the
towns and cities.
Castro's small guerrilla band won some
skirmishes with regular military forces, but ul-
timately the Batista regime collapsed because
Castro captured the imagination of an oppressed,
disenchanted middle class through highly effec-
tive public relations. Once in power, however,
Castro quickly alienated urban groups through his
radical appeals to peasants and workers. The
regime exaggerated and glorified the accomplish-
ments of Castro and his guerrilla colleagues, and
created a rural, agrarian mystique for the revolu-
tion.
In the months following Castro's victory,
exiles and revolutionaries from a number of Latin
American countries unsuccessfully attempted to
initiate guerrilla struggles in their own countries.
By 1960 Castro and Che Guevara were giving
support to such revolutionaries on a large scale.
Misinterpreting their own experiences, they
recommended that rural guerrilla methods be
employed and gave little consideration to urban
tactics. Large numbers of Latin American youths
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traveled to Cuba for training in rural guerrilla
techniques, and Guevara's guerrilla handbook was
widely distributed and used throughout the
hemisphere. In fact, the Cuban leaders and their
revolutionary disciples were so confident of these
methods that from 1959 through 1965 almost
every country in Latin America skirmished with
revolutionaries inspired or supported by Havana.
A few of these efforts endured, but by mid-
decade most of the remaining guerrilla bands were
of declining importance.
These efforts failed principally because the
Cuban leaders themselves refused to understand
the true dynamics of how they came to power
and because they imposed an unworkable strategy
on their followers. As rapidly as new guerrilla
efforts were conceived, however, security and
counterinsurgent forces in many Latin American
countries were expanded and became more effec-
tive. The rural guerrillas also failed because of
ineptness and disputes over leadership, tactics,
and ideology. Generally, they were poorly trained
and equipped despite Cuban efforts, and, desiring
quick results, were unprepared psychologically
for protracted conflict. Rural guerrillas have been
unable in virtually every instance to attract sig-
nificant middle-class support, mainly because
their programs and campaigns have been directed
at rural groups.
In 1966 and 1967 Cuba attempted to re-
vitalize waning guerrilla fortunes in the hemi-
sphere through an intensified, reckless commit-
ment to continental rural guerrilla war. The Latin
American Solidarity Organization was founded as
a hemispheric revolutionary front. It held its first
conclave the summer of 1967. In the meantime,
Che Guevara with 16 other Cubans was spear-
heading a new guerrilla effort in Bolivia. Cuban
advisers were also operating with guerrillas in
Guatemala and Venezuela, and possibly in
Colombia. Castro insisted more stridently than
ever that meaningful change could result only
from violent struggle in the countryside. The
French Marxist, Regis Debray, earlier had pub-
lished a treatise expanding the point, asserting
Special Report
that guerrilla action must be an exclusively rural
phenomenon without significant aid from the
cities. His Revolution Within the Revolution be-
came the new Cuban manifesto on guerrilla war.
Cuba's efforts to "export" the revolution
reached their zenith during this period. Guevara's
summary defeat in Bolivia in October 1967 and
the concurrent failures of guerrillas elsewhere
demonstrated more clearly than before the bank-
ruptcy of Havana's approach. Young revolu-
tionaries throughout Latin America began to
reappraise Cuba's strategy. Castro unintentionally
contributed to an acceleration of this re-evalua-
tion by publishing Guevara's field diary. Che's
poignant memoire of ineptitude, hopeless
meanderings in dense jungles, and flight from
encircling Bolivian troops has undoubtedly con-
vinced many young revolutionaries that other
tactics can lead more quickly to dramatic results.
It is ironic that Che's detailed account of his own
defeat is likely to endure as a more permanent
legacy than his guerrilla handbook or speeches.
Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian author of the
Minimanual o./' the Urban Guerrilla has replaced
both Guevara and Debray as the primary theo-
retician of violent revolution in the hemisphere.
Debray, who was recently released from a Boliv-
ian prison after serving more than three years of a
30-year term for his part in the Guevara fiasco,
admitted on 30 December that he had under-
estimated the importance of urban terrorism. He
now claims to be rethinking his entire treatise on
guerrilla tactics, and has endorsed urban terror-
ism.
Guevara's precipitate failure also led to a
reappraisal of tactics in Cuba. During 1968 and
the first half of 1969, Havana appeared to be
withdrawing from revolutionary liaisons in Latin
America. Cuban support to revolutionaries in
Venezuela and Colombia terminated, and guer-
rillas in other countries were told to acquire their
own funds and arms. Castro, however, was reluc-
tant to amend his rural guerrilla strategy and was
loath to share the spotlight as foremost
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revolutionary in the hemisphere with Marighella.
Nevertheless, during the second half of 1969
there were signs of a gradual-if grudging-Cuban
acceptance of urban methods as urban terrorists
accelerated their activities in a number of Latin
American cities. In November 1969 Marighella
was killed, and two months later Castro came out
in support of his line by publishing the Mini-
manual.
Since then, Havana has been more flexible
and cautious about endorsing revolutionary
groups. Both urban and rural tactics now are
supported, and in view of events in Chile, the
nonviolent path to power is also publicly ac-
cepted-at least there. Underlying the pragmatism
of this approach, however, is the same enduring
commitment to rural guerrilla methods that has
characterized the Cuban revolution since the early
1960s. Cuban leaders continue to predict that in
most countries rural insurgency will be decisive in
the long run and that urban tactics should be
employed to create favorable conditions for rural
conflict. Marighella himself was making plans to
initiate rural guerrilla warfare in Goias State prior
to his death.
Today, Guatemala may be the only country
receiving material support from Cuba for guerrilla
operations. A few Cuban advisers are in the
Guatemalan countryside, and Cuban funds have
been provided. In other countries, Havana appears
to be giving little more than training and propa-
ganda support to revolutionaries.
