WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008300020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 23, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
4
23 October 1970
No. 0393/70
State Dept. review completed
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3r,VT'Sr, 1
(Information as of noon EDT, 22 October 1970)
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FAR EAST
Vietnam: Good Weather Means More Fighting . . . . . . . . 1
Communist China: Lagging Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Cambodia: Confidence Growing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER A YEAR OF TALKING
France-USSR: Pompidou Visit Satisfies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Brezhnev Campaigns for Local Support
Yugoslavia: New Party Conference to Meet
Norway: Coalition Differences Sharpen . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
UN Focuses on the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Egypt: Sadat Forms a New Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
New Fighting Flares in Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA (CONTINUED)
Syria-Iraq: Room at the Top? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Libya: The Enigma of the RCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Chad: Insurgency May Be Worsening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Somalia: Military Regime Completes First Year . . . . . . . . . . 15
India: Mrs. Gandhi's Bandwagon Hits Rut . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: Prospects for Allende Government . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Boliv a: Pressures on President Torres Increasing . . . . . . . . . 18
Castro Woos Pro-Moscow Latin American Communist Parties . . . . 18
Uruguay: Government Problems Mount . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Uncc tainty in Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
NOT3S: Burma: France; Sierra Leone-Nicaragua: Surinam; Costa
Rica
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FAR EAST
Vietnam: Good Weather Means More Fighting...
The weather will begin to improve soon for
military operations over most of Indochina, as the
rainy southwest monsoon gives way to the rela-
tively dry northeast monsoon. The southwest
wind, now tapering off, brought heavy rains and
flooding to southern South Vietnam, most of
Cambodia, and the panhandle of Laos. This
weather develops during the summer when winds
from the southwest pass over the Gulf of Siam
and bring rains to most of Indochina except the
northern half of South Vietnam, which is pro-
tected by the western highlands. During the
winter, winds from the northeast absorb moisture
from the Gulf of Tonkin, and hard rains and
heavy clouds are generally restricted to the ex-
posed flatlands east of the mountains, the coastal
plains of lower North Vietnam, and upper South
Vietnam.
The clear, dry weather prevalent in much of
Indochina during winter months normally bene-
fits allied operations, especially in the air, but
Communist forces also have conducted major
operations during this time. Captured documents
have noted that improved roads and living condi-
tions make fighting in the field much easier for
Communist ground troops. These considerations
apparently outweigh the risk of heavier allied air
attacks.
The government should be in a good posi-
tion to influence the legislature as a result of the
recent organizational elections in the National
Assembly. Progovernment legislators won most of
the leadership positions in the Lower House and
aligned with independents to take the bulk of the
slots in the Senate. President Thieu's aides were
effective, particularly in the Lower House, in mar-
shaling support for progovernment candidates.
The government's strong showing does not
necessarily mean that its relations with the legisla-
ture will be smooth. Many opposition deputies in
the Lower House reportedly are upset by the
alleged use of undisguised pressure in the form of
financial payoffs by Thieu's aides to influence the
elections. The deputies believe these tactics have
damaged the prestige of the House and lowered
the morale of many deputies.
I n the Senate the Independents, who repre-
sent the largest voting bloc, may not vote consist-
ently with regime backers. Opposition leader Vu
Van Mau has expressed bitter disappointment
with the outcome of the voting for Senate com-
mittee officers. His ten-man ticket had won more
votes than any other in the recent countrywide
election for 30 Senate seats, and he expected
substantial support from the Independents in his
bid to head up the Foreign Affairs Committee.
When he lost badly in the organizational elec-
tions, however, he issued a strongly worded state-
ment charging that an alleged plot aimed at divid-
ing "nationalist forces" had influenced the re-
sults.
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Communist China: Lagging Leadership
Peking is becoming increasingly concerned
that overburdened civil and military authorities
are falling out of step with the regime's policies in
many localities. The inadequacies of local officials
are becoming a recurring theme in domestic
propaganda, and a major article in the authorita-
tive party journal Red Flag this week lashed out
at those who constantly complain that "they have
too much to do." Red Flag's repeated references
to the failure of top leaders and senior cadre to
adh3re to Mao's "revolutionary line" point to an
apparently widening gap between the demands of
the central authorities and local performance and
suggest that the bargaining that now must be
carried on between Peking and powerful local
interests is not going smoothly. Moreover, there
are signs that a campaign is under way to subject
local leaders to a new dose of intensified ideo-
logical pressure, a move with distinctly radical
overtones that i; likely to exacerbate existing
stra ns between conservative and militant forces
throughout the leadership hierarchy.
Many of China's current leadership problems
are of Peking's own making. Undermanned local
governing organs are being urged to push a host of
post - Cultural Revolution reconstruction cam-
paigns often containing contradictory aims. Rural
leaders, for example, are being asked to step up
production drives while carrying on unpopular
political campaigns that interfere with normal
peasant routine. Civil officials are being urged to
perform lengthy stints of manual labor on farms
and in factories while at the same time directives
are pouring in from Peking, and office work is
piling up. Finally, reports from provincial military
con-=erences suggest that there is also little letup
in the pressure on professional army men to con-
tinue carrying the heavy burden of civil adminis-
tratve, political, and production tasks they as-
sumed during the Cultural Revolution.
The result of these varied demands is that
harried local authorities are often taking refuge in
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inertia or returning to bureaucratic practices that
were roundly condemned by Mao during the Cul-
tural Revolution. Such tactics, in turn, have ap-
parently led some militant elements in the regime
to urge that the way to deal with recalcitrant
local officials is to increase rather than decrease
the pressures on them. Thus, the Red Flag article
and several subsequent radiobroadcasts argue that
officials who have adopted "go-slow" tactics and
have become "half-baked revolutionar es" must
now be subjected to a new campaign to study
Mao's thought to show which cadres "have really
learned something" from the Cultural Revolution.
Such radical-sounding arguments have not ap-
peared in authoritative pronouncements for some
time. The precautionary tone of the message is
reminiscent of the fact that many party and gov-
ernment bureaucrats who fell during the Cultural
Revolution were initially charged by their op-
ponents with deficiencies in interpreting Mao's
thought.
A further question raised by the current
antibureaucratic furor is the extent to which the
various pressures experienced by local officials are
affecting the top levels of the regime. It now
seems likely, for example, that Mao's more radi-
cally inclined associates have been chafing over
some of the reconstruction programs the regime
has pushed over the past year, and differences at
the top as well as between the center and the
provinces over policy implementation probably
necessitated the convening of the major party
central committee plenum held in Peking last
month. The plenum's failure to produce any new
policy guidelines, coupled with Peking's con-
tinuing delay in convening the long-awaited Na-
tional People's Congress as well as the recent
propaganda stress on leadership problems, all
attest to the seriousness of the difficulties con-
fronting the regime.
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Cambodia: Confidence Growing
Taking advantage of the present lull in sig-
nificant Communist military action, Cambodian
Army forces have,been on the offensive in various
sections of the country during the past week in
order to reduce enemy pressure against several
major roadways. According to a government
spokesman, a sweep operation along Routes 2 and
3 south of Phnom Penh, employing some 6,500
troops, has blunted "a major Communist drive"
against the capital. Large numbers of enemy
troops still are active in areas near the two high-
ways, however. At midweek, government forces
ran into stiff resistance after they had pushed
beyond Takeo town toward the South Vietnam-
ese border. Earlier the Cambodians had claimed
that they had killed 20 Communists and had
captured sizable amounts of enemy materiel.
In Battambang Province, two tactical groups,
each composed of at least two battalions, were
engaged in clearing a 20-mile area south of the
town of Moung on Route 5; two of the battalions
were retrained recently in South Vietnam. In the
most significant action in that province to date,
rear elements of one group encountered major
resistance from Communist forces near Samrong.
The Cambodians sustained losses of eight killed
and 20 wounded, but reported that they killed at
least 42 enemy troops, most of whom were North
Vietnamese.
There were signs that the government's mas-
sive operation to reopen Route 6 to Kompong
Thom city may go on at least until the end of the
year.. Phnom Penh apparently intends to make
sure it has thoroughly consolidated its control
over the column's immediate area of operations
before pushing beyond Tang Kouk in force. The
task force commander has virtually committed his
troops to remain in their present positions strung
out between Skoun and Tang Kouk by pledging
to protect local villagers during the coming rice
harvest. In an effort to instill a greater sense of
participation and patriotism among government
officials, most civil servants in the capital are
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being required to spend 15 days on active duty
with the column, where they draw arms and per-
form routine military functions. The enemy has
been maintaining its sporadic harassing fire
against elements of the column, although few
casualties have resulted.
The relative calm in the military situation
also appears to have acted as a tonic on some
government leaders, who have been venturing into
the countryside to improve the regime's neglected
contacts with the rural population. The acting
chief of state visited Takeo town to commend its
residents and provincial officials for their courage
in the face of Communist harassment, and the
interim president of the National Assembly
carried messages from Phnom Penh to his con-
stituents in Kompong Speu Province.
Bottom bnq
Samrong, ,Moung ;;:: K ompong Thom
IKd1 k
_,dS kop n~1
PHNOM PENH,
Kompong Speu
Takeo
Cambodia
Communist-controlled
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SOH
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BURMA: Exile l3ader U Nu may intend to an-
nounce over his clandestine radio the start of
active military opposition to the Ne Win regime.
Although he may still be in hiding in Bangkok, his
lieutenants claim that he has gone underground in
the Thai-Burma border area. This, however, may
be no more than a maneuver designed to prevent
embarrassment to Thai officials who granted him
asylum more than a year ago with the stipulation
that he not engage in political activity. Although
U Nu's present military capabilities are limited,
his apparent access to additional funds may well
improve his longer run capability for troublemak-
ing.
EU ROPE
France-USSR: Pompidou VisitSatisfles
Both Paris and Moscow have reason to be
pleased with President Pompidou's week-long visit
to the USSR, eve though neither country gained
or gave away anything of great importance. The
only tangible political product of the visit was a
protocol regularizing consultations. This provides
for semiannual talks as well as emergency con-
sultztions should a threat to the peace arise. Each
country, however, attached importance to pro-
moting and expanding the "special relationship"
carved out by De .aaulle in 1966.
