WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008300050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 13, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
43
State Dept. review completed 13 November 1970
No. 0396/70
DIA review(s) completed.
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(Information as of noon EST, 12 November 1970)
Page
FAR EAST
Cambodia: Back on the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Vietnam: Where Has All the Main Force Gone? . . . . . . . . . . . 2
South Korea: Opposition Rocks the Boat . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Communist China: The Shrinking Elite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
COMMUNAL POLITICS IN MALAYSIA: The Search for a New Beginning
UN: A Melange of Disarmament Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Czechoslovakia: Husak Strengthens His Position . . . . . . . . . 8
Suslov Hits Bonn Revanchists in Anniversary Speech . . . . . . . . 10
Finland: Communist Party Split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Jordan: Cease-fire Faces Hardest Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA (CONTINUED)
Egypt-Libya-Sudan: The State of the Union . . . . . . . . . . .
13
Africa: New Call for Black-White Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
Angola: No End of Insurgency in Sight . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
Chile: New Gov
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ernment Tests the Water . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
Bolivia: Urban
Terrorism May Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
NOTES: Laos, Poland - West Germany; Bolivia;
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FAR EAST
Cambodia: Back on theAttack
The two months' lull in fighting ended on 9
November when the Communists began a series of
coordinated attacks on important government
positions in Kompong Cham Province. Enemy
pressure eased after several days, however, and
Cambodian units once again gave a good account
of themselves.
Some of the heaviest fighting occurred just
northwest of Kompong Cham city, where the
Communists briefly occupied the town of
Troeung at the junction of Routes 7 and 21. A
few miles farther north the enemy inflicted fairly
heavy casualties on two government battalions
defending a small village.
Kompong Cham city was hit by sporadic
enemy mortar fire. The Communists also made a
strong attack on the city's airfield, but three
Khmer Krom battalions defending government
positions at the airfield held their own with the
aid of air strikes. On the east side of the Mekong,
the town of Tonle Bet and two nearby villages
were subjected to enemy ground probes. West of
the city, enemy attacks along Route 7 extended
as far as the town of Skoun, the rear security base
for the government column operating along
Route 6. Cambodian Army troops at Skoun re-
pulsed probing attacks there. South of Skoun, the
Communists destroyed a key bridge, blocking the
movement of reinforcements to Kompong Cham.
The last major Communist attacks in the
Kompong Cham area were in late May. Since
then, government defenses in Kompong Cham
city have been strengthened considerably. The
continuing presence of four Communist main
force regiments near the city indicates the Com-
munists may intend to maintain pressure in this
sector.
The attacks may be designed in part to fore-
stall further Cambodian advances north and east
of Route 6. Cambodian commanders scrapped
plans to divert any troops from the column on
Route 6, however, and reportedly hope to use
forces in Skoun and along Route 7 to reopen that
artery eastward to Kompong Cham.
The military initiative was not left entirely
to the Communists during the week. A combined
force of Cambodian and South Vietnamese Army
troops began a major offensive operation to clear
Communist elements between Routes 2 and 3,
some 20 miles south of Phnom Penh. As was the
case with an earlier Cambodian operation in the
same area, however, only token contact with the
enemy was reported.
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U L .L'.. 1
Vietnam: Where Has All the Main Force Gone?
In shifting from a "general offensive" strat-
egy ii South Vietnam in 1968 to a less ambitious
one in much of Irdochina in 1970, the Commu-
nists have made some drastic changes in their
military organization and deployments- By mid-
1968 they had committed nearly 60 main force
(regular) infantry regiments to the fighting in
South Vietnam. Now, there are only a few more
than 20 in the country, and many of these are in
fairly remote base areas.
the Commu- 25X1
nists near Saigon have also disbanded the 101st
Regiment, a first-line North Vietnamese Army
unit that infiltrated into the South several years
ago.
What has hapaened to the other large units?
A few have been disbanded-possibly as many as
ten regiments-anc' the forces formerly subordi-
nate -:o them have been reorganized to operate as
separate battalions or as reinforcements
Cong local forces and guerrillas.
These shifts underscore the en-
emy'i changing short-term priorities. Laos and
Cambodia now come before Da Nang and Saigon,
at least as far as main force commitments are
concerned. They also point up the fact that a
large part of the enemy's main force is still intact,
even though much of it has been directed away
from objectives in South Vietnam. This is part of
the over-all transformation of Communist tactics
in South Vietnam. toward greater emphasis on
guerrilla forces, terrorism, and political action.
The Communists have also sharply cut large
units in northern South Vietnam, although there
are still more main force regiments there (about
12) than in any other region. This compares with
nearly 30 enemy regiments in or near Military
Region 1 at the peak of the 1968 fighting. Since
then the Communists have disbanded only two
regiments here, both in the Da Nang sector. The
main reduction has been caused by a shift of
major elements of several North Vietnamese divi-
sions back into North Vietnam and the Laos
panhandle.
The Communists have made some of the
most drastic cutbacks in Military Region 3, sur-
rouncing Saigon. It was here that they formed a
number of new regiments in late 1967 and early
1968 in order to bring heavy pressure on the
capital. Soon after the Communists abandoned
this objective in 1969, they began to break up
and disperse at least three main force regiments-
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active and considers even those inadvertently in-
volved as accomplices.
The private property decree also covers
abuses by officials as well as petty crimes. There
have been reports for years that government of-
ficials in the countryside have been pressuring
cooperative members for bribes and for roduce
from private lots.
The regime in Hanoi, seemingly dissatisfied
with the discipline in the North, has taken stern
new corrective measures. Two new decrees were
announced in late October that hit hard at crimi-
nal abuses of both state-owned and private
property.
The state property law is aimed at cracking
down on a wide variety of offenses, ranging from
petty thievery and wastefulness to organized
criminal activity, embezzlement and misap-
propriation by officials. The little information
that has seeped out of North Vietnam regarding
corruption suggests that it continues to be fairly
widespread, and is adversely affecting popular
morale. The regime may be serious this time in
doing something about it. The new law levies
serious penalties, even for misdemeanors, is retro-
Hanoi has moved in other ways to bring the
country under tighter rein. The authorities have
ordered the various inspection mechanisms,
through all echelons of government, to watch
more closely over domestic affairs and to exact
stricter compliance with central government in-
structions. This is buttressed by a rather heavy
propaganda campaign that almost daily has
warned against breakdowns in law and order and
against what the regime clearly considers to be
unsatisfactory levels of performance by cadres
and workers.
This kind of crackdown is a distinct change
from the regime's relatively tolerant attitude of
the past two years. Up to a short time ago, Hanoi
either looked the other way or relied on finger
shaking to correct the country's ills. Although
propaganda of this kind often is overdrawn, it
now appears that the regime is attacking the prob-
lem because it believes it is undercutting to some
extent Communist performance in the war and
the restoration of North Vietnam's econ-
omy.
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LAOS: Souk Vongsak, the special envoy of Lao
Communist leader Prince Souphanouvong, re-
turned to Vientiane from Hanoi via the recently
instituted Soviet air service on 7 November. On
his arrival, Souk said he had come to resume
discussions with Prime Minister Souvanna
Phourna on preparing for peace talks at Khang
Khay. The Communist envoy hewed to the famil-
iar Communist line, insisting that any talks would
be between representatives of the "two princes,"
Souphanouvong and Souvanna, a position that
avoids recognition of Souvanna as head of the
Lao Government. It is not yet clear how this issue
of representation will be resolved, but Souk may
have brought a response to the government's
telegram of 27 October which, in effect, offered
the Communists a chance to compromise. Mili-
tary activity, meanwhile, was at a relatively low
level this week as government forces withdrew six
battalions that had been harassing enemy lines in
the panhandle and prepared defensive positions
for anticipated North Vietnamese attacks west of
South Korea: Opposition Rocks the Boat
Kim Tae-chung of the New Democratic
Party (NDP) has started the 1971 presidential
campaign early, stumping the major provincial
cities where he draws large and enthusiastic
crowds. A forceful orator, he is challenging Presi-
dent Pak by name and has not hesitated to speak
out on potentially explosive issues such as na-
tiona defense and the administration's continued
Kim Tae-chung
failure to implement a
constitutional require-
ment for local self-gov-
ernment. He has also at-
tacked favoritism within
the national militia-an
institution that affects
virtually every South
Korean family. In addi-
tion, Kim has raised a
variety of less sensitive
but nonetheless com-
pelling issues, including
women's rights and tax
reform.
Caught off balance
by Kim's vigorous chal-
Page 4
lenge, harried administration leaders have re-
sponded with public denunciations of Kim's pro-
posals and even veiled threats of outright suppres-
sion. In some instances the local authorities have
resorted to clumsy and generally unsuccessful
tactics, such as offering free admission to local
movie houses on the day Kim is to speak, and
flooding his rally site. Somewhat more subtly,
they have sought to curtail media coverage of his
campaign and to cut off his sources of campaign
funds.
Kim is still a long way from being a threat to
Pak's re-election. In comparison to Pak's Demo-
cratic-Republican party, the conservative NDP is
poorly organized and short of money. Moreover,
the whole weight of the government bureaucracy,
down to the lowest village level functionary, can
be brought to bear in support of Pak. Over-
reaction by the administration, however, could
endanger the political stability that Pak has built
up over the years. Pak has been reported to be
incensed by Kim's criticism and has demanded
that something be done about him. This raises the
possibility that if not Pak himself, a subordinate,
in the hope of currying presidential favor, might
take some drastic action that would stir greater
support for the opposition.
