WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008200060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OSD review completed
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
44
9 October 1970
No. 0391/70
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 8 October 1970)
Page
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Egypt Carries On . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Jordan: Uneasy Calm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Did the Jordanian Army Really Win? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Libya: A New Era?
..............5
Equatorial Guinea: Clouded Anniversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
MALAWI: PAWN OF WHITE SOUTHERN AFRICA?
FAR EAST
Laos: The Going is Getting Tough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Cambodia: A New Beginning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Vietnam: Thrust and Parry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Communist China: Frustration Amid Fanfare . . . . . . . . . . 13
China: Harvest Prospects Good . . . . . . . 14
Fiji: New Nation in the South Seas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
OSD review completed
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EUROPE
West Germany: Follow-up on the Moscow Treaty . . . . . . . . . 17
Yugoslavia Plans Sweeping Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
European Community Commissioner to Visit US . . . . . . . . . 20
Brazil: Ship Purchases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Colombia: President Faces Congressional Opposition . . . . . . . 22.
Chile: Christian Democrats Will Support Allendc . . . . . . . . . 23
Panama: Two Years of General Torrijos . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Bolivia: General Torres Wins Out
Notes: Congo (Kinshasa); South Korea; USSR-Berlin; Ostpolitik; Austria;
U)N; Peru;
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Egypt Carries On
The nomination of acting president Anwar
Sadat to replace Nasir appears to solve the im-
mediate succession problem, but further shifts in
the Egyptian hierarchy can be expected.
Sadat's selection by the executive committee
and the central committee of the Arab Socialist
Union (ASU), Egypt's only legal political organi-
zation, as well as his official nomination by the
National Assembly on 7 October, virtually assures
him the presidency. His name is to be submitted
to a national referendum, tentatively set for 15
October, but this should be a mere formality
because government control of the election proc-
ess in the past has been complete.
As a member of Nasir's Revolutionary Com-
mand Council after the 1952 revolution that over-
threw King Farouk and because Nasir named him
vice president in December 1969, Sadat brings an
aura of legitimacy to his new position. He is
apparently an extreme nationalist; in the past he
has severely castigated both the UK and the US
for their actions in the Middle East. Because he
criticized Egypt's acceptance of the US peace
initiative this summer, Sadat reportedly fell into
disfavor with Nasir for several weeks.
Sadat lacks Nasir's charisma and authority,
and he probably owes his nomination as president
to other influential Egyptian political figures such
as Minister of the Interior Sharawi Jumah, Minis-
ter of State Sami Sharaf, and War Minister Mu-
hammad Fawzi. Rumors circulating in Cairo
allege that Jumah is eventually to be appointed
head of the ASU and that former vice president
Ali Sabri will be named prime minister. In any
case, further changes in the line-up can be ex-
pected over the next few months as the new
leadership settles in.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad's
outline of present Egyptian policy, delivered in a
television interview on 6 October, indicates that
Cairo is not likely to exhibit much flexibility in
the near future. Riad denied that Egypt had vio-
lated the cease-fire and said that Cairo "will not
move a single missile back." Riad also stated that
Egypt would not agree to a permanent cease-fire,
but he did suggest that Cairo was willing to con-
sider extending the present one for a specific
period, possibly three months. This extension,
however, would be agreed to only on the condi-
tions that a serious effort be made toward a
peaceful solution and that UN mediator Jarring
continue his mission of implementing the UN
Security Council resolutions of 1967 on the Mid-
dle East.
The Israelis probably will observe a cease-fire
from their side as long as there is no renewal of
Nasir's "war of attrition." Prime Minister Meir^25X1
was in Israel's interest to
cease-fire as long as pos-
sible. She cautioned,
however, that Israel
would have to re-exam-
ine this stand if it had
proof Egypt was prepar-
ing to resume hostilities.
The Israeli
reaction
sug-
gests that,
despite
the
continuing
missile
de-
ployments
along
the
canal, Tel Aviv does not
intend to initiate an at-
tack without consider-
ably more provocation.
Israel is almost certain to
use the missile deploy-
ment issue as a suitable
excuse not to resume
peace talks, however.
OSD review completed
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Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
said that it
the existing
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Moscow is probably satisfied with the selec-
tion of Sadat as Nasir's successor, a choice sug-
gesting a collective leadership inclined to continue
Nasir's policies and offering some measure of sta-
bility. Nevertheless, the Soviets will watch closely
to detect any hint that the new leaders are devi-
ating from the strategy worked out between
Moscow and Nasir. The appointment of Vladimir
Vinogradov, a deputy foreign minister and Middle
East specialist, as new ambassador to Cairo
further suggests that Moscow intends to keep
itself well-informed while making its own voice
heard in Egypt.
Jordan: Uneasy Calm
The cease-fire has continued to hold in
Jordan, and relative calm prevails.
Nasir's death has created a degree of confu-
sion and uncertainty among both the fedayeen
and the Jordanians; each side will probably be
hesitant to undertake any new moves against the
other until the situation in Egypt becomes clearer
and both sides are surer of where they stand.
Neither wants to be the first to resume any large-
scale fighting for fear of appearing clearly at fault
in the eyes of other Arabs. Furthermore, the
Jordanian Government and the fedayeen are still
exhausted from the last round, and both would
probably welcome a breathing spell.
Most uniformed fedayeen have left Amman,
apparently without incident, but the process of
withdrawal has extended beyond the original
deadline. Some militiamen have remained in the
city, but they have either given up their weapons
or have hidden them. US Embassy personnel have
been able to drive unescorted through the city
since 4 October; they have reported that the task
of cleaning up is progressing apace and that water
and electricity have been restored in some areas.
dissatisfaction among a few Jordanian officials
The north has remained quiet since 5 Octo-
ber, when the guerrillas claimed they had clashed
with the army. Some Jordanian authorities have
apparently moved into Irbid and Ramtha, and are
attempting to restore utilities and other services
there. The fedayeen are pulling out, albeit slowly,
]nd some Palestine Liberation Army elements
have been reported moving across the border into
Syria.
Although there is a general air of optimism
in the government toward the cease-fire, King
Husayn's patience with the fedayeen-despite the
slow pace of their pull-out-has produced some
The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
reported that 25 percent of the dwellings in the
largest refugee camp in the Amman area have
been damaged beyond repair. Although it does
not believe the damage is as extensive in other
camps, UNRWA estimates it will cost $2 million
to provide adequate shelter for the refugees
around Amman and another $1 million to replace
schools and other installations.
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An indication that the Arabs are attempting
to maintain a semblance of neutrality in the
Jordan crisis came on 4 October when a plane
carrying 43 guerrillas landed at Beirut airport.
Lebanese authorities refused to allow these mem-
bers of the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front to
enter Lebanon, saying that, under the terms of
the 1969 agreement in Cairo between the Leb-
anese Government and the Palestinian organiza-
tions, Beirut airport is a civilian installation and is
not to be used for fedayeen action. The Lebanese
appealed to Arab ambassadors in Beirut to apply
diplomatic pressure, and after several hours the
plane departed for Baghdad.
Did the Jordanian Army Really Win?
The Jordanian Army employed about a third
of its 58,000-man force during the hostilities in
September. King Husayn chose not to use the
other two thirds, mostly Palestinians, whose reli-
ability in battle against the fedayeen was con-
sidered uncertain. Although, the King's forces suf-
fered only minimal losses in battling the Syrians
to defeat and the fedayeen to a draw, the army
nonetheless appears to have achieved only an in-
conclusive military victory under special circum-
stances.
On 17 September Husayn moved his military
forces against the fedayeen in Jordan. Three days
later two Syrian armored brigades invaded north-
ern Jordan for the ostensible purpose of "help-
ing" the fedayeen. The Syrians probably hoped,
however, that together with the fedayeen and the
Iraqis they could gain possession of northwest
Jordan, including Irbid, and even bring about the
overthrow of the King.
The Syrians, with about 250 tanks and ac-
companying artillery, took the northern Jor-
Soviet party chief Brezhnev, speaking on 2
October on the recent civil war in Jordan, made
the toughest comments on the Middle East sit-
uation by a Soviet leader in several months. He
admonished his listeners that, in the event of a
new "imperialist" intervention in the Middle East,
"one could not only burn one's fingers, but-who
knows-even lose an arm." He also warned that
"any foreign intervention in the events in Jordan
is absolutely inadmissible"a declaration seem-
ingly aimed as much at Syria as at Israel and the
US. Brezhnev decried the "fratricidal" conflict in
Jordan, and claimed that it had "inflicted no
small harm on the Arab cause."
danian cities of Ramtha and Irbid on 20 and 21
September after a one-day battle with Jordanian
armored units. The Jordanian forces, employing
artillery, some 75 tanks, and no more than six
Hawker Hunter aircraft at any one time, repulsed
Syrian attempts to move farther south and forced
the Syrian troops to retreat to Dar'a. Almost half
the Syrian tank force was disabled. Jordan lost
only a small number of tanks, and two Hunter
aircraft were damaged.
Damascus apparently believed the Jordanian
forces would be easily pushed aside by the Syrian
armored units and that the fighting would be over
quickly. The Jordanians, however, fought well,
and equipment held up because of comparatively
good maintenance. In contrast, the Syrian forces
did not perform well and lost considerable equip-
ment because of poor maintenance as well as in
combat with the Jordanians. By 23 September
Syria was faced with the alternatives of retreating
or increasing its commitment. Damascus almost
certainly decided against sending additional forces
to Jordan in the belief that such action might lead
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fIa(fa
SYRIA
Syrian armored thrust
MIL64
5+)204 10-70 CIA
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20=21 Sept.