For Pompidou, the visit was an opportunity
to demonstrate that despite De Gaulle's departure
the Soviets were still interested in close links with
France. The French President is now so firmly in
control that he no longer has to defer to De
Gau le loyalists in the government and parlia-
ment. Thus, his continuation of Gaullist policy
toward Moscow stems not from fear of alienating
this segment of his domestic support but rather
from a conviction that France's ability to play
any significant role in Europe will in part depend
on is success in cementing its ties with Russia.
Moscow, recognizing Pompidou's sensitivity
to Bonn's Ostpolitik challenge and concern over
inadequate consultations during the recent spate
of detente activity, was eager to allay French
fears on that scare. The attention lavished on
Pompidou, including an almost unprecedented
airport reception by Soviet party chief Brezhnev
and a rarely permitted glimpse of the Soviet space
center at Baikonur, was indicative of Soviet inter-
est in underscoring the value Moscow attaches to
good relations with Paris.
The protocol on political consultations
should also be viewed in this light. It is unlikely
that Moscow attaches much practical significance
to it, but it does serve as a symbolic reaffirmation
of the "special" character of Franco-Soviet rela-
tions. The prompt acceptance by the Soviet lead-
ers of Pompidou's invitation to visit France in
1971 also serves this end.
Pompidou, in return, affirmed French sup-
port-albeit conditional-for Soviet positions on
the Middle East, Vietnam, and European security.
The communique's language on the desirability of
convening a "properly prepared" all-European
security conference (CES) aimed at East-West de-
tente tended to impart new impetus to such a
convocation, especially inasmuch as Pompidou
failed to make the usual link between a CES and
progress on Berlin. French support was hedged,
however, by a reference to adequate preparatory
work and the avoidance of any specific time
frame.
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Despite the joint effort of both sides to put
their economic relations in the best possible light,
the communique and attendant commentary are
long on principles and intentions, but notably
brief on specifics. Both parties recognized that
the resistance of French businessmen to increas-
ing imports of largely unsuitable Soviet goods as
rapidly as their exports to the USSR expand
continues to be the major obstacle to a substan-
tial upswing in trade. Past increases in trade have
been achieved largely on the basis of the Soviet
need for technologically advanced industrial
goods and Paris' willingness to supply long-term
credits to finance such exports. French exports to
the USSR last year amounted to $264 million
compared with imports of only $200 million.
The new long-term trade agreement for
1970-74 signed during the Pompidou visit pro.
vides for French participation in building the
mammoth Kama River truck plant, but the com-
munique does not indicate whether France is to
be the prime contractor in the consortium of
West European manufacturers that Moscow is
trying to put together to undertake this project.
The Soviets also played on the French desire for
new sources of industrial raw materials and fuels,
although the notation that some of these con-
tracts could lead to "preferential cooperation"
suggests that France may have to assume some of
the investment costs entailed in developing
sources of supply in the USSR. Finally, in a
reversal of the normal flow of technical assist-
ance, the communique states that the Soviets will
help build a metallurgical complex in France. If
this project is actually implemented, it presum-
ably would be based on a new Soviet blast furn-
ace technique that has already been licensed to
the Japanese.
FRANCE: The government received an over-
whelming vote of confidence from parliament last
week following Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas'
state-of-the-union message. Although it was not
required, the vote gave the Pompidou regime an
opportunity to win public acknowledgement of
the success of its programs and to involve the
legislature actively in building the "new society."
In his speech, devoted primarily to domestic af-.
fairs, Chaban-Delmas stressed the importance of
reform through the common effort of all socio-
economic groups. The government has in fact
made great strides during the past year, largely
because of innovations introduced to improve the
economy, labor relations, and education. As a
result, France is now more stable than it has been
for some time.
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Brezhnev Campaigns for Local Support
Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev evidently
engaged in considerable politicking on his own
behalf while attending the 50th anniversary cele-
brations in Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan this
summer and fall. As a result, he appears to have
picked up additional support from some impor-
tant local party bosses. Despite these gains, how-
ever, there are other regional party organizations
that remain neutral or even hostile to him, reflect-
ing the continued existence of rival factions
within the leadership.
The ceremonies in Alma-Ata and Baku af-
forded Brezhnev maximum public exposure. He
had the opportunity for extended personal con-
tacts, not only with local officials, but with re-
gional leaders throughout the Soviet Union who
gathered for the celebrations. After leaving Alma-
Ata, Brezhnev made a ten-day swing through the
four Central Asian republics where he toured
enterprises and conferred with various party and
government administrators. His four-day trip to
Baku in early October appeared to be equally
political in nature.
Beneficial effects of this campaigning were
evident at the Baku meeting in the noticeably
warmer attention he received from many of the
Caucasian and Central Asian leaders than on pre-
vious occasions. For example, Uzbek party boss
Rashidov, who is also a candidate member of the
politburo and has avoided anything more than a
neutral reference to Brezhnev in the past, devoted
most of his brief speech in Baku to praising the
leader's "brilliant, exciting" ' speech.
The Azerbaydzhan party boss, new to the
job a year ago, was particularly laudatory. In his
speech in Baku he repeatedly addressed his re-
marks to "you personally, Leonid Ilich," and,
unlike his predecessor, gave every sign of being
solidly in Brezhnev's camp. The Armenian party
boss also demonstrated his political allegiance to
the general secretary by referring to "the po-
litburo headed by comrade Brezhnev. The lat-
ter's protege, Kazakh party boss Kunayev, had
previously been the only important party official
to give Brezhnev this title.
Speakers from other regions, however, main-
tained their traditional aloofness. Brezhnev's
speeches were ignored at both meetings by repre-
sentatives from Belorussia, Estonia, Lithuania,
and Leningrad. The new party boss from Lenin-
grad even ignored him in Baku. Leaders from
these areas have been remarkably consistent in
their coolness to Brezhnev over the years.
A clear picture of Brezhnev's standing with
the various regional party organizations has thus
emerged. He is evidently on his way to consoli-
dating his position in Central Asia and the Cau-
casus. He has strong support in Moldavia and the
Ukraine, although Ukrainian party boss Shelest
seemingly remains neutral. In the Russian Repub-
lic, Brezhnev can apparently count on the alle-
giance of Moscow city leaders, but officials with
ties to Voronov, the premier of the republic, have
remained silent. Brezhnev seems to have no sup-
port in Leningrad, Belorussia, or the Baltic, with
the possible exception of Latvia.
One aspect of this hostility to Brezhnev, at
least among leaders of such highly developed
areas as Leningrad and Estonia, is the belief that
his views on economic administration are not
sufficiently modern. There is the danger, there-
fore, that Brezhnev's increasingly close political
association with the less developed regions of the
south may only strengthen this view, thus hard-
ening divisions within the leadership. 25X1
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Yugoslavia: New Party conference to Meet
The Yugoslav party conference-created at
last year's ninth party congress-faces a plethora
of major problems when it meets for the first
time from 28 to 30 October. The 280 delegates
gathered in Belgrade will have little time to de-
vote to the mechanics of their constituent session,
but instead will immediately tackle the nation's
serious economic problems, as well as the govern-
mental reorganization necessitated by Tito's pro-
posais for a collective presidency.
The divergent opinions on these subjects en-
countered among the party presidium, which met
on 16 October, are a good indication of the
potentially divisive nature of the issues at hand.
S pE a k i n g to the 52-member body, ranking
Macedonian party official Krste Crvenkovski de-
livered a report on the current sociopolitical situa-
tion in Yugoslavia. Crvenkovski's draft was
adopted only after an extensive discussion during
whi:h some ten members of the presidium spoke.
This apparently unexpected and time-consuming
debate forced postponement of Foreign Minister
Tepavac's previoL sly announced address until the
next meeting.
The full texi of Crvenkovski's report has not
been published, but a newscast indicated it dealt
with self-management, the future role of the re-
publics in the Yugoslav federal system, national
defense, and in particular, the state of the Yugo-
slav economy.
In addressing themselves to current eco-
nomic problems, several presidium speakers in-
dicated that some uncomfortable "belt-tighten-
ing" may be in the offing. New measures will
probably include added restrictions on credit and
budgetary spending, as well as new price and
import controls. The regime will be careful, how-
ever, to avoid the harsh restrictive measures that
brought on the severe 1967 recession. In fact,
senior government officials have already indicated
they will not return to centralized, adrninistative
economic controls.
Yugoslavia, however, is fast approaching an
inflationary crisis similar to those of 1961 and
1964. During the first nine months of 1970,
wholesale and retail prices rose by approximately
10 percent and the cost of living currently is
increasing at an annual rate of 12 percent. Enter-
prise managers in various sectors of the economy
are reported to be on the verge of requesting
additional price increases.
Increased investments and a marked growth
in personal incomes have brought additional pres-
sure on domestic prices and have caused a surge in
imports-both of which aggravate the country's
spiraling inflation. Despite a good export per-
formance, the hard-currency trade deficit already
is well above the level for all of 1969. As a
countermeasure, the government several months
ago imposed a temporary 5 percent tax on im-
ported goods, but this half-hearted action has not
yet had any effect.
The five-year plan for 1971-75 has been de-
layed by these problems, and interrepublic squab-
bling over preferential aid to Yugoslavia's under-
developed republics has postponed the plan even
further. Enactment of a new long-term plan soon
is not likely, but a medium-term plan is report-
edly being prepared. All of this points to a oten-
tially heated party conference.
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Norway: Coalition Differences Sharpen
Prime Minister Borten's center-right govern-
ment begins the new parliamentary year divided
over the extent of its commitment to membership
in the European Communities (EC) and chal-
lenged by a resurgent opposition Labor Party,
which may be willing to form a minority govern-
ment if the coalition stumbles.