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Communist China: The Shrinking Elite
The continued absence of Chen Po-ta, a
member of the elite politburo standing committee
and Mao Tse-tung's longtime confidant and per-
sonal secretary, raises suspicions that he has be-
come a victim of another round of factional
quarreling at the top levels of the regime. He has
not appeared in public for over three months and
the regime has offered no explanation for Chen's
failure to be with other ranking leaders on oc-
casions when his presence would seem obligatory.
His prolonged absence from public view is being
treated in a manner strikingly similar to that
employed in the recent ouster of another polit-
buro member, Peking political boss Hsieh Fu-
chill. The disappearance of these top leaders,
together with the unpublicized removal of some
key provincial officials, attests to considerable
behind-the-scenes maneuvering within China's
post - Cultural Revolution elite.
Chen is 65I I Press com-
mentary on last month's National Day turnout in
Peking did not follow the past practice
of noting that some leaders were ab-
sent due to illness. Instead, the cover-
age of the event employed the un-
precedented device of alphabetically
listing Chen's standing committee col-
leagues, Chou En-lai and Kang Sheng,
together with the remainder of the
politburo, suggesting a clumsily con-
trived effort to downplay Chen's ab-
sence.
Western diplomats in Peking re-
cently reported a rumor that at the
major party plenum held from late
August to early September Chen was
criticized for undisclosed sins. An at-
tack on Chen, taken together with the
fall of Hsieh Fu-chih, should be fol-
Page 5
lowed by serious repercussions, but there are as
yet only tenuous signs of disunity among the
remaining leaders. Most, including Mao himself,
have been appearing with unusual regularity since
late summer, suggesting that Peking has taken
pains to maintain a "business as usual" facade at
the top.
Moreover, analysis of regional and provincial
leadership turnouts over the past six months or so
indicates that some first- and second-echelon lead-
ers have probably been removed from their posts.
The officials apparently in disfavor include several
provincial government heads newly appointed
during the Cultural Revolution, and possibly the
commander of the important Peking Garrison
command. The regime's continued refusal since
the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 to provide
an authoritative and comprehensive "pecking or-
der" for the new politburo is yet another indica-
tor that Peking is still struggling to resolve the
power relationships among competing interest
groups that comprise the present elite.
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Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee
Mao Tse-tung
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Chou En-lai Chen Po-ta Kang Sheng
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EUROPE
UN: A Melange of Disarmament Issues
The current session of the UN General As-
semblV, like those of recent years, is being used
by tha less developed countries to press the big
powers to move faster on disarmament. The gen-
eral satisfaction with the strategic arms limitation
talks (SALT) and with the US-USSR draft treaty
limiting military use of the seabeds has served,
however, to blunt much of the sharpness which
characterized previous Assembly debates on arms
control issues.
The draft seabeds treaty, endorsed earlier
this year by all of the 25 nations attending the
Geneva disarmament conference, with the excep-
tion of Mexico, apparently will be approved by
the Assembly members with little or no opposi-
tion and will be opened for signature early in
1971. A resolution commending the treaty was
introduced in committee this week with the im-
pressive total of 34 cosponsors. Mexico has now
been mollified by superpower assurances that the
treaty does not affect either territorial waters
claims or the Lath American nuclear-free zone
establ shed by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Earlier in the current session it appeared that
the East Europeans would be willing to allow the
question of controls on chemical and biological
weapons (CBW)-ari abrasive issue last year-to be
referred back to the Geneva conferees in a way
that would favor neither the Soviet CBW draft
convection nor the British draft treaty on BW
agents alone. Lately, however, they seem to be
more inclined to push for Assembly adoption of a
resolution favoring the Soviet text. Complicating
the problems posec for the US by the CBW issue
is the possibility that Yugoslavia may seek to have
the Assembly again approve the contentious 1969
statement that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans
the use of tear gas and herbicides in war.
only Albania expressed a negative view. In view of
this favorable climate of opinion, it appears un-
likely that the Assembly will be asked to consider
again the 1969 resolution which, addressed di-
rectly to the Helsinki conferees, called for a mora-
torium on the further testing and deployment of
new offensive and defensive strategic weapons
systems "as an urgent preliminary measure."
Sweden is preparing a resolution that simply calls
for a cessation of tests of nuclear weapons and
missile systems, and Japan may attempt to
counter even this mild resolution with one that
merely "welcomes" the talks.
Among the nonnuclear-weapon states the
subject of general and complete disarmament
(GCD) has attracted a surprising amount of atten-
tion again this year. Italy and Sweden, for ex-
ample, may propose a resolution that would give
some specific guidelines on GCD to the Geneva
disarmament conference. Swedish UN delegate
Edelstam has expressed concern that, lacking such
guidelines, the superpower cochairmen of the
Geneva talks will opt for only a miniprogram that
would not be responsive to the disarmament as-
pirations of the nonaligned.
Complementing the interest in GCD are
Romanian and Philippine initiatives on the eco-
nomic and social consequences of the arms race.
The Philippine draft resolution is especially trou-
blesome for the US--and presumably for the
USSR-because it charges the UN Secretary Gen-
eral with the task of developing a disarmament
program and proposing specific measures, a
course of action that would constitute a deroga-
tion from the prerogatives of the Geneva talks.
The Romanian text is less contentious; it merely
calls for a UN study on the subject.
In the Assembly's general debate, several
delegEtions referrec favorably to the SALT talks;
The status of the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) has not caused as much Assembly debate
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as it did last year. Many delegations have referred
with approval to the NPT's entry into force last
March and have pointedly refrained from com-
ments on the safeguards agreements required by
the treaty to prevent the diversion of fissionable
material from peaceful uses. A special committee
of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
which must negotiate and subsequently police
adherence to the agreements, is making substan-
tial progress in formulating the agency's position
for the ne otiations.
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Czechoslovakia: Husak Strengthens His Position
During the past three weeks Czechoslovak
party boss Gustav Husak has moved vigorously
against hard-line critics of his moderate-conserva-
tive policies. Husak apparently is anxious to go
into .he forthcomng central committee plenum
with a firmer control over the party mechanism.
The foundation for the recent moves was
laid down at the June central committee plenum
when the party chief warned that continued
extremist agitation to expand the purge of liberals
would harm his attempts to normalize the situa-
tion. On 10 September Husak called for recon-
ciliation with the disaffected intelligentsia as a
necessary move to ensure effective management
of Czachoslovakia's complex economy.
During all thi; time, however, sniping at his
conci iatory line continued, especially in the pro-
vincial press and in some radio commentaries. On
8 September, hard-liner Bohuslav Chnoupek was
removed as chief of the broadcasting system and
later departed Prague to become ambassador to
Moscow. The radio and other mass media have
since moved toward more consistent support of
Husak's policy. The ultraconservatives' voice has
not been stilled, however, as a new publication,
Leva Fronta, is prcviding the ultras with a vehicle
for criticism of Husak's moderates.
Since mid-October Husak has moved faster
to consolidate his position. Two leading hard
liners have been removed from office-Josef
Groesser, the Czech state interior minister, and
General Otakar Rytir, the liaison officer to the
Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia. Czech state Jus-
tice Minister Jan Nemec and Minister of Educa-
tion Jaromir Hrbek are also rumored to be due
for dismissal.
Husak apparently had a severe struggle be-
fore he was able to prevent the start of political
trials. The recent indefinite postponement of the
trial of the liberal "Pachman group" indicates he
has won on this point. A further blow to the hard
liners was the failure of East German party boss
Ulbricht to provide any sign of encouragement
for them during his recent state visit. In fact,
Ulbricht gave his blessing to Husak's policies.
Moscow's blessing is also implied, as Husak would
not be moving so boldly without assurance of
support from the Kremlin.
Husak thus goes into the central committee
plenum with a relatively strong hand. The unity
of the top leadership remains, with even such
conservative presidium members as Alois Indra,
Antonin Kapek, and Vasil Bilak lining up behind
the current moderate line. It begins to appear that
the power of the hard liners is on the wane,
barring unforeseen developments. The plenum is
not likely to be a showdown, but it will provide
an indication of how far and how fast Husak
intends to go toward "reconciliation."
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Suslov Hits Bonn Revanchists in Anniversary Speech
Some statements of Politburo member Sus-
lov in his October anniversary speech on 6 No-
vember, together with other recent Soviet pro-
nouncements, point to possible differing opinions
among Moscow's leaders on the proper approach
to relations with West Germany. Suslov's re-
marks-which were probably cleared with his col-
leagues beforehand -suggest that the existing con-
sensus may favor a relatively guarded attitude
toward Bonn, in contrast to the enthusiasm ex-
pressed earlier by party chief Brezhnev over the
Soviet - West German treaty.
Suslov praised the Soviet - West German
treaty, calling it a "foundation for a turn to the
better" in bilatera relations, but balanced this
praise with a reminder that the treaty could "only
play its role in ful' measure when it enters into
force." Beyond this, he revived a vigilance theme
that has been virtually absent in recent weeks. He
asserted that "influential reactionary forces" in
West Germany have come out against the treaty,
and warned it would be "unforgiveable" to under-
estimzte the "forces of aggressive militarism and
revanchism" that continue their "insane plans for
recarving the map of Europe." Suslov's remarks
about "revanchist" forces in West Germany re-
versed the pattern of the anniversary slogans,
which for the first time in several years dropped
such language in reference to West Germany.
