WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008300040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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`" Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
6 November 1970
No. 0395/70
State Dept. review completed
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 5 November 1970)
Page
Vietnam: Straws in the Wind? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Laos: Half a Loaf from Vientiane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
North Korea: Finally, a Fifth Party Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Philippines: An Exercise in Constitutional Reform . . . . . . . . . 5
Communist China: Codifying the Cultural Revolution . . . . . . . . 6
USSR: "Containing" China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? 7
Ostpolitik: Much Movement, Less Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Yugoslavia Tackles Economic Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
HUNGARY'S TENTH PARTY CONGRESS WILL EXPAND REFORMS
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
UN: A Controversial Extension of the Cease-fire . . . . . . . . . 12
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- VL tld6L 1
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA (CONTINUED)
Egypt: Sadat Seeks Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Jordan: The New Cabinet of Wasfi Tal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Indian Prime Minister to Face Hostile Parliament . . . . . . . . . 15
Ethiopia: Eritrean Insurgency Continues Unabated . . . . . . . . 16
Iran: Negotiations With Consortium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Brazil Prepares for Congressional Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Guatemala: Arana Government Under Attack . . . . . . . . . . 19
New Government Takes Over in Chile
NOTES:
Africa; Venezue a
UN-China; Romania; India-Nepal; South
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FAR EAST
Vietnam: Straws in the Wind?
A country-wide drive to bring more men
into the armed forces is in full swing in North
Vietnam, but it may not be going smoothly. Since
the regime's call this summer for a buildup of the
home guard and regular army, regional authorities
have met throughout the country to implement
accelerated recruitment and conscription in their
localities. Official statements in the press convey
a sense of urgency about the undertaking and
indicate that it is aimed at meeting both immedi-
ate and long-range requirements for the war. One
article urged, for instance, that mobilization
"must be stepped up in every respect in each
locality...to constantly assist the front line in
human resources."
There are signs in the press that Hanoi antici-
pated difficulties in getting local officials and
organizations to respond to its manpower levies
and took steps early to secure the fast results the
regime clearly wants. It has stressed the need for
tight party control and supervision all down the
line, urged improved coordination among various
echelons, and exhorted party leaders to do a
better job so that fresh troops are available "for
every needy army unit on the battlefield." Two
ranking party leaders, Defense Minister Giap and
fellow politburo member Le Thanh Nghi, have
journeyed to the provinces to underscore the high
priority Hanoi is giving to mobilization.
recently defected in Laos has suggested some o
the kinds of problems that might be affecting the
regime's campaign. He said that civilian morale
has been dipping for about two years, mainly
because the long war has steadily worsened the
lot of the average North Vietnamese. The prob-
lem has permeated the military as well,
quite high and was lowered only after the regime
had cracked down hard.
Despite such problems, the recent press
items and the Communist need for more man-
power to fight this year's wider war suggest that
current draft calls are extensive and will be re-
flected in a high rate of infiltration in the coming
months.
Military Outlook Down South
The Communists' winter campaign in South
Vietnam apparently started last weekend with a
slight step-up in activity and the first rocket at-
tack against Saigon since last summer. The Com-
munists are planning increased military activity in
the coming weeks, but a full-scale offensive is
unlikely. Preparations have been slowed by un-
usually heavy rains in the northern provinces and
by supply and personnel problems in the southern
half of the country.
The main enemy effort this dry season prob-
ably will be aimed at protecting and rebuilding
grass-roots assets. Offensive operations are likely
to concentrate on continued low-key action
against the allied pacification program, which the
Communists acknowledge is impeding their ef-
forts to maintain a firm hold on the population in
many areas. The pattern of harassments, terror-
ism, and light shellings, with occasional forays
against special targets, is likely to persist.
Allied military operations in the northern
provinces are returning to normal following un-
commonly heavy seasonal rains that brought the
war to a virtual standstill. Many of the low-lying,
populated areas in the northern provinces were
inundated last weekend-Quang Nam and Quang
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Ngai provinces were particularly hard hit-and
allied military units concentrated on civilian relief
efforts. More thar 200 Vietnamese civilians were
killed, over 245,000 driven from their homes, and
a large part of the rice crop destroyed-the most
serious losses since the floods of 1964.
The northern coastal region normally re-
ceives heavy rains about this time of year as the
northeast monsoon moves in from the Gulf of
Tonkin. This year's bad weather has been com-
pounded by several typhoons and tropical storms.
The rains now are easing and flood waters re-
cedirg; better weather is improving conditions for
both allied and Ccmmunist military operations in
Laos and Camboda, in addition to most of South
Vietnam.
On the political front in Saigon, the Su-
prem,a Court's action in voiding the conviction of
imprisoned Lower House Deputy Tran Ngoc Chau
may cause political difficulties for the govern-
ment. Chau's arrest and trial before a military
field court last March for consorting with the
Communists raised a storm of criticism both in
Soutr~ Vietnam and overseas. Because Thieu
deeply involved his personal prestige in getting
Chau put behind bars, the judiciary's decision is a
clear assertion of its independence from the exec-
utive. The court has ruled that Chau cannot be
retried unless his immunity is lifted by a two-
thirds vote in the Lower House, but there are
indications that the government will attempt to
use some pretext to justify keeping him in jail in
the meantime.
Page 2
Politicians on the Stump
President Thieu and two leading opposition
figures-"Big" Minh and former Senator Don-
addressed the peace issue in National Day state-
ments last weekend. Speaking at a joint session of
the National Assembly, Thieu reiterated his long-
standing opposition to any coalition government
with the Communists and attacked "cowardly
and defeatist persons" who advocate such a
course. His strong language seemed intended
partly to discourage the peace speculation that
developed in some quarters in South Vietnam
following President Nixon's proposals of 7 Octo-
ber. It may also be meant as a warning to any
political leaders who might be tempted to appeal
to South Vietnamese peace sentiment as a politi-
cal issue in the coming months.
"Big" Minh, however, issued a statement
calling peace the "priority objective" and indi-
rectly criticizing the Thieu government for alleged
deteriorating domestic conditions in South Viet-
nam. Minh long has been potentially considered
Thieu's most effective rival for the presidency,
and his statement may encourage opposition
groups who favor his candidacy. Since his return
from exile in 1968, however, Minh has been ex-
tremely cautious, and his statement contains no
hard indications of his plans. Don, meanwhile, has
publicly revived his "third-force" solution to the
war by asserting that the great majority of the
South Vietnamese people support neither the gov-
ernment side nor the enemy and that in such a
deadlock the war could end only through some
form of reconciliation.
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Laos: Half a Loaf from Vientiane
Vientiane has responded to the Communists'
23 October bid for an early start to peace talks in
what may be a purposely ambiguous manner. The
head of the government negotiating team sent a
telegram to his Pathet Lao counterpart on 27
October welcoming the return to Vientiane by
Communist special envoy Souk Vongsak to pre-
pare for a meeting between the representatives of
the "two princes." Thus the government appeared
to be accepting the "two princes" formula on
which the Communists have been insisting as part
of their effort to deny the legitimacy of Prime
Minister Souvanna's government.
Page 3
Political leaders in Vientiane, however,
quickly denied that the government had made
any concession. Finance Minister Sisouk told a
US official that despite the apparent acceptance
of the Communist formula in the text of the
telegram, the salutation and signature indicated
that Vientiane's chief negotiator was still acting as
Prime Minister-rather than "Prince"-Souvanna's
representative. These disclaimers notwithstanding,
it is possible that the government is making an-
other effort to get around the representation issue
by offering the Communists a statement suffi-
ciently equivocal to permit them to ignore those
portions not to their liking.
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6EURET
On the military front, North Vietnamese
forces in northern Laos recaptured Phou Seu
Mountain this week and also seized other terrain
features on the southwestern edge of the Plaine
des Jarres. By re-establishing their control of
some of the high ground in this area, the Commu-
nists are in a better position to challenge the
government's hold on Ban Na and Muong Pot-
positions that guard the approaches to the Long
Tieng complex. Additional troops have been
brought in to defend these points.
I n addition, government harassment activi-
ties in the Muong Phine - Tchepone area have
increased over the past week. Operating in bat-
talion strength, the government irregulars have
mined roads and have engaged in several sharp
skirmishes with Communist security forces. The
enemy has evidently taken some heavy
North Korea: Finally, a Fifth Party Congress
The congress--he first major North Korean
political conclave since the party conference of
October 1966-opened on 2 November with con-
sideraLle fanfare but no surprises. Originally
scheduled for 1967, the congress was postponed
when the regime's flagging seven-year economic
development plan had to be extended to 1970.
On the agenda are a review of political work and
approval of the new economic plan for 1971-76.
Piemier Kim (I-song gave some hint of what
is to come in his opening keynote address to the
nation. His strong criticism of the performance of
party cadres and emphasis on the need to
strengtien the central role of the party could
Page 4
signal the opening of a party rectification pro-
gram. His singling out of the army in this regard is
firm indication of his continuing preoccupation
with the problem of ensuring party control over
the military.
Extolling the correctness of the party's lead-
ership, Kim finessed the problem of apparent
shortfalls in the current economic plan by citing
an overriding and continuing need for military
preparedness. While holding out some hope of
raising living standards in the years ahead, he
indicated that the new six-year plan would con-
tinue to emphasize heavy industry together with
defense xspending at the expense of consumer
production.
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5LUKJ 1
Kim also focused on the problem of reunifi-
cation of North and South Korea, again rejecting
President Pak Chong-hui's recent call for a lifting
of the barriers dividing the country. Kim reaf-
firmed Pyongyang's two long-standing conditions
for peaceful unification: complete US withdrawal
from Korea and the overthrow of the Pak govern-
ment. He emphasized, however, that the prime
responsibility for achieving these conditions was
not North Korea's but belonged to the "South
Korean people themselves."
Although not ruling out the use of force by
the North to achieve unification on Communist
terms, Kim seemed to indicate that at least for
the time being Pyongyang intends to continue to
rely mainly on propaganda and political subver-
sion against the South rather than on armed har-
assment. These tactics were adopted after the use
of terror by heavily armed North Korean guerrilla
teams infiltrated into the South Korean hinter-
land during 1967-68 failed to generate a war of
"national liberation".
Philippines: An Exercise in Constitutional Reform
The constitutional convention to be elected
next week apparently will be responsive to Presi-
dent Marcos' wishes to adopt few of the wide-
ranging social and political changes being called
for by vocal segments of the Philippine popula-
tion. Marcos, however, is expected to press for
revisions that would either permit him to stay in
office or run for re-election when his term expires
in 1973. His assessment of political realities at the
time the convention convenes next June will de-
termine the forcefulness with which he pursues
this goal. Confident of a sympathetic constitu-
tional body, Marcos will probably concentrate
after the elections on engineering the selection of
a pliable leadership.