The four-party coalition, initially installed in
1965, acquitted itself favorably, during its first
four-year term in office, aided by a rapidly de-
veloping industrial economy and a strong interna-
tional demand for Norwegian shipping. On the
eve of the 1969 elections, however, the combina-
tion of a slight softening in the economy and the
enactment of a value-added tax that threatened a
jump in the cost of living redounded to the ad-
vantage of the Labor Party. That party also suc-
cessfully reoriented itself to the left, attracting to
its ranks dissidents who earlier had wasted their
votes by supporting radical splinter groups. The
1969 elections thus resulted in a razor-thin, two-
vote parliamentary majority for the bourgeois
coalition.
Of the parties in the government, the Con-
servatives and Liberals, disappointed in their
showing in the elections and facing considerable
problems in realigning relationships among their
leaders in government, parliamentary, and party
positions, replaced most of their men in the cabi-
net during 1970. Their principal aim was to shore
up their constituencies and to engage the interest
of the voters, looking toward the 1973 elections.
Even so, voter sentiment, as measured in monthly
public opinion polls, showed a small but persist-
ent shift of support away from the bourgeois
parties, especially the Liberals, and in July the
Labor Party topped the four coalition parties
combined for the first time since 1965. The swing
to Labor may have been prompted by the nine
per cent increase in the cost of living from mid-
1969 to mid-1970 that resulted from the intro-
duction of the value-added tax.
Compounding the coalition's problems at
this time has been a growing dissatisfaction
among Conservatives and Liberals with the stew-
ardship of Prime Minister Borten. There have re-
cently been active behind-the-scenes efforts to
persuade him to step down voluntarily, but he has
refused. He is meanwhile wrestling with powerful
elements in his own agrarian-oriented Center
Party who are determined to obstruct negotia-
tions for Norway's entry into the EC, which he,
as government leader, has reluctantly approved.
Pushing hardest for EC membership are the Con-
servatives, representing shipping, banking, and
big-business interests. Their prolonged and ulti-
mately victorious battle with Borten for the
dominant negotiating role in Brussels earned the
prime minister the sympathy of all the other
parties' youth groups, who are unanimous in their
opposition to Norway's entry.
Even without the Labor opposition's pub-
licizing the disarray in the government, the steady
fraying of intracoalition relations in such matters
as the role of religion in the schools could lead to
a parliamentary reverse. The government's fate
may well hinge on the Labor Party's assessment
of whether it would be more advantageous to
take over the reins of government now, requiring
a potentially divisive reimposition of party disci-
pline on its own young mavericks, or to count on
growing voter discontent to give the party a clear
majority in 1973.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
UN Focuses on the Middle East
The Arabs, IeJ by Egypt, have received ap-
prova of their request that the General Assembly
begin debate on the Middle East on 26 October
following completion of the UN commemorative
ceremonies. Certain to be a focal point of the
debate are the countercharges over cease-fire vio-
lations, but tangential issues, such as the status of
the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), may
also be affected by the anticipated acerbic discus-
sion-
In pressing for the debate, Egypt has taken
the line that it must have an Assembly resolution
calling for continuation of the cease-fire and early
resumption of the .,arring talks before it can agree
to extend the cease-fire beyond 5 November.
Such 3 low-key resolution would probably get an
overwhelming majority.
Under pressure from the radical Arab states,
however, Egypt may press for language calling for
Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in
the 1967 war as a precondition of any settlement
and for restoration of the "rights" of the Pales-
tinians. The US mission in New York believes
such wording might well obtain a majority in the
Asserrbly, although probably not the two-thirds
vote required if the issue is declared an Important
Quest on. A new resolution on the Middle East at
this critical juncture would have an unsettling
impact both on the 1967 Security Council resolu-
tion, the basic document in the search for a
settlement, and the currently languishing Big
Four talks.
Any extended discussion of Palestinian
"rights" is likely to have repercussions adverse to
UNRWA, which provides welfare services in Mid-
dle East refugee camps. Considerable concern
over the fedayeen's ability to utilize the camps in
Lebanon and Jordan-and thus, UNRWA aid-is
the chief factor behind the tepid international
response to the current urgent appeal for funds
by the agency. UNRWA needs about $5.1 million
to cover its 1970 operating deficit and an esti-
mated additional $2 to 3 million for rehabilita-
tion of the camps in Jordan in the wake of the
army-fedayeen warfare. Some 30-35,000 students
lack school facilities in the camps as a result of
the heavy damage and looting.
Although the agreement between fedayeen
leader Arafat and the Jordanian Government re-
mains tenuous, Amman can hardly fail to join the
other Arab states at the UN in vigorously support-
ing Palestinian interests.
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Egypt: Sadat Forms a New Cabinet
The appointment this week of Mahmud
Fawzi as prime minister was apparently calculated
to forestall infighting among Nasir's heirs. Fawzi
is acceptable to all the major domestic power
interests and has not been publicly identified with
either the USSR or the West.
Fawzi's retention of virtually all of the pre-
vious administration's cabinet members is in turn
designed to minimize any fears of a break with
Nasir's policies and to extract maximum political
mileage from the strong hold that the memory of
Nasir has on the Egyptians. By settling on Fawzi,
a career diplomat who has no political following
of his own, Egypt's leaders avoided an immediate
struggle within the ruling circle that might have
been touched off had the choice fallen on either
All Sabri or Zakariya Muhyeddin, who have been
tagged as pro-Soviet and pro-Western, respec-
tively.
The new Egyptian President also sought to
forge a link with Nasir's policies in the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's only political
party, by naming Abd-al Muhsin Abu-al-Nur as its
secretary general. Abu-al-Nur has been the ASU's
assistant secretary general since the June 1967
war.
The formation of the new government leaves
the transitional collegial leadership essentially in-
tact with the instruments of power still in the
hands of Sadat, Minister of State Sami Sharaf,
Interior Minister Sharawi Jumah, and Ali Sabri.
Despite his apparent exclusion from the top posts
in the government, Sabri, a senior member of
both the National Defense Council and the ASU
Executive Committee, presumably has the per-
sonal power to play a role in all key decisions.
The Soviet Union is unlikely to be antag-
onized by the new faces in the government. To
maintain its position in Egypt, Moscow is con-
cerned only that there be a stable, pro-Soviet
regime in Cairo; its interests are not tied to any
one individual. Cognizant of Moscow's minimum
requirements, the Egyptian Army at this point is
likely to agree to any governmental lineup that is
acceptable to the Soviets and thus provides for a
continued flow of arms to Cairo.
New Fighting Flares in Jordan
Sharp and occasionally heavy exchanges of
gunfire have been taking place intermittently in
north Jordan since last weekend. Although each
side has predictably blamed the other, the fight-
ing seems to have been touched off by the army's
efforts to improve its position. On 17 October,
army units apparently moved to new locations
west of Ramtha on the Syrian border, and the
fedayeen attempted to force them to withdraw.
The army was probably trying to seal off the
Syrian border area in order to prevent supplies
and reinforcements from reaching the fedayeen in
the north.
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Repeated local cease-fires arranged by the
Arab truce comm-ttee have held for varying
lengths of time, only to fall through. The in-
tensity of the clashes seems to be ebbing, how-
ever, and the committee may be bringing the
situation under control.
King Husayn seems to be trying to strike a
pose of firmness and flexibility at the same time.
On the one hand, Zaid bin Shakir-who is notori-
ously hardnosed on the fedayeen issue and was
previously dismissed from his army post at feda-
yeen insistence-has been promoted to major gen-
eral and given a position on the joint military
committee charged by the Arab truce team with
implementing provisions of the agreement of 13
October. At about the same time, however, in a
move possibly aimed at reassuring the Palestin-
ians, the King announced that Prime Minister
Tuqan had been made military governor general
in place of Field Marshal Majali. Another civilian
was appointed Tuqan's deputy, and Jordan's in-
cumbent civilian governors will now act as re-
gional military governors. Although the provisions
of martial law remain in force, they will be ad-
ministered by civilian authorities.
Syria-Iraq: Rocin at the Top?
The political situation in Damascus is far
from clear. Press sources in midweek said that
Defense Minister Asad had forced the resignation
of Atasi from the presidency and from his other
key posts as premier and secretary general of the
Baath party.
Whatever the real situation among the lead-
ership, the populace appears to be little bothered.
US and foreign press observers inside Damascus
have detected no undue tension, and the public
has displayed only apathy over the political
machinations of the "leaders."
There has been speculation that the struggle
arose over Syria's recent involvement in the Jor-
danian crisis. Asad is said to have opposed this
and-as the representative of the military wing of
the party-tried to downgrade the role of the
civilian and so-called Marxist members of the re-
gime. Press sources also allege that Asad has
clamped down on Saiqa, the Syrian fedayeen or-
ganization, and has placed other influential per-
sons under house arrest; there is no confirmation
of these reports, however.
In Iraq, the status of the apparent power
struggle is no less hazy. Harlan Tikriti has been
relieved as vice president, a post he attained last
spring when he was removed as defense minister
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and when his downward slide from power prob-
ably began. Speculation is strong in the press
that he was dropped because of his opposition to
direct Iraqi involvement on the side of the feda-
yeen in the Jordan crisis. The real reason, how-
ever, may have more to do with a personal
Libya: The Enigma of the RCC.
The Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC) has abruptly made important but ambig-
uous changes in the cabinet that it appointed only
last month. Simultaneously, it announced death
sentences for four officers who had been retried
on treason charges for which they had received
onl light sentences last summer.
What has really happened, however, is far
from clear. Although Interior Minister al-Huni
was dropped from the cabinet, he resumed his
former position as chief of intelligence.f---
L_J The treasury minister, Muhayshi, has as-
sumed the post of prosecutor-general for the Peo-
ple's Court, set up to try enemies of the state-
more specifically, the numerous members of the
former regime who have been languishing in jail
for more than a year. Muhayshi may also have
already held his present assignment before he left
the cabinet. Thus, not only is the timing of these
various appointments in doubt but, given the
present rubber-stamp character of the cabinet, it
is uncertain whether or not leaving the ministers'
posts constitutes demotion in the current RCC
struggle for power than any real substantive dif-
ferences between those at the top. The Jordan
situation may be just a convenient expedient for
removing Tikriti-a rival of others in power who
happened to be in Spain on his way to attend the
UN General Assembly sessions.
pecking order. The new minister of interior is a
lackluster RCC member known primarily for his
closeness to Premier Qaddafi. The treasury func-
tions, but apparently not the ministerial post,
have been assumed at least temporarily by Dep-
uty Premier Jallud in his role as economy min-
ister.
