WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008100040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
45
State Dept. review completed
14 August 1970
No. 0383/70
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 13 August 1970)
Page
FAR EAST
Laos: Another Step Closer to Peace Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Burma: Progress Against the Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
China's Foreign Trade Continues to Expand . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Cambodia: Muddling Through . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
East Germans in a Quandary over Soviet - West German Treaty
USSR: Crop Prospects Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Spain: New Agreement with US Hailed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Middle East Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
PRE-ELECTION POLITICS IN PAKISTAN
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Bolivia: Political Tension Eases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Balaguer Begins New Term in Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . 15
Central America: Reaction to Soviet - Costa Rican Trade Deal . . . . 16
Uruguay Government Cracks Down on Tupamaros . . . . . . . . . 17
HAITI: NO PRESENT, NO FUTURE
NOTES: Eastern Europe; Czechoslovakia; Togo;
Colombia; Cuba - Trinidad and Tobago
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FAR EAST
Laos: Another Step Closer to Peace Talks
Vientiane is moving rapidly to get peace
talks going with the Communists following this
week's meeting between Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma and Pathet Lao emissary Souk Vongsak.
The Communists have agreed to hold the first
round in the talks at Khang Khay, a town on the
Plaine des Jarres under their control, and a site
they had previously ruled out as "insecure." They
rejected, however, Souvanna's proposal that in-
termediate talks be omitted in favor of meetings
between the three factions-the leftists, the
rightists, and the neutralists. The discussions in
Khang Khay will be, in effect, between repre-
sentatives of the "two sides."
Souvanna lost no time in choosing the gov-
ernment's negotiating team. He proposed Minister
of Interior Pheng Phongsavan, a well-known
neutralist, to head the delegation; but, mindful of
his problem on the right, he also selected prom-
inent rightists in the government and national
assemblymen. Pheng was authorized to discuss
"technical matters" with the Pathet Lao envoy at
the outset of the Khang Khay meetings, including
assurances to the Communists of a halt in the
bombing in a 15-kilometer (9.3 miles) area
around the town. Souvanna anticipates, however,
that there might be additional problems to be
solved before the talks actually get under way.
The prime minister clearly anticipates dif-
ficult negotiations ahead, and he has made a
special effort to assure his cabinet that there
would be full consultations before the delegation
departs for Khang Khay. In trying his best to get
substantive talks under way before he leaves Laos
for an extended trip in early September, however,
Souvanna may find that he is moving too fast for
some of his long-standing, rightist critics. At least
one of them has already charged that Souvanna is
prepared to accept a full US bombing halt in
return for "inspections" and to consider giving
the Communists more cabinet seats than they
presently hold. Another rightist-the deputy chief
of the government delegation-anticipates rough
sledding in hammering out an agenda for the
talks, with actual negotiations at Khang Khay
unlikely before October at the earliest.
For their part, the Communists appear
genuinely interested in getting the peace talks
moving. This is, of course, far different from
being amenable to a reasonable settlement, but
the Communists may hope that they can drive a
wedge between Souvanna and the US on the
bombing issue or perhaps reduce the drain on
their resources by substantially reducing the level
of m i I itary activity in Laos. 25X1
Burma: Progress Against the Insurgents
In a major operation begun in early July, the
Burmese Army has made gains against Communist
insurgents in northern Shan State near the
Chinese border. The Burmese military regime,
alarmed over incursions by the Communists far
beyond their normal area of operations during the
dry season earlier this year, decided to make
concentrated effort to contain the rebels. This led
to a command reorganization and an augmenta-
tion of troop strength, which have paid dividends.
The major success achieved was the recap-
ture on 23 July of the town of Mong Si, which
had been abandoned by the government earlier
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this year. Previously, in a three-hour battle with a
500-man Communist force east of Kutkai on 21
July, the government claims to have killed over
100 rebels. Despite its own relatively heavy losses
and some retaliatory rebel ambushes, the army
appears to have regained the upper hand, at least
temporarily.
Advances in the northeast have been
matched in the Irrawaddy Delta closer to
Rangoon, an area long plagued by Burmese Com-
munist Party insurgents and by tribal Karen rebels
of both Communist and non-Communist bent. In
this area the army believes it has reversed a de-
Page 2
teriorating situation of several months' duration
that was caused by troop deployments to the
northeast. Renewed army pressure in the delta is
bringing more of the area under government con-
trol, and the insurgents, being kept constantly on
the move, are now finding it difficult to operate
in as large bands as before. Both Communist and
non-Communist insurgents in this area are never-
theless able to make their presence felt. The rebel
practice of taking revenge on village militia forces
after the withdrawal of army units illustrates the
necessity for a continuing military presence,
which in many localities the army is unable to
provide.
Despite its recent successes, the army does
not appear disposed to move much farther or to
overextend itself in northern Shan State. An army
spokesman says, for example, that no attempt
will be made to retake the border town of Kyu-
hkok, lost to Communist rebels in March, lest
firing into China incur a reaction by Peking. The
government, furthermore, apparently does not
plan to conduct operations in the area east of the
Salween River, abandoned to the Communists
over a year ago and over which the Communists
have evidently established firm control.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Aug 70
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China's Foreign Trade Continues to Expand
Peking's foreign trade is increasing for the
second straight year from the low levels of the
Cultural Revolution. Early trade returns, along
with current contract information, suggest that
total trade this year will exceed last year's by
about ten percent and will approach the record
$4.3-billion mark set in 1959. The free world now
accounts for about 80 percent of this trade.
An outstanding feature is the increase in
trade with Japan, which, for the first half of this
year, is up 77 percent over the same period last
year, to more than $425 million. This largely
reflects an upsurge in Japanese deliveries of steel
and chemicals under 1969 contracts. Trade with
Western Europe during the first part of the year is
slightly ahead of the 1969 level. Growth in trade
with the United Kingdom and France has largely
offset declines elsewhere in Europe.
This pattern could be altered somewhat by
Chou En-lai's decree last April to halt Chinese
trade with Japanese subsidiaries of US firms and
firms that conduct business with Taiwan and
South Korea. Peking may not enforce this restric-
tion to the letter, but business conducted during
and since the spring Canton trade fair suggests
that China is shifting some of its Japanese trade
to Western Europe. Japanese businessmen are
optimistic, however, that by the end of the year
Sino-Japanese trade will reach a record $700 mil-
lion.
Current negotiations show a strong Chinese
interest in the import of machine tools, textile
machinery, and machinery for processing paper
and plastics. Peking already has contracted for
$70 million worth of trucks, and steel imports
probably will exceed last year's purchases of $145
million.
Peking continues to purchase large quantities
of copper, platinum, and other nonferrous metals.
Imports of these goods, which reached unprec-
edented highs last year, are in part related to
Chinese stockpiling. Peking's effort to build up
reserves of these basic materials probably is the
result of strategic as well as industrial consider-
ations.
Chinese exports also are expected to increase
in 1970. First quarter exports to Hong Kong and
Singapore-Peking's principal source of hard cur-
rency-are moderately above the 1969 level. Sales
of traditional Chinese agricultural goods at the
spring trade fair showed a marked improvement
over last year. Although Chinese metals were
again in short supply, Peking may soon liberalize
their sale.
All 1970 trade agreements with Eastern
Europe call for modest increases and should boost
trade above the $280 million recorded last year.
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THAILAND
= Comrnunist-controlled
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Cambodia: Muddling Through
Military activity in Cambodia has tapered off
since government forces repulsed a series of large-
scale Communist attacks last week on the isolated
provincial capital of Kompong Thom. The Com-
munists appear to have shifted their major at-
tention to the adjacent provinces of Siem Reap
and Kompong Cham.
I n Kompong Cham, the enemy launched a
drive to isolate Kompong Cham city by attacking
government positions to the west along Route 7,
the major land route from Phnom Penh. The
towns of Skoun and Prey Totung on Route 7
have been subjected to continuing Communist
harassing attacks since their recent recapture by
government forces.
In the west, the Communists stepped up
pressure on the provincial capital of Siem Reap
by attacking nearby government positions along
Route 6. The city itself has again been subjected
to harassing attacks. Land access to the city is
under Communist control, although the enemy
has been forced to relinquish the crossroads town
of Kralanh.
Farther north, the situation in Oddar Mean-
chey Province continues to deteriorate. The pro-
vincial governor, upon receiving a report of large
enemy troop concentrations in the eastern part of
the province, has ordered the evacuation of mili-
tary dependents from the poorly defended pro-
vincial capital of Samrong. Government forces in
the province have received little support from
Phnom Penh
The Communists are also active
south of amrong, as they move to extend their
control over the entire province and adjacent
areas north of Route 6.
Meanwhile, small enemy elements made sev-
eral probing attacks near Phnom Penh. Although
the city itself has been free of incidents, the
recent flurry of enemy activity portends raids in
the near future. Prime Minister Lon Nol has re-
cently ordered the police to increase vigilance in
the city, but the Communists probably will be
able to get troops into the capital if they so
desire.