The urban guerrilla groups that have sprung
up since Che Guevara's fiasco in Bolivia are di-
rect-albeit more sophisticated-descendants of
the rural guerrillas of the 1960s. They have
Special Report
learned from Havana's mistakes of the last
decade, but because most of them operate in
highly urbanized societies, they realize that rural
methods are not applicable anyway. They are
young-most of them are believed to be in their
early twenties-from middle-class backgrounds,
and are frequently either university or former
university students. Except in Argentina the
urban guerrillas generally profess to be Marxists.
In the few instances where they have discussed or
publicized their political programs these are vague
but ultranationalistic. Today's urban revolution-
ary desires quick remedies for social and eco-
nomic ills and has chosen the tactics of terrorism
in the cities to achieve rapid results-or at least to
make dramatic headlines.
In general, the urban guerrilla endorses
Havana's theoretical line by ascribing long-term
importance to the rural struggle and to the peas-
antry, but in practice he concentrates or confines
his activities in urban zones. In an interview pub-
lished in October 1970 in the Cuban Communist
Party daily, for example, a Tupamaro admitted
that plans called for extending the struggle into
the countryside, but "not with the characteristics
of typical rural-guerrilla warfare." He emphasized
instead that, at least in Uruguay, future opera-
tions in the countryside would consist of brief,
commando-type raids launched from the cities.
Thus, although urban revolutionaries look to
Havana as the spiritual center of revolution in
Latin America, they are zealously nationalistic
and prefer to maintain tactical and financial in-
dependence. Cuba has provided training for some
urban guerrillas, backs them with propaganda sup-
port, and grants haven to revolutionaries and
political prisoners, but there is no evidence of
more extensive contacts. There are indications
that Havana would like a larger share of the
action, but it is probably known among young
revolutionaries that Cuba has been heavy-handed
and arrogant in dispensing aid in the past.
While Cuba has persisted in emphasizing the
rural nature of its revolution and has
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Ciudad
Juarez
Monterrey
MEXICO;
Guadalajara? ? OMexico City
(i)Medellin
?Cali(DBogeta
_,? DOMINICAN
HAIT1((REVUBLIC
Kingstono ' -, ?i ?Santo
JAMAICA Domingo
{,
"?
GUATEMALAN
EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA
? "-` Barranquilla,
COSTR r
RICA .{-aaniauel
Latin America
Havana"
? CUBA`-
HONDURAS
Guatemala & y
[
s/:
Salvador
?B ranilin*
Belo Horizonte
L~
Sao Paulo Rio de Janeiro
antos
Curitiba?'
?Eirto Alegre
Mendoo URUGUAY,
?
Rosario, ``
O Q Ionievidea
Buenos Aires 0La Plata*
? 250,000-500,000
o 500,000-1,000,000
G) Over 1,000,000
*Metropolitan area
22 January 1971
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concentrated on rural tactics for revolutionaries,
the rest of Latin America has been urbanizing at
accelerating rates. In 1940 there were five Latin
American cities with more than a million inhab-
itants; in 1960 there were nine. It is estimated
that today there are 17, and that in ten years
there will be 26. Mexico City, Sao Paulo (Brazil),
and Buenos Aires already have more than five
million residents, and four other cities have more
than 2.5 million. By the end of this decade five
more cities will surpass the five-million level, and
another five will have more than 2.5 million
people. The accelerating rate of urbanization is
also reflected in the growth of cities of a quarter
million inhabitants or more. In 1970, 19 Latin
American cities had between 500,000 and one
million inhabitants, and another 32 had between
250,000 and 500,000 residents.
The new revolutionary in Latin America
comes from these cities. In his Minimanual,
Marighella said that it is "ideal" when the urban
guerrilla "operates in his own city." In Uruguay
and Brazil, and possibly in other countries, guer-
rillas follow Marighella's advice, organizing them-
selves into four- or five-man "firing groups." Each
group is a largely autonomous tactical squad that
initiates its own operations and has little contact
with other groups. Marighella also emphasizes in-
dividual action, suggesting, for example, that as-
sassinations should be performed by one guerrilla
"in absolute secrecy and in cold blood." Such
rigid compartmentalization accounts in large part
for the ability of urban terrorists to resist police
raids.
Urban terrorists have been responsible for
the kidnapings of six foreign ambassadors since
August 1968-two were murdered. Three US mili-
tary officers have been killed by terrorists during
the last three years, and at least eight other for-
eign diplomats or officials were kidnaped for
ransom in 1970. Local officials are also targets of
terrorist action-particularly in Guatemala. Air-
plane hijackings have become common, and in
October 1970 the first combined hijacking-
kidnaping occurred when a Costa Rican airliner
Special Report -5-
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was hijacked to Cuba. Five US citizens aboard
were threatened with death unless several revolu-
tionaries-including a top Nicaraguan terrorist
leader-were released from Costa Rican jails.
Urban revolutionaries also struck in the Domini-
can Republic last April when the US Air Attache
was kidnaped and later released in exchange for
prisoners. Terrorists have stolen millions of dol-
lars, ransacked arms depots, engaged in various
kinds of sabotage, and murdered local and foreign
officials. They contributed directly to the col-
lapse of the Ongania government in Argentina,
and have undermined stability in several other
countries.
As urban terrorism has increased, contacts
and collaboration among urban-based activists
have also been on the rise. Bolivia is the principal
focus of insurgent interest in South America, and
a number of foreigners have participated in ELN
activities since last summer. Individual Uruguayan
and perhaps Chilean advisers in urban terrorist
techniques were in Bolivia last September. Three
Chilean revolutionaries, rumored to be members
of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (M I R)
were killed in Bolivia last summer, and three
others were allowed to return to Chile after being
captured.