The moves could be related to the sen-
tencing of the convicted officers, but the connec-
tion may be less momentous to Arab than to
Western eyes. Nevertheless, the death sentences-
if they are indeed carried out-will be very un-
popular. The government may therefore concen-
trate on a large show trial of other "traitors" of
the former regime in order to divert the public
and particularly the army. In such an effort, the
25X1
post of prosecutor-general would assume greatly 25X1
increased importance for the state. AI-Huni may
have been interested chiefly in dissociating
himself from the execution of brother officers,
which would have been his responsibility as min-
ister of interior.
In any event, there is nothing at present to
suggest that the series of announcements indicates
any serious opposition to Premier Qaddafi in the
RCC or any lessening of his control over the
Libyan Government.
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Chad : Insurgency May Be Worsening
After a long lull, Muslim dissidence has
picked up in northern Chad amid unconfirmed
reports of Libyan involvement and some signs of
renewed rebel activity in the east. Nevertheless,
Paris is not likely at present to alter its plans to
reduce its direct rcle in counterinsurgency opera-
tions.
Libya's recent expulsion of some 2,000
Toubou tribesmen has apparently rekindled rebel
aggressiveness in tie north, which is populated
mostly by these nomads. Minor skirmishes have
increased over the past month and two ambushes
Areas of Muslim Dissidence
Northern (Toibou)
Central-Eastern (National Liberation
Front of Chad FROLINA and Chad
Liberation Front FLT)
have cost government forces relatively high cas-
ualties. Eleven French soldiers were killed on 11
October, the heaviest single loss sustained by
French troops since they intervened n April
1969. Relief forces captured arms similar to those
used by the Libyan Army, leading the French to
conclude that Tripoli is aiding the Toubou. Presi-
dent Tombalbaye has long suspected Libyan com-
plicity.. The weapons, however, may well belong
to those Toubou who constituted the bodyguard
of the deposed Libyan king and who probably
were expelled along with their brethren.
In eastern Chad, a major new offensive has
suddenly been prepared against other Muslim dis-
sidents, causing at least a two-month delay in the
scheduled withdrawal of the remaining French
foreign legionnaires. The cease-fire in the central
area remains in effect, but military leaders are
now somewhat pessimistic over the forthcoming
peace talks with rebel chiefs.
The French command doubts the ability of
the Chadian forces to assume the fighting next
year. It has probably pressed Paris to extend the
mid-1971 deadline for the final pullout of combat
troops. French officials in Paris, however, face
mounting criticism at home over the unpopular
intervention and believe that the situation outside
the north is basically under control. They have
therefore reaffirmed the policy of phased troop
withdrawals and expanded advisory assistance.
President Tombalbaye is deeply alarmed and
fears that the French will leave him in the lurch.
Under the circumstances, he may feel compelled
to come to political terms with the insurgents
before the French depart.
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Somalia: Military Regime Completes First Year
The military Supreme Revolutionary Coun-
cil that seized power in October 1969 observed its
first anniversary this week. During the year, the
regime has steadily strengthened its grip on the
machinery of government. Militarization of local
and regional administration is now complete and
the council dominates the civilian bureaucracy.
Tough internal security laws, periodic arrests of
former civilian officials and politicians, and the
unprecedented use of occasional public execu-
tions have helped discourage antigovernment
activity. Opposition that surfaced following the
coup is still present among former politicians,
some tribal groups, the police, and in the army
itself, but it has not coalesced into an effective
force.
Despite some initial popular approval of the
coup, the council is now generally unpopular, and
its attempts to solve Somalia's staggering social
and economic problems have produced only
meager results. Although considerable effort has
been made to win public support for various
reform programs, the impact appears to have been
minimal and the constant outpouring of propa-
ganda and rhetoric has taken on a tone of growing
frustration.
I n keeping with its attempts to create a
"revolutionary" image, the regime has moved
decidedly leftward in implementing what it calls a
"positive neutrality" in foreign policy. Relations
have been established with North Korea, North
Vietnam, and East Germany, and recognition has
been extended to the Viet Cong and to exiled
Prince Sihanouk. Although Somalia is a Muslim
state with long-standing ties to the Middle East,
the council presently identifies more closely with
the Arab states than has any previous govern-
ment. These moves are partly ideological but have
also been motivated by a desire to tap new
sources of economic assistance, which the coun-
try desperately needs.
Closer to home, the government has been
very cautious in dealing with neighboring Ethio-
pia and Kenya, and has made no effort to undo
the detente established with these countries in
1967 by ousted prime minister Egal. Relations
with the US, however, have drifted steadily to
their lowest level in the ten years since independ-
ence; the outlook for any immediate improve-
ment remains dim. The Soviets now maintain the
most substantial foreign presence in the country:
there are approximately 250 military and 100
civilian advisers and technicians on the scene.
With the regime apparently well entrenched,
any changes that might occur seem more likely to
come from within the council, the inner workings
of which are still unclear. There have been per-
sistant rumors of discord among the leaders over
the past year but, for the present, the 24 army
and police officers on the council appear willing
to submerge their differences and stick to-
gether
SIERRA LEONE: Prime Minister Stevens gained
an important political victory this week when
Parliament voted to ratify his state of emergency
declaration of last month. The ratification gives
the government sweeping powers and boosts
Stevens' stock and that of party extremists who
advised the current crackdown on opponents of
the regime. Stevens also is continuing to con-
solidate his control over the security forces. He
probably will order further arrests or dismissals,
possibly including those of the army and police
chiefs. Although the prime minister has thus
preserved his immediate position, the basic
divisions that produced the recent political vio-
lence persist.
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Ind i a : Mrs. Gandhi 's Bandwagon Hits Rut
Severing a recent unbroken chain of political
victories for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the
opposition Organization Congress Party managed
this week to hand her a particularly galling defeat
in her home state. Uttar Pradesh is not only
India's most populous state but also is a key to
the prime minister's future electoral strategy.
More immediately, the support of its nearly 40
progovernment legislators in the national parlia-
ment is essential or the continuance of Mrs.
Gandl- is minority government in New Delhi.
For over a year, Mrs. Gandhi has been en-
gaged in a bitter contest to gain control of Uttar
Pradesh. In Februa-y 1970, her Ruling Congress
Party joined a coalition government led by a
regional group, the Indian Revolutionary Party
(BKD), in the hopes of eventually being able to
dominate the coalition. The BKD, however, re-
sisted all the Ruling Congress' efforts to merge
the parties. Eventually, in a particularly blatant
move to install her party in power, Mrs. Gandhi
arrangad to have th3 coalition dissolved and on 1
October to have "President's Rule"--direct con-
trol from New Delhi-clamped on the state.
She had apparently been misled, however,
by overly optimistic reports from the Ruling
Congress' state leaders regarding the party's
strength. Her supporters sought to entice suf-
ficient opposition legislators to defect to her ban-
ner to create a majority in the state assembly, but
a five-party opposition coalition, led by the op-
position Congress Party, beat her at the numbers
game. On 18 October she was forced to allow the
hostile coalition to assume control.
The defeat has put a damper on the band-
wagon psychology Mrs. Gandhi has been trying to
build and it has also damaged her nationwide
prestige. Her high-handed tactics in Uttar Pradesh
were widely criticized throughout the country.
Although her capitulation has taken some of the
sting out of the opposition protests, Mrs. Gandhi
will probably face a serious test over a censure
motion when the national parliament reconvenes
next month. She may yet make another attempt
to recapture her home state, but her recent ex-
perience is likely to prompt her to move with
greater caution. Nevertheless, her popularity ap-
parently remains high and the prime minister is
banking on her government's "progressive" image
to carry her successfully through national elec-
tions-wh ich must take place by February
1972-despite some local defeats along the
way.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: Prospects for Allende Government
Problems and pitfalls that will face Allende's
government are increasingly apparent to members
of his coalition, some of whom are already estab-
lished in key administration offices.
The intransigent attitudes of Allende's own
Socialist Party (PS) and its determination to as-
sert major influence in the Popular Unity (UP)
coalition may be one reason for a delay in an-
nouncing the new cabinet. At a recent PS plenum
the party hardened its stand that a Socialist must
be named minister of interior, the top cabinet
post and in effect Chile's vice presidency. The PS
also reiterated opposition to any deals with the
Christian Democrats, although the other UP com-
ponents consider such deals politically useful. The
Socialists resolved to expand their paramilitary
organization, which is largely trained by the ter-
rorist Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR). In discussing this enlarged "popular mili-
tia," party members were careful to claim that its
function is to protect the Allende government,
not to replace the Chilean armed forces.
Socialist leaders are expressing deep concern,
both in propaganda and party councils, over the
economic problems that they believe the new
administration will face. They accuse Chilean and
foreign business interests as well as the Frei gov-
ernment of actions seriously damaging to the
country's economy.
Communist leaders also have a gloomy view
of the economic prospects for the UP govern-
ment, in which they will play an important role.
They fear that important programs will have to be
postponed for lack of resources and that this
situation could cause popular resentment harmful
to the UP in municipal elections set for March
1971. The Communists are planning to expand
their party's political base as rapidly as possible
during the early months of the Allende govern-
ment.
der.
The Communists are convinced that rightist
and leftist extremists in Chile are in league in
efforts to create an impression of social and eco-
nomic chaos. Their recently reiterated intention
to eliminate the MIR is probably linked to their
suspicions that the Socialists will try to dominate
the government at Communist expense.
The Congressional runoff on 24 October
seems certain to go smoothly for Allende, as his
erstwhile political opponents have fallen into line.
Runner-up Jorge Alessandri has asked his support-
ers not to vote for him in order to restore calm.
Although National Party members may not honor
his request, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
leadership has instructed its 75 legislators to vote
for Allende, which will give him an overwhelming
majority.