E uslov's cautionary remarks may, of course,
have partly reflected Moscow's concern over the
durab lity of the Brandt coalition, whose stability
at the time appeared threatened by state elections
in Hesse. They may also indicate, however, that
the existing consensus within the collective pre-
fers a cautious approach toward Bonn, despite the
ringing endorsement the treaty has received from
other quarters, notably from party chief Brezh-
nev.
Erezhnev, for instance, publicly endorsed
the treaty on two -event occasions, in Alma Ata
on 28 August, and in Baku on 2 October. In the
latter speech, he presented by far the most posi-
tive appraisal of the treaty to come from any
authoritative Soviet source. He acknowledged-in
line with Suslov-that the treaty would "only"
have its full impact after ratification, but asserted
that "even now" it is having "a favorable effect
on the situation in Europe."
While staking out a position as a staunch
advocate of diplomatic approaches to West Ger-
many, Brezhnev has also hinted of domestic op-
position to this policy. In Baku, he referred dis-
paragingly to "differences of opinion which one
encounters here and there as to which side has
gained more from the treaty," and argued that all
sides had gained equally.
Suslov, speaking of the economy, assured his
audience that "the mighty Soviet industry is now
capable" of solving all technical problems, guaran-
teeing rapid economic growth and increasing its
defense capacity. He boasted of the largest grain
crop in history and the fulfillment of major five-
year plan goals. Behind this rosy facade, however,
were admissions of a multitude of unsolved eco-
nomic problems.
Suslov complained that agricultural produc-
tion, especially meat output, currently was inade-
quate to meet the future demands of the popu-
lace. In the industrial sector, he acknowledged
that capital construction was lagging, new tech-
nology was being too slowly introduced, product
quality was low, materials were wasted, and labor
discipline was weak. His projected 1970 growth
rates for industrial production and labor produc-
tivity forecast another year of only moderate
growth. Moreover, the absence of specific com-
ments on the exact status of the next five-year
plan (1971-75) suggests that problems over re-
source allocations persist.
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Finland: Communist Party Split
The split within the Communist Party has
jeopardized the prospects for continued economic
stabilization in Finland and may lead to the par-
ty's withdrawal from the government coalition.
The minority conservative faction in the
party has consistently opposed the tripartite
agreement, painfully worked out after the 1967
devaluation between labor, management and gov-
ernment, imposing strict controls on price and
wage increases. Charging the majority liberals
with selling out the interests of the workers, the
conservatives threatened to form their own party
following their defeat at the 1969 party congress.
Only under Soviet pressure did the two groups
agree to submerge their differences early this year
and conduct a unified campaign for the parlia-
mentary election held in March.
Disenchantment with the establishment role
played by the liberals in the government was
reflected in the lowest voter support received by
the party since 1945. The conservatives, laying
sole responsibility for this setback on the liberals
and eager to discredit them still further, resumed
their campaign against the economic stabilization
agreement, using even harsher and more vitriolic
language.
The liberals were stunned when the con-
servatives went so far as to break party discipline
in a government confidence vote on a bill clearing
the way for extension of the agreement. They
quickly denounced this action and have threat-
ened to force the minority out of the party if it
does not cease its violations of party law. The
Soviets, determined to prevent such a develop-
ment, have printed several articles in Trud and
Pravda supporting the positions held by the con-
servatives.
So far, the liberals seem determined to retain
control of the party and to pursue their role as a
responsible coalition partner. They have been
encouraged by the defection of some of the more
prominent party members from the conservative
group as the latter has hardened its stand. The
Soviets, however, seem at present to be intent on
bolstering the conservatives, even though this may
lead to an event-jai Communist withdrawal from
the government.
POLAND - WEST GERMANY: After a week of
tough bargaining in Warsaw, West German For-
eign Minister Scheel returned to Bonn on 9 No-
vember carrying an invitation from Polish Premier
Cyrankiewicz for Chancellor Brandt to visit Po-
land to sign the treaty. Differences in the wording
of the treaty text had yet to be resolved earlier
this week, but Bonn admitted they were reconcil-
factory compromise.
able. The major difficulty appeared not to in-
volve the treaty itself, but the content of a
proposed exchange of notes between the Federal
Republic and the Allies reaffirming Allied rights
and responsibilities in Germany pending a peace
treaty. Nevertheless, the interest of both parties
in an early conclusion of the bilateral accord
suggests that this issue also will yield to a satis-
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Jordan: Cease-fire Faces Hardest Test
Jcrdan entered the most hazardous phase of
the cezse-fire period when the restrictions of the
13 October agreement and protocol went into
effect after 9 November. Most Jordanians are
apprehensive that extremists on either side might
provoke a renewal of the conflict. Fedayeen lead-
ers and the government appear to be actively
trying to reduce tensions, but recent incidents
have demonstrated the ease with which trouble
can erupt.
The prime condition of the restrictions is
that both the fedayeen and the army will end
military operations in Jordanian towns and cities.
Other provisions call for the issuance of I D cards,
passes, and license plates as well as assigning loca-
tions for arms caches and fedayeen bases. Unified
fedayeen offices in Amman would be limited in
number and personnel.
The fedayeen failed to get a general delay of
the deadline, although the Arab observers com-
mission reported that an extension of "two or
three days" had been granted for two towns near
Amman.
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In some northern
towns, minor incidents are occurring, as usual.
The observer commission is fairly satisfied
with fedayeen implementation of the agreements
so far and is reasonably optimistic that local in-
cidents will not spread. The observer teams, as-
sisted by joint army-fedayeen patrols, have
proved effective in coping with violations and
limiting their spread.
Premier Tal has sought to ameliorate rela-
tions with Egypt and Iraq, two of his chief critics
that might influence fedayeen attitudes. During a
press conference, he supported the Egyptian re-
newal of the Suez cease-fire, and denied that
Jordan had sought the withdrawal of Iraqi troops.
He vowed to uphold the October agreement,
pointing out that it would benefit both the feda-
yeen and the government, and went on to reiter-
ate that Jordan's policy is to recover the West
Bank from Israel, even by war if other means fail.
The fedayeen have been equivocal; while
generally expressing satisfaction with the agree-
ments, Arafat and other leaders have predicted
ultimately another round of fighting. The ob-
server commission has lately begun to echo feda-
yeen expressions of apprehension about the
army's intentions.
The Bedouin troops' distrust of the Palestini-
ans has been hardened by the reassertion of Major
General Zaid bin Shakir's tough attitude toward
the fedayeen. They also believe that they gained
the whip hand during the fighting and intend to
maintain it. At present, the army is probably in a
stronger tactical position than the fedayeen, and
it will be tempted to exploit this advantage. Pre-
mier Wasfi Tal's most difficult test may prove to
be whether he can-with the aid of the Arab
observer teams-not merely maintain the peace
but do so while holding the army's extremist
elements in check without running afoul of the
influence that the troops can exert on the
King.
Egypt-Libya-Sudan:
The State of the Union
Plans for the political, military, and eco-
nomic integration of Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan
were announced in Cairo this week, but they are
likely to be implemented on a protracted sched-
ule.
The communique referred to steps to ex-
pedite the union, but the leaders of the three
countries are fully aware that popular opposition
in Libya and the Sudan to Egyptian hegemony
compels them to move cautiously. The new tri-
partite command-made up of heads of state
Sadat of Egypt, Numayri of the Sudan, and
Qaddafi of Libya-and the various subordinate
planning committees will probably work with
great deliberation in drawing up specific recom-
mendations for implementing the Cairo Declara-
tion. Judging from the modest steps toward inte-
gration that have been taken in such areas as
education and air transport since the three ar-
ranged an alliance last December, tristate unity is
apt to have more form than content for the
foreseeable future.
It is not yet clear what type of union is
contemplated. The failure of the unitary state
established between Syria and Egypt in 1958 is
well remembered in Cairo, and any formal politi-
cal entity is likely to be a much looser structure.
If the agreement to form a political union is
carried out ultimately, it will probably be only a
nominal federation such as was set up between
Egypt and Yemen in 1958.
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The contemplated coordination in the key
area of foreign policy would formalize an arrange-
ment n use since the young Sudanese and Libyan
revolutionaries came to power last year. The lead-
ers of the three governments already maintain
regula' and close contact, particularly in their
handling of various aspects of the confrontation
with Israel.
In committing his prestige to tristate federa-
tion, Egyptian President Sadat is pursuing the
elusive goal of Arab unity that Nasir so long
advocated. Sadat rray hope that by so doing he
will increase his stature both at home and abroad.
Both he and Numayri probably believe that closer
Tunisia: A New Government
The new government installed last Friday is
notable for its tecl-nical competence and for its
loyalty to President Habib Bourguiba. Prime Min-
ister Fledi Nouira, who heads the new cabinet, has
long been influential in financial policy.
Bourguiba presumaoly regards Nouira's colorless
persorality as no threat to his own charismatic
appeal.
Nouira, a lone-time militant of the ruling
Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), has been a close
advise- to the President for many years. He has
few known enemies in either the party or the
government, and during the past year avoided the
factional infighting among potential presidential
successors. A self-styled "progressive conserva-
tive," Nouira won the respect of international
financial circles while governor of the Central
Bank :)f Tunisia. His honesty and incorruptibility
have earned the confidence of Tunisian business
and 13bor circles, but he has little following
among the youth.
Nouira replaces Bahi Ladgham, who had
been Tunisia's second-ranking official since in-
cooperation with Libya will provide easier access
to Tripoli's oil-rich coffers.