Intense interest in the campaign is reflected
in the fact that an average of eight candidates are
competing for each of the 320 delegate seats.
Although both political parties are giving under-
cover support to candidates in the ostensibly non-
partisan election, a sizable proportion of the
candidates appear to be private citizens motivated
by a sense of civic responsibility.
To date the campaign has been the most
peaceful in Philippine history. Strict limitations
on campaign gimmickry, apparently enforced
generally for the first time, have reduced the
incidence of vote buying. Although Marcos has
released a moderate sum of funds to congressmen
of his Nacionalista Party to help favored can-
didates, he has not felt the need to apply
strong-arm methods in view of indications that
candidates sympathetic to the party are running
strong.
The Philippine public is counting on the
coming effort at constitutional reform to provide
a panacea for national problems, and the exercise
will provide a major test of public confidence in
the present politico-economic system. The ex-
pected failure of the convention to adopt mean-
ingful reforms of the 35-year-old constitution
could set the stage for increased agitation against
the government.
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Communist China: Codifying the Cultural Revolution
The pervasive role of the military in Chinese
politi--s is strikingly affirmed in Peking's new state
constitution, an otherwise highly generalized
codification of the sweeping structural changes
wrought by the Cultural Revolution. The draft
document-which was approved by a party
plenum last month and is currently being circu-
lated locally pending ratification by the long-
delaye:d National People's Congress-is a dras-
tically shortened ,ersion of Communist China's
original 1954 constitution. In effect, it is as much
a symbolic political manifesto as a legal instru-
ment. It enshrines Mao Tse-tung and heir-
designate Lin Piao as the nation's personal rulers,
noting specifically that they are supreme com-
mand3r and deputy commander respectively of
the whole nation and the whole army. The army's
continuing political mission is further legitimized
in a provision authorizing the participation of its
representatives, aloig with veteran civilian cadres
and former revolutionary activists, in the adminis-
trative revolutionary committees that emerged
during the Cultural Revolution and were formally
desigrated by the draft as China's future local
governmental organs. Neither Mao nor the army
was rrentioned in the original constitution.
The new 30-article draft departs from its
106-article predecessor on several other counts. It
codifi3s such "revo utionary" innovations as man-
Page 6
datory manual labor service for all state officials,
the right of the "masses" to circumvent authority
by publishing their political views in "big-char-
acter posters," and public participation in polit-
ical trials. Indeed, short shrift is given to the
judiciary system, which is no longer authorized to
administer justice independently and subject only
to state laws. Moreover, the new constitution
makes no provision for the office of head of state,
thereby abolishing the post last held by the dis-
graced Liu Shao-ch'i and leaving Mao as the sole
head of the party, government, and military appa-
ratus.The duty of the head of state to nominate
ministers is now assigned to the Communist
Party-which was not mentioned in the body of
the 1954 document-and the several legislative
powers of the National People's Congress, includ-
ing the power to remove high officials from of-
fice, are pointedly ignored.
The draft also treats the sensitive subject of
economic policy in a far more generalized manner
than the old constitution. China for the first time
is flatly declared to be a socialist state and all
references to vestigial capitalist ownership of
property, including individual rights of inheri-
tance, are eliminated; instead, there is an over-
riding emphasis on collective ownership-with the
single significant exception that peasants may
continue to maintain "small-scale" private plots.
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This section, which reportedly was the subject of
controversy, smacks of compromise; in fact, the
new draft as a whole appears to be a series of
deliberately loose, general propositions that are
likely to be subject to varying interpretations.
There is nothing vague, however, about the
commanding position in China's power structure
provided for Mao and Lin. Such provision attests
UN-CHINA: Voting on the Chinese represen-
tation issue-set back by the Middle East de-
bate-has been delayed until next week at the
earliest. The co-sponsors of the traditional "Al-
banian" resolution to seat Peking and expel
Taiwan have requested further delay, undoubt-
edly anticipating developments that will favor
their position. This move appears related to word
both to a determination to avert any possible
challenge to their control from other powerful
figures in the army, party, or government appa-
ratus and to provide for an orderly transfer of
power in the immediate post-Mao era; the per-
sonalized nature of the constitution, however,
renders it a weak and irrelevant instrument for
coping with China's longer term succession prob-
lem.
that Italy will announce recognition of Peking on
6 November. Most estimates of the probable out-
come of the voting give the "Albanian" resolution
a chance to achieve a plurality for the first time,
but it will fall well below the two-thirds majority
required under the Important Question ruling,
which will surely be adopted again.
EUROPE
USSR: "Containing" China
Moscow is displaying fresh signs of concern
over Communist China's stepped-up efforts to
secure wider international recognition. The Krem-
lin would clearly like to limit Peking's interna-
tional contacts in order to maintain China's sense
of vulnerability to Soviet military and political
pressures and to avoid providing it with additional
outlets for anti-Soviet activity. Nevertheless, the
Soviets seem somewhat at a loss for an effective
means to counter the trend toward increased in-
ternational acceptance of the Chinese.
Although the USSR has avoided public com-
ment on Canada's recognition of Peking, which
was announced on 13 October, its activity behind
the scenes underscores concern that other states
will follow Ottawa's lead.
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3r_UtCE 1
Moscow is also troubled by the prospect that
Peking may evenwally gain membership in the
UN, but the Soviets found it expedient this year
to revert to their traditional stance of public
endorsement of Peking's "rights" in that body.
Last year, with Sino-Soviet tensions at their
height as a result of border fighting, Gromyko
omitted the usual statement of support for China
from his General Assembly speech, but this year
he called for "full restoration" of Peking's
"rights." This gesture was clearly dictated by
Moscow's present policy of minimizing unneces-
sary public frictior with China.
Ironically, Moscow's effort to establish a
degree of stability in its state relations with China
is inhibiting the Soviets from undertaking a more
force-ul and open campaign to limit Peking's
diplomatic gains. A resort to diplomatic arm-
twisting would belie Moscow's assiduously cul-
tivated image that its relations with China are on
the mend, and might make Peking less willing to
persist in its reciprocal restraint. Moreover, such
quixotic tactics might also damage Moscow's
efforts to improve bilateral ties with states now
seeking closer relations with Peking. Finally, the
USSR undoubtedly appreciates that many of the
most important factors improving China's in-
ternational position are beyond its power to in-
fluence.
vately admitting, 25X1
in an effort to delay Chinese recognition and UN
representation. On certain issues, such as "two
China" proposals, Moscow will -be free to cam-
paign more vigorously, arguing publicly that Pe-
king is the sole representative of China but pri-
In the immediate future, the Soviets can be
expected to make additional low-key approaches
that Peking's presence on the Se- 25X1
curity Council would be "embarrassing" to the
USSR. Over the longer term, however, the Soviets
may fall back on the widely shared hope that
broader diplomatic ties will increase pressure on
Peking to follow a more moderate international
ROMANIA: President Ceausescu was pleased
with his two-week private visit to the US. The
Romanian press has, since the conclusion of the
trip on 27 October, expressed optimism that it
will lead to increased bilateral economic ties-one
of the Romanian's primary goals. Ceausescu was
able -:o satisfy his personal curiosity about the
US. He is reported to have been visibly impressed
by tours of aircraft, electronics, and auto plants,
as well as by California's mechanized agriculture.
Several bankers and industrialists to whom he
spoke about increased trade and financial ties are
slated soon for follow-up visits to Bucha-
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Ostl)ol itik: Much Movement, Less Progress
Bonn's campaign to improve its relations
with Eastern Europe continues to move ahead on
a bread front.
Although trying to promote a posture of
reasonableness, the Soviets show little apparent
readiness to make meaningful concessions on
Berlin. The Bonn government has publicly made
such concessions the price for ratifying the non-
use of force treaty signed on 12 August arguing
with some justification that German public
opinion would not tolerate ratification in the face
of Soviet intransigence in Berlin. The Soviets,
even though eager for ratification, clearly want to
give up as little as possible in the Four-Power
Berlin talks.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko underlined
Moscow's effort to appear forthcoming by mak-
ing an unprecedented stopover in West Germany
on 30 October on his return home from the UN
General Assembly. Before departing Frankfurt, he
said his conversation with West German Foreign
Minister Scheel had been "useful" and that bi-
lateral relations were improving. Neither Scheel
nor Gromyko, however, indicated that the two
had been able to agree on more than the broadest
of principles.
East Germany Gets in Step
Only hours before Gromyko's arrival, East
German emissaries arrived in Bonn to announce
Pankow's willingne3s to begin talks on access and
other Berlin issues. This is the first expression of
East German interest in bilateral talks since the
abortive meetings last spring between Chancellor
Brandt and Premier Stoph. The East German
initiative was not entirely unexpected, however,
for the Soviets have been pushing the line that the
Page 10
Four-Power talks should decide "principles"
while the Germans themselves arrange details.
Bonn and Pankow have agreed on an informal
exchange of views, and Bonn has promised careful
coordination with its Western allies.
More Progress in Eastern Europe
There is guarded optimism in Bonn and
Warsaw, meanwhile, that Scheel's visit to Warsaw
this week will result in final agreement on a treaty
to improve their relations. The two sides are
close, but they still differ on the precise wording
of Bonn's acceptance of Poland's western border,
and on the Four Powers' continuing responsi-
bilities in German affairs. Signature of the treaty
would pave the way for re-establishment of diplo-
matic relations, although neither side has pro-
jected a date for this development.
Preliminary talks on a similar treaty between
Bonn and Prague opened in mid-October with the
visit to Prague of a West German Foreign Ministry
official. Both sides appear satisfied with these
technical talks and have agreed to resume discus-
sions in mid-November. The main issue remains
Prague's public insistence that Bonn denounce the
1938 Munich Pact as void from the outset. The
West Germans believe, however, that the Czech-
oslovaks will accept some wording that will min-
imize or eliminate possible legal problems such as
property claims.
The Hungarian regime has also told Bonn
that it wants to establish diplomatic relations.
There are no territorial problems to be nego-
tiated, but Hungarian officials say that they wish
to await Bonn's ratification of the Soviet treaty
and the conclusion of its pacts with Warsaw and
Prague.