The attempted assassination of Army Com-
mander in Chief Rene Schneider on 22 October
has raised tensions but is unlikely to affect the
congressional confirmation of Salvador Allende as
president-elect on Saturday. General Carlos Prats,
who is serving in Schneider's post until he recov-
ers, has resisted all efforts to enlist him in plots
against Allende and will use the emergency pow-
ers that have been invoked to maintain or-
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Bolivia: Pressures on President Torres Increasing
?resident Juan Jose Torres is under pressure
from both the military and the left, but he has
given no firm indication that he intends to grant
demands being made by either side. In a recent press interview, however, Torres
The military demands, made public on 19
October, came from the commanders of two key
units in La Paz and were supported by the head
of the military college. The two commanders
called for elections in the near future, the with-
drawzl of military officers from government posi-
tions, and assurances that Bolivia would not be-
come a "second CJba." According to the press,
one commander said that unless these and other
"proposals" were met, his unit was prepared to
"confront the government in defense of the na-
tion and of the [military] institution."
appeared to rule out the possibility of elections in
the near future. Apparently expanding on his
criticism of existing political parties, he expressed
opposition to unrealistic and "obsolete" demo-
cratic systems and committed his government to
the creation of conditions for an "adequate and
opportune" solution to the problem of erections.
Labor's other demands include the establish-
ment of workers' militias, a general political
amnesty, the "cooperativization" of a major La
Paz daily newspaper, which was seized by workers
and students in the course of Torres' take-over,
and greater labor control of the mining industry.
Torres has refused to consider the idea of militias,
appears to have ruled out a general amnesty, and
has named commissions to study the newspaper
and mining issues. Labor's position on one of its
demands, the nationalization of the US-owned
Matilde Mine, has been undercut by the mine
union concerned, which has publicly asked that
no such action be undertaken until all the impli-
cations have been studied. National mine federa-
tion leaders told a US Embassy official that the
Matilde miners do not favor nationalization be-
cause they obtain better wages and supplemen-
tary benefits than do em to ees of the state min
ing company.
Castr3 Woos Pro-Moscow Latin American Communist Parties
Evidence is increasing that Havana has de-
cided to try to improve its relations with pro-Mos-
cow Communist parties in Latin America. The
Cuban approaches apparently began as early as
the meeting in June 1969 of Communist and
workers' parties in Moscow.
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Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro and In-
terior Minister Sergio del Valle, also in Moscow in
April, had talks with Orlando Millas, a member of
the political commission of the Chilean Commu-
nist Party (PCCh). These contacts eventually re-
sulted in the "re-establishment" of ties between
the PCC and the PCCh. An accord was reached
last June when PCCh Senator Volodia Teitelboim
had extensive talks with Fidel Castro in Cuba.
Also in June, PCC relations with the Com-
munist Party of Argentina (PCA) seemed to im-
prove. The PCA executive committee ordered
that criticism of Fidel Castro and his policies
cease immediately and that a campaign of pro-
Castro propaganda begin the following month. In
an unusual show of solidarity, the PCA sent one
of its central committee members to Cuba to take
part in the sugar harvest.
During this same period, the Cubans report-
edly sent an invitation to Manuel Mora Valverde,
secretary general of the Communist Party of
Costa Rica, to go to Cuba to discuss plans for
furthering revolutionary objectives in Central
America with Fidel Castro. Two members of the
political bureau of the Communist Party of
Panama were in Cuba for the annual 26 July
celebrations and were accorded red-carpet treat-
ment, as were Rodney Arismendi, first secretary
of the Uruguayan Communist Party, and Alfonso
Sandoval, a member of the secretariat of the
central committee of the Dominican Communist
Party.
The sincerity of Havana's efforts to effect a
rapprochement with these parties is open to ques-
tion, however, and the moves may be occasioned
more by opportunism and a desire to adopt a
stand more acceptable to the USSR than by a
genuine interest in developing closer ties. Castro
can be expected to keep his options open by
retaining his ties with promising revolutionary
groups at the same time he is attempting to draw
closer to the pro-Moscow Communist par-
NICARAGUA: The government recently has
been faced with growing student and labor activ-
ism. Last week, in response to a teacher's strike,
President Somoza closed all primary and second-
ary schools for the balance of the academic year,
which ends in late November. Last month he had
to deal with university students and liberal priests
who were protesting alleged government mistreat-
ment of political prisoners. In both instances
Somoza acted with dispatch to defuse a potential
crisis that might have interfered with his current
trip to the US for the UN General Assembly
ceremonies. Only symptoms have been treated,
however, and political tensions are likely to in-
crease-particularly as attention focuses on the
1972 presidential succession question and as gov-
ernment plans to amend the constitution de-
velop.
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Uruguay: Government Problems Mount
The beleaguered Pacheco administration is
facing yet another test as a result of last week's
rejection by congress of the government's eco-
nomic stabilization rogram.
On 14 October, the General Assembly over-
turnec most of President Pacheco's earlier vetoes
of leg slative increases in the budget, triggering a
mass cabinet resigration, a government-declared
bank ioliday, and :he extension of press censor-
ship to financial masters. The congressional rebuff
could double next year's estimated deficit of $30
millioi, thereby fueling the inflation that Pacheco
has been striving to control.
I he prospective deficit also increases pres-
sures for devaluation, a move that would be re-
gardec as an admission of the failure of the aus-
terity program. Pacheco instead, has announced
he will use stopgap measures, such as the tighten-
ing of credit and exchange controls and the impo-
sition of additional import duties, in an attempt
to offset the legislature's action. The President
has not yet accepted any of the proffered resigna-
tions of his cabinet ministers, the president of the
central bank, and the director of budget and
planning. The resignations were for the most part
a show of support or Pacheco's policies, but the
President may use the opportunity to reshuffle
his advisers.
Unhappiness vvith the government's austerity
measures-which deserve a share of the credit for
the relative financial stability of 1969-70-re-
cently has manifested itself in labor circles. Last
Uncertainty in Argentina
Political and economic uncertainty have
gripped Argentina zs a result of the resignation of
two key cabinet m nisters and of extended labor
unrest.
Interior Minister McLoughlin and Economy
Minister Moyano Llerena resigned last week, ap-
parenily in a dispute with the Levingston govern-
week, the major Communist-dominated federa-
tion led an effective general strike that closed
business, transport, and public media in Monte-
video. The Communist federation was joined by
several non-Communist groups in the stoppage,
which was basically a protest against wage freeze
policies.
With general elections scheduled for next
year, labor may grow more restive. Pacheco will
also find it increasingly difficult to find legislative
support for unpopular programs.
The Tupamaros have continued low-level ter-
rorist activities. The only recent major action was
the firebombing last week of a US-associated
firm, causing an estimated $250,000 in damages.
The Tupamaros continue to hold the US agrono-
mist and Brazilian consul who were kidnaped
more than two months ago. The government still
refuses to negotiate with the terrorists or to meet
their principal demand-publication of a political
manifesto by all news media-in return for release
of one of the hostages. The manifesto has been
read in congress and published by two weekly
periodicals without incurring government sanc-
tions, but these actions have brought no response
from the guerrillas. Officials are probably con-
cerned that the Tupamaros will step up their
activities in an attempt to gain further publicity.
A special OAS committee dealing with inter-
American trade relations is scheduled to meet in
early November in Punta del Este, the resort city
targeted for leveling in a recently intercepted
Tupamaro document referring to "operation hot
summer."
ment over long-range policy planning. The govern-
ment, which has held power for more than four
months, has been slow to define its policies, and
criticism of this drift has developed recently.
McLoughlin appears to have sought an ear-
lier return to normal political life than the "four
or five years" that the government and its
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military backers are prepared to accept. Moyano
charged that the government was too weakened
by ambiguities and contradictions to implement
significant "revolutionary" programs. His succes-
sor, former minister of public works Aldo Ferrer,
is known for his interest in rapid national devel-
opment, even at some cost to the economic stabil-
ization program.
The cabinet crisis has coincided with a con-
tinuing period of economic malaise. A general
strike on 9 October-reportedly the most effec-
tive since the days of ex-president Peron-was
called to back labor's demands for higher wages in
the face of rising prices. Although the strike was
peaceful, security forces fear that another strike,
set for 22 October, could lead to violent demon-
strations or provide a peg for new terrorist ac-
tions.
Most military men probably are reluctant to
consider removing Levingston-if only because
they have few other options. They put him in
power and fear that his removal not only would
injure Argentina's image abroad but also would
cause a crisis of confidence at home. Major dem-
onstrations or severe economic problems, how-
ever, probably would cause the military to re- 25X1
assess this support. 25X1
SURINAM: The teacher's strike that began on 15
October appears to be developing into a serious
challenge to the government. The strike was
called over the replacement of a Creole (Negro)
supervisor by an East Indian. Antagonisms be-
tween the two groups have been heightened, and
the issue now is being regarded as basically racial.
Black power elements and other radicals, who
played a leading role in the initial stages, now are
attempting to capitalize on the labor unrest and
racial friction. Minister-President Sedney, who is a
Creole but leads a coalition dominated by East
Indians, has postponed his visit to the United
Nations to work on the problem. The dispute has
provided a focus for uniting opposition forces and
appears to be supported by a growing Creole
antipathy for the East Indians' governmental role
in general.
COSTA RICA: Four guerrillas, including the
leader of the Nicaraguan Sandinist National Liber-
ation Front (FSLN) Carlos Fonseca Amador,
were released from imprisonment in Costa Rica
and flown to Mexico as demanded by hijackers of
a Costa Rican airliner. The Costa Rican Govern-
ment, which has been eager to be rid of the
guerrillas and the continual threat their would-be
rescuers have presented to public security, leaped
at the opportunity to make a "humanitarian"
gesture in meeting the hijackers' terms for pas-
senger safety. The air pirates' nationality has not
yet been determined. They represented them-
selves as members of a united Central American
revolutionary group.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Sino,Soviet Relations After a Year of Talking
Secret
N2 44
23 October 1970
No. 0393/70A
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One year ago on 20 October, Soviet and Chinese negotiators sat down
in Peking to discuss the Sino-Soviet border dispute. Prior to the beginning of
the talks, relations had reached their lowest point since the two antagonists
had begun to quarrel openly. I n the wake of border clashes in March 1969,
skirmishing occurred at many locations along the frontier, military prepara-
tions were intensified, propaganda warfare reached a new intensity, and
bilateral trade and diplomatic contacts dwindled. The Soviet leadership may
have been weighing the advisability'. of stronger military action against China,
and Moscow had embarked on a campaign calculated to convince Peking that
this option was under active review.