Numayri and Qaddafi, who revered Nasir,
appear to be sincere in their advocacy of more
substantive Arab unity. The two Arab leaders
may also hope that closer identification with
Egypt will strengthen their somewhat shaky
domestic positions. This strategy may backfire,
however, by further antagonizing those Libyans
and Sudanese, including members of the ruling
juntas, who would chafe at excessive Egyptian
meddling in their affairs. To some Arabs, in fact,
the Egyptians seem like locusts, coming to strip
their lands of whatever they can find.
dependence in 1956. Ladgham incurred Bour-
guiba's displeasure last spring for his failure to
inject more dynamism into the flagging economy.
Ladgham was also under a cloud for his reluc-
tance to prosecute former planning chief Ahmed
ben Salah, whose socialist policies had proved
highly unpopular with farmers and the middle
class but had aroused the admiration of many
young Tunisians, particularly students. When
Ladgham completes his task as chairman of the
Arab peacekeeping mission in Jordan, where he
has gained considerable personal acclaim, he will
concentrate on his duties as secretary general of
the PSD, preparing for the repeatedly postponed
party congress now scheduled for next October.
Most members of the new government are
holdovers from the previous Ladgham cabinet,
formed last June. The group includes two promi-
nent officials-Foreign Minister Mohamed Mas-
moudi and Interior Minister Ahmed Mestiri-who,
like Ladgham, are considered potential successors
to Bourguiba. One of the two ministers dropped
is Habib Bourguiba_ Jr__ the President's son
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Africe: New Cull for Black- White Talks
Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny is try-
ing to aromote a dialogue between white-ruled
southern Africa and he rest of the continent. By
embarking on such a course, Houphouet is likely
to deepen the split between militant and prag-
matic African governments on the southern
Africa issue.
Houphouet has long believed that unbending
hostility toward South Africa is futile and that
Pretoria's policies cannot be changed by force.
Houphcuet's fear of Communist influence in cen-
tral anc east Africa is probably also a factor in
motivating him to -hake a move that will be
unpopular among many Africans, including many
of his fellow countrymen.
The Ivory Coast President has called for an
African summit conference to consider a peaceful
approach to the problems of Portuguese colonial-
ism, white-rule in Rhodesia, and apartheid in
South Africa. Prior to this conference, his govern-
ment would contact all heads of state to push a
policy of negotiation toward the "white redoubt"
states.
Any genuine dialogue between white and
black Africa, however, is still a long way off at
best. Militant African governments, as well as
some moderate ones, have been quick to voice
strong opposition to the move while many other
countries will simply dissociate themselves or re-
main silent. The mil tants, notably Tanzania and
Zambia, have been the chief supporters of the
southern liberation movements and have spon-
sored increasingly extreme resolutions in interna-
tional forums. At this time, it seems certain that a
majority of the 41 members of the Organization
of African Unity will not be willing to join Hou-
phouet s "crusade."
Response from a few of the moderate
French-speaking states has been favorable. Mala-
gasy President Tsiranana immediately hailed
Houphouet's initiative, while the Malagasy Gov-
ernment announced that the South African for-
eign minister will visit Tananarive later this month
to conclude economic agreements. Presidents
Bongo of Gabon and Maga of Dahomey have
expressed guarded approval. Endorsements by
other former French dependencies may follow
should Paris, which has long favored improved
contacts with South Africa, push actively for the
new approach. Paris may be hesitant at this time,
however, because it has just succeeded in pla-
cating some of the more militant African coun-
tries by tightening its arms embargo against South
Africa.
Among English-speaking leaders, President
Banda of Malawi, who has long cast himself as a
"bridge builder" between white and black Africa,
has welcomed Houphouet's move as a vindication
of his policy. Malawi, which is economically de-
pendent on its white-ruled neighbors, is the only
black African state that has formal diplomatic
relations with Pretoria. Botswana, Swaziland, and
Lesotho, which by geographical necessity must
also deal with South Africa, are likely to give at
least qualified support to Houphouet's initiative.
Ghana's prime minister is already on record as
favoring such a policy, although other Ghanaian
leaders are clearly less enthusiastic.
In South Africa, the development has been
roundly acclaimed. Both the Afrikaner and
English press have reacted euphorically to
Houphouet's statements, which have given a
timely boost to Prime Minister Vorster's "out-
ward looking" policy of cultivating relations with
black states. Political circles in Pretoria are al-
ready interpreting the Ivorian President's move as
a "first step" toward diplomatic recognition of
South Africa-a development that Houphouet has
explicitly ruled out for Ivory Coast, at least for
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Angola: No End of Insurgency in Sight
The two principal insurgent organizations in
Angola are showing new tactics and strengths.
The Portuguese are conducting successful opera-
tions of their own, however, and the nine-year-old
insurgency seems likely to drag on indefinitely.
The most noticeable changes in the fighting
have occurred in eastern Angola, where the pro-
Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA) is the primary guerrilla threat. In
recent months, the MPLA, which has 3,000-4,000
armed guerrillas inside Angola, has concentrated
on breaking out of the sparsely populated east,
where there are few strategic Portuguese targets,
toward the heavily populated center.
The second major insurgent organization is
Holden Roberto's Angolan Revolutionary Gov-
ernment in Exile (GRAE). Its 3,000-4,000-man
force inside Angola operates out of bases in the
Congo (Kinshasa) and has long been the predomi-
nant group in northwestern Angola. Out of favor
with the African and Communist states that pro-
vide most of the assistance to the insurgent move-
ments, however, GRAE usually fielded poorly
trained and inadequately armed guerrillas.
Early this year, GRAE began receiving siz-
ahle quantities of modern arms
UNC
and started its
most substantial offensive in several years. Al-
though Portuguese forces soon put it on the de-
fensive again in the northwest, GRAE guerrilla
units in eastern Angola carried out a few rather
spectacular attacks. In fact, GRAE is at least
temporarily challenging the MPLA as the strong-
est insurgent force along the northern edge of the
guerrilla-affected area in the east.
The Portuguese, for their part, followed up
their success in the northwest with effective
search-and-destroy operations last August in heav-
ily infested MPLA areas of the east. More troops
and new helicopters enabled the Portuguese to
initiate airborne assaults against the MPLA camps.
Sizable quantities of supplies were destroyed and
guerrilla units in these areas were disorganized
and kept on the move.
Although the guerrilla groups can point to
some successes, they have serious obstacles to
overcome. GRAE guerrillas are still hamstrung by
shortages of modern small arms and by restric-
tions placed on their activities by the Congo (Kin-
shasa) Government, which fears Portuguese repris-
als for giving sanctuary to the guerrillas. The
MPLA has adequate arms supplies, but it still
faces immense logistics problems as eastern units
move westward and become increasingly isolated
from reinforcements and supplies in Zambia.
Moreover, recent Portuguese operations have
compounded these difficulties by disrupting sup-
ply lines near the border. Several years ago, a 25X1
strong MPLA force reached the northwest from
Congo (Brazzaville), but has withered because no
reinforcements can get through.
SECRET
Approximate limit of insurgent activity
Heavily Infested MPLA area
Recent Insurgent activity inside Angola (M-MPLA; G-GRAE)
Base area In neighboring country (M-MPLA; G-GRAE)
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
ORAE: Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: New Government Tests the Water
During its first full week in office, the Al-
lende government prepared cautiously to intro-
duce many of the promised new foreign and do-
mestic policies.
Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda toned
down his outspokenly extremist views in his first
officia press performances- Well known for his
sympa_hy toward Havana and Peking, Almeyda
said a-nong other things that although he and
Allende both still sympathize with revolution-
aries, their attitude as government officials would
necessarily be different from past statements.
Almeyda refused to express his characteristic dis-
like of the US. and the embassy in Santiago
believes that his performance is part of an ex-
tensive effort by the new administration to create
a "responsible" image on the international scene.
Almeyda told the US ambassador during a
courtesy call that the recognition of Cuba, an-
nounced on 12 November, would be implemented
as a result of his talks with Cuban cabinet minis-
ter Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, head of the most
numerous and impressive of the many unofficial
delegations to Allende's inauguration. The delega-
tion was part of a current show of closer ties with
Cuba, including the unveiling of a larger-than-life
statue of Che Guevara, the visit of a Cuban
freighter, and television and commercial displays.
The public reFort of Allende's first cabinet
meeting on 9 November leaned heavily on fulfill-
ment of such popular promises as emergency
housing measures, free milk for all children by 1
December, improving distribution of the social
security benefits that most Chileans receive, and a
crackdown on price increases. Although it was
announced that an extensive analysis of the econ-
omy was presented, no specific economic plans
emerged from the meeting. Allende complained
that the "harsh legacy of capitalism" that he had
inherited, including a 34.1-percent cost-of-living
increase in the first ten months of 1970, pre-
sented major problems. He promised that the
traditional year-end wage adjustments would
favor the lowest income groups.
Also present at the cabinet meeting was the
Popular Unity (UP) Political Committee, com-
posed of the leaders of the six parties in the
coalition. This was in line with Allende's promise
to maintain "political pluralism" in his govern-
ment but, in effect, was more attendance than
participation. With Communists and Socialists in-
stalled in positions of control throughout the
administration, some non-Marxist collaborators
are beginning to complain publicly about their
lack of influence.