The situation at Kirirom has eased, with the
Communists reportedly withdrawing from several
positions in the town. Earlier in the week, three
government battalions moving toward Kirirom re-
portedly suffered heavy casualties when they
were ambushed about two miles from the town.
The district capital of Saang was again hit by the
Communists, but it is still in government hands.
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Vietnam:
There are additional signs that the North
Vietnamese have selected an allied outpost in the
remote mountains some 25 miles west of Hue as a
target for another persistent siege.
Enemy shellings and ground probes around
Fire Support Base O'Reilly have increased
steadily during the past week and a sizable enemy
force is massing in the vicinity. The reinforced
South Vietnamese battalion defending O'Reilly
has suffered relatively light casualties so far, but
there is growing concern that the enemy may
intend to repeat the same kind of sustained pres-
sure that caused US forces to abandon nearby
Fire Support Base Ripcord last month.
The commander of the South Vietnamese 1st
Division has asserted that his forces will not with-
draw from the forward artillery and patrol base,
thus increasing the likelihood of a significant bat-
tle. The commander, a respected officer, appar-
ently has made at least a preliminary determina-
tion that the outpost is in a viable defensive
position and that it is better to fight the North
Vietnamese in the mountains than along the pop-
ulated coastal lowlands.
The North Vietnamese probably reason that
an attempt to break through to the coast in force
would be too costly right now. Pressure against
the allied defense screen in the mountains of
western Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, on
the other hand, would have certain advantages.
These include attrition of US and South Vietnam-
ese units and their diversion from more populated
areas, and the immobilization of South Vietnam-
ese forces that have been rumored planning to
attack Communist supply lines and bases along
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in nearby Laos. Stepped-up
enemy action in the western reaches of the north-
ernmost provinces also frees Communist local
force and guerrilla units in the lowlands to in-
crease their harassments and localized actions.
The Communists reportedly have begun ac-
tions in the lowlands that appear intended to set
back the government pacification program. This
program has been relatively successful along the
northern coast during the past two years. The
Communists have not put a high military priority
on this region since 1968 and tens of thousands
of South Vietnamese have been gathered behind
an as yet not seriously tested shield of territorial
security forces. If the Communists keep up the
pressure in the mountains, however, and at the
same time make many more forays along the
coast, government security gains may be severely
challenged.
Preparations for Senate Elections
Many South Vietnamese political leaders
have firmed up their strate for the 30 Au ust
Senate elections.
It is not clear how the
preferred candidate lists are to be supported, but
the Information Minister and his top deputies are
to tour the provinces to pass the word directly to
their subordinates. In past elections, local govern-
ment personnel have found ways in the course of
their official duties to create advantages for some
candidates and to discriminate against others.
There were earlier indications that the Presi-
dent would back the Huyen, Cao, and Le lists,
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but it now appears that he may confine his sup-
port to working behind the scenes through the
bureaucracy. The Le slate's prospects are not as
good as the other two, and Thieu probably pre-
fers not to risk his prestige by endorsing only
favored slates.
Meanwhile, two opposition slates that the
government reportedly believes would damage its
interests if elected may cooperate with one an-
other. Leaders of the militant An Quang Bud-
dhists allegedly have decided that, in addition to
backing the list headed by Buddhist layman Vu
Van Mau, they will also support the slate led by
Nguyen Ngoc Huy of the Progressive Nationalist
Movement (PNM). The PNM has been a moderate
opposition party so far and its leaders supported
the government's suppression of the 1966 Bud-
dhist "struggle movement." There are three prom-
inent Buddhist laymen on the PNM ticket, how-
ever, and the Buddhists apparently will support
the list because of the PNM's strength in the
southern provinces, where An Quang is relatively
weak. If this election agreement is backed up by
good voting discipline, the chances of these op-
position slates will be greatly enhanced.
New demonstrations against the Thieu gov-
ernment by disabled veterans' groups have flared
in Saigon and in a provincial capital. Clashes be-
tween veterans and police last week were touched
off after the police tore down some of the squat-
ter shacks built by protesting veterans. The agita-
tion abated only after government officials
promised to leave veterans' shacks intact and to
negotiate further with them.
There is no firm evidence of over-all direc-
tion to the veterans' agitation, and the causes of
the incidents are dissimilar. Many veterans around
the country, however, are concluding that they
can use force with relative impunity to get what
they want.
The Saigon government is extremely re-
luctant to use harsh tactics against the veterans
because of the sympathy they enjoy in the army.
Police have complained that, although they are
responsible for containing unrest, they receive
little backing from the top leadership. President
Thieu and his government in the past have been
able, with a mixture of firmness and conciliation,
to prevent demonstrations of this nature from
getting too far out of hand. The more militant
veteran factions, however, remain unappeased and
seem determined to instigate further violence. If
the violence continues to spread, the government
will be forced to adopt tougher measures to bring
the situation under control.
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EASTERN EUROPE: The Soviet - West German first Soviet diplomacy and secondly Brandt's po-
nonaggression treaty has elicited a favorable and litical courage, most news media characterized the
optimistic echo among all Eastern European treaty as a step in the direction of a new
regimes except maverick Albania, which called it European security system by encouraging West
a "plot against the German people." Crediting German reconciliation with the rest of the Soviet
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bloc. The Poles, claiming "coauthorship" of the
accord, have particularly stressed their key role in
preliminary negotiations between Bonn and East-
ern Europe, while the Romanians depicted it as
confirming the principles of equal rights, national
independence, and noninterference in the internal
affairs of other states. The optimistic Yugoslavs,
who took the broadest view, focused on the
possibility that the treaty would reflect favorably
on the prospects for general East-West detente,
and specifically on US-Soviet relations via the
East Germans in a Quandary Over Soviet - West German Treaty
The conclusion of the Soviet - West German
nonaggression treaty appears to have impelled the
East German regime to accelerate its drive to gain
international recognition as soon as possible. At
the same time, Pankow's fears that Ostpolitik is
making inroads into Eastern Europe at East Ge--
many's expense has led it to soften its heretofore
belligerent attitude toward continuing a viable,
substantive dialogue with Bonn.
Apparently anticipating the impact of the
treaty signing, East German party chief Walter
Ulbricht last week sent letters to several NATO
and nonaligned countries asking for the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations and for UN mem-
bership for both German states. The assistance of
other Soviet bloc representatives in delivering the
messages suggests that Moscow is encouraging this
hard-sell campaign, and is trying to help East
Germany obtain a negotiating initiative before the
East and West German heads of government meet
again.
Top East German leaders continue to differ
on how to respond to the relatively rapid progress
of the Brandt government's policy toward Eastern
Europe, but they are almost certainly united in
the view that Ostpolitik poses a threat to Pan-
kow's efforts to maintain East Germany as a
separate state. The East Germans, for example, no
doubt are disturbed by the USSR - West German
treaty's allusions to nonpermanent borders, re-
unification of Germany, and residual four-power
rights-all issues that Pankow considers non-
negotiable.
Thus far no top East German official has
publicly commented on the treaty. The press
hailed the agreement as "good news" insofar as
European security is concerned, but gave the pact
less positive treatment than the other Eastern
European regimes. Once again the news media
emphasized that Bonn should recognize Pankow
in the interest of East-West detente and peace,
and made another plea for admission to the UN.
Nevertheless, the nonaggression treaty has
taken some of the wind out of East Germany's
sails. In the last two months there have been
indications-notably Ulbricht's speech to the June
party plenum-that the East Germans are now
more inclined than formerly to sit at the con-
ference table with the West Germans.
Ulbricht, in fact, is said to be planning to
visit Moscow later this month to discuss East -
West German relations in the aftermath of the
treaty. One probable topic is the problems af-
fecting Berlin-an issue upon which Pankow
reportedly is becoming more flexible. West
German Foreign Minister Scheel has said that the
Bonn-Moscow treaty will not be ratified until
there is a significant improvement in the Berlin
situation. Pankow now may be hoping that some
concessions on its part will generate a reciprocal
willingness by Brandt to grant some of the major
concessions that the Ulbricht regime has long
been seeking.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Party leader Husak re-
turned from the Soviet Union on 11 August after
a three-week "vacation" that included substantive
talks with Brezhnev. In particular, the two leaders
probably discussed the Prague regime's purge of
former reformists. They may possibly even have
agreed on what to do with Alexander Dubcek,
who
is presently unemployed. Husak un-
dou to y assured Brezhnev that the necessary
security precautions would be taken to quell any
disturbances during the second anniversary of the
Soviet invasion on 20-21 August. In the light of
the recently concluded Soviet - West German non-
aggression pact, Brezhnev and Husak also may
have reviewed Prague's relations with Bonn. The
Czechoslovak news agency on 11 August hinted
that Prague might be receptive to West German
overtures regarding a similar agreement. For his
part, Husak probably was again fishing for more
demonstrative Soviet support, possibly through a
reduction of Soviet forces in Czechoslo-
vakia.
USSR: Crop Prospects Good
As of mid-July, the condition of Soviet agri-
cultural crops was good, and a record or near-
record grain harvest appears to be in the making.