In entering negotiations, each side was seeking to cool the situation for
its own reasons. Peking sought to damp down tension along the border lest it
lead to, or provide a pretext for, a soviet attack against which it could not
successfully defend. Moscow, concerned that an "open sore" on the exposed
frontier meant prolonged border skirmishing and fearful that such a develop-
ment would weaken its international position, sought to defuse the explosive
border situation and to search for a limited accommodation.
A year of negotiation has failed to produce progress toward a border
accord and has not led to any easing of the fundamental ideological and
political hostility between Moscow and Peking. Nevertheless, both capitals
have partially satisfied their objectives in undertaking the talks. The absence
of fighting along the border has led to a marked reduction of tension in a
situation that had threatened to get out of control. Some steps have been
made toward re-establishing diplomatic contacts, and both sides have sig-
nificantly lowered their voices. Despite these moves toward a tenuous
stabilization, the efforts of both the USSR and China to improve their
military and international positions indicate that relations will continue to
be strained. Peking and Moscow seem ready to accept a prolonged stalemate
in the border talks, however, to avoid a slide back toward open conflict.
Special Report - 1 -
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The factors that induced Moscow to press
for negotiations on the border dispute in the
spring and summer of last year have generally
remained operative despite the lack of movement
toward agreement. The most compelling of these
continues to be Moscow's fear that resumption of
open conflict along the border would produce
either a prolonged drain on Soviet resources or
pressures to escalate the fighting. Although frus-
trated by the impasse in negotiations, Soviet lead-
ers find some satisfaction in the conversion of
exchanges over the border from bullets to words.
The air of relaxation that the talks impart to
Soviet relations with China is particularly valuable
in easing Moscow's international position. Dimin-
ishing tension has made less obvious Moscow's
fear that third parties such as the US would take
advantage of its conflict with China and has
lessened its concern that the conflict might hasten
a possible rapprochement between Peking and
Washington. Continuation of the talks also pre-
cludes accusations from Moscow's socialist allies,
particularly Hanoi, that it is sacrificing the inter-
ests of international Communism to its conflict
with China.
Moscow has been exploiting the talks to
identify trends in Chinese policy and to look for
splits in the leadership. In addition, the talks have
contributed to an atmosphere in which some
obvious shortcomings in Sino-Soviet relations,
such as broken diplomatic contacts, can be
mended.
China's acquiescence in the talks was moti-
vated mainly by anxiety over Soviet military in-
tentions. Although this concern has been some-
what muted over the past year, it still exists.
Peking considers the contact provided by the
talks vital, as it did not in 1964, when it broke off
bilateral border talks with Moscow, and does not
seem prepared to risk the unpredictable outcome
of a break. Furthermore, the Chinese see the talks
as a medium for divining future Soviet intentions.
Special Report
The Chinese also wish to escape the onus of
halting or disrupting the talks to avoid creating
grist for the Soviet propaganda mill. In addition,
they see value in appearing "reasonable" to the
rest of the world-particuarly the socialist camp-
while engaging in widespread diplomatic activi-
ties. All this does not mean that Peking is ready
to abandon its quarrel with the USSR or is san-
guine about prospects for the talks. Indeed, the
Chinese have said they expect "irreconcilable dif-
ferences" to prolong the meetings for months,
even years.
It is a measure of the importance that both
Moscow and Peking attach to the talks that
neither has broken an agreement to avoid a full-
blown public presentation of their discussions.
Nevertheless, both have resorted to occasional
press or diplomatic leaks to communicate their
own, frequently distorted, version of the negotia-
tions. These have obviously been designed to put
the other side in a bad light, but there has been
general concurrence on the points preventing
progress.
Chinese proposals have clearly reflected Pe-
king's primary concern to reduce the Soviet mili-
tary threat. Peking has demanded agreement on
mutual withdrawal of major military units from
the frontier, of armed personnel from disputed
areas, and of Soviet forces from Mongolia as a
precondition to discussing territorial issues. Be-
cause most Soviet forces are deployed close to the
frontier while Peking's troops are not, these pro-
posals mainly work to the detriment of the
USSR. The Soviets have therefore steadfastly re-
sisted them because in addition to diminishing
Moscow's military advantage they would open the
border areas to possible Chinese "marauding,"
and lend legitimacy to Chinese territorial claims.
Moscow also resists the Chinese demand that
it acknowledge that the tsars "unfairly" forced
Imperial China to yield some 590,000 square
miles of territory in Siberia and Central Asia.
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Disputed Sino-Soviet Borders Areas
fl Areas of "unequal treaties"
Pamir
tract
NOR rN
ISOREA
SOUTH
KOREA
Special Report
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~- x x
Hei-hsia-tzu I.
(Big Ussuri) _'-
Boundary shown on_,,"
Russian maps
CHINA
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Both Peking and Moscow have long tacitly rec-
ognized that the! present border provides the
probable basis for any future frontier agreement,
but the USSR will not open itself to revanchist
Chirese claims by admission that its boundaries
are based on "unequal treaties." Another sticking
point has been a Chinese proposal that both sides
agre,3 to a nonaggression treaty covering both
conventional and nuclear forces. Moscow sees this
as a backhanded attempt to force an admission
that it has employed military pressure on Peking.
Moscow has sought to turn the tables on Peking
on this issue by making a Soviet agreement on the
nonuse of force cependent on the Chinese signa-
ture of a border accord.
The Soviets have attempted to gloss over the
issue of their military activities and turn the nego-
tiations to a discussion of frontier demarcation.
Thev have tried to get Peking's agreement on the
identification of t:ncontested sections of the fron-
tier and have proposed that procedures be estab-
lished to adjudicate the disputed territories. These
sections include 8,000 square miles of wasteland
in tie Pamirs, a 375 - square mile area at the
Man-thou-Ii railhead in northwest Manchuria, and
about 700 contested islands- in the Amur and
Ussi ri border rivers. The Soviets have also pro-
posed that both sides agree on a protocol for
regulation of the economic use of frontier areas
by herdsmen anc fishermen, and on procedures
for settling future differences.
Although the Soviets appear ready to make
territorial concessions-they have even privately
indicated that they would give up "blood soaked"
Damanskiy/Chen-pao Island, scene of the major
border clashes of March 1969--they are unwilling
to acknowledge the Chinese position that the
boundary in the Far East follows the main chan-
nel in the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Although this
principle has a firm basis in international law,
Mos:ow adamantly resists accepting it mainly be-
cause it would then lose control of the strategic
islard-named "Eig Ussuri" by the Soviets and
Hei-nsia-tzu by the Chinese-located at the con-
fluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers opposite
Khabarovsk, a principal city in the Soviet Far
East. The Soviets contend that Chinese control of
this island would place the boundary "down the
main street of Khabarovsk" and last August
emphatically stated their intention to retain it by
publicizing plans for its development.
Although the situation along the frontier is
tense, there appears to be no actual combat. Both
sides have apparently abided by the informal un-
derstanding reached during the Chou-Kosygin
meeting in September 1969 to employ restraint
and to refrain from sending troops into disputed
territory occupied by the other. Moscow, for
example, has reluctantly tolerated Chinese oc-
cupation of Damanskiy/Chen-pao Island, ac-
cording to statements by Soviet diplomats.
Although border forces of both countries
apparently have instructions to act prudently, the
border situation remains highly volatile, and the
makings of a confrontation are at hand should
either side choose to touch it off. Soviet diplo-
mats have recently claimed that Chinese herds-
men and fishermen are using Soviet territory
"without permission."
Given the failure of Moscow and Peking to
make substantial progress in resolving their politi-
cal differences, the absence of rapid improvement
in other aspects of bilateral state relations has not
been surprising. Chou En-lai apparently gave
grudging agreement when Premier Kosygin said
during their meeting in September 1969 that a
return to more businesslike procedures in diplo-
matic, trade, and other state contacts would
facilitate the easing of tensions. Infusion of
meaning into this principle has been painfully
slow, however, and characterized by mistrust and
vindictiveness.
Moscow's protracted effort to return an am-
bassador to Peking has exemplified the problem.
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Chou and Kosygin apparently agreed in principle
to restore ambassadorial relations, which were
disrupted in 1966 during the early stages of the
Cultural Revolution. When Moscow named its
man in March of this year, however, Peking pro-
Vasily Tolstikov, new
Soviet Ambassador to China
crastinated in accepting
him, evidently suspect-
ing a move to downgrade
the border talks to am-
bassadorial level and re-
senting Soviet selection
of a man identified with
anti-Chinese polemics.
Moscow eventually ob-
tained Peking's agree-
ment by indicating its in-
tention to continue the
talks at the deputy min-
isterial level and select-
ing a different candidate,
Vasily Tolstikov, for-
merly boss of the Lenin-
grad party apparatus. Al-
though Tolstikov arrived
in Peking on 10 October, the Chinese have re-
mained silent about reciprocating.
The annual Sino-Soviet river navigation
talks, which began in July, also have run afoul of
the failure to improve the political climate. Nor-
mally, these talks deal with technical matters re-
lating to use of the border rivers for shipping,
such as dredging and navigational aids. Navigation
matters may have become linked with the terri-
torial dispute, particularly ownership of contested
riverine islands. The continuation of the naviga-
tion talks for more than four months without any
indication of progress raises the possibility that,
as in 1967 and 1965, no agreement may be
reached.