'Oar'a
Ramtha
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to a protracted and costly war and to intervention
by Israel and possibly by the US.
The Jordanian Army units in the north de-
feated a Syrian force more than twice their size.
It is doubtful, however, that this would have been
the outcome if Syria had introduced its air force
into the battle.
An additional advantage for the Jordanians
in the hostilities during September resulted from
the fact that the 20,000-man Iraqi force stationed
Libya: A New Era?
The marked success in recent oil negotia-
tions, the juggling of the cabinet, and the death of
Nasir all suggest that a new era lies ahead for
Libya. Tripoli, however, must overcome its still-
unresolved domestic problems and avoid rash in-
volvement in foreign affairs. It must also bring
order and direction to the volatile and erratic
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).
The last month has seen real progress for
Libya, even if it was marred by some naive adven-
turism. The drawn-out wrangling with the oil
companies met with great success; firms respon-
sible torabout half of Libya's oil production have
agreed to the government's terms, and the four
major companies still holding out-two US
(Mobile and Esso) and two British-are almost
certain ultimately to reach an agreement approxi-
mating Libyan demands.
In addition, the government has made cabi-
net changes that appear designed to cope with the
country's important problems. Deputy Premier
Jallud, the key official in the oil talks, was ap-
pointed minister for industry and economy, a
posting that placed the problem of internal
reform squarely on the RCC official most com-
petent to handle it.
in Jordan did not intervene. Although the Iraqis
remained an uncertain menace to the Jordanian
Army-because of repeated threats of inter-
vention from Baghdad-they did little more than
patrol the roads in the Mafraq area.
The Jordanian Army is now being resup-
plied, primarily by the US. How effective it will
be in future hostilities will depend, more than for
most armies, on those special circumstances and
advantages created by its neighbors.
Nasir's death, on the other hand, has re-
moved a steadying influence. There is now no one
in the Arab world, especially among military
chiefs off state, to whom the young officers of
the RCC are apt to turn for leadership. The simi-
larity, however, between the petroleum policies
of Libya and Algeria has led some observers to
speculate that, with success in the oil talks, Libya
might now become increasingly attracted to a
closer political relationship with an increasingly
stable Algeria.
Libya's fortunes, however, remain in the
hands of the disunified and immature RCC. Dur-
ing the Jordanian civil war, Libya rashly declared
for the fedayeen, rushed military aid to Da-
mascus, and broke diplomatic relations with
Jordan. Much of this fervor arose from Libya's
failure to participate in the June 1967 war and
the desire of its young leaders to side with what
they considered the wave of the Arabs' political
future. But their timing was poor, and little seems
to have been achieved, for Libya or for the feda-
yeen.
The new cabinet shifts appear, for all prac-
tical purposes, to have left Premier Qaddafi in
control of foreign affairs. The RCC must seek to
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restrain him from embarking on further expensive
foreign adventures and to concentrate on channel-
ing both Jallud's administrative abilities and the
hundreds of millions of new revenue dollars re-
ceived in the oil settlements into an improvement
of domestic conditions. The oil agreements have
opened a new era for Libya in its relationship
Equatorial Guinea: Clouded Anniversary
In the two years of independence from
Spain that Equatorial Guinea will celebrate next
week, a climate of fear and intrigue has become
pervasive and the mini-state's ties with the West
have been seriously eroded. Both trends stem
directly from the mercurial President Macias' con-
tinuing preoccupation with consolidating his posi-
tion and protecting Guinea's sovereignty against
largely imaginary threats.
Macias' feelings of insecurity arise in large
part from his fear that Spain, which did not
support his candidacy in preindependence elec-
tions, is trying to remove him. The seat of govern-
ment, moreover, is situated on the economically
more advanced island of Fernando Po, inhabited
by the chief rivals of Macias' mainland Fang
tribe-the separatist-minded Bubi and Fernando
peoples-and a large population of Nigerian con-
tract workers.
To ensure his personal survival. Macias has
brought government to a near halt while elimi-
nating rivals and creating a one-party police state.
The prevailing atmosphere underscores the ex-
cesses of his ill-disciplined security forces and the
frantic jockeying for favor by his confidants.
Macias is now bent on filling all key posts with
fellow Fangs and organizing his single party at the
grass roots.
Development remains at a standstill, while
the economy stagnates and inflation worsens.
I-tandouts extracted from local businessmen have
with Western investment, and the death of Nasir
has given the Libyans a chance to be their own
bosses. It now remains for the leadership to seize
this opportunity and to make a concerted effort
to carry out the remaining promises of their revo-
lution,
made corruption a way of life. Islanders fear that
their cocoa plantations, the source of most of the
country's export revenues, will be nationalized.
The Nigerian laborers face replacement by na-
tives, and many discouraged foreign technicians
and Spanish merchants are leaving.
FERNANDO PO I.
EUCO r
PROVINCE OF F FE FERNANDO PO
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Macias, swayed by his anti-Spanish bias and
by extremist advisers, has moved closer to radical
African and Communist countries. Relations re-
main severely strained with Spain, the country's
main source of aid and investment, and Madrid is
losing patience with repeated coup charges and
other abuse. In fact, it has so far failed to under-
write this year's large budget deficit. At present
Macias appears to rely heavily on radical advisers
from Guinea in the Foreign Ministry and has
shown a preference for technical assistance of-
fered by leftist African regimes. He has also estab-
lished ties with the USSR and North Korea and
has accepted modest help from both.
The outlook is dim for any lasting improve-
ment in relations with the West even though none
of the Communist countries seems eager to
assume Spain's burden. Domestically, Macias has
no organized opposition, and he is likely to re-
main in office for some time, barring assassination
or a palace coup by disenchanted cabinet cron-
ies. 25X1
CONGO (KINSHASA): Preparations are under
way for the first National Assembly elections
since President Mobutu seized power in 1965. His
official party, the Popular Revolutionary Move-
ment (MPR), has announced the slate of candi-
dates who will run unopposed in the legislative
elections to be held in mid-November. Mobutu
will be the sole candidate in the presidential elec-
tion to be held from 30 October to 1 November.
The President is making an intensive effort in the
pre-election campaign to indoctrinate the public
because he is eager to gain grass-roots support for
the MPR and thus for his own policies. Although
scattered dissidents are incapable of major
disruptions, heavy-handed efforts to get out the
IVORY COAST - NIGERIA: Former Biafran
leader Ojukwu was ordered this week to leave
Ivory Coast, where he has been living since the
Nigerian civil war ended last January. As of 8
October, it was not known where he would re-
locate. The expulsion follows a recent press in-
terview in which Ojukwu made statements that
Abidjan apparently considers a breach of his
promise to refrain from all political activity while
in Ivory Coast.
There are some indications that the in-
terview--the first Ojukwu has given in Ivory
oast--was in fact arranged to provide Ivorian Presi-
dent Houphouet-Boigny a pretext for getting rid
of Ojukwu. His continued presence complicates
current moves toward a full reconciliation be-
tween Nigeria and Ivory Coast, one of the four
African states that recognized Biafra. The rap-
prochement between the two countries should
now move ahead to an early re-establishment of
diplomatic relations. 25X1
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l,overnment ;~ iL ,'g Khong Kho
efforts stabled T1_9
Government-meets
increased resistance
~oumione'
- "Ban Ba
Government % 16 .
harasses Trail
Navane
holovens
Site 26
Plateau 0.
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FAR EAST
Laos: The Going is Getting Tough
Government forces are encountering heavier
opposition throughout the country as they at-
tempt to sustain limited offensive operations in
the waning days of the rainy season. General
Vang Pao's irregulars, still trying to improve the
defenses of their Long Tieng base area before the
anticipated enemy attacks this fall, have gained
no new ground during the past week. Elements of
the North Vietnamese 316th Division have turned
back the latest attempts to seize Ban Na and have
also thwarted a parallel government move toward
Muong Pot. Failure to control these tactically
important sites on the northern approaches to
Long Tieng will complicate the government's de-
fensive efforts during the dry season ahead.
The operations southeast of the Plaine des
Jarres initiated late last month to divert Commu-
nist forces from the defense of Ban Na have not
yet produced significant results. The base camp at
Khang Kho continues to be harassed by small
enemy units, and forays out of Khang Kho in
search of Communist supply caches have turned
up relatively little. A government battalion that
has successfully completed a sweep to the north-
east of Khang Kho ran into very few enemy
troops.
To the west of the Plaine, a 1,200-man gov-
ernment force continues to be stymied in its
effort to retake the former neutralist head-
quarters at Muong Soui. Forward positions have
been established less than a mile from the town's
airstrip, but opposition from what is believed to
be only a small enemy force has so far blocked
the government's main units from advancing. On
5 October, Communist defenders beat back an
attempt by the irregulars to get into the town,
killing the battalion commander, his deputy, and
four company commanders.
In the Laotian panhandle as well, the sub-
stantial government forces operating in the
vicinity of Muong Phine and Toumlane are find-
ing the going increasingly rough. For the past two
weeks, two battalions of government irregulars
have been frustrated in their efforts to cross a
rain-swollen river about ten miles northwest of
Muong Phine and have been under increasing pres-
sure from small North Vietnamese units. Recently
re-enforced by a third battalion, these govern-
ment troops began to receive heavy mortar and
rocket attacks on 6 October. For the first time
since last winter, the enemy appears to be em-
ploying 122-mm. rockets, which are playing a
part in making the government's position in this
area increasingly difficult. Intensive mortar fire
has also been brought to bear on the three ir-
regular battalions in the vicinity of Toumlane,
and these units are preparing to withdraw.