The occurrence of bad weather before the end of
the harvesting season, however, could change the
picture markedly.
A good harvest will permit some upgrading
of the still-drab diet of the Soviet consumer both
directly and through the provision of more and
better livestock feed, and it will make more raw
materials available for certain industries. More-
over, it will lessen the Soviet need to import
agricultural products and will put the USSR in a
position to help those Eastern European states
that are experiencing setbacks in grain production
this year.
Variations in the weather have caused yields
to fluctuate widely from year to year, but over
the last decade grain production has increased at
an average annual rate of about 3.5 percent. Net
output of all agricultural products has trended
upward also, but less rapidly. The gradual up-
swing in crop production reflects the increased
use of mineral fertilizer and other chemicals and
the introduction of improved plant varieties.
Greater mechanization, land improvement
through irrigation and drainage, and the adoption
of better cropping practices also have con-
tributed. Despite continuing improvement, how-
ever, the agricultural sector still suffers from a
general shortage of supplies and equipment.
Thanks largely to favorable weather, this
year's grain harvest promises to approximate or
surpass the 1966 record of 140 million metric
tons of usable grain. Unlike last year, when much
of the area that had been seeded in the fall was
subjected to extensive winterkill and had to be
resown in the spring, fall-sown grains have win-
tered relatively well and promise excellent yields.
As the yield per unit of land generally is much
greater in the USSR for fall-sown grain than for
spring-sown grain, this year's return to a higher
proportion of the former brightens prospects for
the over-all harvest. Crop conditions also are good
in practically all spring grain areas, largely because
the supply of soil moisture has been better than
usual. The total grain area to be harvested is down
slightly from last year, however, apparently be-
cause a larger area has been left fallow to enhance
yields in the future.
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The outlook for nongrain crops is also better
than a year ago. By July, the cotton crop in
Central Asia was developing about a week in
advance of normal and two to three weeks earlier
than last year, a development favoring a higher
yield. Recovery from last year's sharp decline in
sugar-beet production also is in prospect. Sun-
flowers, the major oilseed crop, probably were
planted on a slightly smaller area than last year,
but the condition of the plants is better and
yields are likely to be higher. In addition, the
harvest of potatoes, other vegetables, and fruits is
expected to be substantially larger than a year
ago.
Spain: New Agreement with US Hailed
The Spanish press and government officials
have played up the gains for Spain in the new
Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation with
the US that was signed in Washington last week.
The new five-year accord replaces completely the
Defense Agreement of 1953 and its subsequent
extensions.
Nearly every Spanish newspaper referred to
the accord by its new title and not as a "base
agreement" and emphasized the extension of the
accord to areas other than military, such as agri-
culture, science, and education. The press noted
that the agreement includes a new administrative
system for the formerly jointly administered
"Spanish-American bases on Spanish territory"
and that the bases are under Spanish sovereignty.
Spanish newspapers treat the executive-legis-
lative discussion of the accord in the United
State`s as a US internal constitutional problem and
comment that under international law there is no
difference between an executive agreement and a
treaty.
In meeting with the press on his return to
Madrid after the signing, Foreign Minister Lopez
Bravo lauded the agreement and stressed the value
of the personal contacts made in concluding it,
including his own sessions with Secretary Rogers
and his meeting with President Nixon. Referring
to the use in the press of various figures on the
value of the aid to be provided to Spain, he
glossed over Spain's failure to receive the quid pro
quo originally sought by asserting that a value
could not be placed on a relationship of friend-
ship and cooperation.
Lopez Bravo also said that the new agree-
ment links Spain militarily with the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization. He cited in this con-
nection the tie between the air alert system for
Spain and that protecting NATO members. He
also sees a link for Spain with NATO in the
provision that the chief of US forces in Europe,
who is also the NATO commander, will have an
advisory role in administering the US-Spanish ac-
cord.
In an interpretation that goes beyond terms
of the agreement, the foreign minister claimed
that in it the US declares its favorable disposition
toward the Spanish objective of arriving at a total
integration with the European Communities
through successive stages. His remarks may create
the impression in Madrid that Washington now is
inclined not to oppose the preferential trade
agreement signed in July between Spain and the
EC.
Lopez Bravo may play up his role in the
successful negotiations with the United States to
improve his domestic political fortunes. He can
expect the favorable headlines to counter the
rumors of his impending replacement because of
his alleged involvement in the MATESA export
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fraud case. This publicity will also counteract the him the go-ahead, appears to have resulted more
petition of 82 Cortes members for further study from anger over his failure to allow questions
of the agreement. The petition, which was sub- from committee members than from opposition
mitted following Lopez Bravo's briefing on 27 to the a reement itself. 25X1
July of the Foreign Affairs Committee that gave
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MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
Middle East Situation
In the first few days of its establishment on
7 August, the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was gen-
erally observed-at least along the Suez Canal
itself-with only a few scattered violations having
been reported. There were some exchanges of
small-arms fire, and Israeli planes have apparently
overflown Egyptian territory. Subsequently, the
Israelis alleged that the Egyptians had violated the
cease-fire by moving antiaircraft missiles toward
the Suez Canal.
On the "eastern front" along the Lebanese
and Jordanian borders, the tempo of incidents has
picked up since the cease-fire. The Israelis re-
sponded on 9, 11, and 12 August with air strikes
at fedayeen targets in the Mount Hermon area of
Lebanon, inflicting some casualties on the com-
mandos.
The Palestine guerrilla organizations are con-
tinuing their attempts to sabotage the recent
peace moves, apparently undaunted by efforts of
Egypt and others to persuade them to end their
opposition or by the general Arab support for a
settlement. The central committee of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization, in issuing a call for a
Vietnam-type war in the Middle East, urged all
who have been supporting the fedayeen move-
ment to continue their material and political aid.
Despite these calls to action, however, the peace
effort seems to have thrown the fedayeen into
some confusion as to just how to handle the
situation. Some groups were urging attacks on
and sabotage of US interests, while others seemed
to be urging caution in moving contrary to the
wishes of Nasir and the fedayeen's financial
backers.
FA -rocket attack last weekend against
the o om potash plant suggests that the fed-
ayeen may be planning -to strike at other such
"off-limits" targets as the Sodom plant and the
port of Elat in an attempt to irritate the Israelis.
In Jordan, the fedayeen were continuing to
look warily over their shoulder at the govern-
ment. A fedayeen newspaper warned that at-
tempts by Amman to curb guerrilla activities and
to crush the fedayeen movement could lead to
further clashes between the government and the
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sion calling for a contractual agreement with the
Arabs regarding "secure, recognized, and agreed"
borders prior to any Israeli withdrawal from the
occupied territories. By the middle of the week,
however, the "spirit of crisis" had reportedly
faded. Nevertheless, the flap underlined the Is-
raelis' high degree of suspicion and sensitivity,
and reaffirmed Israeli intentions to resist any
change in their long-established policies on with-
drawal.
Initial popular reactions in both Egypt and
Israel to the cease-fire have been a blend of
euphoria and caution.
In Israel, left and center groups have hailed
the cease-fire with unreserved satisfaction.
Spokesmen for Gahal, which left the governing
coalition in protest over acceptance of the cease-
fire, have now given it grudging acceptance. Out-
right opposition has been voiced only by groups
on the extreme-right fringe. A feeling of cautious
optimism has arisen that there may now be at
least a small chance for peace. This feeling is
tempered, however, by fears-expressed by
spokesmen for all shades of Israeli opinion-that
Israel will face strong pressure from the US and
others for large-scale withdrawal.
Earlier, the Israelis were upset with the US
because a key Israeli condition was not men-
tioned in the announcement of the resumption of
the mission of Gunnar Jarring, the UN Middle
East peace envoy. Israeli Government sources
pointed out that Tel Aviv's formal acceptance,
which was passed to the US, contained a provi-
The cease-fire and peace effort also created
euphoria in Egypt. In fact, there was popular
speculation that a settlement would be reached in
three months. Egyptian leaders were not so san-
guine, however, and Nasir has continued to mini-
mize the chances of an agreement. He held a
top-level strategy session on 10 August at which
Cairo's negotiators reportedly were given instruc-
tions for their contacts with US and UN officials
regarding the peace mission.
At UN headquarters in New York, mediator
Jarring continued to prod the Arab and Israeli
delegates to agree on a time, place, and level for
talks. Jarring fears that unless these procedural
matters are settled soon, his efforts will lose mo-
mentum and collapse. Jordan and Egypt have
informed Jarring that they favor a New York
location for the talks and will appoint their UN
ambassadors as chief negotiators. As of 13 Au-
gust, Israel had not made its views known to the
mediator, but it reportedly favors talks in Cyprus
at the foreign-minister level.
TOGO: President Eyadema's military govern-
ment announced this week that it had foiled an
imminent coup attempt by arresting 17 conspira-
tors, some of them Ghanaians and Dahomeans.