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Yugoslavia Tackles Economic Problems
Yugoslavia's first party conference focused
on the nation's chronic economic problems and
pending political reorganization. The net result
was almost unanimous support of several eco-
nomic changes and a call for the clear delineation
of federal and republic prerogatives.
Leading party official Krste Crvenkovski's
address on the proposed governmental reorganiza-
tion asserted that the party would not lose its
authority to the proposed collective presidency.
He indicated that political decentralization has its
limits by saying that the new executive body
would have the power to make decisions that
would be unpopular.
By far most of the conference time was
devoted to Yugoslavia's economic problems, and
some stopgap stabilization measures to halt infla-
tion and improve the balance of payments were
announced. The program consists of a widespread
price freeze and tighter controls on consumer
credit and on imports.
The price freeze applies to all manufactured
goods, most basic foodstuffs, rents, public util-
ities, and some services. The government, how-
ever, has proposed safeguards guaranteeing ade-
quate supplies of basic consumer goods and in.-
dustrial stocks. Consumer bank credit allowed to
each individual was severely restricted. To limit
imports, merchants must now make a 90-day
dinar deposit with banks equal to one half the
value of their purchases.
These controls are only temporary to give
the Federal Executive Committee breathing space
to enact a broader stabilization package. Its aim is
two-pronged: to halt inflation but still allow
optimum expansion and modernization of the
economy.
The details of the package are not yet com-
plete, but it almost certainly will involve de-
creased budgetary expenditures, tighter controls
on enterprise and bank investments, changes in
taxation, and additional controls on imports and
consumer spending. Conceivably there also could
be major changes in the price and foreign ex-
change systems. According to the Yugoslavs, a
wage freeze will not be imposed, although some
type of incomes policy may be adopted.
Past experience has shown that a new ap-
proach is required. Earlier stabilization programs
have turned booms into sharp recessions. Con-
tinued stop-go policies would impede efforts to
increase efficiency and to lessen regional im-
balances. Moreover, such policies could have a
negative effect on foreign investments, which
have been disappointing despite an increasingly
liberal foreign investment law. 25X1
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
U N : A Controversial Extension of the Cease-fire
The General Assembly this week adopted a
draft resolution-offered by Egypt and several non-
aligned co-sponsors-that could aggravate the diffi-
culty of implementing the 1967 Security Council
resolution, the basis on which the search for a
Middle East peace settlement has so far proceeded.
The resolution does, however, recommend to the
parties concerned an extension of the cease-fire for
another three months.
Although the text approved by a 57-16 vote in
the Assembly contained modifications that toned it
down, it still made no reference to violations of the
cease-fire - stands ill agreement and included an
ambicuous request to the Security Council to con-
sider imposition of economic sanctions against Is-
rael. The resolution was also very selective in its
references to the 1.967 Council resolution, empha-
sizing in particular the need for Israeli withdrawal
from territories occupied in the six-day war. Before
the vote, Israel stated clearly that adoption of the
resolution could cause it to refuse to cooperate
further in peace efforts under both the 1967 resolu-
tion and the 1970 Rogers Plan.
The US failed to obtain significant backing for
its alternative draft, which endorsed the 1967
Council resolution in toto and called for at least a
three-month extension of the cease-fire. The Arabs
especially objected to its stress on the need to
create the conditions of mutual confidence essential
to permit a resumption of talks under the auspices
of Gunnar Jarring, Secretary General Thant's Mid-
dle East envoy.
For a time during the week it appeared that a
compromise resolution offered by several Latin
American states would satisfy both sides and
thereby prevent a contentious outcome. It endorsed
the 1967 resolution and recommended resumption
of the Jarring talks as well as the extension of the
ceasefire for at least three months. As such, the
Latin American craft was believed to cover the
minimum demands of Egypt and its co-sponsors
and to be responsive to their keen desire for some
sort of Assembly statement before expiration of the
cease-fire on 5 November as agreed to in August.
France played a major role in securing suffi-
cient modification of the Egyptian draft to ensure
it of the Western and Francophone African support
to gain the wide margin necessary in Assembly
voting because the issue was an Important Question
requiring a two-thirds majority. Several Arab states
abstained-including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait-
inasmuch as they refuse to be a party to any en-
dorsement of the 1967 Council resolution. The
Latin American draft subsequently failed to gain
even a majority, a setback partially attributable to
London's refusal to support it. The British ab-
stained on both votes, maintaining that both drafts
jeopardized the status of the 1967 resolution.
Neither Egypt nor Israel appears eager to see
active hostilities resume; Tel Aviv is likely to con-
tinue to observe the cease-fire as long as Egypt
does. Popular sentiment in both countries, includ-
ing military opinion, appears to favor the continued
suspension of active hostilities. Following the UN
vote, Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad stated in New
York that his country would observe the three-
month cease-fire extension. In Cairo, however, the
semiofficial al-Ahram reported that although Egypt
would accept a short extension of the cease-fire, a
full 90-day extension was incumbent upon progress
in peace negotiations.
Despite good intentions, however, the initial
period of any cease-fire extension will probably be
somewhat fragile. Each side is unsure of the inten-
tions of the other, and will be on a high state of
alert to guard against surprise attack. As before, a
cease-fire will remain vulnerable to incidents ini-
tiated by undisciplined or disgruntled military per-
sonnel, and this in turn could lead to a general
resumption of hostilities.
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Egypt: Sadat Seeks Support
The formal organization of the new govern-
ment has been completed, and Egypt's new
leaders are attempting to develop stronger do-
mestic support.
Husayn al-Shafi and Ali Sabri were named
this week apparently as co-equal vice presidents.
Both men were vice presidents under Nasir, but
they were dropped from their positions before his
death. Neither man was named first vice presi-
dent, nor were they assigned areas of responsi-
bility, and continued dissension over their future
roles is likely. AI-Shafi is generally considered a
political lightweight; left-leaning Sabri appears to
have more influence, particularly within the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's sole legal political
organization. Nasir put Sabri's organizational tal-
ents to use in rejuvenating the ASU in the mid
1960s, but it still lacks any meaningful grass-roots
support and remains a creature of the regime.
Meanwhile, the government appears to be
making an attempt to capture the support of the
masses by an increased interest in consumer prob-
lems. Prime Minister Fawzi appeared to empha-
size internal matters in his acceptance speech
when he declared that foreign policy is the re-
INDIA-NEPAL: A disappointed team of Nep-
alese trade officials has returned to Kathmandu
from New Delhi without a new trade and trans-
port treaty to replace the ten-year-old one that
was to have expired on 31 October. The reasons
for the deadlock are not clear inasmuch as the
talks opened on a note of optimism, but India
apparently is not yet willing to concede to Nep
alese demands for trade preferences that would
help Nepal's fledgling industrial efforts, or to
flection of domestic policy. Moreover, the regime
recently instituted a series of measures designed
to improve the lot of the masses. The annual price
reductions on certain consumer items and the
distribution of profit-sharing allotments to
workers during the fasting month of Ramadan
were more generous than usual. Additionally, the
government announced the allotment of funds for
the establishment of 400 new health units and
claimed it was expanding Egypt's overworked
telephone system. Although such measures may
be somewhat helpful politically, if pursued too
far they will adversely affect Egypt's already
shaky economy.
President Sadat's performance in the past
few weeks indicates an effectiveness not antici-
pated initially.
t ough he-must continue to share
po itica power with other leading figures, Sadat
has appeared to be one of the leading participants
in Egypt's decision-making process since his in-
auguration. He still, however, lacks any degree of
meaningful popular su ort.
25X1
permit the shipment of Nepalese goods through
India to Calcutta and Pakistan. The old treaty,
however, has been extended at least until the next
round of talks, slated to begin on 12 November.
In the meantime, the stalemate can be expected
to rekindle Nepal's long-held resentment over its
dependent relationship with India, and Indo-
Nepalese relations are likely to suffer a new-but
possibly brief-period of strain. I 25X1
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Z SUT(Ir, IL
Jordan: The New Cabinet of Wasf Tal
Last week King Husayn appointed his fourth
government in less than six weeks. The cabinet is
headed by a four-time former premier, tough-
minded Wasfi Tai, who has considerable support
within the army and among East Bank Jor-
danians. For years he has been known as the
strongest anti-Nasir supporter of the King, and he
has no love for the Baathist regimes of Iraq and
Syria. He has also been a leading advocate of
firmness in dealing with the fedayeen, and feda-
yeen leaders can I-ardly be pleased by his appoint-
men t.
The King has obviously served notice on the
fedayeen that he intends to perpetuate the pat-
tern of governmeital self-assertion that has been
appearing recently. After having previously of-
fered the fedayeen the carrot-and-stick team of
the conciliatory former premier Tuqan and hard-
nosed Major General Zaid bin Shakir, Husayn is
taking one more step to consolidate the success so
far attained. With the replacement of Tugan by
Tal, the King has given Shakir a strong, decisive
partner in the civilian side of the government.
Moreover, the average level of competence of the
new cabinet-which contains a rough balance be-
tween East and West Bankers-seems fairly high.
Five members are holdovers from the previous
cabinet, and several others are competent civil
servants and busnessmen. Only two ministers
have a military background, and this predomi-
nantly civilian character of the cabinet may help
allay some of the criticism directed at the military
aspect of the previous cabinet.
The reaction of other Arab governments and
the attitude of the fedayeen leaders to the new
appointments are not yet clear. Initial press
stories seemed to indicate that Tal particularly
would be the target of attack from all sides. The
offic al Baathist organs in Syria and Iraq have
come out against him; the Egyptian ambassador
has been summoned home, and the Cairo press
has accused Tal of being the prime mover behind
the recent crisis in Jordan. The Arab govern-
ments, however, have withheld official comment
and appear to be adopting a wait-and-see attitude.
Most of the fedayeen leaders also have been
wary in their comments about the new cabinet.
Although the newspaper of the radical Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine in Beirut
said that the new government would drag Jordan
into a new round of fighting, other fedayeen
leaders have been temperate in their comments.
The fedayeen central committee chairman, Yasir
Arafat, said in an interview that "the important
thing for the resistance is that the Palestine rev-
olution should remain and continue." Other lead-
ers are quoted as saying that they would not
object to Tal so long as the Cairo agreement was
implemented.
