WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE THIEU GOVERNMENT AND STUDENTS MILITANT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008400040002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
IYIEEKLY SUMMARY
Sl~eci~l Report
The Thieu Government and Students Militant
Secret
N~ 4 ~
18 December 1970
No. 0401/70A
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THE TH1EU GOVERNMENT AND STUDENTS MILITANT
Far more than a year now, militant students in Soufh Vietnam have
led `outbreaks of student activism that have caused--the government
serious concern.. Student protests have focused public attention on
controversial issues such as taxes, rising living costs, and peace, as well:as
on Saigon's governmental shortcomings. In addition, student disorders
have tended to distract the police. from their important function ofi
ferreting out Communistoperationsin the cties. Never at any time in'
the past year, .however, -have the student protests seriously threatened'.
the stability of the Thieu regime. Saigon-has managed to keep the various
demonstrations from getting out of hand, oftep with brutal a:nd harsh-
tactics, followed up by enough concessions t:o help quiet the students
temporarily.-Thee basic- disinterest of mast students in political agitation
has also proved a boon to the government.
Neverfiheless, extremist students remain eager to confront the
authorities-:by exploiting any usable .issue; for example, the recent
shooting of=a youth by US guards provoked a wave of anti-American
demonstrations in Qui Nhon. Toward this end, the students are
encouraged by bath.-the .Communists and legal opposition groups
desirous of embarrassing- President .Thieu. -None of -these palitica ly
mo#i:vated`forces seems to exercise any significant degree-of control over
student. activity at the present time, but the. Communists, vvho have
shifted to a, greater emphasis on political- wa~~fare; can in the future ;be
expected to accelerate their efforts to spur unrest among'the students.
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There are five universities in South Vietnam,
with an enrollment of upwards of 40,000 stu-
dents. Saigon University is by far the largest, with
30,000 students, while the state-supported uni-
versities of Hue and Can Tho have about 3,000
and 2,000 students, respectively. The Catholic
university at Da Lat in Tuyen Duc Province and
Buddhist-run Van Hanh University in Saigon each
have about 2,500 students. Despite the many
shortcomings of the school system, such as poor
academic standards and inadequate facilities,
there have been practically no student protests
against it except for demands for instruction in
Vietnamese.
Student involvement on the political scene
was launched by the An Quang Buddhist move-
ment to oust Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, when
militant students emerged as an action arm of the
movement during the government raids against
Buddhist pagodas in Hue and Saigon. Even
though martial law was declared, student unrest
continued with such intensity that 1,400 students
were arrested in late August of 1963 and another
2,400 were detained in early September of that
year.
After Diem's death, students remained in
groups associated with various religious and politi-
cal factions. Violent student demonstrations-
usually spurred on by the Buddhists-were instru-
mental in forcing Prime Minister Khanh out of
office in August 1964 and continued to plague
subsequent regimes. Resumption of military rule
in 1965 temporarily held the Buddhists and stu-
dents in check, but they again erupted in a frenzy
of protest against General Thi's dismissal as com-
mander of I Corps. The Buddhist "struggle move-
ment" quickly developed a strong anti-American
tenor as militant students burned the US Consu-
late in Da Nang and the USIS library in Hue.
Political agitation subsided after the struggle
movement was quashed by the government and
did not again become a serious problem until the
disorders of 1970.
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Si:udents have generally tended to stay out
of extracurricular activities, especially in view of
the government's stern measures against agitators.
The only important organization in the uni-
versities are the student unions-theoretically
repres~:nting the entire student body-whose
executive committee constitutes the highest level
of student government. This committee is elected
by the student council of the university, which
includE:s representatives of the student councils of
each faculty.
Of these, the Saigon Student Union (SSU) is
the on?y significant one at present, and even so it
rarely generates widespread student support and
is almost exclusively used as a vehicle for a small
minority of student activists. Although SSU lead-
ers dir~;cted a number of the demonstrations last
spring and summer, several were led by ad hoc
committees of radical mavericks within the SSU.
A prirne example of this was the high school
"hond~~ demonstrations" against Cambodian mis-
treatm~:nt of Vietnamese residents, which were
organized by an SSU officer but were not under
SSU control.
Tl~e Catholics and An Quang Buddhists each
have separate student organizations associated
with the churches rather than with the universi-
ties. 1~he Catholic student organizations have
stayed out of the recent struggle movement en-
tirely. Although Buddhist students have been
active in all the recent protests, the An Quang has
tried tea restrain the extremists and has virtually
stifled student politics in Hue. A number of poli-
ticians have lent support to various student
groups and have tried to channel their activities in
support of particular objectives, but no political
figure Inas developed any lasting influence among
the students.
Vietnamese students have no national or-
ganization and have had little contact with for-
eign student organizations. In the past year,
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however, the SSU has corresponded with several
US peace groups.
Students have long been a priority target for
Viet Cong penetration and recruitment. The ex-
tent of this influence is difficult to estimate but
seems to have been substantial in some instances.