Denounced as key plotters were a disaffected
Togolese police official and two politicians prom-
inent in the regime of Togo's first president,
Sylvanus Olympio, who was assassinated in 1963.
One of the accused, Noe Kutuklui, has been in
exile in Dahomey since 1966 because of his par-
ticipation in a previous coup against the govern-
ment. He has been placed under arrest by the
Dahomeans and will probably be exiled to a third
country. The plot appears to have been an espe-
cially hare-brained scheme, but it has given
Eyadema a chance to neutralize the few opposi-
tion elements that exist and to forestall any fu-
ture plotting on their part.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Bolivia: Political Tension Eases
The conflict between President Ovando and
his top military officers appears to have eased
somewhat this week, although probably only
temporarily. The President has capitulated to
military demands on the formation of the new
cabinet. The retention of the old cabinet, minus
leftist Information Minister Bailey, met the mil-
itary's immediate and most obvious demand, but
mutual doubts and suspicions that have been
aroused will make it extremely difficult for the
government to function smoothly.
Although the political tension has eased
somewhat in La Paz as a result of the President's
actions, it seems likely that the relaxation will be
only temporary in view of the acrimonious words
that passed between Ovando and the men with
whom he now must work closely. Continued
maneuvering for position by both the President
and the armed forces leaders seems inevita-
ble.
Balaguer Begins New Term in Dominican Republic
President Joaquin Balaguer will be inaugu- that any statements of intentions might raise.
rated for his second four-year term as Dominican
president on 16 August. Although he has prom-
ised to form a government of "national unity"
including representatives from major opposition
parties, his plans regarding cabinet appointments
are a well-kept secret. As before his inauguration
in 1966, Balaguer has remained silent in order to
prevent his opponents from capitalizing on issues
All parties except the Dominican Revo-
lutionary Party (PRD) have indicated a limited
willingness to cooperate, but the President has
refrained from making many concrete offers. In a
press conference this week, Balaguer said that
none of the opposition leaders with whom he had
talked had presented platforms that coincided
with his own.
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Opposition parties appear divided on the
issue of participation. The directorate of the
Revolutionary Social Christian Party has decided
not to participate in the new government, but has
left its technicians free to accept positions on a
personal basis. PRD leader Juan Bosch publicly
refused President Balaguer's invitation to attend
the inaugural ceremonies. Another party spokes-
man, however, left the door open to PRD partici-
pation some time in the future. Although the
leader of a rigiht-wing party, former General Wes-
sin y Wessin, has rejected participation, several of
his colleagues reportedly are negotiating with the
government and may decide to cooperate.
Even without the active participation of op-
position political groups, President Balaguer has
reason for entering his new term with confidence.
His strong personal victory in the relatively hon-
est elections in May was buttressed by over-
whelming congressional and municipal majorities
for his Reformist Party. In the short run, at least,
his control of the government has been rein-
forced.
There has been little violence in the Do-
minican Republic since mid-July, although the
government still has military and police forces on
special alert. As inauguration day approaches, the
PRD may organize some anti-Balaguer demonstra-
tions, but the government appears capable of con-
taining any disorders that might develop. 25X1
Central America: Reaction to Soviet - Costa Rican Trade Deal
An upsurge in Costa Rica's trade contacts
with Eastern European countries is providing
Communist nations access to an area that hereto-
fore has generally rejected their overtures for dip-
lomatic relations and formal trade agreements.
Neighboring governments have expressed appre-
hension, however, and Costa Rican press and busi-
ness interests have been especially critical.
Costa Rica's traditional aloofness from Com-
munist countries has faded during the past year
because of the need to dispose of surplus coffee,
and interest in Soviet and Eastern European mar-
kets has increased markedly since President
Figueres was inaugurated in May. Hungary and
Bulgaria have been added to the diplomatic list,
but Figueres' main concentration has been on
concluding a commercial agreement with the
USSR, which was signed on 26 June. Substantial
amounts of coffee have been sold to the USSR
for cash. In addition, the Soviet Union would like
to sell road-building equipment:, for which Costa
Rica has been offered a loan of about $10 mil-
lion.
Conservative and business circles have voiced
considerable opposition to this policy, especially
to the proffered loan and to the protocol
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provisions of the commercial agreement, which
would give the trade mission diplomatic status.
This opposition may be reflected in the Legisla-
tive Assembly when the trade agreement and the
loan come before that 'body after 1 September.
Approval of the commercial agreement requires
only a majority, which the government may be
able to manage. It would be more likely to be
approved without the protocol, and President
Figueres has been under pressure to abrogate that
portion. The loan, however, will require approval
by two thirds of the deputies, and is much less
certain of passage.
Opposition has also beer. expressed privately
by high-level officials of Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua. Although other Central American
countries have also sold coffee to Eastern Europe,
they do not wish to see a Soviet presence estab-
lished in Central America..
Costa Rican Communists, in a flurry of
capitalistic planning, hope to take advantage of
trade channels with the. USSR by establishing
several commercial outlets in Costa Rir~ for
PvPrvthina from motorcycles to medicine.
Uruguay (.government Cracks Down on Tupamaros
The Pacheco administration is maintaining
its adamant refusal to release prisoners demanded
by the extreme leftist Tupamaros in exchange for
a US agricultural specialist and a Brazilian diplo-
mat. Al. the same time, the government is broad-
ening its roundup of suspected terrorists and
sympathizers.
President Pacheco and other high officials
expressed sorrow and indignation over the Tupa-
maros' murder of US AID public safety adviser
Dan Mitrione last Sunday. The killing probably
has strengthened their determination not to ac-
cede to the terrorists' demands for the freedom of
all their jailed comrades in exchange for Brazilian
diplomat Aloysio Dias Gomide and US agricul-
tural specialist Claude Fly. This refusal is con-
sistent with the government's position in the
Tupamaros'' previous three major abductions, all
involving Uruguayans--one of them a close friend
of President Pacheco. All three were eventually
released unharmed.
On Monday, Congress granted the executive
unprecedented powers to deal with the terrorist
problem. The suspension of individual liberties
was granted for 20 days, and an extension could
be authorized if required. The strong support for
the extraordinary measures by the usually frac-
tious Congress was a sign of recognition of the
seriousness of the terrorism problem.
Armed with the special powers to search and
arrest, about 10,000 soldiers and policemen
fanned out through Montevideo in a block-by-
block search for the Tupamaros and their hos-
tages, despite terrorist warnings that the two were
well but would be killed if their location was
discovered. The raids have netted at least two
dozen suspected Tupamaros, including one of the
organization's founders and leaders, Raul Sendic.
Also detained in the dragnet were a Protestant
minister and a Catholic priest known to have
proleftist sympathies and possibly having ties to
the Tupamaros. In some cases the public
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applauded security forces arresting suspects. The
government also recovered part of a large cache of
arms stolen by the Tupamaros from a naval ar-
senal last May.
Brazil has increased pressure on the Pacheco
government to do everything possible-by impli-
cation including giving in to the Tupamaros'
demands-in order to secure the release of Dias
Gomide. Most of the Brazilian press has sharply
criticized the Uruguayan officials and asserted
that they will be "morally responsible" if the
diplomat is killed, Some Brazilian officials have
pointed out in public statements that they have
freed 60 dangerous subversives in order to ensure
the safety of three foreign diplomats, and they
maintain that the Uruguayans should do no less.
The Brazilians reportedly have increased some-
what their military forces along the Uruguayan
border, ostensibly to cut off any fleeing Tupa-
maros, but also presumably as another means of
putting pressure on the Pacheco government. If
the diplomat is killed, a marked deterioration in
relations between the two neighbors appears
likely.
The government has reaped some gains from
the unfortunate episode. The number of Tupa-
maros in custody is probably nearing 175. An
even greater benefit could be a recognition by the
public that the struggle is not between the Tupa-
maros and the police, but rather between the
terrorists and the Uruguayan people.
COLOMBIA: Following his peaceful inaugura-
tion on 7 August amidst tight security measures,
President Pastrana has selected a cabinet that
underlines his intention to carry on the moderate
lines of his predecessor. The key figure on do-
mestic policy will be Minister of Government
Joaquin Vallejo, a leading economist and capable
executive who has served in many top posts. The
new foreign minister, Alfredo Vasquez, is con-
sidered friendly to the United States but as
ambassador to the OAS during the Dominican
crisis in 1965 he was quite critical of the role of
the US and of the OAS in trying to resolve the
problem.
CUBA - TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: The eight-
man Cuban agricultural delegation that traveled
to Port of Spain on 10 August has received a
warm welcome. A Havana University official who
is heading the delegation conveyed Fidel Castro's
personal greetings to Prime Minister Eric Williams,
who will host a reception for the group during its
twelve-day stay. The delegation chief said that he
hoped that "with this type of association some
link" would be established between the two coun-
tries and gave a special greeting to the students
and faculty of the University of the West Indies.
Although the visitors will probably concern them-
selves primarily with agricultural and technical
talks, Havana apparently is hopeful that such con-
tacts will eventually develop into more formal ties
and in the long run help to overcome Cuba's
isolation in the hemisphere.