On the Bolovens plateau, North Vietnamese
and Pathet Lao troops are maintaining the pres-
sure on government outposts from which raids are
made on enemy supply lines along Routes 23 and
16. So far, however, they have been unable to
dislodge the irregulars from Site 26, the recently
recaptured base near Attopeu. Farther to the east
along the Ho Chi Minh trail, elements of two
government battalions are currently involved in
mining and in otherwise harassing Communist
logistic lines in the vicinity of Ban Bac and
Chavane. Enemy reaction to these incursions has
been scattered so far, but it is anticipated that the
irregulars will be confronted with a major Com-
munist clearing operation in the near future. j
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Cambodia: ANewBeginning
After a series of false starts and prolonged
debate, the Cambodian Government is scheduled
to proclaim itself a republic on 9 October.. ending
many centuries of royal rule. The change is
largely symbolic, inasmuch as the throne has not
been a powerful force for many years and has
exercised almost no influence on the country's
affairs since Sihanouk's ouster.
l he excesses of Sihanouk and the royal
family made the move toward a republic almost
inevitable. Conditions in Cambodia were such
that little or no thought was given to the possi-
bility of retaining the throne as a symbol of the
nation, as a unifying force, and as a source of
legitimacy, much in the way that Thailand re-
tained the monarchy after the 1932 revolution.
For most influential or politically aware Cam-
bodians, the monarchy was too closely associated
with Sihanouk and with the anachronistic feudal-
ism by which Cambodia was governed to allow
any such compromise.
The abolition of the monarchy signifies that
Phnom Penh now is more confident of both its
international and domestic positions. Earlier
popular enthusiasm for the formation of a re-
public was dampened by a number of key of-
ficials, who argued successfully that such a change
could raise painful problems of diplomatic
recognition among countries whose initial ac-
ceptance of the Lon No[ regime had been tepid,
at best. They also urged that the peasants, many
of whom retain a deep respect for the throne,
have more time to absorb the shock of Sihanouk's
fall before being confronted with yet another
change.
The birth of "la republique Khmere" should
strengthen Lon Nol's position, particularly in
Phnom Penh and other urban centers, and may
also help refire any sagging revolutionary spirits.
The rural reaction to the republic will be more
difficult to gauge, but Communist organizational
efforts among the peasantry probably will get a
boost from Phnom Penh's move.
Military Action Remains Light
Government troops involved in the Kom-
pong Thom relief operation have continued to
indoctrinate villagers along Route 6, and have
shown no signs of renewing their march north
beyond Tang Kouk. Communist attacks on the
task force increased, but were beaten off with the
aid of air strikes.
There have been indications, however, that
even heavier enemy attacks against the column
may be in the offing.
In addition, large numbers of enemy troops
have been spotted west of Route 6 for the first
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time. Nonetheless, the Cambodian troops still
outnumber the Communists, and their morale re-
mains high.
Northwest and southwest of Phnom Penh,
the enemy sustained its pressures designed to
disrupt government control over Routes 4 and 5
by carrying out new harassing attacks along these
vital roadways. More activity by the Communists
also was reported in Battambang Province, and
their capture of two villages within 15 miles of
Battambang city prompted provincial officials in
the area to take new precautionary steps to
improve local defenses.
Vietnam: ThrustandParry
Vietnamese Communist negotiators at the
Paris talks on Thursday brushed aside President
Nixon's five-point initiative as a pre-election
"gimmick" and an attempt to "legalize American
aggression" and camouflage its "neo-colonialist"
ambitions in Indochina, but they characteris-
tically stopped short of outright rejection.
Madame Binh leveled her major attack on the
proposition that a cease-fire should precede a
political settlement. The Viet Cong, she recalled,
have advocated that an accord on "basic issues"
must come first and she charged that a reverse
sequence robs her side of its "legitimate right of
self-defense against aggression."
A Polish diplomat seasoned in Vietnamese affairs
said recently that the Communists now are more
realistic than before about the situation in South
Vietnam, including the balance of political forces.
One of his colleagues claimed that Communist
bargaining with the Thieu leadership is possible,
Madame Binh's explicit disavowal of this course
notwithstanding. A Swedish diplomat suggested
that the way to break the impasse in Paris was
through the troop withdrawal question on which,
he asserted, the Communists will bend.
Military Actions Unimpressive...
The Communists obviously will have more
to say in the weeks ahead; Madame Binh has
already promised "detailed comments later."
Coming only hours after the President's address,
their initial reactions no doubt are meant to dull
the impact of the US move while Hanoi sorts out
the implications of Washington's latest propo-
sition.
The Communists are likely to continue tout-
ing Madame Binh's own eight points. Despite
their apparent firmness, some observers close to
Hanoi profess to see flexibility in the Viet Cong
proposal and are urging close American scrutiny.
Peace pretensions aside, the Communists
kicked off a new phase of harassing attacks early
in the week, but the effort was lackluster and
allied casualties appear generally light. Most
enemy shellings took place along the populated
central coast. There also was a handful of signifi-
cant enemy ground attacks and terrorist incidents
at scattered points throughout the country. More
sporadic action of this kind can be expected in
coming weeks as the Communists try to maintain
some momentum while generally conserving their
forces in South Vietnam.
Meanwhile, the Communists' effort to re-
build their grass-roots apparatus continues in
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many parts of the country. The South Vietnam-
ese, abundantly aware of this enemy campaign,
have called for countermeasures, but it is not
clear how this clandestine struggle is going. It is
evident, however, that although the enemy's local
military forces and infrastructure have been weak-
ened, they are still intact in many areas, and that
the Communists retain a deeply entrenched base
of popular support in some provinces.
The Communists appear still to have their
strongest popular support in old Viet Minh
strongholds such as Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh
provinces along the central coast and Kien Hoa in
the upper Mekong Delta. In these areas, govern-
ment security forces often are reluctant to move
against known Communists because of old family
ties and fears of retaliation. The Quang Ngai Prov-
ince chief, for example, recently reported that
more than half the families in his province still
have relatives serving in both government and
Viet Cong organizations. In Kien Hoa, the prov-
ince chief said that some 15 percent of the
elected rural officials are Viet Cong sympathizers.
In both provinces, the Phoenix Committees,
which are supposed to oversee government opera-
tions against the Viet Cong underground, are
rated by US advisers as particularly ineffective.
The government is doing better in some
other parts of the country, however. In Da Lat,
operations by South Vietnamese police and para-
military forces during the summer led to the
apprehension of nearly 40 Communist sappers,
intelligence agents, and political cadre who had
been operating in the city. Clandestine assets like
these no doubt played an important role in the
spectacular Communist raid that penetrated and
heavily damaged Da Lat last spring. The South
Vietnamese have conducted similar police work in
and around other larger cities, such as Saigon and
Da Nang.
In the capital itself, the officer in charge of
the city's defenses recently said that he was con-
cerned that the Communists were being assisted
in their local rebuilding by sympathetic village
officials. If a cease-fire was arranged right now, he
warned, the Communists would claim control
over a considerable part of the capital military
district. This account may be somewhat over-
drawn; government
security forces have made it difficult for the
enemy to recruit, tax, and move about near the
capital. It does illustrate the kind of struggle that
is now going on in much of South Vietnam,
however, as the conventional military war con-
tinues in low key.
Saigon Reforms Its Currency
Money, not subversion, captured Saigon's at-
tention last week- The government implemented a
series of economic reform measures designed to
contain inflation by curbing speculation by im-
porters. There is to be a limited devaluation of
the piaster, higher taxes on imports of luxury
goods and agricultural materials, and removal of
restrictions on import licensing. The official ex-
change rate, which still applies to most imports,
was not changed from the present 118 piasters
per dollar, but a second rate of 275 piasters per
dollar was established for purchases of piasters by
American personnel in Vietnam. This rate also
applies to exports and imports of luxury goods.
To head off an adverse reaction to the meas-
ure, the government also announced an im-
mediate pay raise for armed forces and civil serv-
ice personnel and promised controls to prevent a
rise in food prices. Nevertheless, some prices have
gone up sharply, causing anger in some quarters.
A number of Saigon political figures have asserted
that the measure demonstrates South Vietnam's
increased dependence on American aid, while
others commented that it was inevitable and may
be overdue. The government's ability to limit
price increases over the next few months will
probably determine whether it can avoid further
political difficulties such as last fall's trouble over
the austerii t tax isue.
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Communist China: Frustration Amid Fanfare
The regime's continued frustration over per-
sistent domestic political problems was clearly
visible last week in Peking's subdued approach to
the celebrations of the 21st anniversary of Com-
munist rule. Echoing some of last year's sober
themes, the editorial marking the occasion called
attention to the difficulties in getting an effective
performance from China's local governing organs
and projected no quickening in the tortuous proc-
ess of reconstituting the shattered Chinese Com-
munist Party apparatus. Chou En-lai and Lin Piao,
in brief National Day speeches, mentioned that
the fourth five-year economic plan is in the
works, but they failed to convey any new policy
guidelines or to give any further indication of
when Peking will convene the long-delayed Na-
tional People's Congress. The conspicuous ab-
sence of two politburo members at the rally in
Peking as well as the regime's coverage of the
event suggests that behind-the-scenes political
maneuvering may be inhibiting movement on
some personnel issues to be settled at the con-
gress.