In the An Quang Buddhist struggle movement in
1966., the Communists apparently had permeated
the movement in Da Nang and were quite influ-
ential in Hue. During the Tet offensive of 1968,
students and other youths were used to carry and
cache weapons, guide enemy troops into the
major cities, and recruit among the public as part
of the "general uprising." Sizable groups of stu-
dents reportedly were taken to base areas during
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the immediate post-Tet period for political and
military training, and several groups of students
operating as armed propaganda cadres were ar-
rested in Saigon during the spring of 196$. The
chairman of the SSU defected to the Comrtmunist-
sponsored Alliance for (rational, Democra{ic and
Peace Forces in 1968 and has been sentenced to
death in absentia by a government court. Other
students were sympathetic to the Alliance but
hesitated to support it openly.
Since the failure of the general military of-
fensives, the Communists have been more careful
about exposing their assets. There are indications
that they are trying fo develop a covert agent net
among the students, but if they are having any
success, they are keeping it well concea)ed. A
police raid in September 1968 found enemy
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documents at the headquarters of the SSU, but it
is questionable that the SSU staff knew they were
there. A more serious indication of Communist
inroads was produced by the arrest of 40 persons
in March 1970 as members of the Student and
Youth Section of the Viet Cong Saigon City Com-
mittee. Among those arrested was Huynh Tan
Mam, then acting chairman of the SSU, who
admitted knowing students associated with the
Viet Cong but denied that he had engaged in Viet
Cong activities. The evidence of Mam's complicity
with the enemy seemed damaging but was never
conclusive. Mam was found with a letter from the
Viet Cong Saigon Student and Youth Section
requesting a meeting. Another student claimed
that he had seen Mam at a meeting at a Viet Cong
secret base, though many non-Communist youths
have been taken to bases for lectures.
Thus, the Communists seem to be trying to
exploit student dissension and even to give it
impetus, although it is unlikely they are having
much success. Most students, despite their dislike
of the government, do not appear to view the
Communists as an acceptable alternative and are
probably aware of the regimented life the Viet
Cong would impose. The principal danger thus
lies in the ability of covert Communist agents to
gain positions from which they could provoke the
militants into disruptive actions. These in turn
could give a push to political instability in the
nation or prompt increasing repressiveness on the
part of the government.
The militants in South Vietnamese universi-
ties are quick to seize on any issue that has
aroused, or seems likely to arouse, the public's
interest as a focus for demonstrations. There are
several genuine problems, however, directly con-
cerning the universities that are continuing
sources of serious friction between the student
community and the government. The compulsory
military training program for university students
is one. Even the most moderate students oppose
this program, which is poorly organized, limited
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in coni:ent, and time consuming. Graduates going
into the service receive no credit for completing
the program, and they must also take basic train-
ing when they actually enter the service. In addi-
tion, students claim that the summer training
schedule reduces the time available to prepare for
their final exams.
University autonomy, another popular issue,
does not generate the same degree of feeling as
student military training. Militant demands in the
name ref autonomy vary but usually include an
end to all government interference with student
activities on the campuses. During the past year,
student leaders have pressed specifically for of-
ficial recognition of the SSU, government pro-
vision of a new headquarters for the SSU, and
legal codification of university statutes.
Vietnamese students, like the majority of
Vietnamese youth, do not want to serve in the
armed forces and naturally are eager for the war
to end. These sentiments were reflected in their
call for negotiations in mid-1968 and on other
occasions. In general, however, student opposi-
tion to the war has been restrained, no doubt out
of fear of government reprisals, but also because
few students accept the alternative of Communist
rule.
Si:udent militants also have seized on prob-
lems o~.~tside the campus as excuses for taking to
the streets. The country's economic difficulties,
veterans' benefits, and Vietnamese assistance to
the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia have all been
used as launching pads for the youthful pro-
testors; none of these has drawn widespread stu-
dent involvement.
Elements of anti-Americanism have oc-
casion~illy crept into the dialogue of the pro-
testors. This has been more noticeable in Hue and
Da Nang over the years and reflects the intensely
nation~rlistic sentiment prevalent in central Viet-
nam, taut it has also become increasingly notice-
able ire Saigon. The Vietnamese tend to take a
conspiratorial view of politics, and many profess
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to see obscure American plats behind decisions of
the Saigon government. The students have often
reflected a sensitivity felt by many Vietnamese
that the United States is an unwanted foreign
influence in their internal affairs, though they still
seem to accept the need for American military
assistance. As US military assistance dsminishes,
however, the Vie#namese probably will be less
restrained about criticizing the irritating aspects
of the American presence in their country. The
latent xenophobia of many Vietnamese, including
the students, could be sparked at any time by
incidents such as the Qui Nhon shooting and
could take on overtones increasingly hostile to
the United States.