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Pre Election Politics in Pakistan
Secret
N2 44
14 August 1970
No. 0383/70A
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~l,~.lCr 1
PRE-ELECTION POLITICS IN PAKISTAN
Twenty-three years after its inception, Pakistan may at last be moving toward truly
representative government. Ironically, it is also in the midst of one of its most unsettling and
precarious periods, with its continuation as a viable country seriously in question.
Pakistan is not unfamiliar with national instability. In its initial years, the country
experienced such chaos under a series of shaky coalition governments that army commander
Ayub Khan's take-over in 1958 brought a nationwide sigh of relief. In the next ten years,
Pakistan moved from military to civilian rule, but the latter eventually proved to be
essentially autocratic in nature, designed primarily to preserve President Ayub's supremacy.
Special Report _ 1
14 August 1970
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Ayub's gradual isolation from the opinions and needs of his people precipitated his
downfall and the renewal of martial law in March 1969
In contrast with Ayub and his entourage, President Yahya Khan and his senior
military colleagues apparently have no desire to continue governing. With a combination
of firmness and fairness, Yahya has moved deliberately toward basic reforms and toward
an orderly transfer of power to civilian leaders. Despite some skepticism, most observers
believe that elections for a national constituent assembly and for provincial assemblies
will take place by the end of the year. Subsequent developments- the negotiations
leading to a satisfactory constitution, the viability of a government run by squabbling
politicians long out of power, and the long-range outlook for a stable, united Pakistan--
are far more diff cult to foresee or to regard with optimism.
A cursory survey of the present situation
generates a disquieting feeling of deja vu. In a
great many respects, Pakistan seems to be where
it was in 1958 with a military regime, surrounded
by all-too-familiar political faces and parties, is-
sues, and problems. A closer look, however, re-
veals that the approach of the current regime
toward the country's difficulties is considerably
more enlightened than Ayub Khan's. Ayub was a
military man, not a politician. He made no at-
tempt to develop the essential tools to deal
realistically with the political inexperience,
regional antagonisms, and economic disparities
that troubled Pakistan. The political system he
dlevised was based on indirect election and, in
effect, prevented the regular political parties from
operating on a normal basis.
When Yahya Khan assumed control of the
country and declared martial law in March 1969,
he probably had no clear idea of where his regime
was headed. He recognized, however, that he
must avoid the mistakes that had ruined his
predecessor and plunged Pakistan into chaos. His
immediate task of restoring peace and order was
achieved quickly. He then settled down to the
troublesome glob of sorting out Pakistan's myriad
problems and formulating policies to solve them.
The tedious process generated criticism: progres-
Special Report
sives believed he was moving too slowly and in-
decisively, and conservatives considered that he
was moving much too fast.
From the beginning, Yahya insisted that his
would be simply an "interim" administration,
designed to prepare the proper conditions for a
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considered a province.
!ong:
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14 August 1970
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transfer of power to duly-elected civilian officials.
His credibility as a caretaker president increased
as his efforts to carry out this transfer moved
steadily forward.
Constituent assembly elections, now sched-
uled for 5 October, will be based on a one man -
one vote formula that will give more populous
East Pakistan an assembly majority. Provincial
elections are to follow, not later than 22 October.
Prohibitions against political activity were re-
moved on 1 January, and the breakup of West
Pakistan into four ethnolinguistic provinces was
carried out as promised on 1 July.
Despite some political pressure to postpone
elections until after the fall monsoon floods
recede in East Pakistan, Yahya has so far stuck to
his original timetable lest any change be con-
strued as a weakening of his resolve to relinquish
power. In mid-August, however, he visited the
flood-ravaged eastern wing. His statement that
flooding had surmounted elections as his fore-
most concern, together with the government's
failure to release the election schedule on 10
August as expected, increased speculation that
Yahya might indeed postpone elections, probably
until December.
In the meantime, the country has remained
relatively quiet. The unrest and violence among
students and laborers that marked Ayub's final
days in office has virtually disappeared. The stu-
dents stopped protesting almost immediately
after Yahya took over, and their few public
demonstrations since then have occurred pri-
marily in East Pakistan. For the most part, these
have been incidents of infighting among rival stu-
dent groups rather than antigovernment agitation.
Laborers have been somewhat more active, having
been encouraged by the martial law regime's
initial lenient and conciliatory attitude.
In recent months, however, strikes and other
labor difficulties-including violent internecine
clashes-have been dealt with firmly as Yahya
attempted to establish a "no-nonsense" image. A
Special Report
few communal disturbances in both East and
West Pakistan have also been handled satisfac-
torily, although the tensions remain. Thus far, the
electoral campaign has been relatively peaceful,
despite the disruption of a number of political
rallies and meetings by followers of rival poli-
ticians.
In outlining his election plan in November
1969, President Yahya made it clear that pre- and
post-election activity would have to follow cer-
tain rules and that violence would not be tol-
erated. Yahya stipulated, for example, that the
constituent assembly must formulate its constitu-
tion within 120 days or it would be dissolved and
another assembly elected to finish the job. He
also stated that the constitution would not go
into effect until he approved it, a provision
fiercely opposed by leading politicians who re-
sented this infringement of the assembly's sover-
eignty.
Despite discontent with some of the ground
rules, most of the parties decided to continue
their plans to contest the elections. Some political
leaders warned, however, that if the constituent
assembly were unable to resolve grievances con-
stitutionally, a mass movement would be initiated
to obtain satisfactory redress for the people.
The issues of primary concern to Pakistanis
today are problems that have troubled them since
the partition of the Indian subcontinent. These
stem from the artificial nature of the state
itself-its geographical division into two wings
separated not only by 1,000 miles of Indian ter-
ritory but also by ,vast ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic differences. As in 1947, Pakistanis are
still united only by Islam and by the fear of
Hindu India.
In fact, regional antagonisms have increased
since independence as a direct result of various
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inequities, including discriminatory governmental
policy. The Bengalis of teeming East Pakistan
have suffered most under the political and eco-
nomic system, which has been dominated by West
Pakistanis, chiefly by the frequently arrogant
Punjabis. A regional confrontation, which has
been building for some years, is now imminent
because the East Pakistanis appear no longer will-
ing to accept what they regard as second-class
citizenship. Their stand has been buttressed by
spokesmen of some of the smaller reinstated prov-
inces in the western wing, who are also concerned
about provincial disparities and continued Punjabi
domination.
The key issue of the campaign, stimulated
by these regional rivalries, is the degree of pro-
vincial autonomy to be granted under the new
civilian government. East Pakistanis demand ex-
tensive authority to run their own affairs, while
the Punjabis advocate a powerful central admin-
istration, which they hope to control. A resolu-
tion of this basic controversy will entail the
sacrifice of important regional concerns and, thus
far, no spirit of compromise has emerged.
Compromise will be necessary, however, if
the constituent assembly is to hammer out a
national constitution. An early sign of the direc-
tion the constitutional deliberations may take
could be indicated by the internal voting formula
adopted by the assembly. A decision to vote by
simple majority would put the East Pakistanis in a
commanding position and represent a substantial
concession-and possibly a spirit of com-
promise-on the part of the Punjabis. On the
other hand, insistence on a heavily weighted vote,
such as a majority from each of the five provinces
could lead to an immediate and serious deadlock.
Other issues-all secondary to the autonomy
question-are also being debated. The Islam versus
socialism controversy has generated emotional
outbursts and some violence, especially in the
western wing of the country. Declarations of
intentions to nationalize certain businesses and
basic industries have raised worried eyebrows in
Special Report
already nervous commercial circles. Both the
fourth five-year plan and the annual budget have
produced heated exchanges, revolving chiefly
around the relative fund allocations for East
Pakistan and the western provinces. Some parties
have been charged with unethical campaign
practices and foreign financing, with the US
coming in for the lion's share of criticism for
alleged intervention. Foreign affairs issues have
generally been peripheral, but most parties have
jumped onto the anti-CENTO/anti-SEATO
bandwagon.
As the campaign moves deeper into the
important phase of candidate selection, these
broad national issues may slip into the back-
ground. A candidate's stature in his constituency
and his stand on purely local issues will become
more significant. Thus far, party spokesmen have
been flinging around slogans about socialism and
autonomy, but have not dealt with the bread-and-
butter issues that are of daily concern to the
people-hunger, poverty, flood control, prices,
wages. No party has put forward a detailed eco-
nomic program, and the politicians seemingly
have not looked beyond constitution-making to
governing. This does not augur well for eventual
stability or effective civilian government.
Against this rather sobering backdrop,
Pakistan's politicians-old-timers and fledglings
alike-have taken to the hustings with vigor. With
less than two months to go before the elections,
there is a plethora of political parties of all
imaginable ideological bents. Few have indicated
any desire to form electoral alliances, however,
and only one commands significant nationwide
support. The recent break-up of West Pakistan has
increased the provincialization of the parties.