The failure of Hsieh Fu-chih, public security
minister and boss of the Peking municipal govern-
ment, to accompany the other top leaders who
appeared with Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao offered
further evidence that a major break in ranks has
occurred within the ruling politburo. Hsieh has
been out of public view since last March, and it
now seems certain that he has become the first
high-ranking purge victim since acting chief of
staff Yang Ch'eng-wu fell in 1968. There is little
evidence that would provide a plausible explana-
tion for Hsieh's political demise; rumors did circu-
late briefly in Peking immediately after his dis-
appearance alleging that he had alienated some of
his fellow politburo members by his handling of
some issues left over from the Cultural Revolu-
tion. The regime has been careful, however, not
to reveal any shifts in the balance of forces within
the politburo that must have resulted from
Hsieh's f a l l . I n fact, overt signs of ferment at the
top have been tenuous at best.
Another notable absentee at last week's
celebrations was politburo standing committee
member Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's long-time personal
secretary and top party theoretician. Ch'en's close
association with Mao makes it difficult to believe
that he too has been victimized in some muted
behind-the-scenes squabbling, but he has now
been out of sight for two months and the regime's
reluctance to account for his absence is puzzling.
Peking's insistence on publishing the names of
those leaders who did attend the celebrations in
alphabetical order rather than by rank appears
deliberately calculated to obscure the actual
power relationships within the ruling elite and
raises suspicions that some jockeying is con-
tinuing.
Policy and personnel strains revealed in
Peking's coverage of National Day also continue
to affect performance at the lower echelons of
government. The authoritative anniversary edi-
torial strongly emphasized the need for more
competent local leadership, implying that both
high-ranking civilian and military administrators
are often out of step with Peking's policies and
are having difficulty reconciling "the thousand
and one things they have to do." The extent of
the regime's concern over such issues has been
further evident in propaganda output in recent
weeks. There have been complaints of infighting
in revolutionary committees, strained civil-
military relationships, deficiencies in the army's
political performance, and resistance to the
authority of the party committees that are only
slowly being established at the local levels of
administration.
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China: Harvest Prospects Good
Favorable weather and continuing new in-
vestments in agriculture appear to be paying off
in another year of good harvests. The regime's
general satisfaction with the agricultural situation
is reflected in national anniversary pronounce-
ments, which boasted of an "excellent" harvest
for 1970 while virtually ignoring all other eco-
nomic matters.
The claim also was made that there have
been "good" harvests for the previous eight years,
but this is not accurate. The 1960s began with a
food crisis following the collapse of the Leap
Forward and food supplies were barely sufficient
during several years. Peking, however, did effect a
steady improvement in food production by per-
m itting material incentives for peasants and
making agriculture second only to weapons de-
velopment in the allocation of resources. Not
even the Cultural Revolution was allowed to
change these priorities.
ficient to keep pace with population growth. Per
capita caloric intake is still slightly below the level
of the late 1950s before the Leap Forward, but
there has been a compensating improvement in
the quality of the diet, which now includes more
fruit, vegetables, meat, and eggs, predominantly
from private plots. The few food complaints in
letters now sent abroad center on government
attempts to siphon off increases in production
with extra levies-often in the name of "war
preparations."
Little change is expected in Peking's pur-
chase of foreign grain. Wheat imported in 1970,
reflecting contracts concluded in 1969, will prob-
ably amount to about 4.6 million tons. This com-
pares with 4 million tons delivered last year and
an average of about 4.5 million tons during earlier
years. Canada and Australia continue to be
China's main sources for wheat.
The total grain harvest for 1970 will prob-
ably be larger than for 1969, or substantially over
200 million tons. Increased supplies of imported
and domestic chemical fertilizers remain a major
factor in boosting farm output.
Over-all gains in food production during the
past two or three years have probably been suf-
With world wheat stocks at record levels,
China is in a good bargaining position for its 1971
imports.
~ Imports will
probably continue to be used to maintain present
consumption levels in China's cities and to enlarge
stockpiles.
Fiji: New Nation in the South Seas
Nationhood came late to the South Pacific,
and few of the many island groups have any real
chance of surviving as viable states. Three have
already attained independence-Western Samoa,
Nauru, and Tongo-and they are to be followed
on 10 October by Fiji. After nearly a century of
British rule, Fiji was reluctant to break away
because of serious communal problems between
the Fijians and the now more numerous Indians.
Aside from this, however, the island nation faces
a reasonably bright future.
The Indians were originally brought in by
the British as indentured cane-field laborers. Un-
der British rule, political supremacy by the Fijians
over the more aggressive Indians was assured by a
complicated electoral system weighted in their
favor. Similarly, legal strictures were enacted
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FIJI ISLANDS
Vanua
Levu c
Prime Minister!- Leader of the Opposition
j
YASAWA
ROUP /Taveuni
1, G
,Koro
Latyika K 0 11 O
Ovaiv
O;Nsusurl k Ngau
1' 1 L INTERNATIONAL
C AIRPORT
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t bengga
Mcala'
Va[ulele
S E A
Thithil
Nayau
Lakemba
4
Kambara
Totova
Ono-i-Lau
Tuvana-i-Thola? Tuvana-i-Ra
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against the transfer of Fijian land, an arrangement
that created a potentially explosive tenancy situa-
tion. Indian sugar-cane farmers predominate, yet
own only 2 percent of the land, and as tenancy
contracts terminate, Fijian landlords are now in-
clined not to renew.
The Fijians were for years reluctant to ac-
cept independence on terms that might weaken
the safeguards against Indian domination. Con-
versely, the Indians insisted on a one man - one
vote system as the price for their agreement to
independence. An interim solution establishing
equal representation for the Fijian and Indian
communities in the first House of Representatives
to be elected after independence was reached last
spring. The more numerous Indians, however,
have not abandoned their goal of a voting system
that disregards ethnic orgin, and they can be
expected to engage in political obstructionism
should the Fijians stall in meeting this demand.
Fiji's first prime minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese
Mara, head of the Fijian-dominated Alliance
Party, comes to his post with experience and with
high family position, important in the tribally
oriented Fijian society. The Oxford-educated
Mara gained experience as chief minister during
the final three years of British rule that may ease
the transition to independence. The opposition
will come from the basically Indian National
Federation Party, led by S. M. Koya, a lawyer
The good
working relationship that has developed between
Mara and Koya, in sharp contrast with the Fijians'
difficulties with Koya's abrasive predecessor,
which resulted in a near confrontation in 1968,
holds promise for an amicable solution of the
question of political representation. The inbred
hostility between the Fijians and the Indians,
however, suggests that relations between the two
communities will remain strained and oc-
casionally volatile.
Fijian leaders recognize their inexperience in
foreign affairs and will initially limit the country's
diplomatic contacts. They will probably rely on
the good offices of New Zealand, which has also
given unobtrusive assistance to Western Samoa
and Tonga. Fiji will become a member of the
Commonwealth of Nations and of the UN-Mara
is scheduled to speak at the UN later in October----
but does not now plan to open an embassy in
Washington. Relations with the US are neverthe-
less friendly, a pleasant holdover from World War
II when a major US base was sited there. The
current US presence consists of a consulate, a
Peace Corps contingent, and a small US Air Force
station.
New Zealand, which has a strong interest in
the stability of the islands to its north, will prob-
ably take on some of the advisory responsibilities
relinquished by the British and will continue to
lend a brigadier to command Fiji's smai'I military
force. Fiji is inclined to identify itself more with
New Zealand than with Australia, whose size it
finds overwhelming and whose economic in-
fluence in the islands has provoked resentment.
Fiji's economy is based on sugar and tour-
ism. Earnings from tourism, which now offset a
chronic trade deficit, show promise of a
continued sharp upturn and may in fact overtake
sugar as the largest foreign-exchange earner, as
expanded air service to the South Pacific attracts
more visitors. There were some 85,000 of them
last year, mostly Australians and New Zealanders.
The social impact of tourism could add to Fiji's
problems, however, and the Fijians have already
expressed concern that their traditional way of
life is being debased for the benefit of tour-
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SOUTH KOREA: The New Democrats, the coun-
try's only significant opposition party, con-
founded the government last week by nominating
a credible candidate to run against President Pak
Chong-hui next year. He is Kim Tae-chung, a
respected National Assemblyman and a former
leader of the now-defunct political party that was
ousted from power by Pak in the 1961 military
coup. His candidacy will appeal most strongly to
those reform-minded minority elements-stu-
dents, intellectuals, and some members of the
country's new middle class-that are most critical
of government corruption and authoritarianism.
-- ? ?
President Pak is generally conceded to be a
shoo-in next year, but a strong campaign by his
opponent could cut into the government party's
margin of victory in the National Assembly elec-
tions that follow. The New Democrats hold only
42 of the Assembly's 175 seats, compared with
the government party's 112 seats. Government
machinations to finance the nomination of a less
able contender than Kim had threatened to split
the opposition party and make a farce of the
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EUROPE
West Germany: Follow-up on the Moscow Treaty
While awaiting the results of the quadri-
partite talks on Berlin, Bonn is following up its
political treaty with the USSR by negotiating
with Moscow in other fields. The West German
ministers of economics and of science and educa-
tion, Karl Schiller and Hans Leussink, each toured
the Soviet Union in late September, discussing
trade relations and technical-scientific coopera-
tion with their Soviet hosts. Although neither side
obtained all it wished from these visits, further
contacts are planned for the months to come.
Schiller and Soviet Foreign Trade Minister
Patolichev agreed that, assuming the necessary
authorization is granted by the European Com-
munity, their governments would start talks in
mid-November on a long-term trade and coopera-
tion agreement. These negotiations may be held
up, however, if the two sides fail to agree on some
form of "Berlin clause" that would include West
Berlin in the arrangements. Schiller suggested a
new formula on this, but the reaction of the
Soviets was apparently quite cool. Bonn has held
out for such a clause since 1963 but Moscow has
refused to agree.