The first test of the new government may
come on 9 November when the expiration of the
two-week grace period for the enforcement of the
recent agreements could bring -a flurry of provoca-
tions. Both the government and the fedayeen
leadership, however, have taken steps to eliminate
potential sources of friction by such measures as
issuing new ID cards and gun permits. Barring
some unusually recalcitrant and unauthorized act
by the fedayeen fringe element or heavy-handed
actions by government security personnel, the
present "cold war" between the government and
the fedayeen may continue for some time. Snow-
balling incidents such as the one that threatened
the cease-fire on 3 November are likely to recur,
but the fedayeen are not yet prepared to renew
full-scale hostilities, and the Tal government prob-
ably does not wish to stir things up by unduly
provoking them.
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Indian Prime Minister to Face Hostile Parliament
The forthcoming session of the national par-
liament, which opens 9 November, is expected to
present Prime Minister Gandhi with the most se-
rious criticism of her administration since the
split in the Congress Party in 1969 deprived her
of a majority government.
Although her political opposition is still frag-
mented, her opponents are finding an increasing
number of anti-Gandhi issues on which they
agree. Chief among these is condemnation of the
prime minister's use of central powers to interfere
in local affairs for her qwn political gain. A bill
that may be introduced'to limit the central gov-
ernment's control over the states has the backing
of some parties normally aligned with the prime
minister. In the foreign affairs field, Mrs. Gandhi
may be attacked for leaning too heavily toward
the Soviet Union. Although she can argue that US
neglect has forced her closer to the USSR, some
of her opponents may seek to reverse the argu-
ment, charging that her "pro-Soviet" policies
were what triggered the recent US offer to sell
limited quantities of arms to Pakistan. Washing-
ton, however, will remain the major target of this
issue.
Morale within the prime minister's own Rul-
ing Congress Party has declined somewhat in the
last few weeks. For one thing, Mrs. Gandhi's
abortive attempt last month to impose a Ruling
Congress government in Uttar Pradesh-India's
most populous and politically important state--
has hurt her image. Her alleged pro-Soviet policies
and her apparent willingness to establish closer
ties with the pro-Moscow Communist Party of
India (CPI) have run into some high-level resist-
ance within her party. These events, together with
her earlier unsuccessful attempts to persuade local
political leaders of her party to come out strongly
for land reform, have exposed weaknesses in her
control over the party organization.
Heretofore, Mrs. Gandhi's archenemies in
the Organization Congress Party and their allies
on the political right have been eager to avoid
forcing a snap national election out of concern
for the weakness of their electoral machinery.
Constitutionally, the country must go to the polls
by February 1972. Indian politics, however, seem
to be polarizing between the left and right and
the possibility that this phenomenon will increase
support for the opposition camp could prompt
the prime minister's opponents to re-examine
their position toward early elections. Even if they
still opt for stopping short of voting her down on
a no-confidence motion, their enthusiasm for con-
fronting her in other parliamentary tests of
strength is likely to increase.
On balance, the odds appear good that Mrs.
Gandhi will survive the coming parliamentary
session. The leader of the Dravidian Progressive
Federation, a key regional party from South India
that generally supports the government but finds
itself opposed to Mrs. Gandhi on the states rights
issue, has said that he would not support a move
to topple her. In addition, the CPI-which has
gained new respectability and prestige from its
association with the Ruling Congress-would be
unlikely to vote against the government on an
issue crucial to its survival. Mrs. Gandhi has in-
deed suffered some recent setbacks, but so far she
has outwitted most of her opponents; her left-
wing policies are popular, and she is generally
recognized as the only person in India capable of
attracting widespread support in each of India's
17 disparate states and 10 union terri-
tories.
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~.rL,V~1L Z
Ethiopia: Eritrean Insurgency Continues Unabated
The tempo of Eritrean Liberation Front
(ELF) activity within Eritrea has picked up over
the past few months, although the insurgency
itself still appears to be a standoff between the
guerrillas and Ethiopian security forces. The ELF
has not basically altered its pattern of activities,
but it has succeeded in shifting the emphasis more
noticeably to sabotage and terrorism.
In the latest upsurge of activity, the ELF has
demonstrated an improved capability in the use
of demolitions and now poses a new and po-
tentially serious threat to traffic on the provincial
roac network. Sabotage against bridges has in-
creased and attacks on military-escorted civilian
convoys have been noted for the first time. There
havE also been ncidents in the rural areas of
wanton shooting of Christian villagers by the Mus-
lim nsurgents.
Foreign support for the ELF apparently has
not increased sigrificantly, although the Commu-
nist Chinese may have been furnishing additional
supplies. One new development that has the
Ethiopians worried is the emergence of Aden as a
major staging area for the infiltration of men and
supplies along the Eritrean coast. The Ethiopian
Navy and land forces are incapable of interdicting
this movement.
have now been noted in neighboring Tegre Prov-
ince where security is lax and the guerrillas have
been able to disperse to escape pursuing forces.
These developments do not seem to indicate
any dramatic change in the internal security of
the province, at least over the short run, nor does
the ELF seem to be at the point of developing
into a full-fledged, hard-core terrorist movement.
The ELF has enhanced its capabilities, however,
primarily because of the growing number of ter-
rorists in its ranks who have returned from train-
ing with the fedayeen in radical Arab states. The
increase in the organization's radical Muslim or-
ientation and in its terrorist expertise is an indi-
cation of this expanding Palestinian influence.
It is still too early to tell whether the ELF
can sustain the present campaign. Recent terrorist
The authorities in Eritrea maintain that pres-
sure from Ethiopian security forces is requiring
the ELF to act out of desperation, a judgment
that is in part correct. On the other hand, the
usually optimistic Governor General Asrate Kassa
recently admitted that he had asked Addis Ababa
for more reinforcements and small arms to dis-
tribute to villagers who have been harassed by
ELF bands. Moreover, the ELF has moved grad-
ually into new regions in the province outside of
its traditional areas of operation. Guerrilla bands
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l
excesses suggest it may have abandoned the strat-
egy that marked the first few years of the
insurgency-that of trying to enlist the support of
Eritrean Christians, who constitute about half of
the population. In so doing it runs an increased
risk of alienating much of the rural population.
At the same time, the Ethiopian Government has
stepped up its military pressure in Eritrea and will
not hesitate to strengthen its security forces if
necessary.
SOUTH AFRICA: The opposition United Party
made some gains in the provincial elections held
last week, although the ruling National Party re-
tained control of three of the four provincial
councils. Many observers, particularly within the
United Party whose main base of support is the
English-speaking population, portrayed these elec-
tions as a test of whether the party would be able
to susta;n the momentum it gained after winning
nine seats from the Nationalists in last April's
general election.
The outcome seems to reflect a continuing
dissatisfaction with the Nationalist government
among its staunchly conservative Afrikaner sup-
porters rather than a significant increase in United
Party popularity, however. Many National Party
supporters apparently abstained, thus helping the
opposition to pick up a few seats in three of the
provincial councils and to reduce the winning
margin of many Nationalist candidates. Whether
Prime Minister Vorster will interpret the results as
a sign that he must provide more vigorous lead-
ership in order to recapture the support of the
rank and file of National Party adherents remains
to be seen.
Iran: Negotiations with Consortium
The second round of negotiations between
the government and the consortium of Western
oil companies will begin in Tehran on 7 Novem-
ber with the two sides seriously at odds. Pressed
for funds by a growing balance-of-paymentsdef-
icit brought about by increasing military ex-
penditures, a large-scale development program,
and substantial debt repayments, the Shah has
taken a tough stand. In his Speech from the
Throne in October, he warned that unless the
consortium increases its output, legislation de-
signed to "protect Iran's interest" will be enacted.
Either way, the Shah insists that a minimum of
$5,920 million be raised during the five-year plan
ending in March 1973. So far, the consortium has
provided or pledged to the government a reported
$2,830 million.
The government negotiators presented the
consortium with a series of stiff demands during
the first round of talks in October. Iran asked for
a higher posted price-the first Middle East coun-
try to tailor its demands to the new terms exacted
from major oil companies in Libya. The govern-
ment also demanded that the consortium increase
its program for capacity development beyond
1972, the present project being "neither reason-
able nor acceptable."
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year.
It is doubtful that the consortium would
care to see any of its concession areas lost, and it
is most probable that at the end of what looks
like a long and bitter bargaining session, Iran will
extract a new price-tax structure, a source of cost
oil, and the revenue it needs for another
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Brazil Prepares for Congressional Elections
The balloting for members of Congress on
15 November will be the first nationwide popular
elections sincee President Medici came to power
in October of last year. The voting is an impor-
tant step in the government's "political renewal"
program. For a number of reasons, however, the
approximately 30 million registered voters have
little interest in the campaign or the outcome of
the election, and a considerable number of blank
ballcts may be cast.
All members of the Chamber of Deputies
will be chosen to serve from 1 February 1971
through 31 January 1975. Under a constitutional
amendment of October 1969, the new Chamber
will consist of only 293 seats rather than the
present 409. Normally, two thirds of the 66 Sen-
ate seats would be up for grabs, but the cancella-
tion of the po;itical rights of some senators has
made it necessary to elect 46 rather than 44. The
senators will serve eight-year terms starting on 1
February 1971.
Party representation in the new Congress is
likely to be about the same as it is now. The
progovernment National Renewal Alliance
(ARENA) will control two thirds of the seats and
the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement
(MDB)-the only other legal party-the re-
mainder. Roughly the same division will probably
take place in the races for state legislatures and
for public offices in over 2,000 municipalities.
The administration's key political slogan is
.'renovation"-the replacement of politicians who
were active before the 1964 revolution with new
men who are competent administrators dedicated
to such national goals as economic development
and effective education. These "technicians" were
perhaps the dominant group among the men hand
picked by Medici as governors in all 22 states last
month. Although the administration hoped that
this new political breed would also predominate
in the congressional races, it appears that this will
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NOWOf ~r I~IC~ 1 "r
not be the case. Rather, the traditional politi-
cians, who rely on understandings with other in-
fluential politicians, on arrangements with urban
"bosses" and rural large landholders who control
large blocs of votes, and on the liberal allocation
of cash to get elected, will win a large share of the
races and will continue to dominate the federal
and state legislatures.
Because of the steady increase of the powers
of the executive and of the influence of the
military and the "technicians" since 1964, the
traditional politicians have been largely relegated
to positions within the legislative bodies and the
lower levels of the federal and state executive
branches. Spiraling campaign costs; the increasing
difficulty in arousing voter interest and thereby
obtaining contributions; a decline in the power,
prestige, and pay of legislators; and military dis-
trust and hostility toward most politicians are
additional deterrents to running for office. These
handicaps particularly apply to MDB, which has
largely been kept alive by the government to
preserve the semblance of a two-party system for
domestic and foreign public opinion. The party,
however, has had little opportunity to act as an
effective opposition because of the numerous
legal and informal restrictions placed on its activi-
ties. The members of the progovernment ARENA
are only slightly less hampered in their political
maneuvering because of their need to defend all
aspects of the administration's policies regardless
of their personal beliefs.