Nevertheless, many politicians have privately
revealed their awareness that this may be their
last opportunity to establish a democratic, civilian
government. Their overriding interest in achieving
this goal and of personally gaining political office
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may soon stimulate serious coalition negotiations.
Difficulties in finding attractive candidates to
contest the country's 313 constituencies may also
encourage interparty cooperation. Behind the
scenes, some talks have already begun, but recent
efforts among likeminded conservative parties to
form an Islamic United Front have apparently
ended inconclusively.
Although Yahya himself has remained dis-
creetly on the sidelines, recent weeks have
brought increasing rumors of governmental at-
tempts to influence the outcome. Some political
leaders suggest that the regime is not only backing
certain rightist parties but is also seeking a frag-
mented constituent assembly 'in order to impose a
constitution based on a strong central govern-
ment. At the heart of the matter is a growing
feeling that the martial law administration,
dominated by Punjabis, will be unwilling finally
to accept the degree of provincial autonomy
demanded by East Pakistani spokesmen.
Special Report
Mujibur Rahman, charismatic leader of the
moderate-left Awami League, dominates the
political arena in East Pakistan. Extremely
popular throughout the province, 50-year-old
Mujib has become the acknowledged spokesman
of the East Pakistani autonomy movement and a
hero to "sons-of-the-soil" Bengalis for his relent-
less championing of their cause.
His "Six Point Program"-a Bengali plan for
provincial autonomy--has broad appeal among
East Pakistan's 73 million people. Their enthusi-
astic response to his vigorous campaign through
the eastern wing has convinced Mujib that his
party will emerge from the elections with an
overwhelming majority of the seats from East
Pakistan-he boasts 80 percent, but most others
are more willing to concede only 50-60 percent.
His several forays into western Pakistan have at-
tracted a good deal of attention but have prob-
ably won him few votes in that alien territory.
Mujib's present worry is that if elections are
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Mujibur Rahman
postponed, his Awarni League campaign may
peak too early and lose some of its support by
election day.
Mujib's ability to draw crowds and to hold
them spellbound is undeniable, but his potential
as a national policy maker and administrator is
less evident. He has never held a governing post,
and many of his critics contend that he lacks the
intellect, imagination, and competence to handle
executive duties. Nevertheless, if he makes his
anticipated strong showing in the elections, Mujib
will be courted by all mariner of West Pakistani
politicians.
Whether he will then be any more willing to
compromise on his "Six Points" and join a coali-
tion is difficult to say. It is generally believed,
however, that Mujib is extremely ambitious for
national office and therefore has a strong stake in
Special Report
preserving a united country. He is frequently
mentioned as the man likeliest to be designated
prime minister in a new civilian government.
Maulana Abdul Hamid B'hashani, a legend in
his own time, is the octogenarian leader of the
pro-Peking, Communist-infiltrated National
Awami Party/Left (NAP/L). Bhashani's life-long
battle for the rights of the peasantry has endeared
him to millions of Benqalis. Although he himself
is highly revered throughout East Pakistan, his
party is so seriously fragmented that its participa-
tion in the elections remains in question. In any
case, it would be surprising if the NAP/L could
pull itself together in time to make any significant
electoral showing, despite Bhashani's personal
appeal.
The NAP/L's calls for provincial autonomy
and nationalization of basic industries appear to
echo Awami League demands, but NAP/L sup-
porters have traditionally been more ready than
Awami Leaguers to use violence to accomplish
their goals.
East Pakistan has a number of small parties
which, by comparison with the Awami League
and NAP/L, appear insignificant. The Pakistan
Democratic Party (PDP) deserves mention, how-
ever, because of its leader, Nurul Amin, a Bengali
elder statesman who headed the so-called parlia-
mentary opposition during Ayub's rule. Although
colorless Nurul
Amin has been popular among enga is. His
party, an alliance among some long-time conser-
vative and rather lackluster politicians of both
East and West Pakistan advocates a strong central
government and lays great emphasis on Islam as
the basis for the state. A plus in the PDP column
is the support it enjoys from one of East Paki-
stan's most prestigious newspapers, the Pakistan
Observer. Nevertheless, the PDP is expected to
make only a meager showing.
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Politics in West Pakistan is far more frag-
mented than in the eastern wing, and innumerable
splinter groups exist. Even the significant parties
have a strong base in only one of the four prov-
inces-Punjab, Sind, Northwest Frontier, and
Baluchistan-and no more than marginal support
in the others; some have scattered support in East
Pakistan. Although some politicians have been
whistle-stopping outside their own strongholds,
most have not succeeded in substantially expand-
ing their support.
Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi's orthodox
Muslim party, the Jamaat-i-Islam (Jamaat), is at
the extreme right of the political spectrum. The
Jamaat is the only party that can legitimately
claim significant strength in both wings of the
country. Its members' rhetoric has stimulated
some of the most emotional issues of the cam-
paign and has helped polarize the political scene
into Islamic and socialist camps. Although well-
financed and well-organized, the Jamaat has been
unable to broaden its scattered support and is not
expected to do well in the elections. Nevertheless,
the Jamaat has announced that it plans to contest
a substantial number of seats including all of
those in the Sind. It is also negotiating with
several smaller right-wing, Islamic parties for pos-
sible joint support of other candidates.
Qaiyum Khan's Pakistan Muslim League
(PML/Qaiyum) is making itself heard among the
right-of-center parties. Although his home base is
the Northwest Frontier, the peripatetic Qaiyum
has also campaigned vigorously elsewhere, advo-
cating a strong central government and charging
rival politicians with willfully underminin the
solidarity and integrity of Pakistan.
Qaiyum attained his party leadership by
engineering a large-scale defection from the ranks
of former president Ayub Khan's badly shaken
Pakistan Muslim League. Those who remained
loyal to Ayub are continuing to struggle along
under the leadership of Ayub's chosen successor,
Fazlul Quader Chaudhury. Already damaged by
the exodus to Qaiyum, the PML/Quader's elec-
toral prospects, however small, have been prac-
tically destroyed by the government's decision to
freeze PML funds because of alleged misuse and
misappropriation. Although floundering, the
PML/Quader may still salvage something by al-
lying with other parties.
Mian Muntaz Daultana heads the Council
Muslim League (CML), which occupies the center
of the political spectrum in West Pakistan and
dominates the Punjab. With about 62 percent of
the western wing's population, the Punjab has
traditionally controlled West Pakistan's-and the
nation's-political, economic, and military life.
Although East Pakistan and the other provinces
of the western wing are finally rebelling against
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this domination, the Punjab and the CML con-
tinue to wield far-reaching influence and political
clout.
Daultana, a wily veteran politician, is ex-
pected to play an important part in any national
government. Recently there have been some in-
dications that he is trying to temper his rather
conservative image in order to reach an accom-
modation with Mujibur Rahman and the Awami
League. On paper, the programs advocated by the
two groups are strikingly similar, and a post-
election coalition appears possible.
CML forces were (liven a boost in July when
Air Marshal Nur Khan, former commander of the
Pakistani Air Force, announced his decision to
join the party. He is among an increasing number
of retired military men who have recently entered
the political arena. Nur Khan played a significant
role in formulating the controversial labor and
education 'reforms in the early days of Yahya's
regime, but'a'ne subsequently had a falling out with
i:he President. He is a dynamic--although some-
what unapproachable-personality who may be
called upon for leadership in future Pakistani gov-
ernments.
The National Awami Party/Requisitionist
(NAP/R), which broke with Bhashani's faction of
the NAP in 1968, is to the left of center on the
political spectrum. The party claims the North-
west Frontier as its stronghold, and is led by
Abdul Wali Khan, son of the legendary Pathan
leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the "Frontier
Gandhi." Although locked in a political struggle
with Qaiyum Khan, Wali Khan's party appears to
be slightly ahead in the fight for the Northwest
Frontier seats. Initially also leading in sparsely
populated Baluchistan, the NAP/R now is facing
stiff competition for that province's five assembly
seats. the NAP/R's program of extensive pro-
vincial autonomy and other progressive measures
makes it a potential postelection ally of Mujibur
Rahman's Awami League and perhaps of
Daultana's Council Muslim League.
Special Report
Zulficar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party
(PPP), a tenuous leftist group that revolves
around the fiery and controversial former foreign
minister, rounds out the list of important parties.
Bhutto's regional strength lies in the Sind, but
Sindhi politics is so factionalized that the PPP
may not gain any great number of seats there.
Elsewhere, Bhutto remains an extremely popular
figure with students and young people, who are
drawn to his program of "Islamic Socialism"
with an emphasis on socialism--and close relations
with Communist China. He attracts large, en-
thusiastic crowds nearly everywhere he goes, but
observers doubt that his personal charisma can be
turned into many solid votes or can be transferred
to other PPP candidates. Nevertheless, Bhutto is
young, opportunistic, and ambitious and he will
certainly be a familiar figure in Pakistan politics
for some time to come. Interestingly enough,
Bhutto continues to enjoy good personal relations
with many influential members of the establish-
ment of which he was once a part; these friends
generally believe that Bhutto has gone off the
deep end in politics, but they do not take his
activities very seriously.