Schiller stressed, probably to the disappoint-
ment of the Soviets, that the West German Gov-
ernment is not in a position to provide credits at
below-market interest rates; he argued, however,
that high interest might be balanced by other
considerations, such as delivery terms, quality,
and price. Schiller only touched on the question
of a deal between the Soviets and Daimler-Benz
for the construction of a truck factory, because a
Soviet delegation was negotiating simultaneously
on this in Stuttgart. The Daimler-Benz talks have
not yet reached a concrete stage, but both sides
are making optimistic press statements.
Leussink signed an agreement for the annual
exchange of 16 scientists between the Soviet
Academy of Sciences and the German Research
Society, which represents West German uni-
versities and research institutions. Leussink tried
to obtain an explicit reference to Berlin in the
agreement, but the Soviets refused. The arrange-
ments do provide for cooperation in 12 areas of
science and technology, including data processing
and some aspects of nuclear technology; the West
Germans have told US officials that they are
aware of the sensitivity of these areas and of their
responsibility not to pass on strategic hardware. A
first meeting of technical experts will take place
in November, on high energy and plasma physics,
and a second session, on physical chemistry, is
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scheduled for January. Vladimir Kirillin, the
chairman of the Soviet Committee on Science and
Technology, is to return Leussink's visit during
the first half of 1971.
In the realm of unofficial politics, Soviet
political commentator Yuri Zhukov completed a
lecture tour in West Germany in September, con-
veying the message that, although the USSR
recognizes cultural and economic ties between
West Berlin and the Federal Republic, the idea of
political ties is "a completely unrealistic matter."
Contradicting Chancellor Brandt's public posi-
tion, he asserted strongly the Soviet argument
that a Berlin solution is contingent on the ratifica-
tion of the West German - Soviet treaty and said
that Brandt had agreed to this in Moscow.
Zhukov failed to realize one of the principal aims
of his trip: organizing a West German - Soviet
parliamentary group. This foundered on the
USSR-Berlin: The Soviets have moved to quicken
the pace of the Berlin negotiations. At the last
four-power meeting on 30 September, Soviet
Ambassador Abrasimov proposed that the date of
the next formal session be moved up to 9 October
and that it be preceded by a working-level meet-
ing of political advisers. Even though Moscow is
obviously eager to avoid being blamed for the
lack of movement in the talks, progress on sub-
stantive issues has not yet matched the procedural
acceleration of the talks. The Soviets are still
holding firm to their insistence that West Berlin
must be accepted as an "independent political
entity," although they have hinted vaguely at a
willingness to bargain for something less.
OSTPOLITIK: All indications point to the re-
cently concluded sixth round of Polish - West
German political talks in Bonn as the final nego-
tiating session. Although a German spokesman
said that significant textual problems are not yet
resolved, their solution should come during the
scheduled visit to Warsaw of West German For-
eign Minister Scheel in early November. In the
meantime, West German - Czechoslovak talks will
begin in Prague on 12 October-a step considered
preparatory to negotiations. In the dialogue
between East and West Germany, neither side
appears eager at this moment to resume talks. The
East Germans are using the present "pause for
thought" to strengthen their position by seeking
diplomatic recognition and entry into inter-
national organizations. They also began during
the past week light harassment of West German
traffic to and from Berlin, a clear reminder to
Bonn and to the quadripartite conferees that the
East Germans can ultimately control access to the
city.
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Yugoslavia Plans Sweeping Changes
President Tito's proposal on 21 September to
create a collective presidency for Yugoslavia was
apparently just the first of a number of proposed
changes in the system of government. Speaking to
the party presidium on 4 October, Edvard Kardelj,
Tito's close adviser and probable political heir, gave
his peers a glimpse of what lies ahead.
According to Kardelj, Belgrade is faced with a
number of basic problems that must be quickly
overcome. These include a clear definition of the
relationship between the Yugoslav federation and
its constituent republics, as well as a delineation of
the limits on the authority of the self-managing
organizations on the one hand, and government
executive and administrative bodies on the other.
With an eye to the future, Kardelj also indicated
Tito is thinking about altering the Yugoslav parlia-
mentary system, the structure of self-management,
and the role and position of the party and mass
organizations, in order to assimilate them into the
proposed new system of government.
The new collective presidency would combine
the functions of the president with some of the
duties of the Federal Executive Council (currently
responsible for executing the policies established by
the Federal Assembly). As a result, the Council's
responsibilities will be trimmed down to well-
defined administrative duties. Kardelj implied, as
had Tito earlier, that the presidency will have the
right to initiate certain laws without prior recourse
to the Federal Assembly, but he was not specific as
to their nature. The new presidency also will work
directly with republic authorities in establishing a
unified foreign policy and in matters affecting na-
tional defense and security.
The numerical composition of the presidency
is still open to discussion, but Kardelj said that no
matter its size, it will be based on equal representa-
tion from all the republics. From among these
representatives a president of Yugoslavia will be
chosen for a short term (perhaps one year). The
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post of titular president will be rotated among the
republic members of the presidency.
Kardelj then dispelled speculation that Tito
was stepping aside by noting that it is necessary to
make a constitutional "exception" in the person of
Tito, whose participation in the new body is very
much needed. Tito's presence on the new body
underscores his determination to set the wheels of
succession in motion while he is still able to oversee
and manage the process to avoid a crisis once he is
gone.
Changes on the magnitude outlined by Kardelj
call for constituional revision, and are bound to
infringe on the rights and privileges of those at-
tached to the present system. With these individuals
in mind, some of whom have already been critical
of the new scheme, Kardelj denied what is appar-
ently the basis of their criticism-that the new presi-
dency would give a monopoly of power to a few.
He said that there would be built-in checks on the
new body.
Kardelj's defensive comments may have been
meant primarily for Slovenian ears. Speaking to the
presidium, Slovenian party boss Franc Popit agreed
with Kardelj's statement on the problems that exist,
but said that there is no need to change the con-
stitutional system. The following day, moreover, in
reporting back to the central committee in Ljub-
ljana, Popit supported the presidium's endorsement
of the presidency, but without making any refer-
ence to changes in the constitution. He further
implied that nationalist tendencies in Slovenia must
be subordinated to the interests of the federation as
well as to the proposed creation of the collective
presidency.
The next discussion of the proposed new exec-
utive body will come on 29-30 October when the
first nationwide party conference will be convened
in Belgrade.
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European Community Commissioner to Visit US
Trade relations between the EC and the US
will come under close scrutiny during two days of
talks with EC Commissioner Rolf Dahrendorf in
Washington on 15-16 October.
The discussions come at a time of increasing
malaise on both sides of the Atlantic over protect-
ionist trends. They also coincide with the EC's
enlargement negotiations and rising European
concern that the US may be reassessing the politi-
cal advantages it has traditionally expected would
flow from greater European integration. The
Commission therefore hopes next week's talks
will initiate a permanent dialogue, for-even apart
from immediate and pressing trade problems-the
Community's plan for monetary union and an
industrial policy will require continuing US-EC
consultations if friction is to be kept to a mini-
mum.
From the Community's point of view, the
most urgent matter is pending US legislation that
would restrict the import of textiles, shoes, and
other goods, and Dahrendorf has been instructed
to express the EC's grave concern. The Com-
munity, however, is also trying to come up with
proposals that might ease the US textile problem.
the EC pres-
ently is thinking ot retreating trom- its previous
position which would have sought protection
against Japanese textile exports diverted to Euro-
pean markets?should Japan agree to limit textile
exports to the US. The Community would hope
in this way to encourage Tokyo to reach such an
agreement with the US and also to gain time for
the EC to develop a trade liberalization package.
German efforts to encourage the develop-
ment of a liberalization package to head off US
protectionism so far have not borne fruit. Al-
though a committee of Community trade officials
has been charged with draftinq liberalization pro-
posals, Paris may prove a stumbling block. The
French have already cautioned Dahrendorf
against "going too far" in his Washington talks,
s:nd they were instrumental in postponing--at
least until after he returns-a Council agreement
in principle to renew talks in Geneva under GATT
auspices between the US, the EC, UK, and Japan.
Even the Germans, moreover, are wary of domes-
tic opinion and hope that any suggestions for
concessions on trade in agricultural and textile
products can be attributed to the Commission.
Agriculture is in fact prominent on the
agenda for the Washington talks. Agriculture
Commissioner Mansholt is willing to consider con-
cessions, but it seems doubtful the Commission
will be able to go very far now, before it knows
whether it can hold down Community price levels
and begin instituting new measures to accelerate
modernization of community farming.
On the increasingly contentious issue of the
EC's association and preferential trade agreements
with nonmembers-which have recently taken a
heavy drubbing in GATT--Dahrend orf will prob-
ably again ask US "understanding" of the Corn-
munity's special relationship with Africa and the
Mediterranean. However, he may also offer to
discuss specific US problems arising from some of
the recently concluded arrangements.
On the question of EC enlargement and how
best to handle discussions with the US on this
issue as the entry negotiations proceed, the Com-
mission can be expected to be very sensitive.
Although it recognizes that the US will have to
look out for its trade interests in an expanded
Community, it no doubt is nervous lest US con-
cern complicate the entry talks. It may also fear
that EC-US consultations could be taken by other
affected countries as an invitation to become, in
effect, arties to the enlargement negotia
tions.