Politicians of both parties-which were
created by the government and have little genuine
popular support-have continued to participate in
the game under the rules set by the administra-
tion because they believe that eventually the po-
litical process will change to their advantage. The
possibility that the politicians might eventually
regain their pre-1964 dominance is a prime cause
of military frustration. The administration's and
the military's conviction that severe restrictions
on political activity are necessary may mean that
Brazilian "democracy" under Medici will be a
very different brand from the usual con-
cept.
Guatemala: Arana Government under Attack
The government's poor showing in the secu-
rity field is enhancing the appeal of extremist
solutions to Guatemala's insurgency problem.
Many of President Arana's supporters regard as
absurd his fixation with legality in countering the
subversive threat in the face of the rise of terror-
ism over the past two months. Elements within
the security forces have even begun to ignore the
President's insistence on playing by the constitu-
tional rules.
The President is finding that his own deter-
mination to transform the army and police into
effective forces is no match for the entrenched
inefficiency and corruption that characterize
these services. His efforts to forge a professional
investigation team that would coordinate its ac-
tivities have shown almost no promise, and he, for
that matter, seems to have little understanding of
the magnitude of the problem. Arana, who re-
cently told the US ambassador of his frustration
at the competing demands for money and of his
reluctance to divert resources away from social
and economic programs, is beginning to realize
that a professional security force is a long way off
and will require large inputs of manpower and
funds.
The immediacy of the terrorist problem,
plus rising discontent with the government's inac-
tion, will probably make Arana more amenable to
the advice of those who advocate "fighting fire
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wits- fire." If he decides to resort to counterter-
ror, this may merely grant official sanction to an
ongoing process. Mysterious disappearances and
the murder of students and others associated with
the left indicate that some of the security forces
may already be using interim extralegal tactics.
The pressure on the government will grow
substantially in the event the Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR) carries out its plans to stage some sort of a
"spectacular operation." Most of the FAR's re-
cent actions have been directed against policemen
and other low-paid security officials
VENEZUELA: Student demonstrations broke
out across the country following last week's oc-
cupEtion of Central University in Caracas, but the
protests were vigorously put down by the police
and national guard with a minimum of property
damage. The problems at Central University re-
main unresolved, however. No replacement has
beer found for the rector, Jesus Maria Bianco,
who was suspended for his refusal to abide by the
new university reform law. Sixteen school deans
and 14 of the 19 members of the university
council have corie out publicly in support of
Bianco.
If Arana abandons his commitment to the
legal path, Guatemala will see a revival of the long
cycle of political violence that took place under
his predecessor. In the past, the tendency on both
the left and the right to include moderates on
their lists of extremists and the generally un-
sophisticated approach to "eliminating the en-
emy" have meant the victimization of many in-
nocent citizens.
Nervousness over the student situation
probably contributed to an unusual incident in
the military establishment in Maracay. F2 5X1
about 10 officers were arrested, 25X1
apparently for disciplinary rather than political
reasons. The Maracay incident is unusual because
of the generally stable economic and political
situation and because the government's firm ac-
tion against leftists in the university has tended to
minimize military discontent.
New Government Takes Over in Chile
Salvador Allende was inaugurated President
on 3 November in a mixture of traditional pomp
and Marxist demagoguery. His promise to "build
socialism" through a pluralistic government is be-
lied by his appointment of a cabinet dominated
by Communists and Socialists.
Atheist Allende's first act as President was to
attend a high mass in his honor, then to hold a
reception where unofficial Communist delegates
from around the world were welcomed as warmly
as the 70 official delegations that preceded them.
Shortly after moving into an expensive new
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residence, Allendf, told newsmen that only
through the profo mnd structural changes, hard
work, and "liberation from imperialism" that he
offers can the Chilean people benefit from their
country's great potential.
Allende's hard-line, militant cabinet was
named after a bitter power struggle within his
six-party Popular Unity coalition. His own Social-
ists won the two top ministries and two other
patronage posts. The Communists also received
four key ministries, although influential Minister
of Economy and Development Vuscovic does not
publicly admit to being a party member. The
largest non-Marxist member of the coalition, the
Radical Party, got three ministries, and the re-
maining three members had to share the other
four posts. Communists and Socialists, however,
are capturing the vital secondary posts in these
seven ministries, giving them effective control.
The average age of the generally unimpressive
cabinet is over 50, in contrast with the Frei ad-
ministration's emphasis on young, activist leaders.
An exception is the revolutionary Catholic and
intellectual, Jacques Chonchol, the new minister
of agriculture. He left a key post under Frei and
the Christian Democratic Party in protest against
the "slow pace and moderation" of the agrarian
reform program, of which he was the chief archi-
tect. In the early 1960s, Chonchol served as a UN
agricultural adviser to Fidel Castro.
Also intelligent and articulate is Allende's
close Socialist confidant, Jose Toha, who as min-
ister of interior is first in the line of succession if
the President leaves the country, dies, or is in-
capacitated. Toha also controls the administration
of Chile's 25 provinces and all of the police
forces. He already has appointed a Communist
and a Socialist as governors of the two major
provinces. Allende is particularly interested in en-
suring support from the paramilitary national po-
lice force of 25,000 men, which is better trained
and slightly larger than the army. The new police
commandant is not an outstanding officer and
was probably chosen for his malleability.
The defense minister is a 69-year-old leftist
Radical whose many years as a teacher at the
military academy appears to be his major qualifi-
cation. His appointment may be short-lived and
designed primarily to reassure the military, as
were the appointments of three retired officers as
subsecretaries for the three services. The new
commanders in chief of the services are all senior
and experienced officers known to be acceptable
to Allende.
Allende's foreign relations may test his abil-
ity to please everyone. His foreign minister, Clod-
omiro Almeyda, is from the most radical wing of
the Socialist Party, which even distrusts Allende.
Almeyda has little use for the US or the USSR,
but favors Cuba and Communist China.
Almeyda's appointment is unlikely to
change the USSR's considerable reserve thus
far toward the new government. The main thrust
of comment from Moscow has been that Chile
will pose no threat to other countries in the
hemisphere. The election has been described as a
national liberation and social development, Soviet
terms for "progressive," nonaligned countries.
Moscow's caution seems prompted in large part
by fear that Allende may sooner or later seek
Soviet financial assistance. In keeping with this
approach, a third-stringer, one of 15 vice presi-
dents of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet, headed the four-man Soviet delegation to
the inaugural.
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INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Hungary's Tenth Party Congress Will Expand Reforms
Secret
N2 43
6 November 1970
No. 0395/70A
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HUNGARY'S TENTH PARTY CONGRESS WILL EXPAND REFORMS
During his 14-year tenure as Communist party first secretary, Janos Kadar has worked out
a uniquely successful system of gradual reform predicated on cautious pragmatism and ideologi-
cal flexibility. Kadar bases his domestic rule on a shrewd economic policy that emphasizes
relatively wide availability of consumer goods while avoiding excessive foreign debt and
inflation. He has introduced a reform of the economic system in many ways similar to Ota Sik's
aborted plan for Czechoslovakia. The economic reform has not caused major political or
economic disruptions and has laid the groundwork for badly needed political reforms. At the
tenth party congress opening on 23 November, the Hungarian leaders intend to set the
parameters for a precedent-setting, political modernization program intended to reverse the
current inefficient centralization of authority in Budapest, to raise the present extremely low
level of popular identification with the system, and further to weaken the vestiges of Stalinism.
The modest "social democratization" program proposed is to be brought about by institutional
changes, the first since the reconstruction era immediately following the 1956 revolt.
Although the specific measures envisioned are not likely to cause domestic upheavals, some
of Kadar's more conservative allies in the USSR and East Germany may see the program as a
threat to the post-Dubcek status quo in Eastern Europe. At the same time, however, moderate
Communists throughout the area will be watching the Hungarian experiment for potential leads
on solving similar problems. In the end, Kadar's prestige, his skills at judicious compromise, and
his success in maintaining order in Hungary, should help him avoid any serious difficulties.
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Kadar's reign, begun amid the rubble of
postrevolt Budapest, set off a grim authoritarian
tack. Behind the scenes Kadar was waging a bitter
struggle with the remnants of the party's Stalinist
wing, and only with the firm support of Nikita
Khrushchev was he able to gain mastery over the
party in the early 1960s. Kadar then embarked on
a program of national reconciliation," whose
growth he nursed consistently if gradually. This
program even survived the fall of Khrushchev, and
Kadar emerged late in the decade as the Warsaw
Pact's most successful reformist leader.
Kadar's accomplishments are remarkable
even when taken out of the context of the post-
revolt years. He has established a modus vivendi
with the nation's creative intelligentsia unpar-
alleled in the Soviet orbit of influence, done away
with coercion as a primary means of control,
drastically reduced the traditional subjugation of
peasantry to the urban class, successfully
launched one of the most liberal economic re-
forms ever introduced in the Soviet orbit of influ-
ence, and refurbished the country's international
reputation.
Despite conspicuous successes, there have
been galling failures. Kadar's reform has been
rigidly controlled, and consequently there has
been no mass public identification with the sys-
tem. His distrust of grass-roots spontaneity and
his seeming alacrity in following Moscow's lead in
foreign affairs have also diluted the effectiveness
of his leadership of the independent-minded and
highly nationalistic Magyars. Moreover, his failure
to deal conclusively with the legacy of Stalinist
terror and postrevolt repression still prejudices his
relations with key segments of society. He has
been most successful in reaching the population
through the judicious use of material incentives,
but this tactic also has had negative side effects; it
has produced a cynical and materialistic public
mood that has infected even members of the
party.
Special Report
To Kadar, who has publicly admitted his
desire to unify the nation regardless of ideological
differences of opinion, these failures are most
disturbing. Refusing easy paths, however, he for-
swears the use of nationalist demagoguery, which
he considers caused national ruin in two world
wars and sparked the revolt of 1956. He predi-
cates his policies on close ties with the USSR,
even though such a policy limits his options in
developing corrective programs. He has taken the
difficult political course of turning the basic So-
viet institutional model into one suitable for Hun-
gary, which at the same time is acceptable to the
USSR.