Trade negotiations have also dragged, and a
significant increase in economic exchange seems
unlikely as long as political differences remain
unresolved. The failure to conclude a Sino-Soviet
trade agreement last year, along with the dis-
ruptive effect of the border fighting, reduced
Special Report
economic exchange to a record low of $57 mil-
lion. This contrasts with 1959's record high of
over $2 billion. This year, trade discussions be-
tween low-level commercial representatives in
Peking have evidently resulted in a general agree-
ment to increase trade somewhat. The agreement
has not yet been formalized, however, and 1970
trade thus probably will remain well below the
1968 level of $95 million.
The moderating of Sino-Soviet tempers dur-
ing the last year, nevertheless, has produced a few
symbolic developments. For example, the Mos-
cow-Peking "hot line," which was disrupted by
the Chinese at the height of the border tension
last year, has apparently been restored. Children
of Soviet diplomats have returned to Peking for
the first time since the Cultural Revolution. In
addition, low-level barter trade talks were con-
ducted last summer between local Chinese and
Soviet groups in the Far East. Such steps, how-
ever, have mainly flowed from the dampening
down of tension along the border rather than
from political reconciliation.
The USSR's opening this month of a perma-
nent air route to Hanoi via India suggests that
some bilateral arrangements may never exist as
they did in happier days. Prior to the Cultural
Revolution, Moscow-Hanoi flights went through
Peking, but they were terminated in 1967 when
Soviet passengers were beaten by Red Guards.
Moscow evidently is not confident that such
harassment has permanently ended and con-
sequently has opened the alternative route.
Needless to say, contacts between the Soviet
and Chinese Communist parties are nonexistent
and show no sign of being re-established. Ideo-
logical differences-as demonstrated by Peking's
major attack on Moscow's marking of Lenin's
centennial last April, and Moscow's bristling re-
joinder a month later-continue to contributeito
the aggravation of relations. Although both sides
have suppressed direct ideological polemics during
the past several months, it seems likely that they
will resurface periodically.
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POLEMICS FOR ONLY 8,000 YEARS?
Mao has often been quoted as saying
that Sino-Soviet ideological polemics would
last "for ten thousand years-even after Com-
munism has beer achieved." A Soviet expert
on China recentlV said that during the Kosy-
gin - Chou En-lai meeting in September 1969,
"the Soviets proposed a reduction to nine
thousand years. Subsequently, the Romanians
suggested five thousand. Mao finally compro-
mise:d on eight thousand."
USSR Continues to Amass Military
forces Opposite Carina
Moscow continues to view its military
strencth along the border as an essential element
of its policy toward China and has continued its
military build-up at a deliberate pace while the
talks n Peking are under way.
The Soviets last November publicly acknowl-
edged the creation of a Central Asian Military
District (MD) designed to consolidate control of
forces opposite Sinkiang that formerly were sub-
ordinate to the Turkestan MD. Considerable So-
viet rilitary activity has also taken place in Mon-
golia during the past year. Marshal Grechko's visit
to Ulaanbaator this past September was the first
by a Soviet defense minister since 1966 and
demonstrates the i ?nportance Moscow attaches to
its military position in Mongolia. In the Trans-
Baikal and Far East MDs, the Soviets have appar-
ently continued to expand and fill out their
forces during the past year.
Since 1965, Soviet forces along the border
are estimated to have more than tripled. Approxi-
mate y 37 divisions are thought to be in place
opposite China but it is highly unlikely that all
are cambat ready. These forces and their support
units total about 325,000 men and are backed up
with heavy concentrations of artillery and tactical
nuclear weapons.
Special Report
The Soviet build-up has been gradual and
deliberate, suggesting that at the time the deci-
sions were being made the Soviet planners per-
ceived no immediate danger from the Chinese.
Rather, they appeared to be building a force
intended to counter any future Chinese threat
and to fill political needs. There has been no
evidence indicating an appreciable change in the
rate of deployment in the past year, suggesting
that Moscow has not attached additional urgency
to the border build-up as a result of the 1969
border fighting.
In addition to its military rationale, the So-
viet build-up against China has important political
motivations. The overwhelming force deters Chi-
nese "adventurism" along the border and assures
the Soviet leadership that it is negotiating with
Peking from a position of strength. These
forces-as shown last year-can be used to intimi-
date Peking. Continuation of the build-up height-
ens Chinese apprehensions over Soviet intentions
and makes Peking somewhat more susceptible to
diplomatic pressure. The Soviet leadership also
probably views the force as a possible element of
leverage in any post-Mao leadership struggle.
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Chinese War Preparations:
Symbolic and Real
The Chinese obviously view the Soviet
build-up with some apprehension. An important
aspect of China's strategy against the Soviets has
been its own "war preparations" campaign. Some
aspects of the campaign serve to bolster national
unity while others, such as efforts to increase
industrial and,,Agricultural production and to dis-
perse populat` on and industry, promote long-
standing policies. A principal goal, however, has
been, to deter the Soviets by stressing that China
is prepared to fight no matter what the odds.
Some of the well-publicized quasi-military meas-
ures-such as extensive construction of air-raid
shelters and trenches, stockpiling of strategic
materials and food, and emphasis on regional
self-sufficiency-seem aimed at underscoring for
Moscow's benefit the fact that Peking plans an
in-depth defense of its territory. At the same
time, the "war preparations" theme furthers Pe-
king's propaganda line that Moscow is the po-
tential aggressor in the dispute. As Peking has
become more relaxed about the Soviet threat,
however, it has given less emphasis in its propa-
ganda to the continuing campaign.
Special Report
Peking Attempts to Break out of
Its International Isolation
Peking probably judges that it can counter
the Soviets at present through an active, tradi-
tional diplomacy more effectively than through
polemical exchanges and a hermit-like attitude
toward the rest of the world- as was the case
when the 1969 border clashes took place. The
general thrust of Peking's strategy since the Pe-
king talks began, therefore, has been to reduce its
vulnerability to Moscow's military and diplomatic
pressures through positive diplomatic action.
A major aspect of this has been China's
successful efforts to expand and improve its inter-
national contacts, most clearly illustrated by the
return of 28 ambassadors to posts vacated during
the Cultural Revolution. In particular, China's ties
with France, Romania, Yugoslavia, North Viet-
nam, and North Korea have blossomed during the
past year. Peking has also broadened its efforts to
develop new friends, such as Canada, Italy, Peru,
and Chile, and has made its international presence
felt by a variety of friendly gestures to a hetero-
geneous group of states. The Chinese have also 25X1
revealed a strong interest in taking their "rightful
place in the UN," which would allow them a
prestigious forum for presentation of their case
against Moscow as well as the West. Most drama-
tically, they resumed contacts in Warsaw with the
US in January of this year. The talks have been
suspended since the US intervention in Cambodia,
but Peking has made clear its intention to resume
them. They are probably no longer quite so im-
portant to China in the Sino-Soviet context,
however.
The Chinese return to the international
arena is designed, in the first instance, to counter
Soviet attempts to perpetuate and if possible to
increase the self-imposed diplomatic isolation into
which China drifted during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. This relative isolation in itself made China
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vulnerable to Soviet pressures, and its termination
was obviously to 3eking's advantage. But in addi-
tion, more extensive and closer contacts abroad
have probably allowed Peking to gain greater in-
sight into Soviet intentions by assessing the views
of third parties, v`hile at the same time they have
given China a wider forum in which to present its
own case. To achieve this end, Peking has gone to
some lengths to appear "reasonable"-primarily
by maintaining a general polemical standdown on
Sino-Soviet bilateral issues since the Chou-
Kosygin meeting.
Moscow Seeks to Keep Peking Bottled Up
Moscow has, in turn, continued to press to
"contain" China internationally despite the easing
of b lateral tension. Just as Peking suspects, this
policy is aimed at increasing Chinese vulnerability
to Soviet political and military pressure. It en-
compasses continued emphasis on "socialist
unity" to isolate China ideologically, efforts to
increase Soviet influence in Asia at Chinese ex-
pense, and attempts to foster Peking's continued
exclusion from the international community.
Moscow's efforts to press for closer "social-
ist u-ity" have taken a particularly anti-Chinese
cast in Eastern Europe, where the USSR has
vigorously pushed its interpretation of the War-
saw Pact as applicable against China. It has
pointedly claimed that treaties renegotiated last
year with Czechoslovakia and Romania, as well as
earliEr ones with -lungary and Bulgaria, commit
each contracting party to come to the other's aid
in the event of attack by "any state." The Soviets
have also indoctrinated East European leaders
with their interpretation of the "China problem"
through consultations, and by visits to Mongolia
and the Soviet Far East.
Moscow wants to impress on the East Euro-
pean; that geographic, strategic, and political
realities dictate their support for the USSR in the
event of a Sino-Soviet conflict. In addition, Mos-
cow is seeking to out its East European allies on
notice that even now excessive flirtation with
Pekirg is not acceptable.
Spec al Report
MOSCOW ON CHINESE
REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS
The Peking leaders are responsible for
posing `their adventuristic tactics or some
detachments of the Communist and national
liberation movement in Asia and Africa, thus
dooming them to defeat and rout. On believ-
ing advisers from Peking, tens of thousands of
courageous fighters have to pay with their
lives and the revolutionary movement in some
countries was pushed far back. Such is the
result of the adventuristic intrigues and provo-
cations of the Peking "ultra-revolutionaries."
I n Asia, Moscow has sought to intensify fear
of China through assiduous efforts to portray
Peking as aggressive and adventuristic. Asian Com-
munists have been warned that Peking will sub-
ordinate their interests to its own goal of "Chi-
nese hegemony over Asia." A steady stream of
Asian visitors has been greeted in Moscow, and
the Soviets have made diplomatic and commercial
demarches in states such as Thailand, Singapore,
and the Philippines, where Soviet influence has
heretofore been minimal.
Moscow's handling of events in Indochina
following Sihanouk's ouster dramatically demon-
strated the intensity of Soviet concern over Chi-
nese influence in that area. The Kremlin has per-
sistently indicated that it will not endorse Si-
hanouk's provisional government as long as the
Prince is under Peking's domination. Although
this position has put Moscow out of step with
Hanoi on an important issue, the Soviets calculate
that as long as they give Hanoi the military and
economic assistance it wants, they will retain
their influence there. In any event, Moscow is still
counting on North Vietnam to counter Peking in
Indochina over the long run.