The Tupamaros and
the hilean are he two groups most likely
to engage in proselytizing. If the MIR or the
Altamirano faction of the Chilean Socialist Party
is permitted to aid terrorists in other countries, in
fact, Santiago could become the primary revo-
lutionary capital in Latin America. Although
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Havana has provided some training and backs
urban guerrillas with propaganda, the Cubans ap-
parently have few contacts with South American
terrorists.
The new breed of urban revolutionary has
been most active in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argen-
tina. These countries had almost no difficulties
with rural guerrillas during the 1960s and few
manifestations of urban violence until the last few
years. Guatemala, however, has had a long history
of rural and urban violence, which intensified
during much of the decade of the sixties. Urban
terror recently has become more important there
than has Castro-line guerrilla struggle, but revolu-
tionaries maintain a significant capability for both
kinds of action. In Bolivia there have been two
abortive guerrilla episodes since 1967, and revolu-
tionaries appear increasingly interested in adopt-
ing new urban methods. In Colombia and
Venezuela rural guerrillas continue to operate in
the countryside, but they are the weakened and
disheartened remnants of large and important
guerrilla groups that were threats in the mid
1960s. The current status of the revolutionaries in
each of these countries is described in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
The National Liberation Movement
(MLN)-better known as the Tupamaros-is a
revolutionary Marxist organization that has had a
spectacular and rapid rise to prominence during
the last few years. Since late 1969 it has been the
most active and successful insurgent group in
South America. It has kidnaped a total of seven
Uruguayan and foreign officials during this
period, and three of them-the British ambas-
sador, a US agronomist, and the Brazilian con-
sul-are still in captivity.
The Tupamaros are highly organized and
disciplined, and through audacious and ingenious
offensives have been a disruptive force far out of
proportion to their numbers. They initially en-
joyed considerable public sympathy, but lost
Special Report
much of this support after they murdered a US
AID official last August. Nevertheless, they are
likely to remain a significant disruptive force for
some time to come, especially in the tense politi-
cal atmosphere that probably will precede the
presidential election in November.
Named after Tupac Amaru, a Peruvian
Indian who organized an important uprising
against Spain in 1780, the movement was
founded in northern Uruguay in 1962 by Raul
Sendic. It was not active until 1966 when it began
to conduct sporadic robberies for money, arms,
and supplies such as police uniforms and identifi-
cation papers. Until 1967, the movement con-
centrated its activities in areas outside of metro-
politan Montevideo, but later turned more and
more to urban violence.
From 1967 through 1969, the Tupamaros
succeeded in portraying themselves as romantic,
quixotic revolutionaries. They attempted to
minimize personal violence and excesses, and
gained considerable popularity and publicity as
selfless Robin Hoods. In elaborate public relations
efforts, the Tupamaros redistributed to the poor
some of the money they had stolen, as well as
food, milk, and other provisions. They also "ex-
posed" alleged financial frauds through the dis-
semination of compromising stolen documents,
which did cause considerable alarm in government
and financial circles. By daring daylight robberies,
they accumulated large sums of money, often
robbing banks by recruiting employees or by dis-
guising themselves as policemen or guards.
On 8 October 1969, about 40 Tupamaros
raided the small town of Pando, robbing three
banks, taking over the police and fire stations,
and severing communications. There were casual-
ties on both sides, and the Tupamaros claim that
members captured by police were tortured and
killed. The Pando raid marked a major turning
point for the guerrillas, who thereafter turned
increasingly to murder and other extreme forms
of urban violence.
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Their activities-especially the murder of
police and security officials-increased in late
1969 and early 1970. In late July 1970, an
Uruguayan judge was kidnaped but later released
unharmed. On 31 July, US AID official Daniel
Mitrione and the Brazilian consul were kidnaped;
on 7 August, US agronomist Claude Fly, was
abducted. Mitrione was killed on 10 August after
the Pacheco government refused to negotiate with
the terrorists. Tupamaro demands for the release
of all imprisoned guerrillas in exchange for Fly
and the Brazilian gradually faded in the face of
government intransigence. By mid-September the
terrorists retreated further and agreed to release
the captives if major news media publicized their
political manifesto. Although two Montevideo
papers and a magazine subsequently printed the
treatise-in violation of government censorship
laws-the hostages have not been released.
The government's determination not to
negotiate with the guerrillas has been com-
plemented by a considerable show of force. Ag-
gressive counterinsurgency campaigns-especially
an unprecedented crackdown following the
August kidnapings-have resulted in significant
guerrilla losses. In August, Congress authorized a
20-day, limited state-of-siege as thousands of
soldiers and policemen scoured the Montevideo
area in search of the terrorists. A number of
important guerrilla leaders, including Raul Sendic,
were apprehended. As a result, an estimated 250
to 300 Tupamaros are currently imprisoned. Ac-
cording to some estimates, only about 150
Tupamaros remain active.
A hard core of the Tupamaro organization
weathered the government's counterterrorist cam-
paign, however. During the last few months of
1970 terrorists remained very active. They took
over cinemas to make political promulgations,
assaulted important communications facilities,
robbed banks, and in early November they carried
out one of the largest robberies in the country's
history. In conjunction with these spectacular
operations, they have also conducted a persistent
campaign of low-level harassment designed to
Special Report
attract constant publicity and to keep security
forces off balance. Finally, on 8 January 1971
they added another hostage to the list of for-
eigners being held, when UK ambassador Jackson
was kidnaped. Uruguayan police estimate that
about 50 Tupamaros participated in this elab-
orately coordinated kidnaping in the streets of
Montevideo.