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AUSTRIA: Chancellor Kreisky's minority Social-
ist government picked up one additional seat in
parliamentary by-elections on 4 October, but it is
still one shy of a majority. Nevertheless, the
Socialists received a psychological boost that
may help them in the fight they face later this
UN: There is an increasing prospect that the
Soviets and their allies may not associate with any
guidelines for the Second UN Development
Decade (DD-II), the 1970s. Moscow adamantly
opposes the less developed countries' quest for a
provision specifying that the major powers set
aside one percent of their gross national product
for official and private capital transfers to them.
month over the budget-their first major test in
parliament since the general elections in March.
Kreisky has threatened new elections should his
budget fail, but a statement by the leader of the
small Liberal Party suggests that Kreisky might
win its support on this issue if he is willing to
deal. 25X1
The USSR also favors insertion into the guidelines
of references to disarmament and decolonization
that are unpalatable to Western countries. Time is
growing short for agreement on DD-II, which had
been regarded as a likely highlight of this month's
special ceremonies marking the UN's 25th an-
niversary.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Brazil: Ship Purchases
A Brazilian delegation led by the finance
minister signed a contract in London last week
for six frigates, according to press reports con-
sidered substantially correct by US military group
officers in Brazil. The package-reported to be
priced at more than $240 million-is the largest
sale of military equipment to a developing coun-
try by Great Britain. The frigates will be of a new
"Mark-10" design and will be armed with tor-
pedoes and with "Seacat" sea-to-air missile sys-
tems. In addition, four will be outfitted especially
for combating submarines and will carry anti-
submarine missile systems.
Payment is to be made over eight years at
5.5-percent interest; a British firm reportedly has
agreed to finance 80 percent of the price. Four of
the ships will be built in the UK by Vosper
Thorneycroft and the other two will be built in
Brazil with British technical assistance. Delivery
of all is to be completed by 1979.
This purchase and contracts already signed
with Great Britain for two "Oberon"-class sub-
marines and with West Germany for mine-
sweepers constitute the major share of the Brazil-
ian Navy's purchases in the armed forces
modernization program. The air force's key pur-
chase was 16 supersonic Mirage fighters from
France. The army is seeking primarily US equip-
ment, although no purchases have been
made.
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Colombia: President Faces Congressional Opposition
President Pastrana's two-month period of
grace may be ending. It is already clear that the
administration's lack of a majority in either the
Senate or the Chamber of Deputies will make the
passage of government-sponsored legislation diffi-
cult, and that the National Front, under whose
auspices Pastrana was elected, needs support from
other congressional blocs. If too much of his
legislation is blocked, however, he can adopt a
traditional method used by Colombian presi-
dents-rule by decree.
The first real test carne on 30 September
when the Chamber failed to elect a comptroller
general of the republic. In the first ballot Antonio
Ordonez, the candidate of defeated presidential-
hopeful Rojas Pinilla's National Popular Alliance
(ANAPO), received 115 votes and the official
Liberal candidate, Alfredo Cadena, secured 89. In
the second round, Ordonez received 116 votes
and Cadena 91. Although the Chamber agreed to
hold another vote on 21 October, it seems un-
likely that either of these two candidates will be
elected at that time because a two-thirds vote is
required for election. Analysis of the 30 Septem-
ber balloting indicates that ANAPO voted as a
bloc and that the followers of defeated presiden-
tial randidates Sourdis and Betancur split, with
some National Front deputies also voting for the
ANAPO candidate.
Liberal
Liberals Independent
Conservatives
TOTAL
Pastrana
37
2
18
57
Rojas
12
26
38
Betancur
3
9
12
Sourdis
5
6
11
CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES
Pastrana
59
4
31
94
Rojas
28
44
72
Betancur
6
18
24
Sourdis
8
12
20
210
-------------------------------------------
Pastrana lacks three votes in 118-member Senate to achieve 50% plus one. In 21(1-member
chamber he lacks 12 votes for 50% plus one.
Pastrana's position is much stronger in cases
where only a majority is required. Nevertheless,
ANAPO partisans in the Chamber control three
important committees dealing with foreign af-
fairs, defense, education, public health, labor and
social assistance-all areas of major interest to the
Pastrana government. In the Senate, a complete
breakdown is not available, but ANAPO controls
at least two committees dealing with constitu-
tional reform and congressional relations, and
with foreign affairs and defense.
Pastrana's difficulties will not be limited to
the National Congress. Of the 22 Departmental
Assemblies, only six are under the control of the
National Front. In Cundinamarca, the department
in which Bogota is located, the assembly elected
an Anapista as president, a Betancur follower as
first vice president, and a Communist as second
vice president- The other departmental assemblies
appear to be under the control of various combi-
nations of Anapistas and followers of Betancur
and Sourdis. The 1968 constitutional reform re-
moved many powers from the assemblies and
made them administrative bodies. They still retain
the power, however, to supervise the apportion-
ment of the assembly budget and to appoint
individuals to various positions, especially in the
area of fiscal control.
I he governors will be able to carry out their
governmental functions, but the assemblies can
make their tasks more difficult. The assemblies
can be utilized as a base for political demogogy
by the opposition and to attack the departmental
and national government. Whether the alliances
between the three groups will remain in effect on
natters of substance is not clear, but it appears
likely that appointee positions will be divided
among them to the virtual exclusion of National
Front supporters. The opposition groups stand to
henefit by having their members appointed to
positions within the governmental structure,
thereby strengthening their political power bases
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Chile: Christian Democrats Will Support Allende
Salvador Allende now is virtually certain to
be confirmed as president in the congressional
runoff on 24 October. After an acrimonious and
divisive struggle, the national congress of the
governing Christian Democrats (PDC) on 5 Octo-
ber committed the party to support Allende, ask-
ing only limited negotiations in return.
The PDC's abandonment of its bargaining
position amounts to capitulation to Allende by
Chile's largest political party and the only possi-
ble center of political opposition to him. The
move has been hailed by spokesmen of Allende's
Popular Unity (UP) coalition as a positive move
and an explicit recognition of his victory-claims
no one can dispute. The PDC representatives
named to the negotiating committee with the UP
are all advocates of accommodation with Allende
and are unlikely to challenge the UP statement
that the committee's jurisdiction is restricted en-
tirely to points on which both sides agree.
The outcome of the PDC congress has in-
creased and deepened divisions, irreparably weak-
ening the PDC. The Marxist press is crowing that
the crucial 271-191 vote there signifies the vic-
tory of defeated presidential candidate Radomiro
Tomic over President Frei within the party. There
are, however, several active "accommodationists"
who consider Tomic discredited as a leader and
see themselves as strong contenders for the role.
President Frei's failure to give open support
to the anti-Allende forces at the congress, despite
his personal fear of a Marxist government, was a
strong factor in their defeat. Some of the most
courageous of this group represent the PDC grass-
roots-labor, peasant, slum dweller, and women's
organizations-and they are likely to pay dearly,
both politically and personally, for their hard
fight.
Until the eve of the PDC congress, Allende's
initial refusal to discuss the party's demands for
democratic guarantees had increased pressure
within the PDC against supporting him. The UP's
vague, last-minute offer on 2 October to negotiate
Composition of the Chilean Congress
(200 seats)
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apparently swung the balance. The tactical switch
from the hard line of Allende's fellow Socialists
was a successful political ploy by some of his
more pragmatic advisers in the UP, notably the
Communists, who are reported to be increasingly
at odds with the Socialists over their respective
roles in an Allende government.
Panama: Two Years o,' General Torri jos
Sunday will mark the second anniversary of
the "revolutionary" government dominated by
General Omar Torrijos. The occasion will be
celebrated with speeches magnifying past "suc-
cesses" and renewing the regime's commitment to
social reform and economic development. The
government has few laurels to rest on, however.
In the coming months, its attention is likely to
focus on growing budgetary difficulties and the
desire to readjust to its own advantage the treaty
relationship with the US.
F orrijos has managed to win a measure of
popular support and is so little worried about
dangers from the left that exiled Communist
Party members reportedly now will be allowed to
return home. Nevertheless, considering the plot-
ting that has occurred within the Guard and
within the oligarchy, and the continuing efforts
of deposed President Arias and his supporters to
regain power, the biggest accomplishment of the
two-year-old regime is, indeed, that it is two years
old. Although current plotting is given little'
chance of success, the threat of assassination still
hangs over Torrijos, and tight political control is
likely to continue. Press censorship remains in
effect, political parties are not allowed to func-
tion, and meaningful elections are far in the
future.
The local business community remains sus-
picious of Torrijos' revolutionary rhetoric and his
A recent example of the Communist Party'
moves to increase its influence is the suspension
of textbook printing forced by a Communist
union in a major (PDC-run) publishing house. The
union claimed that after the new government
takes office on 4 November there will be some
than es in school texts.
flirtation with the left. In this atmosphere of
mutual distrust, government efforts to get
Panamanian businessmen to increase their rate of
investment have not been successful and the
regime has had to take up the economic slack.
The government, however, again is having dif-
ficulty finding money for its public works pro-
grams and raising matching funds for interna-
tionally approved, long-term economic projects.
Having already obtained $40 million on the in-
ternational capital market within the past six
months, the regime's ability to borrow additional
funds at reasonable rates is becoming increasingly
circumscribed. Panamanian leaders apparently are
counting on the US to bail them out of a serious
financial crisis develops.
Torrijos' attitude toward the US has varied
with his mood. Apparently angered by allegations
of US involvement in antigovernment plotting, he
caused relations to cool during August and early
September. The government published a 32-page
denouncement of the 1967 draft treaties, which
represented the culmination of three years of
bilateral negotiations. In addition, there were
strong indications that the government would de-
nounce the 1903 Canal treaty at the United Na-
tions General Assembly.