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Moscow's efforts to isolate Peking took a
new turn this fall when the USSR privately
threatened to oppose Belgium's candidacy for a
Security Council seat if it presented a resolution
at the UN that might have fostered China's entry.
Heretofore the Soviets have not employed
strong-arm tactics on the issue of Chinese repre-
sentation.
Moscow's relations with the West have also
been subtly but significantly affected by its con-
tinuing difficulties with China. Although specula-
tion is often overdrawn that last year's border
fighting spurred Moscow to seek diplomatic agree-
ments with the West in order to "obtain a free
hand against China," the USSR is working to
avoid a simultaneous heightening of tension on
both its eastern and western flanks. Such policies
as pursuit of a Soviet - West German accord, ad-
vocacy of a European security conference, and
exploration of a strategic arms agreement have a
long history and logic of their own. Their coinci-
dence with Moscow's desire to devote additional
resources to its China problem, however, is cer-
tainly a point in their favor. In addition, Moscow
relishes the jitters created in Peking by the specter
of an East-West detente.
Nevertheless, Moscow's unwillingness to
make concessions indicates that it is not going to
sacrifice important interests, or, as in the Middle
East, to curb efforts to expand its influence,
simply to secure agreement with the West. Fi-
nally, Moscow realizes that the relationship be-
tween its policies toward China and toward the
West is a two-edged one. Moscow is acutely sensi-
tive to any suggestions that the West is attempting
to take advantage of Soviet concern with China to
improve its position vis-a-vis the USSR. Thus,
Moscow has sought to temper its dispute with
Peking in part to ensure that it does not have to
yield to the West on significant positions.
The deep suspicion and preoccupation over
long-range Soviet military and diplomatic inten
Special Report
PEKING VIEWS THE-SOVIET
MILITARY BUILD-UP
Social-imperialism greedily eyes Chinese
territory. It has not for a single day relaxed its
preparations to attack China. It claims that it
poses no threat to China. Why then does it
mass troops in areas close to Chinese borders?
Why has it dispatched large numbers of troops
into another country which neighbors on
China? Why does it frenziedly undertake mili-
tary deployments to direct its spearhead
against China? It is clear that social-imperial-
ism, like US imperialism, says that it poses no
threat to China only to weaken our vigilance,
to fool the people of its own country and the
world.
Joint Peking editorial marking
43rd anniversary of the
People's Liberation Army
1 August 1970
tions that China demonstrated earlier this year
remain as strong as ever and color Peking's cur-
rent diplomatic activities world-wide. The Chi-
nese, however, probably consider that the reduc-
tion of tensions in the immediate border region
will allow them to avoid any concessions in the
Peking talks.
Nevertheless, Peking probably judges that
the Soviets are focusing their efforts on finding an
opportunity to compel a humiliating Chinese re-
treat on the frontier question, and that military
pressure will continue to be a major tactic. For
this reason, it probably expects the Soviets to
continue filling out and improving their forces
along the border. Peking apparently does not rate
very high the likelihood of either an early Soviet
"surgical strike" against Chinese advanced-weap-
ons facilities or a general and full-scale invasion of
China, but clearly it has not ruled out these
possibilities entirely. Indeed, in assessing Soviet
intentions, it seems likely that the Chinese do not
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S1,UKI, I
feel they can be certain just what Moscow will do.
Chinese statements, both public and private, have
freq.iently allude] to Soviet "perfidy" and un-
trustworthiness. Moreover, Peking may well con-
sider that the Soviets could at any time respond
with a harsh local reprisal to normal Chinese
patrolling in the border area, and that such a clash
could quickly escalate, either through miscalcula-
tion or as a result of deliberate Soviet aggressive-
ness. into a major confrontation. An attempt to
forestall such a possibility was a major Chinese
obje:tive in the Chou-Kosygin agreement last
year, and it remains an important Chinese motive
in keeping the dialogue going in Peking.
The Chinese probably also anticipate con-
tinued Soviet diplomatic pressures aimed at isolat-
ing and weakening them as a complement to the
Soviet military "threat." They clearly view cur-
rent Soviet diplomatic activities as indicative of
such an approacf,. Moscow's recent public ges-
tures toward China suggesting a conciliatory atti-
tude to bilateral problems have been interpreted
by the Chinese as an attempt to lessen Chinese
vigilance against possible future "surprise attack"
and to justify such an action internationally by
branding Peking as hostile and intransigent. By
the same token, Chinese charges that Moscow's
recent diplomatic moves in the Middle East and
with regard to Germany were designed to free
Soviet hands "for moves against China" were
probably at leas-. partially believed at home.
Above all, Peking seems convinced that Moscow is
working hard all around the world to paint China
in tl-e darkest possible colors to ensure that, iso-
lated diplomaticaly, it will be vulnerable to con-
tinued and perhaps increased Soviet pressures.
If the Soviets should step up the pressure,
China will probaoly react as it did last year,
conceding only what is necessary to deflect the
immediate threat without prejudicing its over-all
claims. Peking's increased confidence in its ability
to control tensions along the border and its im-
prov ng international position will probably be
major factors supporting continued resistance to
Soviet demands.
Spec al Report
The Soviet leadership probably takes some
satisfaction from the reduction of Sino-Soviet
tensions that has occurred during the past year.
Moscow probably hopes that Peking's own moves
toward domestic and international moderation
will incline the Chinese to stabilize relations fur-
ther. It is doubtful, however, that Moscow has a
great deal of confidence that this will be the case
with the "unpredictable" Chinese.
Moscow realizes, however, that it has little
positive leverage that could impel Peking toward
an agreement on the border or improvement of
other aspects of state relations. Although the
USSR might consider a more belligerent line in-
volving increased military pressure attractive in
view of its success in getting Peking to the nego-
tiating table, the Kremlin appears to have con-
cluded that sabre-rattling is only likely to stiffen
Peking's resolve while impeding Soviet efforts to
project a favorable international image of its con-
duct in the dispute. A more bellicose posture
might also lead to collapse of the talks themselves
or produce a resumption of fighting along the
border, in which case the USSR would be right
where it was over a year ago.
On the other side of the coin, Moscow is
obviously not willing to make the major retreat
needed to entice Peking to sign a frontier accord.
Periodic hints that the USSR is readying some
"new proposal" in the talks and occasional cooing
by Kremlin leaders seem mainly designed to give
the Peking talks the appearance of substance and
project an international image of Soviet restraint
and flexibility. Indeed, it is possible that concilia-
tory gestures such as the dispatch of Ambassador
Tolstikov to Peking without reciprocal Chinese
action has already irritated Kremlin hard-liners.
Moscow thus appears ready to continue the
talks for the foreseeable future, while working to
restore a limited degree of bilateral contact. The
replacement this past summer of chief negotiator
Kuznetsov with the much-less-valued Deputy
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3r,l,JACr, I
Chief Chinese negotiator,
Chiao Kuan-hua
Chief Soviet negotiator,
Leonid Ilichev
Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev seems to have
signaled Moscow's adoption of such a course. This
will probably incline Moscow to shrug off minor
pin pricks and slights from Peking, while sharply
responding to major polemical attacks such as the
Chinese assault this past September on the West
German - Soviet treaty.
A policy of restraint and "coexistence" ac-
cords with the long-term Soviet hope that a post-
Mao China may produce a situation more to the
liking of the USSR. Moscow may dream that,
after Mao, China could disintegrate into squab-
bling regions or become preoccupied with internal
power struggles. More realistically, the Soviets
may hope that a post-Mao leadership will pursue a
more tempered policy toward the USSR and
avoid some of the excesses inspired by Mao's
personal animosity toward Moscow. An essential
element of such a long-term approach, however,
will be continued reliance on military strength.
Peking's development of advanced strategic
weapons will increasingly influence Moscow's out-
Special Report
look. The few public and private Soviet com-
ments on China's weapons program have tended
to belittle Chinese progress on the grounds that
China cannot threaten the USSR for many years.
The USSR appears to be calculating that its own
nuclear deterrent and, if its employment is neces-
sary, its pre-emptive capability, are adequate de-
fenses against a Chinese nuclear attack. Soviet
policy makers have probably concluded, however,
that Peking's acquisition of nuclear weapons will
make China even less susceptible to Soviet pres-
sure. Indeed, this concern seems to lie behind the
oft-voiced Soviet interpretation that Peking is
stonewalling in the talks in order to buy time to
push ahead in its advanced weapons program. In
any event, the Kremlin may be increasingly vexed
by pressure from Soviet hawks that it "do some-
thing" about Peking's bomb. The Soviets will also
have to wrestle with its implications for broader
Soviet policy in Asia as well as relations with
China.
Peking and Moscow now seem intent on
continuing the vague and unformalized accom-
modation that has emerged along the frontier
during the past year as a result of the talks. This
arrangement has reduced the concern of both
over escalation while requiring neither to concede
anything of its position on a frontier settlement.
The border situation, however, remains subject to
accidental confrontation, and either side can in-
crease tension along the frontier if domestic or
international politics so requires.
Neither side has given an inch on ideological
differences, and Moscow shows no signs of ad-
justing to Peking's great-power aspirations. Move-
ments toward "normalization of state relations"
have thus largely been atmospheric gestures with
little political content. Meanwhile, Moscow's con-
tinuing military build-up can only enhance
Peking's suspicions of Soviet intentions, while
Peking's progress toward a credible nuclear
- 11 - 23 October 1970
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SLUKr I
striking force inc-eases the Kremlin's concern.
Moreover, Peking'; resurgent diplomatic activity
and international gains may become a more
significant concern to Moscow and trigger a
stepped-up Soviet effort to discredit the Chinese
abroad. Thus, after a year of talking, the pros-
Special Report
pects for imminent military confrontation
between Moscow and Peking have been reduced,
but the basic factors producing continued and
perha s hei htened contention remain ative.
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