With constituencies delimited and elections
approaching, all Pakistani political parties are
frantically searching their ranks for attractive
candidates. Having been out of power and
restricted in operation for many years, the parties
lack the local talent and organization on which
successful campaigns are built. Aggravating this
problem is the image of corruption and in-
competence associated with several of the tradi-
tional parties, which may be a factor encouraging
potential candidates to seek election as inde-
pendents.
The strength of the independents, of whom
there are likely to be a substantial number, is one
of the important unknowns that must be cranked
into any prediction of election results. Some of
them conceivably could play an important role in
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the constituent assembly. The most notable of
the already-announced independent candidates is
another former commander of the Pakistani Air
Force, Asghar Khan, who first involved himself in
politics in the waning days of the Ayub regime.
Asghar is widely respected for his integrity, but
indecision regarding his own political plans has
marked him as a political novice.
A, Polling Place in the Punjab
Another unknown factor clouding the elec-
tion scene is the potentially enormous peasant
vote. It is widely believed that in East Pakistan,
IMlujibur Rahinnan has successfully captured the
local peasantry under his popular banner of pro-
vincial autonomy and "Bengal first." The situa-
tion is more complicated in the western wing.
Most observers are predicting that ideology will
have little influence on Punjabi and Sindhi
peasants, who will probably follow traditional
voting patterns, i.e., they will vote according to
landlord instructions. In other areas of West
(Pakistan, caste, tribal affiliations, and local issues
are expected to be the determining factors.
Should these observations be accurate, the tradi-
tional, regional parties will emerge victorious,
with the Council Muslim League the strongest
because it represents the Punjab.
Although no date has been set for the con-
vening of the constituent assembly, it is unlikely
to precede the provincial elections. Disposing of
provincial elections before the first assembly
meeting will allow the members to devote full
Special Report
attention to constitution-making with no worries
about campaigning. Presumably, if Mujibur
Rahman and the Awami League receive a strong
East Pakistani majority, Mujib may be more will-
ing to negotiate his "Six Points" than if he were
still under political pressure to prove his creden-
tials as a loyal Bengali.
The newly elected members of the con-
stituent assembly will probably spend the interval
between the elections and their first meeting
jockeying for position and bargaining to form
alliances. Loose, temporary coalitions will prob-
ably be formed. I n any case, it is generally
recognized that success for the constituent as-
sembly hinges on some compromise of East and
West Pakistani interests. An Awami League -
Council Muslim League axis appears to offer the
best hope of a satisfactory agreement. Should this
be achieved, a constitution would have one final
hurdle: it must pass muster with Yahya and the
army.
The representatives, on the other hand, may
not be able to come up with a constitution
agreeable to a majority. Pakistan's first con-
stituent assembly deliberated nine years before
reaching an accord. Should the 120 days expire
without agreement, President Yahya will have sev-
eral options. He may do as he has already sug-
gested-dissolve the assembly and hold new elec-
tions. It seems just as likely, however, that he will
propose a constitution of his own and demand
acceptance. In fact, it is widely rumored that a
constitution has already been drafted by Yahya
and some of his closest advisers. Such a constitu-
tion, while providing for substantial provincial
autonomy, would certainly reserve sufficient
federal powers to ensure a strong central govern-
ment.
In any case, any new constitution will prob-
ably set up a federal republic of the parliamentary
type, with the president and prime minister
coming from different parts of the country, the
latter probably being a Bengali and the former a
Punjabi or a Pathan from the Northwest Frontier.
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Even if the political processes should pro-
gress this far, such a marriage of hostile regional
elements might fall apart within a few years if it
failed effectively to solve Pakistan's overwhelming
economic, political, and social problems. The
similar formula that was the basis of coalition
governments before Ayub Khan failed to produce
stability, and the politicians do not appear to
have changed much in the meantime.
In the long run, then, regional interests and
cultural differences may prove stronger than the
ties of religion and common antipathy toward
India. Conceivably, the present Pakistan could
eventually dissolve into two sovereign states. If
secessionist tendencies do grow stronger, the
army probably would go only so far in an attempt
to counter them. During the chaos of Ayub
Khan's final days, the army fully recognized that
it would not be able to control a province-wide
uprising in East Pakistan. At this point, it would
probably not even be willing to oav the tre-
mendous cost of trying
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Haiti: No Present
, No Future
Secret
N2 44
14 August 1970
No. 0383/70B
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HAITI: NO PRESENT, NO FUTURE
For the past 13 years President t=rancois Duvalier has ruled Haiti despotic?ily. He personlally handles all
major administrative matters. I he country lacks effective institutions; it is devoid of the leadership and trained
personnel that could provide government services and continuity. Duvalier suffered a protracted illness last year
and his health may be gradually weakening. A sudden termination of his brutal di tatorship--ether through his
death or overthrow--would produce turmoil.
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r.lA Ji 1 _
On April 24-25 1970, Coast Guard commandant Octave Cayard, who was sup-
posedly loyal to Duvalier, led a futile rebellion following the arrests of several military
and civilian figures for alleged coup plotting. The failure of the mutiny probably will
discourage other military leaders from moving against the regime in the immediate
future. Contingency planning will continue, however, and a rapid deterioration in
Duvalier's mental or physical powers could inspire a palace coup.
The extent of turmoil that will follow Duvalier's disappearance from the scene will
depend on the ability of his would-be heirs to consolidate power. Available evidence
suggests that when change does come, the succession will be controlled by the individual
leaders of one or more of the security forces-the army, civil militia, and secret police.
They are in the strongest position to act because they are armed and organized, and
because their men in the palace will be among the first to know if something happens to
Duvalier.
No matter who succeeds Duvalier, Haiti's troubles are not likely to be relieved. The
country lacks riot only modern government institutions, but also labor, organizations,
professional associations, and a responsible press. In short, society is as lacking in
effective structures as the government itself.
Since Haitian independence in 1804, only
five of the 33 presidents have completed their
terms of office-three of these during the occupa-
tion by U.S Marines (1915-1934). Violence,
intimidation, and dictatorship have been con-
stants of political life. With few exceptions, those
who have acquired power have felt no responsi-
bility as public servants but have sought to grasp
power permanently while enriching themselves at
public expense. Consequently the pitifully poor
masses have remained illliterate, superstitious, and
apathetic.
The government of Francois Duvalier fits the
pattern. Since his accession to power in 1957, he
has crushed all sources of internal opposition,
including the Communists. He has purged and
divided the army, cowed the Roman Catholic
church, and subjugated all government organiza-
tions to his personal whim. His fanatic concern
with political security and his indifference to
economic problems have stifled government
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programs for economic development. As a result,
the standard of living of the Haitian people has
deteriorated steadily. Estimated per capita gross
national product has dwindled to about $100.00,
less than 20 percent of the Latin American
average. Exports of the principal agricultural
product (coffee) have declined. The government
has chronic budget deficits and often does not
pay its official debts.
Duvalier began his rule by weakening the
military leadership, which had played a dominant
role in almost every change of government since
independence. He systematically purged all com-
petent officers who might oppose him-including
the mulattoes who initially made up the majority
of the officer corps-and replaced them with his
own creatures. On one occasion, for example, he
sacked a dynamic, well-trained commander in Cap
Haitien who had gained the respect of the people
in his department, in favor of a dissolute non-
entity capable of neither action nor betrayal.
He also undercut military authority by
creating two counterforces, the National Security
Volunteer Corps (VSN) popularly known as the
civil militia, and a loosely structured investigative
unit known as the "Service Duvalier." Until this
year the 5,000-7,000-man militia was maintained
in a parallel but separate status from the regular
armed forces. Recently, however, Duvalier an-
nounced that vacancies within the military ranks
would be filled by militiamen. It is not clear
whether he plans a complete reorganization or
simply a token integration of these forces, but his
actions probably will have little effect on national
security. The militia is not organized, equipped,
or trained for major military operations. It has
never defeated an invading group with its own
resources, but it has assisted the army in patrol
and mop-up operations. Only one militia com-
mander, Zacharie Delva, has demonstrated un-
usual competence as the chief VSN trouble-
shooter for (Duvalier.
Although Haiti spends more proportionately
on defense (approximately 23 percent of the
Special Report
budget) than other Latin American countries, its
only effective military units are located in Port-
au-Prince. These include the Presidential Guard of
400 men, the Dessalines Battalion with 800 men,
and the Port-au-Prince police with about 800
men. The capability of these organizations, which
are directly under the command and supervision
of the President, contrasts sharply with that of
the remainder of the army, totaling about 5,000
men, most of whom are untrained and poorly
armed.
The "Service Duvalier," which consists of a
handful of Duvalier's favorites, is not a secret
police organization in the conventional sense.
During the mid-60s, when it was headed by Elois
Maitre and Luc Desir, it did acquire a sinister
reputation, but now its responsibilities consist of
interrogating political prisoners and fulfilling
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occasional investigative tasks for the President.