Economic Reform, the First Link in the Chain
At the eighth party congress in 1962, Kadar
brought economic specialists, headed by party
secretary Rezso Nyers, into the leadership. Armed
with hard evidence and professional projections,
the economists warned that without a drastic
restructuring of the economic system, stagnation
and possibly even reverses were to be expected by
the mid-1970s.
The problem of posing alternatives to the
Soviet economic model was eased by
Hungarian Ninth Party Congress convenes,
26 November 1966.
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Khrushchev's toleration of economic experiments
in the USSR. The participation of Hungary's most
capable economists in this study, irrespective of
their standing within the party, ensured a
thorough hearing for national interests. After
three years of detailed research into shortcom-
ings, projected needs, and possible solutions, the
findings and recommendations were adopted at
the ninth party congress in 1966, and, after
further polishing, were introduced as the New
Economic Mechanism (NEM) on 1 January 1968.
The NEM's basic strategy, built around a
break with the rigid centralization of authority in
the economy, involved the introduction of the
profit motive as a factor in economic life. Central
Planning was to be limited to setting general na-
tionwide guidelines, and the central ministries'
role in directing the everyday operations of local
enterprises was consequently restricted. Local fac-
tory management received considerable authority
over its own financial and production problems,
and there was also a counterbalancing increase in
authority of local trade union organizations to
protect workers' interests against abuses by man-
agers in pursuit of profits. Various other rational-
ization measures were introduced, including a
more flexible price system designed to allow mar-
ket forces to have some effect on the economy
and the granting of authority to some factories to
deal directly with foreign firms. Even while the
economic reforms were being effected, party ex-
perts admitted that they were linked with the
need for eventual political changes, saying that it
was as desirable to free the political as the eco-
nomic system from the pervasive grip of central
authority.
The turmoil accompanying the "Prague
spring" in 1968 and military intervention in
Czechoslovakia later that summer had the unex-
pected side effect of accelerating the Hungarian
party's political reform program.
The intervention, in which Hungary re-
luctantly participated, came as a deep shock to
the nation. Kadar sought to dissociate himself
from it by dropping from public view for six
weeks. Public concern about Kadar's safety be-
came linked with fears of a resurgence of conser-
vativism throughout Eastern Europe, and for the
first time there was a palpable mass identification
with a Communist leader in postrevolt Hungary.
Beyond this increase in Kadar's personal
popularity, there was another important turn in
Hungary's history. The Hungarians behaved them-
selves. Ulbricht, Brezhnev, and Gomulka were
faced in 1968 with student protests and mass
disaffection on the part of intellectuals, but the
Hungarians by and large remained quiescent. This
demonstration of self-control in a critical period
marked a high point in Kadar's efforts to establish
stability among the "eternal rebels on the Dan-
ube"* and presented the regime with a unique
opportunity for starting new programs.
Kadar announced his political reform pro-
gram in early March 1969 during the virulent
anti-Dubcek propaganda campaign taking place
elsewhere in the area following the "hockey
riots," in February. Kadar's public commitment
to political reforms and his decision to buck the
conservative tide that was building in Eastern
Europe were widely recognized as demonstrations
of personal courage, especially because most Hun-
garians had despaired of such boldness on the part
of the national leadership. Kadar utilized the
hypersensitive atmosphere of the crisis period in
Czechoslovakia to make a rare, direct appeal to
the Hungarian nation for support. He contended
that gradual reform was "the only possible way"
of building socialism in Hungary.
The announcement was made to a highly
unusual convention of the party central commit-
tee, national assembly, regional party leaders, and
heads of the party's national front. Before the
meeting, Kadar and his most trusted advisers
*Khrushchev's description of the Hungarians after the 1956 revolt.
Special Report -3-
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made the rounds of cultural groups, editorial of-
fices, and factories, explaining their decision and
the need for continued public order. As if to
emphasize the intention to bury the past, on the
day following this meeting, the regime held a
public honorarium for former premier Laszlo
Rajk, the nation'!. best-known victim of Stalinist
terrc r.
Such an essentially nationalistic gesture,
however, has not been, and probably will not be,
a main feature of Kadar's reform strategy He has
since relied mainly on private personal diplomacy
among key groups (students, intellectuals, and
workers). Whether openly or not, however, the
"Hungarian way" is based on an inherent appeal
to the receptively nationalistic population.
One of Kadar's primary concerns has been
the retention of the Kremlin's military, economic,
and political support. In return for leeway in
domestic affairs. Kadar has generally offered to
Moscow his support-although often not whole-
hearied-of Soviet foreign-policy objectives, and a
seeming stability n Hungary. The means of pro-
viding stability had been largely left to Kadar
until 1968, when Czechoslovakia and the Hun-
garian economic reform brought more detailed
Soviet scrutiny.
During the six months after the announce-
ment of March 1969 that Hungary intended to
initiate political reforms, an unusually heavy
strea-n of Hungarian party "study" delegations
beat a path between Moscow and Budapest. No
details of the discussions are available, but it is
almost certain that Moscow probed the Hungarian
programs and intentions in detail. The Soviets had
already registered suspicion of the Hungarian eco-
nomic reform with Kadar early in 1969 when he
sought clearance to proceed in March.
The Hungarians appear to have obtained
Moscow's qualified approval for their reforms,
although the Sov ets have posed some definite
criteria for the economic reform (e.g., no heavy
indebtedness to the West, no heavy unemploy-
ment or rapid inflation, and no disruptions in
contracted trade with the USSR). Specific Soviet
requirements regarding the proposed political
changes, no doubt have been made clear to Buda-
pest, and there has been a sudden resumption of
training in the USSR for local Hungar-an party
officials.
For the most part the Soviets have main-
tained a reserved official silence on the Hungarian
reform process. The closest thing to a Soviet
endorsement was some vaguely worded praise by
Brezhnev at the Hungarian 20th liberation anni-
versary in April 1970. The Hungarians have
pointed to the successful completion of the five-
year plan trade negotiations this fall as an indica-
tion of Soviet support for the economic reform,
but the Kremlin has steered clear of specifics.
Whatever the reason for this reticence, the
Hungarians know that their own margin for error
is small. They have therefore made a concerted
effort to improve Hungary's image in Moscow as a
reliable ally. Articles in the Hungarian press ex-
pressing irritation about laudatory Western press
coverage of so-called liberal trends in Hungary are
directly attributable to nervousness that the So-
viets might be misled about Hungarian intentions.
Budapest's concern is well founded. Mos-
cow's acquiescence in the Hungarian political and
economic reforms presupposes above all the assur-
ance of centralized party control. It was the
Czechoslovak leadership's apparent inability to
control the reform process, more than any other
factor, that aroused Soviet fears and doomed the
Czechoslovak experiment in 1968. Despite Mos-
cow's greater confidence in the Hungarian leader-
ship, failure to maintain party authority in Hun-
gary would be almost certain to spark a reaction
in Moscow as hostile as that to Prague's earlier
failure.
Kadar's other major external obstacle to suc-
cesss in his programs is Walter Ulbricht, East
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Germany's dogmatist in matters of ideology. Hun-
gary's NEM is the antithesis of East Germany's
relations between the two leaders can only e-
described as coolly correct. Ulbricht worries
about Kadar's lack of support for Pankow's poli-
cies vis-a-vis West Germany and about Hungary's
eagerness to establish diplomatic relations with
Bonn, East Germany's wishes notwithstanding.
Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Hungarian
experiments are watched with more sympathy.
The Poles, in particular, have shown positive in-
terest and have openly supported various aspects
of the NEM that seem relevant to their similar
economic problems. Hungarian-Polish efforts in
pushing for a restructuring of CEMA and their
common interest in seeking normalization with
Bonn have further enhanced the cooperative at-
mosphere. Also, Kadar's relations with the new
Husak regime in Czechoslovakia have produced
some examples of favorable support. Although
the internal stabilization process in Czechoslo-
vakia drastically limits the moderates' readiness to
involve themselves deeply in problems outside
their country, there is a conscious feeling in
Prague that Kadar's tactics can be selectively ap-
plied in rebuilding the domestic order there.
Moreover, the Hungarians have established close
ties with their Yugoslav neighbors that the Yugo-
slavs themselves have described as a model they
would like other Pact countries to follow.
Political Reforms: Strategy and Tactics
Kadar is convinced that Communism can
thrive in Hungary as long as the right adaptations
are made at the right time. His current goals
appear to be to increase the efficiency and re-
sponsiveness of the system and to widen the base
in meaningful popular participation in politics.
His tactical approach leans heavily on partial de-
Special Report
The Hungarian people would have perished long ago
if its political wisdom had not succeeded in preserving
it.... It is very characteristic ... that by giving up the
battle it has in fact consolidated its position and its
opportunities in Europe... the whole existence of this
people has been a series of lucid compromises and an
uninterrupted meditation on its actual possibilities....
Mihaly Babits, On the Hungarian Character, 1939
Developments in building a socialist society are not
attained by large scale use of force, but by eliminat-
ing antagonistic interests in the social and economic
spheres, by systematically decreasing the use of force
to eliminate existing differences, and by utilizing
democratic forms and methods in the interest of close
cooperation on the widest possible scale with the
masses of the working people.
Imre Nagy, On Communism, 1955-56
There are those who like what we are doing: others
are indifferent or dislike it. Let our reputation be
"the Hungarians know what they want and what they
want they are able to achieve. " We want socialism,
Communism, progress and peace in the world. This is
what we are fighting for and, according to our pow-
ers, we contribute to it. The recent stock-taking
carried out by the central committee was realistic.
Janos Kadar, speech to Angyalfold Workers,
Dec. 1969
centralization of political authority, a firmer ad-
herence to legal requirements, and the legitimiza-
tion of the principle of group participation (e.g.,
trade unions, youth groups) as a check on the
often arbitrary and abusive bureaucracy.
The development of practical mechanisms
for this scheme has been very difficult. Because
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the track records of other reformers (excluding
Tito. who stands n a class by himself) have been
unimpressive and conditions in Hungary call for
some unique approaches, no one foreign model
has been applicable to Kadar's problems. More-
over, Dubcek's adventure in 1968 boded ill for
nationalistic experiments in Eastern Europe. The
Hungarians have argely got around these prob-
lems by selectively adapting aspects of their con-
servative neighbors' political systems relevant to
their problems, mixing them with some cautious
formulas of their own. From the Poles, for ex-
ample, they have taken certain concepts of decen-
tralization and parliamentary reform.