The UP is finding other key Chileans to
speak in its favor. Cardinal Silva told Cuban inter-
viewers on 9 November that the Chilean Church
supported the fundamental reforms proposed by
the UP. On the same day the Chilean delegate to a
banking congress in Mexico City said that private
banking organizations were cooperating exten-
sively with the new government. This may indi-
cate that the government is trying to reassure
bankers that accommodation will pay. It may be
using the same line toward the mining industry,
its other immediate major nationalization target.
Other Allende opponents are finding it con-
venient to accommodate to his government. The
editorial line of the prestigious daily El Mercurio
is beginning to reflect the shift in control to a
pro-Allende member of the Edwards family from
its former owner, who has left Chile.
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Bolivia: Urban Terrorism May Increase
The National Liberation Army (ELN) may
give greater emphasis to urban warfare as a result
of its serious losses in rural guerrilla warfare since
July.
The training by the Tupamaros is another
indication of foreign participation in ELN activi-
ties. In July the ELN published a list of its foreign
members, including Chileans, Brazilians, Peru-
vians, and at least one Argentine. Several of those
named were later killed or captured in army
clashes with the guerrillas. Three Chileans were
among the six ELN members who surrendered to
a Bolivian peace commission and were granted
asylum in Chile. The ELN is known to have
solicited support from several revolutionary
groups in South America. A Chilean committee to
support the ELN has been in existence for nearly
a year.
A concentration on urban warfare probably
would be a temporary shift in tactics rather than
a rejection of rural activities. Within the past few
months, ELN propaganda has been giving more
notice to the urban struggle. Published statements
now warn that the ELN will "fight to final
victory in the mountains and the cities." Earlier
statements did not refer to urban activities.
To date, the ELN has demonstrated a lim-
ited capability in urban operations. It robbed a
payroll truck in La Paz in December 1969, but
lost several of its trained guerrilla personnel. The
group has carried out well-publicized murders of
several of its political opponents in the past 18
months. In one case the alleged murderers have
been apprehended. The ELN is probably respon-
sible also for some of the bombings that oc-
casionally occur in La Paz.
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ULV1'L 1
BOLIVIA: The government is under increasing
pressure to release imprisoned Marxist theoreti-
cian Jules Regis Debray.
Simultaneously, leftist groups in Bolivia are
continuing a campaign to include Debray in a
general political amnesty. The government may
decide to release Debray to placate the left, which
is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with
President Torres' policies. There is no con-
firmation of press speculation that the Tupamaros
in Uruguay would release Claude Fly and the
Brazilian diplomat kidnaped three months ago in
exchange for Debray.
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Secret
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Communal Politics In Malaysia:
The Search For A New Beginning
Secret
Na 44
13 November 1970
No. 0396/70A
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Communal Politics
In Malaysia:
The Search For A New Beginning
With the resignation last month of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and the installa-
tion of a new cabinet headed by the Tunku's long-time deputy and heir apparent, Tun Abdul
Razak, Malaysia is approaching the end of the emergency rule imposed after the racial
conflagration of May 1969. These political ceremonies predictably were accompanied by public
expressions of confidence and national reconciliation. Despite the brave words, however,
everyone in Kuala Lumpur is painfully aware of the bitter legacy of 1969, and no one is under
the illusion that the political life of the nation can simply be picked up where it left off some 18
months ago. On the contrary, the ruling Alliance Party, its previous policies discredited and its
new leadership a question mark, is venturing into political no-man's land without enthusiastic
support from any significant quarter.
The government's uncomfortable position is a direct result of the national elections of May
1969 and the days of anti-Chinese violence that followed. The basic contradiction between the
concept of Malay political supremacy and the government's liberal, democratic posture finally
surfaced; the Chinese and Malay communities backed away from each other and any meaningful
dialogue. Since then, the alienation of the two communities from each other and from their
government has grown. The ruling Alliance Party, with its communal policy of moderation,
compromise, and, at times, hesitation, has been left high and dry. Under these difficult
circumstances, it is somewhat surprising, but hopeful, that the government has opted for a
gradual return to the pitfalls and uncertainties of open political life. Malays backed the
imposition of emergency rule and would undoubtedly favor its continuation if they were
convinced that the government was ready to adopt strong pro-Malay policies. The moderate
Malay leadership, however, has chosen a different and far more hazardous road. The government
must recapture its disaffected Malay constituency and at the same time find a way to halt the
mounting alienation of the Chinese community. Given the political and social vise in which the
government finds itself, the rebuilding of some form of multiracial political system will be
difficult. Whether the new government can muster the wisdom, skill, and strength to keep its
balance remains very much an open question. The good intentions of Tun Razak and his
lieutenants will not by themselves be enough. There is a seeming willingness on the part of all
parties, however, to let the new Razak government have a fair chance to succeed.
Special Report
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The Underlying Reality of Malay Nationalism
Widespread Malay disenchantment with the
United Malay Nat!onal Organization (UMNO), the
principal component of the ruling Alliance Party,
is at present the single most important reality of
Malaysian political life. UMNO leadership, com-
plair, the Malay;, has not done enough to
strengthen their "special position" in their native
land They argue that the time has come to rec-
oncile the Chinese community to the fact that
ultimate political power in Malaysia is a Malay
prerogative and that this power will be used to
obtain for the Malay a proper share of the na-
tion's wealth. If this can be done at no significant
expense to Chinese interests, all the better. But if
not, they contend, the Chinese will simply have
to pay the price required to remain in a Malay
land. Any assessment of the political situation in
Malaysia must take into account this new Malay
assertiveness and its implications for the future
direction of events.
Since Malayan independence in 1957, politi-
cal power has been held by a handful of Malay
elite, molded by English education and tradition,
and dominated by Tunku Abdul Rahman. Al-
though the Tunku and his colleagues expected
non-Malays to accept voluntarily the dominant
polit cal position of the Malay, they preferred to
down-play this to ichy subject and to emphasize
the concept of a multiracial democracy in which
the political, economic, and cultural rights of all
citizens are protected. Under this style of leader-
ship Malaysia became known as a model of com-
munal and political stability; but, in retrospect,
one suspects that the unifying effect of two suc-
cessive security threats-the Communist
emergency of the 1950s, and the Indonesian con-
frontation of 1962-65-was in large part responsi-
ble for Malaysia's enviable record. At any rate,
Malay discontent with the government's even-
handed communal policy was always near the
surface. As they became more and more embit-
tered and frustrated over their inability to over-
come the legacy of centuries of feudalism, pov-
erty, and ignorance, growing numbers of Malays
Special Report -2-
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came to see the Tunku's highly publicized British
sense of fair play as evidence of treachery and
betrayal of their interests.
Obscured by the nation's over-all economic
growth and prosperity and the Tunku's tendency
to dismiss signs of unrest as the work of a few
"ultras" or extremists, the depth of Malay disaf-
fection went unnoticed until the parliamentary
elections of May 1969 and the ensuing anti-
Chinese violence. Although much has been made
of the unexpected success of Chinese opposition
parties in the 1969 election, gains by the Pan-
Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), a small right-wing
party harshly critical of the government's "soft"
approach toward the Chinese, were actually more
significant. The PMIP captured three UMNO
seats, but far more importantly, it captured over
40 percent of the total Malay vote. The UMNO
managed to retain a comfortable majority of
Malay seats, but it had come close to electoral
disaster. In the past eighteen months the UMNO's
foundations within the Malay community have
continued to erode, and today few observers
would care to place much money on the party in
a head-on test of strength with the PMIP. Pres-
ently, the government is refusing to schedule two
overdue parliamentary by-elections in Selangor
and Malacca because its own private survey in-
dicates that both seats, now held by UMNO,
would fall to the PMIP.
What all of this means is that the top eche-
lon of UMNO is no longer in a position to dismiss
Malay criticism of its communal policies as the
reaction of a few "ultras." Indeed the term
"ultra" has probably lost much of what meaning
it ever enjoyed in the Malaysian political lexicon.
Although nationalist Malay opinion may be
judged "ultra" or extremist by an absolute stand-
ard, it is by no means limited to the PMIP. It
presently runs the breadth and depth of the
Malay community, including UMNO itself.
In the past UMNO has been run in an ex-
tremely authoritarian manner; the views of the
top echelon were simply imposed on the rank and
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file. Many senior officials of UMNO, although
perhaps not sharing the PMIP's desire for a rigid
Islamic state, have sympathized with the PMIP's
blunt pro-Malay posture. At the Kampong level it
would probably be quite difficult to distinguish
the politics of the local UMNO organizer from
those of his PMIP counterpart. In the future there
is likely to be much more give-and-take between
Razak and these secondary echelons of UMNO,
long ignored by the Tunku. The top leadership is
bound under the existing political circumstances,
to become more receptive and vulnerable to pres-
sure from below.
Identifying the specific sources of such pres-
sure is not easy, because Malay nationalists within
and outside UMNO have always been short of
forceful and articulate spokesmen. Perhaps the
single most important figure to watch in the
coming days is Data Harun bin Idris, a senior
UMNO official and chief minister of Selangor.
Although apparently loyal to Razak, Harun has
been an outspoken critic of UMNO's communal
policies and has lines out to Young Turks in
UMNO and the military. In May 1969, Harun
delivered a fire-eating speech to a large assembly
of young Malays in Kuala Lumpur-one of the
developments that led directly to the anti-Chinese
rioting.