With Elois Maitre in disfavor at the Palace, the
Service Duvalier is nominally led by Luc Desir,
but it seems to have little if anything to do.
Recently Duvalier created a special staff consist-
ling of four cronies, including his personal phy-
sician and Legislative Deputy Luckner Cam-
bronne, to investigate the abortive coup attempt
of 24-25 April 1970. Cambronne and Finance
Minister Clovis Desinor appear to be the most
powerful civilian Ton Ton Macoutes in the gov-
ernment.
Duvalier supporters march through Port-au-Prince follow-
ing abortive Coast Guard revolt in April.
The Ton Ton Macoutes (Creole for "uncle
boogeymen") are a name for active Duvalier sup-
porters who receive special favors from the Presi-
dent and have been given carte blanche to do as
they wish without fear of interference from or
punishment by civil or military authorities. The
most feared group in Haiti, they belong to no
organization and include cabinet members as well
as ordinary thugs and taxi drivers. They can best
be described as a legalized Mafia whose sole mis-
sion is to maintain Duvalier in power.
Duvalier has erected a facade of constitu-
tionality around his regime. The legislature and
the judiciary, however, like all other organizations
and groups, are directly subservient to the Presi-
Special Report -4-
4 -
dent. The Constitution of 1964, which designated
dent.
Duvalier "President for Life," contains no
provision for succession. All political parties
except Duvalier's Party of National Unity (PUN)
have been suppressed, and PUN exists in name
only, lacking even a paper organization.
No one within the government has the
strength to challenge Duvalier. Individual mem-
bers of the President's family, however, have
exercised some authority at various times. During
the past year personal rivalries within the Presi-
dent's family have resulted in the fall of in-
dividuals who once wielded power in the Haitian
Government. In December 1968 Duvalier's oldest
and reportedly his favorite daughter, Marie
Denise, returned to Haiti as private secretary to
her father, displacing Madame Yvon St. Victor, a
one-time presidential intimate and sister of Luc
Foucard, Duvalier's ex - son-in-law. Marie was
soon joined in Port-au-Prince by her husband,
Max Dominique, who in 1967 had been sentenced
to death for treason by a Military Tribunal and
had gone into exile in Spain. Dominique, a former
member of the Presidential Guard, was officially
reinstated and appointed ambassador to France.
Madame St. Victor, Luc Foucard, and Elois
Maitre, former chief of the Secret Service (rep-
ortedly an enemy of Max Dominique), have lost
the influence they once had.
The standard of living in Haiti, long the
lowest in the Western Hemisphere, has become
still worse under Duvalier. It is said that Haiti's
gross national product is less now than it was at
the time of independence. The economic prob-
lems resulting from declining agricultural produc-
tion and only a limited growth in the small
manufacturing sector are too basic and severe for
any quick solution. Yet Duvalier, instead of
adopting constructive measures, has consistently
ignored the recommendations of international
financial organizations to eliminate corruption
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and implement fiscal and administrative reform. Opposition
Despite continuing pressure from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Duvalier has refused to After 13 years of absolute rule over a largely
make a public accounting of the financial opera- illiterate society, Duvalier appears to have con-
tions of the State Monopoly (Regie du Tabac). Its vinced most people in Haiti that they are bene-
revenues, estimated at $10-12 million per year, fiting from his rule even thou h b all o
are used to support his security apparatus and standards the are not.
regime favorites. Because of his unwillingness to
cooperate with international lending agencies,
Duvalier has been denied the benefits of external
assistance programs large enough to slow the
economic and social deterioration.
Since 1963, when the US suspended most
forms of direct aid to Haiti, assistance has been
limited to a few humanitarian projects (prin-
cipally malaria eradication and food distribution
programs), whose funds are channeled through
multilateral or private charitable institutions.
Haiti currently receives $3-4 million annually in
assistance from the US and is drawing disburse-
ments from the $7.2-million loan granted by the
Inter- American Development Bank. Haiti has
given no indication that it would utilize this
Financial assiistance to alleviate its basic economic
problems, however.
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Ljh_emasses, who have displayed a re-
markable endurance for suffering, will not easily
be shaken out of their apathy.
Luxurious summer home outside the capital as contrasted with slums in Port-au-Prince.
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financial mainstay of the Haitian Coalition, which
has between 200 and 300 members and is head-
quartered in New York. It is the largest of the
exile groups, but its activity has been declining,
arid at the moment it appears moribund.
It is doubtful that any of the small exile
organizations could become a serious threat to
Duvalier without decisive help from a foreign
government. Military units from Port-au-Prince so
far have defeated all exile incursions, probably
because the exiles were poorly led and lacked
motivation and adequate support, and because
the average Haitian just is not interested in revolu-
tion. The most recent exile attempts against
Duvalier occurred in June 1969 when ex-Haitian
Army Colonel Rene Leon led ten men in an inept
bombing attack on the National Palace, doing
minimal damage, and in January 1970 when two
small exile forays from the Dominican Republic
fizzled.
Inside the country only the Communists
have demonstrated a capability for sustained,
though feeble, subversive activity. In December
1968 two minuscule parties, the United Haitian
Democratic Party and the Party of Popular Ac-
cord, merged to form the United Party of Haitian
Communists (PUCH). After the merger there was
a definite increase in terrorist activity, although it
did not represent a threat to Duvalier. Following
some bombing attempts and the seizure of a few
small villages, a number of people who had been
to Communist countries were arrested. The gov-
ernment then picked up more than 100 persons,
including several leaders of the PUCH, for sub-
versive activities. The crackdown left the party in
a shambles, and there has been little militant
activity since mid-1969. Apparently the party is
undergoing a period of retrenchment and con-
sol idation.
oriented have been closely associated with
Duvalier throughout his tenure. The government
will arrest anyone possessing Communist propa-
ganda leaflets, but Communist books and
magazines are sold openly in Port-au-Prince book-
stores. Duvalier also continues to tolerate the
Polish Commercial Mission despite the low level
of trade between the two countries and reports
that the mission has served as a channel for funds
and communications between the PUCH and
Communist parties in Cuba and the Soviet Union.
These two countries provide what little out-
side assistance the Haitian Communists receive. In
the past, both countries have given instruction in
Marxist doctrine and guerrilla warfare to selected
exiles
Radio Havana continues to broadcast in
Creole and French 14 hours a week, but there is
no evidence that the programs-which condemn
Duvalier and the support he is alleged to receive
from the United States--have any significant ef-
fect on the Haitian people. Broadcasts from both
Havana and Moscow play heavily on the theme of
armed revolution as the only solution for Haiti.
Duvalier probably will die in office rather
than ste down voluntaril .
Although Duvalier's public position has been
consistently hard-line anti-Communist, his actions
have been highly pragmatic. Despite the recent
crackdown on Communist activities, a number of
intellectuals often reputed to be Communist
Special Report
14 August 1970
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Octave Cazard, former commandant of the
Coast Guard and leader of abortive mutiny
in 1970
Since the abortive rebellion, President
Duvalier has moved to prevent further dissension
within the Haitian armed forces. Although none
of the tactical ground units in Port-au-Prince par-
ticipated in the insurrection, Duvalier has evinced
his displeasure with the failure of the police to
ferret out alleged conspirators. Several officers
reportedly have been arrested, and last month the
government created a new position of deputy
chief of police for Colonel Frank Romain, who
Special Report - 7 -
had earned Duvalier's confidence by routing exile
invasions in 1964 and 1968.
In spite of this normalization of relations,
Duvalier has continued to persecute foreign
clergy. In September 1969 all members of the
Order of the Holy Ghost, only one of whom was
a native Haitian, were accused of collaborating
with Communists and forced to leave the coun-
try. These priests, who operated the College of St.
Martial, had been collaborating with suspect ele-
ments and were active in promoting discussion
and study groups among young Haitians. The
church continues to play an important role in
education by providing instruction to between
one third and one half of the children who attend
school in Haiti. Educational policy guidelines,
however, are established by the government; the
church schools must conform or risk retribution.
Although 75-80 percent of the population is
ostensibly Roman Catholic, voodoo continues to
exert influence in almost all spheres of Haitian
life. Consequently Duvalier has capitalized on the
ignorance and superstition of his subjects for his
own political advantage. He regularly compares
14 August 1970
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himself to the ancient leaders of Haiti, as well as
to such noted Americans as George Washington
and Abraham Lincoln, often going so far as to
imply that he is their reincarnation.
As long as Duvalier rules, Haiti will remain a
one-man dictatorship of the most extreme
variety. His passing, however, probably will not
affect the lives of most Haitians. Present indica-
tions are that there will not be a blood bath, as
the struggle for power probably will be restricted
to those who exercise some authority over the
command structure and have access to military
hardware. The army probably will be in the fore-
front of the successor movement, but none of the
key personnel has demonstrated any special lead-
ership capabilities, and it would be sheer specula-
tion to designate anyone as a probable heir-
apparent. It is conceivable that the military would
be content with an administrative role and turn to
someone outside their ranks to serve as Presi-
dent.
Special Report
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