The Tupamaros have a fairly extensive base
of support among students and youths, who form
a potentially large reservoir of new recruits. Stu-
dent and faculty federations at universities and
secondary schools are dominated by extreme left-
ists and Communists who sympathize with or
overtly support guerrilla demands. In late August,
for example, secondary school students demon-
strated violently in Montevideo in favor of the
Tupamaros. This resulted in a government decree
closing the schools until the beginning of the new
academic year this March. Students have been
relatively quiescent in recent months, during the
Uruguayan spring and summer, but student Com-
mittees for the Support of the Tupamaros have
appeared.
The Tupamaros also have been supported by
fairly large numbers of middle-class professionals
who increasingly are disenchanted with the
quality of life and economic stagnation in
Uruguay. Middle-class support probably has con-
tinued to diminish, however, since the Pando raid,
mainly because of the terrorists' increased
emphasis on murder and other extreme forms of
violence. One Tupamaro leader has stated pub-
licly that the chivalrous tactics employed before
the end of 1969 have been replaced by greater
revolutionary militance.
The Tupamaros have demonstrated remark-
able resiliency, determination, and skill since last
summer, and it is likely that, because they enjoy
extensive support from students and youths, they
will remain a formidable force in Uruguay for
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some time. The boldly executed Jackson kid-
naping shows that the terrorists retain the capa-
bility to carry out complex and important as-
saults and that the government's refusal to nego-
tiate and police dragnets have had only limited
results. Immediate Tupamaro objectives and their
full capabilities are not known, but it is likely
that the terrorists will remain active in the coming
months, perhaps building toward a concerted,
large-scale campaign of urban terrorism to coin-
cide with the period preceding the presidential
elections.
Since September 1969, Brazilian security
forces have moved aggressively and effectively
against suspected leftist terrorists. A substantial
number of terrorists have been rounded up, and
Carlos Larnarca Engaging in Guerrilla Training
two of the most important Brazilian guerrilla
leaders and theoreticians have been killed and
others exiled. In early November 1970 the gov-
ernment launched a massive counterterrorist
operation in several major cities in an attempt to
frustrate a terrorist campaign they had learned
about from captured documents. Estimates of the
number of persons arrested in the operation vary
from 500 to more than 5,000, which has pro-
voked widespread criticism of the police and the
military.
Terrorists are still able to carry out major
operations, however. This was demonstrated
dramatically on 7 December when Swiss Ambas-
sador Bucher was kidnaped in Rio de Janeiro and
held nearly six weeks for ransom. After pro-
tracted negotiations the government on 14 Janu-
ary released 70 political prisoners, who were
flown to Chile in exchange for the ambassador.
For the first time, however, the government
forced the terrorists to reduce their original de-
mands significantly by adhering to a firm nego-
tiating posture. The guerrillas dropped ,their
demands for the publication of communiques and
for free railroad transportation and yielded when
the government refused to release a total of 37
other prisoners. The terrorists, in fact, were the
net losers in the Bucher affair, inasmuch as their
credibility and their image of invincibility in kid-
nap cases were undermined seriously.
The National Liberating Action (ALN), one
of the two most important terrorist groups in
Brazil, has been active for about three years.
Former officials of the Soviet-line Brazilian Com-
munist Party (PCB) who split off in opposition to
the party's nonviolent policies form the core of
the ALN's leadership as well as that of most of
the other major terrorist groups. Carlos Mari-
ghella, the author of the Minimanual of the Urban
Guerrilla and the foremost Brazilian revolutionary
of recent years, was the ALN's leader until he was
killed by police in November 1969. His deputy,
Joaquim Camara Ferreira, took over, but died in
October 1970 resisting arrest. In September 1969
ALN members, working jointly with a student
group closely affiliated with the ALN, kidnaped
US Ambassador Elbrick. He was released un-
harmed when 15 terrorists were flown to Mexico.
Most of them went on to Cuba, where they were
greeted by Fidel Castro.
The Popular Revolutionary Vanguard
(VPR), a second important terrorist group, is
headed by Carlos Lamarca, a former army captain
and counterinsurgency specialist who deserted in
January 1969. The VPR was responsible for the
first significant terrorist action against a foreign
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national in Brazil when, in October 1968, they
killed US Army Captain Charles Chandler in Sao
Paulo. In March 1970 VPR militants kidnaped the
Japanese consul-general in Sao Paulo. He was later
released in exchange for five imprisoned terror-
ists. In April 1970 the US consul in Rio Grande
do Sul foiled an abduction attempt by the VPR
when he ran down one of the terrorists in his car.
In June 1970 VPR terrorists working with the
ALN kidnaped the West German ambassador.
Forty prisoners were flown to Algeria to secure
his release. The Bucher kidnaping in December
was the most recent example of VPR capabilities.
It is likely
tha tas securityragnets have become more effec-
tive this year and several leaders have been lost,
terrorists have begun to pool their diminished
resources.
The number of militants taking part in ter-
rorist operations is probably not more than
1,000. Most are former university students, but
many are cashiered military and police personnel,
extreme leftist labor figures, and professional
criminals. There is a good deal of sympathy for
some of the terrorists' goals among intellectuals
and the radical clergy. Several priests have been
accused of assisting the ALN's support sector, and
military and security officials are convinced that
terrorists have important contacts among the
Brazilian clergy. Marighella devoted a paragraph
in the Minimanual to the clergy, saying that "the
priest who is an urban guerrilla is an active ingre-
dient" in the struggle.