Creating the right atmosphere to accompany
the reform process has been another, considerable
prob em for Kad3r. Too much ballyhoo could
raise expectations to dangerous levels and invite
foreign interference. Too little could give an
academic tone to the reform, and cause it to be
dismissed by the average Hungarian as meaning-
less. The latter danger has been acknowledged to
be the more acceptable, and the party leadership
has opted for a gEnerally low-key approach. The
main problem from the regime's viewpoint is con-
vincing the public of the need for personal disci-
pline during the sensitive reform period.
Kadar does Sot intend a rapid, inflexible
abou-:-face for either the political or economic
system. He is a past master at judicious com-
promise and is willing to retard troublesome as-
pects of his programs that might threaten the
safety of the total program either because of
domestic objections or because of Soviet suspi-
cions Experience with the economic reform of
1968 is illustrative of the impact of Kadar's prag-
matism. Although the economic reform was en-
acted as a package on 1 January 1970, several
important elements of the NEM were not put into
effect immediately because of "political consider-
ations." The most prominent digressions from the
plan were the regime's decision to hold up imple-
mentation of wage -differentiation and the failure
to close down inefficient factories, as scheduled.
Worker opposition to a change in the traditional
egalitarian pay system and to potential unemploy-
ment gave ammunition to domestic conservatives
who disagreed, and still disagree, with the "con-
cessions to capitalism" inherent in the NEM. The
party leadership has patiently worked out com-
promises with the advocates of workers' rights
and seems to have reached an understanding that
will allow the preliminary introduction of wage
differentiation after the tenth party congress. The
issue of closing down inefficient plants, however,
appears still to be unsettled.
Throughout the preparatory stages of the
political reforms, the Hungarians have cautiously
refused to construct an ideological model justify-
ing their approach. They probably believe that
such a move would restrict their options and
invite needless attention from the high priests of
Marxism-Leninism in Moscow, Pankow, and else-
where. Their insistent denials of an intention to
create "a Hungarian way to Communism" and
their equally forceful commitments to "continue
creative applications of the universally valid
tenets of Marxism-Leninism according to local
conditions" are among the anomalies resulting
from the absence of a firm ideological founda-
tion.
Electoral and Parliamentary Reform
The area in which Kadar hopes to make the
most gains in obtaining deeper national involve-
ment in the system is in rrublic participation in
the parliamentary process. To make this attrac-
tive, the regime has ordered another face lifting
for the largely rubber-stamp national assembly
and an electoral reform that contains aspects of
genuine democratization.
Nevertheless, the changes proposed ?n parlia-
ment's political role so far are severely restricted.
The almost total lack of legislative initiative in
that body may be modified slightly, but it is
fairly clear that parliament will not reassume its
pre - Communist era role as supreme lawmaker.
Other bodies, i.e., the Council of Ministers and
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the Presidential Council, will probably retain
legislative initiative in major matters.
The party hopes to improve parliament's ef-
fectiveness in widening the scope of its authority
to debate certain problems and to increase its
supervision over the government. It is unlikely,
however, that critical areas, such as trade, foreign
policy, secret police activities, or defense policy
will get more than approving nods from the legis-
lature. At the same time, there is a good chance
that parliament's authority to look into domestic
consumption policies, corruption, and programs
such as education, welfare, and medical services
will be enhanced. Whether this investigative au-
thority will be complemented by the power to
force the government to comply with the parlia-
ment's will has not been made clear. The regime
hopes that the concessions it plans will be gen-
erally viewed as an upgrading of public control
worth supporting.
Another and a more solid step is the reform
of the electoral system, already passed by the
national assembly on 3 October 1970. Under this
new system, the populace receives the right to
nominate candidates to run against the list drawn
up by the party for national assembly and local
government seats. The scheme also provides for
the eradication of the most flagrant bias of the
old system; it abolishes the "negative vote"
(whereby all unmarked ballots were regarded as
votes for the official candidate), provides for pos-
sible party endorsement of two contending candi-
dates, and promises that all candidates, despite
their endorsement or lack of it, will have equal
opportunity to use public forums in their cam-
paigns. There are still prohibitions against the
nomination of openly hostile persons, but there
appears to be no internal mechanism that assures
the election of an official candidate.
The party will fight actively for its endor-
sees, and its influence (and block of votes) still is
a strong prejudicial factor in the system. If a
district's voters prove adamant about nominating
and supporting their own candidates, however,
Special Report
there appears to be no certain means of pushing
through an unpopular official candidate. This as-
pect of the system could eventually cause serious
embarrassment to the some 20 party leaders who
hold elective posts and under the electoral reform
must take their records before a popular nomina-
tion system.
The regime, however, is not considering and
will not countenance the creation of a cohesive or
a national opposition. The popular nomination
system is limited by geographical boundaries. The
Hungarian Communists have not seriously con-
templated a multiparty system since the 1956
revolt, and they have no intention of doing so in
the foreseeable future. All candidates will have to
swear allegiance to the party's policies.
The Kadar regime has admitted and has set
out to rectify some of the shortcomings of mono-
lithic command authority vested in the central
state bureaucracy. In the economy, where the
defects of the system were most glaring, the Hun-
garians moved early, introducing the NEM in
1968. Now, partially as a result of new require-
ments generated by the economic reform and
partly by a desire to rationalize the cumbersome
and inefficient process of state administration,
consistent political decentralization in the form
of new local council law is to be discussed by the
party congress.
"All tasks which solely concern local inter-
ests, or which can most efficiently and most eco-
nomically be resolved locally should be relegated
to the jurisdiction of the local councils" is the
slogan behind the program. In effect, however,
the party probably intends initially to restrict this
authority to matters of culture and education,
social welfare, and local economics. To emphasize
its firm intentions, the party leadership has al-
ready taken steps to establish the economic and
political power base for the local councils.
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The Hungarians are keenly aware of charges
that they are "playing at self-management"
(Yucoslav style), but they deny that there will be
any ocal power bases that could pre-empt general
party prerogatives in forming national policy. In
fact, the congress will specifically order the party
apparatus to "interfere in any politically impor-
tant matter irrespective of jurisdictional consider-
ations." On the other hand, the Hungarians bridle
at the suggestion that this provision negates the
whole purpose of the decentralization and em-
phasize that the `'"ugoslav restrictions on the in-
tegriiy of "self-managing units" in practice are
not much different from what the Hungarians
plan.
At the same time, the party hopes that by
giving local government bodies the tools and au-
thoriy to conduct local affairs it can develop an
effective alternative to centralized inefficiency.
Arbitrary abuses of power and protected chi-
canery in the present system have already caused
serious criticism cf "institutionalized irresponsi-
bility," and frank warnings by party intellectuals
of a deterioration of respect for the state and
socialism itself are no longer taken lightly by the
regime.
As can be seen from events in Poland and
Czechoslovakia in 1968, an East European re-
gime's relations with intellectuals and youth are
central to domestic stability. The Kadar govern-
ment's recent achievements with both groups are
promising, but some negative trends are building
that tie first secretary is moving to avoid.
Hungary's creative intelligensia in particular
have been rather content with the modus vivendi
achieved with the regime. There is no comprehen-
sive censorship, regime restrictions on artistic con-
tent are fairly ligl-t, and the means of enforce-
ment are generally limited to manipulation of
material incentives, personal argumentation, and
stern warnings. Imprisonment of intellectuals for
dissent is all but inheard of: the most recent
Special Report
known case, in 1964, involved charges of subver-
sive activities by the Chinese Communist Em-
bassy-and the Hungarians pride themselves on
avoiding the "Asiatic" cultural controls employed
by the Soviets. Kadar's promise to fight hostile
ideas but not the people espousing them lies at
the core of this pragmatic policy for winning the
cooperation of the nation's intelligentsia.
This is not to deny that there are still under-
lying frictions in relations with the intellectuals.
For one thing, the early granting of relative free-
dom to the intellectuals has brought them much
closer to the limits of permissiveness than any
other sector of society. As a result, the party
congress reform package contains no new conces-
sions for the intellectuals and, in fact, shows
evidence of an attempt to consolidate the re-
gime's hold over them by introducing a new
propaganda concept, that of the "socialist cham-
pion, with suitably ideological criteria for judg-
ing cultural products.
Hungarian writers have quietly countered by
pushing a scheme for freeing themselves $rom the
grip of centrally formed policies. An unprece-
dented influx of once hostile liberals into the
behind the door
they are plotting our lives
we don't even know the questions
we try to pass off answers
memorized beforehand
anxiety
beads our faces
solitude of minus 273 degrees
maybe our turn will come soon
before the granite
slabs of waiting
topple and crush us
Sandor kakos (newly elected member of Hungarian
Writers Union Steering Committee)
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Writers' Union hierarchy at its congress last spring
has created an unusual degree of unity behind the
intellectuals' drive for a "new cultural mech-
anism." Orthodox critics have sent up a howl of
public protest decrying the low state of ideologi-
cal purity and the "uncritical acceptance of West-
ern ideas" in the cultural community. Kadar has
refused, so far, to take sides in the squabble and
hopes to avoid open ruptures on the issue because
factional infighting in Hungary could spread
rapidly and uncontrollably beyond the dispute's
original limits.
Hungarian youth have been so quiescent in
the past decade that they have hardly figured at
all in the regime's daily considerations. For young
people, overt political activity has largely been
limited to torpid demonstrations organized by the
party's front organization, The Communist Youth
League (KISz). Infrequent antiregime activity has
been squelched by the regime's secret police
through their effective network of informants.
Furthermore, Kadar's permissive attitudes toward
the emulation of innocent Western fads have pro-
vided a useful means of allowing the young
people safely to blow off steam.
In this atmosphere young people have
largely turned their attentions toward individual
goals, participating in "required" political activi-
ties out of cynical self-interest but avoiding any
real identification with the regime and its aims.
The party leadership, lulled by the ability of KISz
to create satisfactory demonstrations of youth
support, had largely left the formulation of youth
policy to second-rate party hacks. The student
disturbances that swept through Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and East Germany in 1968, however,
caused the Hungarian leadership to review its poli-
cies. Proceeding from detailed samplings of youth
opinion, a study made by the regime found that
the situation was not quite as benign as it had
assumed.
Widespread dissociation from the regime and
its goals, deep pessimism over the nation's future
possibilities, and dissatisfaction with the forma-
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tion of long-range policy without reference to
youth's aspirations were some of the findings of
the study. After a brief flurry of finger-pointing
and mutual recriminations, the party announced a
detailed program that was to prepare a new youth
policy. The first step was the sacking of the old
KISz leaders and the breaking of that organiza-
tion's monopoly of authority in youth affairs. A
nationwide canvas of all state, party, and front
groups for suggested reforms of youth policy was
undertaken, and these are to be discussed at the
party congress. Another step taken was the prep-
aration of a "youth constitution" (similar to East
Germany's) aimed at detailing in a legal document
the responsibilities of the various units of society
to young people, as well as the duties and rights
of the country's youth.