What the Students Have Beers Up t~1 Lately
The Vietnamese authorities were startled
and angered by the number of students involved
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in Communist proselyting activities in Saigon and
Hue during the 1968 Tet offensive. As a result the
police cracked down hard on student political
activities during the 1968-69 school year; After
the SSU chairman went over to the Communists,
union headttuarters were seized and closed, and
official recognition of the SSU was temporarily
withdrawn, so that all its activities would be tech-
nically illegal, The following summer the govern-
ment dealt firmly with attempts by some students
to boycott military training, surrounding the
demonstrators and trucking them directly to the
training camp. The government proved itself not
totally insensitive to the students' plight; how-
ever, by rearranging the examination schedule to
allow mare tune for studying after training ended.
Several student leaders were arrested in I~te De-
cember 1969 for demonstrating against the gov-
ernment, although there appeared to be no con-
nection between the students and the Com-
mu nsts.
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The arrests of members of the Viet Cong's
Student and Youth Section in Saigon in March
1970 came at a time when the students were
already aroused over increases in newsprint taxes
and school fees. The resulting boycott of classes
gradually spread to other universities as well as to
some high schools. Although many students
believed that Huynh Tan Mam might be involved
with the Viet Cong, others suspected the police of
fabricating the issue in order to destroy the SSU.
Student dissent continued to percolate
throughout the spring as the students leapfrogged
from one issue to another to seize opportunities
for thumping the government. The massacres
among the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia
kicked off more militant protests in the latter
part of April.
The government proved itself flexible in
dealing with this resurgence of student militancy.
Open dissension was met with harsh and some-
times brutal treatment, but then followed by con-
cessions designed to defuse the issues that at-
tracted student support to the militant leaders.
Some of the sanctions applied by the govern-
ment-such as arrests and loss of draft defer-
ments-undoubtedly discouraged many students
vvho might otherwise have joined the militants.
Instances of police brutality, however, generated
widespread support for the militants, even among
more moderate students, and fed the basic hos-
tility between the campus and the palace. A
notable example was the outraged reaction that
occurred when several students who had been
tortured by the police had to be carried into
court on stretchers after the March 1970 arrests.
The government became more circumspect in
handling the student problem after that.
The increasingly disruptive demonstrations
in the spring and summer were treated with re-
markable tolerance, and the government made a
number of concessions that dealt with several
long-standing issues. It recognized the SSU and
made a building available for its headquarters. A
bill codifying the university statutes was pre-
sented to the Assembly.
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This relatively conciliatory official attitude
only seemed to encourage the militants to pro-
gressive boldness, however, until the government
was finally forced to close all schools and uni-
versities in Saigon on 6 May and arrest a number
of militant leaders. These tactics put a temporary
damper on student disorders, although militant
students again took to the streets in mid-June,
despite -the release of Huynh Tan Mam on 13
June after his trial by a military court was de-
clared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
But there was no real issue this time, and the
protests sputtered out from lack of support.
They militancy of the student demonstrations
of the past year was probably influenced by the
general ~~tmosphere of unrest in the country. Seri-
ous economic problems have been plaguing urban
residents. Veterans' demands for increased bene-
fits during the spring and summer became in-
creasingly violent and eventually caused a back-
lash that caught the students as well. Faced with
growing turmoil in Saigon and elsewhere, the gov-
ernment decided to crack down on all demonstra-
tions and authorized the police to use any force
necessar~~ to put down disturbances.
A violent demonstration on 30 August
against I:he summer military training program re-
sulted in ,wholesale arrests. As in the past, most of
those arrested were quickly released, but the lead-
ers were imprisoned, including Mam for the
second time. Although government officials
initially vowed their determination to bring the
student leaders to trial, they were again released
on prok~ation after university authorities peti-
tioned President Thieu and promised to control
the students in the future.
ThE; government has managed to defuse or
cushion the impact of student opposition, which
nevertheless will continue to harass the Thieu
regime in the months ahead. Military training and
peace are issues that radical leaders can exploit at
almost ~~ny suitable opportunity, and continued
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inflation could produce an atmosphere of unrest
conducive to student excesses. The militants will
no doubt be ready to seize any issue of the
moment as well. The recent shooting of a boy in
Qui Nhon city by American soldiers was
promptly protested by the SSU, which has threat-
ened to exploit the incident in an anti-American
campaign. Nevertheless, even though these issues
have broad appeal among the students,. large num-
bers of them are not likely to be willing to take
the risks of open confrontation unless a particular
situation or a combination of adverse conditions
seriously worsens. Regarding one specific issue,
however, the upcoming campaign for the 1971
presidential election provides an occasion for the
students to dramatize their opposition to the
regime, and the militants may well try to inject an
element of extremism into the campaign.
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In the long run, of course, there is the dan-
gerous possibility that the Communists may gain
control of a radical student element that could
exploit the many problems facing the government
and stimulate serious urban turmoil, with spo-
radic agitation an its awn or in conjunction with
labor and other disaffected groups. Although this
prQSpect at present seems unlikely, it remains a
major goal of the Communists if the war develops
into a basically political conflict. Equally dan-
gerous, however, wa~uld be violent agitati?n by
students not responding to Communist direction
but nevertheless creating a disruptive situation
advantageous to the Communists and harmful to
the stability and unity of the country. 25x
25X
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