Some terrorists-particularly in the ALN-
have received training in Cuba, and Uruguayan
terrorists have assisted Brazilians in illegal border
crossings and in obtaining passage to other coun-
Special Report
tries. Brazilian revolutionaries are probably
largely self-sufficient as a result of robberies of
financial institutions. It is possible that Havana
also has provided some financial backing, but
there is no firm evidence of this. Marighella was
long one of Castro's favorite revolutionaries. He
attended the conference of the Latin American
Solidarity Organization in August 1967, and he
may have returned to Brazil with definite com-
mitments of Cuban support at a time when
Havana was still relatively generous in dispensing
aid.
Urban terrorism appears to be becoming a
less serious problem in Brazil, even though kid-
napings, robberies, and sabotage are likely to con-
tinue. Terrorist capabilities appear to have de-
clined during 1970 as police became more effec-
tive in apprehending and killing important guer-
rilla leaders as well as a significant number of
militants. The government's performance in the
recent Bucher kidnaping enhanced its prestige,
just as the terrorists' capitulation on many im-
portant points during the negotiations probably
strengthened the hand of those military and
security officials who advocate a stronger line in
dealing with terrorists. It is possible, therefore,
that urban terrorism has already reached its peak
in Brazil and may now be declining in importance
and intensity. Terrorists retain the capability to
carry out many types of assaults and acts of
sabotage, nevertheless, and undoubtedly will
remain a destabilizing factor in Brazil for some
time.
Although Argentina experienced a brief epi-
sode of Cuban-supported rural guerrilla action in
late 1963 and early 1964, urban terrorism did not
become a problem until 1969. Some Peronists
and other extremists in the labor and student
sectors have long engaged in occasional acts of
urban violence and strikes, but the phenomena of
bank robberies, kidnapings, and other spectacular
acts of urban terrorism are relatively new. Unlike
terrorists in neighboring countries, most of
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whom identify with Castroite or Maoist doctrines,
the bulk of Argentine urban revolutionaries claim
to be left-wing Peronists. Very little is known
about their structure and membership. There may
be as many as a dozen small groups, some of
which reportedly are attempting to form coali-
tions or to merge forces. The Peronist Armed
Forces group appears to be the most active.
During the early months of 1970, terrorists
concentrated on raiding small police and military
posts and on robbing banks. In March, members
of the Argentine Liberation Front, a group
formed in late 1969 or early,1970 from the union
of three earlier revolutionary groups, seized a
Paraguayan consul in Buenos Aires and demanded
the release of two imprisoned leftists. The govern-
ment rejected the demand. Paraguayan President
Stroessnbr, who was vacationing in Argentina at
the time, endorsed the Ongania government's
decision and the terrorists later released their
captive. This was the first case in Latin America
in which a government successfully defied the
demands of kidnapers of a foreign diplomat.
An almost immediate reaction to this esca-
pade was the attempted abduction of a Soviet
diplomat, apparently by right-wing extremists led
by an official of the Argentine Federal Police.
The effort was foiled by the police. One of the
most spectacular events of the year was the kid-
nap and murder of former president Pedro
Aramburu. He was abducted on 29 May, and the
kidnapers, who later identified themselves as
Montoneros, said on 2 June that he had been
tried and executed for crimes allegedly com-
mitted when he. headed a provisional government
from 1955-58. The military government of Presi-
dent Ongania, seriously embarrassed, was ousted
by the armed forces a week later.
Terrorism has continued during the admin-
istration of General Levingston. On 1 July 1970 a
15-man commando group, whose members iden-
tify themselves as Montoneros, terrorized a small
town near Cordoba. They robbed a bank, occu-
pied the police station, and severed communica-
Special Report
tions. Four weeks later, a similar raid was made
on a town near the capital. In October, the home
of the US Defense Attache was fire-bombed, and
other explosive devices were found at the homes
of two other US officials. Later in the month
terrorists forcibly entered the homes of three US
military officers and made off with arms, uni-
forms, and identity documents.
Terrorism in Argentina is less spectacular
than in Uruguay or Brazil, but the Aramburu
murder and its aftermath demonstrate what a
small and fanatical group can achieve. It is likely
that terrorist bands will increase their activities
this year, aiming especially at US officials. Al.-
though they have not demonstrated many of the
capabilities of the Tupamaros or of one or two
Brazilian terrorist groups, Argentine urban bands
are slowly increasing their potential both by
experience and probably through their contacts
with the Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR. Argen-
tine security and police forces have not yet had
much success in halting them, and relatively few
guerrillas have been imprisoned.
Little is known about the extent of support
and sympathy for the-terrorists, but as in Brazil
and Uruguay, youths and students probably ac-
count for a substantial portion. Elements of
Argentine's highly politicized labor federations
probably sympathize generally with terrorist
objectives, and it is also known that some radical
priests, members of a group known in Argentina
as the Third World Movement, have contacts in
terrorist circles.. Last December a "Third World"
priest was giver a two-year suspended prison sen-
tence for his alleged contacts with terrorists in-
volved in the Aramburu murder. Measures an-
nounced by the government late last year were
designed to move Argentina gradually toward
constitutional government during the next four or
five years, but they are not expected to have a
major impact in reducing terrorists' activities. It is
likely, in fact, that terrorist activity will continue
to increase during the next few years and may
pose a more serious problem to the government.
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Because of its geographic location in the
center of South America and the weakness of its
political institutions, Bolivia has long been a
target of cross-border subversion. In 1970 revolu-
tionaries from Bolivia and other South American
countries, with Cuban support, attempted to
avenge and vindicate Che Guevara by reviving his
National Liberation Army (ELN). Even though
ELN rural guerrilla efforts failed a second time,
revolutionaries have continued their attempts to
give the impression that a continental guerrilla
movement is being forged in Bolivia. There were
reports last November that a "South American
Liberation Army" was trying to begin operations
in Bolivia, and Cuban propaganda continues to
place heavy emphasis on the international char-
acter and support of revolutionary activity in
Bolivia. Despite this outside interest and rhetoric,
efforts to revive rural guerrilla action have been
completely frustrated. In recent months, more-
over, the ELN appears to be taking an increased
interest in urban guerrilla methods, and it is likely
that rural efforts will be abandoned, at least
temporarily.