Another Malay nationalist who may assume
a position of influence is Musa bin Hitam, a
former assistant minister to Razak. Following the
May 1969 riots, Musa openly advocated the re
tirement or dismissal of the Tunku and was as a
result relieved of his assistant ministership. Sub-
sequently, Musa went to London to study, but
when the Tunku announced in August that he
intended to retire, Musa quickly reappeared in
Kuala Lumpur. There is an air of vindication in
Musa's sudden return
Another Malay
requently identified as an "ultra" leader is Dr.
Mahathir bin Mohamed, a 45-year-old physician
from Kedah. Mahathir was known in mid-1969
for his opposition to the Tunku, and for this was
Special Report
dismissed from the central executive committee
of UMNO and later from UMNO itself. In addi-
tion to practicing medicine, Dr. Mahathir is a
journalist and has frequently contributed articles
on Malays and politics to various Malaysian publi-
cations under the pseudonym of C. H. E. Det.
Mahathir is also the author of "The Malay
Dilemma" published in Singapore in 1970 and
banned in Malaysia. In this book Mahathir points
out the essential differences in background, cul-
ture, political systems, and acquisitiveness be-
tween the Chinese and Malays. Because of these
factors, he questions whether the Malays could
ever compete with the Chinese on an equal basis
and suggests that the only way to close the eco-
nomic gap is for the government to weigh the
scales heavily in favor of the Malays. Mahathir has
been generally politically inactive since his expul-
sion from UMNO, but he remains a potential
leader of those favoring Malay supremacy.
Another influential channel of Malay na-
tionalism is "Utusan Melayu," the UMNO's unof-
ficial press organ. The Jawi script edition of
"Utusan Melayu" enjoys by far the largest circula-
tion of any newspaper in Malaysia and is widely
read at the Kampong level. For years, "Utusan
Melayu" has been notorious for its chauvinistic
Malay tone-a fact that kept its UMNO editors
perpetually in the Tunku's doghouse. Last spring,
for instance, "Utusan Melayu" raised the Tunku's
ire by implying that the Malay military establish-
ment might take over the government and do a
better job of protecting Malay interests than the
previous administration. In the months ahead the
restraint or excess of "Utusan Melayu" polemics
may shed some light on the degree of nationalist
sentiment and influence within UMNO and the
new government.
Another barometer of nationalist pressure is
the Malay university student. One of the most
dramatic indicators of the change in political
climate in Malaysia has been the radicalization of
the Malay student movement and its turn toward
political activism. In the past, student politics
were dominated by the University of Malaya
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movement will retain. The vision of some of the
movement's more ambitious leaders that Malay
students will assume the same influential role
played by Indonesian youth during and following
the overthrow of Sukarno seems highly unreal-
istic. Malay students do offer an enticing vehicle
for opportunistic Malay oliticians
Student Union, a left-of-center, multiracial organ-
ization with little real strength or appeal. Follow-
ing the events of May 1969 it was quickly pushed
into the background by the Malay Language
Society, which soon gained a degree of national
polit cal importance as the spearhead of the effort
to force the Tunku's resignation. Student agita-
tion against the prime minister, ignored by the
Tunku himself, was a source of serious embarrass-
ment for the government, even though demon-
strations were usially confined to the campus
premises.
Now that the students' prime objectives have
been achieved, it is uncertain what impetus their
Special Report
Perhaps the most significant Malay interest
group is the military. The Malaysian military es-
tablishment, through its participation in the emer-
gency government, has for the past year and a
half been involved in political affairs to an un-
precedented degree. How and to what degree the
military has sought to influence political decisions
up to now is unclear. There is little question,
however, that the military establishment reflects
parochial Malay interests. Regardless of the politi-
cal role the military chooses or is forced by cir-
cumstances to assume, it is likely to remain an
instrument of Malay nationalism.
The top command structure of the armed
forces is dominated by Malays as are the 12 royal
Malay regiments, the backbone of the Malaysian
Army. Aware of the Maoist adage that political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun, the
government has carefully preserved the exclusive
Malay make-up of the regiments as a symbol of
Malay political supremacy.
~ The rank
and file of the regiments are recruited from Malay
peasant stock and are narrowly racist in outlook.
Depending on which accounts are believed, the
regiments at best did little to curtail the anti-
Chinese violence of May 1969 and, at worst,
actively participated in it.
Presently the top command structure of the
military is dominated by the "Johore clique," a
close-knit and influential association of senior and
junior officers connected by marriage and place
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of birth. The Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Gen-
eral Ibrahim, is the number-one member of the
group. For the past year and a half Ibrahim has
also been an influential member of the National
Operations Council (NOC), the executive organ of
the emergency government. Although he is not
politically ambitious, he possibly could be per-
suaded at some crisis point that military interven-
tion might be needed to "save the nation." Of the
63 top positions in the armed forces-from gen-
eral down through colonel, including navy and air
force equivalent ranks-the "Johore clique"
holds approximately 20 percent. The individual
and collective influence of this group of like-
minded, closely associated officers even though it
has no formal organization is unrivaled within the
military. Another key figure associated with the
"Johore clique" is the army commander, General
Nazaruddin, who comes from Pohang. Naza-
ruddin is known to hold and to have openly
expressed strong Malay nationalist views. None of
this means that the military establishment is dis-
loyal to Razak. On the contrary, the new prime
minister is generally regarded as the civilian poli-
tician most favorable to the military's desires and
aspirations.
There is a deadly symmetry at work today in
Malaysian politics. If the government faces a hard-
ening of Malay communal feeling and diminished
support within the Malay community, its prob-
lems and prospects on the Chinese front are at
least as grim. Essentially the government is con-
fronted with Chinese rejection of the time-
honored Malaysian recipe for political and social
stability. This traditional formula tacitly provided
for Malay political domination and special priv-
ileges in such areas as government jobs, education,
and land ownership in return for which the Chi-
nese would be awarded citizenship. The political
vehicle for this arrangement between the Malay
and Chinese establishments was an "Alliance" in
which UMNO shared political power on a token
basis with its client party, the Malaysian Chinese
Association (MCA). Chinese voting strength was
Special Report
restricted by the assignment of disproportionally
heavy representation to rural Malay districts and
by the MCA's willingness to contest only a
mutually agreed-upon number of "Chinese" par-
liamentary seats.
The Alliance arrangement, in other words,
was based on a racial myth-that Chinese don't
mind who owns the cow as long as they can milk
it. This myth has achieved considerable currency
in Southeast Asia because of the remarkable
ability of the outnumbered Chinese to make
necessity a virtue. In Malaysia, however, where
Chinese are roughly equal to Malays in number, it
has been wearing thin for a long time. No longer
willing to limit voluntarily their political leverage
for the sake of communal harmony, the younger
generations of Chinese have become increasingly
dissatisfied with the leadership of the MCA. More-
over, the Chinese, seemingly more aware of grow-
ing Malay nationalist sentiment than the govern-
ment itself, have come to view the full exercise of
their political rights as the best means to protect
themselves and. their hard-earned economic posi-
tion from eventual Malay encroachment and sup-
pression. The expulsion of Singapore from
Malaysia in 1965-the result of Lee Kuan Yew's
attempt to extend his political organization to
Malaysia and offer an alternative to MCA repre-
sentation-served as a catalyst for this growing
Chinese political restiveness. The full force of
Chinese discontent was dramatically reflected in
the strong showing of two relatively new and
underorganized Chinese opposition parties in the
elections of May 1969. The Democratic Action
Party (DAP) and Gerakan captured between them
nearly a fifth of parliament's seats, winning in the
process 14 of the 27 seats formerly held by the
MCA.
At present, the DAP and Gerakan are taking
a cautious approach to the resumption of political
activity, concentrating on repairing the damage
done to their organizations by the last year and a
half of inactivity. Eventually, however, both par-
ties intend to get on with the job of building a
base of support throughout West Malaysia. In this
13 November 1970
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Special Report
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effort, the DAP, which ran ahead of Gerakan in
the elections, will probably make the greatest
gains.
The DAP, spiritual descendent of the Peo-
ple's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore, was
formed after Singapore's expulsion from the
Federation. Although the DAP ostensibly opposes
racial politics, a very definite tone of Chinese
chauvinism creeps into its noncommunalism. The
party calls for democracy "with no precondi-
tions" and multilingualism in education and gov-
ernment. It views Malay royalty as a feudal drag
on the nation and condemns the system of special
Malay privileges incorporated into the constitu-
tion as an example of the paternalism that has
kept the Malay in a backward economic condi-
tion. The DAP does not participate in the Na-
tional Consultative Council (NCC), an appendage
of the emergency government set up to consider
the problem of national reconciliation, because
the government refused to accredit the DAP
candidate, who was then in jail. The party's press
releases during emergency rule, the only form of
political activity allowed, remained strident, how-
ever, and there is no indication that the DAP is
now prepared to back away significantly from its
strong opposition to the government.
The DAP's platform is without doubt an
accurate reflection of popular Chinese opinion.
Yet it could be a tragedy of the first order if the
party continues to grow in appeal and becomes
the clear-cut choice of the Chinese electorate. To
the government, the DAP is anathema. It strongly
suspects that the party's strings are pulled from
Singapore, although there is no foundation to this
as far as is known. Further, the government con-
siders, with a certain degree of justification, that
the DAP is. an unreconcilable agent of communal
divisiveness. At the moment it is impossible to
imagine any cooperation between the DAP and
the Razak government or any other future Malay
government.