The party also has promised young people
more opportunities to rise to leading positions. It
has stressed its sincerity by opening its ranks to
18-year-olds for the first time. It has undertaken
some changes in the administration of higher edu-
cation, granting university administrations and
students more authority to deal with their cam-
pus problems. It has also promised to remedy
some of the social ills influencing young people's
attitudes.
Legal Structure and the Police
The question of legality in Hungary is emo-
tion laden, because any discussion of the topic
inevitably leads backward to the Stalinist terror
and the gross illegalities accompanying it. One of
Kadar's most galling failures has been his inability
to find a suitable means of rationalizing the
events of the Stalin era. All of Kadar's amnesties,
exonerations, and symbolic honoring of the vic-
tims have not and cannot erase the shameful
memory of the degradation of the whole nation
that supplied cheering ranks for senseless execu-
tions, tortures, and imprisonments. Moreover,
events outside Kadar's control, such as the inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia and the anti-Semitic
purge in Poland during 1968-69, renew tensions
and suspicions, forcing Kadar constantly to revive
his assurances.
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Because Kadar cannot conclusively rid him-
self of this problem by any other means, he has
opted for some institutional guarantees. Although
denying any intention to instill artificial "legal-
istic' inhibitions on the power of the party, he
has gradually turned to the law as a means of
diluting the arbitrariness of state power. For ex-
ample, although tt-e "new" passport law passed in
1970 is little more than a public codification of
once-secret administrative decisions, it contains
the significant addition of a right to obtain a
written statement of the reason for being refused
a passport and the establishment of a process for
appeal of the initial decision. The law contains no
airtight assurances of freedom to travel, but it
does make it more difficult for the police ar-
bitrarily to reject passport applications.
Similar qualitative reforms are scheduled in
legal administration. Changes upgrading the pro-
cedural rights of defense counsels have been pro-
posed, as has a review of the unnecessarily com-
plicated (and prejudicial) organization of the
court structure. There is also a discernible move-
meni to decrease the number of "political
crimes" that should be dealt with as misdemean-
ors punished by fire.
Another central issue is the role and au-
thori-_y of the secret police. Since Kadar came to
power, he has extended party control over that
once-autonomous and all-powerful body. Abuse
by the secret police of its extralegal powers has
been slowly restricted, but until early 1970 there
had not been any serious official questioning of
the powers themselves. In January 1970, how-
ever, Interior Minister Andras Benkei announced
his office's dissatisfaction with the effects of this
unique authority. Benkei complained that the
police are often used as final arbiters of disputes
in which no illegality is even suspected and which
in many cases are simple failures of officials to
work out their own problems. He announced ad-
ministrative decisions within the ministry aimed
at chocking such proceedings and asked for a clear
codif cation of his ministry's duties vis-a-vis other
government ministries. Furthermore, Benkei
SE
specifically asked that certain, unspecified duties
that more properly belong to other ministries be
specifically deleted from his charter.
As a practical political program, the changes
requested by Benkei have not received much pub-
lic exposure since their announcement. There are
very delicate secondary effects of such a pro-
gram-not the least of which is the Soviet attitude
toward any weakening of the power of the secret
police-and it is not likely that the party will push
these changes while other aspects of the domestic
reforms still present some potential for internal
disruption.
A central issue of political reform in Hun-
gary is modernization of the constitution. This
involves more than just semantics. The old con-
stitution, a relic of the Stalinist period, is sadly
lacking in any serious relationship to present-day
realities. The party's role is obscured by the con-
spiratorial, underground psychology of the old
constitution's drafters, and the rights and duties
of the citizenry are less than clear.
Although it can be argued that constitutions
have little practical importance in Communist
countries, Kadar nevertheless sees a new constitu-
tion as a basic prop for his reform programs. Up
to now, his continuous assurances of an intention
to eradicate Stalinism have not been popularly
considered a serviceable guarantee of the future.
Furthermore, disparities between the letter of the
constitution and the bureaucracy's practice
hinder the regime's ability to establish credibility
among a wary population. Kadar needs a realistic
constitution-one that more accurately reflects
the political realities in terms of legitimizing the
present power structure, and at the same time
provides a basis for developing reforms.
Kadar controls the party leadership, but this
does not mean that he is always able to reconcile
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differences within the party or in every instance
to get the party apparatus to do his bidding.
Conservatives in the lower- and middle-level hier-
archies still oppose the more liberal aspects of his
programs and are quite skillful at using bureau-
cratic means to muddy the party leadership's
original intentions. Their numerical and organiza-
tional strength is not known, but the conserva-
tives have been powerful enough to bring their
objections to bear against Kadar on the floor of
past party congresses. There has been evidence of
similar conservative dissent during the prepara-
tions for the tenth party congress.
A furor among party rank and file over de-
clining party influence, at least so described in the
conservative-oriented trade-union journal, is the
latest overt pegpoint for attacks on leadership
policies. The journal contends that party mem-
bers are losing their prestige in their places of
work because of the increased authority of local
management, and it complains of a widespread
"lack of respect" for party members. The attack
used some of the hard-line jargon seen in Czecho-
slovakia during the recent purges. To dramatize
the case, it charged the existence of a "moral
terror... against those in the party who should
speak out."
The appearance of such a diatribe in the
official trade-union journal suggests that Sandor
Gaspar, the head of the trade-union council and a
member of the party politburo, may be one of
the leaders of the opposition. The Communists in
the trade-union movement and particularly in the
leadership positions appear to be trying to get the
support of workers who are apprehensive about
inflation and possible unemployment. Regime
leaders have countered, promising that the tenth
party congress will adopt "a grand social pro-
gram," including better wages and living condi-
tions.
Aside from expected minor factional infight-
ing, the congress will have the traditional duties
of praising the past, explaining the present, and
planning the future. The economic reform pro-
Special Report
gram will be cautiously extended into new areas,
the political reform will be adopted, and party
personnel and administrative policies for the next
four years will be set.
A new cadre policy will involve some thorny
problems. Kadar always insisted on "maintaining
the stability of leading organs" as a key in his
efforts to preserve domestic order. This policy has
succeeded, but perhaps a little too well. Party
leaders from the central committee on up are
fairly balanced in terms of social and political
roles, and their average age is in the early fifties.
But there is attitudinal isolation between this
group and the 20-25 percent of the people who
have grown to maturity in postrevolt Hungary.
The Kadar regime has failed to elevate a single
party member from the postrevolt generation to a
policy-making post. Furthermore, the presence of
honorary central committee members in their
dotage exacerbates the frustrated ambition of the
generation in waiting, particularly in view of the
fact that this better educated young generation
has assumed many responsible administrative
posts in the economy, government service, and
even in the local party apparatuses.
Because Kadar's past personnel policies have
not precluded an average 20 to 25 percent turn-
over in the central committee, it is expected that
many of the 20-odd openings resulting from the
upcoming congress will be filled by members of
this so-far-unrecognized generation. It is doubtful,
however, that many young people will emerge in
policy-making positions in the politburo or secre-
tariat.
There are also compelling administrative
reasons that recommend an injection of new
talent into the party leadership. Kadar's intention
of reorienting local party work away from de-
tailed daily interference in routine local govern-
ment and factory matters will run against the
grain of old-timers who are either incapable or
unwilling to adapt. Under the new requirement, a
more sophisticated party presence will be ex-
pected, and in many cases new blood will be
necessary to carry out the changes.
- 11 - 6 November 1970
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These two photos, taken a
year apart in May 1969 and
April 1970, demonstrate the
heavy toll that Kadar's duties
take on his health. He seems
to snap back from periods of
excessive fatigue after a suit-
able rest but the rests are be-
coming more common. Ka-
dar's succession may present
an important underground is-
sue at the tenth party congress.
There will not be many high-level party per-
sonnel changes at the congress. Age and failing
health may force the retirement of the 60-year-
old Foreign Minister Peter, which would also re-
sult ir, his replacerrent on the central committee.
Gyula Kallai, president of the national assembly
and politburo member, has also reached the legal
retirement age, and his political eclipse probably
will Le accelerated by Kadar's desire to revamp
parliament's imagE. Politburo members Dezso
Nemec and Antal Apro are, respectively, over or
near The retirement age, but their status as the
leadership's symbol of continuity from the 1940s
might recommend continued tenure, particularly
inasmuch as the two wield only ceremonial au-
thority. Other shuffles might occur among those
party leaders entrusted with responsibilities in
such chronic problem areas as internal trade and
construction, but tiese changes would cause few
policy problems.
There is a cha ice that the 58-year-old Kadar
will make some slight reference intended to
clarify the problerr of succession to himself. Af-
ter the ninth congress the two front-runners were
party secretaries Bela Biszku and Zoltan
Komocsin. Since that time, however, there have
been persistent rumors that Karoly Nemeth,
Budapest city party boss, has been tapped for
eventual succession to Kadar's mantle. Kadar's
health is not robust (he takes periodic rests of
two to three weeks' duration and is rumored to
have a nervous condition), and there already have
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Karoly Nemeth,
currently an alter-
naTe Politburo
member and party
boss of Budapest,
is a new, but prom-
ising, candidate for
eventual succession
to Kadar.
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been some hints that he should delegate more of
his authority. Beyond clarifying Nemeth's posi-
tion, Kadar is unlikely to open any succession
sweepstakes, to concede any of his authority, or
to take any other steps that could lead to instabil-
ity.
Kadar's chances for a successful, gradual po-
litical reform are better than even for the short
run. He is better armed than most other leaders in
Eastern Europe with precise data concerning the
nation's problems. He has enlisted and received
the cooperation of the most important segments
of society in finding solutions and setting out on
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this new tack. As a result, the program will re-
ceive at least a modicum of popular support.
Nevertheless, small as the scope of the reform
seems from Western eyes, from a Hungarian point
of view it will, if successful, denote the first major
move to create a modern Hungarian state that is
not merely an appendage of the USSR. If there is
a subliminal message inherent in Kadar's programs
that make them salable to the public, this is it. In
the long run, however, the very idea that is so
attractive to Hungarians may prove to be more
than the Soviets could tolerate. Indeed, if the
political reforms were carried some day to their
logical conclusion, it would be more than Kadar
could tolerate. In the meantime, a cautious
Magyarization of Communism will be under
way.
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