The present ELN is the offspring of the
movement founded and led by Guevara until it
was all but obliterated in 1967. Inti Peredo, one
of the survivors of that effort, began to reor anize
revolutionary cadres in 1968 and 1969.\
In September 1969, however,
Inti was i ec in a police raid, and leadership
passed to his brother Chato.
On 19 July 1970, the resuscitated ELN be-
gan another phase of guerrilla activity by over-
running a mining camp at Teoponte, north of La
Paz. About 75 guerrillas, many of them students
from La Paz, dynamited the installation and
seized two German employees as hostages. The
Bolivian Government later released ten political
prisoners in order to free the hostages. The ELN
was forced to take the defensive almost imniedi-
ately, and counterinsurgency forces picked off
the guerrillas systematically in skirmishes during
the next few months. By early September, when
eight guerrillas were killed in a fire-fight, the ELN
probably had been reduced to half its original
size. By the end of October, Chato Peredo had
been captured and about 55 guerrillas killed. A
few remained in the countryside and eight, in-
cluding Peredo and three Chileans, were granted
safe conducts to Chile. Rural guerrilla activity
ceased.
In July 1970 the Uruguayan press published
the text of a letter allegedly written by Chato
Peredo and addressed to the Uruguayan
Tupamaro terrorist group. It announced the es-
tablishment of "formal" relations between the
Tupamaros and the ELN. Chato said that "in the
near future we must give more and more proof of
integration, not only in the sense of help, but also
in the interchange of militants." In January 1970
a committee for the support of the ELN was
formed in Chile. Socialist Senator Carlos Alta-
mirano was named director and the then presi-
dential candidate, Salvador Allende was identi-
fied as a member.
Following the collapse of its rural guerrilla
operation, the ELN appears to be shifting
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emphasis to urban tactics with the help of in-
dividual Uruguayan and perhaps Chilean advisers.
Within the last few months ELN propaganda
has been giving greater notice to the urban strug-
gle. Published statements now warn that the ELN
will "fight to the final victory in the mountains
and the cities." Earlier statements did not refer to
urban activities. So far, however, the ELN has
demonstrated a limited capacity for urban activi-
ties. It robbed a payroll truck in La Paz in Decem-
ber 1969 but lost several trained guerrillas in the
process. It has carried out well-publicized murders
of several of its political opponents in the last 18
months, including two in the capital recently. It is
probably also responsible for some of the bomb-
ings that occur sporadically in La Paz, and the
dynamiting of the USIS office in Santa Cruz on 7
December 1970.
Like the FAR in Guatemala, the Cuban-
oriented ELN is not the only violent revolution-
ary group in Bolivia. The pro-Chinese Communist
Party began its own militant operations in Octo-
ber when party members seized a cattle ranch and
handed it over to peasant groups. The action was
designed to gain sympathy from the peasants and
to create a base for future guerrilla operations.
The government's subsequent seizure of the
property practically annulled the party's gains,
however.
One faction of the Trotskyist Revolutionary
Workers Party is also committed to guerrilla ac-
tivities, but some of its better trained members
have joined the ELN. The pro-Soviet Communist
Party is opposed to guerrilla activities and, as a
result, many of its more activist members have
joined the ELN.
Because of the continued interest of Bolivian
and foreign revolutionaries in maintaining an ac-
tive insurgency in Bolivia, the ELN probably will
Special Report
continue to be active. Significant numbers of
university students are ELN members or sympa-
thizers, and the labor unions, which have a long
tradition of radicalism, may also contribute mem-
bers. The ELN has made it clear in repeated
announcements that it intends to persevere in the
stru le
During the last two or three years there has
been more violence and terrorism in Guatemala-a
country of only five million people-than in any
other country in the hemisphere. It is estimated
that terrorist activities since 1967 have resulted in
an average of about 90 deaths a month-a third of
whom have been policemen. It is also believed
that about 50 prominent businessmen have been
abducted for ransoms averaging about $200,000.
The major perpetrator of the violence is the
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), a pro-Cuban revolu-
tionary group with both urban and rural wings. In
January 1968, two high-ranking members of the
US military group in Guatemala were murdered
by the FAR, and in August US Ambassador Mein
was killed resisting a kidnap attempt. The FAR
was the first Latin American terrorist group to
resort to kidnapings, assassinations, and other ex-
treme forms of urban violence.
Since 1969 the FAR has escalated its activi-
ties. In the autumn, guerrillas overran an oil-drill-
ing camp near the Mexican border, occupied a
rural town, temporarily seized farms in outlying
areas, and increased assassinations in rural areas.
In December, the FAR launched a particularly
violent but unsuccessful campaign to disrupt the
March 1970 presidential election. FAR cadres
killed more than a dozen security officials, the
right-wing candidate for mayor of Guatemala
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City, and a highly regarded editor of the coun-
try's leading newspaper. Fire bombings in down-
town Guatemala City caused damage estimated in
the millions of dollars.
In 1970, urban terrorism largely supplanted
rural offensives. On the eve of the election the
FAR secured the release of a captured colleague
by kidnaping the Guatemalan foreign minister,
and a week later it obtained the release of two
other guerrillas in exchange for the abducted US
Labor Attache. After the election in March, West
German Ambassador Von Spreti was kidnaped.