The Gerakan Party shares the democratic
socialist precepts of the DAP and many of its
Special Report
communal views, but it has adopted a far dif-
ferent tactical approach to political survival in a
Malay-dominated state. Although it remains es-
sentially a Chinese party, it has made a genuine
effort to assume a multiracial character and has
been moderately successful in attracting non-
Chinese recruits. Unlike the DAP, Gerakan has
adopted a cooperative posture and has gone out
of its way to avoid antagonizing the government.
The party participated in the proceedings of the
NCC and last summer was seriously considering a
government invitation to move into the Alliance
and take part in the new cabinet.
Gerakan discovered, however, that its policy
of cooperation was weakening its support within
the Chinese community, one more indication of
the polarization of communal feeling in Malaysia.
This, plus the realization that the new Razak
government will be emphasizing Malay benefits
rather than concessions to the Chinese com-
munity, forced Gerakan to the conclusion that
collaboration with the government would amount
to political suicide. In late August the party with-
drew from its discussion with the government;
Gerakan participation in the Alliance now seems a
dead letter. As political activity gets under way
again, Gerakan is likely to move a little closer to
the DAP position and to the center of Chinese
opinion.
This leaves the government holding an
empty bag. Although the MCA still functions as
the Chinese component of the Alliance, it is po-
litically bankru
The MCA's leader,
Finance Minister Tan Siew-Sin, has publicly ad-
mitted that he can no longer speak for the Chi-
nese masses, a candid statement that has caused
the government considerable embarrassment. Al-
though talk is still heard of pumping new blood
into the MCA, there seems small chance that it
will be resuscitated to any significant degree.
The government's abortive attempt to bring
Gerakan into the Alliance clearly indicates the
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moc'erate Malay leadership's awareness of the
need to provide for more meaningful Chinese
participation and representation in the govern-
ment. Given the present degree of communal
polarization, however, there is no readily appar-
ent solution to this problem. As a result, Razak
repcrtedly is said to be considering scrapping the
Alliance in favor of a single integrated party open
to all races. Although such a move could be a first
step toward repudiation of communal politics in
Malaysia, it is not likely to solve the government's
immediate racial problems. The evolution of a
truly multiracial and democratic party will be a
slow process at best. For the time being any new
government party would be dominated by the
former UMNO leadership; the problem of attract-
ing meaningful Chinese participation would not
be significantly lessened.
Perhaps one limited move in the right direc-
tion would be to seek an improvement in rela-
tions with the Singapore government of Lee Kuan
Yew. Lee remE ins a popular figure among
Malzysian Chinese, and even his indirect endorse-
ment of the new Razak government might help
reduce Chinese alienation and apprehension. It
will be difficult for the government to move in
this direction, however. Last August, Lee can-
celed his first trip to Malaysia since Singapore left
the Federation after Kuala Lumpur had reacted
bitterly to a trivial incident between Singapore
police and a group of visiting Malaysian hippies-a
good example of the role paranoia and suspicion
still play in Malaysian-Singapore relations.
Cosying up to Lee would also be likely to
exacerbate tensions between moderate and radical
Malay elements, and, in fact, there has been no
visible extension of an olive branch in Lee's di-
rection.
The caliber and stability of the government
caught within this communal vise is difficult to
judge. The greatest unknown is Tun Razak him-
self. Although groomed for years as the heir ap-
parent, Razak never developed any of the
Special Report
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Tunku's charisma or shared any of the respect
enjoyed by the Tunku within the non-Malay
population. Following the May 1969 .riots, when
the Tunku went into a period of semi-retirement,
Razak disappointed nearly everyone with his in-
decisive leadership. Now, out from under both
the inhibiting influence and the protection of the
former prime minister, Razak will have to prove
himself equal to the difficult tasks ahead. Fortu-
nately he will have the able assistance of the
Deputy Premier and Home Affairs Minister Tun
Dr. Ismail. Ismail is without question the most
effective and widely respected politician in the
government.
The most interesting aspect of the new
cabinet is the central role to be played by Ghazali
bin Shafie, formerly the permanent secretary of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ghazali was ap-
pointed to the senate last month in order to make
him eligible for a cabinet position. As minister
"with special functions" he has been given the
crucial task of coordinating and implementing the
government's efforts to restore national unity and
to expand Malay participation in the nation's
economic life. Ghazali's performance in this
crucially delicate role is presently a matter of
great conjecture in Kuala Lumpur. An oppor-
tunist with long-standing political ambitions,
Ghazali in the past has oscillated between the
camps of Malay moderates and chauvinists.
Although a long-standing member of UMNO, his
entry into the cabinet via the back door has
already raised the hackles of a number of UMNO
politicians.
After Razak, Ismail, and Ghazali, there is
little to be said about the new cabinet members.
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Tan Sri Ghazali
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A lack of leadersh p depth is a real problem for
the Razak government just as it was for its prede-
cessor. Largely because of the authoritarian man-
ner in which UMNO has been run in the past,
adequate second-level leadership simply has not
developed. Ghazali bin Shafie, for example, has
for years been cons:dered the only young "up and
comer" in UMNO worth mentioning.
Razak has brought two other Malays into his
cabinet. Education Minister Hussein bin Onn is
distinguished mainly by his loyalty to Razak, but
he is regarded as a racial moderate and brings into
the cabinet the magic of the Onn name-his father
was the founder of UMNO. The other Malay is
Mohamed Khir bin Johari, the minister of com-
merce and industry. Although Khir has somewhat
blotted his copybook as former minister of educa-
tion and as UMNO nanager of the 1969 elections,
he nonetheless has the ear of the UMNO Execu-
tive Committee. If Tun Dr. Ismail
hor,id become unable to continue
to serve as deputy prime minister, Khir could lay
stronc claim to that position, probably with the
support of the party hierarchy. Razak and Khir
25X1 are nct particularly close, however
Only one member of the previous cabinet
was dropped from the new one, an MCA minister
whose notorious corruption had become an in-
tolerable burden fcr the government. The cabinet
thus remains loaded with ministers closely as-
sociated with the Tunku. Most of them will even-
tually go as Razak seeks to give his new govern-
ment a more dynamic character. The timing of
their departure, however, may depend at least in
part on how much influence the Tunku can still
exert or intends .o exert from his retirement
residence in Kuala Lumpur. Most observers be-
lieve that there will be no further cabinet changes
until after parliament convenes in February..
Future Policy Directions:
Political Restrictions and Malay Benefits
Although the caliber of the new leadership
remai-is a questior mark, its modus operandi is
Special Report
slowly emerging. First of all, the government is
intent on preventing another round of racial vio-
lence. There are still clear signs of underlying
communal tension in Kuala Lumpur and large
numbers of police still patrol the streets, but in
most aspects life has long since returned to
normal, and the government has been remarkably
successful in preventing inevitable minor racial
incidents from turning into serious trouble.
Aside from effective police work, the gov-
ernment has attributed its success in maintaining
order to the absence of communal polemics
during the past year and a half of emergency rule.
Accordingly, it is in no hurry to give up all of its
emergency powers. Razak has pledged that parlia-
ment will once more be the supreme political
authority when it reconvenes next February. The
National Operations Council will be abolished and
a new "National Security Council" established.
This group will be concerned with both internal
and external security matters, and, as planned,
would be an advisory group only, with neither
executive nor legislative authority. The govern-
ment, in conjunction with the return to open
political life, has, however, placed extensive re-
strictions on future political debate. In essence
the restrictions forbid public discussion of the
provisions of the constitution relating to citizen-
ship, national language, Malay rights and benefits,
and the sovereignty of Malay rulers. The govern-
ment is empowered to proscribe entire political
organizations that habitually violate these restric-
tions. Going one step further, when parliament
reconvenes in February, it will be greeted by a
government-sponsored constitutional amendment
removing the members' parliamentary immunity
from punishment for infractions of the new re-
strictions on political debate.
The essence of the government's position
seems to be that Malays cannot be pacified if
non-Malays are allowed to question the political
status quo; the curbing of political debate is
necessary to prevent a recurrence of the May
1969 disturbances. Nevertheless, it is hard to
escape the conclusion that the restrictions are also
designed to handcuff or possibly destroy the gov-
ernment's Chinese opposition. If the new
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restrictions are given a broad interpretation, the
public platform of the DAP will for all practical
purposes be swept away. Needless to say, this has
given a somewhat hollow ring to the resumption
of open political activity and the convening of
parliament. Public reaction thus far has been re-
strained, but resentment is bound to grow and
could reach a dangerous level if the government is
tempted to use the restrictions as an outright
weapon of political suppression. Whether in the
long run the restrictions will help achieve their
stated objective of racial peace remains very much
an open question.
As the curbs on political debate suggest,
future domestic policy will have a pro-Malay cast.
This, of course, has been a foregone conclusion.
Razak and his colleagues are, after all, Malay
politicians, and their Malay constituency must be
recaptured, soothed, and reassured if the present
government is to survive. Unanswered are the
questions, can the government achieve this end
and maintain its balance in the process, and how
far will it be willing to go in satisfying Malay
aspirations at the expense of Chinese interests?
In the sensitive area of language policy the
government has already made its move. Beginning
this year English-track schools in the Malaysian
educational system will start to convert to Malay,
on a stair-step basis. In 1986, English instruction
at the fourth-year university level will end, thus
completing the process. This action has not fully
satisfied Malay opinion but hopefully will be ac-
cepted as a step in the right direction. Many
Malays are unhappy that similar action was not
taken in regard to Chinese-track schools. The
Chinese are more unhappy. They have been the
primary user of the English-track system, but,
more important, they view the government's ac-
tions as being the prelude to Malayanization of
the Chinese school system. The government's ac-
tion has been tempered, however, by a recent
official statement that implied that scientific and
technical subjects will still be taught in the ap-
propriate language--generally interpreted as
English.