Advised by President Lakas and others that
the UN initiative would be counterproductive,
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Torrijos retreated from his belligerent stance.
Anti-US polemics were muted and Lakas grate-
fully accepted a White House dinner invitation. If
Torrijos does not obtain canal concessions that he
Bolivia: General Torres Wins Out
General Juan Jose Torres declared himself
President of Bolivia's "revolutionary government"
on 7 October after dislodging the military junta
that had replaced President Ovando only the day
before. Torres' government will include civilians
and military officials and is expected to take a
sharp turn to the left.
The rather confused series of events that led
to Torres' assumption of power was initiated on 4
October when a group of middle-level army of-
ficers, led by army commander General Miranda,
issued a demand for President Ovando's resigna-
tion and an eventual return to constitutional gov-
ernment. Ovando refused, and government and
military officials loyal to him tried to isolate the
Miranda-led rebels.
Ovando retained the loyalty of the presi-
dential guard in La Paz, the air force, and the elite
paratroop units headquartered in Cochabamba-
Bolivia's second largest city. Miranda, however,
obtained the backing of the more powerful
armored units in La Paz and the majority of
commands elsewhere in the country. Negotiations
led to an agreement to abide by the vote of
officers in the La Paz area on a resolution of the
crisis, but Ovando then rejected the vote, which
called on both the President and Miranda to
resign. Faced with the determination of those
bent on his removal and the apparent superiority
of Miranda's military strength, Ovando finally an-
nounced his resignation on 6 October "to avoid
bloodshed."
Miranda then established a junta of the com-
manders of the three armed services and resigned
considers suitable, however, he is likely to resume
his pressure tactics. These ultimately might in-
clude public demonstrations against the Canal
Zone. 25X1
himself. The junta named its cabinet and ap-
peared to be consolidating its control. At the
same time, however, General Torres, a close sup-
porter of Ovando, grouped those military units
that had remained loyal to Ovando and from El
Alto Air Force Base declared himself the new
"revolutionary president." Torres obtained the
support of extreme leftist leaders of labor and
students, and following the bombing and strafing
of government buildings in La Paz, the new junta
began to crumble. The aerial attack caused little
damage, but it apparently convinced some mem-
bers of the new government that Torres would
use further force if necessary.
On 7 October General Torres marched tri-
umphantly into La Paz and swore himself in as
the new president. His victory, however, came not
through obtaining the full support of the armed
forces, but rather through
the coalition of military of-
ficers, peasants, and leftist-
led students and labor that
he put together from his
stronghold at El Alto.fl
The actual take-
over was loodless, but stu-
dents raided several US JUAN JOSE TORRES
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installations and the homes of pro-Miranda mili-
tary officers.
orres was visited by a group of radical
leftist leaders of labor, the universities, and sev-
eral political parties including the pro-Moscow
and pro-China Communists, and was presented
with a list of 20 demands on which their con-
tinued support apparently hinged. The demands
reportedly included the removal of foreign mili-
tary missions, the abrogation of the compensation
agreement with the US-owned Gulf Company
whose property had been expropriated last Octo-
ber, the nationalization of foreign banks and the
US-owned Matilde Mines, and the establishment
of diplomatic relations with "all socialist coun-
tries." On more-domestic issues, the group de-
manded amnesty for political prisoners, worker
control of private industry, and the establishment
of "workers' militias."
Torres demonstrated ultranationalist and
leftist tendencies when he served as Ovando's
armed forces commander. At that time he was
reported to be the prime mover in the expropria-
tion of Gulf. His final victory in the contest for
power this week depended heavily on leftist labor
and student support, and he is likely to accept at
least some of their demands. In fact, Juan Lechin,
the fiery leader of the Bolivian labor con-
federation, announced after conferring with
Torres that an agreement on "co-government"
had been reached and that eight ministers (about
half the cabinet) would be named by his organiza-
tion.
PERU: President Velasco's speech on 3 October,
the second anniversary of his coup, was devoted
to reviewing his major reforms and accomplish-
ments and attacking Peruvians who did not sup-
port his revolution. His most blistering attack was
on the "reactionary oligarchy," to which he con-
signed those persons and newspapers that have
been critical of his reforms. He made no specific
mention of the US, although Communist-led
workers used the occasion to chant "Yankees out
of Peru" and to display anti-US placards. The
Communist labor confederation played a major
role in organizing the celebration, and the Com-
munists were probably taken aback when Velasco
noted that they are supporting the revolution in
the mistaken belief that it prepared Peru for an-
other revolution in the future. He said that no
other revolution is necessary, but that "now it is
imperative to create the mechanisms and the in-
stitutions that will make it possible to achieve
popular participation upon permanent and con-
structive bases." Another celebration will be held
on 9 October-the anniversary of the expropria-
tion of the US-owned International Petroleum
Company-and it will provide the occasion for
additional, and probably more vocal, anti-US
propaganda.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Malawi: Pawn of White Southern Africa?
Secret
N2 44
9 October 1970
No. 0391/70A
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Malawi: Pawn of White Southern Africa?
My first duty is toward my own people. If, in order to look after my people, I
have to deal with the devil, I will do so.
President Hastings Banda
Geographic location and economic imperatives have largely determined
Malawi's relations with its neighbors in southern Africa. Impoverished and
landlocked, Malawi is dependent on white-ruled Portuguese Mozambique for rail
outlets to the Indian Ocean. Rhodesia and South Africa provide employment for
Malawi's large surplus of manpower and are also important contributors of
foreign exchange. Moreover, South Africa has become an increasingly significant
source of development capital for projects that Malawi has been unable to
finance elsewhere.
President Banda's policy of open cooperation with the white states* has
earned him the title "Odd Man Out" in Africa. Malawi is the only black African
state that has official relations with South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia. The
President's outspoken defense of his ties with these "racist regimes" has resulted
in his isolation from other black African leaders and has strained Malawi's
relations with most black states. Banda, however, sweeps aside all criticism,
arguing that dialogue will bring about change where violent confrontation has
failed.
A politician of consummate skill, President
Hastings Kamuzu Banda has a deceptively mild
appearance that masks an explosive temper and a
demagogic, overbearing manner. He enjoys
enormous prestige within his country as the man
who took the former British dependency of
Nyasaland out of the unpopular Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland and to independence as
Malawi. Ironically, Banda at that time was con-
sidered a strong spokesman for African na-
tionalism. Dr. Banda had led an unsuccessful
campaign in London
from 1951-53 to keep
Nyasaland out of the
proposed federation,
fearing domination by
Southern Rhodesia. I n
July 1958, Banda re-
turned home to a tumul-
tuous welcome and as-
sumed the leadership of
the Nyasaland inde-
pendence movement.
*The white-ruled governments of southern Africa include the Republic of South Africa, South-West Africa, Rhodesia,
and the Portuguese African territories of Angola and Mozambique.
Special Report
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Banda was named prime minister when the
colony achieved internal self-government in 1963,
and one year later he became president of the
independent state of Malawi. Since independence,
Banda has completely dominated Malawi, relying
primarily on British expatriates to keep the civil
service, army, and police effective and loyal.
Through a mixture of paternalism and force,
Banda maintains firm control of the government
machinery and of the only legal political party; he
makes all major and many minor decisions. Be-
cause of this dominance he has unfettered author-
ity to push ahead with Malawi's policy of co-
operation with the white governments of
southern Africa. This policy has generated some
opposition among the few educated Malawians,
but Banda's forceful personality and authoritarian
rule have deprived them of any significant role.
Malawi's foreign policy toward the white
redoubt reflects Banda's own philosophy on how
to cope with the racial problems of southern
Africa. He is convinced that his approach is more
realistic than the strategy of "boycott, isolation,
and violent confrontation" espoused-at least
verbally-by many black African states. While
Banda opposes all forms of racial discrimination,
he also believes that violence will only aggravate
what he considers its root cause-the white man's
fear of the black majority. Instead, Banda argues
that through contacts and dialogue, black and
white leaders can gradually develop respect for
each other, thereby paving the way for peaceful
and evolutionary change. He admits that eradica-
tion of black-white hostilii:ies is an exceedingly
difficult and distant objective and that his ap-
proach may take several generations to achieve.
Nevertheless, Banda is convinced that the alterna-
tive black African solution, relying on the use of
force, has even less chance of success.
Malawi thus is the only African state that
has full diplomatic relations with South Africa,
consular relations with Portuguese Mozambique
as well as a nonresident ambassador to Lisbon,
and a government representative in Rhodesia.
President Banda has welcomed these relations not
Special Report
only because of the economic benefits but also
because of his wish to be a "bridge-builder" be-
tween the races of Africa.
Malawi's Economic and Geographic Imperatives
In addition to his personal convictions, the
pragmatic Banda realizes he must deal with white
Africa because of Malawi's economic weakness.
With few exploitable natural resources and with
90 percent of its 4.5-million people engaged in
agriculture, the country is one of the poorest and
most densely populated states in Africa. Its man-
power surplus is manageable only because
Rhodesia and South Africa annually employ ap-
proximately 255,000 Malawians, nearly twice the
number of Malawian wage earners at home
Malawi also occupies a strategic position be-
tween Zambia and Tanzania-the two most active
supporters of African liberation movements-and
white-ruled Mozambique. Should Malawi become
a major infiltration route for African militants, it
would complicate the insurgency problem for the
Portuguese in Mozambique and in turn cause dif-
ficulties for Rhodesia and South Africa. Con-
versely, denial of the use of Malawian territory to
the guerrillas would make it even more difficult
for them to operate effectively. The white govern-
ments accordingly have attempted to cultivate
Malawi as a means of restraining it from granting
black African insurgents a base of operations.