He was killed on 5 April when the government
reversed its earlier policy and refused to negotiate
with the terrorists.
In the latter part of 1970 the FAR suffered
a debilitating leadership crisis and splits over the
choice of tactics
Rural
guerri la operations apparently have been
minimized temporarily, but guerrilla safe zones
have been established in the hinterlands, perhaps
as havens for urban terrorists on the run. In
mid-September 1970, a two-month lull in urban
activities ended with dozens of bombings, assas-
sinations, kidnapings, and various scattered acts
of sabotage.
Special Report
In October 1970 the hijackers of a Costa
Rican airliner identified themselves as members of
the United Revolutionary Front of Central
America. This was the first public mention of this
sobriquet
I t is not
likely that a united or coordinated Central Ameri-
can revolutionary group exists at this time in
more than a propaganda context.
The FAR has engaged in some cross-border
operations, mainly into neighboring Mexico and
Honduras in search of safehavens. It was in such a
Mexican hideout, however, where Marcos
Antonio Yon Sosa, a veteran of Guatemalan guer-
rilla struggles since 1960 and leader of the now
moribund 13th of November Revolutionary
Movement, was killed by a Mexican Army patrol
in May 1970.
Terrorism is not the work of the FAR alone.
The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) is also
committed to armed revolution even though its
long-term strategy calls for preparing the masses
prior to violent operations. Since 1962 the party
has tried to gain control over its own guerrilla
factions, and it has had a history of rivalry with
the FAR, interspersed with occasional abortive
periods of unification.
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terrorists-in early December,
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The upsurge of terrorist activity in Novem-
ber resulted in one of the harshest crackdowns in
memory. On 13 November President Arana de-
clared a 30-day state of siege that was extended in
December for another month. Stringent counter-
insurgency measures were adopted that resulted
in the death of at least one guerrilla leader and
the capture of another. The government's actions
were so exaggerated that the Air Force mis-
takenly attacked a fleet of Salvadoran shrimp
boats in the Pacific believing they were engaged in
illicit activity. Four boats were sunk, two
Salvadorans were killed, and 15 wounded.
Right-wing counterterrorists have also been
active on a large scale. Their operations were
responsible for many deaths during the recent
On January congressman Adolfo Mijangos-a
well-known intellectual who had been confined to
a wheelchair-was killed. On 17 January one of
Guatemala's leading labor officials was machine
gunned. The continuing inclusion of prominent
political figures on the government's clandestine
assassination list will serve to keep the cycle of
retributory violence in motion.
Neither the government nor the left-wing
terrorists are likely to achieve a decisive victory in
the near future. US citizens and other foreigners
will continue to be major targets. A US business-
man was beaten and killed-perhaps by right-wing
Special Report
Since the peak of activity from 1962
through 1964, insurgency has fallen to such insig-
nificance in Venezuela that there are now prob-
ably less than 100 guerrillas divided into several
rival guerrilla factions, and only isolated acts of
urban violence occur. Rural guerrillas continue to
decline in importance and pose no direct threat to
the government. They have conducted a few small
raids and ambushes during the last few years, but
are not capable of sustained operations and are
expected gradually to abandon the struggle or
resort to banditry. Low-level violence and crime
could increase in the cities this year, but this will
not be a serious problem.
The Armed Forces of National Liberation
(FALN) was one of the primary recipients of
Cuban support for many years, as well as one of
the most active and formidable guerrilla groups in
the hemisphere. From 1962 through 1964 it com-
bined a high level of urban terrorism with rural
operations. In 1963, the Betancourt administra-
tion probably was more beleaguered and threat-
ened by terrorists and guerrillas than any Latin
American government since Batista's in Cuba.
From 1962 through 1964 urban terrorists burned
factories, murdered police and security personnel,
kidnaped a popular Spanish athlete, and engaged
in various acts of sabotage. In early 1962 the US
Embassy was bombed, US businesses were raided,
and two US military advisers were kidnaped.
Rural operations were carried on simultaneously,
and spectacular acts such as the seizure of a
Venezuelan merchant ship on the high seas were
carried out.
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Guerrilla fortunes declined steadily under
the Leoni administration (1964-1969), however,
and in 1966 the Venezuelan Communist Party
(PCV) formally abandoned violent tactics. Under
the leadership of Douglas Bravo, some FALN
cadres split with the PCV over this decision, en-
deavoring with Cuban aid to revive rural guerrilla
insurgency. By 1967, however, the FALN had
fallen into such lassitude and incompetence, that
Castro publicly denounced Bravo as a "pseudo-
revolutionary." Cuban guerrilla advisers, including
at least two members of the Central Committee
of the Cuban Communist Party who had been
attached to the FALN, were withdrawn by early
1969. Other forms of Cuban support also dried
up. The Pro-Castro Movement of the Revolution-
ary Left (MI R) has been active since 1960. In
September 1969 it split into three rival factions,
two of which compete with a total of about 40
uerrillas in the field.
Guerrilla fortunes were so dim by 1969, in
fact, that President Caldera instituted a wide-
ranging pacification program in March aimed at
absorbing Communists and guerrillas into the
legal political framework. He offered an amnesty
to guerrillas who would lay down their arms,
legalized the Communist Party, established rela-
tions with the USSR, reorganized the security
forces and restrained aggressive armed forces
operations against the guerrillas. The pacification
plan has been successful in attracting some guer-
rillas away from their mountain redoubts and
probably has undermined morale and added to
the divisions among those who remain in the
field.