Special Report
The compromise decision to scale down in-
struction in English has allowed the government
to maintain a degree of communal balance in its
educational policy and still satisfy nationalistic
Malay interests. In doing so, however, the govern-
ment ironically has undermined more important
long-term Malay interests. An obvious way to
remedy the existing economic imbalance between
Chinese and Malay is to produce more Malay
graduates who can compete with the Chinese in
the English language - oriented world of business.
The fact that the nation's language policy is now
headed in the opposite direction is a perfect
example of the problem the Razak government
faces in reconciling emotional Malay nationalism
and Malaysian national interests.
The same phenomenon also can be seen at
work in the current effort to Malayanize the
government bureaucracy. Although most senior
positions in the civil service are staffed by Malays,
the rest have been filled primarily by non-Malays
who think out and implement government policy.
This has long been a sore point for Malays, and
the government is now attempting to correct the
situation by accelerated promotion and hiring of
Malays. What this can do to the morale of better
qualified non-Malay civil servants who remain es-
sential for the effective functioning of the bu-
reaucracy goes without saying.
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3
LAYS IA
Kuala Lumpu,*
West
Malaysia
Kota
Kinabalu,
Bandar Sort Sego..
.RUMEE
all,
\
1
SELECTED ETHNIC GROUPS
Malay
Chinese
Indian (predominantly Temit)
Other
I#w lowalq"
Special Report
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Another area in which the government could
easily lose its balance is that of economic policy.
Chronic Malay resentment and dissatisfaction is
based in large part on the economic disparity
between the Malay and Chinese communities.
Malays, for example, account for only 9.1 percent
of managerial and professional personnel and only
13.8 percent of the technical and supervisory
workers in the labor force, and Chinese income
per capita exceeds Malay income by 75 percent.
The Razak government has publicly committed
itself to reducing this imbalance, and its survival
could depend on the results it obtains.
Last March the National Operations Council
announced general guidelines for a "new eco-
nomic policy"-the first major step in the govern-
ment's attempt to convince Malays that it is ready
to embark on a vigorous program to better their
economic lot. In August, the economic com-
mittee of the National Consultative Council in-
corporated these guidelines in its recommenda-
tions to the government. The proposals chart out
a number of general areas of effort. First, govern-
ment reform and participation in the rural
marketing and credit facilities are called for. The
flow of rural Malays into the urban sector is to be
encouraged and facilitated by government infor-
mation, welfare assistance, and massive "job
corps" programs. Industrial firms are required to
hire a certain percentage of Malay staff at all
personnel levels under mandatory employment
quotas. And direct government participation in
the private sector-through joint government-
Malay ventures, the blanket reservation of certain
pioneer industries for Malay capital, and govern-
ment loans or capital-holding for Malay ven-
tures-is suggested as a possible way to guarantee
Malay opportunity.
Special Report
Everyone on the Malaysian political scene, 25X1
including the Chinese opposition, agrees that high
priority should be attached to attacking economic
imbalance. There is little agreement, however, on
exactly how this should be done; and, not sur-
prisingly, the government's future economic
policy has become a matter of considerable con-
troversy. Critics of the government guidelines,
including most of the non-Malay economists and
planners within the bureaucracy, complain that
such blatantly preferential treatment will be
deeply resented by the Chinese and only worsen
the nation's racial problem. More specifically,
they fear that rigid employment quotas and gov-
ernment intrusion into the private sector will slow
down the rate of economic growth and inevitably
lead to a sharp hike in urban Chinese unemploy-
ment-something that could result in a dangerous
rise in communal tension.
Recently various government spokesmen, in-
cluding the man on the spot, Ghazali bin Shafie,
have attempted to defuse such criticism by
pledging the government's determination to work
on the behalf of all economically deprived citi-
zens regardless of race, a program that would on
the face of it affect poor Chinese also. Exactly
what Ghazalis rhetoric means, however, is un-
clear. Most economically deprived citizens are
Malay. As a matter of political expediency, if
nothing else, the government must come up with
a program that primarily benefits the Malay. The
damage done to Chinese interests will depend on
the specific legislation introduced in parliament
next February and the manner in which the legis-
lation is implemented. In the meantime, govern-
ment economic planning will remain the source of
considerable Chinese apprehension.
I n the months ahead, the effort to restore
Malaysian political and social stability will right-
fully absorb most of the government's attention
and energy. But there are other problem areas.
Kuala Lumpur faces a potentially explosive situa-
tion in the East Malaysian State of Sarawak,
where local political forces are continuing to
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resist strong federal control. On the international
front, the reduction of British military presence is
forcirg the government to reassess its position in
world and regional affairs. There are already clear
signs that the Razak government intends to fol-
low a more obviously nonaligned policy, although
it wil probably remain in most respects oriented
toward the West. n addition, the government is
still confronted with a persistent and growing
Comriunist insurgency, not only along the fron-
tier with Thailand but in the jungles of East
Malaysia as well. It is difficult to exaggerate the
potertial Communist threat to Malaysia. Present
Communist capabi`ities and resources are limited,
however, and, barring a breakdown of Malaysian
political and social order, the insurgent threat can
probz bly continue to be contained as it has been
for years. But the government is far more con-
cerned with the political communal tasks that lie
aheac than with Communist activity or other
peripieral problems, and it has got its priorities
straight.
.given the many political unknowns and
variables within the present situation, an assess-
ment of the government's ability to hold a mod-
erate and rational course is difficult. Under the
best of circumstances, the Chinese community
will probably have little to smile about in the
coming months, and Chinese disaffection is
bound to remain a leading feature of the political
landscape. The Chinese are not likely, however, to
take the lead in a renewal of communal violence
in which they would be the inevitable losers.
Similarly, the specter of a mass Chinese turn to
Communist struggle remains only that-a specter.
The Malayan Communist Party did not pick up
much Chinese support as a result of the riots of
May 1969, and at present there appears to be
little sentiment within the Chinese community
for such a desperate alternative. Furthermore, the
Communists believe that their strong Chinese
image is both an ideological and practical draw-
back. and they have been attempting to put their
movement on a class rather than racial basis.
Consequently-at least so far-they have avoided
the temptation of using Chinese chauvinist appeal
in their recruiting efforts.
Special Report
The greatest danger to stability will come
from within the Malay community. If the govern-
ment proves unwilling or unable to satisfy Malay
demands and rebuild Malay confidence in UMNO
leadership, communal tension will rise while gov-
ernmental authority declines. In such unstable
circumstances the military might well move in to
control the situation. But an army coup d'etat
against the moderate Malay leadership seems most
unlikely. Any military intervention would be
without the backing of the air, naval, and support
services of the armed forces, all heavily staffed by
non-Malays, and would almost certainly cause in-
stant chaos. A distinct possibility, however, is the
forceful assertion of Malay military influence be-
hind the facade of civilian government. Shortly
after the May 1969 riots, Razak, in his capacity as
chief of the NOC, offered to turn the government
over to the military. In similar circumstances he
could flinch again. With either a military-
dominated government or the emergence of a
more openly nationalistic civilian regime, the pos-
sibility of an extreme Chinese reaction would
escalate. The outcome could range from a sharp
deterioration in the functioning of the govern-
ment and economy, both heavily dependent on
Chinese participation, to destructive racial civil
war open to Communist exploitation.
Fortunately, such pessimistic speculation is
still premature. Despite the multitude of pitfalls
ahead, there are a few bright spots. The absence
of serious racial incidents during the past year and
a half is a hopeful sign. Another plus is Malaysia's
continuing economic boom. The government has
an economic development cushion that should
allow it, with a little balance and finesse, to
improve the Malay economic position at
minimum expense to the Chinese. The greatest
favorable factor, however, is simply the lack of
appealing alternatives to the present leadership.
The Razak government may now be the only
thing standing between the present uneasy situa-
tion and national breakdown-a situation that all
parties on the political spectrum probably realize,
at least in their more candid moments. At any
rate, the real testing period for the new govern-
ment lies ahead. Its right to survive will be judged
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on the basis of how it handles its parliamentary
opposition next February, the specific legislative
programs it comes up with, and the manner in
which it implements its new policies, especially in
the economic area. Although the general outlines
of government policy have emerged, it is still far
too early for anyone to pronounce judgment. The
question of whether a moderate Malay govern-
ment can survive in Malaysia is not likely to be
answered within the next six months.
Regardless of the eventual answer to this
central question, there seems little chance that
Malaysia can return to democracy along pre-1969
lines. The political tight-rope Razak is walking
leads directly to the parliamentary elections due
three and a half years hence-a date far in the
future but nevertheless in the back of everyone's
Special Report
mind. During this period communalism is almost
certain to remain the driving force of Malaysian
politics. It is difficult to imagine a reversal of the
trend toward greater Chinese political assertive-
ness; the Chinese opposition parties are likely to
compound their 1969 electoral gains in future
elections. A glance at the population chart shows
that the non-Malays will hold the political balance
of power in a truly democratic system. No Malay
government, including the present one, is likely to
consider letting this happen. There is, of course,
plenty of ground between outright Malay political
suppression and total democracy. Hopefully,
what can be obtained is a gradual transition from
executive control to some form of limited
representative government-a process that will al-
low a new beginning for long-term development
of racial reconciliation and a noncommunal politi-
cal system.
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