South Africa: Moving Outward via Malawi
South African Prime Minister Vorster's of-
ficial visit to Malawi Iasi: May was a victory for
Banda and a high point in relations between the
two countries. President Banda touted the pres-
ence of the apartheid leader as vindication of his
policies and expressed the hope that it would
result in even closer relations.
As for South Africa, the state visit con-
firmed Vorster's intention to proceed with his
"outward policy" of establishing friendly rela-
tions with neighboring black African states.
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Although this policy has not yet gotten much
beyond Malawi, Pretoria hopes it will eventually
improve South Africa's image in the West, defuse
black African hostility, and win acceptance of the
status quo in white-ruled Africa.
In addition to these political contacts, over
the past three years there has been a significant
increase in Malawi's economic ties with South
Africa concurrently with a decline in assistance
from the UK-still Malawi's main benefactor-and
from other Western sources. The lack of com-
petition from other Western nations and Banda's
unswerving opposition to accepting aid from
Communist states have given South Africa the
opportunity to fill the aid vacuum.
President Banda has been especially ap-
preciative of South African assistance for two of
his pet goals. The first project, announced in
1968, involved two loans totaling $15.4 million
(Banda Reassures Vorster on Critics in South Africa)
"Sonic of niy best friends are White!"
Special Report
President Banda and Prime Minister Vorster exchange views
for rolling stock and construction of the Malawi
portion of a rail link leading to the Mozambican
seaport of Nacala. The same year, Banda also
obtained an $11.2 million loan for construction
of the first phase of a new national capital at
Lilongwe. Both of these projects had been re-
jected by traditional Western aid sources as un-
necessary. The still largely uncompleted capital,
which may cost more than $50 million to finish,
may enable South Africa to increase its political
leverage on Banda because Pretoria is the only
likely source of additional aid. These projects will
give Malawi few immediate economic returns, but
Banda insists they are necessary for his country's
long-range growth and its balanced development.
Trade with South Africa will probably de-
cline in the future, however. Malawi has doubled
its imports from South Africa since signing a
bilateral trade agreement in 1967 (to approxi-
mately 15 percent of total imports in 1969), but
the bulk of this increase is related to Pretoria's
financial assistance and is therefore a temporary
phenomenon.
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St"U1t1J I
1Oar es Salaam
Malawi
Special Report
Gaborone*
REPUBLIC: OF
SOUTH AFRICA
Mbaband
SWAZILAND
I
Nairob
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SOUTHERN
RHODESIA
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Portuguese Mozambique: Vital
Economic Lifeline
Good relations with Portuguese Mozambique
are a matter of economic survival because all
imports and exports are transported via the Beira
and Nacala rail lines. Since independence, Banda
has avoided doing anything that would provoke
the Portuguese into closing these lines. Addi-
tionally, he has forbidden nationalists of the
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), who
operate principally out of Tanzania, to stage
armed raids into Mozambique from Malawi or
even to transport arms through his country. As a
result, FRELIMO has been forced to keep its
armed activity in Malawi to a minimum, although
the guerrillas often use remote border regions for
refuge and staging bases. Because of these un-
authorized activities, Blantyre has generally
acquiesced to recurring but minor border viola-
tions by Portuguese counterinsurgency patrols.
As in the case of South Africa, Portuguese
cooperation extends into several areas. In early
1970, Lisbon agreed to its first major loan of $6
million for a new highway. Portugal has also given
Malawi two boats and has trained seamen for
patrolling Lake Nyasa. Both regular and informal
contacts are maintained by administrative, mili-
tary, and security officials on both sides of the
border. The interest of the Portuguese in support-
ing Banda's continued rule became evident in
1967, when they allegedly offered military as-
sistance to help him defeat an abortive uprising.
Rhodesia: Mecca for Malawian Labor
Malawi's relations with Rhodesia are pri-
marily economic. An estimated 155,000 Mala-
wians are employed each year in Rhodesia, and
the wages they bring home contribute a substan-
tial amount of foreign exchange. In addition,
Malawi has good trade connections with the Ian
Smith regime; in 1969, about 17 percent of
Malawi's imports came from Rhodesia. Neverthe-
less, Banda does not condone "sanction-busting"
activities within his country, primarily because he
does not want to aggravate his relations with the
UK. The sanctions against Rhodesia have actually
benefited Malawi, by driving up the price of
tobacco, its major cash crop.
In the political field, Malawi has resisted
Rhodesian overtures to establish diplomatic or
consular relations, or alternatively to accept a
resident Rhodesian representative. Malawi main-
tains an official representative in Salisbury, how-
ever, as a liaison between the Rhodesian Govern-
ment and Malawian laborers.
Malawi's open cooperation with its white
neighbors has strained its relations with most
other black African countries. Altho' gh nomi-
nally remaining a member of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), Malawi's contacts with this
organization and most of its member states have
gradually lessened. Banda refuses to support the
African Liberation Committee* of the OAU and
since 1965 he has boycotted the annual OAU
summit conferences by scheduling a national
party convention for the same time. When
Malawian delegations do attend OAU ministerial
meetings, they usually abstain or express reserva-
tions on southern African issues.
Banda's public statements have been almost
as big an obstacle to better relations with black
Africa as his policies have been. Indeed, he some-
times seems to take perverse pleasure in making
sarcastic remarks about the "idle childish threats"
of the OAU and in expressing his contempt for
*The African Liberation Committee, set up in 1963 to channel funds to the liberation movements, has received little
support from the black African states. In 1968-69 it received only some $0.6 million of its budget of $1.9 million,
because only five states paid their full assessments, and 20 paid nothing at all.
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the idea that combined black African forces could
prevail against South Africa and Rhodesia.
Black African attitudes toward white south-
ern Africa cover a broad spectrum and a number
of states have come to share some of Banda's
views. Rulers of Ivory Coast, Gabon, and
Madagascar speak privately of South Africa as a
possible source of aid and as a bulwark against the
spread of Communism in Africa. Prime Minister
Busia of Ghana has stated publicly that the dcor
for dialogue with South Africa should be left
open. These and other black states maintain un-
publicized trade with southern Africa.
Y,arnbia and Tanzania: Banda's Militant Neighbors
Malawi's policies have been criticized most
severely by neighboring Zambia and Tanzania.
Blantyre has never had diplomatic relations with
Dar es Salaam and only recently established them
with Lusaka. Both Zambian President Kaunda
and Tanzanian President Nyerere bitterly resent
Banda's embrace of the white redoubt. They have
sharply criticized him for refusing to assist in tie
liberation struggle, for going far beyond what is
necessary for economic survival, for grossly over-
estimating his ability to influence the white
regimes, and for giving verbal support to black
Africa's enemies.
Since 1964 when several dissident ministers
fled Malawi for Tanzania and Zambia, Banda has
suspected both governments of giving support as
well as refuge to his opponents. Both govern-
ments did in fact grant Malawian dissidents po-
litical asylum, and Tanzania also supplied them
with limited arms and training from 1964-67.
Although neither country now gives the dissidents
any assistance, Banda remains suspicious, espe-
cially of Tanzania.
In 1969, however, Malawi initiated the latest
of several attempts to improve relations with its
black neighbors. Bilateral negotiations were he d
with Tanzania in May and July, the occasion for
the latter's first ministerial-level visit to Malawi
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since 1964. Although little progress was made at
the talks, both countries agreed to refrain from
publicly attacking each other. In an unusual ad-
dress the following September, Banda emphasized
his desire to improve relations with neighboring
black states. Shortly thereafter, he attempted to
demonstrate his "bridge-building" role by inter-
ceding with the Portuguese for the release of
several Zambians held prisoner in Mozambique.
The South African prime minister's visit last
May seems to have offered only a temporary
setback to Malawi's efforts to establish better
relations with its black African neighbors. The
government-controlled press in Zambia and
Tanzania once again took up the cudgels, pointing
to Vorster's visit as further proof of Banda's col-
laboration with the white regimes, but it soon
lapsed into silence. And in mid-September,
Zambia and Malawi finally established diplomatic
relations.
As long as President Banda remains on the
scene, Malawi will almost certainly follow its
present policies. Banda will continue to argue that
dialogue and contacts with the white governments
are the most realistic means of eradicating racial
discrimination in southern Africa, and that the
insurgent movements are doomed to remain inef-
fective for the foreseeable future. Blantyre will
probably maintain its present level of relations
with Rhodesia and Mozambique. Relations with
South Africa may expand, at least over the short
run, in view of Pretoria's willingness to fund
Banda's costly new capital. Nevertheless, this is
unlikely to undercut seriously Malawi's freedom
of action, and Banda in the final analysis will
continue to be his own man.
Banda will also continue his efforts to im-
prove relations with other black African states.
Barring a modification of the white governments'
racial policies or of black Africa's animosity to-
ward the white regimes, however, his aspiration to
an international role as the "bridge-builder of
Africa" seems likely to remain only a dream.
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The future of Malawi's foreign policy largely
depends on the continuing leadership of Banda
himself, however. The able President is at least 64
and may be several years older. The next genera-
tion of Malawian leadership will probably be
more in tune with black Africa and less zealous in
maintaining ties with the white states. Par-
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ticularly, Malawi's considerable reliance on South
Africa for economic and technical assistance
might be sharply reduced after Banda departs.
Nevertheless, any future Malawian government
will face the same limitations and realities that are
now imposed on it by geography and economic
necessity.
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