Some Venezuelan officials appear to be ap-
prehensive that small bands of revolutionaries
may seek to emulate the successes of terrorists in
other South American countries. The defense
minister said publicly on 11 January that the
government is concerned about a possible increase
in terrorism. He cited as evidence the murder of a
former guerrilla by FALN members, a bombing in
Caracas, and an attempted bombing. The US
Embassy in Caracas has speculated that the recent
split of the PCV into two factions could result in
sharper competition among extremist groups and
an increase in violence and crime. PCV dissidents,
including about a third of the party's leaders, are
forming a new party less subservient to Moscow.
This faction could resort to robberies in order to
fund its activities, even though the use of violent
methods would be a departure from the peaceful
approach that all factions of the PCV have en-
dorsed since 1966. Thus, despite the current low
level of violence and crime and the possibility
that it will increase somewhat this year, there is
virtually no chance that terrorism or guerrilla
activity will be renewed on levels comparable to
those of the mid-1960s.
Rural violence has been an integral part of
Colombian life since 1948 when rampant ban-
ditry and guerrilla strife that lasted a decade were
An ELN Guerrilla Training Camp
unleashed. During the 1960s three rival guerrilla
forces looking to Moscow, Havana, and Peking for
support emerged from the remnants of earlier
rural struggle. None prospered for long, however,
and all have declined appreciably during the last
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few years. They no longer attract young recruits
or receive much publicity in the cities or on the
campuses. In all, there are probably only about
600 guerrillas in Colombia-a country of 21 mil-
lion people.
The guerrillas have generally confined their
activities to marginal mountain areas, and they
now engage more in banditry than in guerrilla
warfare. Because of these activities, they still
cause trouble in the countryside
The Army of National Liberation (ELN) is
the most active guerrilla group in Colombia. It has
enjoyed considerable prominence there and in the
rest of Latin America since 1966, when it began
guerrilla operations and lost in battle its most
famous son-the guerrilla priest Camilo Torres. In
early September 1970 the ELN ambushed an
army patrol, killing seven soldiers and wounding
eight. It was the most serious guerrilla action of
any kind in Colombia in more than a year.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-
bia (FARC), the action arm of the pro-Soviet
Colombian Communist Party, is larger than the
ELN but less active. Operating in four main
groups, the FARC's policy since late 1968 has
been to avoid provoking the government, because
Moscow is reluctant to have the FAR jeopardize
newly established Colombian-Soviet relations or
the legal role of the Communist Party. Some
small clashes with military forces take place from
time to time, however
Special Report
The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) is the
action arm of the pro-Pekin Communist Party of
Colombia Marxist-Leninist. 25X1
The EPL
avoids clashes with superior forces, but has at-
tacked small, isolated towns, ranches, and police
posts. Such raids apparently are the product of
the EPL's weakness and its need to acquire re-
visions and publicity.
These guerrilla groups have not engaged in
significant urban violence and appear to have lit-
tle capacity for such action. They do not pose
serious challenges to the government, and are
likely to continue to fade in importance.
Rural guerrilla insurgency probably will be
eschewed as a viable method by Latin American
revolutionaries in most countries in the foresee-
able future. Although the Cubans are likely to
continue emphasizing this approach and some
urban revolutionaries will express the belief that
urban and rural tactics should be employed
simultaneously, fewer and fewer volunteers are
likely to be enlisted for rural action. Guatemala,
where all forms of violence and terrorism remain
at unprecedented levels, may be the only country
where a resurgence of rural guerrilla activity is
possible. The Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR) and the Cubans will probably continue to
encourage and perhaps materially support revolu-
tionaries from other Central American countries.
The potential for revolution in those countries is
not very great, however, and it is unlikely that
new rural guerrilla groups will emerge in the next
year or so.
Urban revolutionaries in South America have
been far more successful than their rural counter-
parts in embarrassing governments and in up-
setting stability. They have won important con-
cessions from the governments-especially in
forcing the release of political prisoners. In Argen-
tina, they were able to exploit the weaknesses of
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the Ongania regime and they contributed to a
change of government after they kidnaped and
murdered a former president. This year, terrorist
activities may increase in Argentina and Bolivia,
continue at relatively high levels in Brazil and
Uruguay, and they could be initiated by small,
fanatical bands at any time in several other coun-
tries. Prospects are, therefore, that terrorist ac-
tivity will increase in as many as half a dozen
South American countries.
In the entire South American continent,
however, there are probably no more than 3,000
active urban revolutionaries. Police and counter-
terrorist techniques became more sophisticated
and effective in 1970, and terrorists have been
dealt hard blows in several countries. Important
guerrilla leaders in Uruguay, Brazil, and Guate-
mala have been killed or captured, and large num-
bers of terrorists are in 'ail.
Terrorists succee e at first arge y
because governments were surprised, confused,
and unprepared to deal with them. During 1970,
however, as terrorist methods became better
known the Guatemalan Government adopted a
the same policy despite important kidnapings.
Kidnaped foreign officials were murdered in each
country as a result, but guerrillas suffered signifi-
cant losses of popularity for their brutality. Al-
though the Brazilian Government in the past ac-
ceded quickly to terrorist demands, it adopted a
tougher line in the recent Bucher kidnaping and
undoubtedly will uphold this firm position in
future dealings with guerrillas.
Small bands of violent urban revolutionaries
may be able to harass and embarrass Latin Amer-
ican governments for some time to come, but
they are not likely to pose serious challenges to
any with the possible exceptions of the regimes of
Guatemala and Uruguay. In Guatemala, FAR-ini-
tiated violence and right-wing counterterror al-
ready amount to a small-scale, bloody civil war
that could increase in proportion depending on
what actions the government takes. In Uruguay,
the Tupamaros continue to demonstrate a re-
markable ability to carry out spectacular opera-
firm
policy of refusing to negotiate with terror-
ists, and the Uruguayan Government persisted in
Special Report -17-
SECRET
22 January 1971
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